BAIJNATH JHA versus SITA RAM AND ANR.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 12 June 2008 | [2008] 9 S.C.R. 1134 | 2008 INSC 749
Key facts
- Decided
- 12 June 2008
- Bench
- ARIJIT PASAYAT*, P.P. NAOLEKAR
- Bench size
- 2
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 403/2000
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [2008] 9 S.C.R. 1134
- Neutral citation
- 2008 INSC 749
Text of the judgment
[2008) 9 S.C.R. 1134
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BAIJNATH JHA
v
SITA RAM AND ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No. 403 of 2000)
JUNE 12, 2008
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND P.P. NAOLEKAR, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.482 - Exercise of
power under - Scope of - Discussed - Raid conducted in
premises of Respondent No. 1 by officers of the State E/ectricity Board - Allegation that he committed theft of electricity
- Appellants were members of the raiding party - Respondent No.1 though arrested on basis of the FIR lodged with the
police officials, subsequently released on bail - Thereafter,
Respondent No. 1 filed complaint before the Magistrate a/legD
ing that the three Appellants and one 'R', then functioning as
Executive Engineer in the Electricity Board, had demanded
illegal gratification - Proceedings instituted on the said complaint - Appellants filed petition u/s. 482 - Dismissal of, by
High Court - On appeal, held: The proceedings instituted were
E malafide, based on vague assertions and were initiated with
malafide intents - It constituted sheer abuse of the process of
law - No reason was shown before the High Court as to why
the complainant-Respondent No. 1 chose not to proceed
against one of the four accused persons initially named viz R'
F - Proceedings against the Appellants directed to be quashed.
.,
c
A raid was conducted in the premises of Respondent No.1 by four officers of the Bihar State Electricity
Board on the allegation that he had committed theft of
electricity attracting penal consequences under s.379 IPC
G
and ss.39.and 44 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910. Appellants were members of the raiding party. Respondent No.1
was arrested on basis of the FIR lodged with the police
officials, but subsequently released on bail. Thereafter,
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BAIJNATH JHA v SITA RAM AND
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+ Respondent No.1 filed complaint before the Magistrate A
'(
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alleging that the three Appellants and one 'R', then functioning as Executive Engineer in the Electricity Board, had
demanded illegal gratification. The date of the demand
was not indicated in the complaint. When the Magistrate
(Trial Court) took cognizance, Appellants filed petition B
before the High Court under s.482 CrPC contending that
the complaint was a counter blast by Respondent No.1
to the action taken against him. The petition was dismissed by the High Court.
Meanwhile, the said 'R' had filed a petition for quash- _c
ing the prosecution against him. The same was dismissed
by the High Court while the petition filed by the Appellants was pending. 'R' moved this Court, before which, a
statement was made by Respondent No.1 that he did not
want to proceed against 'R' but wanted to continue the D
proceedings as regards the others. Consequently the proceedings were quashed qua 'R'.
The contention raised by the Appellants before this
Court is that the proceedings against them was a sheer
abuse of the process of the Court; that they and the said
'R' stood on a similar footing and that Respondent No.1
had lodged the complaint with a view to harass the Appellants for taking action against him.
).
'
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Allowing the appeals and quashing the proceedings
against the Appellants, the Court
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HELD:1.1. Exercise of power under s. 482 CrPC in a
case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The
section does not confer any new powers on the High
Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court G
possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to
an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of the Court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008) 9 S.C.R.
of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down
any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of
inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing
with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. The Courts, therefore, have inherent powers
apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed
upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognises and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All Courts,
whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any
express provision, as inherent in their constitution, have
all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to
undo a wrong in the course of administration of justice
on the principle "quando lex aliquid a/icui concedit,
concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest"
(when the law gives a person anything it gives him that
without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers
under the section, the court does not function as a court
of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully
and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and
substantial justice for the administration of which alone
the courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that
authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power
to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of
the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the
powers, the court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/ continuance of it amounts
to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When
no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may
examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought
y
BAIJNATH JHA v SITA RAM AND
ANR.
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to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials A
to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether
any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto. [Para 3] [1142-E-H, 1143-A-F]
1.2. In R.P Kapur's case, this Court summarised some
categories of cases where inherent power can and should
be exercised to quash the proceedings, namely (i) where
it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the
institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction; (ii) where
the allegations in the first information report or complaint
taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do
not constitute the offence alleged and (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with the last
case, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where
there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the
accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support
the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under s.482
CrPC, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon
an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable
or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of
the trial Judge. Judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. The Court
should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it
would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument
handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution
and bring about its ~udden death. (Para 4 and 5] (1143-FH, 1144-A-F]
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R.P Kapur v. State of Punjab (1960) 3 SCR 388-referred
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to.
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2.1. The scope of exercise of power under s.482
CrPC and the categories of cases where the High Court
may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set out in some
detail by this Court in the Bhajan Lal case. A note of caution was, however, added that the power should be exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest of rare cases.
The seven illustrative categories indicated by this Court
in that case were: (1) where the allegations made in the
first information report or the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do
not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case
against the accused; (2) where the allegations in the first
information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under s.156(1 ),
CrPC except under an order of a Magistrate within the
purview of s.155(2), CrPC; (3) where the uncontroverted
allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the
accused; (4) where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under s.155(2) of the Code; (5) where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (6)
where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of
the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under
which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institu-
y
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BAIJNATH JHA v SITA RAM AND
ANR.
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tion and continuance of the proceedings and/or where A
there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance
of the aggrieved party and (7) where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafides and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior mo- B
tive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a
view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
[Para 5] [1144-E-H, 1145-A-G]
2.2. The powers possessed by the High Court under
s.482 CrPC are very wide and the very plenitude of the
power requires great caution in its exercise. The Court
must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this
power is based on sound principles. The inherent power
should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution.
The High Court being the highest court of a State should
normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case
where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so
when the evidence has not been collected and produced
before the Court and the issues involved, whether tactual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their
true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no
hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in
which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. It would
not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of
the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to
determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and
on such premises arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess
the material before it and conclude that the complaint
cannot be proceeded with. In a proceeding instituted on
complaint, exercise of the intierent powers to quash the
proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. [Para 6] [1145-G,H, 1146-A-F]
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2.3. The background of the present case clearly show
that the proceedings instituted were malafide, based on
vague assertions and were initiated with malafide intents
and constitute sheer abuse of process of law. No reason
was shown before the High Court as to why the complainB ant chose not to proceed against one of the four persons
initially named. The cases at hand fit in with category (7) of
the Bhajan La/'s case. [Para 7] [1146-E,F,G]
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State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992) Supp 9 SCC 335;
Jana ta Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary (1992) 4 SCC 305 and Raghubir
Saran (Or.) v. State of Bihar (1964) 2 SCR 336 - relied on.
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 403 of 2000
D
From the final Judgment and Order dated 23.11.1998 of the
High Court of Judicature at Patna in Crl. Misc. No. 10561of1998
l
WITH
Criminal Appeal Nos. 404 and 405 of 2000.
E
Pramod Swarup for the Appellant.
Manish Kumar and Gopal Singh for the Respondents.
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The following Judgment of the Court was delivered
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. In these appeals challenge is to
F the order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Patna High
Court dismissing the application filed under Section 482 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the 'Code'). The validity of the order taking cognizance in Complaint Case No.40 of
1994 pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Patna
G City was questioned in the petition filed before the High Court.
2. Background facts as highlighted by the appellant in a
nutshell are as follows:
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A raid was conducted on 4.1.1994 in the premises of respondent No.1 by four officers of the Bihar State Electricity
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BAIJNATH JHA v SITA RAM AND
ANR. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
1141
Board. The appellant in each of the Criminal Appeal was a
member of the raiding party alongwith others and one Ravindra
Kumar Singh who was then functioning as Executive Engineer.
Respondent No.1 was arrested on the basis of First Information Report was lodged with the police officials. Allegation
against respondent No.1 was that he had committed theft of
electricity attracting penal consequences under Section 379 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC') and Sections
39 and 44 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (in short the 'Electricity Act'). The respondent No.1 was released on bail on
7.1.1994 and on 11.2.1994 respondent No.1 filed a complaint
before the learned Judicial Magistrate alleging that the appellant in each case and aforesaid Ravindra Kumar Singh had
demanded illegal gratification. Interestingly, no date of such
demand was indicated in the complaint. When the learned Judicial Magistrate took the cognizance of the offences punishable under Sections 347, 161, 167, 385 and 511 IPC the appellants filed petitions before the High Court questioning correctness of the order. A specific stand was that the complaint
was a counter blast by respondent No. 1 to the action taken
against him and no explanation was offered as to why the complaint was filed on 11.2.1994 without even indicating as to when
the alleged demand for illegal gratification was made. The said
Ravindra Kumar Singh had filed an application
(Crl.Misc.No.1973 of 1995) for quashing the prosecution. The
same was dismissed on 20.7.1995. The High Court dismissed
the application filed by Ravindra Kumar Singh while the application filed by present appellants was pending. He moved this
Court in SLP (Crl.) No.3045 of 1996. This Court granted stay
on 23.9.1996 and therefore proceedings before the trial Court
remained stayed. The special leave petition was disposed of
on 17.7.1997. Since a statement was made before this Court
by the complainant that he did not want to proceed against the
petitioner in the special leave petition but he would like to continue the proceedings so far as the others are concerned, the
proceedings were accordingly quashed qua the petitioner in
the SLP.
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So far as the present appellants are concerned the High
Court was of the view that this Court had interfered because of
the concession made and, therefore, no case for interference
was made out. The High Court did not attach importance to the
fact that the complaint was lodged in February, 1994 and there
B was no date indicated as to when the alleged demand was
made.
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Learned counsel for the appellant in each case submitted
that the proceedings were sheer abuse of the process of the
Court. The appellants and Ravindra Kumar Singh stood on simic Jar footing. His case was disposed of by this Court and earlier
in his case the High Court had declined to interfere and he had
moved this court. It was submitted that in the background facts
it is clear that with a view to harass the appellants for taking
action against him, the respondent No.1 had lodged the comD plaint. There is no appearance on behalf of the respondent No.1.
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Learned counsel for respondent No.2-State supported the
order of the High Court.
3. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a
E case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The section
does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves
the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under
which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to
F give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of
the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of
justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can
provide for all cases that may possibly arise. The courts, thereG
fore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of
law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and
duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which
finds expression in the section which merely recognises and
preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether
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BAIJNATH JHA v SITA RAM AND
ANR. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
1143
civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provi- A
sion, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are
necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in the course of
administration of justice on the principle "quando lex aliquid
alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse
non potesf' (when the law gives a person anything it gives him
that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal
or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide
has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and
only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid
down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae
to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which
alone the courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent D
abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow
any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers the court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing
of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of jus- E
tice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court
may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought
to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to
assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto. F
s
c
4. In R.P Kapur v. State of Punjab (1960(3)SCR 388) this
Court summarised some categories of cases where inherent
power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings:
(SCR p. 393)
(1)
where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against
the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction;
(ii)
where the allegations in the first information report or
complaint taken at its face value and accepted in
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[2008] 9 S.C.R.
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their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;
(iii)
where the allegations constitute an offence, but there
is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence
adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.
5. In dealing with the last case, it is important to bear in
mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal
evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support
the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482
of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon
an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or
whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would
not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial
process should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needD
less harassment. The Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts
and circumstances into consideration before issuing process,
lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly.
E At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over
to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its
sudden death. The scope of exercise of power under Section
482 of the Code and the categories of cases where the High
Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable
F offences to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise
to secure the ends of justice were set out in some detail by this
Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp91)SCC
335). A note of caution was, however, added that the power
should be exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest of rare
G cases. The illustrative categories indicated by this Court are as
follows: (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102)
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"102. ( 1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face
value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute
"
BAIJNATH JHA v SITA RAM AND
ANR. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J]
1145
any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except
under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section
155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR
or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the
same do not disclose the commission of any offence and
make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are
so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which
no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
~
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of
the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which
a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a
specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing
efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala tides and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance
on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private
and personal grudge."
6. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High
Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the
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very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise.
The Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of
this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power
should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The
High Court being the highest court of a State should normally
B refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the
entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence
has not been collected and produced before the Court and the
issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and
cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient mateC rial. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard
to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary
jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. [See Janata
Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary (1992(4)SCC 305) and Raghubir Saran
(Dr) v. State of Bihar (1964(2) SCR 336).] It would not be proper
for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the
0
light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In a proceeding instituted on
E complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not
disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive.
7. The backgrounds clearly show that the proceedings instituted were malafide, based on vague assertions and were
initiated with malafide intents and constitute sheer abuse of
process of law. No reason was shown before the High Court as
to why the complainant chose not to proceed against one of the
four persons initially named. The cases at hand fit in with catG" egory (7) of Bhajan Lal's case (supra).
F
8. The appeals are allowed and the proceedings in complaint case No.40 of 1994 in the Court of Judicial Magistrate,
First Class, Patna City stand quashed.
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B.B.B.
Appeals allowed.
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