AMERICAN HOME PRODUCTS CORPORATION versus MAC LABORATORIES PRIVATE LIMITED AND ANR.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 30 September 1985 | [1985] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 264 | 1985 INSC 218
Key facts
- Decided
- 30 September 1985
- Bench
- AMARENDRA NATH SEN*, D.P. MADON
- Bench size
- 2
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 2159/1970
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1985] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 264
- Neutral citation
- 1985 INSC 218
Text of the judgment
264
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AMERICAN ID1E PRODUCTS CORPORATION
V•
MAC LABORATORIES PRIVATE LOOTED AND ANR.
SEPTEMBER 30, 1985
B
[AMARENDRA NATH SEN AND D.P. MADON, JJ.]
Trade Marks Act, 1940 (5 of 1940), ss.14(1) and 39(2) and
Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 ( 43 of 1958), ss. 18,
46(l)(a)(b) and 48 - "Trade Mark" - What is - Registration of Valuable right on the proprietor whether conferred - Infringement
of rights - Remedies - What are.
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Trade Marks Act, 1940 - s.14(1) - Trade matk 'Dristan' Registration of.
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Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 - s.46(l)(a)(b) "Trade !'lark" - Removal of from Register of Trade Marks - Two
conditions precedent under cl.(a) must be cumulatively satisfied
- Burden of proving applicability of s.46(l)(a)(b) - On person
seeking removal of trade mark - Distinction between els. (a) and
(b) - What is - S.46(1) - Object of - Trafficking in trade mark What is - Ascertainment of bonafide intention to use trade mark Whether dependant on the facts and circumstances of each case Whether continuous chain of events even subsequent to the application for registration to be considered - Intention to use trade
mark sought to be registered - Must be genuine and real at the
date of application for registration - Whether the words
"proposed to be used by hill'" in s .18 mean "proposed to be used by
the proprietor, his agents and servants" - Effect of sub-s.(2) of
s.48 on sub-s. (1) of s.18 - What is.
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Trafficking in Trade Marks - What is.
Interpretation of Statutes:
Deeming provision - Full effect to be given.
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Construction leading to manifest
inconvenience or anomaly to be avoided.
absurdity,
injustice,
Precedents: Doctrine of
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English decisions - Can be referred to, but applicability
would depend upon context of Indian laws, legal procedure and
practical realities of litigation in India.
AMEkICAN H.P.COF.PN. v. MAC LABS.
265
The appellsnt-American Home Products Corporation, is a
Corporation incorporated in the United States of America. ·0ne of
its activities is, the manufacture and marketing of pharmaceutical products and drugs carried on through its division."Whitehall
Laboratories". The appellant was dealing with the Ind1an Company
- Geoffery Manners & Co. Ltd., through its subsidiary - Home
Products International Ltd. Some time prior to 1956 it acquired
40% shareholding in the Indian Company. In 1956 it introduced an
anti-iiystamin drug in the American market under the trade'"1llllrk
'Dristan'. It got the trade mark 'Dristan' registered as a
distinctive trade mark in the Trade Marks Register in the United
States and subsequently in several foreign countries.
The appellant entered into a technical collaboration
agreement with the Indian Company effective from Nov. l, 1957.
Under this agreement the Indian Company received the formulae,
manufacturing technology, and other assistance essential for the
efficient manufacture in India of various products of the
appellsnt. The appellant granted to the Indian Company; for the
duration of the agreement an exclusive aud non-transferable
licence to make and sell the "Licensed Products" in India under
the nsme or marks of the appellant. The agreement inter alia
further provided that rights of registered user will be extended
to the Indian Company in respect of each "Licensed Product" by
the appellant - proprietor of such trade mark.
Pursuant to the collsboration agreement the Indian Company
manufactured and marketed the products covered thereunder and got
itself registered as the registered user in respect of the trade
marks relsting to the goods of' which the appellant was the
registered proprietor. On and from December 1957 it was decided
that the Indian Company should introduce in the Indian market
nine new drugs of the appellsnt including 'Dristan' tablets. On
August 18, 1958, the appellant filed an application under s.14(1)
of the Trade Marks Act 1940, in Form TM-I for registration :>f
the trade mark 'Dristan' in class .5 claiming to be its proprietor
and that the same was proposed to be used by it. The application
wss advertised as required by the Trade Marks Rules 1942. No
Notice of opposition to the registration of the trade mark was
filed by any one and the trade mark 'Dristan' was registered on
June 8, · 1959 by the Registrar of Trade Marks as trade mark
No. 186511 in class 5. Thereafter, the Indian Company obtained a
licence for the purchase of a machine for manufacturing of
'.Driatan' tablets and installed the SSllie·
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[1985] SUPP.3 s.c.R.
OD May 31, 1960, the first respondent - Mac Laboratories
Private Ltd. - applied for registration of the trade mark
1
Tristine 1 in claas 5. On Januaey 18, 1961, the appellant filed a
notice of opposition to the registration of the mark 'Tristine'
on the ground that it was deceptively similar to its trade mark
'Dristan'. The appellant 1s opposition was not accepted by the
Aaaistant Registrar of Trade Marks and by his order dt. March 27,
1962 1 he ordered the trade mark 1Trist1.ne 1 to be registered in
Part A of the Register of Trade Marks. The Appell.ant thereupon
filed an appeal in the Bombay High Court which was allowed by a
Single Judge on Feb. 5, 1963. The appeal filed by tne first
respondent before a ·Division Bench was allowed with the
directions that the respondent 1 s application be amended so as to
read the trade mark 'Tristine 1 as 'Tristina 1 •
During the pendency of the application of the first
respondent for registration of the trade mark 1Tristine' the
Indian Company on Sept. 23, 1960 applied to the Central Govt.
under s .11 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act
1951 for a licence to manufacture the tablet 'Dristan' which waa
granted on January 19, 1961 for the manufacture of 'Dristan'
tablets to the extent of 5 lakhs tablets per month with the
conditions that "no ,royalty would be payable" and that the
products will be marketed with the trade mark already in use or
without any trade mark. It also applied for an import licence for
import of materials for manufacture of 'Dristan' tablets, and got
approval for manufacture of 'Dristan' tablets.
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On October 18, 1961 another agreement was entered into
between the Appellant and the Indian Compan;r for granting to the
latter the non-exclusive r~t to use the trade mark 'Dristan 1
upon or in relation to the goods in respect of which the said
trade mark was registered during the unexpired residue of the
tem of the registration of the said' trade mark. Under this
agreement the Indian Company agreed to become the registered user
of the trade mark 'Dristan' and further agreed that the rights
granted to it under the agreement would not be deemed. to entitle
it to use the trade mark otherwise than as the registered user
thereof.
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On October 22, 1961, the 'Dristan' tablets were first
marketed in India by the Indian Company. On March 6, 1962 1 a
joint application in Fom 'IM-28 was made by the appellant and the
Indian Company for registering the Indian Company as a registere,d
user of the trade mark 1Dristan 1 in respect of the goods for
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AMERICAN H.P.CORPN. v. MAC LABS.
267
which it """ registered subject to certain conditions or restrictions. lbe application stated that the proposed permitted use was
without limit of period subject to the right of the appellant registered proprietor to appiy for cancellation of the registered
user forthwith after notice in writing to the Indian Company.
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lbe first respondent on April 10, 1961 filed with the
lle,gistrar of the Trade Marks an application under ss.46 and 56 of
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the 1958 Act for rectifying the Register of Tracie Marks by
removing therefrom the appellant's trade mark 'Dristan' on the
grounds:
(i) That the trade mark 1Dristan 1 is deceptively and
confusingly similar to the trade mark 1Bistan 1 already
registered in class 5 and which has been used and is
being used.
(ii) That the trade mark 'Dristan' is deceptively
similar to the trade mark 'Tristine' which the Applicants have lawfully been using since October 1960 in
respect of their medicinsl preparation.
(iii) That there has been no bons fide use of trade
nark 'Dristan' in India in rei&tIOntothe goods for
which it is registered by proprietor thereof for the
time being upto date one month before the date of this
application.•
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On May 5, 1961, the first respondent applied for amendment
of the Rectification Application by substituting the submissions
in support of the grounds taken earlier. The submissions so
substituted were :
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"(i) That the trade mark 'Driatan • was not distinctive
nark and/or wAa not registerable trade mark under s.6
of the Trade Marks Act, 1940 (corresponding to s.9 of
Act No.40 of 1958), except upon evidence of its
distinctiveness and no such evidence was submitted to
the Registrar before registration.
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(ii) That the said trade mark was registered in
contravention of s.8 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940
(corresponding to a.11 of Act of 1958).
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[1985] SUPP.3 s.c.R.
(iii) That the said trade mark offends against the
provisions of s.11 of the Act.
(iv) That the trade mark 'Dristan' is not distiDCtive
of the goods of the registered proprietors.
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(v) That the trade mark 'Dristan' was registered
without any bona ~ intention on the part of the
Applicants thst it would be used in relation to their
medicinal preparation for symptomatic treatment of
respiratory ailments by them and thst there has, in
fact, been no bona fide uae in India of the said trade
mark 'Dr1.stan' in relation to the said goods by the
said proprietors upto a date one month before the date
of this application."
On December 7, 1964, the Registrar of Trade ~iarks dismissed
the Rectification Application of the first Respondent holding·
thst the Whitehsll Laboratories was a division of the appellant
and not a separate ·legal entity and, therefore, the mark could
not be registered in its name but only in the name of the
appellant and accordingly ordered the entry in the Regj.ster
relating to the Trade ~rk 'Dristan' to be varied by amending the
registered proprietor's name to read as "American Home Products
Corporation trading as Whitehall Laboratories." The appeal filed
by the first respondent was allowed by the Single Judge holding
(1) thst at the date of the making of the application for registration the appellant did not have a bona fide intention to uae
the trade mark ·'Dristan' by itself, (2) that the appellant had
not at any time used the said trade mark in relation to the goods
in respect of which it was registered, (3) that the legal fiction
created by s.48(2) of the 1958 Act came into play only after a
trade mark was registered and that an intention to uae the trade
mark through someone who would subsequently get himaelf registered as a registered user did not amount to an intention on the
part of the applicant for registration to uiie the trade mark
himaelf; and (4) that to accept the appellant's contention would
amount to permitting trafficking in trade marks. In view of
these conclusions the Single Judge did not decide the question
whether trade mark 'Dristan' was deceptively and confusingly
similar to the trade mark 'Bistan'.
In the appeal filed by the appellant the Division BeDCh held
that trade mark 'Dristan' was not deceptively and confusingly
similar to the trade mark 'Bistan'. Dismissing the 11ppeal it,
AMERICAN H.P.CORPN. v. MAC LABS.
269
however, agreed with the ·view taken by the Single Judge in
respect of the construction which he hsd·placed upon ss.18 and 48
of the 1958 Act to come to the conclusion that the appellant had
no bona fide intention to use itself the trade mark 'Dristan 1 and
thattheapjjellsnt had not at any time made use of the said trade
mark.
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In the appeal to this Court on behalf of the appellant it ·
was contended:
(1) the legal fiction created by sub-s.(2) of s.48 is,
as expressly stated in that sub-section, for the
purposes of s. 46 or for any other purpose for which
such use is material under the 1958 Act or any other
law. To confine this fiction to a case of an actual
use of a trade mark by a registered user 'is to confine
it only to use for the purposes of clause(b) of
s.46(1) which is contrary to the purpose for which the
fiction was created and, therefore, when s.18(1) of
the 1958 Act (corresponding to s.14(1) of the 1940
·Act) uses the words "proposed to be used", these words
must be read as "prop0sed to be used by a proposed
registered user".
(2) To register a trade mark which is proposed to be
used by a registered user does not per se SDX>unt to
trafficking in trade marks and whether it does so or
not must depend upon the facts and circU111Btanc"s of
each case.
( 3) The reliance placed by the High Court - both by
the Single Judge and the Division Bench - upon the
'PUSSY G6LOllll' Trade llarlr. Case (1967] R.P.c. 265, was
unjustified and unwarranted inss111UCh as the provisions
of the English Trade Marks Act, 1938, are radically
different from those of the 1958 Act as also the 1940
Act and, therefore, that case has no relevance so far
as the construction of s.18(1) read with s.48(2) of
the 1958 Act is concerned.
( 4) The reliance placed bY the High Court (both bY the
Single Judge and the Division Bench) upon the
Shavaksha Committee Report and the Ayyanagar Report
was equally misplaced as Parliament did not accept the
recommendations with respect to registered users.
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(5) The facts awl circumstances of the case show that
the appellant had, at the date of the making of the
application for registration, a bona fide intention to
use the trade mark 'Dristan 1 through a registered
user.
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(6) In any event, the appell.4nt itself had made bona
fide USe Of the trade mark 1 Dristan I Up tO a date
month before the date of the First Respondent's
Application for Rectification.
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On behalf of the First Respondent following contentions were
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made.
( l) The words "proposed to be used" in s .18( l) of the
1958 Act s.14(1) of the 1940 Act mean "proposed to be
used by the applicant for registration, his servants
awl agents" and not by any person who is proposed to
be got registered as a registered user awl, thetefore,
the legal fiction enacted in s.48(2) cannot be
imported into s.18(1).
(2) A registered user can only come into being after a
trade mark is registered. Therefore, as at the date of
an application for registration of a trade mark, there
cannot be any person in existence who is a registered
user. The words "proposed to be used" cannot therefore
posslbly mean "proposed to be used by a proposed
registered user".
(3) To permit a trade mark to be registered when the
applicant himself does not propose to use it but
proposes to use it through someone else who 1iOUld
subsequently be registered as a registered user would
be to permit trafficking in trade marka which i•
contrary to the policy underlying the Trade Marks
laws.
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(4) The only case which the 1958 Act permita the
registration of a trade mark when the applicant for
registration does not intend to use it himself but
intends to use it through another is the one set out
in s.45, namely, where the Registrar is satiafied that
a company is about to be formed awl registered under
the Companies Act, 1956, awl the applicant intenda to
assign the trade mark to that company with a view to
the use thereof by the company.
AMERICAN H.P.CORPN. v. MAC LABS.
271
(5) The 1958 Act is, as the 1940 Act was, based upon
the English Trade Marks Act, 1938, and the decision in
the 'PUSSY G61.0BE' Trade llarlt cue (supra) concludes
this point against the appellant.
(6) The Shsvaksba eo...ittee Report and the Ayyanagar
Report show the legislstive intent not to allow a
proposed use by a proposed registered user to be
equated with a proposed use by the applicant for
registration.
( 7) The appellant bad not at any relevant· time made
use of the trade mark 'Dristan 1 •
(8)
The
appellant
bad
fradulently
obtained
registration of the trade mark 1Dristan' by stating in
the application for registration that it proposed to
use the said trade mark itself and by not discloaing
the fact that it proposed to use it through a proposed
registered user.
(9) The trade mark 'Dristan 1 was deceptively and
confusingly similsr to the trade mark 'Bistan' and,
therefore, it cannot be allowed to remain on the
Register of Trade Marks.
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(10) to allow the trade mark 1Dristan' to remain on
the Register of Trade Marks would be contrary to the
policy of the Government of India.
Allowing the appeal,
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HELD : ( l) The Judgment of the Division Bench of
the
Calcutta High Court appealed against is reversed and the order
passed by it is set aside. Appeal No.165 of 1968 filed by the
appellant before the Division Bench is allowed with costs and
the judgment and order of the Single Judge of the High Court are
reversed and set aside. As a result, Appeal No. 61 of 1965 filed
by the First Respondent before the Single Judge of the High Court
is dismissed with costs and the order of the Registrar of Trade
Marks, Calcutta, dismissing the First Respondent's Application
for Rectification, No.CAL-17 is confirmed. [341 B-C]
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2. Before a person can make an application under s.46(1) to
tske off a trade mark from the Register he bas to be a "person
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
aggrieved". Undisputedly, the First Respondent was a "person
aggreived" within the meaning of s.46(1). Section 46(1) provides
for two cases in which a registered trade mark may be taken off
the Registrar in respect of sny of the goods in respect of which
it is registered. The first case is set out in cl.(a) of s.46(1)
and the second in cl.{b) of that sub-section. Before cl.(a) can
become applicable two conditions are to be satisfied, nmnely, (l)
that the trade mark was registered without sny bona fide
intention on the part of the applicant for registration that !t
should be used in relation to those goods by him, and ( 2) that
there has, in fact, been no bona fide use of that trade mark in
relation to those goods by sny proprietor thereof for the time
being up to a date one month before the date of the application
under s.46(1). The only exception to the first condition is of a
case to which the provisiorul of s.45 apply. Both the conditions
in cl.(a) are clllllllative and not disjunctive. Clause (a),
therefore, will not apply where even though there has been no
bona fide intention on the part of the applicant for registration
to use the trade mark but, in fact, there has been a bona fide
use of the trade matk in relation to those goods by any
proprietor thereof for the time being up to a date one month
before the date of the application under s.46(1). Similarly,
cl. (a) will not apply where, though there had been a bona fide
intention on the part of the applicant for registration to use
the trade mark, in fact, there has been no bona fide use of the
trade mark in relation to those goods by any proprietor thereof
for the time being up to a date one month before the date of the
application under s.46(1). [311 G-ll; 312 A-E]
3, Clause (b) of s.46(1) applie• where for a continuous
period of five years or longer from the date of the registration
of the trade mark, there has been no bona fide use thereof in
relation to those goods in respect of which it is registered by
any proprietor thereof for the time being. An exception to cl.(b)
is created by s.46(3). Under s.46(3), the non-use of a trade
mark, which is showu to have been due to special circumstances in
the trade and not to any intention to abandon or not to use the
trade mark in relation to the goods to which the application
under s.46(1) relates, will not amount to non-use for the purpose
of cl.(b). [312 F-il]
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4. The distinctio~ between cl.(a) and cl.(b) is that if the
period specified in cl.(b) has elapsed and during that period
there has been no bona fide use of the trade mark, the fact that
the registered proprietor had a bona fide intention to use the
AMERICAN H.P.CQRPN. v. MAC LABS.
273
trade m&rk at the date of the application for registration
becomes imllaterial and the trade oork is liable to be removed
from the Register unless his case falls under s.46(3), while
UDder cl. (a) where there had been a bona fide intention to use
the trade mark in respect of which regf&tr..tion was sought,
merely because the trade mat:'< had not been used for a period
shorter than five years from the date of its registration will
not entitle any person to have that trade mark taken off the
l!egister. [313 A-BJ
(5) Under ·both these clauses the burden of proving that the
facts which bring into play cl.(a) or cl.(b), as tbe case may be,
exist is on the person who seeks to have the trade mark removed
from the Register, Thus, where there hes been a non-user of the
trade mark for a continuous period of five years and the
application for taking off the trade mark from the Register hes
been filed one month after the expiry of such period, the person
seeking to have the trade mark removed from the l!egister hes only
to prove such continuous non-user and hsa not to prove the la.ck
of a bona fide intention on the part of the registered proprietor
to use the trade merit at the date of the application for
registration. Where, however, the non-user is for a perie<! of
less than five years, the person seeking to remove the trade mark
from the Register hes not only to prove non-user for the
requisite period but hes also to prove that the applicant for
registration of the trade mark had no bona fide intention to use
the trade mark when the application for registration was made.
[313 C-E]
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(6) The definition of "trade mark" contained in cl.(v) of
s.2(1) shows that a trade mark is a mark used or proposed to be
used in relation to goods for the purpose of indicating or so ss
to indicat~ a connection in the course of trade between the goods
and some person having the right to use the mark. It is, therefore, not necessary for the purpose of registering a trade mark
that those goods should be in existence at the date of the
application for registration. If the position were that the mere
non-user of a trade mark for the period mentioned in cl. (a) of
s.46(1) would make a trade mark liable to be taken off the
Register, it would result in great hardship and cause a large
number of trade marks to be removed from the Register, because
the moment one month hes elapsed, after the registration of a
trade mark hes been ordered, a trade rival can make an application on the ground set out in cl.(a) of s.46(1) claiming that
there has been no bona fide use of the trade mark up to a date
one month before the date of his application. It is in order to
prevent such harassment and absurd result that the two conditions
specified in cl.(a) have been made cumulative. (313 F-ti; 314 A-CJ
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(7) The object uwierlying s.46(1) is to prevent trafficking
in trade marks. 'lbia is, in fact, the object underlying all trade
mark laws. A trade mark is meant to distinguish the goods made by
one person from those made by another. A trade mark, therefore,
cannot exist in vacuo. It can only exist in connection with
the goods in relation to which it is used or intended to be used.
Its object is to indicate a connection in the course of trade
between the goods and some person having the right to use the
mark either with or without any indication of the identity of
that person. When a person gets his trade mark registered, be
acquires valuable rights by reaaon of such registration. Registration of his trade mark gives him the exclusive right to the
use of the trade mark in connection with the goods in respect of
which it is registered and if there is any invasion of this right
by any other person using a mark which is the same or deceptively
similar to his trade mark, be can protect his trade mark by an
action for infringement in which he can obtain injunction,
damages or an account of profits made by other person. In such an
action, the registration of s trade mark is prima facie evidence
on its validity. After the expiry of seven years from the date of
the registration, a trade mark is to be valid in all respects
except in the three cases set out in s.32. The proprietor of an
unregistered trade mark whose mark is unsuthorisedly used by
another cannot, however, use for the infringement of such trade
mark. His only remedy lies in bringing a passing-off action, an
inconvenient remedy as compared to an infringement action.
[314 C-i!; 315 A-BJ
7(i) In a passing-off action the plaintiff will have to
prove that his mark has by user acquired such reputation as to
become distinctive of the plaintiff's goods so that if it is used
in relation to any goods of the kind dealt with by the plaintiff,
it will be undl'!rstood by the trade and public as meaning that the
goods are the plaintiff's goods. (315 B-C]
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7(11) In an infringement action, the plaintiff is not
required to prove the reputation of his mark. Further, under s.37
a registered mark is assignable and transmissible either with or
without goodwill of the business concerned while under s.38, an
unregistered trade mark is not assignable or transmissible except
in the three cases set out in s.38(2). [315 C-ll]
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(8) As the registration of a trade mark confers valuable
rights upon the registered proprietor thereof, a person cannot
be permitted to register a trade mark when he has not used it in
relation to the goods in respect of which it sought to be registered or does not intend to use relation to such goods. [315 ~)
AMERICAN H.P.CORPN. v. MAC LABS.
275
A
llatt:'a case, (1898) 2 Cb.D 432, 436; s.c.15 R.P.C. 262, 266,
(1898) 2 Cb. D. 432 at pages 439-442, sub nmf111tt John Batt lo Co.
-v. Dmmett and another, (1899) A.C. 420; s.c. 16 R.P.C. 411
relied Ul'On•
(9) To get a trade mark registered without any intention to
use it in relation to any goods but merely to make money out of
it by selling to others the rif,ht to use it would be trafficking
in that trade mark. If there is no real trade connection between
the proprietor of the mark and the licensee or his goods, there
is room for the conclusion that the grant of the licence is a
trafficking in the mark. It is a question of fact and degree in
every case whether , a sufficient trade connection exists•
[316 A-B; 317 A-BJ
Re Allleric:an Greetinp Corp. 's Application, [1983) 2 All E.R.
609 & 619 [1984] l All E.R. 426, 433 relied upon.
(10) The intention to use a trade ma_rk sought to be
registered must be genuine and 1real and the fact that the mark
was thought to be something which some day might be useful would
not·amount to any definite and precise intention at the time of
registration to use that trade mark. The intention to use the
mark must exist at the date of the application for registration.
Section 46(l)(a) expressly speaks of "bona fide intention on the
part of the applicant for registration" which would mean "at
the date when such applicant makes his application for
registration.· [317 C-E)
In re Ducter's trade Mark (1928) Ch.l 405, 409 referred to.
(11) Intention is a state of mind. No person can make out
- the state of mind or any other person. None the leas courts are
often called upon for various purposes to determine the state of
a person's mind. The courts can only do oo by deducting the
existence of a particular state of mind from the facts of a case.
[317 H; 318 A]
(12) In the instant case, in order to ascertain the intention of the appellant at the date of filing of application for
registration the facts could be smunarised with reference to
three periods: (l) events which took place upto the date of the
application for registration, namely, August 18, 1958, (2) events
which happened between that date and the date of Application for
Rectification, namely April 10, 1961 and (3) events which
happened subsequently to April 10, 1961. [320 D-E)
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U(i) Prior to 1956, the appellant had acquired a substantial shareholding to the extent af 40 per cent in the Indian
Company. In 1956 the appellant introduced 'Dr is tan' tablets in
the American market and got the trade mark 'Dristan' registered
in the United States of America and in several. other countries, A
technical collaboration between the Appellant and the Indian
Company cmppenced froa Nov. 1, 1957, and an agreement in that
behalf was signed on May 16, 1958. In pursuance of the said
collaboration agreement the Indian Company manufactured and
markets several produced of the appellant. The appellant got
registered its trade marks J.n respect of such products and the
Indian Company was registered as the registered user in respect
of such trade marks. As early as December 1957, it was decided
that the Indian Company should introduce in the Indian market
nine new products of the appellant including 1Dristan' tablets,
On August 18, 1958, the appellant filed an application for registration of the trade mark 1Dristan' and the said trade mark was
duly registered on June 8, 1959. [320 F-ti; 321 A]
12(11) During the period between August 18, 1958, and the
date of the First Respondent 1a Application for Rectification,
that is, April 10, 1961 the Indian Company applied for and
obtained a licence for the purchase of a Stokes Triple Layer
Machine for manufacturing 'Dristan' tablets and when the said
machine was received installed it at its Ghatkoper factory. It
also obtained from the appellant three units of 'Dristan' tablets
as samples and the manufacturing manual for the tablets. Further,
it applied to the Central Government under s.11 of the Industries
(Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, for a licence to manufacture 1Dristan' tablets which was granted to it. It also
applied for and obtained a licence to import certain ingredients
used in the manufacture of 'Dristan 1 tablets and imported such
ingredients. It further applied for and obtained from the
Director, Drugs Control Administration, State of Maharashtra,
permission to manufacture 'Dristan' tablets. The appellant also
filed a notice of opposition to the First Respondent's Application for registration of their mark 'Tristine'. [321 Ii; 322A-CJ
12(111) During the period subsequent to the First Respondent 1s Application for Rectification, that is subsequent to April
10, 1961, on October 18, 1961, the registered user agreement was
entered into between the appellant and the Indian Company. On
October 22, 1961 the 'Dristan' tablets were first marketed in
India by the Indian Company. On March 6, 1962, the appellant ana
the Indian Company jointly made en application to register the
Indian Company as a registered user of the trade mark 'Dristan'.
[322 C-E]
I
AMERICAN H.P.CORPN. V• MAC LABS.
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l2(iv) The facts set out sbove clesrly show that esch of
them is sn integral link in a chain and that they cannot be
divided into three separate periods. This continuous chain of
events establishes beyond doubt that the appellant had an
intention that the trade mark 1Dri.stan' should be used in
relation to the tablets in question by the manufacture and sale
of these tablets in India. [322 E-FJ
(13) The appellant's application for registration of the
trade mark 'Dristan' was made under s.14(1) of the 1940 Act and
was registered under the Act. Under s.14(1) only a person claiming to be the proprietor of a trade mark "used or proposed to be
used by him" could apply for registration of that trade mark. The
provisions of s.18(1) of the 1958 Act are identical. [323 F-G)
(14) If the 1940 Act did not contain a legal fiction similar
to that enacted in s.48(2) of the 1958 Act, the appellant's case
would fall to the ground because then at the dste of its application for registration of the said trade mark, its intention
would be not to use it itself but to use it through another. 'll1e
1940 Act, however; also made provisions with respect to registered users and created a similar legal fiction in s.39(2) of
that Act. [325 A-BJ
(15) The only difference between s.39(2) of the 1940 Act and
s.48(2) of the 1958 Act is that while under s.39(2) the legal
fiction crested by it applies "for any purpose for which such use
is material under this Act or any other Liw", under s.48(2) the
legal fiction applies "for the purposes of s.46 or for any other
purpose for which such use is material under this Act or any
other law". The addition of the words "for the purposes of s.46"
in s.48(2) does not make any difference but clarifies the scope
of the said legal fiction. Clause (a) of s.46(1) refers both to
bona fide intention on the part of the applicant for registratioD that the trade mark should be used in relation to those
goods by him• as also to bons fide use of the trade mark in
relation to those goods by liiiY" proprietor thereof for the time
being". It cannot possibly be that wheo s.48(2) expressly
provides that the permitted user of a trade mark by a registered
user is to be deemed to be user by the proprietor of the trade
mark for the purposes of s.46, the fiction is intended only to
apply to the use of the trade mark referred to in the second
condition of cl.(a) of s.46(1) and not to the use of that trade
mark referred to in the first condition of cl.(a). Under s.18(1),
V1 application for registration of a trade mark can only be made
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by a person who claims to be the proprietor of tbat trade mark.
Therefore, the words "applicant for registration" in cl.(a) of
8046(1) would mean "the person claiming to be the proprietor of
the trade mark who is the applicant for registration of that
trade mark", The first condition of cl.(a) would, therefore, reed
"that the trade mark Wiiii registered without any bona fide intention on the part of the person claiming to be the proprietor of
that trade mark 'Who has made the application for registration
that it should be used in relation to those goods by him.• So
read, there can be no difficulty in reeding the words "by him"
alao as "by a registered user". Similarly, the legal fiction in
s.48(2) can also be applied to s.18(1). S.18(1) in the light of
the legal fiction would read as •any person claiming to be the
proprietor of a trade mark w.ed or proposed to be used by him or
by a registered user". By reason of the provisions of s.39(2) of
the 1940 Act, s.14 of that Act should also be read in the S8r'I!
way. [325 E-11; 326 A-DJ
lut lad J)op1J1ngn Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Coomc11,
(1952) A.C, 109 & State of Bmlbay V• Pandunng Vinayak Oiepbalker
and Ore., [1953J s.c.a. 773 relied upon.
(16) lbe purposes for which the fiction hes been enacted are
set out in a.48(2). These purposes are the purposes of s.46 or
for any other purposes for which such use is material under the
1958 Act or any other law. To confine the purpose only to a part
of s.46 would be to substantially cut d0"'2 the operation of the
legsl fiction. Tbe purpose for whlch the legal fiction is to be
resorted to is to deem the permitted use of a trade mark, which
means the use of the trade mark by a registered user thereof, to
be the use by the proprietor of that trade mark. [327 A-BJ
(17) Section 17(1) of the Engliah Trade Marks Act, 1938 (l &
2 Ge<>, 6, c.22) sets out who can apply for registtation of a
trade mark and is in pari materia with s.18(1) of the 1958 Act.
Under a.17(4), the refusal by a Registrar to register the trade
mark is subject to appeal to the Board of Trade or to the Court
at the option of the applicant. If the appeal is to the Court,
there can be further appeal to the Court of Appeal and from there
to the Houae of Lords. Section 26 provides for removal of a trade
mark fraa the Register and is in pari materia with s.46 of the
1958 Act. Section 32 deals with rectifying the entries in the
Register and is analogous to a.56 of the 1958 Act. [327 E-F)
(18) Under s.87 of the Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act,
1883 (46 & 47 Viet. c.57), any registered proprietor could grant
licences to use the mark subject to any equity. l'be 1883 Act in
AMERICAN H.P.CORPN. v. MAC LABS.
279
so far as it related to trade marks was repealed by the Trade
Marks Act, 1905 (5 F.dw. 7 c.15). The 1905 Act did not, however,
contain any power in the registered proprietor to grant licences.
'lhe English Act of 1938, however, introduced a system of official
approval for licences to use a trade 11Brk particularly by providing for registering a person other than the proprietor of the
trade mark as the registered user of the trade mark. [327 G-ii;
328 A]
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(19) The High Court was unduly impressed by l'usay Galon!
'frllde Mark case and unnecessarily attached great importance to
it. The High Court was justified in relying upon that case by
referring to the case of Ashok a..mder llakhit Ltd., [1955] 2
s.c.a. 252 but the High Court overlooked that in Ashok Chander
llakhit's case the section of the 1940 Act which fell for interpretation was not in psri materia with the corresponding section
of the English Act of 1938 which had been judicially interpreted
by the courts in England. [332 E-G]
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'I.be llegiatrar of Trade llarlul V• Asholt Chandra llakhit Ltd.,
[1955] 2 s.c.a. 252 referred to.
(20) In the absence of any binding authority of an Indian
Court on a particular point of law, English decisions in which
judgments were delivered by judges held in high repute can be
referred to as they are decisions of i:ourts of a country from
which Indian jurisprudence and a large part of Indian law is
derived, for they are authorities of high persusdve value to
which the court may legitimately turn for assistance; but whether
the rule laid down in any of these casea can be applied by Indian
courts must, however, be judged in the context of Indian laws and
legal procedure and the practical realities of litigation .in
India. [332 B; 333 A-BJ
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romaol v. 011 and llatural Gas c..dsston, [1984 J 1 s.c.a.
526, 549, 567; s.c. [1984] Supp. s.c.c. 263, 280, 295 referred
to.
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(21) The relevant proviaioDB relating to registered users
in the English Act and in the 1958 Act are materially different.
'1'he English Act crest es two legal fictions. 'l'he first is
contained in s .28(2) which relates to the permitted .use of a
trade mark. That fiction is for the purpose of s.26 (which
corresponds to section 46 of tbe 1958 Act) and for any other
purpose for which such use is material under the E.nslish Act or
at common law. The second is contained in s.29(2) and relatee to
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intention on the part of an applicant for registration that a
trade mark should be used by him. The second fiction is for the
puq>oses of paragraph(a) of s.26(1) which corresponds to cl.(a)
of s.46(1) of the 1958 Act. The 1958 Act, however, contains only
one fiction. It is in s.48(2), which is in pari materia with
s.28(2) of the English Act. The omission from the 1958 Act of a
provision similar to that contained in s.29(2) of the English Act
does not make any difference if one were to see s.(2) in its
proper setting and context. The English Act does not prescribe,
just as the 1958 Act does not, any period of time from the date
of registration of a trade mark within which an application for
registering of a person as a registered user of that trade mark
should be made. Section 29(1) of the English Act, however,
provides that an application for registration of a trade mark can
be accooipanied by an application for the registration of a person
as a registered user of that trade mark, and if the tribunal is
satisfied that the proprietor of the trade m<lrk intends it to be
used by that person in relation to those goods and is also 1111tisfied that person will be registered 118 a registered user thereof
after the registration of the trade mark, it will not refuse to
register the l:rade mark. The effect of s.29(1), therefore, is
that an appliCJ•tion for registering a person as a registered user
can be made simultaneously with the application for registering
the trade mark and if both are found to be satisfactory, the
application for registration would be granted and immediately
thereafter the registration of the registered user would be
al.loved. In such a case, the intention on the part of the
applicant for registration that the trade mark should be used by
the registered user thereof is to be deemed to be an intention to
use that trade mark by the applicant for registration. This is a
special provision applicable to a special case. The fiction
crested by s.29(2) is also made applicable to the case of a
corporation about to be constituted to which the applicant
intends to assign the trade niark. There is no such fiction
relating to intention expressly provided in the 1958 Act, nor is
there any provision for simultaneously making an application for
registration of a trade mark and "" application for registering a
person as the registered user of that trade mark. The purpose for
which the fiction waa crested by s.29(2) with respect to "
registered user was to el:lminste all possibility of trafficking
in a trade mark by a persoa getting himself registered as the
proprietor of a trade mark and thereafter going in search of SOi!le
person who will use it as the registered user thereof. If the
existence of the spec.1.al Hction crested by s.29(2) cuts down the
full operation of the general fiction enacted in s. 28(2), it
AMERICAN H.P.CORPN. v. MAC LABS.
281
does not follow that the absence of such spE1cial fiction in the
1958 Act will also cut down the operation of the fiction in
s, 48( 2) in the same way by limiting it to the actual use of a
trade mark only, In the 1958 Act wherever the phrHe "used by
him" occurs the fiction Will apply. In other words,
the
pennitted use of a trade mark ia, by the fiction. enacted in
s.48(2), equated with "use by the registered proprietor". Consequently wherever the word "use" occurs With all its permutations
and c0111111tations, as for instance in phrases such as "proposed to
be used by him" or "intended to be used by him", the fiction Will
apply. Form Jio,'IM-2, which is the form prescribed for an application for registration of a trade mark prescribed by the Rnglish
Trade Marks Bules, 1938, was substituted in 1982 811'! under the
substituted Form a new column is provided which requires details
of an application wider s.29(1) to be given. The old Fonn No.'IM-2
did not contain this requirement nor does Form Tll-1 appended to
the Trade and Merchandise Marita Rules, 1959. [333 B-1i; 334 A.-G]
(22) Under the 1958 Act, an application for registration of
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a trade mark as also an application for registering a registered
user are to be made to the Begistrar and it is the Begistrar who
bas to grant both of them. The Begistrar would refuse the
application if it appears to him thst the grant thereof · would
tend to facilitate trafficking in a trade mark. This question is
to be considered by tt.e Begistrar himself. The provisions of the
1940 Act were the same but the provisions of the 1958 A.ct are
radically different. Under the 1958 Act, though both the application for regist~ation of a trade mark and the application for
registration of registered user are to be made to the Begistrar,
the Registrar bas the power to grant the application for registration of the trade mark only. So far as the application for
registering a person as a registered user is concerned, he has to
~orward it together with his report to the Central Government and
it is for the Central Govermnent to decide whether to permit such
application to be granted or uot. In order to decide this, the
Central Government has to take into account the matters set out
in sub-s.(3) of s.49 and in rule 85 of the Trade Marks llules,
1959. The matters to be considered by the Central Government
include not only Tihether the pennitted use, i f allowed, would
amo-.int to trafficking in trade lll!lrks but also the interests of
the general public and the developll>!!nt of any industry, trade or
c<lllJDerce in India. After the Central Government has taken its
decision, the Registrar is to dispose of the application in
accordance with the directions issued by the Central Goverlllllent.
Tlrus, Tihile under the English Act the authority to decide an
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application for registering a registered user is the 6"Jlle aa the
authority for registering a trade mark, under the 1958 Act they
are different and so are the considerations which are to be taken
into account. [334 ll; 335 A-E]
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(23) Under the 1958 Act an application for registering a
registered user can only be made 'after a trade mark is
registered. If an intended use by a person who will be registered
as a registered user is not to be included in the legal fiction
created by section 48(2), it would make that fiction operate
within a very narrow compass an alloost render the provisions
relating to registered users meaning less. It is in very rare
circumstances that a person will get a trade mark registered aa
proposed to be used by himl3elf, use it in relation to the
concerned goods, and thereafter permit :lt to be used by another
aa a registered user. It is also not open to everyone who wants
to register a trade mark to form a company to which after the
trade mark is registered and the proposed company is incorporated, the trade mark w:!'ll be assigned. These things are not
practical realities and Parliament could not have intended such
absurd results. [335 F-l:l]
(24) It is not necessary that the appellant should have got
the trade mark registered with the intention that it will itself
use the trade mark and in order to effectuate that intention the
appellant should have set up a factory and manufactured and
marketed the tablets 'DRISTAN' and then either assigned the trade
mark to the Indian Company or to get the Indian Company registered aa the registered user of that trade mark. By reason of
foreign exchange and industrial policies in India it is not
possible for a foreign company to establish its own industry in
India. It can only do so by entering into a collaboration with
Indian entrepreneurs in which the foreign company would not be
permitted to have more than 40 per cent shareholding and would be
subject to other restrictions. Even if a foreign proprietor of
a trade mark were to establish an industry of his own in India,
it would be absurd to imagine that it would thereafter cease
manufacturing the goods and allow someone else to do so. It is
equally illogical that the appellant and the Indian Company
should have jointly applied for registration of the trade mark
'DRISTAN 1 • The appellant was already in collaboration with the
Indian Caopany. lhere was no need for it to seek other collaborators to establish a new company. To assign the trade mark to the
Indian Caopany or to make jointly with the Indian Company an
application for registration of the trade mark 'DRISTAN' would be
to destroy the appellant's proprietorship in that trade mark.
[336 A-DJ
AMERICAN H.P.CORPN. v. MAC LABS.
283
(25) It is a well-known principle of interpretation of
statutes that a construction should not be put upon a statutory
provision which would lead to manifest absurdity of futility,
palpable injustice, or absurd inconvenience or anomaly. While
plsclng construction on s.48(2), the High Court did not apply
this principle and failed to give to the legal fiction enacted by
s.48(2) its full force arid effect. [336 E-F]
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'l!llSTlTCB' Trade Maxk (1963) R.P.C. 183 and 'PVSSY GAL<llE'
Trade Haxlt, (1967] R.P.c. 265 inapplicable.
(see: II.. Pentiah and Ors. v. Mnc!dala Veer81P81Jappa and
Ors.) (1961] 2 s.c.R. 295, 303 referred to.
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Astm v. Harlee Manufacturing Caopany, (1959-60) 103 c.1.R.
391 relied upon.
(26) The Parliament did not accept the recommendation made
in Sbavakasba Committee Report and Ayyanagar Report. These
Reports, therefore, cannot be referred to for ascertaining the
intention of Parliament when enacting the relevant provisions of
1958 Act. [337 G)
(27) In the instant case, the facts on the record show
that only when it was decided to introduce 'DRISTAN' tablets in
the Indian market through tbe Indian Company that the appellant
made its application to register the trade mark 'DRISTAN'. There
was a close connection in the course of trade between the
appellant and the Indian Company. The appellant owned 40 per cent
of the shareholding in the Indian Canpany. It bad entered into a
technical collaboration agreement with the Indian Company which
provided for strict quality control and for formulae and
services to be provided by the appellant. The manufacture,
marketing and advertising of all products under the agreement
were to be under the control of the appellant. There was no
royalty payable by the Indian Company to the appellant in respect
of the use of the trade mark 'DRISTAN ' • In the event of the
collaboration agreement being terminated by reason of the
happening of any of the events mentioned in the agreement,
amongst which events was the shareholding of the appellant becoming less than 40 per cent, the Indian Company was to cease to be
entitled to manufacture the tablets 'DRISTAN'. There was here,
therefore, no question of any trafficking . in a trade mark. In
these circumstances, the intention of the appellant to use the
trade mark 'DRISTAN ' through the Indian Company which was subsequently to get itself registered as the registered user of the
said trade mark cannot but be characterised as bona fide.
[338 D-1!; 339 A)
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(28) The two corulitioUI! of cl.(d) of s-46(1) are cumulative
and since the first eowlition has
not been satisfied in this
case, it is unuecessary to consider the question whether the
appellant had in addition to having a bona fide intention to use
the trade mark 'Dristan' had also used""Tt:within a period of one
month before the date of Application for Rectification. [339 A-C]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal
No.
2159 of
1970.
From the Judgment and Decree dated 16.12.69 of the Calcutta
High Court in Appeal No. 165 of 1968.
c
F.s. Nariman, J,I. Mehta, Michal Fysh, T.M.. Ansari, v.
Tulzapurkar, C.M.. Maniar, Ai,hok Sagar, Aditia Narayan, Alok
Vidyalankar and D.N. Misra for the Appellant.
Dr. v. Gouri Shankar, K.L. Hathi, Manoj Arora, Nareudrabhai
Zaveri, M.s. M.alati Jhaveri and Vijay F. Shah for Respondent No.l.
D
Ex-parte for Respondent No. 2.
T.U. Mehta and V. Dave for Intervener.
E
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
MADON, J, This Appeal has been filed pursuant to a certifiby the Cslcutt.a High Court against its judgment and
order dated December 16, 1969, in Appeal No. 165 of 1968. The
certificate has been given by the High Court under sub-clauses
(a) and (c) of clause (1) of Article 133 prior to the substitution of that clause by a new clause (1) by the Constitution
(Thirtieth Amendment) Act, 1972. The grounds on which the certificate has been i;iven are (1) that the value of the subjectmatter in dispute in the court of the first instance and still in
dispute on appeal was and is not less than Rs.20,000 and that as
the judgment in appeal was one of affirmance, the appeal involves
a substantial question of law, and (ii) that the case was a fit
one for appeal to the Supreme Court. The High Court obserbed:
cat~ granted
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"The appeal raises a question of great importance in
Trade Marks Law, that is to say whether a proprietor
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AMERICAN l!.P.CORPN. v. MAC LABS. [MADON, J.J
285
of a trade mark who intends to use i t solely by a
registered user is entitled to registration of his
trade mark, under Se~. 18 of ti1e Trade Marks Act, t.r
to put i.t differently, do the words 'proposed to be
used by him' in Sec. 18 mean 'proposed to be used by
the proprietor, his agents and servants' only •••• The
case also involves the question of conotruction of
sub-section (2) of Sec. 48 and consideration of the
effect of that sub-section en sub-section (1) of Sec.
18 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958,"
The questions so posed by the l!igh Court resolve themselves
the following two questions :
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(1) Whether a proprietor of a trade mark who intends
to use it solely by a registered user is entitled to
registration of his trade mark under section 18 of the
Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 ?
(2) Whether by reason of the provisions of sub-section
(2) of section 48 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks
Act, 1958, the words "proposed to be used by him" in
.sub-section (1) of section 18 of the said Act mean
"proposed to be used by the proprietor, his agents and
servants only" or do they also include a proposed user
someone who will get hiruself registered under
section 48(1) of the said Act as a registered user?
by
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The l!igh Court further observed :
"The matter is of considerable importance to foreign
proprietors of trade marks, to registered users of
trade marks in general and
Commerce at large."
to
the Industry and
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Before embarking on a discussion of the above questions it
will be convenient to relate first the facts which have given
rise to this Appeal.
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The Appellant, American l!ome Products Corporation, is a
multi-national corporation incorporated under the laws of the
State of Delaware in the United States of An.erica. One of the
activities of the appellant is the manufacture and marketing of
pharmaceutical products and drugs. The division of the Appellant
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[1985] SUPP.3 s.c.R.
which at all relevant times carried on and still carries on this
activity is called the ''.Whitehall Laboratories". Geoffrey Manners
& Co. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "the Indian Company") is a
company registered as a public limited company under the Indian
Companies Act, 1913, and is a public company within the meaning
of the Companies. Act, 1956. Home Products International Limited
is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Appellant and at all material
times represented the Appellant in its dealings with foreign
distributors, licencees and subsidiaries. In the present case the
said Home Products International Limited had carried or
correspondence on behalf of the Appellant with the Indian
Company. International Chemical Company Limited is another wholly
owned subsidiary of the Appellant. Some time prior to 1956, the
Appellant acquired a substantial shareholding to the extent of 40
per cent in the Indian Company. In 1956 the Appellant introduced
an anti-hystamin drug in the American market under the trade mark
'DRISTAN' for the treatment of respiratory ailments in the form
of a decongestent tablet for symptomatic relief for cold and
congestion. The Appellant got the trade mark 'DRISTAN' registered
as a distinctive trade mark in the Trade Marks Register in the
United States and subsequently thereto between 1957 to 1961 in
about 39 other foreign countries. These countries included Great
Britain, Ireland, Belgium, Denmark, France, Holland and other
countries in the Continent of Europe, Canada, Mexico, and several
countries in south America, Asia and Africa.
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By an agreement signed on May 16, 1958, effective from
November 1, 1957, the Appellant entered into a technical
collaboration agreement with the Indian Company. The recitals of
' the said agreement are material and may be reproduced. They read
as follows
" WHEREAS, American Home Products Corporation directly
or thrnugh its wholly owned subsidiaries is one of the
leading American manufacturers of drugs, pharmaceuticals, biologicals, vaccines, antibiotics, nutritionals
and medicinal preparations and conducts continuously
active reserach in its various 1.aboratories for the
discovery of new and improvement of existing
therapeutic products, and
WHEREAS, American B.ome Products Corporation is
prepared to provide Geoffrey Manoers on the terms and
condi.tions of this Agreement the formulae and
manufacturing
technology and other assistance
AMERICAN H.P.CORPN. v. MAC LABS. (MADON, J.]
287
essential for the efficient manufacture in India of
various American Home Products Corporation .products,
and
WHEREAS, Geoffrey Manners has access to and use of
lands and
buildings and has the experience,
facilities, equipment and personnel needed or desired
for successful production, sale and distribution of
the aforementioned products in India."
The said agreement related to two classes of products, namely,
"Whitehall Products" and "Weyth Products". We are concerned in
this Appeal with Whitehall Products. The term "Whitehall
Products" was defined in the said agreement as meaning "all
formulations owned by or whose sales are promoted under the
direction of Whitehall Laboratories Division of American Home
Products Corporation or International Chemical company Limited
which are manufactured and sold under the name or trade marks of
Whitehall Laboratories Division of American Home Products
Corporation or International Chemical Company Limited and
packaged in form for sale and distribution by the trade to the
ultimate consumer". The term "Ucensed Products" was defined in
the said agreement as meaning "those Whitehall Products whose
import, manufacture, sale or distribution in India by Geoffrey
Manners are licensed under and pursuant to the terms of this
Agreement. These shall include those identified in Schedule a
annexed hereto and made a part hereof." Schedule A to the said
agreement set out four products, namely, 'Anacin' , 'Kolynos'
Dental Cream, 'Bi&1llag' , and 'Anne French' Cleansing Milk.
'DRISTAN' was thus not mentioned in the said Schedule A. Under
the said agreement, the Appellant agreed to furnish or cause to
be furnished to the Indian Company the manufacturing technology
and other assistance essential for the efficient manufacture by
the Indian Company of inter alia the Licensed Products and
further agreed that qualified employees of the Indian Company may
visit the laboratories, plants and facilities of the Appellant to
observe and learn for the period required to obtafo the necessary
working knowledge, the methods and equipment for the production
of the Licensed Products and that qualified members of the
appellant would be assigned to discuss such method and equipment
with such qualified employees of the Indian Company during the
period of their visits. The Indian company likewise agreed that
qualified employees of the appellant may visit the laboratories,
plants and facilities of the Indian Company in order to observe
and examine the methods being employed and the equipment being
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used for the Licensed Products. The Appellant further agreed to
supply to the Indian <'.ompany a written description of each
process utilized for the production of Licensed Products
including flowsheets of processes, necessary test methods and
basic specifications for apparatus and equipment utilized in
production and that thereafter the Appellant and the Indian
Company should furnish each other with all significant
information which either of them developed and was free to
disclose concerning improvements in the processes and in the
equipment, raw materials and intermediates used therein. It was
further agreed that before making any offer to a third party or
contracting any •~onnnitment with a third party for the purpose of
manufacture and sale in India of any Whitehall Products, the
Appellant would offer to the Indian Company, upon the terms and
conditions set out in the said agreement, "the right to
manufacture, sell and/or distribute" such products in India. In
the event of such off er being accepted by the Indian Company in
respect of any Whitehall product, such product would be deemed a
Licensed Product for the purposes of the said agreement. During
the period 0f the said agreement, the Indian Company agreed not
to manufacture, distribute or sell any new products whose
production or sale would compete with the production and sale of
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the Licensed Products except with the prior consent thereto in
writing obtained from the Appellant, and the Appellant granted to
the Indian Company for the duration of the said agreement an
exclusive and non-transferable license to make and sell the
Licensed Product:• in India under the name or marks which for
these purposes the Appellant would design or cause to be designed
for such products. Clause (a) of Article IV of the said agreement
inter alia provided that "Rights of registered user will be
extended to Geoffrey Manners in respect of each Licensed Product
by the proprietor of such trade mark". Further, under the said
agreement the Appellant was to furnish to the Indian Company the
manufacturing technology applicable to each Licensed'Product and
to provide reasonable engineering and technical assistance and
instructions to those representatives of the Indian Company who
were to direct or supervise the manufacture of such products and
who would visit the Appellant's plants for such assistance and
instructions. The advertising expenditures, plar.s and budgets for
each fiscal year with respect to each Licensed Products was to be
determined annually and approved by the Appellant and the
selection, appointment of all advertising agencies by the Indian
Company for promoting the sale and distribution of the Licensed
Products was to have the previous agreement in writing of the
Appellant. The said agreement also set out in detail the various
AMERICAN H.P.CORPN. v. MAC LABS. [MADON, J.]
289
services which were to be rendered by the Appellant to the Indian
Company. The said agreement was to continue in force for an
indefinite period of time subject to its sooner termination in
the event of any of the eventualities set out in the said
agreement taking place, one of them being that of the Appellant
ceasing to be the owner of at least 40 per cent of the issued and
outstanding share capital of the Indian Company. The said
agreement contained a secrecy clause and upon the termination of
the said agreement, the Indian Company had to return to the
Appellant all manufacturing technology received by it from the
Appellant and not to make any use of it thereafter.
In pursuance of the said collaboration agreement the Indian
Company manufactured and marketed the products covered thereunder
and got itself registered as the registered user in respect of
the trade marks relating to the said goods of which the Appellant
was the registered proprietor. The correspondence on the record
shows that on and from December 1957 it was decided that the
Indian Company should introduce in the Indian market nine new
products of the Appellant including 'DRISTAN' tablets. On August
I
18, 1958, the Appellant filed an application under section 14(1)
of the Trade Marks Act, 1940 (Act No. V of 1940) in the
prescribed form TM-I for registration of the trade mark 'DRISTAN'
in class 5 (which includes pharmaceutical substances) as a
medicinal preparation for treatment of respiratory ailments
claiming to be the proprietor of the said mark by whom the said
mark was proposed to be used. The said application was advertised
as required by the Trade Marks Rules, 1942. No aotice of
opposition to the registration of the said trade mark was filed
by anyone and the trade mark 'DRISTAN' was re&istered by the
Registrar of Trade Marks, Bombay, as Trade Mark No. 186511 Ln
class 5 on June 8, 1959. With effect from November 25, 1959, the
Trade Marks Act, 1940, was repealed and replaced by the Trade and
Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 (Act No. 43 of 1958).
Thereafter the Indian Company applied for and obtained a
licence for the purchase of a Stokes Triple Layer Machine which
could produce two-layered tablets, the intention being to use
this machine for the purpose of manufacturing 'DRISTAN' tablets.
The Indian Company intimated this fact to the Appellant asking it
to supply urgently the manufacturing manual for 'DRISTAN'
tablets. The Indian Company also wrote to the Appellant asking it
to supply free of cost
three
units
(comprising
twenty
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four
tablets in all) of 'DRISTAN' tablets as samples. The manufacturing manual as also the samples were duly sent by the <\.ppellant to
the Indian Company.
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On May 31, 1960, Mac Laboratories Private Limited, the First
Respondent in this Appeal, applied for registration of the trade
mark 'TRISTINE' in class 5 in respect of its medicinal
preparation for symptomatic treatment of respiratory ailments. On
January 18, 1961, the Appellant filed a notice of opposition to
the registration of the said mark 'TRISTINE' on the ground that
it was deceptively similar to its trade mark 'DRISTAN', The
Appellant's opposition was not accepted by the Assistant
Registrar of Trade Marks, Bombay, and by his order dated March
27, 1962, he ordered the trade mark 'TRISTINE' to be registered
in Part A of the Register of Trade Marks. The Appellant thereupon
filed an appeal in the Bombay High Court which was allowed by a
learned Single Judge of that High Court on February 5, 1963. The
First Respondent thereupon filed an appeal before a Division
Bench of the said High Court and the Division Bench on April 19,
1968, allowed the said appeal but directed that the Respondent's
application be amended so as to read the trade mark 'TRIS7INE' as
'TRISTINA I .
In the meantime, while the First Respondent 1 s application
for registration of the trade mark 'TRISTINE' was pentling, the
Indian Company applied on September 23, 1960, to the Central
Government under section 11 of the Industries (Developnent and
Regulation) Act, 1951, for a licence to manufacture the tablets
'DRISTAN'. In the said application, the Indian Company stated :
"No Royalty payment is involved. This new product will
be marketed under the trade mark 'DRISTAN' which
belongs to American Home Products Corporation, New
York who own 40% of the Company's capital and whose
products are manufactured and distributed by us in
India."
The Indian Company installed the said Stokes machine at its
Ghatkopar factory on October 5, 1960 and also informed the
appellant that as the said machine was installed, the Indian
Company would be working on experimental batches of 'DRISTAN'
tablets after completing a few formalities with the Government.
It also wrote to the said Home Products International I..irll.ted
requesting it for a sample of 200 gms of Phenindamine Tartarate
u.s.P., one of the ingredients used in the n:a.~ufacture of
'DRISTAN' tablets. The Indian Company also applied for an import
licence for import of Phenylophrine Hydrocloride and Phenindamirre
Tartarate to the value of Rs. 6,000 and Rs. 12,000 c.i.f, Bombay
respectively for the purpose of initial production of 'DRISTA..~'
..
AMERICAN H.P.CORPN. v. MAC LABS. [MADON, J.]
291
tablets. The licence under the Industries (Developm'!llt and
Regulation) Act, 1951 was granted to the Indian Company on
January 19, 1961, for the manufacture of 'DRISTAN' tablets to the
extent of five lakhs tablets per month. Two of the conditions of
the said licence were that "no royalty would be payable" and that
"the product Will b.e marketed With the trade mark already in use
or Without any trade mark"·. A further condition was that no
special concession in regard to the import of basic raw materials
and ingredients would be sought in relaxation of the general
policy in force from time to time. On January 23, 1961, the
Indian Company applied to the Director, Drugs control Administration, State of Maharashtra, for permission to manufacture
'DRISTAN' tablets. The said application was approved by the Drugs
Controller on February 10, 1961. Meanwhile, on January 18, 1961,
the Appellant had filed a notice of opposition to the application
for registration of the mark 'TRISTINE'. As a counterblast to the
said notice of opposition, the First Respondent on April 10,
1961, filed With the Registrar of Trade Marks, Calcutta, an
application, being Application No. Cal-17, for rectifying the
Register of Trade Marks by removing therefrom the l\ppellant' s
trade mark 'DRISTAN'. On May 5, 1961, the first Respondent applied for amendment of the said Recitif ication Application by
substituting the paragraph containing the submissions in support
of the grounds taken therein by a new paragraph. This application
for am'endment was allowed.
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On October 18, 1961, an agreement was entered into between
the Appellant and the Indian Company for granting to the Indian
Company the non-exclusive right to use the trade mark 'DRISTAN'
upon or in relation to the goods in respect of which the said
trade mark was registered during the unexpired residue of the
term of the registration of the said trade mark and during all
extensions of the same subject to the determination of the said
agreement as provided therein. By the said agreement, the Indian
Company agreed to become the registered user of the said trade
mark 'DRISTAN' and further agreed that the rights granted to it
under the said agreement would not be deemed to entitle it to use
the said trade mark otherWise than as the registered user
thereof. Clauses 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the said agreement provided
as follows
F
G
"3. The Indian Company shall follow the formulae and
specifications prescribed and supplied by the American
Company. The Indian Company will conform to the
teclulical
advice
tendered,
will
use
the
quality
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1985] SUPP.3 s.c.R.
control n.ethods prescribed by or on behalf of the
American Company in the course of manufacture of the
goods and will not place upon the market any goods
which do not attain to the standard of quality fixed
by the American Company.
4. To ensure maintenance of standards, the Indian
Company will submit to the American Company or to
laboratories designated by the American Company for
test purposes batch samples of the goods manufactured
and also permit duly authorised representatives of the
American Company to examine and inspect the Indian
Company's installations and manufacturing processes
and control methods used in the manufacture of the
said goods on the premises of the Indian Company at
any time.
D
5. The Indian Company convenants that it will not use
the said Trade Mark in any manner whatsoever which may
jeopardize the significance, distinctiveness or validity of the said Trade r.ark and the Indian Company will
take all steps within its power to protect and defend
E
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or assist in protecting defendiI!b the right of the
American Company in and to the said Trade Mark.
6. All use of the said Trade Mark by the Indian
Company shall clearly show its ownership by the
American Company and its use by the Indian Company
only by permission of the American Company. The Indian
Company therefore will apply and use the said Trade
Nark only in such form and manner as the American
Company may from time to time direct and all labels,
containers, packing, pamphlets, advertising and the
like shall show the said Trade Mark in manner, design
and use as the American Company so directs and with
the prior approval in writing of the American Company.
7. There is no royalty or other relllUileration payable
by the Indian Company to the American Company for the
proposed permitted use of the said Trade Nark."
H
The said agreement provided that in the event of any breach or
default by the Indian Company of any of the conditions contained
in the said agreement, the appellant would have the right to
prohibit forthwith further use by the IndiaJ Crnupany of the trade
AMERICAN H.P.CORPN. v. MAC LABS. [MADON, J.]
293
mark 'DRISTAN'. The said agreement was to remain in force until
determined by either party by ninety days' notice in writing and
in the event of such termination the Indian Company was to
discontinue all further use of the said trade mark and to deliver
to the Appellant the manufacturing techonology relating to the
said tablets 'DRISTAN' including formulae, raw materials,
finishing materials and packing materials supplied by or on
/
behalf of the Appellant and to hold at the disposition of the
Appellant or its authorized representative all stocks of finished
goods ready for transfer to any party or parties to whom the
Appellant or its authorized representative may direct delivery
against payment of any accrued or unpaid manufacturing charges
with respect to the .same.
On October 22, 1961, the 'DRISTAN' tablets were first
marketed in India by Indian Company. On March 6, 1962, a joint
application in Form 'IM-28 was made by the Appellant and the
Indian Company for registering the Indian Company as a registered
user of the trade mark 'DRISTAN' in respect of the goods for
which it was registered subject to the following conditions or
restrictions set out in the said application :"The Trade Mark is to be used by the registered user
in relation to the goods only so long as the goods are
manufactured in accordance with the formulae and
specifications prescribed and supplied by the
registered proprietor, only so long as the registered
user conforms to the technical advice tendered and
uses the quality control methods prescribed by or on
behalf of the registered proprietor in the course of
manufacture of the goods and only so long as the
registered proprietor has a right to inspect, on the
premises of the registered user, the goods, the
installations, manufacturing processes and control
methods used in the manufacture of the goods and is
supplied on request with samples of the goods."
In the said application it was stated that the prop~sed permitted
use was without limit of period subject to the right of the
registered proprietor-, namely the Appellant, to apply for cancellation of the registered user forthwith after giving ninety days
notice in writing to the Indian Company. The said application was
accompanied by an affidavit of Kenneth A. Bonham, the Executive
Vice President of the Appellant, affinned on October 18, 1961,
that the trade mark 'DRISTAN' was not till then used in India. In
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[1985) SUPP.3 s.c.a.
A
view of the said rectification proceedings, the said application
for registering the Indian Company as registered user of the
trade mark 'DRISTAN' was not processed but kept pending until the
final decision of the Rectification Application made by the First
Kespondent.
B
On December 7, 1964, the Registrar of Trade Marks, Calcutta,
dismissed with costs the First Respondent's Rectification Application. The First Respondent thereupon filed an appeal in the
Calcutta High Court, being Appeal No.61 of 1965, making the
Second Respondent before us thP. Registrar of Trade Marks,
Calcutta, the Second Respondent thereto. A learned single Judge
of the said High Court by his judgment delivered on May 10, 13
and 14, 1968, reported as Mac laboratories Private Ltd. v.
American lilllDe Products Corporation and Anr. A.I.a. 1969 Cal. 342,
allowed the said appeal with costs and set aside the order of the
Registrar of Trade Marks. Thereupon, the Appellant filed a
further appeal, being Appeal No. 165 of 1968. A Division Bench of
the said High Court by its judgment and order dated December 16,
1969, reported as American lbDe Products Corpn. v. Mac
Laboratories Private Ltd. and Anr. (1970-71) 75 c.w.N. 118, s.c.,
[1984] Fleet Street Reports 215, dismissed the said appeal with
no order as to costs. It is against this judgment and order that
the present Appeal by certificate has been filed.
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In order to appreciate what was held by the Registrar of
Trade Marks and the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench
of the Calcutta High Court and to test the correctness of the
rival submissions advanced before us, it is now necessary to
refer to the relevant statutory provisions.
The first legislation in India relating to trade marks was
the Trade Marks Act, 1940 (Act No. V of 1940), hereinafter
referred to as "the 1940 Act". The 1940 Act was repealed and
replaced with effect from November 25, 1959, by the Trade and
Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 (Act No. 43 of 1958), hereinafter
referred to as "the 1958 Act". Section 2 of the 1958 Act is the
definition section. Clause (v) of section 2(1) defines the
expression "trade mark" inter alia as meaning "a mark used or
proposed to be used in relation to goods for the purpose of
indicating or so as to indicate a connection in the course of
trade between the goods and some person having the right, either
as proprietor or as registered user, to use the mark whether with
or without any indication of the identity of that person". The
definition of the expression "trade mark" contained in clause (1)
AMERICAN H.P.CORPN. v. MAC LABS. [MADON, J.]
295
of section 2 of the 1940 Act was the same as the portion of
clause (v) of section 2(1), of th2 1958 Act reproduced above.
Under clause (b) of section 2(2) any reference to the use of a
mark in relation to the goods is to be construed as "a reference
to the use of the mark upon, or in any physical or in any other
relation whatsoever, to such goods". Clauses ( q) , ( r) and ( s)
of section 2(1) define the expressions "registered propritor",
"registered trade mark" and "registered user". They read as
follows :
"(q) 'registered proprietor', in relation to a trade
mark, means the person for the time being entered in
the register as proprietor of the trade mark;
A
B
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(r) 'registered trade mark' means a trade mark which
is actually on the register;
(s) 'registered user' means a person who is for the
time being registered as such under section 49".
D
Clause (x) of section 2(1) defines the expression "tribunal" as
meaning "the Registrar or, as the case may be, the High C.Ourt,
before which the proceeding concerned is pending".
The other definition which is relevant for our purpose is
that of the expression "permitted use" contained in clause (m) of
section 2(1). That definition is as follows :
"(m)
'permitted use',
E
in relation to a registered
trade mark, means the use of a trade mark (i) by a registered user of the trade mark in relation
to goods -
F
(a) with which he is connected in the course of trade;
and
(b) in respect of which the trade
registered for the time being; and
mark
remains
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(c) for which he is registered as registered user; and
(ii)
which
complies
with
any
conditions
or
restrictions to which the registration of the trade
mark is subject".
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Section 6 provides for the maintenance of a record called
the Register of Trade Marks in which all registered trade marks
are to be entered. Under section 7(1), the Register is to be
divided into two perts called respectively Part A and Part l!.
Under section 7(2), the Register or Trade Marks existing at the
commencement of the 1958 Act is to be incorporated with and to
form part of Part A of the Register. The Appellant's trade mark
'DIUSTAN' having been registered under the 1940 Act, it became
part of Part A of the Register of Trade Marks under the 1958 Act.
Under section 136(2), a registration made under the 1940 Act is,
if in force at the commencement of the 1958. Act, to continue in
force and have effect as if made under the corresponding provision of the 1958 Act. Sub-section (l) of section 9 of the 1958
Act, which corresponds to sub-section (1) of section 6 of the
1940 Act sets out the requisites for registration cf a trade
mark. Under it a trade mark is not to be registered in Part A of
the Register unless it contains or consists of at least one of
the essential particulars set out in that sub-section. One of the
essential particulars set out in section 9(1) is "one or more
invented words".
D
Sub-section (1) and (4) of section 18 provide as follows
"18. Application for llegi.stration. E
F
(l) Any person claiming to be the proprietor of a
trade mark used or proposed to be used by him, who is
desirous of registering it, shall apply in writing to
the Registrar in the prescribed manner for the
registration of his trade mark either in Part A or in
Part B of the Register.
x
x
x
x
x
x
(4) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the
Registrar may refuse the application or may accept Jt
absolutely or subject to such amendments, modificaG
tions, conditions or limitations, i f any as he may
think fit,"
The Appellant's application for registration of the trade mark
'DRISTAN' was made under section 14(1) of the 1940 Act which
provided as follows :
H
"14. Application for registration.-
AMERICAN H.P.CORPN. v. MAC LABS. (MADON, J.]
297
( l) Any person claiming to be the proprietor of a
'trade mark used or proposed to be used by him who is
desirous of registering it shall apply in writing to
the Registrar in the prescribed manner, and subject to
the provisions of this Act, the Regi5trat may refuse
the application or may accept it absolutely or subject
to such all!endments, modifications, conditions or
limitations, if any, as he may think fit."
It is pertinent to note that both under section 14(1) of the 1940
Act anc;I section 18(1) of the 1958 Act, an application for
registration must be a person claiming to be the proprietor of a
trade mark used or proposed to be used by him. Therefore, unless
it is the case of an applicant for registration that he is the
proprietor of a trade mark which has been used by him or which is
pfoposed to be used by him, he is not entitled to registration.
Admittedly, in this case the trade mark 'DRISTAN' was not at any
time used by the Appellant in India at the date when it made its
application for registration on August 18, 1958, nor did it claim
in its application that the said trade mark had been so used by
it. wbat was stated in the said application was that the said
A
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trade mark was proposed to be used by it. Once an application for
registration is made and accepted by the Registrar, the Registrar
has to cause the application to be advertised and within three
months from the date of the advertisement, any person may lodge
with the Registrar a notice of opposition in writing to the
registration of such mark. A copy of such notice of opposition is
to be served upon the applicant. These provisions made in
sections 20 and 21 of the 1958 Act correspond to section 15 of
the 1940 Act. Under section 23(1), if the application has not
been opposed "'!d the time for giving the notice of opposition has
expired or if the application has been opposed and the opposition
has. been decided in favour of the applicant, the Registrar is
"unless the Central Government otherwise directs" to register the
said trade mark in Part A or Part B of the Register, as the case
may be. The trade mark when registered is to be registered
of
the date of the making of the application for registration and
such date is to be deemed to be the date of registration. A
similar provisions existed in section 16 of the 1940 Act. No
notice of opposition to the registration of the trade mark
'DRISTAN' was ever lodged by anyone, and accordingly i t was
ordered to be registered by the Registrar of Trade Marks. In view
of the provisions of section 16 of the 1940 Act, the said trade
mark 'DRISTAN' was to be deemed for the purposes of the 1940 Act
to be registered from the date of the application for its
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SUPREME CO{)R1: REPORTS
[1985] SUPP.3 s.c.R.
registration, namely, from ~ust 18, 1958, and even after the
coming intc force of the 1958 Act to be deemed to be registered
from the same date for the purposes of the 1958 Act. Under
section 25 of the 1958 Act, which corresponds to section 18 of
the 1940 Act, the registration of a trade mark is to be for a
period of seven years, but can be renewed from time to time on
application made by the registered proprietor of the trade mark
in the prescribed manner and! within the prescribed period and
subject to the payment of the prescribed fee. The renewal of the
registration of a trade mark is to be for a period of seven years
from the date of expiration of the original registration or the
last renewal of registration, ~s the case may be.
The registration of a trade mark confers very valuable
rights upon the registered proprietor of that trade mark. Under
section 27(1) of the 1958 Act, no person can institute any
proceeding to prevent, or to recover damages for, the infringement of an unregistered trade mark. However, his right of action
against any person for passins off goods as the goods of another
person or the remedies in r:espect thereof is not affected by
reason of the fact that his trade mark is an unregistered one.
Under section 28(1) of the 1958 Act, subject to other provisions
of the Act, the registration of a trade mark, if valid, gives to
the registered proprietor of the trade mark the exclusive right
to the use of the trade mark in relation to the goods in respect
of which the trade mark is tegistered and to obtain relief in
respect of that a company is about to be formed and registered
under the Companies Act, 1956, and that the applicant intends to
assign the trade mark to that company with a view to the use
thereof in relation to those goods by the company.
(2) Th!' tribunal may, in a.case to which sub-section (1)
applies, require the applicant to give security for the costs of
any proceedings relative to any opposition or appeal, and in
default of such security being duly given may treat the application as abandoned.
( 3) Where in a case to which sub-section ( 1) applies, a
trade mark in respect of any goods is registered in the name of
an applicant who relies on intention to assign the trade mark to
a company, then, unless within such period as may be prescribed,
or within such further period not exceeding six months as the
Registrar may, on application being made to him in the prescribed
manner, allow, the company has been registered as the proprietor
of the trade marks in respect of those goods, the registration
AMERICAN H.P.CORPN. v. MAC LABS. [MADON, J.]
299
shall ceased to have effect in respect thereof at the expiration
of that period, and the Registrar shall amend the register
accordingly."
A
An important section for the purpose of the present Appeal
is section 46 which provides for removal of a registered trade
mark from the Register. The infringement of the trade mark in the
manner provided by the 1958 Act. A similar provision was to be . B
found in section 21(1) of the 1940 Act. Section 29 of the 1958
Act defines what constitutes infringement of a trade mark while
section 30 sets out the acts which do not constitute an
infringement of the right to the use of a registered trade mark.
Under section 36, a registered proprietor of a trade mark has the
power t~ assign the trade mark. Under section 37, a trade mark is
C
assignable and transmissible whether with or without the goodwill
of the business concerned and that in respect either of all the
goods in respect of which the trade mark is registered or of some
only of those goods. Under section 38, an unregistered trade mark
is not assignable or transmissible except in the cases set out in
sub-section (2) of that section.
D
Section 45 provides as follows
"45 Proposed use of trade mark by ccmpa11y to be
formed.E
(1) No application for the registration of a trade
mark in respect of any goods shall be refused, nor
shall permission for such registration be withheld, on
the ground only that it appears that the applicant
does not use or propose to use the trade mark, if the
Registrar is satisfied material provisions of section
46 are as follows :
"46.
llemoval' frm
register
and
imposition
F
of
limitatioDB on grouod of oon-use.-
(1) Subject to the provisions of section 47, a
registered trade mark may be taken off the register in
respect of any of the goods in respect of which it is
registered on application made in the prescribed
manner to a High Court or to the Registrar by any
person aggrieved on the ground either (a) that the trade 'mark was registered without any
bona fide intention on the part of the applicant for
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300
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[1985] SUPP.3 s.c.R.
registration that it should be used in relation to
those goods by him or, in a case to which the
provisions of section 45 apply, by the company
concerned, and that there has, in fact, been no bona
fide use of the trade mark in relation to those goods
by any proprietor. thereof for the time being up to a
date one month before the date of the application; or
B
(b) that up to a date one month before the date of the
application, a continuous period of five years or
longer had elapsed during which the trade mark was
registered and during which there was no bona fide use
thereof in relation to those goods by any proprietor
thereof for the time being:
c
D
E
Provided that, except where the applicant has been
permitted under sub-section (3) of section 12 to
register an identical or nearly resembling trade mark
in respect of the goods in question or where the
tribunal is of opinion that he might properly be
permitted so to register such a trade mark, the
tribunal may refuse an application under clause (a) or
clause (b) in relation to any goods, if it is shown
that there has been, before the relevant date or
during the relevant period, as the case may be, bona
fide use of the trade mark by any proprietor thereof
for the time being in relation to goods of the same
description, being goods in respect of which the trade
mark is registered. ~
x
F
x
x
x
x
(3) An application shall not be entitled to rely for
the purpose of clause (b) of sub-section (l) or for
the purposes of sub-section (2) on any non-use of a
trade mark which is shown to have been due to special
circ\.DUStances in the trade and not to any intention to
abandon or not to use the trade mark in relation to
the goods to which the application relates."
G
The First Respondent's said application for rectification
was made both under section 46 and 56 of the 1958 Act. Under
section 56(2), any person aggrieved by any entry made in the
Register of Trade Marks without sufficient cause or by any entry
wrongly remaining on the Register may apply in the prescribed
H
AMERICAN H.P.CORPN. v. MAC LABS. (MADON, J.]
301
manner to a High Court or to the Registrar, and the tribunal may
make such order for making, expunging or varying the entry as it
may think fit. Under section 56(4), this power can also •be
exercised by the High Court or the Registrar of its own motion
after giving notice to the parties concerned and after giving
them an opportunity of being heard. This power includes the power
to cancel or vary the registration of a trade mark. Against such
an order made by the Registrar rectifying, cancell!Lng or removi·ng
a trade mark from the Register of Trade Marks., an appeal lies
under section 109 to a Single .Judge of the High Court and against
an order made by the Single Judge of the High Court, a further
appeal lies to a Bench of the High Court.
What is now required to be set out is section 48 .of the 1958
Act, the interpretation of which is crucial for the purpose of
deciding this Appeal, for that section provides for registration
of a registered user and the effect of such registration.
Section 48 provides as follows
A
.II
c
D
"48. Registered users.(1) Subject to the provisions of section 49, a person
other than the registered proprietor of a trade mark
may be registered as the registered user thereof in
respect of any or all of the goods in respect of which
the trade mark is registered otherwise than as a
defP.nsive trade mark; but the Central Government may,
by rules made in this behalf, provide that no application for registration as such shall be entertained
unless the agreement between the parties complies with
the. conditions laid down in the rules for preventing
trafficking in trade marks.
(2) The permitted use of a trade mark shall be deemed
t.o be use by the proprietor thereof, and shall be
deemed not to be use by a person other. than the
proprietor, for the purposes of section 46 or for any
other purpose for which such use is material under
this Act or any other law."
Section 49 prescribes the procedure for registration
registered user and is in the following terms
of
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F
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a
"49. Application for registration as registered user.-
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302
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1985] SUPP.3 s.c.R.
(1) Where it is proposed that a person should be
registered as a registered user of a trade mark, the
registered proprietor and the proposed registered user
shall jointly apply in writing to the Registrar in the
prescribed manner, and every such application shall be
accompanied by -
B
(i) the agreement in writing or a duly authenticated
copy thereof, entered into between the registered
proprietor and the proposed registered user wi.th
respect to the permitted use of the trade mark; and
c
D
(ii) an affidavit made by the registered proprietor or
by some person authorised to the satisfaction of the
Registrar to act on his behalf,(a) giving particulars of the relationship, existing
or proposed, between the proprietor and the proposed
registered user, including particulars showing the
degree of control by the proprietor over the permitted
use which their relationship will confer and whether
it is a term of their relationship that the proposed
registered user shall be the sole registered user or
that there shall be any other restriction as to
persons for whose registration as registered users
application may be made;
E
(b) stating the goods in respect of which registration
is proposed;
F
(c) stating the conditions or restrictions, i f any,
proposed with respect to the characteristics of the
goods, to the mode or place of permitted use, or to
any another matter;
(d) stating whether the permitted use is to be for a
period or without limit of period, and, if for a
period, the duration thereof; and
G
(iii) such further documents or other evidence as may
be required by the Registrar or as may be prescribed.
H
(2) When the requirements of sub-section (1) have been
complied with to his satisfaction, the Registrar shall
forward the application together with his report and
all the relevant documents to the Central Government.
AMERICAN H.P.CORPN· v. MAC LABS. [MADON, J,j
303
(3) On receipt of an application under sub-section
(2), the Central Government, having regard to all the
circumstances of the case and to the 1nterests of the
general public, and the development of any industry,
trade or connnerce in India, may direct the Registrar -
A
(a) to refuse the application; or
B
(b) to accept application either absolutely or subject
to any conditions, restrictions or limitations which
the Central Government may think proper to impose;
Provided that no direction for refusing the application or for its acceptance conditionally shall be
made unless the applicant has been given an opportunity of being heard.
(4) The Registrar shall dispose of the application ln
accordance with the directions issued by the Central
Government under sub-section (3).
c
D
(5) The Central Government and the Registrar shall, i f
so requested by the applicant, take steps for securing
that Information given for the purpose of an application Ut-ider this section (other than matters entered
E
in the register) is not disclosed to rivals in trade.
(6) The Registrar shall issue notice in the prescribed
manner of the registration of a person as .a registered
user, to other registered users of the trade mark, if
any."
F
As we have seen,
before a person can be registered as a
registered user of a registered trade mark, the registered user's
agreement between the parties is to comply with the conditions
laid down in the Rules for preventing trafficking in trade marks.
Section 133 confers upon the Central Government, by notification
published in the Official Gazette and subject to the condition of
G
previous publication, the power to make. rules to carry out the
purposes of the 1958 Act. Under section 134, all rules so made
are to be laid for not less than thirty days before each House of
Parliament as soon as may be after they are made and are to be
subject to such modifications as Parliament may make in the
session in which they are so laid or the session immediately
H
304
A
B
c
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E
F
G
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1985J SUPP.3 s.c.R.
following. In exercise of this power the Central Government has
made the Trade and Merchandise Marks Rules, 1959. Chapter V of
these Rules coflsisting of Rules 82 to 93 relates to registered
users. Under Rule 82, an application for registering a person as
a registerea user is to be made in Form TH-28 jointly by the
proposed registered user and the registered proprietor of the
trade mark and is to be accompanied inter alia by the agreement
in writing or a duly authenticated copy thereof entered into
between the registered proprietor and the proposed registered
user with respect to the permitted use of the trade mark. Rule 85
is in the following terms :
"85. Consideration by the Central Goverooent.The Central Government, on receipt of an application
for registration as registered user forwarded to it by
the Registrar under sub-section (2) of section 49,
shall, if satisfied that the application and the
accompanying doc\.Ullents comply with the provisions of
the Act and the rules, consider whether the application should be allowed having regard to the matters
specified in sub-section (3) of that section, and in
doing so may take into account all or any of the
following matters :(1) whether the permitted use if allowed would
contravene the policy of the Act which is to prevent
trafficking in trade marks;
(2) whether the registered proprietor has registered
the trade mark without any bona fide intention to use
it in relation to his goods in the course of trade or
solely or mainly for the purpose of permitting others
to use it under agreements for registered user; and
(3) whether the registered proprietor has acquired
title to the trade mark by assignment without any
bona fide intention to use it in relation to his goods
in the course of trade or solely . or mainly for the
purpose of permitting others to use it under agreements for registered user.
Explanation I. - For considering the bona fides of the
registration of the trade mark under clause (2) regard shall be
had inter alia to -
\a). whether tlle goods for which the trade mark is
registered are similar to or are different from the
g:oods in which the registered proprietor h:3.s been
A
trading or dealing before the registration of the
mark;
( b) whether the registered proprietor has ever used
the mark in question in relation to his 11oods l.n the
course of trade before the date of the agreement for
registered user, and ii 1>0 1 the amount aud duration of
such us~r;
ll
(c) whether the terms as to royalty and other
rt!lllu11eratlor. payable by the proposed registered user
and reasonat>le taking into account the expenses which
the registered proprietor LS likely to incur in
exercising control over the permitted use.
C
n. - r'or considering the bona. fidcs of the
of title undel· clause (3) regara sha.L.L b~ had,
besid.is the matters set· out in Explanation I to tho foll~wint>
funher matter, n£llllely, whether the rei;istered proprietor hua
oot<Lined assignment of other registere<l trade uiarks and 1f so,
wt1«ther he has dealt with such other 11lilrks by way of assignment
or registered user."
~xplanation
J)
acquisl~.(oa
C
Three 11rowids were taken in the First Respondent's Appll.c;;tiou for tw.ccification. lt will focilicate an understundiug of
the contl'oversy between the partJ.es if we were to reproduce these
~rounds. 'fhey Jr0 :
"(i) .That the said tr11de mark 'ilRlSTM' ia d~ceptively
and confcsi1110lY silllilar t:o the trade wark 'llISTAli'
registered wider No. 122391 in class 5 (advertised in
l'.M. Journal No. 47) in the nawe of Messrs Prof,
Gajjar's Standard Chemical Works Ltd., of Bombay. The
said trade mark 'BISTAN' has been used and is beillll
usec! by ics said proprietors in respect of their
medicinal preparation since several years past.
F
G
(ii) That the Registered Proprietor of the said trade
mark 'DRISTAN' alleged in the said opposition No. Bom.
76 that the sa:Ld trade mark 'ORISTAN' is deceptively
similar to the said trade mark ' TRISl'INE' which the
II
A
[1985] SUPP.3 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
306
Applicants have lawfully been using since October 1960
in respect of their medicinal preparation.
(iii) That there has been no bonafide use of the said
trade mark 'DRISTAN' in India in relation to the
goods for which it is registered by any proprietor
thereof for the time being upto date one month before
B
the date of this application."
The second ground mentioned above was taken in order make out
C
that the First Respondent was a "person aggrieved" for the
purposes of section 46 and 56(2) of the 1958 Act. The Appellant
had contested this position but this particular controversy does
not survive for it is no more in dispute that the First
Respondent was person aggrieved.
The submissions set out in the said Application for
Rectification in support of the above three grounds were
substituted by fresh submissions by an amendment as mentioned
earlier. These submissions define the scope of the controversy
between the parties. The submissions so substituted were
lJ
"(i) That the said trade mark
'DRISTAN' was not
distinctive mark and/or was not registerable trade
mark under Sec.6 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940
(corresponding to Section 9 of Act No. 40 of 1958),
except upon evidence of its distinctiveness and no
such evidence was submitted to the Registrar before
registration.
F
(ii) ·That the said trade mark was registered in
contravention of Section 8 of the Trade Marko Act,
1940 (corresponding to Section 11 of the present Act,
of 1958).
(iii)
That the said trade mark offends against the
provisions of Section 11 of the Act.
(iv)
That
distinctive
proprietors.
the said
of
the
trade mark
goods
of
'DRISTAN' is not
the registered
(v) That the said trade mark 'DRISTAN' was registered
without any bonafide intention on the part of the
Applicants for registration that it should be used in
H
'
AMERICAN H.P.<XlRPN. v. MAC LABS. (MADON, J.]
307
relation to their medicinal preparation for symptomatic treatment of respiratory ailments by them and
that there has, in fact, been no bona fide use in
India of the said trade mark 'DRISTAN' in relation to
the sai~ goods by the said proprietors upto a date one
month before the date of this application."
A
B
All the above submissions were rejected by the Registrar.
In coming to the conclusion that the Appellant had the bona fide
intention to use the trade mark 'DRISTAN' the Registrar relied
upon the decision of Lloyd-Jacob, J,, in the case of 'llOSTI'l'Cll'
Trade Hark, (1963) R.P.c. 183. Accordingly, the Registrar dismissed the said Rectification Application. During the course of
the proceedings, a carton of 'DRISTAN' tablets was filed along
with an affidavit made on bahalf of the First Respondent. The
legend upon the said carton read as follows :
"MADE IN INDIA BY ; GEOFFREY MANNERS & CO. LIMITED,
Magnet House, Doughall Road, Bombay for the Proprietors Whitehall Laboratories, New York, N.Y., U.S.A."
The Registrar held that Whitehall Laboratories was not a separate
legal entity and, therefore, the mark could not be registered in
its name but only in the name of the Appellant of which it formed
a part and accordingly the Registrar ordered the entry in the
Register relating to the Trade Mark 'DRISTAN' to be varied by
C
D
E
amending the registered proprietor's name to read as "American
Home Products Corporation ( a corporation organised under the
laws of the State of Delaware, United States of America) trading
as Whitehall Laboratories". In the appeal filed by the First
Respondent against the order of the Registrar the learned single
Judge held that at the date of the making of the application for
registration the Appellant did not have a bona fide intention to
use the trade mark 'DRISTAN', by itself. In coming to this conclusion the learned Single Judge relied upon the decision of the
lloard of Trade in England in the case of 'PUSSY GALORE' Trade
Mark, (1967) R.P.C. 265, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the
"Shavaksha Committee Report"), and the Report of Mr. Justice
Rajagopala Ayyangar on Trade Marks Law Revision, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as "the Ayyangar Report"). The learned Single
Judge further held that the Appellant had not at any time used
the said trade mark in relation to the goods in respect of which
it was registered. According to the
legal fiction created by
learned
section 48(2)
of
Single
the
Judge,
1958
F
G
the
Act came
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308
A
Jl
c
D
F
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SllPliliME' COURT REPORTS
[1985] SUPP.3 s.c.a.
intv play only after a trade mark was registered and that an
intention to use a trade mark through someone who would
subsequently get himself registered as a registered user did not
amount to an intention on the part of the applicant for
rei;istratlon to use the trade mark himself. The learned Single
Judge held that to accept the Appellant's said contention would
amount to permitting trafficking in trade marks. In view of the
conclusion he had reached/ the learned Single Judge did not
decide the question whether trade mark 'DRISTAN' was deceptively
and confusingly siwllar to the trade mark 'BISTAN'. The learned
Single Judge accordingly allowed the said appeal. In further
appeal the Division Bench rejected the contention that the trade
mark 'DRISTAN' was deceptively and confusingly similRr to the
trade mark 'BISTAN'. It, however, confirmed the judgment of the
learned Single Judge in respect of the construction which he had
placed upon section 18 and 48 of the 1958 Act in order to come to
the conclusion that the Appellant had no bona fide intention to
use itself the trade mark 'DRIS'.I:AN' and that the Appellant had
not at any time made use of the said trade mark. It accordingly
dis:n.1.ssed the Appellant' a further appeal, The main judlj!UE!nt of
the Division 8e11Ch was delivered by s.K. Mukherjee, J., with whom
A.K. Mukherjee, J,, agreed and at the conclusion of his judgment
s.K. Mukherjee, J,, pointed out the l)ardship whicli the construction placed by the Division Bench upon section 18 and 48 of the
1958 Act would lead to. These observations are (at page 143)
"It is neither good sense nor good policy to be plus
royaliste que le roi, to be· lllOre of a royalist than
the king h1maelf. A legal situation which permits use
of a registered Lrade mark by. a registered user but
disqualifies the proprietor from registering his mark
if he intends to use it only through a registered user
even when a user is available who is ready and willing
to be registered on terms which are unexceptionable,
18 a situation fraught vi.th tllree-'quartera irony aod
the rest U11C011Scious bwour.
It is not for the Courts of Law to provide relief
where relief should ?e provided by the le8islature by
ignorlns a conscious departure the statute has made,
strain its constl'uction and assume powers which LOore
properly belong to the legislature."
(llmphasl.s su,,plfod.)
'
AMERICAN H.P.CORPN. v. MAC LAJ!S, (MADON, J.]
309
A proper construction of the relevant sections of the 1958 Act
shows that the<e is neither any cause for sardonic merriment nor
any need to shed tears.
The subnltssions made at the hearing of this Appeal by Mr.
F.S. Nariman, learned counsel for the Appellant, may be. thus
summarized :
A
B
l. The legal fiction created by sub-section (2) of section
48 is, as expressly stated in that sutrsection, for the purposes
of section 46 or for any other purpose for which such use is
material under the 1958 Act or any other law. To confine this
fiction to a case of an actual use of a trade mark by a
registered user is to confine it onl.Y to 11se for the purposes of
clause (b) of section 46(1) which is contrary to the purpose tor
which the said fiction ~as created ana,· therefore, when section
18(1) of the 1958 Act (corresponding to section 14(1) of the 1940
Act) uses the words "proposed to be used", these words must be
resd as "proposed to be used by a proposed registered user."
C
D
2. To register a trade mark which is proposed to be used by
a registered user does not ,per se amount to traffic.king in trade
marks and whether it does so or not must depend upon the facts
and circtn:nStances of each case.
E
3. The reliance placed by the High Court, both by the
learned single Judge and Division Bench upon the 'PUSSY GM.ORE'
Trade Mark r.aae was unjustified and unwarranted inasmuch as the
provisions of the. English Act, namely, the Trade Marks Act, 1938,
are radically different from those of the 1958 Act as also the
1940 Act and, therefore, that case has no relevance so far as
the construction of section l~(l) read with section 48(2) of the
1958 Act is concerned.
4. The reliance placed by the High Court (both by the
learned single Judge and the Division Bench) upon the Shavaksha
Comwittee Report and the Ayyangar Report was equally misplaced as
Parliament did not accept the recommendations with respect to
registered users made in either of these reports.
F
G
5. The facts and circumstances of the case show that the
appellant had at the date of the making of the application for
registration a bona fide intention to use the trade mark
'DRISTAN' through a registered user.
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310
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1985] SUPP.3 S.C.R.
6. In any event, the Appellant itself had made bona fide use
of the said trade mark up to a date one month before the date of
the First Respondent's Application for Rectification.
The submissions made by Dr. Gauri Shankar, learned Counsel
for the First Respondent, were as follows :
B
1. The words "proposed to be used" in section 18(1) of the
1958 Act and section 14(1) of the 1940 Act mean "proposed to be
used by the applicant for registration, his servants and agents"
and not by any person who is proposed to be got registered as a
registered user and, therefore, the legal fiction enacted in
section 48(2) cannot be iQlported into section 18(1).
c
2. A registered user can only come into being after a trade
mark is registered. Therefore, as at the date of an application
for registration of a trade mark, there cannot be any person in
existence who is a registered user, the words "proposed to be
used" cannot possibly mean "proposed to be used by a proposed
registered user".
D
3. To permit a trade mark to be registered when the
applicant himself does not propose to use it but proposes to use
it through someone else who would subsequently be registered as a
registered user would be to permit trafficking in trade marks
which is contrary to the policy underlying the Trade Marks laws.
E
4. The only case in which the 1958 Act permits the
registration of a trade mark when the applicant for registration
does not intend to use it himself but intends to use in through
another is the one set out in section 45, namely, where the
Registrar is satisfied that a company is about to be formed and
registered under the Companies Act, 1956, and the appiicant
intends to assign the trade mark to that company with a view to
the use thereof by the Company.
F
G
H
5. The 1958 Act is, as the 1940 Act was, based upon the
English Trade Marks Act , 1938, and the decision in the 'PUSSY
GALORE• Trade Mark Case concludes this point against the
Appellant.
6. The Shavaksha Committee Report and the Ayyangar Report
show the legislative intent not to allow a proposed use by a
proposed registered user to be equated with a proposed use by the
applicant for registration.
AMERICAN H.P.CORPN. V• MAC LABS. [MADON, J ·]
311
7. The Appellant had net at any relevant time made use of
the trade mark 'DRISTAN'
8. The Appellant had fradulently obtained registration of
the trade mark 'DRISTAN' by stating in the application for
registration that it proposed to use the said trade mark itself
and by not disclosing the fact that it proposed to use it through
A
B
a proposed registered user.
9, The trade mark 'DRISTAN' was deceptively and confusingly
similar to the trade mark 'BISTAN' and, therefore, it cannot be/
allowed to remain on the Register of Trade Marks.
10. To allow the trade mark 'DRISTAN' to remain on the
Register of Trade Marks would be contrary to the policy of the
Government of India.
c
We will now test the correctness of these rival submissions.
The first Respondent's Application for Rectification was
stated to be made under section 46 and 56 of the 1958 Act and
Rule 94 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Rules, 1959. Rule 94
is irrelevant because it merely prescribes in which form an
application for rectification of or for varying or expunging any
entry in the Register of Trade Marks is to be made and by what
documents such an application is to be accompanied. Under section
56 an entry wrongly remaining on the Register of Trade Marks is
liable to be expunged therefrom. An entry relating to a mark the
use of which would be likely to deceive or cause confusion, would
be an entry wrongly remaining on the Register and, therefore,
liable to be expunged therefrom.
The principal challenge of the First Respondent to the trade
mark 'DRISTAN' remaining on the Register was under clause (a) of
section 46(1). The main question before us, therefore, is whether
the entry in the Register relating to the said trade mark falls
within the mischief of the said clause (a); for if it does, it is
liable to be taken off the Register. The relevant provisions of
D
E
F
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section 46 have already been set out above. Before a person can
made an application under section 46(1) to take off a trade mark
from the Register he has to be a "person aggrieved". It is now no
more disputed that the First Respondent was a "person aggrieved"
within the meaning of section 46(1). Section 46(1) provides for
two cases in which a registered trade mark may be taken off the
Register in respect of any of the goods in respect of which it is
H
312
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1985] SUPP.3 s.c.R.
registered. The first case is set OJUt iri clause (a) cf section
46(1) and the second in clause (b) of that sub-section. There are.
two conditions to be satisfied before clause (a) can become
applicable. These conditions are :
t,
R
1. that the trade mark was registered without any bona fide
intention on the parl of the a?p.licant for re;;istrationthatit
should be used in relation to those ~oods by him, and
2. that there has, in fact, been no bona fide use of that
· trade mark in relation to those goods by any propcietor thereof
for the time being up to a date one month before the date of the
application under section 46(1).
c
The only exception to the first condition set out above is of a
case to which the provisions of section 45 apply, that is, if the
trade mark of which registration is sought is proposed to be used
by a company which is about to be formed and registered under the
Companies Act, 1956, and to which the applicant intends to assign
the trade mark. Both the conditions set out in clause (a) are
tl
E
cumulative and not di.sjuncitve. Clause (a), therefore, will not
apply where even though there had been no bona fide intent ion on
the part of the applicant for registration to use the trade mark
but, in fact, there has been a bona fide use of the trade mark in
relation to those goods by any proprietor thereof for the time
being up to a date one month before the date of the application
under section 46(1). Similarly, clause (a) will not apply where,
though there had been a bona fide intention on the part of the
applicant for registration to use the trade mark, in fact, there
has been no bona fide use of the trade mark in relation to those
goods by any proprietor thereof for the time being up to a date
one month before the date of the application under section 46(1).
F
Clause (b) of section 46(1) applies where for a continuous
period of five years or longer from the date of the registration
of the trade mark, there has been no bona fide use thereof in
relation to those goods in respect of which it is registered by
any proprietor thereof for the time being. An exception to clause
(b) is created by sec•ion 46(3). Under section 46(3), the non-use
G
of a trade mark, which is shown to have been due to special
circumstances in the trade and not to any intention to abandon or
not to use the trade mark in relation to the goods to which the
application under section 46(1) relates, will not amount to
non-use for the purpose of clause (b).
AMERICA>'i H.P.CORPN • .v. MAC LABS. [MAIJON, .J.]
313
The distinction between clause (a) and clause (b) is that if
the pe~iod specified in clause (b) has elapsdd and during that
period there has been no bona fide use of the trade mark, the
fact that the registered proprietor had a bona fide intention to
use. the trade mark at the date of the application for registration becomes immaterial and the trade mark is liable to be
remo.ved from the Register unless his case falls under section
46(3), while under clause (a) where there had been a bona fide
intention to use the trade mark in respect of which registration
was sought, merely because the trade mark had not been used for a
period shorter than five years from the date of its registration
will not entitle any person to. have that trade mark taken off the
Register.
Under both these clauses the burden of pro.ving that the
facts which bring into play clause (a) or clause (b), as the case
may be, exists is on the person who seeks to ha.ve the trade mark
removed from the Register. Thus, where there has been a non-user
of the trade mark for a continuous period of five years and the
application for taking off the trade mark from the Register has
been filed one month after the expiry of such period, the person
seeking to have the trade mark removed fmm the Register has only
A
B
c
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to proVe sush continuous nou-user and has not to pt'ove the lack
of a bona fide intention on the part of the registered proprietor
to use the trade mark at the date of the application for
registration. Where, however, the non-user is for a period of
less than five years, the person seeking to remove the trade mark
from .the N.egister has not only to prove non-user for the
E
requisite period but has also to prove that the applicant for
registration of the trade mark had no bona fide intention to use
the trade mark when the application ~or registration was made.
The reason why the two conditions specified in clause (a)
are made cumulative is obvious. As the definitio'b of "trade mark"
contained in clause (v) of section 2(1) shows, a trade mark is a
· mark used or proposed to be used in relation to goods f.lr 'the
purpose of indicating or so as to indicate a connection in the
course of trade between the goods and some person having the
right to use the mark. It is, therefore, not necessary for the
F
G
purpose of registering a trade mark that those goods should be in
existence at the date of the application for registration. A
person who intends to manufacture goods or has made preparations
for the manufacture of goods but the manufacture has not
commenced and, therefore, goods have not been marketed is none
the less entitled to get the trade mark which the proposes to use
H
314
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SUPREME COURT RF.PORTS
[1985] SUPP.3 s.c.R.
in relation to those goods registered. In the present day world
of commerce and industry, a manufacturing industry can neither be
commenced nor established overnight. There are innumerable preparatory steps required to be taken and formalities to be
complied with before the manufacture of goods can start and the
manufactured goods marketed. The processes must of necessity take
time. If the position were that the mere non-user of a trade mark
for the period mentioned in clause (a) of section 46(1) would
make a trade mark liable to be taken off the Register, it would
result in great hardship and cause a large number of trade marks
to be removed from the Register, because the moment one month has
elapsed after the registration of a trade mark has been ordered,
a trade rival can make an application on the ground set out in
clause (a) of section 46(1) claiming that there has been no bona
fide use of the trade mark up to a date one month before the
date of his application. It is in order to prevent such harassment and absured result that the two conditions specified in
clause (a) have been made cumulative.
The object underlying section 46(1) is to prevent trafficking in trade marks. This is, in fact, the object underlying all
trade mark laws. A trade mark is meant to distinguish the goods
made by one person from those made by another. A trade mark,
therefore, cannot exist in vacuo. It can only exist in connection
with the goods in relation to which it is used or intended to be
used. Its object is to indicate a connection in the course of
trade between the goods and some person having the right to use
the mark either with or without any indication of the identity of
that person. Clause (v) of section 2(1) which defines the
expression "trade mark" makes this abundantly clear. Trade marks
became important after the Industrial Revolution as distinguishinggoodsmadeby one person from those made by another; and soon
the need was felt to protect traders against those who were
unauthorizedly using their marks ana accordingly registration of
trade marks was introduced in England by the Trade Marks
Registration Act, 1875, which was soon replaced by more detailed
and advanced legislation.
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When a person gets his trade mark
registered, he acquires valuable rights by reason of such
registration. Registration of his trade mark gives him the
exclusive right to the use of the trade mark in connection with
the goods in respect of which it is registered and i f there is
any invasion of this right by any other person using a mark which
is the same or deceptively similar to his trade mark, he can
protect his trade mark by an action for infringement in which he
can obtain injunction, damages or an account of profits made
AMERICAN H.P.CORPN. v. MAC LABS. (MADON, J.]
315
by the other person. In such an action, the registration of a
trade mark is prima facie evidence of its validity. After the
expiry of seven years from the date of the registration a trade
mark is to be valid in all respects except in the three cases s~t
out in section 3~. The proprietor of an unregistered trade mark
whose mark is unauthorisedly used by another cannot, however, sue
for the infringement of such trade mark. His only remedy lies in
bringing a passing-off action, an inconvenient remedy as compared
to an infringement action. In a passing-off action the plaintiff
will have to prove that his mark has by uaer acquired such
reputation as to become distinctive of the plaintiff's goods so
that if it is used in relation to any goods of the kind dealt
with by the plaintiff_, it will be uriderstood by the trade and
public as meaning that the goods are the plaintiff's goods. In an
infringement action, the plaintiff is not required to prove the
reputation of his mark. Further, under section 37 a registered
mark is assignable and transmissible either with or without goodwill of the buainess concerned while under section 38, an
unregistered trade mark is not assignable or transmissible except
in the three cases set out in section 38(2).
As the registration of a trade mark confers such valuable
rights upon the registered proprietor thereof, a person cannot be
permitted to register a trade mark when he has not used it in
relation to the goods in respect of which it is sought to be
registered or does not intend to use it in relation to such
goods. The reason for not permitting such trade marks to be
registered was thus stated by Romer, J. , in 1n re the llegistered
Trade-illlrks of John Batt & Co. and In re carter• s Applicatioo for
a Trade-Hark:, (1898) 2 Ch. D. 432, 436, s.c. 15 R.P.C. 262, 266.
A
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" ••• one cannot help seeing the evils that may result
from allowing trade-1Wlrks to be registered broadcast,
if I may use the expression, there being no real
intention of using them, or only an intention possibly
of using them in respect of a few articles. The
inconvenience it occasions, the cost it occasions, is
very large, and beyond that I cannot help seeing that
it -.Id lead in SC111e cases to absolute oppression,
and to persoos using the positioo they have obtained
as registered <Miers of trade marks (which are not
really booa fide trade marks) for the purpose of
trafficldng in tbea and using t1- as a .....,_ to
obtain money from subsequent persoos vbo -y want to
use bona fide trade mazks in respect of SC111e classes
in respect of which they find those bogus trade-marks
registered.•
(Emphasis supplied)
G
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316
SUU:)J. C:CLR'J hlf'iJh1:,
A
The judgn.ent of l.:on.er, J., in Batt 's Case was confi rn,ed by the
Court of Appeal, ('0%) 2 Ch.L. 432 at pa,,es 439-442, aud by the
houoe of Lords sub nominee John Batt & co. v. LUDnett and Amo.
(1&99) A.G. 420; 5.C. 16 R.P.C. 411.
1
c
To get a tLade n.ark rt!t:,istered without any intention to use
it in relation to any &oods but rr.erely to make n,oney out of it ty
selling tc others the rit,ht 'to use it would be trafficking in
that trad€ n.ark. In Re American C.reetint,s Corp. 's Application,
[ 19&3] 2 All. E.k. 6G9, 619, Lillon, L. J., said in the Court of
Appeal :
"1raf1ickin& in a trade n.ark has fron, the outset been
one of the cardinal sins of traci.e 11;ark lav1. l)ut there
is no statutory definition o.f traffickint,i and one may
suspect that, as wi.th usur)' in tht hiddle AE,es, though
it is known to be a aeadly sin, it has become less and
D
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less clear, as econon.ic cireurr,stances ha\re developed,
wt:at the sin rtctually con,prehendr.
1rafficking musl involv~ trading in or dealing with
the t~Ade mark for money or money's worth, but. it is
not al1 dealin5 wj th a trade rr.ark [or money thut is
objectionaLle, since it has alv.'ays b€en accepted that
it i.s peru,issible to sell a. trad2 niark together with
the f>OOdwill of the business in tht course of which
the trade rr.a.rk has '!Jeen used."
(Err.phasis supplied.)
F
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In the sarr,e case, Lord F..ri.ghtmen in the house of Lords, [1984] 1
All E.R. 426, 433, summed up the position in la" thus:
''fl-iy Lords, although as a n.atter of ordinary English,
trafficking in trade marks n.i.5ht mean the buying and
selling of trade marks, it seerr.s otvious that it is to
have a n.ore specialised rueanint:, in a trade mark
context. I have no quarrel with the definitions
suggested by the assistant registrar and by Sir Lenys
Buckley, but perhaps one further atten...pt on my part
rray not be out of place. The courts have to 5rope for
some means of delineating the forbidden territory, and
different niodes of expression may heli: to indicate
boundaries which are not and cannot be rr.arked out with
absolute precision. To my mind, trafficking in a trade
AU.RICI>~ !i.LCvhl'~.
v. MC LA1S. [MALCt,, J.]
317
A
n.zirk cvotext conveys the notion of dealing in a ti.'ade
o.ark primarily as .::i commodity in its own ri!$ht and
not prinaril; for the pur~ose of ind~ntifyini, or
rror:.oting rr...erchandise ip. which the i.ii.:oprietor of the
ruark i..s interested. If ther1,;. is no real trade
connection between the proi:-ri~tot of tl1i! n..ark and the
licensee or hie. !;OOds, there is roou. for the
B
conclusion that the grant · of the. licence is a
trafticidn1; in the mark. lt is a question of fact and
deb1·ee ir. every case whether a. sufficient trade
connection exists.
we have no hesitation in acceptini; the n.eardn;; eive·., to the
expression '"traffickini; in a trade mark'" by Lillon, LJ., and Lord
Brightman.
The intention to use a trade mark soubht .to be registered
must be, tnereiore, genuine. and real and as po:!.nted out by
Tomlin, J., Jn In re ducker's Trade !ia~k., (1>28) Ch. L 405, 409,
the fact that the wark ;,as thought to be son;ethin~ which scu.e
day might be useful would 11ot ai..cunt to any deUni te and precise
intention at the t.in.e of registration to use. that niB.rk.- The
intention to use the mark must exist at the date of tbe
application for re!;istration and such intention must Le gem1ine
and bona fide. In fact, ser.tiou 46(l)(a) expressly si,eaks of
"bona fide intention on the part of the a!'plJ.cant for
registration" 1.l>ich would n.ean '"at the ciate when sue\. ni;pl.1.cant
makes his aHlic<.tioc for regJ.stratiun.'"
We will tlO"'-' ad<lr'.:'~S ourselves to the c.i.ue&tion ~liether t.hc
facts which brin~ into play clause (a) of section 46(1) exist i.n
the present case.· What. io first rt:quire<l to be nscertained for
this purpose io whether the Appellant had any intention that the
trade mark 'LRIS1M' should be u•ed fo lndJ a in relation to the
concerned f.OOds. Assundn& the Ai-Pellant h~d such an intentJ.on,
the next question which will fall to be deteruJ.r,ed is whether
this intention was an intention on the part of the Appellant to
use the saJ.d trade 1LBrk itself or to use it throuf,h a re1;istered
user and if the intention was to use it throuf.h a resi.st.ered
user, whether clause (a) of section 46(1) would be attracted. 1he
third question will be whether such intention on tl1e eart of the
Appellant was a bona fide one.
Intention is a sta~e of mind. ho person can uiake out the
state of mind of another person. ~one the less courts are often
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
318
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l1985] SUPP.3 s.c.R.
called upon for various purposes to determine the state of a
person's mind. The Courts can only do so by deducting the
existence of a particular state of mind from the facts of a case.
Section 14 cf the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, provides as follows:
"14. Facts showing existence of state of mind, or of
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body, or bodily feeliDg.-
c
Facts showing the existence of any state of mind, such
as intention, knowledge, good faith, negligence,
rashness, ill-will or good-will towards any particular
person, or showing the existence of any state of body
or bodily feeling, are relevant, when the existence of
any such state of mind or body or bodily feeling is in
issue or relevant.
~tion
1.
A fact
relevant
as
showing
the
existence of a relevant state of mind must show that
the state of mind exists, not generally, but in
reference to the particular matter in question.
D
x
x
x
x
The second Explanation to that section is not material for out
purpose.
It was submitted by Dr. Gauri Shankar, learned Counsel for
the First Respondent, that in order to ascertain what the
Appellant's intention was,
the Court can only look at events
previous
date,
to
the
relevant
namely,
the
date
of
the
application for registration made by the Appellant, that is,
August 18, 1958, and not to any events subsequent thereto.
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Whether subsequent events are relevant or not would depend upon
the facts and circumstances of each case and the question at
issue therein. In Srinivas Mall Barirollya and Anr. v. Emperor,
A.I.R. 1947 P.C. 135, Appellant No. 1, a Salt Agent for the
District Magistrate, was inter alia charged with having abetted
Appellant No.2, who had been appointed by him, in selling salt to
licensed retail dealers to whom allocations of specific
quantities of salt had been made by the Central Government, on
three specified dates at a price exceeding the maximum price
which had been fixed by the Distict Magistrate. Appellant No.l
was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment under Rule 81(4) of
the Defence of India Rules, 1939, relating to the control of
H
prices. In additi.on to the evidence of the three dealers to whom
AMERICAN H.P.CORPN. v. MAC LABS. (MADON, J.]
319
A
the salt was sold, nine other dealers who had bought salt from
Appellant No. l and had to deal with Appellant No.2 and had
obtained salt from him at a price exceeding the fixed maximt..UU
price, were also called in evid~nce as prosecution witnesses. The
transactions with the other nine dealers took place not only
during and shortly before the dates on which the offences were
committed but also after the period covered by the dates of the
offences. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held (at
page 139)
B
The evidence was relevant to the charge of
abetting, because it showed an intention to aid the
C
con:mission of the offence and an intentional omission
to put a stop to an illegal practice, which, it need
hardly be added, was an 'illegal omission'. The
e.vidence was thus admissible to prove intention under
s. 14ll Evidence Act."
D
(Emphasis supplied.)
!lr. Gauri Shankar then submittied that in any event facts
subsequent to the date of the First Respondent's Application for
Rectification, namely, April 10, 1961, could not be looked at by
the Court. We are equally unable to agree. As we have pointed out
E
earlier t '.<ihere a trade mark has been registered on the ground
that the applicant for registration proposes to use such trade
Ulark, a trade rival in order to cause vexation and harassment to
the registered proprietor can file his application immediately
after the expiry of one mvnth from the date of the order
registering the trade mark. As pointed out by us, where a trade
mark is proposed to be used, the manufacture and marketing of
goods in relation to which such trade mark is proposed to be used
F
must of necessity take time; and not to look at events subsequent
to the date of the Application
for Rectification would result in
great injustice.
It was next submitted by Dr. Gauri Shankar that for the
purpose of ascertaining the intention of the Appellant, the Court
cannot look at the technical collaboration agreement and the
registered user agreement inasmuch as neither these agreements
nor copies thereof :were produced
before the High Court but
copies thereof were produced for the first tLne during the course
of the hearing of this Appeal. This argument also cannot be
accepted. Both these agreements have been referred to in the
affidavits f ileci before the Registrar and the High Court and also
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320
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SUPREME COU!tr REPORTS
[L98Sj SUPP.3 s.c.R.
dealt with by the Registrnr, the learned Sir,~.le Judi;~ and the
Uivision Hench in their respective judgments. In this connection,
it will not be out of place to set out here the c1rcu.1ndtances i.n
which copias of these agreements came to be produc~d before thi;
Court. During the course of the h·earitl;I. of the Appeal, we calle<l
upon learnea Counsel for the Appellant to file before us copies
of the application for registration of the trade mark 'DRISTAN'
and the application for registering the Indian Company as the
registered user of the said trada mark. The original file
relating to the trade mark 'DR.ISTAfl' was before the Registrar
when he heard tlte ~"irat Respcndent 1 s Application for
Rectification and also before the High Court when the 1Mtter was
heard by the Lear.ned Single Judge and the Division Bench. Copies,
however, of th~ said two applications were not on the record, and
we wanned to ascert.:3in for ourselves what was stated in those
applications. At that ti!lle learned Counsel. for the first
Respondent r,ot up alld requested us that the Appellant •hould al:;o
be asked to produce copies of th" said two agreetnents and
accordingly we directed the Appellant to f il.e copies of tho&e tw
agreP.ments aloo, which tt di.d.
It is because the intention of the Appellant at the date ot
filing the application for registration is to be ascertain"d frolll
tne facts existillll in this case that we have related them at some
length in the earlier part of our judgment. We will now
SUlllluarize these facts with refereni:e to three periods : (L)
events which took place up to the date of the application for
registration, namely, Au&ust 18, 1958, (:.:) eventa which happon"d
between that date. and the elate of the Application Luc
l\ectification, m•aely, Api:il lu, L96l, amt \3) events wlucil
happened subsequent to April LU-, L96 J.,
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So far ad the period up to August J.ll, 1958, is concerned,
prior to L956, the Appellant had acquired a substantial
shareholding to the extent of 40 per cent in the Indian Company.
In 1956 the Appellant introduced 'DKISTAN' tablets In the
American market and got the trade mark 'DRISTAN' regist~red J.n
the United States of America and in several other countries. .~
technical collaboration between the Appellant and the Indian
Company collllllenced from NoveU1ber l, L957, and an agreeramt !.u
that behalf was signed on May L6, 1958. In pursuance of the aaid
collaboration agreement the Indiarl Company wanufactured and
marketed se"eral prod•JCts of the Appellant. The Appd Lant got.
registered its trade marks in respect of such products and the
Indian Compar,y was registered as the re~ist~red user in reap~ct
AMJ::RICAN lf.P.COKPN. v. MAC LABS. [MADON,
J.J
321
A
of such trade marks. ·As early as December 1957, it was decided.
that the Indian ·company should introduce in the Indian market.
nine new products of the Appellant Including 'DRISTAN' tablets.
On August 18, 1958, the Appellant filed an application for
registration of the trade mark 'DRISTAN' and the said trade mark
was duly registered on June 8, 1959.
B
Dr .• Gauri. shankar, however, submitted that the collaboration
agreement was irreleVant because
1
DRISTAN'
tablets were not
mentioned in Schedule A to the said agreement, and, therefore,
the intention to introduce 'DRISTAN' tablets in the Indian market
and the facts relating thereto did not have anything to do with
the said collaboration agreement. In this behalf, Dr. Gauri
Shanl<ar relied upon the definition of 'Licensed Products' given
in the said agreement. This submission is wholly .without
foundation. That definition related to Whitehall Products in
respect of whose marketing, manufacture, sale or distribution l.n
India, the Indian Company was to be licensed under and pursuant
to the terns of the said collaboration agreement and it further
stated that "these shall ioclude those identified in Schedule
Annexed hereto and made a part hereto". It is true that Schedule
A to the said agreement does not mention 'DRISTAN' tablets but
the products set out in Achedule A are not exhaustive of the
Licensed Products to ·which· the said collaboration agreeiaent
related .and this is made clear by the use of the word "incwde"
with reference to the products identified in Sehedule A· There l.s
no dispute that 'llRISTAN' tablets are Whitehall Products. The.
division of the Appellant, which at all relevant times carried on
and still carries on the activity of manufacturi~ and aiarketing
pharmaceutical products, is called the Whitehall laboratories and
it was for this reason that the ·Registrar ordered the entry
relating to the trade mark 'DRISTAN' to be amended. so as to show
i;he Appellant trading as "Whitehall Laboratories. The definit:ioo
of ''Licensed Products" in the said collaboration agreement
-comprehended not only the Whitehall Products set out in Sched11le
A to the collaboration agreement but also other products in
respect of which the Indian Company would be licensed for import,
manufacture, sale or distribution in India under the terms of the
said agreement. The correspondence between the parties leaves no
doubt that the manufacture and of the 'DRISTAN tablets by t:l!e
Indian CompaI>y in India was to be under the said collaboration
agreement.
So far as the second period is concerned~ namely~ that
between August lti, 1958, e1.nd the date of the firs·t l<ec.ponde:mt's
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1985] 5UFP.3 s.c.R.
Application for Rectification, that is, April 10, 1961, during
that period tl1e Indian Ccn.pany applied for and obtained a licence
for the purchase ·of a Stockes 1riple La)er ~.achine for
manufacturin5 'CRI51AN' tablets and li.ihen the said n.B.chine \!las
received installed it at its Ghatkopar factory. It also.obtained
from the ApJ'ellant three units of
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'L1'.151M' tablets as samples
and the ~nufacturing inanual for the said tablets. Eurther, it
aplied to the Central Government .under section 11 of the
Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1551, for a licence
·to manufacture 'tRIS1Al.' tablets ~hich was branted to it. It also
applied ·rar and otained a licence to !~port Certain ingredients
used -in-the tr.a"nufacture of 'LRIS'IM' tablets and in..ported such
ingredients. It further applied for and obtained from the
Director, Lrut.s Control Adndnistration, State of ?-.aharashtra,
permission to manufacture 'tRISTAN' tatlets. lhe Appellant also
filed a notice of opposition to the Hrst Respondent's
Application for registration of their n.atk '1RIS1l~E'.
·
During the third period, naILel), the period subsequent to
the ,First Respondent's Appiication for Rectification, that is,
sub~equent to April 10; 1961, on Cctoter 18, 1961, the said
registered u·ser _agreen.ent lo/as enter~ intO betloleen the Appellant
and the Indian Company. On. October 22, 1561, the 'DRISTIM'
tablets "ere first marketed in India b) the lndian Company. On
March 6, 1962,.the Appellant and the Indian Curupany jointly made
an application to .reiister the Indian Corupany as a registered
user of the trade mark 'J;RISTM'.
\
The facts set out above clearly show that each of them is an
integral link in a chain and that they cannot te divided into
three separete periocis as contended by J:r. Gauri Shankar. This
continuous chain of events establishes t.eyond doubt that the
Appellant had an intention thatthe trade mark 'DRISTAN' should
_ be used in relation tO the tablets in <iuesti.on by the n.anufacture
and sale of these tablets in India.
G
'ibis brings us to the question to.:hether the intention of the
Appellant co n.arket and manufacture 1 Df..IS1Al.' tablets in India
was to do sv itself or to do rso thrcut:,h a registered user. Y.x.
!iariruan, learned Counstl for the A~pellant submitted that as the
intention of the. Appellant "as to n.arket 'DiU51All' tablets in
India, it could translate that intention into action either l:iy
getting it n.anufactureo and marketed b)I a rtgist.:red user in
India. or by exportini, the tablets to India and H the impf)rt
B
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AMERICAN H.P.CORPN· v. MAC LABS. [MADON, J.]
323
policy did not permit this to be done, it could export the
tablets to India when the import policy was relaxed. This
argument is contrary to the facts on the record and must be
rejected. A person's iiltention is shown by the facts of a case
and not by statements made at the Bar. The facts of this case
clearly establish that the Appellant's intention in applying for
registration of the trade mark 'DRISTAN' was to use it in
relation to goods to be manufactured and marketed by the Indian
Company and that for this -purpose the Indian Company would get
itself registered as the registered user of -the said trade mark.
Further, in the affidavit sworn on April 13, 1962, by S. Waldron,
Vice-~resident of the Appellant, it is categorically stated as
follows :
"It was intended that the product bearing the
'DRISTAN' trade mark be introduced in India through
Geoffrey Manners & Co. Ltd. should ·be registered as
registered user in India of the trade mark 'DRISTAN'.
For this . reason all applications to Government
authorities and Drug Control authorities were made by
Geoffrey Manners & Co. Ltd. In implementation of the
intention to appoint Geoffrey Manners & Co. Ltd. as
registered users of the trade mark .'DRISTAN',
preparations were undertaken to appoint Geoffrey
MaIUlers & Co. Ltd. as registered users and these
culminated into execution of registe~ed user agreement
between the Registered Proprietors and Geoffrey
Manners & Co. Ltd. which has been dated the 18th
October, 1961".
In view of this sworn statement made on behalf of the Appellant
it is not open to Counsel to submit that the proposed use by the
Appellant could also have been by exporting 'DRISTAN' tablets to
India.
The Appellant's application for registration of the trade
mark 'DRISTAN' was made under section 14(1) of the 1940 A.ct and
was registered under that Act. Under the said section 14(1), oaly
a person claiming to be the proprietor of a trade mark "usea or
~r<)posed to be used by him" could apply for registration of that
trade mark. The provisions of section 18(1) of the 1958 Act are
Identical. This brings us to the crucial question Whether the
words "proposed to be used by him" would include "proposed to be .
used through a registered proprietor". In other words, the
question is whether a proposed user by a registered user of a
trade mark can be equated with a proposed user by the proprietor
of the trade mark.
A
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324
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1985] SUPP.3 S.C.R.
On behalf of the Appellant it was submitted by Mr. Nariman
that the two phrases "proposed to be used by him" and "proposed
to be used by a registered user" must be equated by reason of the
statutory legal fiction created by section 48(2) of the 1958 Act
which corresponds to section 39(2) of the 1940 Act. According to
Mr. Nariman, unless the legal ficti.on enacted in section 48(2)
applied also to the provisions of s«ction 18( l), it would have a
very limited operation and can apply only so hr as the second
condition of clause (a) of section 46(1) and clause (b) .of that
sub-section are concerned, which, according to him, would render
nugatory the words "or for any other purpose for which such use
is material under this Act or any other law" occurring in section
48(2).
Dr. Gauri Shankar on behalf of the First Respondent, however
submitted that both under the 1940 Act and the 1958 Act a
registered user is not the same person as the proprietor of a
registered trade mark for a registered user can only be some
person other than the proprietor of the trade mark and that no
registered user can come into being unless and until a trade mark
has been registered and theredter an application for
registration as the registered usei: thereof has been made and
granted. He also submitted that the legal fiction enacted in
. section 48(2) of the 1958 Act and section 39(2) of the 1940 Act
cannot for this reason apply to the provisions of section 18(1)
or to the first condition of clause (a) of section 46(1) of the
1958 Act and, therefore, the Appellant was not entitled to seek
the protection of the said legal fiction. According to Dr. Gauri
Shankar, if the proprietor of a trade mark intended to use it
through another, he could only do it by having re•wrt to section
45 of the 1958 Act, which corresponds to section 36 of the 1940
Act, by getting i t registered for the purpose of assigning it to
a company to be formed and reg:(.stered under the Companies Act,
1956. In Dr. Gauri Shankar's submission the only three ways in
which, therefore, the trade mark 'DRISTAN' could have been used
in India were for the A?pellant to have resort to section 45 by
floating a company to which, when incorporated, the trade mark
would be assigned or by manufact\'ring the tablets 'DRISTAN'
itself in India and thereafter by assigning it to the Indian
Company or by Jointly applying along with the Indian Company to
have the Indian company regist~red as the registered user of the
said trade mark.
The Appellant's application for registration of the trade
mark 'DRISTAN' was made under the 1940 Act and its registration
was also ordered under that Act. The application for registering
AMERICAN H.P.CQRPN. v. MAC LABS. [MADON, J.]
325
A
the Indian company as the registered user was, however, made
under the 1958 Act. If the 1940 Act did not contain a legal
fiction similar to that enacted in section 48(2) of the 1958 Act,.
the Appellant 1 s case Would fall to the ground because then at the
date of its application for registration of the said trade mark,
its intention would be not to use.it itself but to use it through
another. The 1940 Act, however, also made provisions with respect
to registered users and created a similar legsl fiction in
section 39(2) of the Act. Section 39 of the 1940 Act provided as
follows :
·
"39. l!egistered users.-
(1) A person other thah the proprietor of a trade mark
may be registered as a registered user thereof in
respect of all or any of the goods in respect of which
it is registered (otherwise than as a defensive trade
mark) and either with or without conditions or
restrictions.
(2) The permitted use of a trade mark shall be deemed
to be use by the proprietor thereof, and shall be
deemed not to be use by a person other than the
proprietor, for any purpose for which such use is
material under this Act or any other law."
The only difference between section 39(2) of the 1940 Act and
section 48(2) of the 1958 Act is that wllile under section 39(2)
the legal fiction created by it applies "fer any pt1rpose for
which such use is material under this Act or any other law",
under section 48(2) the legal fiction applies "for the purposes
of section 46 or for any other purpose for which such use is
ruaterial under this Act or any other law". The addition of the
words "for the purposes of section 46" in section 48(2) not only
does not make any difference but clarifies the scope of the said
legal fiction. As we have seen, clause (a) of section 46(1)
refers both to "bona fide intention on the part of the applicant
for registration that it (that is, the trade mark) should be used
in relation to those goods by him" as also to "bona fide use of
the trade mark in relation to those goods oy any proprietor
thereof for the time being." It cannot possibly be that when
section 48(2) expressly provides that the permitted user of a
trade mark by a registered user is to be deemed to be user by the
proprietor of the trade mark for the purposes of section 46, the
fiction is intended only to apply to the use of the trade mark
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
326
A
SUPREME COURT REPORlS
[1965] SLtP.3 s.c.R.
referred to in the second conaition of clause (a) of section
46(1) and not to the use of that trade n.ark referred to in the
first condition of the said clause (a). ender section 18(1), an
application for registration of a trade n.ark can only be ni.ade by
B
a person who clain.s to be the proprietor of that tracle mark.
Therefore, the "1{)rds "applicant for registration" in clause (a)
of section 46(1) "'ould mean "the person claiming to be the
proprietor of the tracie mark who is the apylicant for registration of that trade mark". The fir&t condition of clause (a)
would, therefore, read "that the trade niark was ret:,istered with-
out any bona fide intention on the i;;art of the i:-erson claimin!;_ to
be the proprietor of that trade mark who has Thade the application
for registration that it should be used in relation to those
C
D
goods by him". So read, there can be no difficulty in reading the
words "by him" also as ''by a registered user". Sifuilarly, we see
no difficult; in arplyini, the legal fiction in section 48(2) to
section 1&(1). Section l&(l) in the lit,ht of the said legal
fiction would read :_js "any person clain.ing to be the rroprietot
of a trade n.ark '1sed or proposed to te used by hin1 or by a registered user". E.y reason of the provisions of i:.ection 39(2) of the
1940 Act, section 14(1) of that Act should also te read in the
same way.
In celebrated passa1;e Lord Asquith of 1ishopstor.e in East
End Dwellin&S Co. Ld. v. Finsbury llorOU{)i C.Ouncil
(1952) A.c.
109, said (at page 132) :
L
F
" If you are tidden to treat an iTLaginary state of
affiars as real, you 1L.ust surely, unless prohibited
from doing so, also irr.af;ine as real the consequences
and incidents which, if tt1e IJUtative state of affairs
had in fact existed, n1ust invitatly have flowed from
or accon.panied it."
In the State of Lombay v. Panduran& Vinayak Chaphall.ar and
Others [19)3j S.C.K.773, this Court held (at page 778) while
approving the above passage of Lord Asquith :
G
H
"When a statute enacts that sorr,ethin& shall be deemed
to have been done, \Vhich in fact and truth was not
done, the court is entitled and bound to ascertain for
what purposes and between what persons the statutory
fiction is to be resorted to and full effect must be
given to the statutory fiction and it should be
carried to its logic conclusion."
AMERICAN H.P.GORPN. v. MAC LA.llS. (MADON, J.]
327
The purposes for which the said fiction has been enacted are
set out in section 48(2). These purposes are the purposes of
section 46 or for any other purpose for which such use is
material under the 1958 Act or any other law. To confine the
purpose only to a part of section 46 would be to substantially
cut down the operation of the legal fiction. The purpose for
which the legal fiction is to be resorted to is to deem the
permitted use of a trade mark, which means the use of the trade
mark by a registered user thereof, to be the use by the
proprietor of that trade mark. Having regard to the purposes for
which the fiction in section 48(2) was created and the persons
between whom it is to be resorted to, namely, the proprietor of
the trade mark and the registered user thereof, and giving to
such fiction its full effect and carrying it to its logical
conclusion,
A
B
c
no other interpretation can be placed upon the
relevant portions of section 18(1) and of clause (a) of section
46(1) than the one which we have given.
In reaching the conclusion which they did, the learned
Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High court relied
heavily upon the PUSSY GALORE' Trade Mark Case. In order to
understand what was held in that case it is necessary first to
refer to some of the provisions of the English Trade Marks Act,
1938 (1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 22), as the 1958 Act is based largely upon
the provisions of the English Act though with certain important
differences. Section 17(1) of the English Act sets out who can
apply for registration of a trade mark and is in pari materia
with section 18(1) of the 1958 Act. Under section 17(4), the
refusal by a Registrar to register the trade mark is subject to
appeal to the Board of Trade or to the court at the option of the
applicant. If the appeal is to the court, there can be further
appeal to the Court of Appeal and from there to the House of
Lords, Section 26 provides for removal of a trade mark from the
Register and is in pari materia with section 46 of the 1958 act.
Section 32 deals with rectifying the entries in the Register and
is analogous to section 56 of the 1958 Act.
Under section 'd7 of the Patents, Designs and Trade Marks
Act, 1883 (46 & 47 Viet. c. 57), any registered proprietor could
grant licences to use the mark subject to any equity. The 1883
Act in so far as it related to trade marks was repealed by the
Trade Marks Act, 1905 (5 Edw. 7 c. 15). The 1905 Act did not,
however, contain any power in the registered proprietor to grant
licences. The English Act of 1938, however, introduced a system
of official approval for licences to use a trade mark
D
E
F
G
H
(l~ES]
328
SLFP.3 &.C.R.
particularly by providint, for re6istering a rerson other than the
proprietor of the trade mark as the ref_istered user of the trade
mark. It will be useful to set out the provisions cf the En6 1 ish
Act of 193C relating to reE,istered usE:rs in ordtr to focus our
attention on the differences between the English Act and the 155&
B
Act with resyect to registered users.
Sub-sections (1), (2) and (4) to (6) of section 28 provide
as follol<s
"2&. Registered users.-
c
[;
E
E
G
H
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a
person other than the proi.:rietor of a trade ·n:.a.rk u.ay
be re5istered as a registered user thereof in respect
of all or any of the t,OOdS in respect of which it is
re5istered (otherwise. than as a defensive trade rr.ark)
and either with or without conditions or restrictions.
The use of a trade mark by a re:g,istered user thereof
in relation to goods with t•;hich he is connected in the
course of trade and in respect of which for the tin:e
l:.eing the trade niarh. rerr.ains re5istered and he is
registered as a registered user, beinb use such as to
corr.i-ily with any conditions or restrictions to which
liis registration is subject, is in this Act referred
to as the 'IJermitteci use' thereof.
(L) The pern.iitted use of a trade niark shall be deemed
to Le use 1)' the 1,roprietor thereof, ano shall be
deemed not to be use by a yerson other than the
r.-roprietor, for the purpose of section twenty six of
this Act anri for any other puri;oses for wliich such use
is niaterial under this Act or at comihOO lav.•.
( 4) Where it is proposeci that a per sun should be
registered as a ret,istered user of a traae mark, the
propreitor and the proposed reE:,istered user n.ust apply
in writing to the Registrar in the prescribed rr,anner
and n.ust furnish him with a statutory cieclaration nia.de
by the proyrietor, or Ly sonic person aL1thorised to act
on his behalf and approved Ly tl1e hegistrar(a) !;,ivin!:, i;articulars of the relatiousl1i1•, existing
or proF-osed, between the proprietor anci tlie proposed
AMERICAN H.P.CORPN. v. MAC LABS. [NADON, J.]
329
regi8tered user, including particulars showing the
degree of control by the proprietor over the permitted
use which their relationship will confer and whether
it is a term of their relationship that the proposed
registered user shall be the sole registered user or
that there shall be any other restriction as to
persons for whose registration as registered users
application may be made;
A
B
(b) stating the goods in respect of which registration
is proposed;
(c) stating any conditions or restrictions proposed
with respect to the characteristics of the goods, to
the mode or place of pennitted use, or to any other
matter, and
(d) stating whether the permitted use is to be foe a
period or wi_thout limit of period~ and if for a
period, the duration _thereof;
and
with
such
further
documents,
information
D
or
evidence as may be required under the rules or by the
Registrar.
E
(5) When the requirements of the last foregoing
subsection have been compled with, if the Registrar,
after considering the information furnished to him
under that sub-section, is satisfied that in all the
circumstances the use of the trade mark in relation to
the proposed goods or a.ny of them by the proposed
registered user subject to any conditions or
restricti.ons which the Registrar thinks proper would
not be contrary to the public interest, the Registrar
may register the proposed registered user as a
registered user in respect of the goods as to which he
is so satisfied subject as aforesaid.
F
G
( 6) The Registrar shall refuse an application under
the foregoing provisions of his section if it appears
to him that the grant thereof would tend to facilitate
trafficking in a trade mark."
Sub-section (1) and (2) of section 29 provide as follows :
"29. Proposed use of trade mark by corporation to be
constituted, etc.
H
330
• SUPREME COURT REPORTS
.A
[1985] SUPP.3 s.c.R.
(1) No application for the registration of a trade
mark in respect of· any goods shall be refused, nor
shall. permission for such registration be withheld, on
· . the ground only that it appears that the applicant
does not use or propose to use the trade mark, - 1
B.
(a) if the tribunal is.satisfied that a body corPorate
· is about to .be constituted, am! that the applicant
intends to assign the trade mark to the corporation
with a view to the use thereof . in relation to those
goods by the corporation; or
c
D
(
(b) if the application is accompanied by an application for the registration of a person· as a registered
user of the trade mark, and the tribunal is satisfied
that the proprietor intends it to be used by that
person in relation to.those goods and the tribunal is
also satisfied that that person will be registered as
a registered user thereof illlmediately after the
registration of the trade mark.
(2). The provisions· of section twenty-six of this Act
shall. have effect, in relation to a t~ade mark
registered under the power conferred by the foregoing
sub-section, as if for the refereqce, in paragraph (a)
of sub-section (1) of that section, to intention on
the part of an applicant for registration that a trade
mark shculd be used by him there were substituted a
reference to Intention on his part that lt should be
used .bY the corporation or registered user concerned.'"
'
E"-,,
In the 'l'USSY GAIDRE' Trade Harlt Case a ·company filed
,
,forty-six applications for registering different trade marks in
respect of goods falling under - seventeen d tf fer.ent classes. An
official objection was raised that, owing to the very large and
diverse range of goods -.covered' by the several applic.ations, the
Registrar was .not satisfied that the applicant company had lt.•elf
G
the necessary intention ·to use the marks applied for. All the
marks sought to be registered .related to novels written by the
. late Ian Fleming. Thirty-nine of the said application• rel,.ted to
marks 'James Bond SeCret. Agent' and '007 Secret Agent', Jaraes
'--.Jlond being the hero of those novels and 1 007' beini; his oHic!al
cod~ number. Tile remaining seven appitcations were in respect 6f ~
H
· the mark . 'PUSSY GALORE'.· fussy Ga tore was a character f~l.url 111',
in Ian Fleming's novel 'Godfinger', being'a feinale with S04'ncwhat
Af'iERICJ\N \i.F.CORPN. v. MAC LABS. [MOON, J.]
331
unorthodox fuorals and a name which would appear to be an obscene
A
pun in very questionable taste. The Registrar heard one of the
said applications which related to the trade mark 'FUSSY GALORE'.
The other relevant facts appear in the decision of the Registrar.
The relevant passage is as follows (at page 266) :
" The mark in suit and the others to which I have
B
referred all contain references either directly or
indirectly to the well~known fictional character James
Bond and ~ir. Bevan explained that the applicant
company were closely connected with the deviser of
that character, the late Mr. Ian Fleming and that his
wido'W has some interest in the company. Mr. Bevan
further explained that at the time the various
applications were filed ·the applicants did not
propose to use the mark themselves but were 'firmly of
the intention to seek others who would put the mark to
use either as registered users or as licensees. The
application was not however accollipanied by application
to register users as !Specified in section 29(l)(b).
c
D
hr. Devan stated that it was a convenient commercial
practice to operate throUf.h
regi~tcred
users but the
latter mit,ht not be agreeable so to act until th~ mark
was registered. He submitted that the requirements ot
the Act as to intention to use are satisfied ir. these
contiitions. •·
The Registrar took the view that the English Act of 1938 required
that, to qualify as an applicant, the proprietor of the niark must
either possess the intention to use the mark hinself at the time
of application or have applied under the conditions of clause (a)
or clause (b) of section 29(1). The Registrar accordingly refused
the application. The applicant appealed to the Board of Trade and
the appeal was heard by G.W. Tookey, Esq., <,.c., who dismissed
F
the appeal. The relevant passages frolli the judgTuent of the Board
of Trade are as follows (at pages 269 and 27C) :
'' having carefully considered the relevant sections of
the Act, I conclude that the Registrar's decision is
riE,ht. In my view, section 17 has the lind ted meaning
attributed
to
it by
the Registrar.
There
is. no
difficulty about the case of servants and agents,
because although various executive acts may be
performed by them on behalf of their principal who is
the applicant
for
the mark,
the use of
the mark
Ii
332
SUPRE.rJE COURT REPORTS
[1985] SLPP.3 s.c.R.
A
B
c
D
vis-a-vis the public is by the applicant and no one
else. As regards registered users, when section 17 was
framed by the legislature, the effect of the
introduction into trade mark law for the first time of
registered user provisions must have. been borne in
mind. It would be obvious from the provisions of
section 28, and also from the definition of 'trade
mark' in section 68, that actual use of a trade mark
might be exclusively by a registered user and not by
the proprietor at all ••••
I agree with the Registrar that section 28 is dealing
with matters which arise after registration, and has
no such bearing upon the interpretation of section 17
and 29 as the applicants have contended. As above
indicated, my view is that section 29 states the only
cases in which an intended use, ex hypothesi not a use
by the applicant, can be regarded as justifying
dispensation from the requirements of section 17. What
happens after registration calls for different
consideration both as regards the use of marks in
accordance with the provisions of the Act and as
regards the consequences of use
othe~ise
than in
accordance with the provisions of that Act."
E
F
In our opinion, the High Court was unduly impressed by this
case and unnecessarily attached great importance to it. The High
Court justified its reliance upon that case by ref erring to the
following passage from the jµdgment of this Court in The
Registrar of 'Irade Marks v. Ashok chandra Iiakbit Ltd. [1955] 2
S.C.R. 252. (at pages 259-60) :
"As the law of Trade Marks adopted in our Act merely
·reproduces the English Law with only slight
modifications, a reference to the judicial decisions
G
H
on the corresponding section of the English Act is
apposite and must be helpful."
What the High Court overlooked was that in Ashok Chandra Rakhit's
Case the section of the 1940 Act which fell for interpretation
was in pari materia with the corresponding section of the English
Act of 1938 which had been judicially interpreted by the courts
in England. As pointed out by this Court in Forasol v. Oil and
Natural Gas Caunission [1984] 1 s.c.R. 5£6, 549, 567; s.c. (1984)
Supp. s.c.c. 263, 280, Z95, in the absence of any binding
AMERICAN H.P.CORPN. v. MAC LABS. [MADON, J.]
333
authority of an Indian Court on a particular point of law,
English decisions in which judgments were delivered by judges
held in high repute can be referred to as they are decisions of
courts of a country from which Indian Jurisprudence and a large
part of our law is derived, for they are uuthorities of high
presuasive value to which the court may legitimately turr. for
assistance; but whether the rule laid down in any of these cases
can be applied by our courts must, however, be judged in the
context of cur own laws and legal procedure and the practical
realities of litigation in our country.
The relevant provisions relating to registered users in the
English Act and in the 1958 Act are materially different. The
English Act creates two legal fictions. The first is contained in
.section 28(2) which relates to the permitted use of a trade mark.
That fiction is for the purpose of section .26 (which corresponds
to section 46 of the 1958 Act) and for any other purpose for
which such use is material under the English Act or at common law.
The second is contained in section 29(2) and relates to intention
on the part of an applicant for registration that a trade mark
should be used by him. The second fiction is for the purposes of
paragraph (a) of section 26(1) which corresponds to clause (a) of
secion 46(1) of the 1958 Act. The 1958 Act, however, contains
only one fiction. It is .in section 48(2), which is in pari
materia with section 28(2) of the English Act. In our opinion,
the omission from the 1958 Act of a provision ·Similar to that
contained in section 29(2) of the English Act does not make any
difference if one were to see the said section 29(2) in its
proper setting and conte~t. The English Act does not prescribe,
just as the 1958 Act does not, any period of time from the date
of registration of a trade mark within which an application for
registering a person as a registered user of that trade mark
should be made. Section 29(1) of the English Act, however,
provides that an application for registration of a trade mark can
be accompanied by an application for the registration of a person
as a registered user of that trade mark, and if the tribunal is
satisfied that the proprietor of the trade mark intends it to be
used by that person in relation to those goods and is also satisfied that that person will be registered as a registered user
thereof after the registration of the trade mark, it will not
refuse to register the trade mark. The effect of section 29(1),
therefore, is that an application for registering a person as a
registered user can be made simulataneously with the application
for registerilll;; the trade mark and if both are found to be satisfactory, the application for registration would be granted and
A
.B
c
D
E
F
G
H
334
SUPREME roURT REPORTS
[1985] SUPP.3 s.c.R.
A
B
immediately thereafter the registration of the registered user
wuld be allowed. In such a case; the intention on the part of
the applicant for registration.that the trade mark should be used
by the
registered user thereof is to be deemed to be an
intention to use tr.at trade mark by the appl1ca11t for registration. lhis is a .special provision applicable to a special case.
The fictl.on created by section 29(2} is also !llade applicable to
the· case· of• a. corporation abo-Jt to be constituted to which the
applicant intends to assign the trade mark. There is no such
fiction re1ating to.inte~tion express1y,provided in.the 1958 Act.·
nor is .there any provision for simultaneously making an application .for .. registration of a trade mark and an application· for
C
registering a person as· the registered user of the trade mark. It
appears to us that the purpose for which fiction ~-as created by
section 29(2) with respect.to a registered user was to eliminate
all possibility of trafficking in a trade mark by a person
getting himself registered as th~ proprietor of a trade mark and
tr.ereafter going io search of some person who will use it as the
registered user thereof. Assuming thai: the existence of the
D · special fiction. created by section Z9 (2) cut's dow:i the full
operation' of the general fiction enacted in section 28(2). it
does not follow that the absence of such special fiction in the
1958 Act will. also cut down· the operation· of the fiction in
section 4U(2) in the. sa:ne way by limiting it to the .actual use of
a trade mark only. A• pointed out earlier, in the 1958 Act
E
wherever the phrase "used by hlru" occurs the fiction will apply.
·In other ,words,. the pP.tmitted use of a trade mark is,' by the
fiction enacted in section 4b(2), equated with "use by the regis, tered f·roprietor". Co·asequentlY: wherever the word "use" accurs
·with- all its permutations and c01lll1llltations, . as for instance in
'' phrases such as .. proposed to be used by him" or .. intended to be
,
F
used by him", the fiction will apply. At this stage, it is perti'··
neot to note that form No. rn-2, which is the form prescribed for
' · an application for registration of
trade mark prescribed by the
Eilglish Trade : Marks Rules, 1938, wo.s substitut<ad in 1982 and
under · the substituted Form a new column is provided which
requires details of an ·application under section 29(1) to be
G
given~ The old Form No. TH-2 rlid not contain this requirement nor
does form rn-1 ap)!ended to the 'fr~de and Merchandise Marks Rules,
0
·a
195S.
There is another v!tal point of distinction between thP.
provisions of the. tni;lish kt and.those of the 1958 Act relating
to re&lst~red users. U11~er the 1958 Act, an application foi:;
regLsttation of a ·trade mark as also an application for
---------------------------------------AMERICAN·H.P.CORPN. v. MA.:: LABS. [MADON, J.j
335
registering a registered user are to be made to the Registrar and
it is the Registrar who has to grant both of them. The Registrar
would refuse the application i f it appears to him that the grant
thereof would t~nd to facilitate trafficking . in a trade mark.
Thfs question• is to be considered by the Registrar himself. The
• provisions of the 1940 Act were the ~ame but the provisions of
the 1958 Act are radically different. Under the 1958 Act, though
.both the application for registration of a trade mark and the
application-for registration of a registered user are to be made
to the Registrar, the Registrar has the power to grant the application for registration of the trade mark only. So far as the
application- for registeiihg." a person as a registered user is
concerned, he has to forward it together with his report to the
Central Government and it is for the Central Government to decide
whether to permit 8uch application to be granted or not. In order
to decice this, the Central Government has to take into account
the matters set out_ in sub-section ·(3) of section 49 and in rule
BS of the. Trade Marks Rules, 1959. The mattere to, be considered
by the Central Government include not onl~ whether the permitted
use, i f allowed, would amount to trafficking in trade marks but
also the interests of the gen~ral public and the development of
any industry, trade or commerce in India. After the Central ·
Government has taken its decision, the Registrar is to dispose of
the application in accordance with the directions issued by the
Central Government. Thus, while under the English Act the autho<ity to decide an application for registering a registered user is
. the same as the authority for registering a trade mark, under the
1958 Act they are different and so are the considerations which
are to be taken into account.
Under the 1958 Act an application for registering a
registered user can only be made after a trade mark is
registered; If an intended use by a person who will be registered
user is not to be Included in the legal . fiction created by
section 4ll(2) it \JOuld Make that fiction operate within a very
narrow compass , and almost render, the provisions relating to
registered users m.ea·ntngless. I:: ts in very r:ire cir.:!umstances
that a person· will get " .trade .mark regist11red as prGposed to l:>e
used by himself, use it in relatia11 to the conc:.erned goods, and
. therecifter permit it to be used by another a~ a registere.d user:·
It is also not open to everyolle who t{ant:s to resister a trade
mark to form a company to· lithit.h after the tTade (r\ark is
registered and the · prvposed C.O(llpa:iy is ioc.orporated, th-= trade
mark will be assigned. Y.1ese t'\ii11&s are not pr&Ctlcal n~itles
and Parliament could not have intended such almlt'J rQSults. The
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argument of Dr. Gauri Shankar that the Appellant should have got
the trade mark registered with the intentlon that it will itself
use the trade mark and in order to effectuate that intention the
Appellant should have set up a factory and manufactured and
marketed the tablets 'DRISTAN' and then either assigned the trade
mark to the Indian Company or to get the Indian Company
registered as the registered user of that trade mark is
illogical. By reason of our foreign exchange and industrial
policies it is not possible for a foreign company to establish
its own industry in India. It can only do so by entering into a
collaboration with Indian entrepreneurs in which the foreign
company would not be permitted to have more than 40 per cent
shareholding and would be subject to other restrictions. Even
assuming that a foreign proprietor of a trade mark ;;ere to be
establish an industry of his own in India, it would be absurd to
imagin that it would thereafter cease manufacturing the goods and
allow someone else to do so. Equally illogical is the argument of
Dr. r.auri Shankar that the Appellant and the Indian Company
should have jointly applied for registration of the trade mark
'DRISTAN'. The Appellant was already in collaboration with the
Indian Company. There was no need for it to seek other
collaborators to establish a new company. To assign the trade
mark to the Indian Company or to make jointly with the Indian
Company an application for registration of the trade mark
1 DKISTAN' would be to destroy the Appellant's proprietorship in
that trade mark. lt is well-known principle of interpretation of
statutes that a construction should not be put upon a statutory
provision which would lead to manifest absurdity or futility,
palpable inJUS tice, or absurd inconvenience or anomaly. (see: M.
Pentiah aod Ors. V• HiKlda!a Veeramallappa and Ors. [196lj 2
$.C.R. 295, 303. The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court
saw the absurdity, inconvenience and hardship resulting from the
construction which was placed by it upon section 48(2), as is
shown by the passages from its judgment reproduced earlier. It,
however, forget the above principle of construction and failed to
give to the legal fiction enacted by section 48(2) its full force
and effect.
G
The 'PUSSY GALORE' Trade Mark Csse was a decision of the
Board of Trade and not of any English Court. As against that
case, we have the decision of the High Court of Australia in
Ast:on v. Harlee Manufacturing Caapany, (1959-60) 103 C.L.R. 391,
on which Fullagar, J,, held (at pages 402-3) :
H
"I would only add that the 'registered user'
provisions of the Trade Marks Act were introduced in
'
AMERICAN h.P.CORPN. V• MAC I.ABS. (YiADON, J.]
337
194fs, and an intention to take advantage of those
provisions would, in Tll'J opinion, be a sufficient
'intention to use'."
A
So far as· the 'EOSTITOI' Trade Mark Case relied upon by the
· ·Registrar is concerned, it baa no relevance to the question which
we have to decide. It turned upon its own facts.and what was held
1n that case was that the provisions of section 28 of· the English
,Act are riot mandatory but permissive.
B
The High Court also took the assistance of the Shavaksha
Comnittee Report and the Ayyangar Report to enable it to place
the construction which it did upon section 48(2). 1'ben it was
intended to revise the 1940 Act, the Government of India set up
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in 1953 that lrade ¥..arks enquiry Committee under the. Chairmanship~
of Yrr. K.s. Shavaksha, the then, Registrar of 'Irade Marks• The
Report . of the .. Shavaksha COILtllittee t.as made. in 1954. The
Government thereafter appointed 11.r; Alagiriswami, who had acted
as the Secretary of the Comnittee, as Special Officer to consider
the· Shavaksha COILtllittee '-Report,
and he made . his own
· reconmendations. 'Ihe Government, ··therefore, felt that the
Shavaksha ComrrJ.ttee Report and the recommendations made by the
Special Officer should be further examined by a judicial
authority and it accordingly appointed Mr. Justice Rajagopala
,Ayyangar to examine the matter. Both the learned Single Judge
and the Livision Bench were of. the ' opinion that the
·reconmendation made in the Ayyangar Report were accepted by the
Government. 'Ibis is, : however, not correct. 'Ihe Shavaksha
Conmittee had reconmended the insertion of a provision similar to
clause (b) of section 29(1) of .the English Act in section 36 of
the 1940 Act which corresponds to section 45,of the. 1958 Act. The
Ayyangar Report did not accept this recomn.endation but · had
recommended the addition of a provision. to the effect that
registered proprietor should not .be entitled to permit use by a
registered user ·unless such proprietor had used the .mark in
relation to goods in the course of trade for a period of at least
two years_before the date of the application for registration of
a registered user •. Parliament did not accept the reconmendation
made in either of these Reports. These Reports, therefore, cannot
be referred to for ascertaining the intention of Parliament when
enacting the relevant provisions of the 1958 Act.
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a
'P'rom what we have said above, we must not be understood to
mean ·that a person, who does not intend to use a trade mark ·
himself can get it registered at)d when faced with an application
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under clause (a) of section 46(1) to have that trade mark
removed, turn round and say that he intended to use it through
some person who was proposed to be got registered as a registered
user. This would clearly amount to trafficking in a trade mark.
'PUSSY GAUJRE' Trade Mark Case could easily have been decided on
the ground that the applications for registration made therein,
if granted, would amount to trafficking in trade marka. This has
been pointed out in Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition,
Volume 48, in footnote 6 to paragraph 30 at page 25.
In our opinion, to enable the proprietor of a trade mark who
has got it registered on the ground that he intends to use the
trade mark to avail himself of the fiction created by section
48(2), he must have had in mind at the date of his application
for registration some person to whom he intends to allow the use
of the trade mark as a registered user. This would eliminate all
chances of trafficking in a trade mark. If an applicant for
registration did not have at the date of his application for
registration a particular registered user in view, he cannot be
said to have had a bona fide intention to use th£ trade mark and
in such an event he cannot resist an application made under
clause (a) of section 46(1) of the 1958 Act.
Turning now to the present Appeal, the facts on the record
show that only when it was decided to introduce 'DRISTAN' tablets
in the Indian market through the Indian Company that the
Appellant made its application to register the trade mark
'DKISTAN'. There was a close connection in the course of trade
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between the Appellant and the Indian Company. The Appellant owned
40 per cent of the shareholding in the Indian Company. It had
entered 1nto a technical co1laboration agreement with the Indian
Company which provided for strict quality control and for
formulae and services to be provided by the Appellant. The
manufacture, marketing and advertising of all products under the
said agreement were to be under the control of the Appellant.
There was no royalty payable by the Indian Company to the
Appellant in respect of the use of the trade mark 'DRISTAN'. In
the event of the collaboration agreement being terminated by
reason of the happening of any of the events mentioned in the
said agreement, amongst which events was the shareholding of the
Appellant becoming less than 40 per cent, the Indian Company was
to cease to be entitled to manufacture the tablets 'DRISTAN' or
to use its formula or to use tfl.e trade mark 'DRISTAN'. There was
here, therefore, no question of any trafficking in a trade mark.
In these circumstances, the intention of the Appellant to use the
AMERICAN H.P.CQRPN, v. MAC LABS. [MADON, J •]
339
trade mark 'DRISTAN' through the Indian Company which was
subsequently to get itself registered as the registered user of
the said trade mark calU1ot but be characterized as ~ fide.
Mr. Nariman, learned Counsel for the Appellant, also urged
that in addition to having a bona fide intention to use the trade
mark 'DRISTAN', the Appellant had also used it within a period of
one month before the date of the Application for Rectification.
For this purpose, learned Counsel relied upon the samples sent by
the Appellant to the Indian Company. In the view which we have
taken that the two conditions of clause (a) of section 46(1) are
cumulative and that the first condition has not been satisfied in
this case, we find it UlU1eceasary to consider this point.
It was also submitted by Dr. Gauri Shankar, learned Counsel
for the First Respondent that the Appellant was not entitled to
retain the trade mark 1DRISTAN' on ·the register because it had
obtained its registration by making a false statement in its
application for registration inasmuch as it had not stated in the
said application that the said trade mark was proposed to be used
by a registered user but instead stated that it was to be used by
the Appellant who claimed to be the proprietor thereof. This
point was not raised at any time before the Registrar or the High
Court and it is not open to the First Respondent to take this
point for the first time in this Appeal by certificate. Apart
from that, there is no substance in this point. Form 1M-l appended to the Trade and Merchandise Marks Rules, 1959, does not
contain any column similar to the column in the new Form No. TM-2
appended to the English Trade Marks Rules, 1938. The relevant
portion of Form TM-1 is as follows :
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" Application is hereby made for registration in Part
A(a)/B of the register of the accompanying trade mark
in class (b) •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• in respect
of
(c)•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
name(s)
of
address is
in
(d)•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
(e)
the
whose
.••..••••..••••••••.••••••••• ,-.. who
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claim(s) to be the proprietor(s) thereof (and by whom
the said mark is proposed to be used) (f) or (and by
whom and his ( thefr) predecessor( a) in title (g) the
said mark has been continuously used since •••••••••••
•••.•• 19 ••••••••••• ) in respect of the said goods(h)."
The Appellant, therefore, caru10t be said to have practised any
deception in stating in its application that it intended to use
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the trade mark itself. In our opinion, it would be better if the
Central Government were to amend Form Til-1 to require the
applicant to . state whether he proposes to use the trade mark
himself or through a registered proprietor and if so, to state
the particulars of the.proposed registered user.
It was ~t sought to be ·argued by Dr. Gauri Shankar that
the trade mark 'DRISTAN' was deceptively and confusingly similar
'to the trade mark 'BISTAN' of which the registered proprietor is
M/s. Prof. Gajjar's Standard Chemical Wroks Ltd. This is not one
of the questions upon which the certificate was granted by the
High. Court,and it is not open to the First Respondent to take
this point in this Appeal. In any event, this point too is
without any substance. It was rejected by the Registrar. The
learned single Judge did not deal with it. Though the Uivision
Bench was.of the opinion that it.was not-necessary to decide that
questi.on,.
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[1985) SUPP.3 s.c.R.
it
recorded
the
facts
relating thereto whl.ch wou1d
justify the rejection of that contention. These facts are that
though the proprietor of the said trade mark 'BISTAN' had made an
affidavit supporting the First Respondent in. the proceedings for
rectification of the Register it had not either opposed the
registration of the trade mark . 'DRISTAN' nor had it at any time
alleged, apart from the said affidavit, that there would be any
confusion_ or deception by the use of the trade mark 'DRISTAN',
In the written' sul:missions filed by the First p_.;spondent
after the hearing before us was concluded it was contended that
the Court's discretion should be exercised against the trade mark
'DRISTAN' remaining on the Register inasmuch as to allow it so to
· ·continue would be ·contrary to the policy of the · Central
Government with respect to .brand names belonging to foreign ,
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companies· and also because two of the ingredients used in the
'·<.
· formula for the manufacture of . 'DRISTAN' tablets were banned by
·-..... .... the authorities. In support· of this contention copies of some
'circulars and notifications were. filed along with the written·
submissions •. This point was not at any time ·taken before the
. Registrar or the High Court' nor does the certificate granted by
G· the High court cover it. It is not fair to produce copies of any
'
circular or notification .. along' with written sul:missions after
oral ; .arguments have · closed . because the other . side has. no
opportunity to . meet this case. For ought we know, after some
ingredients in the composition of the 'DRISTAN' tablets were
banned, the manufacturers may have changed the formula, We are
not ciincerned in this Appeal with this question. The application
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AMERICAN HoPoCORPN. Vo MAC LABS. [MADON, J.]
341
said trade mark is atill pending and when the Central Govemment
comes to consider that application, it will decide the matter for
itself, After all, the best guardian of the policy of the Central
Government is the Central Government itself and not a private
limited company,, namely, Hae Laboratories Private Lilllited, the
First Respondent before us, which has a vital interest in having
the trade mark 'DRISTAN' removed from the Register.
For the reasons given above, this Appeal must succeed and is
allowed and the judgment of the Division Bench of the Calcutta
High court appealed against is reversed and the order passed by
it is set aside. Consequently, Appeal No. 165 of 1968 filed by
the Appellant before the Division Bench of the Calcutta High
Court is allowed with costs and the judgment of the learned
Single Judge of that High Court and the order passed by him are
reversed and set aside. As a result Appeal No. 61 of 1965 filed
by the First Respondent before the learned Single Judge of the
Calcutta High Court is dismissed with costs and the order of the
Registrar of Trade Marks, Calcutta, dismissing the First
Respondent's Application for Rectification No. CAL-17 with costs
is confirmed.
The First Respondent will pay to the Appellant the costs of
this Appeal.
A.P.J.
Appeal allowed.
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