M. KARUNANIDHI versus UNION OF INDIA
Supreme Court of India | Decided 20 February 1979 | [1979] 3 S.C.R. 254 | 1979 INSC 42
Key facts
- Decided
- 20 February 1979
- Bench
- Y.V. CHANDRACHUD*, P.N. BHAGWATI, N.L. UNTWALIA, S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, R.S. PATHAK
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 270/1977
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1979] 3 S.C.R. 254
- Neutral citation
- 1979 INSC 42
Text of the judgment
254
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M. KARUNANIDHI
v.
UNION OF INDIA
February 20, 1979
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J.Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., P. N. BHAGWATI, N. L. UNTWALIA,
S. MURTAZA, FAZAL ALI AND R. S. PATHAK; JJ.J
Tamilnadu Public Men (Cmninal MlscO{lduct) Act, 1973-Whether inconsistent with the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, Prevention
of Corruption Act 1947 & Criminal Law (Atnendment) Act, 1952-Art. 254
of Co11sti111tion of India-Inconsistency between laws 1nade by Parliament and
lalvs 1nade by legislature of states-Effect of.
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Constitution of India 1950-Arts. 164 & 161-Nature, constitu/jonal position and status of Minister Dr Chief Minister.
Indian Penal Code 1869-S. 21(12)-Public servant & Criminal Procedure Code 1898-S. 199(2)-'0ther public servant'-Scope of-Chief Minister
whether 'public servant'.
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Words & Phrases-'in the service or pay of the Government'-S. 21(12)(a)
!PC-Meaning of.
In December 1973, the Madras Legislature passed an Act known as the
Tamil Nadu Public Men (Criminal Misconduct) Act, 1973 after obtaining the
assent of the President. The State Act was amended by Act 16 of 1974 and
the President's assent was received on April 10, 1974. The provisions of the
State Act were brought into force with effect from May 8, 1974. The State
Act was repctlled and the President's assent to the repealing Act was given on
September 6, 1977.
l'he Act provided for the investigation in respect of a complaint of crimin::iJ misconduct against any public man by a Commissioner or the Additional
Commissioner of Inquiries appointed for this purpose. The word 'public
man' had been given a specific connotation in s. 2(c) of the Act and clearly
excluded a Government servant.
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The appellant was the former Chief Minister of the State of Tamilnadu.
On June 15, 1976 the Chief Secretary to the State Government requested the
Central Bureau of Investigation to make a detailed investigation into certain
allegations tht:Jt the appellant and others were alleged to have abused their
official position in the matter of purchase of wheat from Punjab. With the
State Governor's sanction a charge sheet was filed after investigation for the
prosecution of the appellant under ss. 161, 468 and 471 IPC and s. 5(2) read
with S. 5(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act for allegedly having
derived pecuniary advantage to the extent of Rs. 4 to ~ lakhs for passing
favourable orders in respect of some firms.
The appellant applied for discharge under s. 239 Cr. P.C. on the ground
that the prosecution against him suffered from various legal and constitutional
infirmities. On the application being rejected, the appellant applied to the
High Court' for quashing the proceedings and for setting aside the order of the
Special Judge refusing to discharge him. The High Court rejected the
applications.
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M. KARUNANIDHI v. UNION
255
In the appeal! to this Court, it was contended on behalf of the appellant :
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( 1) Even though the State Act was repealed, the provisions of the Central
Acts having themselves been protanto repw!ed by the State Act when it was
passed could not be pressed into service for the purpose of prosecuting the
appellant unleM these provisions were re-enacted by the appropriate legisla·
ture.
(2) It was contended that even assuming that the State Act had ceased to
exist and the Central Acts applied, the appellant cannot be prosecuted under
any of the sections of the Penal Code or the Corruption Act, becallSe by virtue
of the position -that the appellant enjoyed as Chief Minister, there was no
relationship of master and servant between him and the Government and he
was acting as a constitutional functionary, and therefore could not be described
as a .'public servant' as contemplated by s. 21(12) 0£ the Penal Code.
(3) The provisions contained in the State Act run counter to those of the
Central Acts in respect of the following matters; (a) The procedure for
investigation of- the offences by a Central Agency as contemplated by the
Corruption Act b dispensed with and is instead invested in · a Commissioner
appointed under the State Act. (b) The provisions under the Prevention of Corruption Act, regarding the grant of sanction under s. 197 of the Code to the
accused is given a complete go by and instead a Commissioner is appointed
to hold a regular inquiry for himself and then to submit his report. An accused
who has to be tried under the State Act b thus · deprived of the protection
afforded to every Government servant regarding grant of a sanction by the
appointing authority. Therefore the protection if any, given by the State Act
is purely illusory, and
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(4) By virtue of the fact that the State Act has obtained the assent of the
President, it will be deemed to be a dominant legislation, and therefore it
would over-rule the Central Acts.
Dismise:ing the appeal!,
HELD : 1. The scheme of the Constitution is a scientific and equitable distribution of legislative powers between Parliament and the State Legislatures.
First, regarding the matters contained in List I, i.e. the Union List to the
SevCnth Schedule, Parliament alone is empowered to legislate and the State
Legislatures hal'e no authority to make any law in respect of the Entries contained in Li!t I. Secondly, so far as the Concurrent List is concerned, both
Parliament and the State Legislatures are entitled to legislate in regard to any
of the Entries appearing therein, but ·that is subject to the condition laid down
by Art. 254(1). Thirdly, so far as the matters in List II, i.e. the State List are
·concerned, the State Legislatures alone are competent to legislate on "them and
only under certain conditions Parliament can do so. [263 D-E]
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2. In such matters repugnancy may result from the following circums·
tances : (i) Where the provisions of a Central Act and a State Act in the Concurrent List arC fully inconsistent and are absolutely irreconciliable. the Central
c\ct will prevail and the State Act will become void in view of the repugnancy.
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SuPREME COURT REPORTS
(1979] 3 s.c.R.
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(ii) Where however a law passed by the State comes into collision with a
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law passed by Parliament on an Entry in the Concurrent List, the State Act
shall prevail to the extent of the repugnancy and the provisions of the Central
Act would become void provided the State Act has been passed in accordance
with cl. (2) of Art. 254.
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(iii) \\''here a law passed by the State legislature while· being substantially
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within the scope of the entries in the State List entrenches upon any of the
Entries in the C..e.ntral List the constitutionality of the lay may be upheld by
invoking the doctrine of pith and substance if on an analysis of the provisions
of the Act it appears that by and large the law falls within the four corners of
the State List an entrenchment, if any, being purely incidental or jnconsequential.
(iv) Where, however, a law made by the State Legislature on a subject
covered by the Concurrent List is inconsistent with or repugnant to a previous
law made by Parliament, then such a law can be protected by obtaining the
assent of the President under Art. 254(2) of the Constitution. The result of
obtaining the assent of the President would be that so far as the State Act is
concerned, it will prevail in the State and over-rule the provisions of the Central Act in their applicability to the State only. Such a state of affairs will
exist only until Parliament may at any time make a law adding to, or amending,
varying or repealing the law made by the State Legislature under the provisO'
to Art. 254. [263 F-264 DJ
3. A careful analysis, therefore, of the various provisions of the State . '\.ct
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leads to the irresistible inference that the State Act was passed 'vith a view t()
afford sufficient protection to a public man by enjoining a summary inquiry or
investigation by a high and independent Tribunal of the status of a High Court
Judge or a Senior District Judge to instil confidence in the people and to prevent public men from being prosecuted on false, frivolous and vexatious allegations. Although the ingredients of criminal misconduct as defined in s. 5(1)(d) of the Corruption Act are substantially the same in the State Act as in the
Central Acts but here also the, punishment is much severer in the case of the
State Act than the one contained in the Central Acts. It is, therefore, manifest
that the State Act does not contain any provision which is repugnant to the
Central Acts, but is a sort of complementary Act which runs pari passu the
Central Act. [270 .G-271 A]
4. Prima facie, there does not appear to be any inconsistency between the
State Act and the Central Acts. Before any repugnancy can arise, the follo\ving conditions must be satisfied :
(i) That there is a clear and direct inconsistency between the Central Act
and the State Act; (ii) that such an inconsistency is absolutely irreconcilable;
(iii) that the inconsistency between the provisions of the two Acts is of such
a nature as to bring the hvo Acts into direct collision with each other ::ind a
situation is reached where it is impossible to obey the one without disobeying
the other. [272D-E]
5. ( 1) In order to decide the questions of repugnancy it must be shown
tha.t the two enactments contain inconsistent and irreconcilable provisions~
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M. KARUNANIDHI V. UNION
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257
so that they cannot stand together or operate in the same field; (2) that there
can be no repeal by implication unless the inconsistency appears on the face
of the two statutes; (3) that where the two statutes occupy a particular field,
but there is room or possibility of both the statutes operating in the same field
without coming into collision with each other, no repugnancy results; ( 4) that
where there is no inconsistency but a statute occupying the same field seeks
to create distinct and separate offences, no question of repugnancy arises and
both the statutes continue to operate in the same field. [278 F·H]
Hu111e v. Palmer, 38 CLR 441; Union Steamship Co. of New Zealand v.
Comn1onwealth, 36 CLR 130; Clyde Engineering Co. v. Cowburn, 37 CLR
466; Ex. Porte McLean, 43 CLR 472; Zavarbhai Amaidas v. State of Botnbay,
,,l [1955] I SCR 799; Ch. Tika Ramji & Ors. etc. v. The State of U.P. & Ors.
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[1956] SCR 393 Shyamakant Lal v. Rambhajan Singh, 1939 FCR 188; Om
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Prakash Gupta v. State of U.P., [1957] SCR 423; Deep Chand v. State of UP &
Ors. [1959] 2 Supp. SCR 8, Megh Raj & Ors. v. Allah Rakhia & Ors. AIR
1942 FC 27; State of Orissa v. M. A. Tulloch & Co. [1964] 4 SCR 461;
T. S. Balliah v. T. S. Rangochari, [1969] 3 SCR 65; referred to.
Colin Heward's Australian Federal Constitution
i\.ustralian Constitution 2n<l Edn. p. 303 referred to.
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Law 2nd Edn. Nicholas
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There can be no doubt that the State Act creates distinct and separate
offences with different ingredients and different punishments and it does not
in any way collide, with the Central Acts. On the other hand, the State Act
itself permits the Central Act, namely, the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act
to come to its aid after an investigation is completed and a report is gubmitted
by the Commissioner or the Additional Commissioner. [279 A-B]
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6. Doubtless, the State Act is the dominant legislation but there are no
provisions in the State Act which are irreconcilably or directly inconsistent
with the Central Acts so as to over·rule them. f279 Cl
The original s. 29 of the State Act underwent an amendment which was
brought about by Tamil Nadu Act l 6 of 1974 which substituted a new s. 29
~ for the old one. This amendment received the assent of the President on 10th
April, 1974 and was published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette Extraordinary, dated 16 April, 1974. Although the State Act was passed as far
back as 30 December, 1973 it feceived the' assent of the President on the 10
April, 1974 that is, on the same date as Act 16 of 1974. The Act was how•
~ver brought into force on the 8 May, 1974 when. the new s. 29 which had
:tlready replaced the 'old section and had become a part of the statute. There~
fore, for all intents and purposes the State Act cannot be read in isolation, but
has to be interpreted in conjunction with the express language contained in
s. 29 of the State Act. The legislature has in unequivocal terms expressed the
intention that the State Act which was undoubtedly the dominant legislation
would only be "in addition to and not in derogation with any other law for the
time being in force" which manifestly includes the Central Acts, namely, the
Indian Penal Code, the Corruption Act and the Criminal Law (Amendment)
Act. Thus, the Legislature about a month before the main Act came into
force clearly declared its intention that there, ~ou1d be no question of the
State Act colliding with the Central Acts referred to above. The second part
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] 3 s.c.R.
of s. 29 also provides that nothing contained in the State Act shall exempt any
public man from b'eing proceeded with by way of investigation or otherwise
under a proceeding instituted against him under the Central Acts. It is, rhere·
fore, clear that in view of this clear intention of the legislature there can be no
room for any argument that the State Act was in any way repugnant to the
Central Acts. [279 D-280 DJ
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7. The provisions of s. 29 would be presumptive proof of the fact that
there is no repugnancy between the State Act and the C1:ntral Ac.;ts nor did
either the legislature or the· President intend to create any repugnancy beh1i'een
these Acts as a result of which the criticism regarding the repugnancy is com~
pletely obliterated in the instant case and we,, therefore, hold that the State ~
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legislature never intended to occupy the same field as covered by the Central......_ "Acts. [281 BJ
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8. So far as the first part of cl. (12) (a) is concerned, namely 'in the
service of the Government undoubtedly signifies a relationship of master and
servant where the employer employs the employee on the basis of a salary or remuneration. However, the second limb of the clause, 'in the pay of the Government' is concerned, that appears to be of a much wider amplitude so as to include
within its ambit even a public servant who may not be a regular employee
receiving salary from his master. A Minister or a Chief Minister will be
clearly covered by the said expression. [282 E-F]
A careful analysis of the meanings assigned to the word 'pay' in the various
dictionaries an<! the texts would clearly reveal that the expression 'in the pay
of' connotes that a person is getting salary, compensation, wages or any amount
of tnoney. This by itself however does not lead to the inference that a relationship of master and servant must necessarily exist in aII cases where a person
is paid salary. [283 G-HJ
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Shorter Oxford English Dictionary; Websters Third New International Dictionary : Websters New World Dictionary : Words a.nd
Phrases, Permanent Edition Vol. 31A p, 176. Venkataramaya's
Law Lexicon Vol. 11 p. 1122. Corpus Juris Secundum "\lol. 70 p. 200;
referred to.
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9. By virtue of the prov1s1ons contained in Art. 167, the Chief lviinister
undoubtedly performs a public duty of the nature as enjoined by clauses (a)
lo (c) of Art. 167. It is also clearly provided in the Constitution that the
Chief Minister or the Ministers are entitled to salaries or allowances obviously
in lieu of public duties that they perform. The salaries given to the Chief
hfinister or the Ministers are given from the Government funds, and, therefore,
there will be no difficult}' in holding that the Ministers are in the pay of the
Government inasmuch as they receive their salaries, remunerations or wages
from the Government. [285 E-F]
Once it is conceded that the Governor appoints the Chief Minister who is
paid a salary according to a statute made- by the legislature from the Govern~
ment funds, the Chief Minister becomes a person in the pay of the Government so as to fall squarely within cl. (12) of s. 21 of the Penal Code. [286 BJ
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M. KARUNANIDHI v; UNION
259
10. The use of the words 'other public servants' following a Minister of
the Union or of a State clearly show that a Minister would also be a public
servant as other public servants contemplated by s. 199(2) of the Code and
the Code being a statute complementary and allied to the Penal Code can be
looked into for the purpose of determining the real meaning and import of
the words 'public servant' as used in the aforesaid section [286 F]
Dattatraya Narayan Patil v. State of Maharashtra, [1975], Supp. SCR 145;
Emperor v. Sibnath Banerji & Ors., AIR 1945 PC 156; Rao Shiv Bakadur
Singh & Anr. v. The State of .TJ.indhya Pradesh, [1953] SCR 1188; referred
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to.
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S. Tara Singh v. Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, Jullundur &
Ors. AIR 1958 Pub. 302, Bakshi Ghulam Mohd. v. G. M. Sadiq & Ors., AIR
1968 J & K 98; approved.
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11. Three facts that have been proved beyond doubt : . (i) That a Minister is appointed or dismissed by the Governor and is,
therefore, subordinate to him whatever be the nature and status of his constitutional function.
(ii) That a Chief Minister or a Minister gets salary for the public work
done or the public duty performed by him.
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(iii) That the said salary is paid to the Chief Minister or the Minister
from the Government funds. [290A-B]
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12. It is thus incontrovertible, that the holder of a public office such as the
Chief Minister is a public servant in respect of which the Constitution provides
that he will get his salary from the Government Treasury so long he holds
his office on account of the public service that he disch<irges. The tialary
given to the Chief Minister is coterminus with his office and is not paid like
other constitutional functionaries such as the President and the Speaker.
These facts, therefore, point to one and only one. conclusion and that is that
the Chief 1finister is in the pay of the Government ood is, therefore, a public
-iiervant within the meaning of s. 21(12) of the Penal Code. [290 C-D]
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CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos. 270271 of 1977.
From the Judgment and Order dated 10-5-1977 of the Madras
High Court in W.P. No. 429 and Cr!. R.P. No. 50/77.
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K. K. Venugopal, N. A. Subramaniam, C. S. Vaidyanathan, Mrs.
Shanta Venugopal, K. R. Chowdhary and Mrs. Veena Devi Khanna for
the Appellant.
S. N. Kackar, Sol. Genl. (In Cr!. A. No. 270) R. B. Datar and
R. N. Sachthey, for the Respondent.
V. P. Raman, Adv. Genl and A. V. Rangam for the State of Tamil
Nadu.
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[1979] 3 s.c.s.
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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Au, J. These two appeals by certificate are directed
against a common order of the Madras High Court dated 10th May,
1977 dismissiug the applications filed before the High Court by the
appellant for quashmg the order of the Special Judge, Madras dated
4th January, 1977 refusing to discharge the appellant under section
239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the
Code).
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The facts of the case have been detailed in the judgment of the ~ .._
High Court aad it is not necessary for us to repeat the same all over
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again. However, in order to understand the points in issue, it may be
necessary to give a resume of the important stages through which the
case has passed and the constitutional points argued before us.
The appellant, M. Karunanidhi, was a former Chief Minister of
Tamil Nadu and was the petitioner before the High Court in the applications filed by him before the High Court. On 15-6-1976 a D.O. letter
was written by t11e Chief Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu
to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, CBI requesting him lo
make a detailed investigation into certain allegations against the appellant and others who were alleged to have abused their official position
in the matter of purchase of wheat from Punjab. A first information
report was accordingly recorded on 16-6-1976 and four months later
sanction under section. 197 of the Code was granted by the Governor
of Tamil Nadu for the prosecution of the appellant under sections 161,
468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code and section 5(2) read with section 5 (1) (d) cf the Prevention of Corruption Act (hereinafter referred_ J,__
to as the Corruption Act) . Thereafter, the police submitted a charge••
sheet against the appellant for the offences mentioned above and alleged
that the appellant had derived for himself pecuniary advantage to the
extent of Rs. 4 to Rs. 5 Iakhs from Madenlal Gupta for passing favourable orders in respect of some firms. The case was registered before the
Special Judge and the uecessary copies of the records were furnished
to the appellant. The appellant on appearing before the Special Judge
filed an application for discharging him nnder section 239 of the Code
on the grour.d that the prosecution against him suffered from various
legal and conslilutional infirmities. The Special Judge, however, after
hearing counsel for the parties rejected the application of the appellant
as a result of \\hich the appellant filed two applications in the High
Court for quashing the proceedings and for setting aside the order of
the Special Judge refusing to discharge the appellant. As indicated
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M. KARUNANIDHI v. UNION
(Fazal Ali, J.)
261
above, the High Court rejected the applications of the appellant but
granted a certificate for leave to appeal to this Court and hence these
appeals before us.
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As far bacii. as 30th December, 1973 the Madras Legislature had
passed an Act known as The Tamil Nadu Public Men (Criminal Misconduct) Act, 1973 hereinafter referred to as the State Act. The
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State Act was pas~ed after obtaining the assent of the President of India.
This State Act was, however, amended by Act 16 of 1974 and the
President's assent was received on 10th April, 1974. According to the
provisions of the State Act the statute was brought into force by virtue
,_.,J. oj a notification with effect from 8-5-1974. According to the allegations
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made against the appellant, the acts said to have been committed by
him fell within the period November 1974 to March, 197 5. On
31-1-1976 by virtue of the provisions of Article 356 President's rule
was imposed in the State of Tamil Nadu and the Ministry headed by
the appellant was dismissed and a Proclamation to his effect was issued
on the same date. The High Court decided the petitions of the appellgnt on 10-5-1977 and granted a certificate for leave to appeal to this
Court on 27-7"1977. Subsequently, however, the State Act was repealed and the President's assent to the repealing of the State Act was
given on 6-9-1977. Thus, it is manifest that by the time the appeal
bas reached this Court and was taken up for hearing the State Act no
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longer exists. Consequently, some of the constitutional points raised
by the learned counsel for the appellant before the Court do not survive for consideration before us.
Faced with this situation, Mr. Venn Gopal, learned counsel for the
appellant has raised only two points before us. In the first place, be
submitted that even though the State Act was repealed on 6-9-1977
>,.. ,during the time that it was in force, it was wholly repugnant to the
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provisions of the Code, the Corruption Act and the Criminal Law
Amendment Act and by virtue of Article 254(2) of the Constitution
of India the provisions of the aforesaid Central Acts stood repealed
and could not revive after the State Act was repealed. The constitutional position, it is submitted, was that even though the State Act was
repealed the provisions of the Central Acts having themselves been
protanto repealed by the State Act when it was passed could not be
pressed into service for the purpose of prosecuting the appellant unless
those provisions were re-enacted by the appropriate legislature. A
number of grounds were raised by counsel for the appellant in support
of the first plank of his argument that the State Act was repugnant to
the provisions of the Central Acts as a result of which the former was
rendered void.
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[1979] 3 S.C.R.
Secondly, it was ar!'jlled that even assuming that the State Act has
ceased to exist and the Central Acts apply to the facts of the present
case, the appellant cannot be prosecuted under any of the sections of
the Penal Code or the Corruption Act, because being the Chief Minister of the State at the relevant time he was not a public servant as
defined in section 21 clause (12) of the Indian Penal Code. The
argument was that by virtue of the position that the appellant enjoyed
as Chief Minis~r there was no relationship of master and servant
between him and the Government and he was acting as a constitutional
functionary and, therefore, could not be described as a public servant
as contemplated by section 21 (12) of the Penal Code.
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We propose to deal with the two arguments separately. We would
first deal with the question of repugnancy as raised by learned counsel
for the appellant. It is true that the State Act was passed by the
Legislature of Tamil Nadu and the assent of the President was obtained
on 30th December, 1973. By virtue of the provisions of Article 254
(2) of the Constitution since the assent of the President had been
given the State Act was to prevail over the Central Acts so far as the
State of Tamil Nadu was concerned, but the serious question to be
considered is as to whether or not there was a real repugnancy result;
ing from an irreconcilable inconsistency between the State Act and the
Central Acts. Article 254 of the Constitution runs thus :~
"254. Inconsistency between laws made by Parliament
and laws made by the Legislatures of States : ( 1) If any provision of a law made by the Legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament which
Parliament is competent to enact, or to any provision of an
existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated
in the Concurrent List, then, subject to the provisions of
clause (2), the law made by Parliament, whether passed
before or after the law made by the Legislature of such State,
or, as the case may be, the existing law, shall prevail and the
law made by the Legislature of the State shall, to the extent
of the repugnancy, be void.
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(2) Where a law made by the Legislature of a State with
respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent
List contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of
an earlier law made by Parliament or an existing law with
respect to that matter, then, the law so made by the Legislature of such State shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, prevail in that State :
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M. KARUNANIDHI v. UNION
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263"
Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting at any time any law with respect to the
same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying
or repealing the law so made by the Legislature of State".
It would be seen that so far as clanse (l) of Article 254 is concerned it clearly lays down that where there is a direct collision bet~ ween a provision of a law made by the State and that made by Parliament with respect to one of the matters enumerated iu the Concurrent
List, then, subject to the provisions of clause (2), the State law would
be void to the extent of the repugnancy. This naturally means that
~where both the State and Parliament occupy the field contemplated by
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the Concurrent List then the Act passed by Parliament being prior
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in point of time will prevail and consequently the State Act will have
to yield to the Central Act. In fact, the scheme of the Constitution
is a scientific and equitable distribution of legislative powers between
Parliament and the State Legislautres. First, regarding the matters
contained in List l, i.e. the Union List to the Seventh Schedule, Parliament alone is empowered to legislate and the State Legislatures have
no authority to make any law in respect of the Entries contained in
List I. Secondly, so far as the Concurrent List is concerned, both
Parliament and the State Legislatures are entitled to legislate in regard
to any of the Entries appearing' therein, but that is subject to the condition laid down by Article 254(1) discussed above. Thirdly, so far
as the matters in List II, i.e., the State List are concerned, the State
Legislatures alone are competent to legislate on them and only under
certain conditions Parliament can do so. It is, therefore, obvious that
in such matters repugnancy may result from the following circum·.
stances :- ·
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l. Where the provisions of a Central Act'· and a State
Act in the Concurrent List are fully inconsistent and are
absolutely irreconcilable, the Central Act will prevail and the
State Act will become void in view of the repugnancy.
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2. Where however a law passed by the State comes into
collision with a law passed by Parliament on an Entry in the
Concurrent List, the State Act shall prevail to the extent of
the repugnancy and the provisions of the Central Act would
become void provided the State Act has been passed in
accordance with clause (2) of Article 254.
3. Where a law passed by the State Legislature while
being substantially within the scope of the entries in the State
List entrenches upon any of the Entries in the Central List
G
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[1979] 3 s.c.R.
the constitutionality of the law may be upheld by invoking
the doctrine of pith and substance if on an analysis of the
provisions of the Act it appears that by and large the law
falls within the four corners of the State List an entrenchment, if any, is purely incidental or inconsequential.
•
4. Where, however, a law made by the State Legislature
on a subject covered by the Concurrent List is inconsistent
with and repugnant to a previous law made by Parliament,
then such a law can be protected by obtaining the assent of
the President under Article 254(2) of the Constitution. The
result of obtaining the assent of the President would be that
so far as the State Act is concerned, it will prevail in the
State and overrule the provisions of the Central Act in their
applicability to the State only. Such a state of affairs will
exist only until Parliament may at any time make a law
adding to, or amending, varying or repealing the law made
by the State Legislature under the proviso to Article 254.
•
,
So far as the present State Act is concerned we are called upon to
consider the various shades of the constitutional validity of the same
under Article 254(2) of the Constitution.
It is neither alleged or argued that l'arliament has at any time after
the State Act was passed proceeded to pass any law as contemplated
by the Proviso to Article 254. As, however, the State law has already
been repealed and the President's assent to the said repeal has been
received as far back as 6-9-1977 we are concerned only with the limited
qtrestion as to whether if the State law had repealed or overruled the
provisions of the Central law what will be the position after the State
law itself ceases to exist. It is true that the doctrine of eclipse would
~ot apply to the constit~tio~ality of the Central law and t~e only ~~s~ ~
hon we have to determme 1s whether there was such an meconcilabfe -....,.
inconsistency between the State Act and the Central Acts that the
provisions of the Central Act stood repealed abd unless re-enacted the
~said provisions cannot be invoked even after the State Act was itself
•
repealed. In order, however, to enter into the domain of repugnancy
of the two Acts we have to consider the relevant provisions of the
Central Acts and of the State Act. The High Court has on a very
careful abd cautious analysis of the various provisions of the two Acts -' •
come to a clear finding that there is no repugnancy between the State
Act and the Central Acts, but the State Act merely creates a new and
distinct offence which in its nature and purport is ~sentially different
from the offences contemplated by the Ibdian Penal Code and the
Corruption Act. It has been pointed out by the High Court as also
•
....
'
M. KARUNANIDHI v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.)
·•
•
'
\
2 65
by the Solicitor General that not only the ingredients of the offences
created by the State Act are different from those of the Central Act,
but even the procedure is different. It was further argued by the Solicitor General that there is absolutely no repuguancy between the two
Acts and both can operate in their respective fields.
A
Iu order to appreciate this question, we would briefly refer to the
scheme of the State Act. Section 2 defines o~rtain dignitaries like
Commissioner, Additional Commissioner, Government, Public man,
public servant.
B
Clause (a) of section 2 defines 'Commissioner' thus:
" 'Commissioner' or "Additional Commissioner'' m·~ans
the Commissioner of Inquiries or an Additional Commissioner
of Inquiries, as the case may be, appointed under section
c
4"
Clause ( c) of section 2 defines 'public man' thus :
"Public man" means
D
(i) any person who is or has been the Chief Minister or
any other Minister of the State;
(ii) a person who is or has been a Member of the Legis-
lative Assembly or of the Legislative Council of the
State; or
-
E
(iii) a person who is or has been a Mayor or Deputy
"'••'>----··
'
Mayor of the Municipal Corporation of Madras or of
Madurai or Chairman of any Standing or Subject or
other Committee constituted or deemed to be constituted under the Madras City Municipal Corporation
Act, 1919 (Tamil Nadu Act IV of 1919) or the
Madurai City Municipal Corporation Act, 1971
(Tamil Nadu Act 15 of 1971) as the case may be;
(iv) a person who is or has been the Chairman or ViceChairman of a Municipal Council or Chairman of any
Standing or Subject or other Committee constituted
or deemed to be constituted under the Tamil Nadu
Disirict Municipalities Act, 1920 (Tamil Nadu Act
V of 1920) or any other law for the time in force;
( v) a p~rson who is or has been the Chairman or ViceChairman of a Panchayat Union Council or Chairman
or President of any Standing or Subject or other Com·
mittee of such council constituted or deemed to be
18-196 SC!/79
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•
constituted under the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act,
1958 (Tamil Nadu Act XXXV of 1958), or any
other law for the time being in force;
(vi) a person other than a Government servant who is or
has been the Chairman of-
B
c
( a) any corporation (not being a local authority)
established by or under a State or Provincial Act
and owned or controlled by the State Government;
(b) any Government company within the meaning of
section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 (Central Act 1 of 1956), in which not less than fiftyone per cent of the paid-up share capital is held
by the State Government, or any company which
is a subsidiary of a company in which not less
than fiftyone per cent of the paid-up share capital
is held by the State Government".
It may be noticed here that the concept of public-man as contemplated
by the State Act differs in certain respects from that of a public servant
as contemplated by section 21 (12) of the Penal Code.
E
F
G
H
To begin with, unde.r the State Act a public-man clearly includes
the Chief Minister or any other Minister of the State as also a member
of the State Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council. Secondly, the
word 'public man' appearing in Section 2(c) clearly excludes a
Government servant, unless he falls within the categories of (a), (b)
and (c) of clause (vi) of section 2 of the State Act. This is a basic
departure from the provisions of the Penal Code where the word
'public servant' has been used in the widest possible sense so as to
include not only Government servants who are receiving salary from
the Government, but also other dignitaries who are in the pay of the
Government.
Section 3 clauses (1), (2) and (3) define criminal misconduct
which is almost the same as defined by the provisions of the Corruption
Act and the Penal Code (sections 5(2) and 5(1) (d) of the Corruption
Act and section 161 of the Indian Penal Code).
It may, however, be noted here that the State Act does not make
ioections 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code any offence under this
Act. Section 4 prescribes the procedure for appointment of a high
;
1
M. KARUNANIDHI v. UNION
(Fazal Ali, !.)
267
powered tribunal for the purpose of holding investigation into the allegations made against any public man. Sections 4 a'nd 5 run thus :-
A
"4. Appointment of Commissioner of Inquiries and Additional Commissioner of Inquiries: (1) For the purpose of
..
conducting investigation in accordance with the provisions of
this Act, the Government shall, on the recommendation of the
Chief Justice of the High Court appoint, by notification, a
person to be known as Commissioner of Inquiries and one or
more persons to be known as Additional Commissioner of
Inquiries.
•
'
B
c
(2) The Commissioner shall be a person who is, or who
is qualified for appointment as, or who has been, a Judge of
a High Court and an Additional Commissioner shall be a
person who is, or who is qualified for appointment as, or who
has been, a District Judge.
(3) Every person appointed as the Commissioner or
Additional Commissioner shall, before entering upon his office,
make and subscribe before the Chief Justice of the High Court
or some person appointed in that behalf by him a'n oath for
affirmation in the form set out for the purpose in the First
Schedule.
•
D
E
( 4) The Additional Commissioner shall be subject to the
administrative control of the Commissioner, and in particular,
for the purpose of convenient disposal of investigations under
this Act, the Commissioner may issue such general or special
directions as he may consider necessary to the Additional
Commissioner;
Provided that nothing in this sub-section! shall be construed to authorise the Commissioner to question any finding
conclusion or recommendation of an Additional Commissioner.
F
·.--.::-1
'
x
~
x
x
x
"
x
G
5. Term of office and other conditions of ,!ervice of Commissioner and Additional Commissioner :
x
x
x
x
(4) There shall be paid to the Commissioner and the
Additional Commissioner such salaries as are specified in the
Second Schedule.
H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] 3 S.C.R.
(5) The allowances and pension payable to, and other
conditions of service of, the Commissioner or Additional
Commissioner shall be the same as admissible -
•
(a) to a Judge of a High Court in the case o! the Com-
missioner,
";.
B
(b) to a District Judge in the case of an
Commissioner :
Provided that the allowance" and pension payable to, and
other conditions o! service of, the Commissioner or an Additional Commissioner shall not be varied to hii cliiadvantage
after his appointment".
D
E
•
Additional
J.
Another impcrtant provision which is contained in the State Act
but not in the Central Acts is a provision regarding limitation. Under
section 8 which was introduced by section 2 of the Tamil Nadu Amending Act 16 of 1974 it is provided that the Commissioner or the Additional Commissioner shall not investigate any complaint invohing
criminal misconduct which is made after the expiry of 5 years from
the date on which the criminal misconduct complained against was
alleged to have been committed or after the expiry o! one year from
the date on which the public man ceased to be such public man. The
provisions of section 8 may be extracted thns : -
•
"6. Limitation for preferring complaints : ( 1) The Commissioner or an Additional Commissioner shall not investigate
or cause to be investigated any complaint involving criminal
misconduct if the complaint is made : -
F
G
(i) after the expiry of five years from the date on which
the criminal misconduct complained against was alleged to
have been committed; or
(ii) after the expiry of one year of the date on which the
public ceases to be such public man,
Whichever is later.
H
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section
(1), the Commissioner or an Additional Commissioner shall
not investigate or cause to be investigated any complaint involving criminal misconduct, the complaint is made after the
expiry of one year from the date on which the action complained again5t becomes known to the complainant".
,
M. KARUNANIDHI v. UNION
(Fazal Ali, !.)
26 9
Similarly section 10 of the State Act confers plenary powers on
the Commissioner or the Additional Commissioner to prescribe a
procedure for conducting an investigation in respect of a complaint
and runs thus : -
A
(
'
"10. Procedure in respect of investigation of criminal
misconduct : ( 1) The procedure for conducting any investigation in respect of a complaint of criminal misconduct
against any public man shall be such as the Commissioner
or tl1e Additional Commissioner considers appropriate in the
circumstances of the case.
B
'\
(2) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (1), where
any complaint of criminal misconduct against a public man
is received by the Commissioner or Additional Commissioner,
the Commissioner or Additional Commissioner shall make or
cause to be made a preliminary investigation to find out
whether there is any prima facie case against the public
man in respect of the allegation of criminal misconduct :
x
•
D
x
x
( 3) Where tht Commissioner 01: Additional Commissioner
gives a finding under sub-section (2) that there is no
prima facie case against the public man in respect of the
allegation of criminal misconduct, he shall dismiss the complaint after briefly recording his reasons for doing so :
Provided that the Commissioner or Additional Commissioner shall not dismiss any complaint under this sub-section,
unless the complainant has been given an opportunity of being
heard, if such complainant has not already been heard
under clause (a) of the proviso to sub-section (2).
x
C
x
x
E
F
x"
Under clause (3) of section 10 the Commissioner or the Additional
Commissioner is empowered to dismiss the complaint if he is satisfied
that no prima facie case against the public man ha$ been made out,
but such an order of dismissal can be made only after the complainant
has been given an opportunity of being heard.
Section 11 is also a new provision as compared to the Central
Acts which provides for grant of compensatory costs to the public
man if the. allegation made against him are found to be false, frivolous
or vexatious to the knowledge of the complainant.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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Section 12 gives a right of ap~al to a Division Bench of the
High Court against any order passed by the Commissioner or Additional Commissioner under sub-section (1) of • section 11 granting
compensatory costs to the public man and runs thus : -
"Appeal against an order under section 11 :
(1) •
Against any order passed by the Commissioner or Additional
Commissioner under sub-section (1) of section 11, the
complainant may, within such period as may be prescribed,
• appeal to a Special Appellate Tribunal consisting of two
Judges of the High Court nominated from time to time by
the Chief Justice in that behalr'.
'
Section 14 provides the procedure for examination of witnesses,
receiving of affidavits, issuing of commissions etc.
Section 15 provides an enhanced punishment of seven years for
criminal misconduct as compared to the punishment provided by the
Corruption Act.
Section 16 provides for prosecution of a complainant if his complaint is found to be false, frivolous and vexatious and such a complainant is liable to be punished for a term which may extend to three
years and fine, but such a prosecution can be launched only witbi the
previous sanction of the Commisioner. Section 16 runs thus:"16. Punishment for false, frivolous or vexatious complaint : ( 1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act,
every person who makes a false, frivolous or vexatious complaint against a public man under this Act, shall on conviction
bo punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend
to three years and shall also be liable to fine".
A careful analysis, therefore, of the various provisions of the State
Act leads to the irresistible inference that the State Act was passed
with a view to afford sufficient protection to a public man by enjoining
a summary inquiry or investigation by a high and indepmdent Tribunal
of the status of a High Court Judge or a Senior District Judge to
instill confidence in the people and to prevent public man from being
prosecuted on false, frivolous and vexatious allegations. Although the
ingredients of crimiqal misconduct as defined in section 5 (1 )( d) of
the Corruption Act are substantially the same in the State Act as ll,:i
the Central Acts but here also the punishment is much severer in the
case of the State Act than the one contained in the Central Acts. It
is, therefore, manifest that the State. Act does not contain any provision which is repugnant to the Central Acts, but is a sort of comple-
•
·~
•
M. KARUNANIDHI v. UNION
(Fazal AU, !.)
:&71
mentary Act which runs pari passu the Central Acts mentioned above.
After the investigation by the Commissioner under the State Act
is complete and a report is submitted, section 18 of the State Act
provides thus :-
Report of the Commissioner and Additiona'
Commissioner : (1) Where as a result of any detailed inves-
A
"18.
'
tigation under sul>-section ( 4) of section 10 in respect of a
complaint of criminal misconduct against a public man, the
Commissioner or an Additional Commissioner is of
opinion,(a) that it is expedient in the interest of justice that the
public man against whom criminal misccliduct has been
alleged, should be prosecuted fo~ an offence under section
15; or
(b) that the allegation has not been substantiated, he
shall record a finding to that effect stating his reasons therefor and report the same to the Government.
B
c
D
( 2) In cases falling under clause (a) of sul>-section (1) ,
the public man shall be prosecuted and tried under section 6
of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 (Central
Act 46 of 1952)".
The State Act enjoins that the public man concerned will have to be
prosecuted under the Criminal Law (Amendment). Act of 1952. Thus,
far from there being any inconsistency, the provisions of the Criminal
Law (Amendment) Act are directly applied to a public man by thq
State Act after the preliminary investigation by the Commissioner is
over. It seems to us that what the State Act does is merely to create
,different and distinct offences and not to over-rule any provisions of
the Central Act.
-,
E
F
It was, however, strongly contended by Mr. Venu Gopal that the
provisions contained in the State Act run counter to tho5e qf the
Central Acts in respect of the following matters :
•
1. The procedure for investigation of the offences by a
Central agency as contemplated by the Corruption Act
is dispensed with and is instead invested in a: Com-·
missioner appointed under the State Act.
2. The provision under the Prevention of Corruption: Act
regarding the grant of sanction under section 197 of
the Code to the accused is given a complete go by and
instead a Commissioner is appointed to hold a regular
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] 3 s.c.R.
inquiry for himself and then to submit his report.
Thus, an accused who has been tried under the State
Act is deprived of protection afforded to every Government servant regarding grant of a sanction by the
appointing authority. It is thus suggested that the
protection, if any, given by the State Act is pwely
illusory.
•
..
In order, however, to understand the argument of the learned counsel
for the appellant, it may be necessary to consider the question of
repngna\Jcy in a little broader perspective.
c
E
F
It is well settled that the presumption is always in favour of the
constitutionality of a statute and the onus lies on the person assailing
the Act to prove that it is nnconstitutional. Prima facie, there does
not appear to us to be any inconsistency between the State Act and
the Central Acts. Before any repugnancy can arise, the following
conditions must be satisfied:!. That there is a clear and direct inconsistency between
the Central Act and the State Act.
2. That such an inconsistency is absolutely irreconcilable.
3. That the inconsistency between the provisions of the
two Acts is of such a nature as to bring the two Acts into
direct collision with each other and a situation is reached
where it is impossible to obey the one without disobeying
the other.
•
In Colin Howard's Australian Federal Constitutional Law, 2nd
Edition the author while describing the nature of inconsistency between the two enactments observed as follows:-
"An obvious inconsistency arises when the two enactments produce different legal results when applied to the
same facts".
G
In the case of Hume v. Palmer( 1)
follows:-
Knox, C.J. observed as.
"The rules prescribed by the Commonwealth Law and
the State law respectively are for present purposes substantially identical, but the penalties imposed for the contravention differ ................................. .
In these circumstances, it is I think, clear that the
reasons given by my brothers Issacs and Starke for the deci(1) 38 C. L. R. 441.
.....•
f
M. KARUNANIDHI v. UNION
•
(Fazal Ali, !.)
273
sions of this Court in Union Steamship Co. of New Zealand
v. Commonwealth(') and Clyde Engineering Co. v. Cowburn(') establish that the provisions of the law of the State
for the breach of which the appellant was convicted are
inconsistent with the law of the Commonwealth within the
meaning of sec. 109 of the Constitution and are therefore
invalid".
A
B
Issacs, J. observed as follows:-
,.~··
..
•
"There can be no question that the Commonwealth
Navigation Act, by its own direct provisions and the Regulations made under its authority, applies upon construction
to the circumstances of the case. It is inconsistent with the
State Act in various ways, including (1) general supersession
of the regulations of conduct, and so displacing the State
regulations, whatever those may be; (2) the jurisdiction to
convict, the State law empowering the Court to convict
summarily, the Commonwealth Law making the contravention an indictable offence, and therefore bringing into operation sec. 80 of the Constitution, requiring a jury; (3) the
penalty, the State providing a maximum of £ 50 the Commonwealth Act . prescribing a maximum of £
100, or
imprisonment, or both; ( 4) the tribunal itself".
Starke, J. observed as follows:-
"It i' not difficult to see that the Federal Code would be
'disturbed or deranged' if the State Code applied a different
sanction in respect of the same act. Consequently the State
regulatjon' are, in my opinion, inconsistent with the law of
the Commonwealth and rendered invalid by force of sec.
109 of the Constitution''.
c
D
E
F
In a later case of the Australian High Court in Ex. Parte
Mclean(') Issacs and Starke, JJ. while dw~lling on the question of
repugnancy made the following observation:-
•
"In Cowburn's case (supra) is stated the reasoning for
that conclusion and we will now refer to those statements
without repeating them. In short, the very same ~onduct
by the same persons is dealt with in conflicting terms by the
Commonwealth and State Acts. A Court, seeing that, has
(!) 36 C. L. R. 130.
(2) 37 C.L.R. 466.
(3) 43 C.L.R. 47i.
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[1979] 3 s.c.R.
no authority to inquire further, or to seek to ascertain the
scope or bearing of tbe State Act. It must simply apply
sec. 109 of tbe Constitution, which declares the invalidity
pro tanto of. tbe State Act".
Similarly Dixon, J. observed thus:B
c
"When the Parliament of the Commonwealth and the
Parliament of a State each legislate upon the same subject
and prescribe what the rule of conduct shall be, they make
laws which are inconsistent, notwithstanding that the rule of
conduct is identical which each prescribes, and sec. 109
applies. That this is so is settled, at least when the sanctions they impose are diverse Hume v. Palmer (supra)".
•
•
'
In tbe case of Zaverbhai Amaidas v. The State of Bombay(')
this Court laid down the various tests to determine the inconsistency
between two enactments and observed as follows-
D
E
F
G
ft
"The important thing to consider with reference to this
provision is whether the legislation is 'in respect of the same
matter'. If the lat~r legislation deals not with the matters
which formed the subject of the earlier legislation but with
other and distinct matters though of a cognate and allied
character, then Article 254 (2) will have no application.
The principle embodied in section 107 (2) and Article 254
(2) is that when there is legislation covering the same
ground both by the Centre and by tbe Province, both of
them being competent to enact the· same, the law of the
Centre ehould prevail over that of the State".
"It is true, as already pointed out, that on a question
under Article 254 ( 1) whether an Act of Parliament prevails against a law of the State, no question of repeal arises;
but the principle on which the rule of implied repeal rests,
namely, that if subject-matter of tbe later legislation is
identical with tbat of the earlier, so that they cannot both
stand together, then the earlier is repealed by the later enactment, will be equally applicable to a question under Article 254(2) whether tbe further legislation by Parliament is
in respect of the same matter as that of the State law".
In the case of Ch. Tika Ramji & Ors. etc. v. The State of Uttar
Pradesh & Ors.(') while dealing with the question of repugnancy
(I) [1955] I S.C.R. 799.
(2) (1956] S.C.R. 393
•
M. KARUNANIDHI v. UNION
(Fazal Ali, l.)
275
between a Central and a State enactment, this Court relied on the
observations of Nicholas in his Australian Constitution, 2nd Ed. p.303,
where three tests of inconsistency or repugnancy have been laid down
and which are as follows:" (1) There may be inconsistency in the actual terms of
the competing statutes R. Brisbane Licensing Court(').
(2) Though there may be no direct conflict, a State law
may be inoperative because the Co=onwealth law, or the
award of the Commonwealth Court, is intended to be a
complete exhaustive code Clyde Engineering Co. Ltd. v.
Cow burn (supra).
(3) Even in the absence of intention, a conflict may
arise when both State and Co=onwealth seek to exercise
their powers over the same subject matter Victoria v. Commonwealth(2) Wenn v. Attorney General(')
This Court also relied on the decisions in the case of Hume v.
Palmer as also the case of Ex Parte Mclean (supra) referred to above.
This Court also endorsed the observations of Sulaiman, J. in the
caoe of Shyamakant Lal v. Rambhajan Singh (') where Sulairnan, J.
obl!erved as follows:
"When the question is whether a Provincial legislation is
repugnant to an existing Indian law, the onus of showing its
repugnancy and the extent to which it is repugnant should
be on the party attacking its validity. There ought to be !l
presumption in favour of its validity, and every effort should
be made to reconcile them and construe both so as to avoid
their being repugnant to each other, and care should be
taken to see whether the two do not really operate in
different fields without encroachment. Further, repugnancy
must exist in fact, and not depend merely on a possibility".
•
In the case of Om Prakash Gupta v. State of U.P.( 5 ) where this
Court was considering the question of the inconsistency between the
two Central enactments, namely, the Indian Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act held that there was no inconsistency and
observed as follows:"It seems to us, therefore, that the two offences are
distinct and separate. This is the view taken in A11U1rendra
(I) 28 C.L.R. 23
(2) 58 C.L.R. 618.
(3) 77 C.L.R. 84.
(4) [1939] F. C. R. 188.
(5) [1957] S.C.R. 423.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
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276
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] 3 s.c.R.
Nath Roy v. The State(') and we endorse the opinion of
the learned Judges, expressed therein. Our conclusion, therefore, is that the offence created under section
5 (1) (c) of the Corruption Act is distinct and
separate from the one under section 405 of the Indian Penal
Code and, therefore, there can be no question of section
5 (l) ( c) repealing section 405 of the Indian Penal Code.
If that is so, then, Article 14 of the Constitution can be no
bar".
Similarly in the case of Deep Chand v. The State of Uttar Pradesh
& Ors. ( 2 ) this Court indicated the various tests to ascertain the question of repugnancy between the two statutes and observed as.
follows:-
l'
~·~.
f
"Repugnancy between two statutes may thus be ascertained on the basis of the following three principles:D
( 1) Whether there is direct conflict
provisions;
between the two
(2) Whether Parliament intended to lay down an
exhaustive code in respect of the subject matter replacing the
Act of the State Legislature; and
E
F
G
(3) Whether the law made by Parliament and the law
made by the State Legislat\Jre occupy the same field".
In the case of Megh Raj and Ors. v. Allah Rakhia & Ors.('}
where Varadachariar, J. speaking for the Court pointed out that where
a~ in Australia a provision similar to section l 07 of the Government _ ·"""of India Act, 1935 existed in the shape of section 109 of the Australian -._.
Constitution, there was no corresponding provision in the American
~
Constitution. Similarly, the Canadian cases have laid down a prin'ciple too narrow for application to Indian cases. According to the
learned Judge, the safe rule to follow was that where the paramount
legislation does not purport to be exhaustive or unqualified there is
no inconsistency and in this connection observed as follows : -
•
"The principle of that decision is that where the paramount legislation does not purport to be exhaustive or
unqualified, but itself permits or recognises other laws restricting or qualifying the general provision made in it, it canH
(!) A. I. R. 1955 Cal. 236.
(2) [1959] 2 Supp. S.C.R. 8
(3) A.LR. 1942 F.C. 27.
M. KARUNANIDHI v. UNION
(Fazal Ali, !.)
277
not be said that any qualification or restriction introduced
by another law is repugnant to the provision in the main or
paramount law".
"The position will be even more obvious, if another test
of repugnancy which has been suggested in some cases is
applied, namely, whether there is such an inconsistency between the two provisions that one must be taken to repeal
the other by necessary implication"
•
'
A
B
In the case of Stai. of Orissa v. M.A. Tulloch & Co. (') Ayyangar J. speaking for the Court observed as follows:
,(
A-
>
"Repugnancy arises when two enactments both within
the competence of the two Legislatures collide and when the
Constitution expressly or by necessary implication provides
that the enactment of one Legislature has superiority over
the other then to the extent of the repugnancy the one supersedes the other. But two enactments may be repugnant to
each other even though obedience to each of them is pos·sible without disobeying the other. The test of two legislations containing contradictory provisions is not, however. the
only criterion of repugnancy, for if a competent legislature
with a superior efficacy expressly or impliedly evinces by its
legislation an intention to cover the whole field, the enactments of the other legislature whether passed before or after
would be overborne on the ground of repugnance. Where
such is the position, the inconsistency is demonstrated not by
a detailed comparison of provisions of the two statutes but
by the mere existence of the two pieces of legislation".
Jn the case of T. S. Balliah v. T. S. Rangacha~i(2) it was pointed
..
out by this Coun that before corning to the conclusion that there is a
repeal by implication, the Coun must be satisfied that the two enactments are so inconsistent that it becomes impossible for them to stand
together. In other words, this Court held that when there is a direct
collision between the two enactments which is irreconcilable then only
repugnancy results. In this connection, the Court made the following
observations : "Before coming to the conclusion that there is a repeal
by implication, the Court must be satisfied that the two enactments are so inconsistent or repugnant that they cannot
(I) [1964] 4 S .C.R. 461
.(1) [1969] 3 S·C.R. 65.
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stand together and the repeal of the expr~s prior enactment must flow from necessary implication of the language
of the later enactment. It is therefore necessary in this
connection to scrutinise the terms ana consider the true meaning and effect of the two enactments".
•
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"The provisions enacted in s. 52 of the 1922 Act do not
alter the nature or quality of the offence enacted in s. 177,
Indian Penal Code but it merely provides a new course of
procedure for what was already an offence. In a case of
this description the new statute is regarded not as superseding, nor repealing by implication the previous law, but as
cumulative".
"A plain reading of the section shows that there is no
bar to the trial or conviction of the offender under both
enactments but there is only a bar to the punishment of the
offender twice for the same offence. In other words, the
section provides that where an act or omission constitutes
an offence under two enactments, the offender may be prosecuted and punished under either or both the enactments
but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same
offence".
E
On a careful consideration,· therefore, of the authorities referred to
above, the following propositions emerge : -
F
1. That in order to d~cide the question of repugnancy it
must be shown that the two enactments contain inconsistent and irreconcilable provisions, so that they
cannot stand together or operate in the same field.
2. That there can be no ! ~peal by implication unless the
inconsistency appears on the face of the two statutes.
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3. That where the two statutes occupy a particular field.
there is room or possibility of both the statutes operating in the same field without coming into collision with
each other, no repugnancy results.
4. That where there is no inconsistency but a statute OC·
copying the same field seeks to create distinct and
separate offences, no question of repugnancy arises and
both the statutes continue to operate in the same field.
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In the light of the propositions enunciated above, there can be no
doubt that the State Act creates distinct and separate offences with
different ingredients and different punishments and it does not in any
way collide with the Central Acts. On the other hand, the State Act
•
itself permits the Central Act, namely, the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act to come into its aid after an investigation is completed and
' a report is submitted by the Commissioner or the Additional Commissioner. It was contended however by Mr. Venu Gopal that by virtue
of the fact that the State Act has obtained the assent or the President,
.it will be deemed to be a dominant legislation, and, therefore, it would
,,+.overrule the Central Acts. Doubtless, the State Act is the dominant
"">< legislation but we are unable to agree with Mr. Venu Gopal that there
are any provisions in the State Act which are irreconcilably or. directly
inconsistent with the Central Acts so as to overrule them.
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Last but not the least there is a very important circumstance which
completely and conclusively clinches the issue and takes the force out
of the argument of Mr. Venu Gopal on the question of repugnancy.
It would be seen that in the original State Act, section 29 ran thus
>
"Act to overrule other laws, etc.-The provisions of this
Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent
therewith contained in any other law for the time being in
force or any custom, usage or contract or decree or order
of a court or other authority".
This section underwent an amendment which was brought about by
Tamil Nadu Act 16 of 1974 which substituted a new section 29 for
the old one. The new section which was substituted may be extracted thus:"Saving-The provisions of this Act shall be in addition
to, and not in derogation of, any other law for the time being in force, and nothing contained herein shall exempt any
public man from any proceeding by way of investigation or
otherwise which might, apart from this Act. be instituted
against him".
..._
" This amendment received the assent of the President on 10th April,
1974 and was published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette
Extraordinary dated 16th April, 1974. We have already shown that
although the State Act was passed as far back as 30th December, i973
it P~ceived the assent of the President on the 10th April, 1974 that is
to say, on the same date as Act 16 of 1974. The Act was however
brought into force on the 8th May, 1974 when the new section 29
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which had already replaced the old section and had become a part of
the statnte. Therefore, for all intents and purposes the State Act cannot be read in isolation, but has to be interpreted in coojunction with
the express language contained in section 29 of the State Act. This
section has in unequivocable terms expressed the intention that the
State Act which was undoubtedly the dominant legislatioo would only
B. be "in addition to and '.not in derogation with any other law for the ,
time being in force" which manifestly includes the Central Acts,
namely, the Indian Penal Code, the Corruption Act and the Criminal
Law (Amendment) Act. Thus, the Legislature about a month b~fore
the main Act came i'.nto force clearly declared its intention that there l
would be no question of the State Act colliding with the Central Act!'T'-- ,.
referred to above. The second part of section 29 also provides that
('
nothing contained in the State Act shall exempt any public man from
b~ing proceeded with by way of investigation or otherwise under a
proceeding i'.nstituted against him under the Central Acts. It is, therefore, clear that in view of this clear intention of the legislature there
D can be no room for any argument that the State Act was in any way
repu2nant to the Central Acts. We have already pointed out from
the decisions of the Federal Court and this Court that one of the important tests to find out as to whether or not there is repugnancy is
to ascertain the inteution of the legislatnre regarding the fact that the
dominant legislature allowed the subordinate legislature to operate in
E the same field pari passu the State Act.
,-;j···
Craies in his Interpretation on Statute Law 6th Ed. p. 369 observes as follows:-
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"Many earlier statutes contain clauses similar in effect
to the general rule, but without the confusing words as to
contrary intention. These statutes, of some of which a list
is given below, seem not to be affected by the above rule,
Gave so far as it enables the revisers of the 'tatute-book to
excise the particular clauses. In accordance with this rule,
penalties imposed by statute for offences already punishable
under a prior statute are regarded as cumulative or alternative and not as replacing the penalty to which the offender
was previously liable."
,.._.
Such an intention is clearly discernible from, the provisions of section
29 of the State Act. Mr. Venn Gopal tried to rebut this argument on
!he ground that section 29 would have no application where the inconsistency between the dominant statute and the subordinate statute
. is direct and complete. We have already found on a discussion of
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M. KARUNANIDHI v. UNION
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(Fazal Ali, J.)
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the various provisions of t'he State Act that there is no direct inconsistency at all between the State Act and the Central Acts, ;md this
affords a sufficient answer to the argument of Mr. Venu Gopal. Having, therefore, given our anxious consideration to the import and ambit
of section. 29 · it seems to us that the provisions of section 29 would
be presumptive proof of the fact that there is no repugnancy between
the State Act and the Central Acts nor did either the legislature or the
President intend to create any repugnancy between these Acts as ii
result of which the criticism regarding the repugnancy is completely
obliterated in the instant case and we, therefore, hold that the State
,~ legislature never intended to occupy the same field covered by the
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Central Acts.
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It wns also contended by Mr. Venu Gopal that if the Central Acts
being repugnant to the State Act are pressed into service even after
the repeal of the State Act, the Central Acts would stand repealed
hence the prosecution of the appellant would be hit by Article 20(3)
of the Constitution, i.e. the appellant cannot be prosecuted for an ex
post facto offence. On our findings in this case that there is no inconsistency between the State Act and the Central Acts the application of Article 20(3) of the Constitution to the facts of this case does
not arise at all. We, therefore, find ourselves in complete agreement
with the view taken by the High Court that the State Act creates new
and distihct offences and is not in m1y way repugnant to any provisions
-0f the Central Acts and consequently overruled the first limb of the
argument of counsel for the appellant.
Similarly the contention of Mr. Venu Gopal as to whether or not
t11e prosecution of the appellant would be violative of Article 14 of
!he Constitution is not available to the appellant, and consequently
the lean1ed counsel gave up this point and in our opinion very rightly
because since the State Act has now been repealed the question of the
prosecution of the appellant hereafter under the State Act does not
arise at all, and, therefore, the question of two remedies being open to
the prosecution which they may elect at their own option does not arise
in this case. The appellant can be prosecuted only under the Corruption Act and the Penal Code and under no other Act at the moment.
Moreover, it was obviously wrong to say that the earlier Central Law
became violative of Article 14 as soon as the State law was enacted.
This brings us to the second limb of the argument of the learned
counsel for the appellant which relates to the import and connotation
of the term 'public servant' appearing in section 21 (12) of the Indian
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Penal Code. Clause 12 of section 21 which is the relevant provision
so far as the present case is concerned runs thus : "21. The words 'public servant' denote a person falling
under any of the descriptions hereinafter following namely :x
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It was vehemently contended by Mr. Venu Gopal
that having
regard to the constitutional and public duties of a Chief Minister or
a Minister he cannot be deemed to be a public servant in any sense
of the term. He further contended that the entire clause (12) (a)
should be read as a whole and cannot be severed into two limbs inas much as the words 'in the service or pay of the Government' are
used .as synonyms. It was further contended that the words 'in the
service or pay of the Government' clearly connote the relationship of
master and servant-a relationship which is completely beyond the
concept of the position of a Minister or a Chief Minister. We, however, agree that so far as the first part of clause (12) (a) is concerned, namely 'in the service of the Government' undoubtedly signifies a
relationship of master and servant where the employer employs the
employee on the basis of a salary or remuneration. But we are of
the opinion that so far as the second limb 'in the pay of the Government' is concerned, that appears to be of a much wider amplitude so
as to include within its ambit even public servant who may not be
a regular employee receiving salary from his master. In other words;
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we think that even a Minister or a Chief Minister will be clearly
covered by the expression 'person in the pay of the Government'. Mr.
.•Venu Gopal, however, relied on the meaning of the words "in the
pay of' as appearing in the various dictionaries.
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Twelfth-Every person(a) in the service or pay of the Government or remunerated
by fees or commission for the performance of any public
duty by the Government:
x
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In Shorter Oxford English Dictionary the expression 'in the pay
of' is defined thus-
"To give money, etc., in return for something or in discharge of an obligation. Of a thing or action. To yield an
adequate return. To give money or other equivalent value
for".
Similarly 'Payer' is defined thus:
"One who pays a sum of money".
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M. KARUNANIDHI v. UNION (Faza/ Ali, /.)
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· In Webster's Third New International Dictionary the expression
'in the pay of' is mdicated to mean:"Compensate, remunerate, satisfy, reimburse, indemnify,
recompense, repay. Pay is a general term, lacking particular connotation but sometimes bluntly stressing the purchase of service, pay a machinist high wages".
A
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"Wages, salary remuneration".
In Webster's New World Dictionary the expression 'in the pay of
is thus defined:-
"Stresses the idea of payment for a service rendered,
but it often also carries an implication of reward (a bumper
·
crop remunerated the farmer for his labors)".
In Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition Vol. 31A p. 176 the
meaning,of the word 'pay' is given thus:/
.
.
'~Pay"
is remuneration, wages or salary.
rate; to recompense, to give any pay''.
To
remune-
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In Venkataramaya's Law Lexicon Vol. II p.1122 the expression
'to pay money' has the following connotation:"To piiy money is to pay it in respect of a right which
some person has to receive it".
E
In Corpus Juris Secnndum Vol. 70 at. page 200 the word 'pay'
if used as a noun is defined as remuneration, wages, compensation,
salary and the following observations are also made:"To noun 'pay' has been held equivalent to, or synony-, mous ·with, 'compensation', salary and wages and has been
compared with, or distinguished from, 'aliowance' and 'consideration' ".
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A careful analysis of the meanings assigned to the word 'pay' in
the various dictionaries and the texts referred to above would clearly
reveal that the expression 'iii the pay of' connotes that a person is
getting salary, compensation, wages or any amount of money. This
by itself however does not lead to the inference that a relationship of
master and servant must necessarily exist in all cases where a perso!l
is paid salary. This aspect of the matter would become crystal Clear
if we examine the nature and. the 'constitutional position and status of
·
a Minister or a Chief Minister:
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Article 164 of the Constitution runs thus:"Other provisions as to Ministers: ( 1) The Chief
Minister shall be appointed by the Governor and the other
Ministers shall be appointed by the Governor on the advice
of the Chief Minister, and the Ministers shall hold office
during the pleasure of the Governor:
Provided that in the States of Bihar. Madhya Pradesh
and Orissa, there shall be a Minister in Charge of tribal
welfare who may in addition be in charge of the welfare of
the Scheduled Castes and backward classes or any other
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work".
This Article clearly shows that a Chief Minister is appointed by
the Governor and having been appointed by the Governor it is manifest that he is subordinate to the Governor. Even in section 52 ( 1)
of the Government of India Act, 1935 which preceded our Constitution the provision was worded thus:"52(1) The Governor of a Governor's province may,
by notification, appoint ministers, not being members of his
executive council or other officials to administer transferred
·subjects, and any ministers so appointed shall hold office
during his pleasure:
E
There may be paid to any minister so appointed in any
province the same salary as is payable to a member of the
executive council in that province, unless a smaller salary
is provided by vote of the legislative council of the province".
F
In this section also it was the Governor who alone had the power
to choose the ministers. In fact, in Article 164 the word 'appointment' is much higher than the concept of a person being chosen.
Article 164(5) provides for the salary and allowances of Ministers
and runs thus:-
G
"164 (5) The salaries and allowances of Ministers shall
be such as the Legislature of the State may from time to
time by law determine and, until the Legislature of the State
so determines, shall be as specified in the Second Schedule".
H
Under this provision the Ministers on being appointed by the
Governor are entitled to such salaries and allowances as the Legislature of the State may determine from time to time and until this is
done, the emoluments will be such as are specified in the Second
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M. KARUNANIDHI v. UNION (Fazal AU, !.)
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285
Schedule. As however all the Legislatures of the States as also Parliament have already passed Acts providing for the salaries and
emoluments of the Chief Minister and the Ministers the specification
of iheir emoluments in the Second Schedule to the Constitution have
bee.a deleted.
A
Article 167 lays down the duties of the Chief Minister and runs
thus:-
B
"167. Duties of Chief Minister as respects the furnishing of information to Governor etc. It shall be the duty of
the Chief Minister of each State( a) to communicate to the Governor of the State all decisions of the Council of Ministers relating to the administration of the affairs of the State and proposals for
legislation;
(b) to furnish such information relating to the administration
of the affairs of the State and proposals for legislation as
the Governor may call for;
(c) if the Governor so requires, to submit for the consideration of the Council of Ministers any matter on which a
decision has been taken by a Minister but which has not
been considered by the Council" .
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It is, therefore, clear that by virtue of the provisions contained in
Article 167, the Chief Minister undoubtedly performs a public duty J
of the nature as enjoined by clauses (a) to (c) of Article 167. It
is also clearly provided in the Constitution that the Chief Minister or
the Ministers are entitled to salaries or allowances obviously in l~u of
public duties that they perform. The salaries given to the Chief F
Minister or the Ministers are given from the Government funds, and
therefore, there will be no difficulty in holding that th<> Ministers are
in the pay of the Government inasmuch as they receive their salaries,
remunerations or wages from the Government. Mr. Venu Gopal, how0ver, submitted that no analogy can be drawn between the constitu· G
tional provisions and the provisions contained in the Government of
India Act because the constitutional position of a Chief Minister
under the Constitution was not the same as under the Government of
India Act where the Governor enjoyed vast and plenary powers and
was not bound by the advice of the Council of Ministers as the
Governor is under our Constitution. It is not necessary to probe into H
this aspect of the matter, because the Constitution clearly lays down
that the Governor appoints the Chief Minister and being the appoint-
286
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ing authority he is also the dismissing authority. We are not at all
concerned ·in the instant case as to the circumstances under which the
Governor can appoint or dismiss the Chief Minister. Once it is
conceded that th~ Governor appoints the Chief Minister who is paid
a salary according to a statute made by the legislature from the Government funds, the Chief Minister becomes a person in the pay of the
Government so as to fall squarely within clause (12) of section 21 of
the Penal Code.
.
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There is another circumstance to show that a Chief Minister or a
Minister is undoubtedly a public servant which was relied upon by the
High Court in repelling the argument of Mr. Venu Gopal. Section
199 of the Code runs thus:"199 (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this
Code, when any offence falling under Chapter XXI of the
Indian Penal Code is alleged to have been committed against
a person who, at the time of such commission is the President of India, the Vice President of India, the Governor of
a State, the Administrator of a Union Territory or a Minister
of the Union or of a State or of a Union territory, or any
other public servant employed in connection with the affairs
of the Union or of a State in respect of his conduct in the
discharge of his public functions a Court of Session may
take cognizance of such offence, without the case being com·
mitted to it, upon a complaint iu writing made by the Public Prosecutor".
The use of words 'other public servants' following a Minister of
the· Union or of a State clearly show that a Minister would ·also be a
public servant as other public servants contemplated by section 199 ·- . ..L.
(2) of the Code are the Code being a statute complimentary and allied ~~
to !he Penal. Code can be looked into for the purpose of determining
the real meaning and import of the words 'public servant' as used in
'
the aforesaid section.
H
The Solicitor General placed reliance on the decision of this Court
in the case of Dattatraya Narayan Patil v. State of Maharashtra(')
where this Court had held in a slightly different context that a Mimster
was a public servant. Mr. Venu Gopal has, however, distinguished
this decision on the ground tliat this Court proceeded on the ass11mption that it was not disputed before the Court that the Minister was
a Public Servant and the case having been decided on the concession
(I) [1975] Supp. S.C.R. 145.
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M. KARUNANIDHI v. UNION
(Fazal Ali, !.)
28 7
<Of the parties cannot be relied upon by the Solicitor General. In that
case to which two of us (Untwalia and Fazal Ali, JJ.) were parties
to the judgment, the following observations were made:"The duty assigned to a public servant by his master, be
it be under a statute or by an executive order, will assume the
character of public duty, provided the duty assigned is not
illegal or against public policy. Will it make any difference
in the case of a Minister? In our judgment, not. The
Minister is a public servant-not disputed".
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. These observations no doubt fortify our opinion that the Chief
Minister is a public servant which is baaed on the reasons that we
have already given and which are different from those given in the
<:ase cited before us.
In the case of Emperor v. Sibnath Banerji & Ors.(') the Privy
Council clearly held that it was not in a position to accept the suggestion of the counsel that the Minister was not subordinate to the Governor. This was the precise argument which had been put forward
by Mr. Venu Gopal when he contended that the Chief Minister is not
~ubordinate to the Governor. The Privy Council observed as follow!
in this connection:-
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"So far as it is relevant in the present case, their Lordships are unable to accept a suggestion by counsel for the
respondents that the Home Minister is not an officer subordinate to the Governor within the meaning of s.49 (1), and
so far as the decision in Emperor v. Hemendra Prasad
<Jhoshe (19) I.L.R. (1939) 2 Cal. 411 decides that a
Minister is not such an officer their Lordships are unable to
agree with it. While a Minister may have duties to the
Legislature, the provisions of s.51 as to the appointment,
payment and dismissal of Ministers, and s.59 (3) and ( 4)
of the Act of 1935, and the Business Rules made by virtue
of s.59, place beyond doubt that the Home Minister is an
officer subordinate to the Governor" .
We find ourselves in complete agreement with the view taken by
the Privy Council. In fact the case of the Privy Council referred to
above was noticed and relied upon by this Court in the case of Rao
(1) A.T.R. 1945 P. C. 156.
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Shiv Bahadur Singh & Anr. v. The State
where this Court observed as follows:-
of
Vindhya
Pradesh(')
•
"Clause 9 of section 21 Indian Penal Code shows that
every officer in the service or pay of the Crown for the performance of any public duty is a 'public servant'. The decision of the Privy ·Council in King Emperor v. Sibnatfr
Banerji(') is decisive to show that a Minister under the
Government of India is 'an officer' subordinate to the Governor. On the same reasoning there can be no doubt that
the Minister of Vindhya Pradesh would be an 'Officer of
the State of Vindhya Pradesh. Therefore, prior to the passing of Ordinance No. XLVIII of 1949 and on the view that
the Indian Penal Code with necessary adaptation mutatis
mutandis was in force at least in the Rewa portion of
Vindhya Pradesh (if not in the entirety of Vindhya Pradesh)
the first appellant was a public servant as defined in section
21, Indian Penal Code, as adapted. The amendment of the
said section brought about therefore no substantial change
in the position of the first appellant".
"
In the case of Namdeo Kashinath A her v. H. G. Vartak & Anr. ( 3 )
Deshpande, J. observed as follows:"Whatever be the practical and actual position, the fact
remains that it is the Governor who can accept the resignation of the Ministry or Minister and it is the Governor
again who can dismiss or remove the Minister from office.
Under section 3(60) of the General Clauses Act, 1897,
the word 'State Government' has been defined. Clause (cl
of section 3 ( 60) is applicable to the present case and
therefore the State Government is to mean the Governor for
the purpose of the present case. The result therefore is that
accused No.1 is a public servant who can be said to be
removable only by the State Government, meaning thereby
the Governor, and I do not find any difficulty in coming to
the conclusion that the second requirement of Section 197,
Cr. P.C. also is fully satisfied as far as accused No. l is concerned".
(I) [1953] S.C.R. 1188..
(2) (1945] F.C.R. 195.
(3) A.LR. 1970 Born. 385.
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Jn the case of S ..Tara Singh v. Director'Consolidation of Holdings,
Punjab, Ju/l1111d11r & Ors.(') the Punjab High Court took the same
view and observed as follows:-
.•
"lt follows from the above conclusion that under Article
154 (1) of the Constitution the Governor may act· directly
or through his subordinate officers. In the present case he
has acted through the Development Minister. The question
arises whether he could so act. Obviously the executive
. authority carries on the business of the Government and part
of this business is the power given to the State Government
under section 42 of the Consolidation Act. Under Article
166 (3) of the Constitution the Governor can allocate this
business to any Minister he likes ............ Moreover
there can be no doubt that a Minister is subordinate to the
Governor. . The Governor is the executive head of the State
and this position he does not share with the Chief Minister
or any other Minister. He allocates his executive duties to
various Ministers under Article 166 (3) of the Constitution.
He appoints a Minister albeit on the advice of the Ch!ef
Minister and the Minister holds office during his pleasure.
Therefore it is open to a Governor under the Constitution to
dismiss an individual Minister at· his plesure. Jn these
circumstances there can be no doubt that a Minister is to be
considered as an officer subordinate to the Governor".
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We find ourselves in complete agreement with the view taken and
the reasons given by the Punjab High Court in the aforesaid case.
To the same effect is a decision of the 1 & K High Court in the
case of Bakshi Ghulam Mol1d. v. G. M. Sadiq & Ors( 2 ) where Anant
Singh, J, observed .as follows:-
a
"A Minister of State is 'paid from its public exchequer,
and he is ·paid for doing public duty and, in my opinion, a
Minister is a 'public officer' within the meaning of Sec. 80
as defined in Sec. 2 (17) (h) of the Civil Procedure Code".
The opinion expressed by the learned Judge is clearly in consonance with the view that we have taken in this case.
(1) A.I.R. 1958 Punjab. 302.
)
(!) A. I. R. 1963 J & K. 98.
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Three facts, therefore, have been proved beyond doubt:1. That a Minister is appointed or dismissed by the
Governor and is, therefore, subordinate to him whatever be
· the nature and status of his constitutional functions.
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2. That a Chief Minister or a Minister' gets s3tary for
the public work done or the public duty performed by him.
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3. That the said salary is paid to the Chief Minister or
the Minister from the Government funds.
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It is thus incontrovertable, that the holder of a public office such
as the· Chief Minister is a public servant in respect of whom the
get his salary from the Government
Constitution provides that he
Treasury so long he holds his office on account of the public service
that he discharges. The salary given to the Chief Minister is coterminus with his office and is not paid like other constitutional functionaries such as. the President and the Speaker. These facts, therefore, point to one and only one conclusion and that is that the Chief
Minister' is in the pay of the Government and is, therefore, a public
servant' within the meaning of section 21 ( 12) of the Penal Code.
will
For the reasons given above, we are satisfied that a Chief Minister
or a Minister is undoubtedly a public servant as defined in section ·
21(12){a) of the Penal Code and the view taken by the High-Court
on this point was absolutely correct in law. The result is that all the
.contentions raised by Mr. Venu Gopal, counsel for the appellant fail
and the appeals are dismissed. The case before the Special Judge
will now proceed to its ultimate end according to law.
N.V.K.
Appeals dismissed.
'
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