Regulation 13, Telecommunication Interconnection Regulations, 2018 (1 of 2018): Power of the Authority to issue direction
Telecommunication Interconnection Regulations, 2018 (1 of 2018) - Regulation 13
Text of regulation 13
Power of the Authority to issue direction
13. Power of the Authority to issue direction.- Without prejudice to any of the provisions of the
Act or any other regulations made under the Act or direction issued thereunder, the Authority may,
from time to time, issue such directions, as it may deem fit, to the service providers on any aspect
of interconnection for which provisions have been made under these regulations.
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Schedule-I
Bank guarantee per E1 link at a POI
(See regulation 5.)
S.
No.
Item Value (in Rs.)
1 Ceiling on bank guarantee per E1
link at POI (in Rs.)
8,00,000 multiplied by the interconnection usage
charge per minute applicable for the traffic carried
on E1 link
(S.K. Gupta)
Secretary
Note: The Explanatory Memorandum explains the objects and reasons of the Telecommunication
Interconnection Regulations, 2018 (1 of 2018).
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Explanatory Memorandum to
“THE TELECOMMUNICATION INTERCONNECTION REGULATIONS, 2018”
A. Introduction
1. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) defines Interconnection as “The commercial
and technical arrangements under which service providers connect their equipment, networks
and services to enable customers to have access to the customers, services and networks of
other service providers.”1
2. Interconnection is extremely important from a consumer perspective. Consumers of
telecommunication services cannot communicate with each other or connect with services they
demand unless necessary interconnection arrangements between telecom service providers
(TSPs) are in place. The international experience suggests that interconnection is the key to
success of ‘open competition’ in telecommunication services.
B. The Need for Regulation of Interconnection
3. If two TSPs are not in direct competition with each other, such as those operating in different
countries, they interconnect voluntarily because interconnection increases the value of a network
to its subscribers by increasing the number of people they can call and the range of
telecommunication services they can access (network externality effect). However, the
international experience shows that in a competitive market (such as an access service market in
a country in which several TSPs provide access services to the same set of consumers),
interconnection is not made available freely by an incumbent to its competitors; the incumbent
generally seeks to limit competition, and, thereby, preserve its market power by way of - (a)
refusing to interconnect; (b) offering interconnection at a price, or on such terms and conditions
that make it difficult for a new entrant to compete; or (c) seeking to sabotage the new entrant by
providing it a lower quality interconnection service than the incumbent provides to itself.
4. The World Trade Organization (WTO) Reference Paper on Basic Telecommunications lays down
guidelines for interconnection as below:
1http://www.citi.columbia.edu/elinoam/articles/interconnection_pricing.htm
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“2.2 Interconnection to be ensured: Interconnection with a major supplier will be
ensured at any technically feasible point in the network. Such interconnection is
provided:
(a) under non-discriminatory terms, conditions (including technical standards and
specifications) and rates and of a quality no less favourable than that provided
for its own like services or for like services of non-affiliated service suppliers or
for its subsidiaries or other affiliates;
(b) in a timely fashion, on terms, conditions (including technical standards and
specifications) and cost oriented rates that are transparent, reasonable, having
regard to economic feasibility, and sufficiently unbundled so that the supplier
need not pay for network components or facilities that it does not require for the
service to be provided; and
(c) upon request, at points in addition to the network termination points offered to
the majority of users, subject to charges that reflect the cost of construction of
necessary additional facilities.”
5. The European Union’s Directive 2002/19/EC (Access Directive) provides that “National regulatory
authorities shall, … ensure, in accordance with the provisions of this Directive, adequate access
and interconnection, and the interoperability of services, exercising their responsibility in a way
that promotes efficiency, sustainable competition, efficient investment and innovation, and gives
the maximum benefit to end-users.”
6. The USA’s `Telecommunications Act of 1996' provides that –
“…each incumbent local exchange carrier has the following duties:………….
(2) INTERCONNECTION- The duty to provide, for the facilities and equipment of any
requesting telecommunications carrier, interconnection with the local exchange carrier's
network—
(A) for the transmission and routing of telephone exchange service and exchange access;
(B) at any technically feasible point within the carrier's network;
(C) that is at least equal in quality to that provided by the local exchange carrier to itself
or to any subsidiary, affiliate, or any other party to which the carrier provides
interconnection; and
(D) on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory, in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the agreement and the requirements of this
section and section 252.”
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7. It has been observed that many telecommunication regulators in the world have devised formal
ex-ante regulatory frameworks for interconnection based on Fair, Reasonable and Non-
discriminatory (FRAND) principles with an overall aim to promote and facilitate competition.
C. The Present Regulatory Framework for Interconnection in India
8. In India, the regulatory framework for interconnection has been established by Telecom
Regulatory Authority of India (hereinafter, referred to as, the Authority or TRAI). Some of the
important regulations and directions issued by the Authority on the matter of framework for
interconnection are outlined below.
9. In the year 1999, The Authority, through ‘The Register of Interconnect Agreements Regulations
1999’ mandated all TSPs to register with the Authority any interconnection agreement to which
they are parties.
10. In the year 2001, the Authority issued a Determination dated 08.01.2001 on Interconnection,
through which, it prescribed various points of interconnection between fixed-line networks and
mobile networks.
11. In the year 2002, the Authority issued the Telecommunication Interconnection (Reference
Interconnect Offer) Regulation, 2002. As per the Regulation, a TSP enjoying Significant Market
Power (SMP) status is required to submit its proposed RIO (describing, inter-alia, the technical
and commercial conditions for interconnection based on the model RIO as annexed to the
Regulation) to the Authority for approval and then to publish the approved RIO on its web-site.
Such RIO, thereafter, forms the basis of all interconnection agreements to be entered into by/
and with the issuer of the RIO. The Telecommunication Interconnection (Reference
Interconnection Offer) Regulation, 2002 also contains three Annexures containing (a) Explanatory
memorandum to the regulation to explain the reasons for the issuance of the Regulation; (b) the
model RIO; and (c) Guidelines.
12. Based on the stipulations contained in the Telecommunication Interconnection (Reference
Interconnection Offer) Regulation, 2002, SMPs of that point of time viz. M/s Bharat Sanchar
Nigam Ltd. (BSNL), M/s Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. (MTNL), M/s Videsh Sanchar Nigam
Ltd. (VSNL) and other TSPs submitted their RIOs for approval of the Authority. On 09.10.2002,
the Authority suggested 29 modifications in the draft RIO submitted by M/s BSNL and M/s MTNL
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and directed them to immediately publish their RIOs after incorporating the suggested
modifications.
13. M/s BSNL and M/s MTNL filed appeals (Appeal No. 11 & 12 of 2002) in Telecom Disputes
Settlement & Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT) against modifications suggested by the Authority.
Subsequently, on 27.04.2005, TDSAT passed judgement in these appeals. In compliance to the
Order of TDSAT, M/s BSNL and M/s MTNL published their RIOs on their web-sites. The option
was also given to the TSPs, who had already signed interconnection agreements, to migrate to
the RIO regime notified with effect from the date when such RIO was actually published.
14. Though TDSAT did not strike down the Telecommunication Interconnection (Reference
Interconnect Offer) Regulation, 2002, it held that the Authority would remain bound by the terms
and conditions of interconnectivity of the service providers as given in the licenses issued after
the amendment to the Act in 2000. The TDSAT held that the Authority has power to change the
terms and conditions of interconnectivity of the licenses issued prior to the amendment of 2000
to the extent that these are in conformity with the terms and conditions of interconnectivity
contained in the licenses issued after the amendment of 2000.
15. The Authority filed appeal in Hon’ble Supreme Court (Appeal No. 3298 of 2005) against the
afore-mentioned Order of TDSAT; the matter is still pending before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
However, on 06.12.2013, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in another matter in Civil Appeal No. 5253
of 2010, held the following:
“In exercise of the power vested in it under Section 14(b) of the Act, TDSAT does not
have the jurisdiction to entertain the challenge to the regulations framed by the Authority
under Section 36 of the Act.”
16. Further, in the Unified License (UL), which is the most recent license, the licensor i.e. Department
of Telecommunications (DoT) has put interconnection between TSPs under TRAI’s regulatory
framework of interconnection. The relevant clauses of the License are reproduced below:
“27.3 Interconnection between the networks of different Licensees for carrying circuit
switched traffic shall be as per national standards of CCS No.7 as amended from time to
time by Telecom Engineering Centre (TEC) and also subject to technical feasibility and
technical integrity of the Networks and shall be within the overall framework of
interconnection regulations/ directions/ orders issued by the TRAI/ Licensor from time to
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time. For inter-networking between circuit switched and IP based network, the Licensee
shall install Media Gateway Switch. Further, the Licensor may direct the LICENSEE to
adopt any other technical standards issued by TEC on interconnection related issues.
27.4 Licensee shall interconnect with other Telecom Service Providers at the points of
Inter-connection (POI) subject to compliance of prevailing regulations, directions or
determinations issued by TRAI. The charges for accessing other networks for
internetwork calls shall conform to the Orders/ Regulations/ Guidelines issued by the
TRAI/ Licensor from time to time. The Interconnection Agreements will, inter-alia,
provide the following: (a) To meet all reasonable demand for the transmission and
reception of messages between the interconnected systems. (b) To establish and
maintain such one or more points of Interconnect as are reasonably required and are of
sufficient capacity and in sufficient number to enable transmission and reception of the
messages by means of the Applicable Systems, (c) To connect, and keep connected, to
their Applicable Systems.
27.5 The charges for accessing other networks for inter-network calls shall be based on
mutual agreements between the service providers conforming to the Orders/IUC
Regulations/Guidelines issued by the TRAI from time to time.
27.6 The provision of any equipment and its installation for the purpose of
Interconnection shall be subject to mutual agreement of the concerned parties and shall
conform to TRAI’s regulations and orders.
27.7 The Interconnection Tests for each and every interface with any Telecom Service
Provider shall be carried out by mutual arrangement between the Licensee and the other
party involved. In case of disagreement for rectification of deficiencies / deviations in
conducted interconnection tests, reference could be made to Licensor / TRAI.”
17. In the year 2005, the Authority issued a Direction dated 07.06.2005 to provide interconnection to
the interconnection seeker within 90 days of the applicable payments made by the
interconnection seeker.
D. The Present Exercise to Review the Regulatory Framework for Interconnection in
India
18. The Authority received several representations from various service providers to review the
regulatory framework for interconnection in order to make it useful and relevant. Accordingly, the
Authority issued a Pre-consultation Paper (PCP) on 14.10.2015 and sought the views of the TSPs
on the following issues:
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Question (a): In view of regulatory, market and technological changes during the last few
years in telecommunication sector, is any review of existing regulations on
interconnection called for with a view to make interconnection agreements more
effective, non-discriminatory, fair and transparent? If yes, which kind of changes are
required in interconnection regulation framework?
Question (b): Should TRAI notify/ prescribe a standardized interconnection agreement
(default option) in those situations, where the two service providers fail to negotiate
mutually agreed terms and conditions of interconnection within a specified time frame?
19. After examining the comments received from the TSPs on the PCP dated 14.10.2015 and further
analysis, the Authority decided to conduct a comprehensive review of the regulatory framework
for interconnection in the country and released a Consultation Paper (CP) on ‘Review of the
Regulatory Framework for Interconnection’ on 21.10.2016 to seek the views of stakeholders on
various aspects of interconnection. Stakeholders were asked to submit written comments by
21.11.2016 and counter-comments by 06.12.2016. On the request of some stakeholders, the
dates for submission of comments and counter-comments were extended up-to 12.12.2016 and
26.12.2016 respectively. Written comments were received from three industry associations, 12
TSPs and two other stakeholders. Counter-comments were received from two TSPs. The
comments and the counter-comments received from the stakeholders were placed on the TRAI’s
website - www.trai.gov.in. An Open House Discussion was held on 17.03.2017 at Delhi with
stakeholders. The issues raised in the CP and the views of stakeholders thereon are being
examined in the succeeding paragraphs.
E. Analysis of the Key Issues Raised in the Consultation Paper
20. In the CP dated 21.10.2016, the Authority had sought the views of stakeholders on the following
broad issues related to interconnection:
(a) How to ensure fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions of
interconnection agreement between TSP?
(b) Should seeker/ provider concept continue?
(c) Whether it is appropriate to mandate only those TSPs who hold significant market
power (SMP) to publish their Reference Interconnect Offers (RIOs)? If yes, what should
be the criteria for reckoning a TSP as SMP?
(d) What details should a new TSP furnish for entering into interconnection agreement?
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(e) What should be the time-frame for entering into an interconnection agreement? Should
financial disincentive be imposed TSPs for not entering into interconnection agreement
within stipulated time?
(f) Is there a need for bank guarantee (BG) in the Interconnection Agreement? If yes, how
to determine the amount of BG?
(g) Should an interconnection agreement between TSPs continue to operate when one of
them acquires a new license?
(h) Whether existing interconnection agreements should also be allowed to be migrated to
the new framework which will come out as a result of this consultation process?
(i) Should Interconnection Agreements and POIs be service-specific or service-agnostic? If
POIs are merged together (service-agnostic POIs), which methods of discovery,
prevention and penalization of any traffic manipulation by TSPs should be put in place?
(j) Under what circumstances, a TSP can disconnect POIs? What procedure should be
followed before disconnection of POIs?
(k) Is there a need to have a co-ordination committee to facilitate effective and expeditious
interconnection between TSPs?
(l) Whether there is any need to review the level of interconnection as mentioned in the
Guidelines annexed to the RIO Regulations, 2002?
(m) In case, interconnection for Inter-circle calls to fixed-line network continues to remain
at SDCA, should alternate level of interconnection be specified in cases of technical non-
feasibility (TNF) at SDCA level?
(n) What should be the framework to ensure timely provisioning/ augmentation of E1
ports?
(o) Should separate time periods for provisioning of ports be prescribed for (a) fixed-line
networks and (b) mobile/ IP networks?
(p) Should financial disincentive be imposed for (a) not providing initial POI and (b) not
augmenting POI within stipulated timeframe?
(q) Whether augmentation of ports be allowed at higher levels such as STM-1 in place of
E1s?
(r) How to ensure that inflated demand for ports is not made by a TSP?
(s) In case interconnection seeker agrees to bear the total cost of equipment required for
augmentation in advance, should a TSP give the requested ports irrespective for the
traffic at POI?
(t) What should be the method to settle IUC and how should the delayed payment
between TSPs be handled?
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(u) Which policy and regulatory measures are required to be taken to encourage TSPs to
migrate to interconnection at IP level?
(v) Whether there is a need to establish a framework for Interconnect Exchange to
eliminate bilateral interconnection issues?Is there any need for a separate framework
for Interconnect Exchanges in view of the fact that the new NLDO authorization permits
transit traffic to be carried over by NLDO?
21. An analysis of these issues based on the comments and inputs received from stakeholders is
presented below.
(1) How to ensure fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions of
interconnection agreement between TSP?
22. In the CP, stakeholders’ comments were invited on the following question:
Question: Which amongst the following is the best option to ensure fair, reasonable and
non-discriminatory terms and conditions of interconnection agreement between telecom
service providers (TSPs), in view of the technological, market, licensing, regulatory and
legal developments in the telecommunication services sector in India since 2002?
(i) To amend the Telecommunication Interconnection (Reference Interconnection
Offer) Regulation, 2002 taking into consideration the technological, market,
licensing, regulatory and legal changes since the year 2002;
(ii) To prescribe a Standard Interconnection Agreement, which must be entered into
between interconnecting TSPs, in case they are unable to mutually agree on terms
and conditions of interconnection agreement between themselves in a specified
time-frame;
(iii) To prescribe only the broad guidelines based on fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory principles and leave the details of the interconnection agreement to
be mutually decided by the interconnecting TSPs in a time-bound manner; or
(iv) Any other method.
Please provide justification in support of your response.
23. A large variety of views have been received from stakeholders in response to the above question.
At one extreme, is a stakeholder who has stated that interconnection agreements must be left to
the market forces and the Authority should maintain only a regulatory oversight over
interconnection matters and should step-in ex-post only. At the middle, are a few stakeholders
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who have opined that no change is required in the present regulatory framework for
interconnection. The other extreme is occupied by most stakeholders who have stated that the
present regulatory framework requires to be amended to make it more effective and enforceable.
However, the stakeholders seeking change in the regulatory framework are not unanimous on
any one particular method; they have expressed divergent views on the preferred method viz.-
(a) View-1: The Authority should prescribe only the broad guidelines based on Fair,
Reasonable and Non-discriminatory (FRAND) principles; the Authority should leave the
commercial and technical details of the interconnection agreement for mutual
negotiations between the interconnecting TSPs to allow flexibility and innovation.
(b) View-2: The Authority should only amend the RIO Regulations of 2002 with a focus to
ensure that the principle of reciprocity is followed by the interconnecting TSPs; and
(c) View-3: Standard Interconnection Agreement (SIA) is the best option to ensure fair and
reasonable terms and conditions of interconnection agreement between TSPs.
24. One state-owned TSP has stated that prescription of SIA as a default option is not appropriate as
it will always adversely impact one party or another; a party will not agree for mutual negotiation
if it is likely to be benefited from such default agreement.
25. Based on the stakeholders’ comments and further analysis, the Authority attempted to find
answers to the following questions:
(a) Which method is appropriate - ex-ante regulation or ex-post intervention on
Interconnection matters?
In a multi-service provider (or competitive) environment, interconnection is regarded as a
lifeline of a telecommunication services sector. Internationally, strategic anti-competitive
behavior on interconnection matters has retarded onset of competition in many
telecommunication markets around the world. According to ITU surveys2, interconnection
related issues are ranked by many countries as the single most important problem in the
development of a competitive marketplace. It is widely believed that the incumbent TSPs
have a tendency to delay interconnection by way of prescribing one sided terms and
conditions in the interconnection agreement, charging a high price etc.; such behavior
leads to protracted and costly negotiations between competing TSPs at the cost of
2 Source: Telecommunication Regulation Handbook Module 3 Interconnection Infodev, accessible on
https://www.itu.int/ITU-D/treg/Documentation/Infodev_handbook/3_Interconnection.pdf
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efficient services to the consumers. Clearly, it is in the interest of consumers that
effective and expeditious interconnections take place between TSPs. Most countries in
the world have formulated ex-ante regulatory guidelines for establishing proper
environment to facilitate interconnection. The Authority observed that in recent past in
the country, there have been several instances of - (a) refusal to enter into
interconnection agreement; (b) refusal to make available adequate interconnection
capacity; and (c) posturing for disconnection of interconnection facility on flimsy grounds,
by some TSPs. Based on the foregoing facts and analysis, the Authority is of the opinion
that the case for ex-post regulatory regime for interconnection in India remains weak.
Accordingly, the Authority has decided to continue with the formal ex-ante regulatory
regime for interconnection in India.
(b) Whether the present regulatory framework for interconnection in India is suited for the
present-day telecom market?
The present regulatory framework for interconnection hinges primarily on the three
directives of the Authority viz. – (a) Determination dated 08.01.2001;(b) The
Telecommunication Interconnection (Reference Interconnect Offer) Regulation, 2002
dated 12.07.2002; and(c) Authority’s Direction dated 07.06.2005 to provide
interconnection to the interconnection seeker within 90 days of the applicable payments
made by the interconnection seeker.
The Telecommunication Interconnection (Reference Interconnect Offer) Regulation, 2002
mandates a TSP enjoying Significant Market Power (SMP) status to submit its proposed
RIO (describing, inter-alia, the technical and commercial conditions for interconnection
based on the model RIO as annexed to the Regulation) to the Authority for approval and
then to publish the approved RIO on its web-site. Such RIO, thereafter, forms the basis
of all interconnection agreements to be entered into by/ and with the issuer of the RIO.
The Authority took note of the fact that with the present level of fragmentation in the
telecommunication services market, not many TSPs may be reckoned as SMPs and
therefore, the matter of entering into interconnection agreement requires a review.
The Authority’s Direction dated 07.06.2005 mandates interconnection provider to provide
interconnection within 90 days of the applicable payments made by the interconnection
seeker. Though the afore-mentioned Direction enabled provisioning of POIs to
interconnection seekers to a certain extent, the followings facts indicate that the time-
frame for provisioning of POIs requires a review:
(i) The provisions of Direction dated 07.06.2005 come into effect only after the
interconnection seeker has made the applicable payments to the interconnection
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provider, which is possible only after the interconnection provider issues demand
note to the interconnection seeker; in absence of a specific time-frame mandated
to the interconnection provider to issue demand note after receiving demand for
provision of initial interconnection and augmentation of points of interconnection
(POIs), it is possible to obey the ‘letter’ of the Direction even without obeying its
‘spirit’.
(ii) The 90 days’ time period provided for fulfilling the demand of interconnection
seeker has proved to be rather long keeping in view the fact that many new
entrants have acquired a large number of subscribers in rather short periods of
time, in turn, requiring a ramp-up of POI capacities at much shorter notice.
Clearly, the present day regulatory framework for interconnection in the country requires
an overhaul to cater to the needs of the present-day telecom market. Accordingly, the
Authority has decided to prescribe a broad regulatory framework to address the
contentious issues between interconnecting service providers through these regulations.
(c) What should be the broad regulatory framework for interconnection?
The Authority examined the options available to it for devising a regulatory framework
for interconnection with a view to ensure effective and expeditious interconnection
amongst TSPs and has decided that henceforth ‘The Telecommunication Interconnection
Regulations, 2018’ (hereinafter referred to as the TIR,2018) comprising of regulations on
important aspects of interconnection (e.g. interconnection agreement, bank guarantees,
provisioning of initial interconnection and augmentation of POIs, disconnection of POIs,
financial disincentive on interconnection matters etc.) shall apply over all the service
providers offering telecommunication services in India. The provisions of the TIR, 2018
shall prevail over the existing interconnection arrangements between the TSPs in India.
Through these regulations, the Authority has decided to, inter-alia, mandate the
following with respect to interconnection agreement between service providers:
(i) A service provider who intends to enter into an interconnection agreement with
another service provider shall place request to such service provider.
(ii) The service provider, to whom request has been made for entering into
interconnection agreement, shall, within five working days of receipt of the
request, send draft interconnection agreement to the service provider from whom
the request was received.
(iii) On receipt of the draft interconnection agreement, the service provider who made
the request for entering into interconnection agreement shall, within five working
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days, submit its suggestions and objections, if any, on such draft to the other
service provider.
(iv) The service provider to whom request has been made for entering into
interconnection agreement shall, within thirty days of receipt of request, enter into
interconnection agreement, on non-discriminatory basis, with the requesting
service provider.
With regard to the interconnection charges such as set-up charges and infrastructure
charges, the Authority has decided that the interconnection charges may be mutually
negotiated between service providers subject to the regulations or directions issued by
the Authority from time to time, provided that such charges are reasonable, transparent
and non-discriminatory.
(2) Should the concept of interconnection seeker/ interconnection provider
continue?
26. Through the Telecommunication Interconnection (Charges and Revenue Sharing) Regulation
1999, the Authority defined Interconnection Provider and Interconnection Seeker as below:
“Interconnection Provider” means the service provider to whose network an
interconnection is sought for providing telecommunication services.
“Interconnection Seeker” means the service provider who seeks interconnection to the
network of the interconnection provider.
27. As per the traditional practices, an interconnection seeker is liable to pay mainly the following
charges to the interconnection provider:
(a) Set-up Charges (Payable towards configuration, testing and commissioning of new POI);
(b) Port Charges (In accordance with the Telecommunication Interconnection (Port Charges)
Regulation, 2001 as amended from time to time); and
(c) Infrastructure Charges(Charges for infrastructure provided by the interconnection
provider i.e. collocation charges etc.)
28. The Model RIO contained in the Telecommunication Interconnection (Reference Interconnection
Offer) Regulation, 2002 stipulates the following with regard to the cost of interconnection:
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“12.3.1 The cost of upgradation/ modifying interconnecting networks to meet the service
requirements of the service shall be met by the Party seeking interconnection. However,
mutually negotiated sharing arrangements for cost of upgrading/ modifying
interconnecting networks between the service providers shall be permitted.
12.3.2 Two years after the initial interconnection is established, the issue as to who
bears the cost of additional resources required shall be negotiated between the service
providers. The general principle followed in these negotiations is that each party should
bear the incremental costs incurred for the additional ports required for meeting the QoS
standards relating to its outgoing traffic to the other Party.”
29. Relevant clauses in the Licenses dealing with the question of which party to bear the cost of
interconnection are reproduced below:
Clause 17.11 of Basic Services, Clause 17.9 of NLD license and Clause 17.10 of ILD
license: “The network resources including the cost of upgrading/ modifying
interconnecting networks to meet the service requirements of service will be provided by
service provider seeking interconnection. However mutually negotiated sharing
arrangements for cost of upgrading/modifying interconnecting networks between the
service providers shall be permitted”.
Clause 28.4 of CMTS license, Clause 27.3 of UASL and Clause 28.2 of UL: “The network
resources including the cost of upgrading/ modifying interconnecting networks to meet
the service requirements of the licensee will be mutually negotiated keeping in view of
the orders and regulations issued by the TRAI from time to time.”
30. The issue of continuation (or otherwise) of the concept of interconnection seeker/
interconnection provider is quite contentious owing to the fact that the concept in its present
form, generally, requires the interconnection seeker to pay interconnection cost to the
interconnection provider either perpetually or at least for certain initial period. In this
background, the following question was raised for stakeholder’s views in the CP:
Question: Whether there is a need to continue with the present concept of
interconnection seeker/ interconnection provider? If yes, what should be the criteria?
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31. In response to the afore-mentioned question, some stakeholders have supported continuation of
interconnection seeker/ provider concept while some other stakeholders have suggested removal
of seeker/ provider concept.
32. The opponents of the interconnection seeker/ provider concept are of the view that
interconnection provision is mutually beneficial arrangement for both the interconnecting parties
and, therefore, there should not be any concept of interconnection seeker/ provider and both the
interconnecting parties should bear their own cost for provision of interconnection whereas the
cost of the interconnection link between the two networks should be shared by the
interconnecting parties. Such stakeholders have opined that the current concept of
interconnection seeker/ provider has resulted in an anti-competitive situation where
interconnection providers are able to dictate terms to the interconnection seekers. A stakeholder
opposing the interconnection seeker/ provider concept has contended that the seeker/ provider
concept was relevant in the initial days of liberalization, when only one incumbent TSP had alone
to bear the cost of up-gradation to provide interconnection to all new entrants of that time; at
that time the capacity of exchanges was limited and huge cost was involved in order to provide
interconnection to the other TSPs; therefore, a cost causation principle was used and this led to
seeker/ provider concept; however, at present, competition already exists in the market and
there is no such capacity constraint in the new technology exchanges, and so the seeker/
provider concept is archaic. This stakeholder, however, holds such views only with respect to
interconnection between access service providers and has argued that the National Long
Distance operator (NLDO) and International Long Distance Operators (ILDOs) should always be
treated as seekers vis-a-vis access service providers.
33. On the other hand, a large number of stakeholders have supported the concept of
interconnection seeker/ provider. In support of their view, they have furnished the following
arguments:
(a) The interconnection provider has to create capacities in its own network for the
interconnection seeker in the initial phase of interconnection. The creation of these
capacities has cost implications for the interconnection provider. Therefore, it should be
borne by the seeker for a (mutually agreed) pre-defined period.
(b) The interconnection seeker may use a different technology from that used by the provider.
Hence, the provider may have to modify its network to facilitate interconnection to the
seeker. The concept of interconnection seeker/ provider helps in shifting the responsibility to
the interconnection seeker for bearing the cost of such technology changes.
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(c) The Interconnection seeker/ provider concept is prevalent worldwide.
34. However, the stakeholders supporting the broad ‘concept’ of interconnection seeker/ provider are
not unanimous in the ‘description’ of the concept. The views of such stakeholders on ‘the period
for which interconnection seeker/ provider concept should apply’ may be summarized as below:
(a) View-1: Concept to apply forever: A few stakeholders including public sector service
providers have argued that there can be only one criterion for defining interconnection
seeker/ provider viz.- the existing TSP is interconnection provider and a new TSP is
interconnection seeker and shall remain seeker for ever irrespective of the market share;
all other definitions are prejudiced and mischievous and chaotic. A public sector service
provider has contended that the status of PSUs as ‘interconnection provider’ should be
perpetual as they are incumbent service providers.
(b) View-2: Concept to apply for initial two years in case of new entrants: Many stakeholders
have opined that the status of interconnection seeker/ provider should be applied only
when a new entrant launches the service for the first time in a particular licensed service
area (LSA), for the initial period of two years from the date of launch of commercial
services. After two years, each party should bear the cost of its outgoing traffic including
the capacity built in first two years; this includes the cost of interlinking media.
(c) View-3 : Concept to apply differently for difference service segments: A few stakeholders
have suggested the following method to implement seeker/ provider concept:
(i) For interconnection between two access service providers, the late entrant
should be considered as the interconnection seeker for the initial period of two
years after which the cost should be borne by both parties based on their
respective outgoing traffic.
(ii) For interconnection between access service provider and NLDO/ ILDO, the
NLDO/ILDO should be considered as interconnection seeker in perpetuity.
(iii) In case the license of an access service provider is renewed upon expiry of 20
years, it should no longer be regarded as interconnection seeker in the fresh
interconnection agreement.
35. While evaluating the suitability of the interconnection seeker/ provider, the Authority observed
that the concept of interconnection seeker/ provider has been prevailing since the onset of
competition in the telecommunication services sector in India. Also, the licenses for Basis service,
NLD service and ILD service recognize the status of interconnection seeker as distinct from
interconnection provider (with respect to the bearing of cost of interconnection).
23
36. It has been observed that, in any interconnection arrangement, the interconnecting service
provider who benefits more from the interconnection assumes the role of interconnection seeker.
For instance, when the Government granted Licenses to private players for offering cellular
telephony in India, the basic service operators viz. Department of Telecommunications (now
BSNL) and MTNL were the incumbents in the sector. At that time, the cellular service providers
were to benefit more from interconnection with the basic service operators as the cellular service
providers were starting from the scratch and the basic service providers had a reasonably large
subscriber base. This was one of the reasons for the cellular service providers’ taking the role of
interconnection seeker vis-a-vis the basic service operators.
37. Similar situation occurred when the Government granted new licenses for cellular services and
introduced third and fourth operators in cellular service market. In this case, the new entrants
sought interconnection not only from the basic service operators but also from the then existing
cellular service providers. When the National Long Distance (NLD) and International Long
Distance (ILD) sectors were opened for private participation in the country, the new NLDOs and
ILDOs sought interconnection from the access service providers (both basic as well as cellular
service providers).
38. The interconnecting parties in access-to-access (A2A) interconnection (where both the parties are
access service providers) hold a peer-to-peer relationship. In this relationship, while they
cooperate by way of entering into interconnection arrangements, at the same time, they compete
in the marketplace, generally, for the same set of customers. In the initial period of
interconnection between a new entrant with an incumbent, there exists a significant asymmetry
in outgoing and incoming traffic at the POI. However, as soon as the new entrant gains a
worthwhile market share, the two interconnecting parties start inching towards symmetry in
traffic at the POI. Therefore, beyond a certain point in time after establishing interconnection, not
only the interconnection seeker but also the interconnection provider begins to receive the
benefits of interconnection by way of positive network externalities. Clearly, the argument that
the new entrants benefit more from the interconnection holds good only in the short-to-medium
run.
39. In view of the comments of the stakeholders and further analysis, the Authority has decided to
put in place the following mechanism:
(a) For a period of two years from the date of establishment of initial interconnection, the
service provider, who made the request for entering into interconnection agreement, shall
24
seek ports at POIs from the other service provider to meet the demand of incoming and
outgoing traffic at the POIs.
(b) At the end of two years from the date of establishment of initial interconnection or on the
1st February, 2018, whichever is later, the total ports existing at a POI shall be converted
for carrying one way traffic in such a manner that the number of ports for sending the
outgoing traffic of each service provider to the other service provider are in proportion to
their outgoing traffics averaged over a period of preceding three months; and after the
conversion of ports, each service provider shall seek ports to meet the requirement of its
outgoing traffic.
(3) Which details should a new TSP furnish for entering into interconnection
agreement?
40. In response to the issue as to which details should a new TSP furnish while placing request for
entering into interconnection agreement, the stakeholders have expressed a variety of views. At
one extreme is a stakeholder who has argued that the Authority should not prescribe details/
documents to be furnished by a new entrant to the existing service provider; instead, these
should be mutually decided and negotiated by the interconnecting service providers. On the other
extreme are a few stakeholders who have suggested a new TSP should furnish a large number of
details and documents including the following :
(a) letter issued by DoT intimating MSC SPC for every LSA;
(b) letter issued by DoT intimating MSISDNs/ TFN Levels/ Fixed Number Series level
allocation for provisioning subscribers;
(c) company profile and market share;
(d) TEC Interface approvals for all equipment to be connected for interconnection;
(e) network architecture with low level and high level POP details;
(f) projection of likely reasonable demand for Interconnect Location wise E1 capacity for six
months post-commercial launch (locations should be given with detailed Address and
latitude-longitude);
(g) likely date of start of commercial operations;
(h) services proposed to be offered and proposed connectivity (with justifications);
(i) Interconnecting technology, for example, TDM/IP, SMPP, ISUP, SCCP, etc.;
(j) details of transport media such as satellite, Microwave, PDH, SDH, DWDM, ATM, etc.;
(k) KYC documents of the requesting service provider viz. Service Tax Certificate / PAN
Card/GST Registration Certificate etc.
25
(l) a copy of Memorandum of Association of the Company;
(m) a copy of Article of Association,
(n) the latest Annual report of the company,
(o) a list of Directors with DIN,
(p) a certified true copy of Board resolution,
(q) original Power of Attorney,
(r) specimen signature,
(s) copy of Incorporation Certificate with CIN
41. In the middle of afore-mentioned two extremes are a few service providers who have suggested
that only a few documents need to be furnished by a new TSP while seeking interconnection.
One of them has suggested that the new TSP needs to provide only two documents viz.- (a) a
copy of its License Agreement; and (b) location of its switches/ infrastructure while another
stakeholder has stated that the services proposed to be provided by the new entrant should also
be furnished by the new entrant.
42. While examining the views of the stakeholders, the Authority observed that in case the
documents and details which need to be furnished by the new entrant while seeking
interconnection are left for mutual negotiation between the interconnecting parties, it may lead
to a situation where the existing service provider may employ delaying tactics by way of seeking
a large number of unnecessary details. At the same time, the Authority is cognizant of the fact
that existing service providers require certain details and documents from the new entrants prior
to entering into interconnection agreement for reasons such as the following:
(a) To ascertain as to whether the requesting service provider is licensed for the service for
which it is seeking interconnection;
(b) To know the location of POI and interconnection technology of the requesting service
provider.
43. In view of the comments of the stakeholders and further analysis, the Authority has decided to
prescribe that a service provider who intends to enter into an interconnection agreement with
another service provider shall make request to such service provider alongwith ---
(a) a copy of its license agreement;
(b) name of the services for which interconnection is sought;
(c) proposed locations of its POIs; and
(d) name of technology to be used for interconnection at each POI.
26
(4) What should be the time-frame for entering into an interconnection agreement?
44. As already described above, the Authority, by way of issuing TIR, 2018 has decided that
interconnecting service providers shall get a time-period of 30 days for entering into
interconnection agreement between themselves through mutual negotiation under compliance to
the TIR, 2018 from the date on which a service provider submits a formal request (alongwith the
requisite details and documents) to the other service provider.
(5) Is there a need for bank guarantee (BG) in Interconnection Agreement? If yes,
how to determine the amount of BG?
45. In response to the question regarding the need for bank guarantee3 in interconnection
agreements, a variety of views have been received from stakeholders. While a few stakeholders
have opined that there is no rationale for seeking bank guarantees in interconnection
agreements, a few others have argued that there is a strong need for bank guarantees. In the
middle of these two sides are an industry association and a TSP who have contended that the
matter of bank guarantee does not require any regulatory intervention.
46. The opponents of the provision of bank guarantee in interconnection agreements are of the view
that there is no requirement for seeking bank guarantee in the interconnection agreement as
both the interconnecting parties receive benefit of interconnection. A stakeholder has opined
that, in general, there is a limited exposure (i.e. the amount that could be lost) in the
interconnection agreements; however in the case of interconnection agreements of access
service providers with ILDOs, there could be significant financial exposure and, therefore, there is
a need for bank guarantees in such agreements. A stakeholder has stated that provision of bank
guarantees is not justified except in the following two cases viz.-
(a) An interconnecting TSP is using the POIs for terminating traffic only and is in net payable
position at all times (for example in case of interconnection with standalone NLDO/
ILDOs), and,
(b) An interconnecting TSP defaults in payment by more than 10 days for three consecutive
months in the year.
3 A bank guarantee is a guarantee from a lending institution ensuring the liabilities of a debtor will be met. In
other words, if the debtor fails to settle a debt, the bank covers it.
Source: http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bankguarantee.asp
27
47. On the other hand, the supporters of the provision of bank guarantee in interconnection
agreements have argued the following in support of their position:
(a) Bank guarantees are required to securitize the net receivable from the interconnecting
TSP. Even the licensor follows this practice to securitize its net receivable on account of
License Fees and Spectrum Usage Charges.
(b) Certain TSPs, while exiting their businesses, did not pay their dues of interconnection
charges to the interconnecting TSPs. The provision of bank guarantees is required to
guard against such eventualities.
48. The public sector TSPs, while supporting the provision of bank guarantees, have contended that
the bank guarantees are required to be given by private TSPs and not vice-versa. A public sector
TSP has also furnished a letter from the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) asking it to
obtain adequate bank guarantees from other TSPs before their launch of services, wherever
needed; and to obtain additional bank guarantees during their course of operation, whenever
needed. Another public sector TSP has stated that bank guarantees are required to be obtained
from interconnecting TSPs for the purpose of audits and investigations by various statutory
bodies.
49. The advocates of the forbearance in the matter of bank guarantees have opined that all
commercial aspects of the interconnection should be left to the interconnecting TSPs for mutual
agreement on a reciprocal basis.
50. While examining the suitability of the provision of bank guarantees in the interconnection
agreements, the Authority took note of the reports that many TSPs, while exiting from operation
of telecom services in the country due to cancellation of licenses or other business reasons, did
not pay interconnect usage charges and other charges payable by them to other TSPs. At the
same time, the Authority also took cognizance of the reports that certain incumbent TSPs have
sought bank guarantees of the order of Rs. ten lakh per E1 link in access-to-access
interconnection agreements.
51. Based on the comments of the stakeholders and further analysis, the Authority has decided to
prescribe ceiling on bank guarantees which a TSP can seek from another interconnecting TSP as
per the following scheme:
28
(a) The service provider, who made request for entering into interconnection agreement, shall
be liable to furnish bank guarantee, for a period of six months from the date of
establishment of initial interconnection for the total number of ports sought during such
period, if demanded by the service provider to whom request for entering into
interconnection agreement was made: Provided that the amount of such bank guarantee
shall be determined in the manner specified in the Schedule-I to these regulations.
(b) At the end of six months from the date of establishment of initial interconnection or on the
1st February, 2018, whichever is later, liability to furnish bank guarantee shall be
determined in the following manner:
(i) the interconnection usage charges payable by the two interconnecting service
providers to each other for the two months prior to the end of six months from the
date of establishment of initial interconnection or the 1st February, 2018,
whichever is later, shall be calculated and the service provider who is liable to pay
interconnection usage charges, after adjustment, to the other service provider,
shall be liable to furnish bank guarantee for a period of six months, if demanded
by the other service provider;
(ii) the bank guarantee shall be limited to the amount of interconnection usage
charges payable by a service provider after adjustment as discussed in the above
clause; and
(iii) this process to determine the liability of a service provider to furnish the bank
guarantee shall be repeated at the end of every six month.
52. As the interconnection usage charges are settled between TSPs on monthly basis, the Authority is
of the view that, for the period of six months from the date of establishment of initial
interconnection, the maximum amount of bank guarantee payable by a service provider should
be equivalent to maximum net IUC payable by the service provider for a period of two months.
In the following table, an attempt has been made to estimate the maximum net difference in
minutes sent from one service provider to the other service provider in two months per E1.
29
S.
No.
Item Legend Value
1 No. of channels in an E1 circuit a 30
2 Average utilization of a channel for carrying payload b 70%
3
Maximum no. of equivalent channels utilized per E1
circuit
c=a*b 21
4
Maximum minutes of usage (MOU) in busy hour per E1
circuit
d=c*60 1,260
5
Maximum MOU in a day per E1 circuit
(assuming busy hour traffic as 9% of the daily traffic)
e=d/(9%) 14,000
6 Maximum MOU in one month per E1 f=e*30 4,20,000
7 Maximum MOU in two months per E1 G=f*2 8,40,000
53. As the maximum amount payable by the requesting service provider to the other service provider
in two months per E1 link would be obtained by multiplying the applicable interconnection usage
charge by the maximum net MOUs from the requesting service provider to the other service
provider (assuming entire voice traffic flows from the requesting service provider to the other
service provider and none in the opposite direction) in two months per E1, the Authority has
decided to prescribe the ceiling on bank guarantee per E1 link at POI for the period of six months
from the date of establishment of initial interconnection as below:
Ceiling on bank guarantee per E1 link at a POI (in Rs.)
=8,00,000 multiplied by interconnection usage charge per minute applicable for the
traffic carried on the E1 link
54. For illustration purposes, for E1 links between two access service providers, ceiling on bank
guarantees per E1 link at POI, at present rate of IUC, may be computed as below:
Ceiling on bank guarantee per E1 link at POI (in Rs.)
=8,00,000 * Rs. 0.06
= Rs. 48,000
55. As a further illustration, bank guarantee to be furnished at the end of six months from the date
of establishment of initial interconnection or on the 1stFebruary, 2018, whichever is later may be
calculated as below.
30
(a) If IUC payable by the service provider-1 to the service provider-2 for the period of the
preceding two months is Rs. 50 Lakh and IUC payable by the service provider-2 to the
service provider-1 for the period of the preceding two months is Rs. 35 Lakh;
(b) then the service provider-1 is liable to pay a maximum of bank guarantee of Rs. 15 lakh
for a period of six months if the service provider-2 demands for it.
(6) Should an interconnection agreement between TSPs continue to operate when
one of them acquires a new license?
56. In the past three to four years, many TSPs have acquired new licenses after expiry of their old
licenses. Earlier, these TSPs made representations to the Authority stating that their
interconnection agreements with the public sector TSPs were co-terminus with their earlier
licenses and, therefore, new interconnection agreements need to be entered into after expiry of
the old licenses and onset of new licenses; however, even after several rounds of discussions
with the public sector TSPs, they have not been able to finalize new agreements with public
sector TSPs and traffic at the POIs is being exchanged without any formal agreement. In this
background, the following question was raised in the CP for stakeholders’ views:
Question: Should an interconnection agreement between TSPs continue to operate if an
interconnecting TSP acquires a new license upon expiry of an old license? Alternatively,
should fresh agreements be entered into upon specific request of either party to the
interconnection?
57. In response to the afore-mentioned question, a wide variety of responses have been received
from stakeholders. One set of stakeholders has contended that the existing interconnection
agreements between TSPs should continue to operate when an interconnecting TSP acquires a
new license upon expiry of an old license. The second set of stakeholders is of the view that
fresh agreement should be entered into when an interconnecting TSP acquires a new license
upon expiry of old license. A variant of this view is that if both the interconnecting parties
declare, in writing, to continue with the same terms and conditions of interconnection, then the
interconnection agreement may continue, however, if either party seeks a review, a fresh
agreement must be entered into by the interconnecting TSPs. The third set of stakeholders has
argued that there is no need for any regulatory intervention on this matter; the interconnecting
TSPs should be free to decide matters relating to bilateral agreements by themselves.
31
58. The stakeholders supporting the continuation of existing interconnection agreements between
TSPs when an interconnecting TSP acquires a new license upon expiry of an old license have
submitted the following arguments:
(a) As long as there is continuity in the interconnectivity, terms and conditions of the existing
interconnection agreement between TSPs should continue to operate.
(b) The expiry of existing license and issuance of new license is a commercial aspect as no
disconnection in the interconnection is ever effectuated and no fresh demands for
interconnection are made. Also equipment are normally not replaced or for that matter
even the existing system are not altered in any manner whatsoever. So, merely some
technical alterations in the license/ change of license cannot be a sustainable ground in
defying the existing agreement between the parties since it was signed on mutually
agreed terms.
(c) The existing interconnection agreements do not contain a clause regarding
termination/renewal of the agreement as a consequence of renewal of license.
59. The stakeholders advocating that fresh agreement should be entered into when an
interconnecting TSP acquires a new license upon expiry of old license have furnished the
following arguments in support of their view:
(a) 20 years is a long period of time and many changes relating to technological, market,
licensing, regulatory and legal developments may have happened which require changes
in the agreement. Hence, fresh agreements should be entered into as and when the
existing agreements expire on the expiry of license. However, status of interconnection
seeker/ provider should not apply to such fresh interconnection agreements.
(b) Interconnection agreement between TSPs is legally based on the valid licenses held by
the interconnecting TSPs. In case of expiry of the license of either of the interconnecting
TSPs, the existing interconnection agreement would not remain legally valid unless both
the interconnecting TSPs agree for the same and record the same in form of addenda to
the existing interconnection agreement. Else a fresh interconnection agreement needs to
be entered into by the interconnecting TSPs.
60. While examining the issue at hand, the Authority took note of the fact that when the Government
grants a new License to a licensee upon expiry of an old license, the same resources (number
series, MSC and SP codes etc.), the approvals for lawful interception and SACFA clearances to the
licensee etc. continue to operate, and therefore, period of an interconnection agreement needs
32
not to be linked with the expiry of an old license agreement of either party when that party has
already entered into a new license agreement.
61. In any case, the reasonable interests of the interconnecting service providers in the existing
interconnection agreements would remain protected in view of the facts that the provisions of
the TIR, 2018 shall prevail over the existing interconnection arrangements between service
providers.
(7) Should existing interconnection agreements be allowed to be migrated to the
new framework which will come out as a result of this consultation process?
62. As the Authority has already decided that the provisions of the TIR, 2018shall prevail over the
existing interconnection arrangements, the issue of applicability of the new framework for
interconnection on the existing interconnection agreement has already been taken care of.
(8) Should Interconnection Agreements and POIs be service-specific or service-
agnostic? In case, POIs are merged together, what methods of discovery,
prevention and penalization of any traffic manipulation by TSPs should be put in
place?
63. As per the existing terms of the interconnection agreements, the full mobility, limited mobility
and fixed-line network of UASL have separate POIs with the public sector TSPs. Such POIs are
treated independently for all purposes, including setup costs, port charges etc. During the pre-
consultation process, some TSPs submitted that after the migration of the Licenses to Unified
License, there is a need for making changes in the interconnection agreement so that any
infrastructure taken under one license should be allowed to be shared with the same licensee
who has authorisation to provide other services also. In this background the following questions
were raised in the CP for stakeholders’ comments:
Question: Whether interconnection and interconnection agreement should be service-
specific or service-agnostic (i.e. a TSP can send any type of traffic on a point of
interconnection which is allowed under the terms and conditions of the license given to
it)? What are the advantages/ disadvantages of having service specific POIs when the
TSPs are equipped with call data record (CDR) based billing systems?
33
Question: If POIs are merged together, what methods of discovery, prevention and
penalization of any traffic manipulation by TSPs (whereby higher IUC traffic is recorded
as lower IUC traffic in the CDR of the originating TSP) should be put in place?
64. In response to the afore-mentioned questions, diverse responses have been received from
stakeholders. Except for one stakeholder who has stated that the matter of service-specific or
service-agnostic POIs should be left to TSPs to decide as per their mutual interconnection
agreement, other stakeholders have either expressly supported the provision of service-specific
interconnection and interconnection agreement or have opposed such a provision.
65. The supporters of the provision of service-specific interconnection and interconnection agreement
have stated the following to substantiate their views:
(a) With respect to service-specific interconnection agreement: While the License may permit
offering a wide range of services, interconnection agreement should be service-specific
because interconnection for different services involves different technical and commercial
aspects. The interconnection agreement includes the charges incurred on the set-up of
an interconnecting network such as port charges, set-up charges etc. These charges vary
as per the applicable set-up/interconnection scenario and, hence, there can be no
standard interconnection agreement that covers all scenarios. The charges are required
to be agreed upon, on a case-by-case basis.
(b) With respect to the service-specific interconnection (points of interconnection/ trunk
groups): The type of traffic, an interconnecting TSP hands over to the other
interconnecting TSP at the POI, depends upon the terms of the interconnection
agreement. ATSP may have a POIat a designated location for various services with other
TSP; however, the Trunk Groups (TGs) are to be kept separate for different services to
ensure that only the traffic from services meant for a particular TG is handed over. While
TSPs are equipped with a CDR-based billing system, a unified POI with no demarcation
would induce the TSPs to tamper with the CLIs, leading to a loss to the terminating TSP.
In such a situation, the TSP will have no means to check and block such traffic. The
routing, numbering, IUC charges etc. are also all service specific and any attempt to have
service agnostic interconnection would result in misuse and arbitrage. The CDR at
terminating exchange/network does not have the provision to identify the location of
calling subscriber, leading to billing disputes between TSPs.
34
66. On the other hand, the supporters of the provision of service-agnostic interconnection and
interconnection agreement have made following arguments in support of their view:
(a) With respect to service-agnostic interconnection agreement: At present the prevailing
regime for licensing is Unified Licensing and, therefore, multiple interconnection
agreements should not be insisted upon. There should be only one interconnection
agreement for all the services allowed under the terms and conditions of the License
signed by the TSP with specific provision for each type of License authorizations, such as
NLD, ILD etc.
(b) With respect to service-agnostic interconnection: Service-specific POIs lead to inefficient
utilisation of resources as there will be a level of unused capacity in multiple POIs.The
requirement for service-specific POIs originates from the requirement to distinguish
between the type of calls terminating on a TSPs network as different type of calls have
different IUC charges. However, with enhanced CDRs the same objective can be
achieved without the requirement of having service-specific POIs. Each TSP must
maintain CDRs which record the originating and terminating numbers, the originating and
terminating type of call i.e. wireline, wireless, Fixed Wireless Access (FWA), internet
telephony. Once these CDRs are exchanged at the end of the month, the IUC payable
would be easily determined and there would be no requirement to resort to service
specific POIs and the POIs can be made service agnostic. This would increase the
efficiency of the network and also achieve the purpose of being able to determine the
correct type of call for the purpose of determining the final IUC bill.
67. The Authority, while examining the suitability of the provision of service-specific or service-
agnostic interconnection and interconnection agreement, took note of the following:
(a) Interconnection agreements are entered into by the TSPs who have been granted any of
the following licenses in the country:
(i) License for access service (viz. BSO/ CMTS/ UASL);
(ii) License for NLD services;
(iii) License for ILD services;
(iv) Unified License having authorization for at least one of the access/ NLD/ ILD
services.
(b) At present, termination charges for - domestic calls from wireline networks; domestic
calls from wireless networks; and international calls; - are different.
35
(c) In the past, there have been allegations on some TSPs of passing off higher-IUC calls as
lower-IUC calls by way of tampering CLI of calling party.
(d) CDR based billing systems cannot detect as to whether CLI of calling party has been
tampered with.
68. In view of the comments of the stakeholders and further analysis, the Authority is of the view
that the service providers should be able to enter into an interconnection agreement for multiple
services; however, the issue of service-agnostic or service-specific POI should be left for mutual
negotiation between interconnecting service providers. Accordingly, the Authority through these
regulations, has mandated the service provider, who places request for entering into
interconnection agreement, to furnish name of the services for which interconnection is sought
while placing the request.
(9) Is there a need to have a coordination committee to facilitate effective and
expeditious interconnection between TSPs?
69. On the question of need for coordination committee(s) to facilitate effective and expeditious
interconnection between TSPs, most of the stakeholders are of the view that there is no need for
coordination committee(s). These stakeholders have stated that the matter of interconnection is
a bilateral issue which should be left for mutual negotiation between the interconnecting TSPs
under the overall regulatory framework for interconnection; after-all, the option of approaching
TDSAT is available to the TSPs for seeking adjudication of disputes between TSPs. Some
stakeholders have stated that the Authority already seeks report on interconnection matters and
holds meetings with corporate level officers of TSPs to resolve issues. On the other hand, a
stakeholder has opined that there is an urgent need to have a coordination committee to
facilitate effective and expeditious interconnection between TSPs; the Committee should be
empowered to intervene if deadlines are not met by any TSP and compel the TSP to meet the
deadlines by imposing financial penalties on the TSP.
70. The Authority took note of the fact that the issues related to interconnection between TSPs keep
surfacing up at various stages, even when, formal interconnection agreements between them,
are well in place. When such matters are brought to the notice of the Authority by the
interconnecting TSPs, the Authority attempts to facilitate the TSPs with an aim to ensure effective
interconnection between them. Such a mechanism of facilitation of interconnection matters has
been working fairly well till date. In case of deadlock situations between service providers, they
approach TDSAT for seeking adjudication of disputes between themselves. As the present
36
mechanism has worked reasonably well, the Authority found no merit in introducing any scheme
of Coordination Committee for resolving interconnection matters. At the same time, the Authority
is conscious of the fact that new service providers, at times, face difficulties in entering into
interconnection agreements and getting required ports at POIs. With a view to facilitate effective
and interconnection expeditiously, the Authority, has decided to stipulate that it may, from time
to time, issue such directions as it may deem fit to the service providers on any aspect of
interconnection for which provisions have been made under these regulations.
(10) Under what circumstances, can a TSP disconnect POIs?
71. In response to the afore-mentioned question, a wide variety of responses have been received
from stakeholders. While a stakeholder has opined that no TSP should be permitted to disconnect
POIs under any circumstances, a few other stakeholders have suggested that an extreme step
such as disconnection of POI should not be resorted to, barring exceptional circumstances. On
the other hand, several stakeholders have stated that disconnection of POIs should be permitted
under certain justifiable circumstances.
72. The stakeholders, opposing disconnection of POIs, have argued that disconnection of POIs is
against consumer’s interests and also is in violation of licensing conditions, there should not be
disconnection of POIs based on TSPs own interpretation of terms and conditions for non-payment
of dues etc.; disconnection of POIs should be allowed only as per order of the Authority or the
Licensor. A few other stakeholders have contended that disconnection of POIs is an extreme step
which should not be resorted to, barring exceptional circumstances such as- (a) the licensee
shutting down services; (b) the licensee shutting down the relevant POP; (c) on the basis of
mutual agreement; or (d) upon breach of interconnection agreement.
73. The stakeholders, who have supported provision for disconnection of POIs on justifiable grounds,
have cited the following reasons as justifiable for disconnection of POIs:
(a) When a TSP bypasses traffic i.e. the TSP hands over traffic, which is meant to be handed
over at a designated POI, at other POIs meant for other services, primarily to pay lower
termination/ carriage charges;
(b) When a TSP transits traffic through a third party i.e. the TSP hands over its traffic to the
interconnecting TSP via some other TSP without its consent;
(c) When a TSP hands over calls without CLI/ Incorrect CLI/ tampered CLI in order to pass
off higher-IUC calls as lower-IUC calls;
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(d) When a TSP provides a service not defined in its license;
(e) When a TSP does not make payment of IUC as per the agreed terms of interconnection;
(f) When a TSP uses services against national security or in contravention of laws, terms of
License or regulations;
(g) When a TSP’s network adversely affects the normal operation of the interconnecting
TSP’s network;
(h) When a TSP commits a breach of confidentiality provisions of interconnection agreement;
(i) When a TSP has been adjudged bankrupt or insolvent;
(j) The defaulting party has ceased to hold license under Sec-4 of the Indian Telegraph Act,
1885.
74. The Authority, while evaluating the provision of disconnection of POIs, took note of the following:
(a) The Licenses issued by the Government require inter-alia that interconnected networks
will connect, and keep connected, to their Applicable Systems.
(b) The Authority, vide its Direction dated 31.12.2003, inter-alia, directed that a TSP who
wish to disconnect the POIs should give a notice for disconnection of POI with a suitable
time period (not less than 10 days). M/s BSNL appealed in TDSAT against the afore-
mentioned Direction (Appeal No. 2 of 2004). TDSAT, vide its order dated 21.04.2004, set
aside the TRAI’s Direction except the period of notice (not less than 10 days) for
disconnection of POI.
(c) The Authority has received numerous representations from several TSPs in the past,
contending that some TSPs, unilaterally, disconnect POIs in certain circumstances based
on their own interpretation of terms and conditions for non-payment of dues etc. Such
disconnection of POIs results in blocking of services to consumers.
75. After taking into account the comments of the stakeholders and further analysis, the Authority is
of the view that (a) the disconnection of POI should not be resorted to barring exceptional
circumstances; and (b) when resorted to, it should be carried out only after following a due
process. Accordingly, the Authority has decided to mandate that a service provider, before
disconnection of a POI, shall –
(i) give a show-cause-notice of fifteen working days to the other service provider with reasons
for the proposed disconnection;
(ii) if not satisfied with the reply of the show-cause-notice issued under above clause or no
reply is received to the show-cause-notice, give a notice of fifteen working days to such
service provide specifying the date of disconnection of POI; and
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(iii) not disconnect POI before the expiry of the period of notice given under the above clause
(ii):
Provided that the above provision not shall apply if a POI is disconnected with mutual consent, or
on the direction of the Licensor or the Authority.
(11) Whether there is any need to review the level of interconnection as mentioned
in the Guidelines annexed to the RIO Regulations, 2002?
76. In response to the issue of need for review of the levels of interconnection, many stakeholders
have stated that there is a need to review the level of interconnection particularly those involving
PSTN. On the other hand, the public sector TSPs have argued that the present levels of
interconnection should be retained.
77. The Authority examined the views of the stakeholders and observed that certain provisions of the
licenses, transit/ carriage charges and numbering system etc. have a significant bearing on the
levels of interconnections. The Authority is of the view that there is a need for further
deliberations on the matter of levels of interconnection.
(12) What should be the framework to ensure timely provisioning/ augmentation of
E1 ports?
78. In the year 2005, the Authority issued a Direction on provision of interconnection, through which,
it directed all TSPs to provide interconnection on the request of interconnection seeker within 90
days of the applicable payment made by the interconnection seeker. It is worth noting that in
response to the Authority’s PCP dated 14.10.2015, some TSPs pointed out that the time period of
90 days start from the date of making payment against a demand note issued by the a service
provider against a firm demand made by a requesting service provider; however, some service
providers, in many cases, do not raise the demand note for significantly long periods of time and,
therefore, the maximum time-period of 90 days for provision of interconnection become
infructuous. On the other hand, some TSPs have stated that, at times, interconnection seekers
tend to place unreasonable demands for provision of interconnection ports, which becomes
difficult to meet in short periods of time. In this background, the following issue was raised for
soliciting views of stakeholders:
Question: What should be the framework to ensure timely provisioning/ augmentation of E1
ports? Please provide full framework with timelines including the following aspects:
39
(a) Minimum number of E1 ports for start of service;
(b) Maximum time period for issuance of demand note by the interconnection provider;
(c) Maximum time period for payment for demanded E1 ports by the interconnection
seeker;
(d) Intimation of provisioning of requested E1 ports by interconnection provider;
(e) Space allocation for collocation of transmission equipment;
(f) Maximum time period for establishment of transmission links by the interconnection
seeker;
(g) Maximum time period for acceptance testing;
(h) Maximum time period for issuance of final commissioning letter by the interconnection
provider; and
(i) Maximum time period for start of traffic in the POI after provisioning/ augmentation of E1
ports for which payment has already been made.
79. In response to the afore-mentioned question, two sets of responses have been received from
stakeholders. While one set of stakeholders has stated that there is no requirement of any further
regulatory intervention on the matter of provisioning and augmentation of interconnection ports,
the other set of stakeholders has argued that there is an urgent need of clear and unambiguous
timelines for each step of interconnection. Some stakeholders have also stated that the
framework to ensure timely provisioning/augmentation of ports should be process-oriented, the
compliance of which should be closely monitored by the Authority.
80. A stakeholder, who is of view that there is no need of any further regulatory intervention on the
matter of provision and augmentation of interconnection ports, has stated that augmentation is a
complex process involving multiple domains like core and transmission; capacity augmentation
requirements can be in terms of switch ports, a single card in the transmission box or cover an
entire ring/ network in transmission; the procurement process of core and transmission
equipment typically takes 6to8 weeks from order to delivery and another 2to4 weeks for the
justification, ordering, installation and commissioning process depending on whether it’s a card
level upgrade or a network level upgrade. Hence the 90-days period provided in the Authority’s
Direction of 07.06.2005 is reasonable and justified.
81. On the other hand, a stakeholder who has argued that there is an urgent need of clear and
unambiguous timelines for each step of interconnection, has stated that the Authority’s Direction
dated 07.06.2005 does not serve much purpose as the incumbent TSPs do not agree to the
traffic forecasts and requests of POI augmentation of new TSPs; more importantly, the
40
incumbent service providers do not issue the demand notes to the new TSPs, as a result the
interconnection seekers are not able to make applicable payments; the incumbent TSPs issue
only meagre ports for POI augmentation, and that too at their own discretion.
82. The stakeholder, who has argued that the framework to ensure timely provisioning/
augmentation of ports should be process-oriented, has stated the following:
(a) Demand should be reasonable: Demand for interconnection ports should be placed by
the interconnection seeker along with justification of traffic because the provisioning of
interconnection ports does not require augmentation of capacity at POIs only but also in
the access network. As the interconnection seeker compensates the interconnection
provider only for the cost of interconnection capacity accruing to its traffic, a substantial
amount of investment made in the access network for handling the additional traffic will
go waste if the actual requirement of the service provider turns out to be much lower
than the demand projected by it.
(b) The Interconnection provider requires to perform ‘due diligence’ prior to agreeing for
demand: Considering the fact that the interconnection provider has an existing network,
which may require expansion and other changes to accommodate the demand of
interconnection seeker, the interconnection provider needs to perform due diligence of
the demand with the help of historical trends of traffic on POIs. This is important to
ensure that an interconnection provider do not have to invest in creating needless
capacities in its network.
(c) Initial E1s for the pre-launch phase should be limited to 1-2 E1s for testing the
interconnectivity between the networks.
(d) The interconnection provider should intimate the location for POIs so that the
interconnection seeker can make timely planning and arrangement.
(e) Provision for space, power, and infrastructure: If the agreement provides for space,
power and infrastructure to be provided to the interconnection seeker, the feasibility for
space allocation, power, etc., needs to be checked by the interconnection provider within
a specified time frame. In case it is found to be unfeasible, the interconnection seeker
should be required to make alternate arrangements within a defined time frame.
83. The stakeholders supporting need for clear and unambiguous timelines for interconnection and
those arguing for a process-oriented framework to ensure timely provisioning/ augmentation of
ports have suggested time-periods for various aspects of provisioning and augmentation of ports.
The time-periods suggested by many of them are quite different.
41
84. The Authority, while examining the need for a framework for provisioning and augmentation of
interconnection ports, took cognizance of the fact that provisioning and augmentation of ports at
POIs has always been a contentious issue between interconnecting service providers. Several
TSPs have, on numerous occasions, brought the issue of non-cooperation and filibustering on
part of incumbents to the knowledge of the Authority. Therefore, the contention of the
stakeholders that the Authority should lay down clear and unambiguous timelines for each step of
interconnection and should make it process-driven in order to ensure effective and expeditious
interconnection does not seem to totally unjustified. At the same time, it does not appear to be
prudent to micro-manage the various aspects of provisioning and augmentation process.
85. On the basis of the comments of the stakeholders and further analysis, the Authority has decided
to put in place the following framework to ensure provisioning of initial interconnection and
augmentation of ports at POIs in a time-bound manner:
(a) A service provider, upon receipt of request of ports, and collocation space, if required,
shall issue letter of acceptance and demand note, if any, within five working days of the
receipt of the request.
(b) A service provider, upon receipt of the demand note, shall pay the amount within three
working days from the date of receipt of the demand note.
(c) The service provider, who issued the letter of acceptance, shall intimate the requesting
service provider about provisioning of the ports and allocation of the collocation space, if
applicable,---
(i) within five working days from the date of issue of its letter of acceptance, in
case no demand note was issued; and
(ii) within five working days from the date of receipt of payment from the
requesting service provider against the demand note, in case a demand note
was issued.
(d) A service provider, upon receipt of the intimation about provisioning of the ports and
allocation of the collocation space, if applicable, shall, within three working days of the
receipt of the intimation, intimate the other service provider about establishment of the
transmission link between the POIs of the two service providers.
(e) A service provider, upon receipt of the intimation about establishment of the transmission
link between the POIs, shall, within five working days of the receipt of the intimation,
carry out acceptance testing and issue final letter of commissioning of the ports to the
other service provider.
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86. As an illustration, the following Chart demonstrates the various timelines to be adhered to with
respect to provisioning of initial interconnection and augmentation of ports at POIs, in case
demand note is issued by the service provider, to whom request for provisioning of initial
interconnection or augmentation of ports is placed:
Maximum period (in working days) for service
provider-2 to issue letter of acceptance and
demand note, if any, upon receipt of request of
ports and collocation space from service
provider-1
10
Maximum period (in working days) for service
provider-1 to pay the amount from the date of
receipt of the demand note
7
Maximum period (in working days) for service
provider-2 to intimate service provider-1 about
the provisioning of the requested ports at the
POI and allocation of collocation space
Maximum period (in working days) for service
provide
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All provisions of Telecommunication Interconnection Regulations, 2018 (1 of 2018)
Questions people ask
Is regulation 13 of Telecommunication Interconnection Regulations, 2018 (1 of 2018) still in force?
No repeal of Telecommunication Interconnection Regulations, 2018 (1 of 2018) is recorded.