BABU RAM JAGDISH KUMAR & CO., ETC., ETC versus STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS., ETC., ETC.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 4 May 1979 | [1979] 3 S.C.R. 952 | 1979 INSC 109
Key facts
- Decided
- 4 May 1979
- Bench
- N.L. UNTWALIA*, R.S. PATHAK, E.S. VENKATARAMIAH
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 1028/1976
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1979] 3 S.C.R. 952
- Neutral citation
- 1979 INSC 109
Text of the judgment
952
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BABU RAM JAGDISH KUMAR & CO., ETC., ETC.
v.
STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS., ETC., ETC.
May 4, 1979
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[N. L. UNTWALIA, R. S. PATHAK AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.J
Puttjab Sales Tax Act, 1948-S. 31-Constitutional validity of-.
Legislatutc. If could delegate po1ver to executire to add or delete anything
in Schedules to the A.ct.
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Words &: Phrases "Taxable e~e1u" 1uui "taxablt· person''- ,\leaning of.
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S<ction 5(1) of the Punjab Sales Tax Act, 1948 authorises the Stato
Government to deternline the rates of tax payable on ihe taxable .turnover of
a dealer not exceeding the limit prescribed therein. Sub-section (2) lays
down the principles governing the Jetermination of the taxable turnover.
Schedule 'C' - of the r\ct refers to goods, the tun1over of which is subject to
purchase tax. Section 31 of the Act \Vhich gives specific power to the State
Government to amend Schedule '(:' provides that afler giving by notification,
not less than three months' notice of its intention so to d•J the State Govern·
ment may add to or delete from Schedule 'C' any goods and thereupon
Schedule 'C' shall be deemed to be an1ended accordingly.
By a notification dated January 15. 1968 the- State Government added in
Schedule 'C', "paddy" and "rice" as items on which purchase tax could' be
levied. .As a result of thi.:; notification turnover relating to the purchase of
paddy and rice became exigible to purchase tax in the hands of the purchasers
with effect from that date.
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Tn.e appellants who are dealers in paddy, buy paddy ln the first instance
and sell rice after converting paddy into rice. They filed writ petitions in
the High Court questioning the validity of s. 31 of the i\ct and the notifica·
tion issued thereunder and their liability to payment of purchase tax. T-be
High Court dismissed the writ petitions.
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In appeal to this Court it was contended that s. 31 of the Act which
authorised the State Government to vary Schedule 'C' by adding certain goods
\Vh06e turnover was not liable to payment of sales tax earlier, suffered from
the vice of excessive delegation of legistatiYe power.
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Dismissing the appeals,
HELD: l(a) The delegation of po-wer to the State (iovernment to determine whether any class of goods should be included or excluded from Schedule 'C: to the Act cannot be considered as unconstitutio:aal. [967 G].
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(b) The case in so far as s. 31 of the Act which is an integral part of
a single enactment and which authorises the Stat~ Government to . amend
Schedu1e 'C' to the Act cannot be different from the case which was dealt
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BABU RAM JAGDISH &
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with by the Constitution Bench, in Pt. Banarsi Das Bhanot v. State of M.P.,
[1959] SCR 427. If it is permissible for the Legislature to authorise
the State Government to convert tax free goods into taxable ones, there is
hardly any justification for holding that the State Government cannot be
entrusted with the power to include goods in Schedule 'C' n1aking their purchase turnover taxable. [968 D-Fl.
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(c) It is well established that the delegation of power by the legislature hl
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a local authority or to the executive Government to vary or modify an existing Jaw would not be unconstitutional so long as such delegation does
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co. v. PUNJAB (Venkataramiah, J.) J53
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not involve the abdication of essential legislative power by the 'legislature.
Such delegations of legislative powers have been upheld by this Court on
several varied and diverse grounds such as the scheme and policy of the
statute under which the power is delegated, the presence of guidelines in the
statute regarding the exercise of delegated power, the lack of time for the
legislature to make provision with regard to all the details involved in the
adm:nistration of law, the incapacity of the legislature to foresee future events,
the nature of the subject matter of the legislation and the nature of the:. donee
of power etc. Even in matters relhting to taxation laws, it has been consistently held that the legislature can. delegate the power to fix rates of tax provided
there are necessary guidelines regarding such fixation on the ground that in a
ntodern society, taxation is one of the methods by which economic and social
goals of State can be achieved and the power to tax should be flexible and
capable of being easily altered to meet the exigencies of circumstances. Such
delegation has been held to be not amounting to delegation of essential legislative function. [959A-DJ.
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Pt. Banarsi Das Bhanot v. State of M.P. &: Ors., {1959] SCR 427; /l;!unicipal Corp. of Delhi v. Birla Cotton, Spinning and Weaving Mills, Delhi &
Anr., [1968] 3 SCR 251; Corporation of Calcutta & Anr. v. T/Je Liberty
Cinema, [1965] 2 SCR 477; Sita Rain Bisha1nbar Dayal & Ors. v. State of
U.P. & Ors., [1972] 2 SCR 141; Hirata/ Rattan/al etc., etc. v. State of
U.P & Anr. Pfc., etc. [1973] 2 SCR 502; referred to.
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i(a) The argument that even though s. 31 was not unconstitutional
the
was not enforceable against the appellants has no force. In Pt.
Banarsi Das Bhanot v. State of M.P. it has been held that it is open to the
Legislature to delegate the power to withdra\v the exemption which has been
given by the Legislature in respect of certain transactions specified, 1n the
Act under consideration in that case. It cannot be said that the principal
object 'of the Act is to encourage manufacturing industry. The Act is a fiscal
legislation and its object is to collect revenue for the purpose of n1eeting
the expenditure of the Government. It is true that while levying tax under
the Act, the Legislature may grant exemptions in certain cases and may
decline to grant exemption in other. The question whether such exeniption
should be given or not is only incidental or ancillary to the principal object
viz., the object of levying tax for the purpose of collecting revenue. Jt
cannot be said that wJlen certain goods are sold in favour of a manufacturer,
the seller is always entitled to deduct such sales turnover from the grosl!
turnover. He can do so only when such goods are specified in the certificate
of registration obtained by the purchaser and they are used by him in the
aotiffcat~on
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
manufacture in the State of any goods other than goods declared tn. free
under s. 6 of the Act for sale in the State. Transactions in paddy cannot be
considered as having been generally exempted from payment of tax under
the Act. Section 5(2)(a)(ii) of the Act grants exe!Ilj>tion from payment of
sales tax on the turnover of goods sold in favour of a manufacturer under
the circumstances mentioned therein only to the seller and not to the boyer
even though indirectly the buyer may be benefited thereby. [970A-F]
(b) 1be terms "taxable goods", "taxable event" and "taxable person'' are
three distinct concepts. In the instant case the "'taxable event" is the pur·
chase of paddy and not its sale which alone attracts s. 5(2)(a)(ii) of the Acl
''Taxable person" i.e. the person liable to pay tax is the purchaser and not
the seller. The appellants cannot complain that any e-xem.ption graated to
them by the Act has been taken away. Even though the liability to pay
purchase tax may be on the appellants, it is bound to, have repercussions on
the price at which they buy paddy and the price at which rice manufactured
by them out of that padey is sold by them. The tax payable under the
Act being an indirect ta""\, the tax burden would ordinarily fall on the consumer of rice and not on any of the intermediaries including the appellants.
The iinpugned notification cannot therefore, be treated as one issued against
the policy of the statute. [970G-H, 971A-B]
State of Tamil Nadu v. M. K. Kandaswanii, etc., i~tc., [1976] 1 SCR 38;
referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JuRiso1cTJON :
1976.
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[1979] 3 S.C.R.
Civil Appeal No. 1028 of
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
8-3-1976 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 354/75.
AND
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1029-1032 OF 1976
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Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
8-3-1976 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in C.W.P. Nos. 564
and 582/75 and C.W.P. Nos. 1988 and 2000/76 respectively.
AND
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CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1033 OF 1976
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
31-5-1976 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in C.W. Petition
No. 2580/76.
AND
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1034 OF 11976
o
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order 10-6-1976
of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Petition No.
2890/76.
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BABU RAM JAGDISI! &
co. v. PUNJAB (Venkataramiah, J.) 955
AND
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1035 OF 1976
A
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
28-6-1976 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Jurisdiction No. 3216 of 1976.
M. C. IJhandare, A. K. Sen, (in CA 1029/76), Mrs. Sunanda
Bhandare A. N. Karkhanis, Miss Malini Poduval and G. R. Sethi (in
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CA 1031/76).
Soli J. Sorabjee, Addi. Sol. Genl.
' ).._ Singh for the Respondents.
(In CA 1028/76), Hardev
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
VENKATARAMIAH, J.-In these appeals by special leave, we are
called upon to pronounce on the validity of section 31 of the Punjab
General Sales Tax Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'),
the Notification dated the 13th January, 1968 issued thereunder by
the Government of Punjab and the liability of the appellants to pay
purchase tax under the Act in respect of the turnover relating to the
purchases of paddy made by them during the relevant period.
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The appellants are dealers in paddy and engaged in the business
of millers in the State of Punjab. They buy paddy from growers or
katcha adatias, convert it into rice and sell rice. Most of the rice
manufactured by them is purchased by the State Government under
food procurement orders.
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A brief history of the relevant provisions of the Act is as follows : -
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Under the Act as it was originally enacted, there was no provision
levying tax on the purchase turnover of the goods dealt with by a
dealer as defined in the Act. The Act was amended by Punjab Act
No. 7 of 1958 which received the assent of the Governor on April
18, 1~58 and the amending Act came into force at once. The
amending Act brought about the following changes in the Act : In the long title of the Act, after the word "sale" the wo d "
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pur ase were mserte . Clause ( d) of section 2 of the Act whi h
defined the expression 'dealer' was amended so as to bring with~n
the scope of that expression a person who purchased any goods ·
the course of trade or business. The turnover relating to purchas~~
?1ade by a deal~ subsequent to the commencement of the amendmg Act of certam goods was made liable to pa}'lllent of tax. The
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[1979] 3 s.c.R.
word 'pm chase' was defined by clause (ff) of section 2 whi~h was
introduced by the amending Act as follows : -
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"2. (ff) 'purchase' wilih all its grnmmatical or cognate
expressions, means the acquisition of goods other than
sugarcane, foodgrains, and pulses for nse in the manufacture
of goods for sale for cash or deferred payment or other
valuable consideration otherwise than under a mortgage,
hypothecation, charge or pledge.". . . . . . . . (The rest of
the clause is not necessary for the purpose of these cases).
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The Act was further amended by Punjab Act No. 13 of 1959
which deleted the words "other than sugarcane, foodgrains and
pulses" in clause (ff) of section 2. Section 6 of the Act was repealed and substituted by a new section which read as follows : -
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"6. Tax free goods.-(!) No tax shall be payable on
the sale of goods specified in the first column of Schedule C
subject to the conditions and exceptions, if any, set out in
the corresponding entry in the second column thereof and
no dealer shall charge sales tax or purchase tax on the sale
or purchase, as the case may be, of goods which are declared tax free from time to time under this section.
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Section 4 of the Act was amended by imposing t~x on pur
chases also subject to sections 5 and 6 of the Act. It is, however,_,.( •.
seen from clause (ff) of section 2 that the purchase of foodgrains
was not covered by the definition and remained unaffected by the
above amending Act.
(2) The State Government after giving by notification
not less than three months' notice of its intention so to do
may by like notification add to or delete from Schedule B
or Schedule C and thereupon Schedule B or Schedule C, as
the case may be, shall be deemed to be amended accordingly.''
It is seen from the above provision that the turnover relating to
the sale of goods mentioned in the first column of Schedule 'C' to
the Act subject to the conditions and exceptions, if any, set out in
the corresponding entry in the second column thereof was exempted
from payment of tax.
By Punjab Act No. 24 of 1959, the above section 6 was substituted by a new section which read as follows :-"6. Tax free goods.-(1) No tax shall be payable on
the sale of goods SJ'.>~ified in the first column of Schedule B.
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BABU RAM JAGDISH & co. v. PUNJAB (Venkataramiah, J.) 957
subject to the couditious and exceptiou, if any, set out in
the corresponding entry in the second column thereo~ and
no dealer shall charge sale tax on the sale of goods which
are declared tax-free from time to time under this section.
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(2) The State Government after giving by notification
not Jess than three months' notice of its intention so to do,
may by like notification add to or delete from Schedule B
and thereupon Schedule B shall be deemed to be amended
accordingly."
By Punjab Act No. 18 of 1960, clause (ff) of section 2 of the
Act which had undergone some alteration when Punjab Act No. 24
of 1959 came into force was snbstituted by a new clause which
read :
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"2. (ff) 'purchase', wtth all its grammatical or cognate
expressions, means the acquisition of goods specified in
Schedule C for cash or deferred payment or other valuable
consideration otherwise than under a mortgage, hypothecation, charge or pledge."
The effect of the said amendment was that the turnover relating
to the purchase of goods mentioned in Schedule 'C' to the Act
became liable to tax subject to the other provisions of the Act.
Section 4 of the Act was also amended by the introduction of subsection (2-A) providing that notwithstanding anything contained in
sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 4 of the Act, no tax on the
sale of any goods should be levied if a tax on their purchase was
payable under the Act. Originally seven items of goods had been
specified by the State Legislature in Schedule 'C' to the Act. By
the Punjab General Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1965 (Punjab
Act No. 28 of 1965) section 31 was inserted in the Act authorising
the State Government to amend Schedule 'C'. It read as follows ._
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"31. Power to amend Schedule C-The State Government, after giving by notification not less than three
months' notice of its intention so to do, may by notification
add to, or delete from, Schedule C any goods, and there~pon Schedule C shall be deemed to be amended accordmgly."
The words 'three months' 1"n the b
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by 'twenty days' by Punjab Act No. 7 of 1967.
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[1979] 3 s.c.R.
In exercise of the power conferred by the above provision, the
State Government issued the Notification on the 15th January, 1968
adding paddy and rice as items (8) and (9) in Schedule 'C'. The
result was that the turnover relating to the purchase of paddy and
rice became exigible to payment of purchase tax under the Act in
the hands of the purchasers with effect from the 15th January, 1968.
Aggrieved by the said notification, the appellants who became liable
to payment of purchase tax on the turnover relating to the purchases
of Paddy made by them filed petitions under Article 226 of the
Constitution on the file of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana
questioning the validity of section 31 of the Act, the Notification
dated the 15th January, 1968 issued thereunder and their liability
to payment of purchase tax.
The principal contentions urged by the appellants before the
High Court were (1) that section 31 of the Act which authorised
the State Government to amend Schedule 'C' to the Act by adding
certain items making the turnover relating to their purchases liable
to tax was void on the ground that it suffered from the vice of
excessive delegation of legislative power and therefore the notification
issued thereunder was also void and (2) that the appellants who
were carrying on the business of manufacturers of rice could not
be denied the benefit of section 5(2) (a) (ii) of the Act which authorised the deduction from the gross turnover die turnover relating to
the sales of paddy effected in their favour notwithstanding the inclusion of paddy in Schedule 'C' to the Act. The High Court rejected
both the contentions of the appellants and dismissed the writ petitions. Hence these appeals under Article 136 of the Constitution.
In this Court also, the very same contentions which were urged
before the High Court were urged in support of the appeals with
some slight variations. The first contention urged by Mr. M. C.
Bhandare, learned counsel for the appellants was that section 31 of
the Act which authorised the State Government to vary Schedule 'C'
to the Act by adding certain goods whose turnover was not liable to
payment of sales tax before suffered from the vice of excessive
delegation of legislative power and in the alternative he submitted
that even if the said provision was otherwise valid, it could not be
interpreted as including within its scope the power to issue a notification which would run counter to the express legislative policy of
the Act contained in section 5(2)(a)(ii) thereof which had been
enacted with the avowed purpose of giving assistance to manufacturing industries.
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BABU RAM JAGDISH & co. v. PUNJAB
(Venkataramiah, J.) 959
A review of the decisions of this Conrt to some of which we will
presently refer shows that the delegation of power by the legislature
to a'. local authority or to the Executive Government to vary or
modify an existing law would not be unconstitutional so long as such
delegation does not involve the abdication of essential legislativ~
power by the legislature. Such delegations of legislative power have
been upheld by this Court on several varied and diverse grounds
such as the scheme and policy of the statute under which the power
is delegated, the presence of guidelines in the statute regarding the
exercise of delegated power, the lack of time for the Legislature to
make provision with regard to all the details involved in the administration of the law, the incapacity of the Legislature to foresee all
future events, the nature of the subject matter of legislation and the
nature of the douee of power etc. Even in matters relating to taxation law, it has been consistently held that the Legislature can
delegate the power to fix rates of tax provided there are necessary
guidelines regarding such fixation on the ground that in a modern
society, taxation is one of the methods by which economic and social
goals of the State can be achieved and the power to tax, therefore,
should be a flexible power and capable of being easily altered to
meet the exigencies of circumstances. Such delegation has been held
to be not amounting to delegation of essential legislative function.
In Powell v. Appollo Candle Company Limited(') the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council was called upon to decide whether
section 133 of the Customs Regulation Act of 1879 of New South
Wales which conferred the power on the Governor to impose tax on
certain articles of import was an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative powers. In holding that it was not unconstitutional the
Privy Council observed :
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"It is argued that the tax in question has been imposed
by the Governor and not by the Legislature who alone had
power to impose it. But the duties levied under the
0rder-in-Council are really levied by the authority of the
Act under which the Order is issued. The Legislature has
not parted with its perfect control over the Governor and
has the power, of course, at any moment, of withdr~wing
or altering the power which, they have entrusted to him.
In these circumstances, their Lordships are of opinion that
the judgment of the Supreme Court was wrong in declar-
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(1) [1885] 10 A.C. 282.
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[1979] 3 S.C.l!..
ing Section 133 of the Customs Regulation Act of 1879
to be beyond the power of the Legislature."
In J. W. Hampton Jr. & Company v. United States(') the validity
of the action of the President to make changes in the rates provided
in the Tariff Act, 1922 under the power delegated by the Congress
arose for consideration. That was challenged as a forbidden delegation of legislative power to executive authority. The challenge was
negatived by the Supreme Court of the United States on the ground
that the Congress bad laid down by legislative act an intelligible
principle to which the person authorised to fix the rate of customs
duties on imported merchandise was to conform.
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The principle enunciated in the above two decisions has been
substantially adopted and followed by this Court in two cases( 1) Pandit Banarsi Das Bhanot v. The State of M1dhya Pradesh &
Ors.(') und (2) Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Bir/a Cotton,
Spinning and Weaving Mills, Delhi & Anr.( 3 ) to which we shall
refer hereafter.
In Rajnarain Singh v. The Chairman, Patna Administration Comndttee, Pdtna and Another( 4 ) where an earnest atternpt was made to
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analyse and explain the judgment of this Court in re. The Delhi Laws
Act, 1912('). Bose, J. after referring in detail to the observations
made by the learned Judges in the latter case observed at page 301 : "In our opinion, the majority view was that an executive authority can be authorised to modify either existing or
future laws but not in any essential feature. Exactly what
constitutes an essential feature cannot be enunciated in
general terms, and there was some divergence of view abont
this in the former case, but this much is clear 'from the
opinions set out above : it cannot include a change of
policy."
In Pandit Banarsi Das Bhanot v. The State of Madhya Pradesh
& Ors. (supra) where this Court was called upon to decide whether
section 6 (2) of the C.P. and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947 which
authorised the State Government after giving by notification riot less
than one month's notice of its intention so to do by a notification
(1) 276 U.S. 394.
(2) [1959] S. C. R. 427.
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(3) [!968]3 SC. R. 251.
(4) [1955] S. C.R. 290.
(5) [!95!] S. C.R. 747.
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BABU RAM JAGDISH &
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after the expiry of the period of notice mentioned in the first notification to amend Schedule II to that Act was constitutional, it was
held that it was not unconstitutional for the Legislature to leave it
to the executive to determine details relating to the working of the
taxation laws, such as the selection of persons on whom the tax
was to be laid, the rates at whlch it was to be charged in respect of
different classes of goods and the like and that the power conferred
on the State Government by section 6(2) of that Act to amend the
Schedule relating to exemption was in consonance with the accepted
legislative practice relating to the topic. In that connection at
page 435, this Court observed :
"Now, the authorities are clear that it is not unconstitutional for the legislature to leave it to the executive to
determine details relating to the working of taxation laws,
such as the selection of persons on whom the tax is to be
laid, the rates at which it is to be charged in respect of
different classes of goods, and the like."
The next case to which reference may be made is Corporotion
of Calcutta & Anr. v. The Liberty Cinema(') where the majority upheld the fixation of a tax on cinema shows by the Corporation of
Calcutta even though the Calcutta Municipal Act of 1951 prescribed
no limits to which the tax could go. In that case, reliance was placed
on the case of Pandit Banarsi Das Bhanot v. The State of Madhya
Pradesh & Ors. (supra) and it was held that the fixation of rate of tax
could be left to a non-legislative body provided the Legislature gave
necessary guidance for such fixation. This Court in that case found
guidance in the various provisions of the statute including the fact that
the body which had been authorised to levy the rate was a municipal
body whose fiscal requirements were restricted by the nature and area
of its jurisdiction.
In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Bir/a Cotton, Spinning and
Weaving Mills, Delhi & Anr. (supra) Hidayatullah, J. (as he then
was) upholding the imposition of a tax by the Delhi Municipal Corporation in exercise of the power granted to it under !lie Delhi Municipal Corporation Act 66 of 1957 observed at page 2'87 as follows : "The doctrine that Parliament cannot delegate its
powers, therefore, must be understood in a limited way. It
_ _o~1!- ~~ans that the legislature must not efface itself but
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(1) [1965] 2 S. C.R. 477.
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[1979] 3 S.C.R.
must give the !egisl~tive sanction to the imposition of tile
tax and must keep the control in its own hands. There is
no specific provision in the Constitution which says that the
Parliament cannot delegate to certain specified instrumentalities the power to effectuate its own will. The question
always is whether the legislative will has been exercised or
not. Once it is established that the legislature itself haS
willed that a particular thing be done and has merely left
the execution of it to a chosen instrumentality (provided
that it has not parted with its control) there can be no
question of excessive delegation. If the delega_te acts contrary to the wishes of the legislature the legislature can undo
what the delegate has done."
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In Devi Das Gopal Krishnan & Ors. v. State of Punjab &
Ors.(') the validity of section 5 of the Act (as originally enacted)
which conferred on the Government power to levy tax at such rates
as the Government might fix arose for consideration. This Court
held that such conferment of power on the Government to levy tax
at the rates determined by it without any statutory limitation or
guidance was void. This Court, however, held that af!er section 5
was amended by Punjab Act No. 19 of 1952 by imposing the restriction that the rates determined by the State Government should
not exceed two paise in a rupee was valid as the Legislature bad delegated the power to the Government to determine the rates subject
to the restriction mentioned above. In the course of the above
decision, Subba Rao, C.J., dealing with the decision of this Court in
Corporation of Calcutta v. Liberty Cinema (supra) observed :
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"If this decision is an authority for the position that
the Legislature can delegate its power to a statutory anthority to levy taxes and fix the rates in regard thereto, it is
equally an ·authority for the position that the said statute
to be valid must give a guidance to the said authority for
fixing the said rates and that guidance cannot be judged by
stereotyped rules but would depend upon the provisions of
a particular Act To that extent this judgment is binding
on us. But we cannot go further and hold, as the learned
counsel for the respondents asked us to do, that whenever
a statute defines the purpose or purposes for which a statutory authority is constituted and empowers it to levy a tax
that statute necessarily contains a guidance to fix the rates :
it depends upon the provisions of each statute."
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In Sita Ram Bishambher Dayal & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors.(')
the validity of section 3D(l) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948
which authorised the levy of a tax on the turnover of first purchases
made by a dealer or through a dealer acting as a purchasing agent
in respect of such goods or class of goods, and at such rates, not
exceeding two paise per rupee in the case of foodgrains, including
cereals and pulses, and five paise per rupee in the case of other goods
and' with effect from such date, as may, from time to time, be notified
by the State Government in that behalE was questioned on the ground
that the delegation of power to the State Government to determine
the goods or class of goods whose purchase turnover would be liable
to tax and the rates of purchase tax subject to the reslriction imposed
in that regard by that section suffered from the vice of excessive
delegation. Repelling the above contention and upholding the said
provision, Hegde, J. speaking for the Court observed thus : "It is true that the power to fix the rate of a tax is a
legislative power but if the legislature lays down the legislative policy and provides the necessary guidelines, tnat
power can be delegated to the executive. Though a tax is
levied primarily for the purpose of gathering revenue, in
selecting the objects to be taxed and In determining the rate
of tax, various economic and social aspects, such as
the availability of the goods, administrative convenience,
the extent of evasion, the impact of tax levied on the
various sections of the society etc. have to be considered.
In a modern society taxation iS an instrument of planning.
It can be used to achieve the e'conomic and social ,goals of
the State. For that reason the power to tax must be a
flexible power. It must be capable of being 1t10dulated to
meet the exigencies of the sitnation. In a Cabinet form
of Government, the executive is expected to reflect the views
of the legislatures. In fact in most matters it gives the
lead to the legislature. However, much one might deplore
the "New Despotism" of the executive, the very complexity
of the modern society and the demand it makes on its
Government have set in motion forces which have made
it absolutely necessary for the legislatnres to entrust more
and more powers to the executive. Textbook doctrines
evolved in the 19th Century have become out of date.
Present position as regards delegation of legislative power
(I) [1972] 2 S. C.R. 141.
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may not be ideal, but in the absence of any better allernative, there is no escape from it. The legislatures have
neither the time, nor the required detailed information nor
even t@ mobility to deal fn detail with the innumerable
problems arising time and again. In certain matters they
can only lay down the policy and guidelines in as clear a
manner as possible."
When the validity of section 3-D of U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948
was again challenged before this Court in Hira Lal Rattan Lal etc.
etc., v. State of U.P. & Anr. etc., e:c. Cl on the very same ground, it
was agair; upheld by this Court with the following observations : "The only remaining wntcntion is that the delegation
made to the executive under s. 3-D is an excessive delegation. It is true that the legislature cannot delegate its
legislative functions to any other body. But subject to
that qualificaltion, it is permissible for the legislature to
delegate the power to select the persons on whom the tax
is to be levied or the goods or the transactions on which
the tax is to be levied. In the Act, under s. 3 the legislature has sought to impose multi-point tax on all sales and
purchases. After having done that it has given power to
the executive, a high authority and which is presumed to
command the majority support in the legislature, to select
for special treatment dealings in certain class of goods. In
the very nature of things, it is impossible for the legislature to enumerate goods, dealin·gs in which Sales tax or purchase tax should be imposed. It is also impossible for the
legislature to select the goods which should be subjected
to a single point sales or purchase tax. Before making such
selections several aspects such as the impact of the levy
on the society, economic consequences and the administrative convenience will have to be considered. These factors
may change from time to time. Hence in the very nature
of things, these details have got to be left to the executive."
We shall now proceed to examine the validity of section 31 of the
Act in the light of the decisions referred to above. The expression
'dealer' is defined in section 2( d) of the Act as "any person including
a Department of Government who in the normal course of trade sells
or purchases any goods, in the State of Punjab." Section 2(ff) of the
(1) [1973] 2 S. C. R. 502.
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BABU RAM JAGDISH &
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co. v. PUNJAB (Venkataramiah, J.) 965
Act defines the expression 'pnrchase' as "acquisition of goods specified
in Schedule 'C' for cash or deferred payment." The word 'sale' is
defined in section 2(h) of the Act as meaning "any transfer of property in goods other than goods specified in Schedule 'C' for cash or
deferred payment." Sub-section (1) of section 4 of the Act which
is the charging section provides that "subject to the provisions of sections 5 and 6, every dealer (except one dealing exclusively in goods
declared tax-free under section ( 6) whose gross turnover during the
year immediately preceding the commencement of the Act exceeded
the taxable quantum shall be liable to pay tax under the Act on all
sales effected after the coming into force of the Act and purchases
made after the commencement of East Punjab General Sales Tax
(Amendment) Act, 1958." Section 5(1) of the Act authorises the
State Government to determine the rates of tax payable on the taxable
turnover of a dealer not exceeding the limit prescribed therein. Subsection (2) of section 5 of the Act lays down the principles governing the determination of "taxable turnover". During the relevant
period, sub-section (2) of section 5 of the Act read as follows : -
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"5. (2) In this Act the expression "taxable turnover"
means that part of a dealer's gross turnover during any
period which remains after deducting therefrom(a) his turnover during that period on(i) the sale of goods declared tax-free under section 6;
(ii) sales to a registered dealer of goods other than
sales of goods liable to tax at the first stage
under sub-section (1-A); declared by him in
a prescribed form as being intended for resale
in the State of Punjab or sale in the course
of inter-Siate trade or commerce or sale in the
conrse of export of goods out of the territory of
India, or of goods specified in his certificate of
registration or use by him in the manufactnre in
Punjab of any goods, other than goods declared
tax-free under section 6, for sale in Puniab and
on sales to a registered dealer of containers
or other materials for the packing of such
goods :
Provided that in case of such sales, l\ declaration
duly filled up and signed by the registered dealer
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to whom the goods arc sold and containing prc<cribed particulars on a prescribed form obtained
from the prescribed authority is furnished by
the dealer who sells the goods
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(ii)
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(iii)
(iv) sales to any und1ertaking
supplying
electric<!!
energy to the public under a licence or sanction
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granted or deemed to have been granted under
the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, of goods for
use by it in the generation or distribution cf
such energy;
( v) sales or purchases of goods falling under section
29;
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(vi) the purchase of goods which are sold not later
than six monts after the close of the year, to
a registered dealer, or in the course of interstate trade or commerce, or in the course of
export out of the territory of India;
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Provided that in the case of such a sale to a registered
dealer, a declaration, in the prescribed form
and duly filled up and signed by the registered
dealer to whom the goods are sold, is furnished
by the dealer claiming deduction.
(vii) Such other sales or purchases as may be prescribed;
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(b) the amount of sales tax included in the gross turnover.''
Section 6 of the Act during the relevant period read as imbstituted
by Punjab Act No. 24 of 1959 with the modification made by Punjab
Act No. 7 of 1967 which substituted the words "twenty days" in the
place of "three months" in sub-section (2) thereof.
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Schedule 'A' to the Act specified certain goods which were considered as luxury goods for purposes of levy of tax at the rates prescribed
by the State Government under the first proviso to section 5 (1),
Schedule 'B' to the Act referred to the items of goods which were
treated as tax-free goods under section 6 and Schedule 'C' during the
relevant period referred to the goods the turnover of which was subject to purchase tax. The State Government was, however, given
power to amend all the three Schedules.
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BABU RAM JAGDISH &
co. v. PUNJAB (Venkdtaramiah, J.) 967
It is seen from the provisions of the Act referred to above that the A
Legislature while directing that the tax shall be levied on the tum-0ver of sales and purchases of goods under section 4 left the rates of
tax payable to be determined by the State Government under section
5 ( 1) of the Act subject to the limits prescribed therein. The Legislature after specifying the goods which should be treated as luxury
B
·goods, tax-free goods and goods whose purchase turnover is liable to
tax in Schedule 'A', Schedule 'B' and Schedule 'C' respectively has
delegated the power to the State Government to amend Schedule 'A'
under the first proviso to sub-section (1) of section 5, Schedule 'B'
·under sub-section (2) of section 6 and Schedule 'C' under section 31
.of the Act. In each of these cases, the State Government can make
the amendment only after giving previous publicity to its intention to
do so thus giving an opportunity to interested parties to make representatioru;, if any. In the case of a democratic Government, this itself
acts as a check on arbitrary exercise of power. At this stage it is
necessary to refer to sub-section (2A) of section 4 of the Act and
·that provides that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections D
(1) and (2) of section 4, no tax on the sale of any goods shall be
levied if a tax on their purchase is payable under the Act. The Act
also contains the machinery for assessment and collection of tax. It
follows from the scheme of the Act that no tax is payable on the
sale of goods specified in the first column of Schedule 'B' subject to
·the conditions and exceptions, if any, set out in the corresponding E
entry in the second column thereof and no dealer shall charge sales
tax on the sale of goods which are declared tax-free. In so far as
goods included in Schedule 'C' to the Act are concerned, tax can be
levied only on their purchase turnover. In the case of all other goods,
tax is levied on their sales turnover subject to section 5 and other proF
visions of the Act. When the State Government in exercise of its
power under section 6(2) of the Act deletes any goods from Schedule
'B', they cease to be tax-free goods and their sales turnover would
become liable to payment of tax. When the State Government in
exercise of its power under sectiou 31 of the Act includes any goods
in Schedule 'C', their sales turnover would become exempt from G
payment of tax but their purchase turnover would become liable for
payment of tax. We are of the view that the delegation of power to
the State Government to determine whether any class of goods should
be included or excluded from Schedule 'C' to the Act cannot be considered as unconstitutional in view of the decisions of this Court referred to above and in particular the decision in Pandit Banarsi Das H
Bhanot v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. (supra) where section
6(2) of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947 corres-
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ponding to section 6(2) of the Act was upheld by a Constitution
Bench of this Court. The Constitution Bench while rejecting the
challenge of section 6(2) observed thns : "The contention of the appellant that the notification in
question is ultra vires inust, in our opinion, fail on another
ground. The basic assumption on which the arg;ument of
the appellant proceeds is that the power to amend the
Schedule conferred on the Government under s. 6(2) 1s
wholly independent of the grant of exemption under s. 6 (1)
of the Act, and that in consequence, while an exemption
under s. 6 ( 1) w.ould stand, an amendment thereof by a
notification under s. 6(2) might be bad. But that, in our
opinion, is not the correct interpretation of the section. The
two sub-sections together form integral parts of a single enactment, the object of which is to grant exemption from
taxation in respect of such goods and to such extent as may
from time to time be determined by the State Government.
Section 6 (1), therefore, cannot have an operation independent of s. 6(2), and an exemption granted thereunder is
conditional and subject to any modification that might be
issued under s. 6(2). In this view, the impugned notification
is intra vires and not open to challenge."
•
We are of the view that the case in so far as section 31 of the
Act which is also an integral part of a single enactment and which
authorises the State Government to amend Schedule 'C' to the Act
cannot be different from the case which was dealt with by the Constitution Bench. If it is permissible for the Legislature to authorise the
State Government to convert tax free goods into taxable ones, there
is hardly any justification for holding that the State Government cannot be entrusted with the power to include goods in Schedule 'C'
making their purchase turnover taxable.
It was, however, argued by Mr. M. C. Bhandare that in the
instant case, the inclusion of paddy in Schedule 'C' to the Act was
against the policy underlying the Act and, therefore, even though
section 31 of the Act might be constitutionally valid, the notification
issued by the State Government directing inclusion of paddy in
Schedule 'C' should be held to be outside the scope of section 31 of
the Act. In other words, he contended that having regard to the
scheme of the Act, it was necessary for us to read section 31 of the
Act as not delegating the power to the State Government to include
paddy in Schedule 'C' to the Act. The argument of the learned counsel
was that the appellants were purchasing paddy either from agricul-
I
BABU RAM JAGDISH & co. v. PUNJAB (Venkataramiah, /.) 969
•
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turists who had grown it on their land or from katcha adatias for A
purposes of manufacture of rice in the circumstances mentioned in
soction 5(2) (a) (ii) of the Act. In either case no sales tax was being
· levied on the turnover relating to the sales in their favour by reason
of item 39 of Schedule 'B' to the Act which declared that agricultural
or horticultural produce sold by a person or a member of his family
grown by himself or grown on any land in which he has an interest B
whether as owner or usufructuary mortgage tenant or otherwise were
tax free goods or of sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section (2) of
section 5 of the Act which required the turnover relating to sales to
a registered dealer of goods specified in his certificate of registration
for .1so by him in the manufacture in Punjab of any goods other than
c
!}Xlds declared tax-free under section 6 for sale in Punjab to be deducted from the gross turnover of any dealer in order to arrive at
'taxable turnover'. It was argued that the tax payable under the Act
w.as an indirect tax and since no sales tax was leviable, the appellants
could purchase paddy before the issue of the impugned notification
witho•Jt being saddled with the liability of payment of sales tax. The D
policy underlying section 5(2)(a) (ii) of the Act was that manufacturers of goods specified in the certificate of registration obtained by
them should be able to acquire raw material for their industry without incurring the extra liability of sales tax. This exemption which
the appellants were enjoying was taken away indirectly by the State
Government by including paddy in Schedule 'C' to the Act resulting
E
in the imposition of purchase tax in respect of its turnover on them.
Relying upon the decision of the High Court of Madras in Syed
Mohamed & Co. v. The State of Madras(') it was argued that sales
tax was in effect tax on the transaction of sale of goods by one person
to another and that it was unreasonable to assume that the Legislature
contemplated different categories of transactions dej>Cnding upon the F
point at which the tax was levied. In support of this contention, our
attention was also drawn to the observation made at page 571 in Devi
Das Gopal Krishnan & Ors. T. State of Punjab & Ors. (supra) and in
State of Assam v. Ramesh Chandra Dey & Ors.( 2 ). The learned counsel for the appellants contended that since the exemption from payment
of sales tax accorded by the Legislature under item 39 of Schedule G
'B' and under section 5(2) (a) (ii) of the Act was in respect of the
transaction of sale, it was not open to the Executive Government to
take away the exemption by including paddy in Schedule 'C' and since
such inclusion was contrary to the express policy of the statute, section
31 of the Act must be so interpreted as not delegating the power to
B
(I) [1952] 3 S. T.
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c,
367
(2) {1962] l S. C. R. 986 at p. 991.
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include paddy purchased by the appellants in Schedule 'C'. We arc,
therefore. asked to hold that even though section 31 was not unconstitutional, the notification was not enforceable against the appellants ..
The abovG argument is no doubt quite attractive but we do not find
any substance in it since it overlooks the decision of the Constitution
Bench of this Court in Pandit Banarasi Das Bhanot v. The State of
Madhya Pradesh & Ors. (supra) where it has been held that it is open
to the Legislature to delegate the power to withdraw the exemption
which has been given by the Legislature in respect of ce:rtain transactions specified in Schedule II to the C.P. and Bcrar Sales Tax Act,
1947. Moreover it cannot be said that the principal object of the Act is
to encourage manufacturing industry. The Act is a fiscal legislation and
its object is to collect revenue for the purpose of meeting the expenditure of the Government. It is no doubt true that while levying tax under
the Act, the Legislature may grant exemptions in certain cases and
may decline to grant exemptions in other cases. 'The question whether
such exemption should be given or not is only incidental or ancillary
to the principal object viz. the object of levying tax for the purpose of
collecting revenue. It cannot also be said that when certain goods are
sold in favour of manufacturer, the seller is always entitled to deduct
such sales turnover from the gross turnover. He can do so only when
such goods are specified in the certificate of registration obtained by
the purchaser and they are used by him in the manufacture in Punjab
of any goods other than goods declared tax-free under s~:ction 6 of the
Act for sale in Punjab. Transaction in paddy cannot, therefore, be
considered as having been generally exempted from payment of tax
under the Act. It is also to be seen that section 5 (2) (a) (ii) of the
Act grants exemption from payment of sales tax on the turnover of
goods sold in favour of a manufacturer under the circumstances mentioned therein only to the seller and not to the buyer even though indirectly the buyer may be benefited thereby. If the observation made
by this Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. M. K. Kandaswami etc.,
etc.(') that 'taxable goods', 'taxable event' and 'taxable person' arc
three distinct concepts is borne in mind, there will be no room foc any
confusion. In the instant case, the taxable event is the purchase of
paddy and not its sale which alone attracts section 5(2) (a) (ii) of the
Act and taxable person, that is person liable to pay tax, is the purchaser
and not the seller. The appellants cannot, therefore, complain that
any exemption granted to them by the Act has been taken away. Even
though the liability to pay purchase tax may be on appellants, it is
bound to have repercussions on the price at which they buy paddy and
(I) [1976! I S. C.R. 38.
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BABU RAM JAGDISH &
co. v. PUNJAB (Venkataramiah, J.) 971
the price at which rice manufactured by them out of that paddy is sold
by them. The tax payable under the Act admittedly being an indirect
tax the tax burden would ordinarily fall on the consumer of rice and
not on any of the intermediaries including the appellants. The impugned notification cannot, therefore, be treated as one issued against the
policy of the statute.
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Jn view of the foregoing, we hold that section 31 of the Act and
the Notification issned thereunder do not suffer from the vice of excessive delegation of legislative power.
•
We may at this stage refer to one other subsidiary argument urged
on behalf of the appellants. It is argued that because paddy and rice
are not different kinds of gqocls but one and the same, inclusion of
both paddy and rice in Schedule 'C' to the Act would amount to imposition of double taxation under the Act. There is no merit in this
contention also because the assumption that paddy and rice are one
and the same is erroneous. In Ganesh Trading Co., Karna/ v. State
of Haryana & Anr.(1) arising under the Act, this Court has held
that although rice is produced out- of paddy, it is not true to say that
paddy continued to be paddy even after dehusking; that rice and paddy
are two different things in ordinary parlance and therefore, when paddy
is dehusked and rice produced, there is a change in the identity of the
goods. Tile above decision follows the principle enunciated by this
Court in State of Punjab v. Chandu Lal Kishori Lal(') in which it was
held that cotton seeds when separated from cotton constituted distinct
commercial goods different from cotton. The above contention has,
therefore, to be rejected.
c
In the result these appeals fail and they are dismissed. The pa11ies
shall, however, bear their own costs.
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N.K.A.
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Appeals dismissed .
, I) 32 S. T. C. 62.l.
(2) [1969] 3 S.C R. 840.
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