RAM LAL NARANG ETC. ETC. versus STATE OF DELHI (ADMN.)
Supreme Court of India | Decided 10 January 1979 | [1979] 2 S.C.R. 923 | 1979 INSC 4
Key facts
- Decided
- 10 January 1979
- Bench
- N.L. UNTWALIA*, O. CHINNAPPA REDDY
- Bench size
- 2
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 373/1978
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1979] 2 S.C.R. 923
- Neutral citation
- 1979 INSC 4
Text of the judgment
923
RAM LAL NARANG ETC. ETC.
v.
STATE OF DELHI (ADMN.)
·A
January 10, 1979
.
[N. L. UNTWALIA AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.]
"
B
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 173-Whether the Police have
powers to jur1/l~r investigate, after the magistrate has taken cognizance of the
offence-Scope and ambit of Section 173 Cr. P.C.
A criminal case, arisi1.1g out of F.I.R. 72 of 1967 against one Sri Bali Ram
Sharma and two others for the offence of the th'eft of two sandstone pillars
of great antiquity, beauty and value from the Suraj Kund Temple, in village
Amin, Dist. Karnal, ended in the acquittal of the accused. During th! pendency
of this ca~'e •. on an applica.tion made by him rn:1e Narinder Nath Malik (N. N.
Malik) an alleged research scholar and a. friend of H. L. Mehfa, the then Chief
Judicial Magistrate was given the custody of these two sandstone pillars which
had been recovered from th'e accused. The pilla.rs remuined in the custody of
N. N. Malik from 1-3-1968 to 27-5-1968 and on the acquittal of the accused
D
on 16-7-1968, they were handed over to the Lambardar of Village Amin. LatC:r,
it came to light that the pillars returned by Malik w'ere not the original pillars
but fakes. 1hereupon, F.I.R. RC 2-71-CIA/SPEICBI was registered at
Delhi against Malik and H. L Mehra under Section 120 B read with Sections
406 and 420 J.P.C. After completing the investigation a charge sheet No. RC 2
of 1971 wa:rs fded on 30-12-1972, in the Court of Spe-cial Magistrate, Ambala
against Malik and H. L Mehra for the aforesaid offences noted in the F.l.R.
Though an order was passed oo 17-5-1976 directing the framing of charge3, no E'
charges were actuaJly framed. However, on 16-5-77, on an application dated
17-4-77 filed by the Public Prosecutor under Section 494 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973, the Special Magistr~te permitted the \vithdrawal of the
case and discharged the accused. During th'e pendency of the case, the two
genuine pillars were traced and found in London in the ware house Of Spink &
Co. Jt wa.s \uspected that Manohar Lal Narang and Ramlal Narang had
E
engaged Balkisban Rawat and Nathubai Rawal of Delhi to make three s'ets of
t'aJceB and had exported the genuine pillars to London. This resulted in the
registering of F.T.R. RC 4/76-0W(A)/SPE by the Superintendent of Police, CIV
(Antiquities 5PE/CBI, New Delhi) against l\fanohar L'll Narang and others for
aHet:ed offences under Section 120B, read \.Vith Section 411 IP.C. and Section
25 (I) of the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972. An application under
s. 306 Cr.P.C. filed by N. N. Malik on 26-6-1976 before the Chief Metropolitan
G
M;iglstrate, New Delhi with reference to this F.lR. RC 4/76, was accepted on
3-7-1976 and Malik was granted pardon, after confessiorial statement was
recorded. On 19-r-1976 a charge sheet was filed (RC 4 of 1976) before the
same Court for offences under Sections 120B, I.P.C. r~ad with Section 420,
411 and 406 J.P.C. and Section 25 of the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act
1972. The case was transferred to the Court of Additional Chier Metropolitim
Magistrate. On 20-7-1976 the Magistrate issued process for the appearance of
H
the accused including the three Narang brothers out of whom the appellant in
Cr!. Appeal 373 of 1978 was already under detention under MISA and
COFEPOSA. The other two who were in London were extradited and brought
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924
A
B
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] 2 S.C.R.
to India on 27-7-1977. An application filed by Ramlal Narang in March 1977
immedia.tely after his release from detention, to drop the proceedings against
him, to cancel the extradition warrants against his two brothers and to
discharge all the accused on the ground of illegality of the Delhi case in view of
the fact that a case on the same facts was a.lready pe~ding in th'e Ambala Court
failed. Thereafter two applications filed by the three N arang brothers
on
21-6-1977 in the Delhi High Court under Section 482 Crl. P.C. once again
challenging the legality of the proceedings arising out of charge sheet RC 4 of
1974 were admitted on 22-6-1977, but dismissed on 10-1-1978. During the pendency of these two appeals Malik died sometime during May 1977 and Mehra
\\·as made a co-accused in the Delhi case on 1-8-1977 in view of th'e withdrawal
of the Ambala case on 1~-5-1977.
..
.
Dismissing the appeals by special IeM>e, the Court,
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HELD : 1. The police have the statutory right and duty to 'register' tvery
informatiotl relating to the commission of a cognizable offence. The police also
have the stntutory right and duty to investigate the facts and circumstances of
the cas'e where the commission of a. cognizable offence was suspected and to
submit the report of s.uch investigation to the Magistrate having jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the offence upon a police report. These statutory rights and
duties of the police were not circumscrib'ed by any power of superintendence
or interference in the Magistrate; nor was any sanction required from a 1'..iagistrate to empolh•er the police to investigate into a cognizable offence. [937 F-H]
(a) The scheme. of the 1898 Code of Criminal Procedure was that the First
Information Report was. followed by investigation, the investigation led to the
submission of a report to the Magistrate, the Magistr3.te took cognizance of the
offence on receipt of the police report and finally, the Magistrate taking cognizance issued process to the accused. As such ordinarily the right and duty of
the police would end with the submission of a report under Section 173(1) Criminal Procedure Code upon receipt of which it was up to the Magistrate to take
or not to tl>ke cognizance of the offence. [937 E-F, 938 Fl
(b) There was no provision in the 1898 Code prescribing the procedure to
be followtd by the police, where after the snbmie~don of a report under Section
173(1) Criminal Procedure Code and after the Magistrate had taken cognizance
of the offence, fresh facts came to light which required further investigation.
Similarly, there was no express provision prohibiting the police from launching
upon an investigation into the fresh facts coming to light after the submission of
the report under-Section 173(1) or after the Magistrate had taken cognizan.ce of
the offence. Therefore further investigation was permissible and was not altogether ruled out merely because cognizance of the case has been taken by the
Court; defective investigation coming to light during the course of a trial could
also be cured by a further investigation, if circumstances permitted it, [938 F~H,
941 C-DJ
King Emperor v. Khwaja Wazir ~4hmed, 71 Indian Appeals, PO
203; followed.
H
Diwakar Singh v. A. Ramamurthy Naidu, AIR 1919 Madras 751. ln
re. Palaniswami Goundan, AIR 1946 Madras 502; Mohd. Niwa/ v. The
Crov:n, 48 Crl. L.J. 744 Lahore; Prose.~uting l11spector v. Minaketan
•
R. L. NARANG v. STATE
925
·~·
A
Monato, AIR 1952 Orissa 350; Ramashankar v. State of U.P., AIR 1956
All. 525; In re. State of Kera/a v. State Prosecutor, 79 Cr!. L.J. 1973
p. 1288 (Kerala) D.B.; approved.
.
H. N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi, [1955] 1 SCR !150; Tara SingM!.
S1"te [1951] SCR 72; referred to.
2. (a) Neither Section '173 nor section 190 lead to the conclusion that the
power of the police to further investigate was exhausted by the Magistrate tak~
ing cognizance of the offence. Practice, convenience and preponderance of
authori '.y, permitted repeated investigations and discovery of fresh facts. Not~
withstanding that a Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offence upon a p61ice
report :mbmitted under Section 173. of !be 1898 Code, !be right of the police to
further investigate was not exhausted and the police could exercise such right as
often aa necessary when fresh information came to light. Where the police
desired to make a further investigation, the police could' express their regard and
respect for the Court by seeking its formal permission to make· further investi
g:.tion. [943 G·H, 944 A]
B
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tb) When it comes to the notice of the invesligating agency that a person
alrt.'aJy an accused of an offence has a good alibi or where the involvement.of
persons who are not already accused comes to the notice of the investigating
agency, the investigating agency cannot keep quiet and refuse to investigate the
fresh information. It is their duty to investigate and submit a report to the
Magistrate upon the innocence or involvement of the persons concerned. In
either case, it is for the Maogistrate to decide upon his future course of action
depending upon the stage at which the case is before him. If he has already
taken cognizance of the offence, but has not proceeded with the ·enquiry or
trial, he may direct the issue of process to persons freshly discovered to be
involved and deal with all the accused in a single enquiry or trial. If the
case of which he has previously taken cognizance has already proceeded to
some extent, he may take fresh cognizance of the offence disclosed against the
newly involved acCused and proceed with the case as a separate case. What
action a Magistrate is to take in accordance with the provisions of the Code
of Criminal Procedure in such situations is a matter best left to the discretion
of the Magistrate. A further investigation by the police cannot be considered
as trenching upon the proceedings before the Court because whatever the police
may do, the final discretion in regard to further action is with the Magistrate.
That the final word is with the Magistrate is sufficient safeguard against any
excessive use or abuse of the power of the police to make further investigation.
[942 P..H, 943 A·DJ
Ram Copa/ Neotia v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1969 Cal. 316 Hanuman
and Anr. v. Raj. AIR 1951 Rajasthan 131; State v. Mehr Singh and Ors., !LR
1973 (3) P & H 561-[1974] 2 Cal. U 970; over-ruled.
(c) Wherf; the rep(\rt of the second
investigation
is
submitted
to
D
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a
•Magistrate other than lhe Magistrate who has already taken cognizaoce of the
first case, it is up to thr prosecuting agency or the accused concerned to take
necessary action by moving the appropriate superior Court to have the two
cases tried together. The Magistrate themselves may take action suo motu.
[944 BJ
H
926
A
B
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] 2 S.C.R.
In the inslant case; the pros~cution did not act with any oblique motive or
out of· any malice by submitting a charge sheet to the Delhi Court and by
withdrawing the case in the Ambala Court. In the charge sheet filed in the
Delhi Court, it was expressly mentioned that a case had been filed in the
Delhi Court against ~ehra and others and, therefore, it was not necessary to
prosecute Mehra in the Ambala Court. The Court granted its permission for
the withdraw&! of the case. [944 C-E]
..
3. Where the conspiracy discovered later is found to cover a much larger
canvas with broader ramifications, it cannot be equated with the earlier conspiracy \vhich covered a smaller field of narrower dimentions. [936 B-C]
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In the present case, (a) the conspiracies which are the· subject matter of the
two cases cannot be said to be identical though the conspiracy \vhich is the
subject matter of the first case, may perhaps be sf.Lid to have turned out to be
part of the conspiracy which is the subject matter of the second case .
\Vhen inve~tigation comn1enced in First Information Report No. RC4 of 1976,
apart from the· circumstance that the property involved was the same, the Iiitk
between lhe conspiracy to cheat and to misappropriate and thC conspira-cy to
dispose cf the stolen property was not known. [936 C·l)]
(h) A con1parison of the two First Infonnation Report cot1pled with the
several facts and circumstances show that the conspiracy which was the subject
matter of the second case could not be said to. be identical with the conspiracy
which was the ·subject matter of the first case. The conspirators were different.
l\.falik and Mehra alone were stated to be the conspirators in the first case,
while the three Narang brothers were alleged to be the principal conspirators
in the second case. The objects of the two conspiracies were different. The
alleged object of the first conspiracy was to obtain possession of the pillars
from the Court by cheating and to misappropriate them. The alleged object
of the second conspiracy was the disposal of the stolen property by exporting
the pillars to London. The offences alleged in the first case were Section 120B
read with Section 420 and 406 IIldian Penal Code while the offences. alleged
in the second case were S. 120B read with S. 411 IPC and· ~ction 25 of the
Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972. ~935 D-Fj
(c) No fault could be found with the police for registering a first information Report against the Narang brothers for the offence of conspiracy to
commit an offence under section 411 Indian Penal Code. In the course of the
investigation into this offence, it transpired that the Narang brothers were also
parties to the original conspiracy to obtain possession of the pillars from the
Court by ch~ating. Facts came to light which indic:ite·l that the conspiracy
which was the subject 'matter of the case pending in the Ambala ·court was but
part of a larger conspiracy. The fresh facts which came to light resulted in
the filing of the second charge sheet. [935 C-D]
(d) Neither at the time when the Fir<;t Information Report perta1n1ng
to the Ambala Case was registered nor at the time when'. the Charge sheet was
filed in the Ambala Court, were the Narang brothers known to be in the picture. The investigating agency was not also aware 'of what Malik and Mehra
had done with the pillars after they bad obtained possession of the pillars from
the ·court and substituted and returned fake pillars to the Court. The First
Information Report and the charge-sheet were concerned primarily with the
•
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R. L. NARANG v. STATE (Chinnappa Reddy, !.)
927
offences of conspiracy to cheat and to misappropriate committed by Malik and
A
Mehra. At that stage, the investigating agency. was not aware of,any conspiracy
to send the pillars out of the country. It was not known that Narang brothers
were also parties to the conspiracy to obtain possession of the pillars from the
·courL It was ni.ucb later, that the pillars sutfaced in London were discovered
to be in the constructive possession of Narang brothers. Even then, the precise
connection between Malik and. Mehra on the one side and Narang brothers on
,,._
the other was not known. All that was known was that the pillars which
were stolen prciperty within the definition of the expression in Section 410
Indian Penal Code were found to be in the possession of Narang brothers in
London.
B
On the discovery of the genuine pillars in the possession of Narang
brothers, without anything further to connect N arang brothers with Malik and
Mehra, the police had no option but to register a case under Section 411
Indian Penal Code against Namng brothers. That was what was done. [934
F-H, 935 A-Bl
C
Observation :
•
In the interests of the independence of the magistracy and the judiciary,
in the interests of the puri\Y of the administration of criminal justice and
in the interests of the comity of the various agencies and institutions en~
trusted with different stages of such administration, it would ordinarily
be desirable that the police should inform the Court ·and seek formal
permission to make further investigatio1t when fresh facts come to
light. [943 El
D
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos. 3733,74 of 1978.
· Appeals by Special Leave frO!m the Judgment and Orders dated
!0-1-1978 and 14-9-1978 of the Delhi High Court in Criminal Misc.
(M) No. 323 and 322/77 and Criminal Misc. Nos. 1083, 1149 cl
1978 in Special Misc. (M) No. 322/77.
.r
Ram Jethnra/a11i (In Cr!. A.373), A. K. Sen (In Cr!. A.374) and
iiarjinder Singh for the Appellants .
E
F
U. R. La/it and R. N. Sachthey for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
CHINNAPPA REDDY, J.-On the intervening light of 31st March
1967 and 1st April 1967, two sandstone pillars of great antiquity,
beauty and value were stolen from Suraj Kund temple, in Village Amin
(District Kamal, Haryana). They were of the Sunga period (2nd
Century B.C.) and their present estimated value in the Intematiopal
Art Treasures' Market is said to be aronnd five hundred thousand
American dollars. A first information report (F.l.R. No. 72 of 1967)
was registered by the Police of Butana, District Kamal. The pillars
were recovered on 2nd May 1967. On completion of investigation a
charge-sheet was filed on 3rd October 1967 in the Court of the Ilaqa
Magistrate at Kamal, against one Bali Ram Sharma and two others.
3-119 SC!/79
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928
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] 2 s.c.R.
A
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The case ended in their acquittal on tl6th July 1968. During the
pendency of the case one Narinder Nath Malik (N. N. Malik) filed
an application before tho Magistrate alleging that he was a research
scholar and requesting that he might be given custody of the two
pillars to enable him to make a detailed study. At the instance of
H. L. Mehra, the then Chief Judicial Magistrate, Karna! and a friend
B of N. N. Malik, the learned. Ilaqa Magistrate gave custody of the two
pillars to N. N. Malik on his executing a personal bond in a sum of
Rs. 20,000/-. The orde.r was written by H. L. Mehra himself and
signed by the Ilaqa Magistrate. The pillars remained in the custody
of N. N. Malik from 1st March 1968 to 27th May 1968, when N. N.
purported to return the~ to the Court of the Jlaqa Magistrate.
c Malik
Kamal. After the acquittal of Bali Ram Sharma and others, the
pillars were handed over to the Lambardar of village Amin. Later, it
came to light that the pillars returned by _N. N. Malik were not the
original pillars but fakes.
Thereupon, First Information Report
No. RC.2/71-CIA/SPE/CBI was registered at Delhi against N. N.
D Malik and H. L. Mchra under Section 120-B read with Sections 406
and 420 Indian Penal Code. After completing the investigation the
C.B.I. filed a charge-sheet No. R.C. 2 of 1971 in the Court of Special
Magistrate, Ambala, against N. N. Malik and H. L. Mel:u-a for
alleged offences under Section 120-B read with Sections 406 and 420
Indian Penal Code. The charge-sheet was filed on 30th December,
E 1972. On 17th May, 1976, the learned Special Magistrate, Ambala,
passed an order directing the framing of charges against N. N. Malik
and H. L. Mehra. But, no charges were actually framed as the
accused were uot present in the Court. On 17th April, 1977, the Public
Prosecutor filed an application under Section 494 Criminal Procedure
Code for permission to withdraw the case against Malik and Mehra.
F The learned Special Magistrate, Ambala, by his order dated 16th May
1977, permitted the withdrawal of the case and discharged the
accused.
(;
H
Between May 1976 and May 1977 several othe.r things happened
and the Narang brothers, the appellants in the two appeals, made
their appearance on the scene. It may be mentioned here, that of the
three Narang 'brothers, Om Prakash alias Omi Narang had been 'Jiving in London since 1970, Manohar Lal alias Manu Narang had been
similarly living in London since July 1974 and Ram Lal Narang alone
had been living in India. Ram Lal Narang was detained first undc.r
the MISA from September 1974 till he was released under o.rders ol
the High Court, and later, under the COFEPOSA from 1st July 1975
till after the revocation of the internal Emergency in March 1977.
I
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R. L. NARANG v. STATE
(Chinnappa Reddy, J.)
929
A
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""
The two genuine pillars which had been removed from Suraj Kund
temple were traced and found in London in the W3rehouse of Messrs
Spink & Co. It was suspected that Manojharlat Narang and Ramlal
Narang had engaged Balkishan Rawal and Nathubhai Rawal of Delhi
to make three sets of fakes and had exported the genuine pillars to
London. A First Information Report (R.C. 4/76-CIU(A) /SPE)
B
was r~stered by .the Superintendent of Police, C!U (Antiquities,
SPE/CBI, New Delhi) against Manohar Lal Narang and others, for
alleged offences under Section 120-B Indian Penal Code ;read with
Section 411 Indian Penal Code and Section 25(1) of the Antiquities
and Art Treasures Act, 1972. On 26th June, 1976, N. N. Malik
made an application before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, c
in case R.C. No. 4/76-CIU(A) /SPE, New Delhi, purporting to be
under Section 306 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, praying
that he might be granted pardon. The application mentioned Sectioris
411, 406 and 420 Indian Penal Code read with Section 120-B and
Section 25(1) of the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972, as the
offences involved. The application was supported by the reply filed D
by the Superintendent of Police, C.B.I. On 3rd July 1976, the Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, granted pardon to N. N. Malik. Before the grant of pardon the confessi_onal statement of N. N. Malik
·was got recorded by the Metropolitan Magistrate; Delhi. Thereafter,
on 19th July 1976, a charge-sheet (R.C. 4/1976) was filed in the
-Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Delhi, for offences under Section E
120-B Indian Penal Code read with Sections 420, 411 and 406
Indian Penal Code and Section 25 of the Antiquities and Art Trea·sures Act, 1972. The case was transferred to the Court of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. On 20th July 1976, the Additional Metropolitan Magistrate issued process for'the appearance of the
F
three Narang brothers. The learned Magistrate also issued. warrants
for the extradition of Omi Narang and Manu Narang who were iii
London. Extradition proceedings were initiated in Britain at the ins·tance of the Government of India. The Metropolitan Magistrate, Bow
Street, London ordered the detention of Omi Narang and Manu
Narang pending the issue of warrants by the Secretary of State under G
Section 5 of the Fugitive Offenders Act. A petition for the issue of
Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Subjiciendum was filed in the High Court
·of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, London. The Divisional Court
directed the release of Omi Narang and Manu Narang. The Government of India filed an appeal to the House of Lords and on 24th
March, 1977, the appeal was allowed. Omi Narang and Mann ff
Narang were finally extradited and brought to India on 27th July,
1977.
930
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[1979] 2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
A
Meanwhile internal emergency was lifted in India in March 1977
and Ram Lal Narang was released. Almost immediately he filed a
petition before the Additional Metropolitan Magistrate to drop the proceedings against him, to cancel the extradition warrants and to discharge the accused. The contention was that the entire investigation
in First Information Report No. R.C. 4/76 was illegal as a case on
B the same facts was already pending b~fore the Ambala Court and that
the Delhi Court acted without jurisdiction in takin[; cognizance of the
case pursuant to a report of police based upon such illegal, investigation. The learned Magistrate held that he was not competent to sit
in judgn1ent, as it were, over the order of his predecessor taking cognizance of the case. He, however, found that the conspiracy which was
the subject matter of the case before the CoJurt at Ambala and the
conspiracy which was the subject matter of the case before himself
were one and the same, but, he held that the question as to which
Court should proceed with the case, was not for him to decide; it was
a matter for the High Court to decide under Section 186 Criminal
Procedure Code. The learned Magistrate also noticed an application
D filed before him, after the conclusion of arguments, informing him that
the case in the Court at Ambala against Malik and. Mehra had since
_been withdrawn on 16th May 1977.
.
'
c
On 21st June 1977, two applications were filed in the Delhi High
Court under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code, one by Ramlal
Narang and the other on behalf of Omi Narangi and Manu Narang
who were still in England awaiting extradition. The applicants sought
quashing of the orders of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate issui'ng
process to them and warrants for the extradition of Omi Narang and
Manu Narang. It was also songht to be declared that the entire inF
vestigation in R. C. 4 of 197 6 was illegal and the orders of the Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate and the Additional Metropolitan Magistrate
taking cognizance of R.C. 4 of 1976 were illegal. The grant of pardon
to N. N. Malik was questioned. It was also prayed that the proceedings before the Metropolitan Magistrate might be quashed. The
G petitions were admitted by the Delhi High Court on 22nd June, 1977,
but ultimately dismissed on 10th January 1978, by a common judgment.
Ramlal Narang having obtained special leave from this Conrt hes
filed Criminal Appeal No. 373 of 1978 and Omi and Manu Narang
bave preferred Criminal Appeal No. 374 of 1978. We may mention
ibere that on 1st August, 1977, a supplemental charge-sheet was filed
H making Mehra an accused in the Delhi case, the case in the Ambala
Conrt having been withdrawn on 16th May, 1977, as mentioned
earlier. Malik, we may add, died sometime during August, 1977.
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R. L. NARANG v. STATE (Chinnappa Reddy, J.)
931
We are given to understand that Mehra also was subsequently granted
pardon.
,
Shri Harjinder Singh, learned Counsel for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 373 of 1978 and Shri Ashok Sen, learned Counsel for
the appeUan!s in Criminal Appeal No. 374 of 1978 argued that the
conspiracy and the overt acts which were the subject matter of the two
First Information Reports and the two charge-sheets were the same and,
therefore, there was an implied bar to the power of the Police to investigate into First Information· Report No. R.C. 4 of 1976 and the
power of the Court at Delhi to take cognizance of the case upon the
report of such information. It was submitted that the mere circumstance that some more persons were mentioned as involved or the mere
circumstance that the property was said to pave been recovered later
would not affect the legal position. It was submitted that gist of the
consp.iracy in both the cases was to obtain possession of the pillars. The
offence of conspiracy relating to the obtaining of the pillars having
been investigated and a charge-sheet having been filed in the Ambala
Court, the Police had no authority in law to start a fresh investigation
under the Criminal Procedure Code by registering another First Information Report and to submit a charge-sheet in the Delhi Court for
the very same offence. That was an unwananted interference by the
Police with the proceedings pending in the Court. The whole of the
investigation subsequent to the filing of the charge-sheet in the Ambala
Court was without jurisdiction and no material or fact gathered during
the course of such 'illegal investigation could be used to found further
proceedings. The Delhi Court was, therefore, in error in taking
cognizance of offences which had already been investigated and which
wen' the subject matter. of proceedings in another Court. It was also
argued that the subsequent withdrawal of the case from the Ambala
Court did not and could not confer jurisdiction on the Delhi Court.
The withdrawal itself was an abuse of the process of the Court.
A
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Shri Lalit, learned Counsel for the respondents urged that the
conspiracy which was the subject matter of the charge-sheet Yiled in
the Delhi Court was not the same as the conspiracy which was the
subject matter of the charge-sheet filed in the Ambala Court. The
circumstance that some of the conspirators were common and part of
the case was the same did not make the two conspiracies identical with
each other. There was, therefore, no question of any bar against the
Delhi Court from· taking cognizance of the .case based upon the wider
conspiracy merely because the Ambala Court had taken cognizance
of the case based upon the narrower conspiracy. Sbri Lalit also urged
that the statutory right of the Police to investigate into cognizable
G
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932
SUPREME 'coURT REPORTS
[ 1979] 2 s.c.R.
A offences was not fettered and did not end with the submission of a
- charge·-sheet to the Court. He submitted that the Police had the
right and indeed, the duty, to investigate into fresh facts coming to
light and to appraise the Court of the same.
B
The basic submission on behalf of the appellants was that the
two conspiracies alleged in the two cases were but one. The sequitur
was that the investigation into and the taking of cognizance of the
second case were without jurisdiction.
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We will first examine the question whether the conspiracy which
was investigated by the Police and which investigation led to the flling
of the charge-sheet in the Ambala case can be said to be the same
as the conspiracy which was later investigated and which led to the
filing of the charge-sheet in the Delhi Court. For this purpose, it is
necessary to emµpare the First Information Report and the chargesheet in the two cases_
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The First Information Report relating to the ease in the Ambala
Court was registered against "N. N. Malik and others" for aileged
offences under "Section 120-B Indian Penal Code read with Section
420 and Section 406 Indian Penal Code." It was stated therein that
N. N. Malik applied to the Court of the Judicial Magistrate-1st Class,
Karna! and obtained possession of the two stone pillars and dishonestly
substituted two fake pillars in their place and returned them to the
Court. The charge-sheet which was filed on 30th December, 1972
mentioned N. N. Malik and H. L Mehra as the two accused in the
case and recited that N_ N. Malik was introduced by Mehra to the
Magistrate as an eminent archaeologist and that he obtained possession
of the pillars on the pretext that he wanted to make some research.
The actual order granting custody of the pillars to Malik was written
by Mehra but signed by the Magistrate R. K. Sen. It was further
recitec•. that sometime after the pillars were returned by Malik to the
Court it was discovered that the pillars so returned were fakes and
that N. N. Malik was not an archaeologist. It was finally said that
Malik and Mehra had "thus dishonestly made misrepresentat;on of
fact and got the delivery of the two statues which were subsequently
substituted by them" and they had "thus committed the offence under
Section 120-B read with Section 420 Indian Penal Code and Section
406 Indian Penal Code." It is, .therefore, seen from the allegations
in the charge-sheet filed in the Ambala Court that the conspirators
involved in the conspiracy which was its subject matter were two,
namely, Malik and Mehra, that the object of the conspiracy was to
dishonestly obtain possession of the pillars by making false representation to the Magistrate and to substitute the pillars by fakes after
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R. L. NARANG v. STATE
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93 3
obtaining possessiol} of the same and that the offences committed were
nnde~ Secti0n 120-B read with Section 420 and 406 Indian Penal
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The First Information Report, in the Delhi case was registered on
13th May, 1916, and the offences mentioned were Section 120-B
Indian Penal Code read with Section 411 Indian Penal Code and
Section 25(1) of the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972. The
accused mentioned in the report were Manu Narang and Ram!a!'
Narang. After reciting that the pillars had been taken from the Court
by N. N. Malik and had been s,nbstituted by fake pillars, the First
Information Report went on to recite that the genuine pillars; which
were stolen from Suraj Kund temple as mentioned above were found
to be in the possession and control of Manohar Lal alias Manu
Narang in London. It was further recited that Manu Narang was
negotiating the sale of the pillars through some London brokers and
the price expected to be fetched ·was approximately five hundred
American dollars. It was recited further that Manu Narang and bis
brother Ramlal N arang had commissioned two well known sculptors
of Delhi to make three sets of fake pillars. The two brothers and
others, acting in conspiracy, had dishonestly received and exported the
two stone pillars. The charge-sheet which followed the investigation
was filed on 19th July 1976 in the Delhi Court. The charge-sheet
mentioned the three Narang brothers, Ramlal Narang, Manoharlal
Narang and Om Parkash Narang, as the three accused persons sent up
for trial and H. L. Mehra as a person not sent up for trial as he was
already facing trial before the Special Mag.istrate, Ambala. The chargesheet recited, among other facts, that the Narang brothers had come
to know in or about the month of February 1978 about the invaluable
nature of the pillars and devised a stratagem to get the custody of the
pillars. They discussed their stratagem with their family friend N. N.
Malik, informing hlm that the pillars were worth a fortune. Ramlal
Narang and Malik met Mehra and it was decided that Malik should
file an application for temporary custody of the pillars and that Mehra
shoukl wield his influence over the Magistrate to help N. N. Malik
to get such temporary custody. That was done. Temporary custody
of the pillars was obtained and they were removed .to Delhi in a truck
at the instance of the Narang brothers to a place in Defence Colony,
New Delhi. Replicas of the pillars were made by Balkrishan Rawal
and Natwarlal, two eminent sculptors of Delhi under the· supervision
of Ramlal Narang and Omi Narang. Manu Narang also used to visit
Delhi and check the progress made. The original pillars were transported to Bombay by Manu Narang and smuggled out of the country.
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Fake pillars were substituted and returned by N. N. Malik to the Court.
Later on, suspicion was created by the discovery of two fake pillars
which were also attempted to be smuggled out of the country. The
two pillars returned by N. N. Malik were then got examined by experts
and were found to be fakes. Malik was presented by the Narang
. b1others with a Fiat car, a revolving brass bed a..'1d a sum of
B Rs. 70,000/-. They also paid for two pleasure trips made by Malik
and his wife io Bombay. It was recited in the charge-sheet that the
facts disclosed "the commission of offences under Section 406 ( criminal breach of trust) , Section 411 (receiving and retaining stolen property), Section 420 (cheating) Indian Penal Code and Section 25 (1)
C of the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972, all read with Section
120-B Indian Penal Code, in pursuance of criminal conspiracy to
which Manoharlal Narang, Ramlal Narang and Om Prakash Narang,
H. L. Mehra and N. N. Malik (already granted pardon) were parties."
It was further recited "Manoharlal Narang, Ramlal Narang and Omi
Narang also abetted the commission of offences under Section 420 and D Section 406 Indian Penal Code by N. N. Malik approver and these
thre~ accused were, therefore, liable for prosecution under Section
406 and Section 420 Indian Penal Code read with Section 109 Indian
Penal Code and they had also committed other offences under Section
411 Indian Penal Code." It was further mentioned in the chargeshee'. that J\Ianoharlal Narang and Omi Narang were in London and
E that proceedings for their extradition were under way. It was also
mentioned that H. L. Mehra was facing trial before the Special Magistrate, Ambala, for the offences committed by him and, :hereforc. he
was nor being sent up for trial in this case.
It is obvious that neither at the time when the First Information
Report pertaining to the Ambala case was registered nor at the time
F
when the charge-sheet was filed in the Ambala Court, were the Narang
brothers known to be in the picture. The investigating agency was
not also aware of what Malik and Mehra had done with the pillars
after they had obtained possession of the pillars from the Court and
substituted a!1d returned fake pillars to the Court. The First InforG mation Report and the charge-sheet were concerned primarily with the
offences of conspiracy. to cheat and to misappropriate committed by
Malik and Mehra. At that stage, the investigating agency was not
aware of any conspiracy to send the pillars out of the country. It
was not known that the N arang brothers were also parties to the conspiracy to obtain possession of the pillars from the Court. It was much
H later that the pillars surfaced in London and were discovered to be in
the constructive possession of Narang brothers. Even then, the
precise connection between Malik .and Mehra on the one side and
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R. L. NARANG v. SH.TE (Chinnappa Reaay, j.)
935
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Narang brothers on the other was not known. All that was known
was that the pillars which were stolen property within the definition
of the e:xpression in Section 410 Indian Penal Code were found to be
in the pos~ession of Narang brothers in London. On the discovery
of the genuine pillars in the possession of N arang brothers, without
anything further to connect N arang brothers with Malik and Mehra,
the police had no option but to register a case under Section 411
Indian Penal Code against Narang brothers. That was what was
done. No fault could, therefore, be found with the police for registering a First Information Report against the Narang brothers for the
offence of conspiracy to commit an offence under Section 411 Indian
Penal Code. In the course of the investigation into this offence, it
transpired that the Narang brothers were also parties to the' original
conspiracy to obtain possession of the pillars from the Court by cheating. Facts came to light which indicated that the conspiracy, which
was the subject matter of the case pending in the Ambala Court was
but part of a larger conspiracy. The fresh facts which came to light
resulted in the filing of the second charge-sheet. The several facts and
circumstances mentioned ,by us earlier and a comparison of the two
First Information Reports and the two charge-sheets show that the
conspiracy which was the subject matter of the second case could not
be said to be identical with the conspiracy which was the subject matter
o! the first case. The conspirators were different. ·Malik and Mehra
alone; were stated to be the conspirators in the first case, .while the
three Narang brothers were alleged to be the principal conspirators
in the second case. The objects of the two conspiracies were different.
The alleged object of the first conspiracy was to obtain possession of
the pillars from the Court by cheating and to misappropriate them.
The alleged object of the second .conspiracy was the disposal of the stolen property by exporting the pillars to London. The offences alleged
in the first case was Section 120-B read with Section 420 and Section
406 Indian Penal Code, while the offences alleged in the second case
were Section 120-B read with Section 411 Indian Penal Code and Section 25 of the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972. It is true that
the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act had no~ yet come into force on
the date when the First Information Report was registered. It is also
true that Omi Narang and Mann Narang were not extradited for the
offence under the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act and, therefore,
they could not be tried for that offence in India. But the question
whet1<_er any of the accused may be tried for a contravention of the
_ Ar.tiquities and Art Treasures Act or under the corresponding provision of the earlier Act is really irrelevant in deciding whether the two
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936
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1979] 2 s.c.R.
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conspiracies are one and the same. The trite argument that a Court
takes cognizance of offences and not offenders was also advanced. This
argument is again of no relevance in determining the question whether
the tw0 conspiracies which were taken cognizance of by the Ambala
~nd the Delhi Courts were the same in substance. The question is
not whether the nature and character of the conspiracy has changed
B
by the mere inclusion of a few more conspirators as accused or by the·
addition of one more among the objects of the conspiracy. The question is whether the two conspiracies are in substance and truth the
same. Where the conspiracy discovered later is found to cover a
much larger canvas with broader ramifications, it cannot be equated
c with the earlier conspiracy which covered a smaller field of narrower
dimensions. We are clear, in the present case, that the conspiracies
wl:ich are the subject matter of the two cases cannot be said to be
id ontical though the conspiracy which is the subject matter of the first
case may, perhaps, be said to have turned out to be part of the conspiracy which is the subject matter of the second case. As we menD tioned earlier, when investigation commenced in First Information
Report No. R.C. 4 of 1976, apart from the circumstance that the property in.-olved was the same; the link between t)ie conspiracy to cheat
and to misappropriate and the conspiracy to dispose of the stolen property was not known.
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The further connected questions arising for consideration arc, what
was the duty of the police on discovering that the conspiracy, which
was the subject matter of the earlier case, was part of a larger conspiracy, whether the police acted without jurisdiction in investigating or
in continuing to investigate into the case and whether the Delhi Court
acted illegally in taking cognizance of the case ?
In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to refer to rhe
relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. Counsel on both
sides argued the questions on the basis that the Old Criminal Procedure
Code governed the situation. We proceed on that assumption without
deciding whether the trial in the Delhi Court will be governed by the
old Code or the new one.
Under the Criminal Procedure Code, l 898, whenever an officer incharge of the Police Station received information relating to the com~
TJJission of a cognizable offence, he was required to enter the substance
thereof in a book kept by him, for that purpose, in the prescribed
form !Section 154 Criminal Procdure Code). Section 156 Criminal
Procedure Code invested the Police with the power to investigate into·
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R. L. NARANG v. STATE (Chinnappa Reddy, !.)
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ccgnizable offences without the order of a Court. If, from the information received or otherwise, the officer in charge of a Police Station
suspected the commission of a cognizable offence, he was required to
send forthwith a report of the same to a··Magistrate empowered to take
cognizauce of >uch offence upon a police report and than to proceed m
person or depute one of his subordinate officers to proceed to the spot,
to im estigate the facts and circumstances of the case and to take
measures for the discovery and arrest of the offender (Section 157
Criminal Procedure Code). He was required to complete the investigation without unnecessary delay, and, as soon as it was completed, to
forward to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence
upon a police report, a report in the ·prescribed form, setting forth
the names of the parties, the nature of the information and the names
of the persons who appeared to be acquainted with the circumstances
of the case (Section 173 (! ) Criminal Procedure Code) . He was
also required to state whether the accused had been forwarded in cu>tody or had been released on bail. Upon receipt of the report submitted under Section 173 ( 1) Criminal Procedure Code by the officer
incharge of the Police Station, the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of an offence upon a police report might take cognizance of the
offence (Section 190 (I) (b) Criminal Procedure Code). Thereafter, if,
in the opinion of the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence, there
was sufficient !Round for proceeding, the Magistrate was required to
issue the necessary process to secure the attendance of the accused
(Section 204 Criminal Procedure Code). The scheme of the Code
thus was that the First Information Report was followed by investigation, the investigation led to the submission of a report to the Magis··
!rate, the Magistrate took cognizance of the offence on receipt of the
police report and, finally, the Magistrate taking cognizance issued process to the accused.
The police thus had the statutory right and duty to 'register' every
information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence. The
police also had the statutory right and duty to investigate the facts
and circumstances of the case where the commission of a cognizable
offence was suspected and to submit the report of such investigation
to the Magistrate having jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence
upon a police report.
These statutory rights and duties of the police
wern not circumscribed by any power of superintendence oc interference in the Magistrate; nor was any sanction required from· a
Magistrate lo empower the Police to investigate into a cognizable
offence. This position in law was well established. In King Emperor
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v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmed('), the Privy Council observed as follows:
"Just as it is essential that every one accused of a crime
should have free access to a Court of justice, so that he may
be duly acquitted if found not guilty of the offence with
!which he is charged, so it is of the utmost importanc~ that
the judiciary should not interfere with the police iu matters
which are within their province and into which the law
imposes on them the duty o( inquiry. In India, as has been
shown, there is a statutory right on the part of the police to
investigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable
crime witho11t requiring any authority from the judicial authorities, and it would, as their Lordships think, be an unfortunate result if it should be held possible to interfere with
those statutory rules by an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. The functions of the judiciary and the
police are complementary, not overlapping, and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law
and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise
its own function, always, of course, subject to the right •Jf
the Courts to intervene in an appropriate case when moved
under Section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code to give
directions in the nature of Habeas Corpus. In such a case
as the present, however, the Court's function begin when a
charge is preferred before it and not until then. . ...... .
In the present case, the police have under Sections 154 and
156 of tl1e Criminal Procedure Code, a statutory right to
investigate a cognizable offence without requiring the sanction of the Court .............. "
Ordinarily, the right and duty of the police would end with the submission of a report under Section 173(1) Criminal Procedure Code
upon receipt· of which it was up to the Magistrate to take or not to
take cognizance of the offence. There was no provision in the
1898 Code prescribing the procedure to be followed by !he police.
where, after the submission of a report under Section 173 ( n Criminal Procedure Code and after· the Magistrate had taken cognizance
of the offence, fresh facts came to light which required further investigation. There was, of c.ourse, no express provision prohibiting the
police from launching upon an investigation into the fresh facts coming to light after the submission of the report under Section 173 (I)
or after !he Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offence. As we
shall presently point out, it was geu~rally, thought by many High
(l) 71 Tndian Appeals 203.
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R. L. NARANG v. STATE (Chinnappa Reddy, J.)
939
Courts, though doubted by a few, that the police were not barred
from further investigation by the circumstance that a report uuder
Section 173 ( 1) had already been submitted and a Magistrate had already taken cognizance of the offence. The Law Commission in its
41st report recognized the position and recommended that the right
of the police to make further investigation should be statutorily affirmed. The Law Commission said :
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"14.23. A report under Section 173 is normally the end
of the investigation. Sometimes, however, the police officer after submitting the report under Section 173 comes
upon evidence bearing on the guilt or innocence of the accused. We sheuld have thought that the police officer can
collect that evidence and se.nd it to the Magistrate concerned. It appears, however, that Courts have sometimes taken
the narrow view that once a final report under Section 173
ha·s been sent, the police cannot touch the case again and
cannot re-open the investigation. This view places a hindrance in the way of the investigating agency, which can be
very unfair to the prosecution and, for that matter, even
to the accused. It should be made clear in Section 173
that the competent police officer can examine such evidence
and send a report to the Magistrate. Copies concerning the
fresh material must of course be furnished to the accused''.
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Accordingly, in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, a new provision,
Section 173 ( 8), was introduced anc;I it says :
•
"Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude further investigation in respect of an offence after a report
under sub-section (2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate and, where upon such investigation, the officer in
charge ·Of the police Station obtains further evidence, oral
or documentary, he shall forward to the Magistrate a further
report or reports regarding such evidence in the form prescribed, and the provisions of sub-sections (2) to ( 6) shall,
as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports
as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under subsection (2)".
The right of the police to make repeated investigations under the
old Code was recognised by the Madras High Court as early as in
1919 in Divakar Singh v. A. Ramamurthi Naidu ( 1), where Phillips
.aad Krishnan, JJ., observed as follows :
(ll A.I.R. 1919 Madras 751.
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(1979] 2 s.C.!L
"Another contention is put forward that when a report
of investigation has been sent in under Section 173, Criminal P.C., the police has no further powers of inv,estigation,
but this argument· may be briefly met by the remark that
the number of investigations into a crime is not limited by
law and that when one has been completed another may be
begun on further information received".
.,.
•
In re. Palaniswami Goundan(') the Madras High Court held that
notwithstanding the filing of a final charge-sheet, a police officer could
still investigate and lay further charge-sheets if he got information
and that there was no finality either to the investigation or to the
layrng of charge-sheets. In Md. Niwaz v. The Crown(') a Bench of
the Lahore High Court consisting of Din Mohammad and Cornelius
JJ., cited with approval the decision of the Division Bench of the
Madras High Court in Divakar Singh v. A. Ramainurthi Naidu(•)
already referred to by us. In Prosecuting Inspector v. Minaketan
D Mahato('), the High Court of Orissa held that the police had the
right to reopen investigation even after the submission of the chargesheet under Section 173 Criminal Procedure Code if fresh facts
came to light. In Rama Shanker v. State of U.P.(') a Division Bench of
Allahabad High Court took the view that the submission of a chargesheet not being a judicial act, the submission of a fresh charge-sheet
E 2fter submission of a report under Section 173 Criminal Procedure
Code was not illegal. In re. State of Kerala v. State Prosecu:vr( 6 ) a
Divismn· Bench of the Kerala High Court thought it was well settled law
that the police had the right to reopen the investigation even after !he
submission of a charge-sheet under Section 173 Criminal Procedure
Code and that there was no bar for further investigation or for filing of
'supplementary report.
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In H. N. Rishbud v. The State of Delhi('), this Court contemplat-
ed the possibility of further investigation even after a Court had taken
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cognizance of the case. While noticing that a police report resulting
from an investigation was provided in Section 190 Criminal Procedure
Code as the material on which cognizance was taken, it was pointed
out that it could not be maintained that a valid and legal police report
was the foundation of the jurisdiction of the Court to take cognizance.
(1) A.J.R. 1946 Madras 502.
(2) 48 Cr!. Law Journal 774.
(3) A.I.R.1919 Madrcs751.
(4) A.J.R. 1952 Orissa 350.
(5) A. I. R. 1956 All 525.
(6) 79 Crl. Law Journal 1973, p. 1288
(7) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1150.
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R. L. NARANG v. STATE (Chinnappa Reddy, J.)
941
I
It was held that where cognizance of the case had, in ~' been taken A
and the case had jlToceeded to termination, the invalidity of the precedent investigatipn did not vitiate the result unless miscarriage of iustice had been caused thereby. It was said that a defect or illegality in
investigation, however serious, had no direct bearing on the compe- ·
tence of the procedure ·relating to cognizance or trial. However, it was
.observed :
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"It does not follow that the invalidity of the. investigation
is to be completely ignored by a Court during trial. When the
breach of such a mandatory provision is brought to the knowledge of the Court at a sufficiently early stage, the Court,
while not declining cognizan<X!, will have to take the necessary steps to get the illegality cured and the defect rectified,
by ordering such re-investigation as the circumstances of an
individual case may call for".
!his decision is a clear authority for the view that further investigation
1s not altogether ruled out merely because cognizance of the case has
!been taken by the' Court; defective investigation coming to light during the course of a trial may be cured by a further investigation, if
circnmstances permit it.
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In Tara Singh v. State(') the police first submitted a report styled
,as "an incomplete challan", which, however, contained all the partiE
culars prescribed by Section 173 (1). Later, two supplemental challans were submitted containing the names of certain formal witnesses.
The Magistrate had taken cognizance of the case when the incomplete
.challan was submitted. It was urged that the Magistrate had taken
cognizance of the case. illegally and the statements of witneses examine}!
.before submission of the supplemental challans should be excluded f!'
cfrom the record. This Court held that the so called incomplete cha]c
Jan was in fact a complete report of the kind contemplated by Section
173(1)(a), and, therefore, the Magistrate had properly taken cognizance of the case. The Court declined to express any opinion on
·!he question whether the police could be permitted to send incomplete
.reports under Section 173 (I) Criminal Procedure Code. This case G
whiie neither approving nor disapproving the practice of· submitting
;incomplete challans in the first instance, certainly notices the exist~nce
of such practice.
Some High Courts tool.: the view that with the submission of a
.charge-sheet under Section 173 the power of the police to investigate . H
.came to an end and the Mai:istrate's cognizance of the offence started.
- (I) [1951] S.C.R. 72,.
942
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] 2 s.c.R.
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It was said that any further investigation by the police would trench
upon the magisterial cognizance.
Vide-Ram Gopal Neotia v. State
of West Bengal('). In Hanuman & Anr. v. Raf(') it was held that
when a case was pending before a Magistrate, the action of the police
in resuming investigation and putting up a new challan against a person not originally an accused as a result of the further investigation was
B unauthorised and unlawful. . In State v. Mehar Singh & Ors.('), a
Full Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana held that the
police became functus officio once the Court took cognizance of an
offence on the filing of a charge-sheet by the police and thereafter further investigation by the police was not permissible. The police, it
was said, could not 'tinker' with the prQCeedings pending in the Court.
c It was, however, observed that it would be open to the Magistrate to
'suspend cognizance' and direct the police to make further investiga- ·
tion into the case and submit a report. The High Court of Punjab
and Haryana acknowledged the existence of the practice of submitting
supplemental charge-sheets, but was of the view that such practice
was
not sanctioned by the Code. Faced with the impracticality of banD
ning all further investigation once cognizance of an offence was taken
by the Court, the High Court tried to find a solution to the problem
·by suggesting the procedure of the Magistrate suspending cognizance
and ordering further investigation. The procedure of 'suspending
cognizance' suggested by the High Court of Punjab and
E Haryana does not appear to us to be warranted by the provisions of
the Criminal Procedure Code.
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Anyone acquainted with the day today working of the criminal
courts will be alive to the practical necessity of the police pc\ssessing
the power to make further investigation and submit a supplemental report. It is in the interests of both the. prosecution and the defence
that the police should have such power. It is easy to visualise a case
where fresh material may come to light which would implicate persons
not previously accused or absol've person' already accused.
When
it comes to the notice of the investigating 11gency that a person already
accused of an offence has a good alibi, i• it not the duty of that agency
to investigate the genuineness of the plea of alibi and submit a report
te the Magistrate ? After all the investigating agency has greater resources at its command than a private individual. Similarly, where the
involvement of persons who ..re not already accuse4 comes to tke
notice of the investigating agency, the investigating agency cannot keep
quiet and refuse to investigate the fresh information. It is their duty
(1) A.I.R. 1969 Cal. 316.
(2) A.I.R. 1951 Raj. 131.
(3) I.L.R. (1973] 2 P & H 561=1974 (2) Crl L J 970.
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R. L. NARANG v. STATE (Chinnappa Reddy,!.)
943
to investigate. and submit a report to the Magistrate upon the invoh1ement of the olher persons. In either case, it is for the Magistrate to
decide upon his future course of action depending upon the stage at
which the case is before him. If he has already taken cognizance of
the offence, but has not proceeded with the enquiry or trial, he may
·direct the issue of process to persons freshly discovered to be involved
and deal with all the accused, in a single enquiry or trial. If the case
cl which lie has previously taken cognizance has already proceeded to
-some extent, he may take fresh cognizance of the offence disclosed
<i°gainst the newly involved accused and proceed with the case as a
separate case. What action a Magistrate is to take in accordance with
lhe provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure in such situations is
a mailer best left to the discretion of the Magistrare. The criticism
that a further inyestigation by the police would trench upon the proceedings before the Court is really not of very great substance, since
whatever the police may do, the final discretion in regard to further
action is with the Magistrate. That the final word is with !he Magis\!rate is sufficient safeguard against any excessive use or abuse of the
power of the police to make further investigation. We should not,
l10wever, be understood to say that the police should ignore the pen,dency of a procNding before. a Court and investigate every fresh fact
that comes to light as if no cognizance had been taken by th.e Court
of any offence. We think that in the interests of the independence of
the magislracy and the judiciary, in the interests of the purity of the
administration of criminal justice and in .the interests of the comity
of the various agencies and institutions entn1stcd with different stages
of such administration, It would ordinarily be desirable that the police
should inform the Court and seek formal p~rmission to make further
investigation when fresh facts come to light.
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As observed by us earlier, there was no provision in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1898 which, expressly or by necessary implication, barred the right of the police to further investigate after cognizance of the case had been taken by the Magistrate, Neither Section
173 nor Section 190 lead us to hold that the power of the police to
further investigate was exhausted by the Magistrate- taking cognizance
of the offence. Practice, convenience and preponderance of authority,
permitted repeated investigations on discovery of fresh facts. In our
view, notwithstanding that a Magistrate had taken cognizance of the
·offence upon a police report submitted under Section 173 of the
1898 Code, the right of the police to further investigate was not
exhausted and the police could exercise such right as often as neccs~ary when fresh informa!ion came to light. Where the police desir4-119 SCJ/79
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B
c
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E
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944
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1979] 2 ~-CR.
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J.,
gard and respect for the Court by seeking its formal pennission t<»
make further investigation.
r
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ed to make a further investigation, the police could express their re·
:\;~
As in the present case, occasions may arise when a second inves-·
ligation started independently of the first may disclose a wide range
B of offences including those. covered by the first investigation. Where
the report of the second investigation is submitted to a Magistrate
other than the Magistrate who has already taken cognizance of the
first case., it is up to the prosecuting agency or the accused concerned
to take necessary action by moving the appropriate superior Court
to have the two cases tried together. The Magistrates themselves
C may take action suo motu. In the present case, there is no problem
since the earlier case has since been withdrawn by the prosecuting
agency. It was submitted to us that the submission of a charge-sheet
to the Delhi Court and the withdrawal of the case in the Ambala Court
amounted to an abuse of the process of the Court. We do not think
that the prosecution acted with any oblique motive. In the chargeD sheet filed in the Delhi Court, it was expressly mentioned that Mehra
was already facing trial in the Ambala Court and he was, therefore,
not being sent for trial. In the application made to the Ambala
Court under Section 494 Criminal Procedure Code, it was expressly
mentioned that a case had been filed in the Delhi Court against Mchra
and
others and, therefore, ·it was not necessary to prosecute Mehra
E
in the Ambala Court. The Court granted its permission for the
withdrawal of the case. Though the investigating agency would ha;
done better if it had infonned the Ambala Magistrate and sought his
formal pennission for the second investigation, we are satisfied that
the investigating agency did not act out of any malice. We are also
F satisfied that there has been no illegality. Both the appeals are, therefore, dismissed.
M.R.
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Appeals dismissed.
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