IN RE THE SPECIAL COURTS BILL, 1978 versus -
Supreme Court of India | Decided 1 December 1978 | [1979] 2 S.C.R. 476 | 1978 INSC 249
Key facts
- Decided
- 1 December 1978
- Bench
- Y.V. CHANDRACHUD*, P.N. BHAGWATI, V.R. KRISHNA IYER, R.S. SARKARIA, N.L. UNTWALIA, S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, P.N. SHINGAL
- Bench size
- 7
- Case number
- SPECIAL REFERENCE CASE No. 1/1978
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Citation
- [1979] 2 S.C.R. 476
- Neutral citation
- 1978 INSC 249
Text of the judgment
47 6
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IN RE THE SPECIAL COURTS BILL, 1978
December 1, 1978
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[Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., P. N. BHAGWATI, V. R. KRISHNA IYER,
R. S. SARKARIA, N. L. UNTWALIA, S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND
P. N. SHINGHAL, JJ.]
Constitution of India--Art. 143-Scope of.
Special Courts Bill-Parliament if has power to enact the Bill-Whether any
of its provisions violate the rights under Articles 14 and 21.
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The draft Special Courts Bill 1978 introduced in the Parliament by a pri~
vate member seeks to create adequate number of courts to be called special
courts. The Bill provides that a special court shall take cognizance of or tr~
such cases as are instituted before it or transferred to it in the manner provide.t ~
therein. If the Central Government is of opinion that there is prima facie evi~ -·
dence of the commission of an offence alleged to have been committed Curing
the period of Emergency by a person who held high public or politjcal office
in India and that the said offence ought to be dealt with under the At:t, it shall
make a declaration to that effect in every case in which it is of that opinion.
A declaration made by the Central Government ca.nnot be called in question
in any ccurt. Clause (7) of the Bill pro~ides that a special ~otnt shall be
presided over by a sitting Judge of a High Court in India or a persc~ \Vho has
held the office as a Judge of a High Court in India and nominated by the
Central Government in consultation with the Chief Justice of India. Clause
10(1) provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal
Procedure, an appeal shall lie as of right from any judgment or order of a.
special court to the Supreme Court of India both on fact and on Ja\v.
The President made a reference to the Supreme Court under Art. 143(1)
of the Constitution for consideration of the question whether the Special Courts
Bill 1978 or any_ of its provisions, if enacted would be constitutionally invalid.
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Preliminary objections as to the maintainability of the reference were raised
on the ground that (i) the reference was of a hypothetical and speculative
character and was vague, general and omnibus; (ii) since the Parliament was
seized of the Bill it is its exclusive function to decide upon the constitutionality
of the Bill and if the court withdrew that question for its considera.tion and
report, it would be encroaching upon the :functions and privileges of the Parliament, (iii) if the reference were entertained it woi!ld suppl;\nt the sa.lutary
provision of Art. 32 of the Constitution, (iv) irrespective of 1he view expressed
by this Court it would be open to the Parliament to discuss the Bill and pass
or not to pass it with or without amendment, and (v) the. reference raised
purely political questions which thei court should refrain from a.nsweri'llg.
HELD: [per majority-Y. V. Cbandrachud, · C.J., P. N. Bhagwati, R. S.
Sarkaria and S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, JJ.]
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1. (a) It is not necessary that the question on which the op1n1on of this
Court is sought under Art. 143(1) must have a.risen actually: it is competent
for the President to make the reference if he is satisfied that the question has
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RE : SPECIAL COURTS BILL
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arisen or. is likely to arise. The plain duty and function of the Court under
Art. 143(1) is to consider the question on which the reference is made and
report to the President its opinion, provided the question is capable of being
pronounced upon and falls within the powers of the Court to decide. If, for
any reason the Court considers it not proper or possible to answer the question
it would be entitled to return the reference by pointing out the impediments in
answering it. The right of this Court to decline to answer a refere.nce does
not flow merely out of the different phraseology used viz., "may" in clause (1)
and "shall" in. clause (2). Even in matters arising under clause (2), the Court
may be justified in returning the reference unanswered, if it finds for a valid
reason that the question is incapable of being answered. [502C-F]
(b) It cannot be said that the reference is of a hypothetical or speculative
character on the ground that the Bill has yet to become an Act. The assu1np...,,- ---tion of every reference under Art. 143 has to be the continued existence of a
context or conditions on the basis of which the question of law or fact a.rises
or is likely to arise. But the possibility of a change, even of a fundamental
.....,..change, cannot make the exercise of the Presidential jurisdiction under Art. 143
speculative or hypothetical. In the present case there is no speculation about
the existence of the Bill and there is nothing hypothetical about its contents
as they stand today. The Bill may undergo changes in future but so may the
Cor:.stitutio1,1 itself, including Art. 143, under v.1hich the President bas made the
referen'l:'e to this Court. The former possibility cainnot make the reference
speculative or hypothetical any more than the latter possibility can make it w.
The Special Courts Bill is there in flesh a.nd blood for anyone to see and
examine. That sustains the reference, which is founded upon the satisfaction
of the President that a question as regards the constitutional va1idity of the
Bill is likely to arise and that the question is of such a nature and of such
public importance tha.t it is expedient to obtain the opinion of this Court upon
it. [503 B-EJ
( c) /\. reference which does not specify with particularity the ground or
grounds on whkh the Bill or alfly of its provisions may be open to attack under
the Constitution is difficult to answer because it gives no indication of the
specific point or points on which the opinion of the Court is sought. It is not
proper or desirable that this Court should be called upon to embark upon a
roving enquiry ir.i.to the constitutionality of a Bill or an Act. Such a course
v'jrtuaJly necessitates the adoption of a process of elimination with regard to
all reasonably conceivable challenges under the Constitution. It is not expected
of this Court, while answering a refereoce under Art. 143, to sit up and dis~
cover, article by article, which provision of the Constitution is most likely to
be· invoked for assailing the validity of the Bill if it becomes a law. Speculative
opinions or hypothetical questions are ¥.urthless and it is contra.ry to principle,
inconvenient and inexpedient that opinions should be given upon such questions
at all. Whenever a reference is made to this Court under Art. 143 of the
Comtitution, care should be taken to frame specific questions for the opinion
of the Court. In the instant reference it is possible to con'iider specific questions as being comprehended within the terms of the reference but the risk
that a vague and general reference ma.y be returned unanswered is real ::ind
ought to engage the attention of those whose duty it is to frame the reference.
[505 E-G, 507B]
(d) The contention that since the Parliament is seized of the Bill, it is its
exclusive function to decide upon the constitutionality of the provisions of the
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Bill betrays a tctal lack of a\vareness of the scheme of division of poY.'ers under
the Constilution. The Court is concerned, not with fanciful theories based on
personal predilictions, but with the scheme of the Constitution and the philo·
sophy underlying it. The principle is firmly and wisely embedded in the Constitution that the policy of law and the expediency of passing it are matters
for the legislature to decide while, interpretation of laws and questions regarding
their validity fall within the exclusive advisory or adjudica.tory functions of
Courl' [507 D-E]
( e) There is equally no force in the contention that if the Court ·withdrew
the question of validity of the Bill for its consideration while the Bill was Jiending c0'.1siqeration before the Parliament, the Court would be encroaching upon
the functions and privileges of Parliament. The President has made a reference
under Art. 143(1) and the Court is under a constitutional obligation to consider
the reference and report to the President. It cannot be said that any particular ,.....~ function or privilege of the Parliament is encroached upon by this Court. The
question whether the provisions of the Bill suffer from any constitutional invali..........,dity falls within the legitimate domain of this Court. Parliament can discuss
a.nd debate the Bill but the ultimate decision on the validity of a la\v has to
be that of the Court, and not of the Parliament. In the absence of any text or
authority showing \vhat the privileges of the British Parliament are in regard
to the kind of matter before the, Court it is impossible to say that there is a
violation of the Parliament's privileges. The a.rgumeut that it would be futile
to consider the constitutional validity of the Bill because whatever view the
Court might take it would still be open to the Parliament to discuss the Bill
and to pass or not to pass it, proceeds on an unrealistic basis. Although the
opinion of this Court can neither deter the Parliament from proceeding with
the Bill nor from dropping it, it cannot be said that even if the Court holds
the Bill as unconstitutional the Parliament would proceed to pass it Without
remo\'ing the defects from Vihich it is shO\Vn to suffer. [508 F-H; 510 B}
(f) The argument that the reference raises a purely political question is
without force. The policy of the Bill and the motive of the mover may be to
ensure a speedy trial of persons holding high public or political office who arc
alleg~d to have committed certain crimes relating to the period of emergency.
The President, however, has not asked the Court to advise him as to the
desirability of passing the Bill or the soundness of the policy underlying it.
The question whether the Bill or any of its provisions are constitutionally invalid
is not a question of political nature which the Court should restrain itself from
answering. The question referred by the President for the opinion of this
Court raises purely legal and constitutional issues v.rhich is the right and function of thi$ Court to decide. [510 D-F]
Clauses 2, 6 and 10(1) of the Bill are within the legislative competence
of the Parliament. [522 H]
2. (a) The challenge to the legislative competence of Parliament to provide
for the creation of Special Courts is devoid of substance. By virtue of A1t.
246(2) read with Entry l!A of the Concurrent List, Parliament has cleairly
the power to make laws with respect to the Constitution a1,1d organisation, that
is to say, the creation and setting up of Specia~ Courts. Clause 2 of the Bill,
is therefore, within the competence of the Parliament to enact. By cl. 10( 1)
of the Bill Parliament clearly bas the co.mpetence to provide that notwith~
standing a11ything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 an o.ppeal
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shall lie as of right from any judgment or order of a Special Court lo the
Supreme C:ourt both on fact and on law. A law which confers additional
powers on the Supreme Court by enlarging its jurisdiction is evidently a Jaw
with respect to the "Jurisdiction and powers" of that Court. [517 C-D; 521 A-B]
(b) The argument that the c1Jnstitution having provided copiously for an
hierarchy of courts, it is in1permissible to the Parliament to create a court or a
class of courts which do not fall within or fit in that scheme has no force.
There is nothing in the Constitution which will justify the imposition of such
a limitation on the Parliament's power to create special courts. The words of
Entry 1 lA are sufficiently wide to enable the Parliament not merely to set up
courts of the same kind and designation as are referred to in the relevant provisions but to constitute and organise, that is to say, create new or '.>pecial
courts subject to the limitation mentioned in the entry as regards the Supreme
Court and the High Courts. [524 A&D]
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( c) It is not correct to say that by reaso'.:l of the fact that the Special Courts
will net haye the constitutional status of }ligh Court-s nor are th~y Di~.trict Courts
within the meaning of Art. 235, the creation of Sp~ial Courts is calculated
to damage or destroy the constitutional safegunrds of judicial independence.
[524F]
3. (a) The classification provided for by the Special Courts Bill is valid
and no obJcctio'.1 can be taken against it. [537E]
(b) The promulgation of emergency is not and cannot be a m.:.tter of
normal occurrence in a. nation's life. Offences alleged to have been commit~ed
during the period of emergency coo.stitute a class by themselves and so do the
persons who are alleged to have utilised the high public or political offices lJ.eld
by them as a cover for committing those offences. This Court is not c0ncerned
with the· truth or otherwise of the allegations, the narrow question before it
being whether, in the first instance, the classification is based on some qualities
or characteristics which are to be found i'.:l all the persons grouped together
and not in others who are left out. The answer to that question can be one
and one only, namely, that offences alleged to have been committed during
the emergency by persons holding high public or political offices i!l India ~tand
in a class apart. The cover of emergency provided a unique opportunity to
the holders of such offices to subvert the rule of Ia.w and perpetrate political
crimes on the society. Others left out of that group had neither the means
nor the opportunity to do so, since they lacked the authority which co!l1es
from official position. Thus persons who are singled out by the Bill for trial
before Special Courts possess common characteristics a"J.d those v,rho fall outi.ide that group do not possess them. [538 B; 540 A-D]
( c) Crimes falling outside the group are of a basically different kind ~nd
have· generally a different motivation. No advantage can be taken of the suppression of human freedom when the emergency is not in operatioo. The suppression of people's liberties facilitates easy commission of crimes \vhen public
criticism is suppressed, there is no fear of_ detection. Crimes which are alleged
to have been committed during emergency are oblique in their design and
selective in their obj'e~t. They are genera1ly designed to capture and perpetuate
political power; and they are broadly directed against political opponents. The
holder of a high public office who takes a bribe does it to enrich hi111.'!elf.
Though, tha.t deserves the highest condemnation, such crimes are not 'Voven
out of the warp and woof of political motivation. Equal laws have to be
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applied to all in the sa1ne situation and the legislature is free to recognise the
degree of harm or evil. Purity in public life is a desired goal at
times and
in. all situations. But, this Court cannot sit as a super legislature and strike down
the classification on the ground of under-inclusion on the score that those others
are left untouched, so long as there is no violation of constitutional restraints.
[540 E-H]
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(d) If the classification is valid and its basis bears a reasonable relationship
with the object of the Bill, no grievance can be entertained under .t\.rt. t4.
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Classification necessarily entails the subjection of those who fall within it to a
different set of rules and procedure, which may conceivably be more disadvantageous than the procedure which generally applies to ordinary trials. In
almost nil of the decisions bearing, on the questions which arise for consideration the special procedure prescribed by the particular Jaws was distinctly more
onerous than the procedure v. hich governs ordinary trials. But once a classification is upheld by the application of the dual test, subjection to harsher _--...,.-.
treatment or disadvantageous procedure loses its relevance, the reason being
that for the purposes of Art. 14, unequals cannot complain of unequal treat-.,
ment. Classification necessarily implies discrimination between persons 'classified
and those who are not members of that class. It is the essence of a classification that upon the class are cast duties and burdens different from those
resting upon the genenul public. The very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in
no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. Some of the provisions
of the Bill, cast upon the accused before the Special Court, certain disadvantages
as compared \Vith the accused who a.re put' up for trial before the ordinary
courts, even as some other provisions give to them certain advantages which
are denied to others. [542 E-HJ
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The State of Wes! Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, [1952) SCR 284;
Kathi 1?.aning 1?.awat v. The State of Saurashtra, [1952] SCR 435;
Lachmandas Kewa!ra1n Ahuja & Anr. v. The State of Bombay, [1952]
SCR 710; Syed Qasim Razvi v. The State of Hyderabad & Ors ..
[1953] OCR 589; Habeeb Mohamed v. The State of Hyderabad, [1953]
SCR 661; Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh & Anr. v. The State of Vindhya
Pradesh, [1953] SCR 1188; Kedar Nath Baioria v. The State of West
Bengal, [19541 SCR 30; Asgarali Nazarali Singaporawalia v. The Stale
of BombiIJ, [1957] SCR 678; referred to.
( e) The grouping together of persons who are alleged to have committed
offences during the period of emergency with others who are alleged to have
engaged themselves in screening certain offenders prior to the declaration of
emergency is tanta.mount 1o clubbing together, in the same class, persons who
do not possess common qualities or characteristics. It is unquestionably reasonable for the Jegis1ature to think that the suppression of human liberties during
the period of emergency furnished an opportunity to persons holding high public or political offices to commit crimes of grave magnitude which were calculated to destroy democratic values. Offences alleged to have been committed
during the period of emergency can be treated as sui generis. The same cannot, however, be said of activities, which preceded the declaration of emergency.
Those doings \Vere open to public criticism and were unprotected by the veil
of emergency. The validity of a classification should be tested by broad con.sidera.tions, particularly when the charge is one of under-inclusiveness. But
RE : SPECIAL COURTS BILL
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persons possessing widely differing characteristics, in the context of their ~ituation in relation to the period of their activities, cannot by any reasonable criterion be herded in the same class. The ante-dating of the emergen~y. as it
were, from June 25 to February 27, 1975 is wholly unscientific and proceeds
from irrationaJ. considerations arising out of a supposed discovery in the matter
of screening of offenders. The inclusion of offences ao..1d offenders in relation
to the period from February 27 to June 25, 1975 in the same class as those
whose alleged unlawful activities covered the period of. emergency is too artifi/
cial to be susttJ.-ined. [545 C-H]
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(f) The answer to the question whether, those who are allc..Jed to have
committed offences prior to the ernergency can be put in the .same cla.ss as
persoos who are alleged to have committed offences during the period of
emergency, has to be in the negative. [546 C]
(g) The classification provided for by cl. 4(1) of the Bill is valid to the
limited extent tO' which the Central Government is empowered to make the
declaration in respect of offences alleged to have been committed during the
period of emergency, by persons holding high public or political offic~s. The
classification is inva.lid in so far as it covers offences committed by such persons
between February 27 and June 25, 1975. No declaration can therefore be
made by the Central Government in regard to those offences and ofier.ders
under the present classification. [546 D]
(h) As regards those who are rightly grouped together, since the classification is valid, it is U'ilnecessary for the purposes o'f Art. 14 to consider whether
the procedure prescribed by the Bill is more onerous tha.n the ordinary proce~
dure. The onerousness of the special procedure would be irreleva,nt in considerations arising under Art. 14, for the reason that the clas<;ifi.catiOn is valid
(to the extent indicated). But the Bill has got to meet the challenge of other
provisions of the Constitution also, in so far as any particular provision is
attracted. [546 F; 547 DJ
4. (a) There is no provision in the Bill for the transfer of cases from one
Special Court t.o another. Absence of such a provision ma:1 undermine the
confidence of the people in the Special Courts. The manner in which a Judge
conducts himself may disclose a bias; or a Judge may not in fact be biased and
yet the· occused may entertain a reasonable apprehension on account of attendant Circumstances that he will not get a fair trial. To compel an accused
to submit to the jurisdiction of a court which, in fact, is biased or is reasonably
apprehended to be biased is a violation of the fundamental principles of naitural
justice and a denial of fair play. Jn yet another case expediency or convenience
may require the transfer of a case, even if no bi<is is involved. [5490-E]
(b) The provision for the appointment of a. sitting lfigh Collrt Judge as a
Judge of the Special COurt is open to no exception. Though unquestionably
retired Judges of High Courts occupy a position of honour and respect in
society, one cannot shut one's eyes to the constitutional position that v1hereas
by Art. 217 a sitting Judge of a High O:iurt enJoys security of tenure until he
attains a particular age, .the retired Judge will hold his office as a Judge of the
SpeciaJ Court during the pleasure of the Governme~1t. The pleasure doctrine is
subversive of judicial independence. A retired Judge presiding over a Special
Court, who display strength and independence may be frowned upon by the
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Government and there is nothing to preve~1t it from terminating his appointment as and when it likes. There is no force in the submission that if the
appointment has to be made in consultation with the Chief Justice of lndia, the
terminatiC1~1 of the appointment will a.lso require similar consultation.
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obligation to consult may not necessarily act as a check on an executive which
is determined to remote an inconvenient incumbent. [549 H; 550 B-E]
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(c) Clause 7 of the Bill violates Art. 21 of the Constitution to the extent
that a person who has held office as a Judge of the High Court can be appointed
to preside over a. Special Court, merely in consultation with the Chief Justice
of India. [550 El
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(d) Yet another infirmity from which the procedure prescribed by the Bill
suffers is that the only obligation which cl. 7 imposes on the Central Govern·
n1ent while ~nominating a person to preside over the Special Court is to consult
the Chief Justice of India. One must look at the matter not so much from
the point of view of the Chief Justice of India, nor indeed from the point of
view of the Government as from the point of view of the accused and the
expectation and sensilivities of the society. It is of the greatest importaace
tha.t in the name of fair and unpolluted justice, the procedure for appoi•.1ting
a Judge to the Special Court, should inspire the confidence not only of the
accused but of the entire community. Administration of justice has a social
dimension and the society at large has a stake in impartial and even-handed
justice. [550 H; 551 A-Bl
5. The fact that the tria.l is to be held by no less a person than a Judge of
a High Court and there is a right of appeal to this Court are salient ~afeguards
of the Bill. [552 HJ
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6. The question as to whether the op1n1on rendered by this Court in th@
exercise of its advisory jurisdiction under Art. 143(1) of the Constitutir:rn is
binding as law declared by this Court within the meaning of Art. 141 of the
Constitution, may have to be considered more fully on a future occasion but
it is to be hoped that the time which has been spent in determining the questi0ns
arising in this reference shall not have been spent in vain. Though it is always
open to this Court to re-examine the question already decided by it and to overn1le, if necessary the view earlier take':l by it, insofar as aill other courts in
the territory of India are concerned, they ought to be bound by the view
expressed by this Court even in the exercise of its advisory jurisdiction under
Art. 143(1) of the Constitution. Jn St. Xaviers College it was pointed uut that
even if the opinion given in the exercise of advisory jurisdicticm may not he
binding, it is entitled to great \veight. It would be strange that a decision
given by this Court on a question of law in a. dispute between two private parties
should be binding on all courts io.1 this country but the advisory opinion ~hould
bind no one at all, even if, as in the instant case, it is given after issuing notke
to all interested parties, after hearing everyone concerned who desired to be
heard, ai:td after a full consideration of the questions raised in the reference.
Almost everything that could possibly be urged in favour of and against the
Bill was urged before this Court and to think that its opinion is an exercise
in futility is deeply fn1strating. (553 D-G]
Estate Duty Bill, [1944] FCR 317, 320, 332, 341; U.P. Legislative
Assembly, [1965] 1 SCR 413, 446-47; St. Xaviers College, [1975] 1
SCR 173, 201-202; Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General
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RE : SPECIAL COURTS BILL
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for Canada, [1912] AC 571, 589; Ram Kislwre Sen v. Union of India,
AIR 1965 Cal. 282; Chhabildas Mehta v. Tl!e Legislative Assembly
Gujarat State, 1970 II Gujarat Law Reporter 729; The Province of
Madras v. Messrs Boddu Paidanna, [1942] FCR 90; Central Provinces
case, [1939] FCR 18; Constitutional Law of India by H. M. Scervai,
2nd Edn. Vol. II, page 1415, para 25.68, referred to.
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Investing the High Courts with jurisdiction to try cases under the Bill may,
in the circumstances afford the best so1utici.1 from every point of view. The
Chief Justices of High Courts will, in their discretion, assign and allocate parti·
cula.r cases to Judges of their courts. To avoid delays and to ensure speedier
trial, no other work may be assigned to the High Court Judge nominated by
the Chief Justice to try a case or cases under the Bill. This will obviate the
nomination, by the Central Governme•.1t, of a particular Judge to try a particular case. [554 C-D]
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Answers to the reference are as follows :
( 1) Pairliament has the legislative competence to create Special Courts and
to provide that an appeal shall lie as of right from any judgment or order of a
Special Court to the Supreme Court. .Clauses 2 and l 0( 1) of the Bill are,
therefore, within the Parliament's legislative competence; [554G-H1
(2) The classification provided for in cl. 4( 1) of the Bill is valid to the
extent to which the Central Government is empowered to ma.ke a declaration
in respect of offences alleged to have been committed during the period of
Emergency by persons who held high public or political offices in Jndia. Persons
who are alleged to have committed offences prior to the declaration of Emergency ca~1not validly be grouped along with those who are alleged to haye
committed offences during the period of Emergency. It is, therefore, not competent to the Central Government to make a declaration under cl. 4 ( l) of the
Bill in respect of persons who are alleged to have committed offences between
February 27, 1975 and June 25, 1975. [555 A-Cl
(3) The procedure prescribed by the Bill for the trial of offences in respect
of which a declaration can be validly made by the Central Government under
cl. 4(1) of the Bill is just and fair except in regard to the following ma.tiers:
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(a} the provision in cl. 7 of the Bill, under which a retired Judge of
the High Court can be appointed as a Judge of the Special Court;
(b) the provision in cl. 7, under which the appoi1.1tme.nt of a' Judge to the
Special Court can be made by the Central Government in consultation with but without the concurrence of the Chief Justice of Indi<:;
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(c) the absence of a provision for transfer of a case from one Special
Court to a•~other.
(d) The Bill is valid and constitutional in all other respects.
[555 D·E1
KRISHNA TYER, J, (Concurring)
1. Corruption and repres~:on-hijack developme•.1t processes, and. in
the long run. lagging national progress means ebbing people's contidence in constitutional ineans to social justice. And so, to track down and
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give short ~hrift to these heavy-weight criminaloids who often mislead the
people by public moral weight-lifting and multipoint manifestoes is an urgent
legislative mission partially undertaken by the Bill under discussion. To punisb
such super-offenders in top positions, sealing off legalistic escape routes and
dilatory strategies and bringing them to justice with high speed and early
finality, is a. desideratum voiced in vain by Commissions and Committees in the
past and is a dimension of the dynamics of the Rule of Law. This Bill, breaks
new ground contrary to people's resigned cynicism that all high~powered jnvestigations, reports and recommendations end in legislative a'Dd judicative futility,
that aJl these valient exercises are but sound and fury signifying nothing. [557
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2. (a) An Act of this nature, with the major changes mentioned by the
Chief Justice to avert collision \\;(th Art. 21 and with \\:ider co\'eragc to con1e
to terms v,rith Art. 14, is long overdue. [577 G-H]
(b) These offenders perfectly fill the constitutional bill as <• !'>cparate ciass
which deserves speedy prosecution and final punishment by high judicial a.gencie<;
if restoration of the slumping credence in the constitutional order and democratic development were to be sustained among the masses in Third World
countries. The Preamble to the Bill i~ revelatory of this orientation. [558 CJ
0
F
G
-
(c) There is a reasonable classification implicit in this Iegisla.tion, but it is
perilously near being under-inclusive and, therefore, unequal. For it is a
truncated projection of a manifestly wider principle that exalted offenders 6hall
be dealt with by the crin1inal law with emergent speed so thl1t the common
m2.n may krn:iw that when public power is abused for private profit or personal
revenge the rule of law shall rapidly run them down and restore the faith of
the pcc:ple in den1ocratic institutions through speed;; justice according to Jaw.
It is in this sense that very important persons wielding large administrative
powers shall, wiih quick despatch be tried and punished, if guilty. Prompt
trial and ea1rly punishment may be necessary in all criminal cases. But, raw
realism suggests that in a decelerating situation of slow motion justice there is a
special case for speedier trial and prompter punishment \Vhere the offender sits
at the top of the adn1inistrativc pyramid. [558 H; 559 A-C]
(d) The Bill must fail morally if it exempts non-Emergency crimiin.als 21bout
whom prior Commission Reports, bear witness. In this larger per5petcivc,
Emergtncy is not a substantial differentia and the Uill nc·Jrlr recognises this by
ante-dating the operation to February, 27, 1975 when there was no 'emergency'.
[559 GJ
I
3. The procedure of crin1inal courts is dilatory, there are a.ppeaJs upon
appeals and revisions and supervisory jurisdiction, ba:ffiing and baulking speedy
termination of prosecutions, not to speak of the co:itribution to delay by the
Administration itself by neglect of the basic necessaries of the judicial process.
Leaving V.V.1.P. accused to be dealt with by the routinely procrastinating legal
process is to surrender to interminable delays as an inevitable evil. Therefore,
the Court should not be finical about absolute processual equality and must be
creative in innovating procedures compelled by special situations. [559H]
4. (a) The idiom of Art. 14 is unmistakeable. The power status of the alleged
criniinal the nature of the alleged crime vis-ai-v!s public CO!Jfidence and the
imperative need for speedy litigative finality, are the telling factors. Every
difference is not a differentia. 'Speedy trial' of offe~1ces of a public
nature
committed by persons who have held high public or political offices in the
f
RE : SPECIAL COURTS BILL
485
country and others connected with the commission of such offences· is the
heart of the matter. (560 D]
A
(b) During that. hushed spell, many suffered shocking treatment. In tl1e
words of the Preamble of the Bill, civil liberties were withdrawn to a great
extent, important fundamental rights of the people wer'e suspended, strict censorship on the press was placed and j'udicial powers were curtailed to a large
extent. [560 Fl
Murthy Match Works etc. etc. v. The Asstt. Collector of Central
Excise, etc., [1974] 3 SCR 121 at 130, referred to.
__,,,,--.....,_
(c) The objects and reasons are informative material guiding the court
about the purpose of a legislation and the nexus of the differentia, if any, to
the end in view. Nothing about Emergency period is adverted to 1here as a
distinguishing mark. The clear clue is that all abuse of public authority by
exalted public men, shall be punished without the tedious delay in the case of
top echeolns. [561 F]
C
Mohamn1ad Shujat Ali & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [1975] 1
SCR 449 at 477; State of Gujarat & Anr. v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd.,
Ahmedabad, [1974] 3 SCR 760 at 782; referred to.
' liberties were suppressed, press censorship was clamped down
(d) Civil
and judicial powers were curtailed. Even if liberty had not been curtailed,
Press not gagged or writ jurisdiction not cut d1~v,-n, criminal trials and appeals
and revisions would have taken their own interminable delays. It is the forensic
delay that ha.s to be axed and that has little to do with the vices of the
Emergency. There is no law of limitation for criminal prosecutions. [564 F;
565 BJ
(e) High powered public and political offenders are not h, peculiar feature
of the Emergency but has been a running stream for long and bids fair to flow
on, thereforC, a corrupt continuity cannot be cut up without better justification.
[565 E-F]
(f) The question, then is whether there is constitutional rationale for keepinJ,l: out of the reach of speedy justice non-emergency criminals in high public
or political offices. Such a Bill, were it a permanent addition to the corpus juris
and available a5 a jurisdiction for th~ public to compel government, if a
prinia facie case \Vere made out even against a minister in office, to launch a
prosecution before a sitting High Court Judge, would be a \vholesome corrective to the spreading evil of corruption in power pyramids. [565 G-H]
(g) On constitutional principles, it is possible to sustain this temporary
measure which isolates crimes and criminals during c, pernicious period from
the rest who share the same sinister properties. When a. salvatiooary alternative
is available, the Court should opt for it when the attack is under .<\rt. 14,
provided the assumptions of fact desiderated by the alternatives are plausible,
not Preposterous. The anatomy of the Emergency as X-rayed in the Preamble,
is all dark ~·hadows. No court to call illegality to order or halt horrendous
torture or challenge high-handed unreason. If this be a potential peril naturally
a dangerous situation develops, and unaccou'.1table power onc'e unsheathed, the
inauguration and escalation of such a.buse becomes a compulsive continuum.
Constitutional tyranny is anathema to decent democracy. In that
state of nervous breakdown of the people, the right to go to court and prosecute
an absolutist in authority for corruption or misuse of power is illusory. lf
D
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486
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] 2 s.c.R.
A
you spez.k up against crimes in high rositions, if you con1plain to court about
abuse of power, you may be greeted \Vith prompt detention and 5ecret torture,
with judicial relief jettisoned and Press publicity Joe-jawed~ If these macabre
n1aybes were assumed, there could be a noxious nexus between the Emergency
season and the sinister crimes covered by this Bill. It follows that a rexus
bet\veein the differentia and the objCct is not tco recondite to be inferred.
[567 A-Bl
B
(h) The scary scenario of emergency excesses' had a nexus \Vith non-action
against pers9ns in high ag2.inst authority and escalation of corruption and
repression v.·hen judicial checks' on abuse had gone to sleep. (568 A-BJ
c
D
(i) The fabric of the offences before and during the Emergency is the same.
What validr..tes the special legislation is the abnormality of the then conditions,
the intensive phase of corrupt operations and the inexpediency o!: digging up
old crimes. Ambica Mills (supra) is the judicial justification for the classification. [570C!
5. (a) The Bill hovers periliously near unconstitutionality (Art. 14) in
certain respects, but is surely saved by application of pragmatic principles rooted
in precedents. Nevertheless, justice to social justice is best done by a permanent statute to deal firmly and promptly with super political offenders, since
these 'untouchable' and 'unapproachable' power wielders have become si'llistcr
yet constant companions of Development in developing countries. [570 E]
c·;1aglinlal Magan/al (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater
Bombay & Ors., [1975] 1 SCR 1, referred to.
E
(b) Basic fairness of procedure is necessary. A valid classification with an
intelligible· differentia ood inteliigent nexus to the object is needed. Within the
class there should be no possibility of using a more burden~orne procedure for
one and a substantially different cue for another. Arbitrariness in this area
also violates Art. 14. [571 D]
( c) Assuming that the facilities under the Bill and under the ordinary Code
are equally fair, could the Government have indicated one or the other in the
ordinary court or the special court on the basis of drawing lots or the first
Jetter of their names, the colour oe their ski\1s or like non-sense ? No. The
wisdom of Art. 14 will not tolerate such whim. Classify or perish, is the
classi·..:: test of valid exempt:on from inflexible equality under the Constitution.
[571 E-F]
(d) The sure solution to the problems raised by the Reference, consistently
with the present object of the Bill, is to make the High Court the custodian of
the new jurisdiction. [571Ci]
UNTWALIA, J. (concurring \Vith the majority)
G
H
1. In ~one of the earlier references answered either by the Federal Court
or by this Court r. precedent is to be found resembling or identical to what
happened in this Special Reference. There is no harm in adopting the· n1ethod
of giving some suggestions from the Court whkh may obliterati a possible
constitutional attack upon the vires of a Bill. It may not be necessary or
ev[io. advisable to adopt such a course in all References under Art. 143 of the
Constitution. But if in some it becomes expedient to do so, as in the instz.nt
one it was so, it saves a lot of public time and money to remove any technical
lacuna from the Bill if the Government thinks that it can agree to do so. The
Bill by itself is not a Iaw. It would be a law whc.11 passed by the Parliament.
·-
RE
SPECIAL COURTS BILL
487
But even 21t the stage of the Bill when op1n1on of this Court is asked for, it
seems quite appropriate in a given case to make some suggestions and then to
answer the Reference on the footing of acceptance by the Government of su-:;h
of the suggc~tions as have been accepted. Otherwise, it i.; inc:ongruous for this
Court to answer the Reference as it is without laking into account the concessions made on behalf' of the Government vis-a-vis the suggestions of the
Court. It is m21nifest that all the three infirmities pointed out in the majority
opinion 1n answer No. 3 vanish after the ac'ceptance ill writing by the Government that the three suggestions made by the Court vis-a-vis the alleged three
intirn1ities, namely, 3 (b), and 3 ( c) would be removed from the Bill.
[572 D-Al
2. The absence of a provision for transfer of a -case from one Special Court
to another, m2kes the procedure unj'ust or arbitrary. But the alleged infirmities,
3(a) and (b), do not make the procedure unjust or . arbitrary. There is no
questic\1 of the procedure· being unjust or arbitrary in respect of any of the
three infirmities (a), (b) and (c) enumerated in answer 3 in view of the
acceptance by the Government of India of the suggestions emanating from the
Court during the course of the hearing of the Reference. Th~ Reference,
therefore, stands amended in view of those cm1cessions and th~ court is now
required to answer the amended Reference which means the Reference ~s if
the Bill as proposed incorporates the three concessions made by the Government. Thus the procedure prescribed in the Bill, undoubtedly, becomes just
and fair aud no longer remains arbitrary in any sense. [573 C-D]
SHINGHAL, J_ (Dissenting)
Clauses 5 and 7 of the Bill are unconstilutional and invalid.
A
B
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D
[573H]
I. (a) The reason given in the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the
Bill for excluding the ordinary criminal courts from trying the class of offences
referred to therein is congestion of work and not their inferior status or incapacity to deal with those cases. Th21t object of the Bill would have been
served by the creaticn of additional courts of the same category as the ordinary
criminal courts and the making of any procedural changes which may have
b~en cons;dercd necessary in that context to exclude avoidable delay in the trial.
E
[574 F.1
(b) There would have been nothing unusual if such additional courts had
been created to save the ordinary crim:nal courts, from the burden of more
¥.:ork and to bring the contemplated prosecutions to speedy termination. That
v..:as permissible under the existing la\v. Even if some procedural changes were
considered necessary, they could have been worked out within the fr2.mework
of the law. The special courts envisaged in the Bill are, however, courts, the
fike of which has not been provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure or any
other law. and are in fact unknown to the Criminal Law of the country.
~ru
(c) The Constitution contemplates that all civil and crimin2J courts in a
State, other than the High Court, shall be no other than the Subordinate Cou1 ts
over which the High Court shall exercise the fullest superintendence and control
and that the presiding officers of those courts shall be under the control rf the
High Court and of no other authority. That is necessary to ensure the independence ul' every court dealing ¥.'ith civil and crirninal matters. [576 DJ
(d) It may be permissible to create or establish civil and criminal courts
a state \Vith designations other than those expressed in article 236, or any exist~
ing designation in the Codes of Civil and Criminal Procedure, but that is far
F
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488
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] 2 s.c.R.
from saying that it is permissible to establish a heirarchy of courts other than
that c.nvisaged in the Constitution. [576 E]
2. (a) The Constitution has made ample and effective provision for the
establishment of a strong, i'!l.dependent and impartial judicial administration in
the country with the necessary complement of civil and criminaJ. court;;. It ~
not permissible for Parliament or a State Legislature to ignore or bypass that
scheme of the Constitution by providing for the establishment of a civil or
criminal court parallel to a High Court in a state or by \Vay of an additional
or extra or a second High Court or a court other than a court subordinate to
the High Court. Any such attempt would be unconstitutional and would strike
at the independence of the judiciary which hatS so nobly been enshrined in the
Constitution and so carefully nursed over the years. [576 G]
(b) The Constitutio!l provides for the appointment of district judg~s .and
other judicial officers in the States. In a large number of c:ises this Court had
declared that it is the High Court which is the sole custodian of the control
over the State Judiciary which in fact is the life blood of ~n independent judicial
administration, and the very foundation of any real judicial edifice. The Con·.
stitutioo. has not considered even the existence or continuation of A..fagi.3trates
who are outside the control of the High Court to be desirable. It is beyond
doubt that the Constitution does not permit the establishment of a crimina.l court
of the status of a court presided over by a District Judge which is not subordi·
nate to the High Court and does not permit the establishment of a court similar
" t<..• the High Court or a court parallel to the High Court. [577 C; 578 A·B]
The Slate of West Bengal v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi, [1966] 1 SCR
771, Chandra Mohan and others, v. State of U.P. & Ors., [1967] I
SCR 77; State of Assam etc. v. Ranga Mohammad & Ors., [1967] I
SCR 454; The State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra & Ors., [1968]
2 SCR 154; State of Assam & Anr. v. S. N. Sen & Anr., [1972] 2
SCR 251; Shanisher Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab [1975] 1 SCR 1'S14;
fligh (7ourt of Puniab & Huryana v. State cf fia;~vana & Ors, etc.,
f1975J) SCR. 365; State of Huryana v. lnder Prakash Anand, A.I.R.
1976 SC 1841: Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. v. L. V. A.
J)ixirulu & Ors., r19791 1 S.C.R. 26, referred to.
(c) Neither s. 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 nor s. 6 of the
Criminal La\v Amendment Act, 1952 justifies the argument that special courts
of the nature contemplated in the Bill would be creat.ed under the scheme of
the Constitution. Although s. 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure rotates that
the five classes of criminal courts stated in it shall be in addition to the High
Court and courts that may be constituted under any law, it cannot be said that
it provides fer the constitution of <:ourts parallel to or on the same footing as
the High Court or of criminal courts which are not subordinate to the Higk
Courts. Sinu1arly, special judges a.ppointed under s. 6 of the Critninal Law
Amendment Act are subordinate to the High Court and fit in the scheme of
the independence of the judiciary envisaged by the Constitution. [578 E·F]
( d) The attempt to justify the creation of special courts by ref1~rence to
.Part XIVA of the Constitution which provides for establishment of adminisl-1 'trative Tribunals cannot be sustained because such Tribunal are not meant for
the trial of offences referred to in the Indian Penal Code. They may well be
said to be quasi~judicial Tribunals, [579 DJ
RE : SPECIAL COURTS BILL
•'
4.89
(e) The Special Courts contemplated by clause 2 of the Bill will not be
on the: same footing as the High Courts a.=id will, to say the least, be Jesser
or inferior courts. [579 E]
(f) Clause 7 of the Bill provides that a special court shall be presided over
by a "sitting judge" of a High Court, but it will not be permissible or proper
to do so as that court is lesser and inferior to a High Court. In all probability,
sitting judges of High Courts will refuse to serve as presiding judges of Special
Courts, and there is no provision in the Constitution under which they can
be compc.lled, or ordered against their will, to serve there. That eventuality will
make the provisions of the Bill unworkable. At any rate, the possibility that
the sitting High Court Judges may not agree to serve as presiding judges ·of
Special Courts is real, and their· very refusal will embarrass the judicial administration and lower the prestige of the judiciairy for clause 7 of the Bill provides
for their nomination in consultation with the Chief Justice of Jnda. f579 F-H]
I
3. (a) Equality before the law, or speaking in terms of the present -controversy, equality in criminal justice, is the U'.1iversal goal of all democratic
forms of government, for no one can ever deny that a11 peroons charged \vith
crime must, in law, stand on the same footing at the 13ar of justice. "That
equality should be assured not only between one accused and &.1other, but
between the prosecution and the a'CCused. That is what the Constitution ha.s
carefully, assuredly and fully provided for every citizen. Article 21 is, by
itself, enough to bring that out. [580 C-D]
(b) In order to fulfil the guarantee of Art. 21 the procedure prescribed by
law for the trial of criminal cases has to be fair, just and reasoo&bJe, and not
fanciful, oppressive or arbitrary. Taken together, clauses 5, 7 and 8 of the
Bill provide for the trial of the accused only by special courts to be presided
over by a judge nominated by the Central Government and clauses 4, 5 and 7
vest the power of de.signating the special court in. which an accused is tu be
tried -exclusively in that Government. The Bi11 enables the· Central Government to decide which of the accused will be tried by which of its nominated
judges. Thus if several 6pecial courts are created by the· Central Government in
Delhi and they are all presided over by judges nominated by the Central
Government, the power of nominating the judge for any particular case triable
kt Delhi shall vest in the Central Government. Such a procedure cann<Jt be
said to be fair, just and reasonable within the meaning of Art. 21 and amounts
to serious transgression on the independence of the judiciary. [581 G; 582 D-FJ
(c) The question of the Central Government or the State Govcrnme\1t
nominating a judge of the Supreme Court or of the High Court for dealing with
a particular case does not and cannot arise. So too in regard to the judges :ind
magistrates of the subordinate courts, sufficient safeguards have. been provided,
In the relevant laws for their appointment by the High Court It is not permissible for the executive to appoint a particula.r jlldge or magistrate to preside
over the trial of a particular accused under the· Code of Criminal Procedure.
That is fair, just and reasonable and relieves the accused of any possible CJppres~
sion. [583 A-Bl
(d) Moreover in the case of trirus before special courts, the trial by the
fiat of a successor government, however, justified, is noticed with scepticism
The suspicion that the trial is motivated by political considerations, that lt
would not be just and fair or that it would lead to injustice, would be lurki'1g
t 3-978SCI/78
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490
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[1979] 2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
in the mind of the accused. It is therefore necessary that everyone concerned,
llt.cluding the accused, should be convinced that the executive had the best of
intentions in ordering the tria.1 and had provided for a fair and straight forward
procedure, and the cleanest of judges, for the trial in an open and fearless
manner. [583 C&El
(e) If the result of the trial has to carry conviction with the people as a
whole, and is meant to acquaint them with the true character of the persoos who
have committed the offences for the surviva.l of the democratic institutions and
cleanliness of the political life as professed in the statement of Objects and
Reasons of the Bill, it is in the interest of those making the declaration under
clause 4 to convince everyone, including the accused, that the trial is not
spectacular in purpose and does not expose those facing it to a risk greater than
that taken by any other accused at an ordinary trial, under the ordinary law.
Human dignity is a concept enshrined in the Constitution and this treasure
should be the priceless possession 2.nd solid hope of alt our fellow-citizens,
including those who have to face trials for offences charged against them.
[583 F-Hl
-
(f) An attempt, like the one made in the present Bill to usurp an important
judicial power and vest it in the executive is a serious inroad on the Jt1dependence of the judiciary and is fraught with serious consequences. It has, therefore, to be put down at the very inception for it maiy otherwise give rise to a
prospe~t too gruesome to envisage and too dangerous to be allowed to have
the sanction of law. [584 HJ
Liyanage & Ors. v. Regi11a [1966] 1 All. E.R. 650 referred to.
ADVISORY JURISDICTION : SPECIAL REFERENCE
E
No, I OF' 1978
...
(Under Art. 143(1) of the Constitution of India).
S. V. Gupte, Attorney General, R. N. Sachthey fa!ld R. B. Datar
for the Attorney General for India.
S. N. Kackar, Sol. Genl., R. N. Sachthey and S. Marka11daya far
the Union of India.
F
K. D. Chatterjee, Adv. Genl. (Bihar), U. P. Singh for the Adv.
Genl. (Bihar).
A. K. Malik, Adv. Genl., (J&K), Alta/ Ahmed and Brij JJelwri
Singh for the A.G.,. J&K.
G
R. N. Byra Reddy, Adv. Genl., S. S. Ray and A. K. Sen, N. Nettar,
J. S. Sinha and Mrs. Alva Margaret for the A. G. Karnataka.
Abdul Khader, Adv. Genl., Kerala and K. M. K. Nair for lhe A.G.,
(Kerala).
H
R. S. Bhonsle, Adv. Genl., (Maharashtra), V. C. Kotwal and
M. N. Shroff, for the A.G. Maharashtra.
B. M. Patnaik, Adv. Genl., (Orissa), Miss Uma Mehta alld R. K.
Mehta for the A.G., (Orissa).
..,..
-
RE : SPECIAL COURTS BILL
491
R. K. Rastogi, Adv. Genl. (Rajasthan), S. M. Jain and M. I. Khan,
for the A.G., Rajasthan.
A
V. P. Raman, Adv. Genl. (Tamil Nadu) and A. V. Rangam, for
the A.G.,, Tamil Nadu.
0. P. Rana, for the A.G. (U.P.).
S. K. Acharya, Adv. Genl. (West Bengal), Sukumar Basu and
G. S. Chatter1ee, for the A.G., West Bengal.
B
F. R. Mridul, H. K. Purl, Vijendra 'lain, Arunashwar Gupta, Vivek
Sethi and Vijay Behl, for the Intervener (Mr. V. C. Shukla).
~
I. S. Wasu and 0. P. Sharma, for the Intervener (Gyani Zail
'""Singh).
c
M. C. Bhandare and O. P. Shanna, for the Intervener (Harideo
Joshi).
,_.
A. K. Sen, Bishambar Lal and Miss Manisha Gupta for the Intervener (Dhirendra Brahmachari).
-r
~
M. C. Bhandare, Mrs. Sunanda Bhandare, R. Nagarathnam, Wazir
Singh and Miss Malini Poduval, for the Interveners (Bansi Lal, Shiv
Kumar Agarwal and Surinder Singh).
A. S. Bobde, M. R. Barot, Mrs. Sunanda Bhandare, R. Nagara;hnam, Wazir Singh, Miss Malinl Poduval and R. N. Mittal, for th·~
Intene;;cr (C. M. Stephen).
Frank Anothony, Mrs. S. Bhandare, M. R. Barot, R. N. Mittal,
R. Nagarathnam and Miss Malini Poduval, for the Intervener (Kanllapati TriJl<lthi).
P. Shiv Shankar and B. Goburdhan, for the Intervener (Parnab
Mukherjee).
D. D. Chawla and N. S. Das Bahl, for the Intervener (R. K.
Dhawan).
Shiva Puµm Singh, for the Intervener (Jagmohan and P. S.
Bhinder).
M. C. Bhandare, N. Nettar, J. S. Sinha and 'Mrs. Alva Margarrt
for the Intervener (Dev Raj Urs).
A. N. Karkhanis, for the Intervener (Narain Dutt Tiwari).
A. S. Bobtk, J. N. Misra, V. C. Mahajan, Ram Lal, D. Goburdhan,
f.or the Interveners (Jagannath Misra and Ram Lal).
A.G. Noorani, Miss Rani lethmalani and H. N. Hln:orani, for the
Intervener (Ram Jethamalani).
P. Shiva Shankar, Frank Anthony, P. P. Rao
Interveners for the State of Andhra Pradesh.
and G. N. Rao,
D
E
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492
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] 2 S.C.R.
S. S. Ray, P. N. Ramalingam and A. T. M. Sampath for the applicant Intervener (State of J&K and for the Advocate General,
Haryana).
S. C. Mohanta, Adv. Gen! (Haryana), Naubat Singh (Dy. Adv.
Genl.), R. N. Sachthey and Girish Chandra, for the Advocate General,
Haryana.
Chandrachud, C.J. delivered the Opinion on behalf of Bhagwati,
Sarkaria and Fazal Ali, JJ. and himself. Krishna Iyer, Untwalia
and Shinghal, JJ. delivered separate Opinions.
CHANDRACHUD, C.J.-On Augnst 1, 1978 the President of India
made a reference to this Court under article 143(1) of the Constitution
for consideration of the question whether the "Special Courts Bill,
1978" or any of its provisions, if enacted, would be constitutionally
invalid. The full text of the reference is as follows :
"WHEREAS certain Commissions of Inquiry appointed
by the Central Government under the Commissions of Inquiry
Act, 1952 (Central Act 60 of 1952) have submitted reports
which indicate that there is reason to believe that various
offences have been committed by persons holding high
political and public offices during the period of operation of
the Proclamation of Emergency dated the 25th June, 1975,
and the period immediately preceding that Proclamation;
AND WHEREAS investigations into such offences are
being made in accordance with law and are likely to be completed soon:
AND WHEREAS suggestions have been made that the
persons in respect of whom the investigations reveal that a
prima facie case has been made out should be tried
speedily in Special Courts constituted for that purpose;
AND WHEREAS a proposal has been made that legi slation should be enacted for the creation of an adequate
number of Special Courts for the speedy trial of such offences
on the lines of the Bill, a copy whereof is annexed hereto
·
(hereinafter referred to as the "Bill");
AND WHEREAS doubts have been expressed with
regard to the constitutional validity of the Bill and its provisions;
AND WHEREAS there is likelihood of the Constitutional
validity of the provisions of the Bill, if enacted, and any
action taken thereunder, being challenged in courts of law
involving protracted and avoidable litigation;
'
RE : SPECIAL COURTS BILL
493
(Chandrachud, C. !.)
~
I
AND WHEREAS in view of what has been hereinbefore stated, it appears to me that the question of law hereinafter set out is likely to arise and is of such a nature and of
such public importance that it is expedient to obtain the
opinion of the Supreme Conrt of India thereon;
A
NOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred upon me by clause (1) of Article 143 of the Constitution,
I, Neelam Sanjiva Reddy, President of India, hereby refer
the following question to the Supreme Court of India for
consideration and report thereon, namely
B
Question
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(I) Whether the Bill or any of the provIB10ns thereof, if
enacted, would be constitutionally invalid ?
New Delhi.
Dated : 1st day of August, 1978
PRESIDENT OF INDIA"
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Annexed to the order of reference is a copy of the Bill
which runs thus :
"TIIB SPECIAL COURTS BILL, 1978
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BILL
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to provide for the trial of a oertain class of offenc7s
WHEREAS Commissions of Enquiry appointed under
the Commissions of Enquiry Act, 1952 have rendered reports
disclosing the existence of prima fade evidence of offences
committed by persons who have held high public or political
offices in the country and others connected with the commission of such offences during the 'operation of the Proclamation. of Emergency dated 25th June, 1975, and during
the preceding period commencing 27th February, 1975 when
it became apparent that offenders were being screened by
those whose duty it was to bring them to book;
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AND WHEREAS investigation.s conducted by the
Government through its agencies have also disclosed similar offences committed during the period aforesaid;
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AND WHEREAS the offences referred to in the recitals
aforesaid were committed or continued during the operation
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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of the Promulgation of Emergency dated 25th June, 1975,
during which a grave emergency was clamped on the whole
country, civil liberties were withdrawn to a great extent,
important fundamental rights of the people were suspended,
strict censorship on the press was placed and judicial powers
WCI(" crippled to a large extent;
AND WHEREAS it is the constitutional, legal aad moral
obligation of the State to prosecute persons involved in lhe
said offences;
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AND WHEREAS the ordinary criminal courts due to
congestion of work and other reasons cannot reasonably be
expected to bring those' prosecutions to a speedy termination;
AND WHEREAS it is imperative for the functioning of
parliamentary democracy and the institutions created by or
under the Constitution of India that the, commission of
offence. referred to in the recitals aforesaid should be judicially determined with the utmost dispatch;
AND WHEREAS it is necessary for the said purpose to
create additional courts presided over by a sittiug judge of
a High Court in India or a person who has held office as a
judge oi a High Court in India;
AND WHEREAS it is expedient to make some procedural changes whereby avoidable delay in the final determination of the guilt or innocence of the persolli to be tried
is eliminated without interfering with the right to a fair
trial;
BE it enacted by Parliament iu the Twenty-ninth yeu
of the Republic of India as follows : 1. ( 1) This Act may be called the Special Courts Act,
1978.
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(2) It shall come into force at once.
2. The Central Government shall by notification create
adequate number of courts to be called Special Court>.
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3. A Special Court shall 'take cognisance of or try such
cases as are iustituted before it or transferred to it as
hereinafter provided.
4. ( 1) If the Central Government is of the opiuion that
there is prima facie evidence of the commission of an offence
RE : SPECIAL COURTS BILL
495
(Chandrachud, C. J.)
alleged to have been committed during the period mentioned
ia the preamble by a person who held high public or politieal office in India and that in accordance with the guideline~
centained in the Preamble hereto the said offence ought to
be dealt with under the Act, the Central Government shall
m.ake a declaration to that effect in every case in which it
is of the aforesaid opinion.
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(2) Such declaration shall not be called in question in
any court.
5. On such declaration being made any prosecution in
respect of such offence shall be instituted only in a Special
Court designated by the C.entral Government and any prosecution in respect of such offence pending in any court in
India shall stand transferred· to a Special Court designated
by the Central Government.
6. If at the date of the declaration in respect of any
offence an appeal or revision against any judgment or order
in- a prosecution in respect of such offence, whether pending
oc disposed of, is itself pending in any court of appeal or
revision, the same shall stand transferred for disposal to the
Supreme Court of India.
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7. A Special Court shall be presided over by a sitting
j11dge of a High Court in Inclia or a person who has held
office
a judge of a High Court in India and nominated
by the Central Government in consultation with the Chief
Justice of India.
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8. A Special Court shall have jurisdiction to try any
person concerned in the offence. in respect of which a declaration is made under section 4 either as principal, conspirator
or abettor and all other offences and accused persons as can
be jointly tried therewith at one trial in accordance with the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
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9. A Special Court shall in the trial of such cases follow
the procedure prescribed by the said Code for the trial of
warrant cases before a Magistrate and save as otherwise provided in this Act be governed by the said Code.
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10. (1) Notwithstanding anything in the said Code, an
appeal shall lie as of right from any judgment or order of
a Special Court to the Supreme Court of India both on fact
and on law.
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(2) Except as aforesaid, no appeal or revision shall lie
to any court from any judgment or order of a Special
Court".
After receipt of the reference on August 1, a notice was issued
to the Attorney General on the 2nd to appear before the Court on
the 4th for taking directions in the matter. On the 4th August, upon
hearing the Attorney General the Court directed, inter alia that :
(1) Notice of ,the reference be given to the Union of India and the
Advocates General of the States requiring them to submit their written
briefs before September 4, 1978; (2) Notices be published in five
newspapers at Bombay, New Dehli, Calcutta, Madras and Bangalore
inviting all persons likely to be affected by the passage of the Bill to
apply for permission to appear or intervene in the proceedings; (3)
Interveners will be permitted to submit their written arguments but
will not be entitled to be heard orally unless the Court considers it fit
and proper to do so; ( 4) Parties concerned shall appear before, the
Court on August 21 for taking further directions; and (5) that the
heaxing of the reference will commence on September 11, 1978
subject to the reasonable convenience of all concerned.'
Notices were issued by the Registry of this Court on the 4th
August itself to the Union of India and Advocates General of 22
States. The newspaper notices were published soon thereafter. By
August 21, a large number of applications were received by the Court
asking that the applicants should either be impleaded to the reference
as parties or in the alternative that they should be allowed to intervene in the proceedings. On August 21, the Court passed an order
after hearing all the interested paxties that it did not consider it
necessary to implead anyone as a formal paxty 'to the reference. The
Court, however, granted permission to 18 persons and 2 State
Governments to intervene in the proceedings. Those eighteen are :
Sarvashree V. C. Shukla, Gyani Zail Singh, Dhirendra Brahmchari,
Bansi Lal, Harideo Joshi, Pranab Mukherjee, R. K. Dhawan, Jagmohan, P. S. Bhinder, Shiv Kumar Aggaxwal, Surinder Singh, Dev
Raj Urs, Narain Dutt Tiwari, Jagannath Misra, Ram Lal, Ram
Jethmalani, C. M. Stephen and Kam!apati Tripathi. The two State
Governments which were allowed to intervene are the State of
Karnataka and the State of Andhra Pradesh. The applications of
all others for being impleaded as parties or for intervention were
rejected.
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Written briefs were filed by the Union of India, the Advocates
General, the two State Governments and the interventionists. The
RE : SPECIAL COURTS BILL
497
(Chandrachud, C. J.)
•
State of J ammu and Kashmir complained on the date of hearing that
its Advocate General had taken a stand in his written brief which
did not reflect the view of the State Govermnent on the question referred to the Court by the President. Thereupon, the State of Jammu
and Kashmir was permitted to file its written brief, such as it was
advised, and through such advocate as it desired. The State Government filed its brief through another advocate .
At the commencement of the hearing of the reference on September 19, counsel appearing for some of the interventionists as also
some of the Advocates General raised a preliminary objection to the
maintainability of the reference contending that for various reasom
which were mentioned by them in their written briefs, the reference
was incompetent and invalid and therefore the Court should refuse
to answer the question submitted by the President for its consideration
and report. As the preliminary objection required for its appreciation
and determination an understanding of the case of the Union of India,
we postponed the consideration of that objection until after the arguments in support of the reference were over. Accordingly we first
heard the learned Attorney General, the learned Solicitor General who
appeared on behalf of the Union of India, the Advocates General
who supported the reference and Shri Ram Jethmalani, one of the
interventionsits on all conceivable aspects of the reference. Thereafter we heard the other side on all its contentions including the
preliminary ob}ection that the reference was not maintainable. We are
indebted to the learned counsel on both sides for the able assistance
rendered by them through their written briefs and oral arguments.
The written briefs facilitated a clearer perception and understanding
of their respective points of view and enabled counsel, without much
persuasion, to reduce their oral submissions to reasonable proportions.
We will dispose of the preliminary objection before taking up
the other points for consideration. The preliminary objection to the
maintainability of the reference is founded on a variety of reasons and
circumstances which may be stated as follows :
Shri A. K. Sen who appears for the State of Karnataka and for
Shri Dhirendra Brahmchari contends that we will be well-advised to
refuse to answer the reference because it is of a hypothetical and speculative character and is also vague. The reference was made by the
President on August I, 1978 which was even before the Special Courts
Bill was introduced in the Lok Sabha by a Private Member, Shri Ram
Jethmalani,, on August 4, 1978. The Bill may or may not become
a law and even if it is passed by both the Houses of legislature, its
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provisions may undergo fundamental changes during the parliamentary
debate. As regards vagueness, Shri Sen contends that the President
has posed a broad and omnibus question as to whether the Bill, if
enacted, will be constitutionally invalid without particularising the
reasons ar the grounds on which it may become invalid. A law can
be constitutionally invalid either for want of legislative competence or
for the reason that it violates any of the fundamental rights conferred
by the Constitution. Not only does the reference, according to the
learned oounsel, not specify which of these two reasons may invalidate
the bill if it becomes an Act, but the reference does not even mention
the fundamental right or rights which are likely to be violated if the
Bill is passed by the Parliament. Reliance was placed in support of
these contentions on the judgment of the Privy Council in Attorney
General for the Dominion of Canada v. Attorneys Genera! for the Provinces of Ontario, Quebec and Nova Scotia( 1) Attorney General for
Ontario v. The Hamilton Street Railway Company · and others( 2 ).
Attorney General for the Province of Alberta v. Attorney Geneml for
tM Dominion of Canada('). In re The Regulation and Control of
Aeronautics in Canada(') and Attorney General for Ontario and
Others v. Attorney General for Canada and Others. (') Couns(:[ also
relied on the decision of the Federal Court in the Estate Duty Bill( 6 )
case and on the decisions of this Court in the references relating to
TM Kera/a Education Bill('). The Berubari Union and Exchange of
Enclaves(•), The Sea Customs Act Bill('), the U.P. Legislative Assembly(") and the Gujarat Legislative Assembly(") as showing that whenever a reference is made by the President under article 143 ( 1) of the
Constitution, a specific question or questions are referred for the opinion
of this Court. Our attention was finally drawn to a judgment of the
Canadian Supreme Court ('") in a reference made by the Govenor
General in Council to the Supreme Court of Canada under sectiorn 55
of the Supreme Court Act, 1927 regarding the validity of three Bills
passed by the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Alberta which
were reserved for significatiorn of the Governor-General's pleasure.
(I) [1898] A.C. 700
(2) (1903] A.C. 524
(3) [1915] A.C. 363
(4) (1932] A.C. 54
(5) [19471 A.C. 127
(6) [1944] F.C.R. 317
(7) [19591 S.C.R. 995
(8) [1960] 3 .C.R. 250
(9) 1964] 3 S.C.R. 787
(10) [1965] 1 S.C.R. 413
(11) [1975] l S.C.R. 504
(12) [1938] Canada Law RePorls 100 (S.C.)
---
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RE : SPECIAL COURTS BILL
499
( Chandrachud, C. J.)
The learned Advocate General for the State of Karnataka, while
,adopting Shri Sen's arguments on the preliminary objection, added that
we should refuse to answer the reference because the opinion of the
Supreme Court was being sought as if it were a Joint Select Committee
of the Parliament, a position which it is neither equipped to fill nor
<me "hich it ought to acquiesce in. It was contended that article 143( 1), in sharp contrast with article 143 ( 2), uses the word "may" which
leaves a wide margin of discretioffto this Court whether or not to answer
.a reference.
Shri Mridul who app_ears fo'r Shri V. C. Shukla objected to the
maintainability of the reference on the additional ground that whereas
all references made by the President to the Supreme Court in the past
were of institutional significance, the present one was an isolated and
·unique case of a reference of individual significance. Learned counsel
contended that the vice of the reference lies in the President seeking the
•opinion of this Court on a purely political question which ought to
restrain the Court from expressing its opinion.
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Shri F"r3nk Anthony who appears for Shri Kamlapati Tripathi leader
of the opposition in the_ Rajya Sabha opened his argument by contending that there is no such thing as the Special Courts Bill in existence
and therefore the reference is incompetent. He said in all solemnity
that if anything were to happen to the mover of the Bill in terms of his
physical existence the Bill will lapse and then there will be nothing
.for this Court to answer. It must, however, be stated in fairness to
Shri Anthony that he expressed the hope that the mover of the Bill
may live for a hundred years. Learned counsel drew our attention
to rule 110 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in
'Lok Sabha relating to withdrawal of Bills which shows that a member
in-charge of a Bill can, normally, withdraw the Bill whenever he
desires to do so. Counsel expostulated that the Bill which was moved
by a "public prosecutor" was influenced by oblique political motives.
We have no power to "lift" the Bill from the Lok Sabha said the
,counsel, and consider its constitutional validity.
Shri M. C. Bhandare who appears for Shri Bansi Lal and others
·contended that we should refuse to answer the reference because the
expediency which prevailed upon the President to make the reference is
political and not constitutional. Counsel further urged that article
143 ( l) cannot be resorted to in a manner which will lead to the virtual
abrogation of article 32 of the constitution. Counsel drew copiously
on an article by Felix Frankfurter who later became a celebrated
.Judge of the United States Supreme Court, which appeared in the
'Harvard Law Review. The author says therein that it was extremely
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dangerous to encourage extension of the device of advisory opinion to
constitutional controversies, that the Supreme Court of America was
not a House of Lords with revisory powers over legislation, that the
legislature cannot be deprived of its creative function and that if the
Supreme Court were called upon tender its advisory opinion on the
validity of laws, it will lead to weakening of legislative and popular
responsibility. After extracting a passage from James Bradley Thayer's
'Life of Marshall' to the effect that references to courts dwarf the political cap&ciiy of the people and deaden its sense of moral responsibility,.
the learned author concludes his article thus :
It must be remembered that advisory opinions are no merely
advisory opinions. They are ghosts that slay.
Shri Shiv Shankar who appears for the State of Andhra Pradesh
and for Shri Pranab Mukherjee founded his preliminary objection on
the ground that since the Parliament is seized of the Bill we should
not answer the reference.
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Shri Bobade who appears ~or Shri C. M. Stephen, leader of the
opposition in the Lok Sabha, and for Shri Jagannath Misra contended
that article 105(3) contains a constitutional bar against our entertaining
the reference since it is the power and privilege of the Parliament and
not of this Court to decide whether the Bill should become an Act and
whether the provisions of the Bill are unconstitutional.
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Shri 0. P. Sharma who appears for Shri Zail Singh and for Shri
Harideo Joshi made a similar argument by contending that notwithstanding our opinion, the Parliament would be within its power in
passing the Bill' after a due discussion of its provisions and therefore
we ought not to answer the reference.
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Shri Shiv Pujan Singh appearing on behalf of Shri Jagmohan and
Shri P. S. Bhinder contended that the reference is incompetent because
it violates articles 107 (I), 108 and 111 of the Constitutiou. His
argument is that if we were to answer the reference, the· powers and
privileges of the Parliament and indeed of the President himself which
are conferred by the aforesaid provisions of the Constitution shall have
been curtailed or encroached upon.
Whenever interveners having a common interest m the subject
matter of a proceeding appear through different counsel, there is, unavoidably. a certain amount of overlapping in their arguments howsoever each counsel may begin with the assurance, and quite genuinely,
that he will not cover the same ground once over again. Striking a
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RE : SPECIAL COURTS llILL
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( Chandrachud, C. J.)
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new path when so many who have preceded have already walked on
the same field is easier assured than achieved though, we cannot deny
that counsel before us strove to their utmost to keep to the time
schedule and to throw some new light on the questio!l whether the
oleference is valid and whether we should or should not answer it.
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Analysing the various points of view converging on the preliminary B
-0bjection, the following contentions emerge for our consideration :
( 1) That the reference is hypothetical and speculative in character;
(2) that the reference is vague, general and omnibus; (3) that since
the Parliament is seized of the Bill, it is its exclusive function to dedde upon the constitutionality of the Bill and if we withdraw that quesc
tion for our consideration and report, we will be encroaching upon
the functions and privileges of the Parliament; ( 4) that the reference,
if entertained, will virtually supplant the beneficient and salutary
provisions of article 32 of the Constitution; (5) It is futile for us to
consider the constitutionality of the Bill because whatever may be
our view, it will be open to the Parliament to discuss the Bill and D
to pass or not to pass it, with or without amendment; ( 6) The reference raises a purely political question which we should refrain
from answering; and (7) Considering the repercussions of the exercise
.of advisory jurisdiction, both expediency and propriety demand that
we should return the reference unanswered. We will consider these
contentions seriatim.
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Article 143 of the Constitution under clause (I) of which the
President ha• made this reference to the Supreme Court reads as
follows :
143(1) If at any time it appears to the President that a
question of law or fact has arisen, or is likely to
arise, which is of such a nature and of such public
importance that it is expedient to obtain the opinion
-or the Supreme Court upon it, he may refer the
question to that Court for consideration and the
Court may, after such hearing as it thinks fit, report
to the President its opinion thereon.
(2) The President may, notwithstanding anything in the
proviso to article 131 refer a dispute of the kind
mentioned in the said proviso to the Supreme Court
for opinion and the Supreme Court .shall, after such
hearing as it thinks fit, report to the President its
opinion thereon.
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Article 143 ( 1) is couched in broad terms which provide that
any question of law or fact may be referred by the President for the
consideration of the Supreme Court if it appears to him that such a
question has arisen or is likely to arise aud if the question is of such
a nature and of such public importance that it is expedient to obta-in
the opinion of the Court upon it. Though questions of fact have not
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been referred to this Court in any of the six references made under
article 143(1), that article empowers the President to make a reference even on questions of fact provided the other conditions of th~
article are satisfied. It is not necessary that the question on which
the opinion of the Supreme Court is sought must have arisen actually.
c It is competent to the President to make a reference under article
143(1) at an anterior stage, namely, at the stage when the President
is satisfied that the question is likely to arise. The satisfaction whether
the question ha~ arisen or is likely to arise and whether it is of such
a nature and of such public importance that it is expedient to obtain
the opinion of the Supreme Court upon it, is a matter essentially
D for the President to decide. The plain duty and function of the
Supreme Court under article 143 (!) of the Constitution is to consider the question on which the President has made the reference and
report to the President its opinion, provided of course the question is
capable of being pronounced upon and falls within the power of the
Court to decide. If, by reason of the manner in which the question
E is framed or for aoy other appropriate reason the Court considers it
not proper or possible to answer the question it would be entitled to
return the reference by pointing out the impediments in answering it.
The right of this Court to decline to answer a reference does not flow
merely out of the different phraseology used in clauses (1) and (2) of
article 143. in the sense that clause (1) provides that the Court
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"may" report to the President its opinion on the question referred to
it, while clause (2) provides that the Court "shall" report to the
President its opinion on the question. Even in matters arising under
clause (2), though that question does not arise in this reference, the
Court may be justified in returning the reference unaoswered if it finds
G for a valid reason that the question is incapable of being answered. With
these preliminary observations we will consider the contentions set
forth above.
We are unable to agree that the reference is of a hypothetical or
i;peculative character on the ground that the Bill has yet to become an
Act. It is true that the mover of the Bill may withdraw the Bill or
me Bill may undergo extensive amendments of a· fundamental charac-
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RE : SPECIAL COURTS BILL
503
(Chandrachud, C. !.)
tor before it is passed, if it is passed at all. But these considerations A
cannot affect the validity of the reference on the score that the
reference raises questions of a hypothetical or speculative nature.
The assumption of every reference under article 143 has to be the
continued existence of a context or conditions on the basis of which
the question of law or fact arises or is likely to arise. The political
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life of a nation has but few eternal veritie~, for which reason every
aspect and facet of that life can justly be described as transient.
But the possibility of a change, even of a fundamental change, cannot make the exercise of fhe Presidential jurisdiction under article
143 speculative or hypothetical. The stark facts are that Parliament
has before it a Bill called the Special Courts Bill, the Bill has been
moved by a Private Member and that the Bill consists of ten clauses
which provide for the trial of certain offences and offenders. There
is no speculation about the present existence of the Bill and there is
nothing hypothetical about its contents as they stand today. The
Bill may undergo changes in the future but so may the Constitution
itself, including article 143, under which the President has made the D
reference to this Court. The former possibility cannot make the
refereuce speculative or hypothetical any more than the latter possibility can make it so. The Special Courts Bill is there in flesh and
blood for anyone to see and examine. That sustaills the reference,
which is founded upon the satisfaction of the President that a question as regards the constitutional validity of the Bill is likely to arise E
and that the question is of such a nature and of such public importance
that it is expedien~ to obtain the opinion of this Court upon it.
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Three references were made in the past under our Constitution,
in regard to a contemplated legislation and not in regard to a mea5ure F
which had already become an Act. In the Estate Duty Case (supra),
the Governor General had made a reference to the Federal Court
under section 213(1) of the Government of India Act 1935 which
corresponds to article 143 ( 1) of the Constitution, except that under
the former provision the power of the Governor General to make a G
reference to the Federal Court was limited to questions of law. Sir
Patrick Spens, C.J., delivering the majority opinion observed that the
fact that the questions referred related to future legislation could not
by itself be regarded as a valid objection to the reference, particularly because section 213 empowered the Governor General to make
a reference even when questions of law were "likely to arise". The H
learned Chief Justice. added that instances were brought to the notice
of the Court in which references had been made under the corres-
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ponding provision in the Canadian Supreme Court Act when the
matter was at the stage of a bill. In the Kerala Education Bill case,
(supra) a reference was made by the President under article 143(1)
of the Constitution regarding the validity of the provisions of a bill
which was passed by the State Legislative Assembly but which had
not become an Act since the Governor had reserved the bill for the
consideration of the President. Das, C.J., who spoke for the majority
(Venkatarama Aiyar J. dis~ented on another point relating to the
validity of clause 20 of the bill), referred approvingly to the view
expressed by Sir Patrick Spens C.J. in the Estate Duty Bill case
(supra) and adopted his reasoning that the fact that reference· was
made at the stage of the bill was no impediment to the consideration
by the Court of the questions referred to it for its opinion. In the
Sea Customs Act Bill, (supra) it was proposed to amend sub-section
(2) of section 20 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 and sub-section ( lA)
of section 3 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The question
referred by the President for the opinion of this Court under article
143 (1) was whether the proposed amendments will be inconsistent
with the provisions of article 289 of the Constitution.
In Canada, the Governor-General in Council referred a question
to the Supreme Court of Canada under section 55 of the Supreme
Court Act, 1927 for considering the v~lidity of a Bill which provided
for abolition of appeals to the Privy Council and for vesting exclusive ultimate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court of Canada. Notwithstanding the fact that the bill was pending consideration before
the Canadian Parliament when the reference was made, the Supreme
Court of Canada entertained and answered the reference. In appeal,
the Privy COilllcil confirmed the majority judgment of the Supreme
Court of Canada on merits of the reference. Neither the Canadian
Supreme Court nor the Privy Council considered that the circumstance
that the reference related to a bill and not to an Act affected the validity of the reference. The judgment of the Privy Council is reported
in Attorney-General for Ontario and others v. Attorney-General for
Canada and others. (1)
There is another Canadian case which may be referred to as the
Three Bills Case( 2 ) which is similar to the Kerala Education
Bil/( 3 ) case. Three bills which were passed by the Legislative
Assembly of the province of Alberta were reserved by the LieutenantGovemor for the signification of the Governor General's pleasure.
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(1) [1947] A.C. 127
(2) [1938] Canada Law Reports, 100.
(3) [1959] S.C.R. 995. ·
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RE : SPECIAL COURTS BILL
50 5
(Chandrachud, C. J.)
Doubts having ariseu as to whether the legislature of the province of
Alberta had legislative jurisdiction to enact the provisions of the bills,
the Governor-General in Council made a refuencc to the Supreme
Court of Canada on the question whether the bills were intra vires of
the legislature of the province of Alberta. The fact that the Bills had
not yet become Acts was not treated by the Canadian Supreme Court
as affecting the validity of the reference.
We will discuss in due course some of the other decisions cited
by the interventionists who raised the preliminary objection to the
maintainability of the reference. But we are unable to hold, for
reasons aforesaid, that the reference is hypothetical or speculative in
character and mirst, therefore, be returned unanswered.
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The second objection to the maintainability of the reference IS
that it is vague, general and of an omnibus nature. The question
referred by the President to this Court is
Whether the Bill or any of the prov1s1ons thereof.
enacted, would be constitutionally invalid?
if
It is true that the reference does not specilv with particularlity
the ground or grounds on which the Bill or any of its provisions may
be open to attack under the Constitution. It does not mention whether
any doubt is entertained regarding the legislative competence of the
Parliament to enact the Bill or whether it is apprehended that the Bill.
if enacted. will violate any of the fundamental rights and if so, which
particular fundamental ri~t or rights. A reference in such bro~d
and general terms is difficult to answer because it gives no indication
of the specific point or points on which the opinion of the court is
sought. It is not proper or desirable that this Court should be called
upon to embark upon a rovin~ inquiry into the constitutionality of
a Bill or an Act. Such a course virtually necessitates the adoption of
a process of elimination with regard to all reasonably conceivable
challenges under the Constitution. It is not expected of us while
answering a reference under Article 143 to sit up and discover, article
by artick, which provision of the Constitution is most iikely to be invoked for assailing the validity of the Bill if it becomes a law. The
Court should not be driven to imagine a challenge and save it or
slay it on hypothetical considerations. As observed in Hamilton Street
Railway Company (1), speculative opinions on hypothetical questions
arc worthless and it is contrary to principle, inconvenient and
incxedient that opinions should be given upon such questions at all.
0) [1903 J A.C. 524, 529.
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We were, at one stage of the arguments, so much exercised over
the undefined breadth of the reference that we were considering
seriously whether in the circumstances it was not advisable to return
the reference unanswered. But the written briefs filed by the parties
and the oral arguments advanced before us ha\e, by their fullness
and ability, helped to narrow down the legal controversies surrounding
the Bill and to crystallise the issues which arise for our consideration.
We propose to limit our opinion to the points specifically raised before
us. Tt will be convenient to indicate at this stage what those points
are.
The fir>t point raised before us is whether Parliament had the
legislative competence to enact the provisions contained in the Special
Courts Bill. The second point raised before us is whether the Bill
or any of its provisions violate the rights guaranteed by articles J 4
and 21 cf the Constitution. We propose to limit our opinion to
these points.
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Relying upon the judgments of the Privy Council in Dominio11
of Canada(!) and Reg11/atio11 and Control of Aeronautics,(') it was
argued that the reference seeks the opinion of this Court on an abstract question and therefore we should decline to answer it. We are
uot disposed to agree with the submission that the question referred
for our opinion, though wi<le and general, is in any sense abstract.
The question which is referred to us is as rega.rd,. the constitutionality
o[ the Bill or of any of its provisions. To the extent to which our
oponion is sought on the constitutional validity of the Bill it is impo55ihlc to say that the question referred to us is of an abstract nature.
ln the former of the two cases cited above. the Privy Council found
it inconvenient to determine in the reference proceedings as to what
exactly fell within the ambit of the expression "public harbour". It
ti1erefore characterised the question in regard thereto as abstract. lt
was impo<sible. in the circumstances before the Privy Council, to
attempt an exhaustive definition of the expression "public harbour"
which would be applicable to all cases, since it was thought that such
a definition was likely to prove "misleading and dangerous.". In the
latter case, the Privy Council appreciated the difficulty which the court
must experience in endeavounng to answer questions of the kind which
were framed for the opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada but all
the same, the questions were answered since they were not of a kind
which it was not possible to answer satisfactorily.
(I)
(21
[l89~] A.C. 700, 7l I.
[19321 A.C. 54. 66.
......__,.
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RE : SPECIAL COURTS BILL
5 07
(Chandrachud, C. J.)
We hope that in future, whenever a reference is made to this
<Court under article 143 of the Constitution, care will be taken to
frame specific questions for the opinion of the Court. Fortunately,
it has been possible in the instant reference to consider specific question as being comprehended within the terms of the reference but the
Tisk that a vague and general reference may be returned unanswered
is real and ought to engage the attention of those whose duty it is to
frame the reference. Were the Bill not as short as it is, it would
have been difficult to infuse into the reference the comprehension of
the two points mentioned by us above and which we propose to
·decide. A long Bill would have presented to us a rambling task in the
.absence of reference on specific points, rendering it impossible to
formulate succinctly the nature of constitutional challenge to the provisions of the Bill.
-
;
The third contention betrays a total lack of awareness of the
scheme of division of powers under our Constitution. The first limb
of the argument under this head is that since the Parliament is seized
of the Bill, it is its exclusive function to decide upon the constitutiona'lity of the provisions of the Bill. There arc a few people here as
·elsewhere who, contending against the powers of judicial review of
legislation. argue that it is the legislature which possc:'.>scs and ought
~o pc·ssess the right to interpret the Constitution and that the legislative
interpretation should not be open to attack in courls of law. But we
are concerned not with fanciful theories based on personal predilections
11ut with the scheme of our Constitution and the philosophy under'ly\ng it. Our federal or quasi-federal Constitution provides by a
copious written instrument for the seting up of a judiciary at
the
Union and Slate levels. Article 124, which occurs in Chapter IV of
the Constitution called "The Union Judiciary'', provides for the establishment of the Supreme Court of India. Its powers and functions are
.•defined in article 32(2), article 129, articles 131 to 140 and in article
143 of the Constitution. Likewise, article 214 provides subject to
article 231, for the establishment of a High Court for each State.
Article 226 confers powers on the High Courts to issue certain writs
while article 227 confers upon them the power of superintendence over
all courts subordinate to their appellate jurisdiction. These provisions
·show that the power of reviewing the constitutional validity of legislations is vested in the Supreme Court and the High Courts and in
no other body. The British Parliament, being supreme, no question
-can arise in England as regards the validity of laws passed by it. The
"position under our Constitution is fundamentally different because,
1he validity of laws passed by the Indian Legislatures has to be tested
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having regard to the scheme of' distribntion of legislative powers and
on the anvil of other constitutional limi_tations like those contained in
nrticle 13 of our Constitution. The right of the Indian judiciary to
pronounce a legislation void if it conflicts with the Constitution is
not merely a tacit assumption but is an express avowal of our Constitution. The principle is firmly and wisely embedded in onr Constitution that the policy of law and the expediency of passing it are
matters for the legislature to decide while, interpretation of laws and
questions regarding their validity fall within the exclusive advisory or
adjudicatory functions of Courts. The function of courts in that behalf is not "The Great Usurpation" as some American critics of the
power of judicial review called it after the American Supreme Court
rendered its decision in Dred-Scott('') in 1856. Rather. the truer
nature of that function is what President Lincoln described it :
We believe as much as Judge Douglas (perhaps more)
in obedience to and respect for the judicial department of
government. We think its decisions on constitutional questions when fully settl~d, should control not only the particular cases decided, bnt the general policy of the conntry.
subject to be disturbed only by amendments of the Constitution as provided in that instrument itself. More than this
would be revolution, but we think the Dred Scott decision is
erroneous. We know the court that made it has often
overruled its own decisions, and W\' shall do what we can to
have it overrule this. We offer no resistance to it.
The second limb of the contention is that if we withdraw the
...,..
question of validity of the Bill for our consideration while the Bill is
pending consideration before the Parliament, we will be encroaching
upon the functions and privileges of the Parliament. In the first
place, in dealing with the reference we are not withdrawing any _
matter from the seizin of the Parliament, much less "lifting'' the Bill
from the Lok Sabha, as was argued by one of the counsel. The
President has made a reference to this Court in exercise of the powers
conferred upon him by article 143 (1) and wc are under a consti-tutional obligation to consider the reference and report thereon to
the President as best as we may. Secondly, it is difficult to appreciate
which particular function or privilege of the Parliament is wittingly
or unwittingly, encroached upon by our consideration of the constitutional validity of the Bill. As we have just said, the question whether
the provisions of the Bill suffer from any constitutional invalidity falls
(I)
15 Lawy•rs' Edition 691.
RE : SPECIAL COURTS BILL
509
(Chandrachud, C. J.)
within the legitimate domain of the courts to decide. Parliament can
undoubtedly discuss and debate that question while the Bill is on the
.anv ii but the ultimate decision on the validity of a Jaw has to be of the
court and not of the Parliament. Therefore, we will nou be encroaching upon any parliamentary privilege if we pronounce upon the vali<lity of the Bill. We must also mention that though it was argued that
the privileges of the Parliament are being encroached upon, none of
the counsel was able to specify which particular parliamentary privilege was involved in our consideration of the reference.
May's
Parliamentary Practice was not even mentioned. Article 105 ( 3) of
the Constitution on which a passing reliance was placed provides that
the powers, privileges and immunities of each House of Parliament
and of the members and the committees of each House, shall be such
as may from time to time be defined by Parliament by law and
until so defined, shall be those of the House of Commons
'Of
the
Parliament
of
the
United
Kingdom,
and
of
its
members
and
committees,
at
the
commencement of
the Constitution. In the absence of any text or authority
showing what are the privileges of the British Parliament in regard
to the kind of matter before us, it is impossible to hold that there is
a violation of the Parliament's privileges. We also see no substance
in the argument that there is any violation of the Parliament's powers
tinder articles 107(1), 108 and 111 of the Constitution.
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The reference then is said to be a virtual abrogation of article 32
'Of the Constitution, an argument which we find to be equally untenable. Article 32(1) confers a fundamental right on all persons to
move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution. That
right is available to persons whose fundamental rights are encroached
upon. In the proceeding before us the question is whether the bill
which is pending before the Parliament contains provisions which are
open to a constitutional challenge. If we hold that the Bill is valid,
the Parliament ,may proceed with it and, we snppose, that if we hold
that the Bill is invalid, the Parliament will not spend any time over
passing a constitutionally invalid Bill. The proceeding under article
32(1) being of an entirely different nature from the proceeding contemplated by article 143 (1) of the Constitution, there is neither
supplanting nor abrogation of article 32, if we pronounce upon the
·question referred to us by the President.
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Learned counsel for the interveners who oppose the reference
11rged as one of the planks of attack on the reference that it is futile
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for us to consider the constitutiQnal validity of the Bill because what~
ever view we may take, it will still be open to the Parliament to dis~
cuss the Bill and to pass or not to pass it as it pleases. This argument proceeds upon an unrealistic basis, its assumption being that
the Parliament will not act in a fair and proper manner. True, that
nothing that we say in this opinion can deter the Parliament from
proceeding with the Bill or dropping it. That is because, no court will
issue a writ or order restrail)ing the Parliament from proceeding with
the consideration of a bill pending before it. But we cannot
assume, what seems to us to be unfair to that august body, that even
if we hold that the Bill is unconstitutional, the Parliament will proceed to pass it without removing the defects from which it is shown
to suffer. Since the constitutionality of the Bill is a matter which
falls within the exclusive domain of the courts. we trust that the Parliament will not fail to take notice of the court's decision.
We are also not disposed to accept the submission that the reference
raises a Furely political question. The policy of the Bill and the motive
of the mover may be to ensure a speedy trial of person holding high
public or political offices who are alleged to have committed certairi
crimes relating to the period of emergency. The President, however,
has not asked us to advise him as to the desirabiiity of passing the
Bill or the soundness of the policy underlying it. Whether special
courts should be established or not, whether political offenders should
be prosecuted or not and whether for their trial a speedy remedy should
be provided or not, are all matters which may be said to be of a
political nature since they concern the wisdom and policy :mderlying
the Bill. But the question whether the Bill or any of its provisions are
constitutionally invalid is not a question of political nature which we
should restrain ourselves from answering. The question referred by
the President for our opinion raises purely legal and constitutional
issues which is our right and function to decide.
The last submission which requires consideration, the 7th, is that
considering the repercussions of the exercise of advisory jurisdiction
we should, in the interest of expediency and propriety, refuse to (.Ul~"''cr
the reference. The dissenting opinion of Zafrulla Khan, .1. in Estate
Duty Bill(') contains as scatching a criticism of reference jurisdiction
as can possibly be imagined. The learned Judge has referred to the
history of advisory jurisdiction, the laws of various countries which
provide for advisory jurisdiction, the approach of the courts of those
countries to matters concerning advisory jurisdiction, the opinion of.
(I) [1944] F.C.R. 317, 322.
RE : SPECIAL COURTS BILL
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(Chandrachud, C. J.)
eminent writers like Prof. Felix Frankfurter (who later became a judge
of the American Supreme Court) and Prof. Carleton Kemp Allen, and
to various decisions of the Privy Council and the House of Lords.
In short, every possible criticism which can be made against the exercise
of advisory jurisdiction has been noticed and made by Zafrulla Khan J.
in his dissenting opinion. But, after referring to texts and· authorities,
the learned Judge observed that in spite of all that the British Parliament had before it, it thought it wise to incorporate section 213 in
the Government of India Act, 1935. Eventually, the learned Judg<>
held that if the proposal was cast in a form which does not give rise
to difficulties, the court might find it possible to pronounce upon it
, and added that one precaution which might be taken in that behaW was
to attach to the reference a draft of the bill which was proposed
to be placed before the legislature. Since the bill on which the
Governor-General had made the reference to the Federal Court was a
fiscal measure, the learned Judge thought that attaching a copy of the
bill lo the reference was indispensable and in the absence of the biil,
it was not possible to answer the reference. The ultimate conclusion to
which the learned Judge came was that in the State of the material made
available to the court, no useful purpose could be served by attempting
to answer the questions referred to the court.
We have pointed out during the course of our discussion of the.
various facets of the preliminary objection that since the question
referred for our opinion by the President raises a purely comtitutional
issue and since it is possible to limit the consideration of the reference
to the two points mentioned by us, it is neither difficult nor inexpedient
to-answer the reference. The difficulty pointed out by Zafrulla Khan J.
in Estate Duty Bil/(1) has been removed in this reference by supplying
to us a copy of the Special Courts Bill which is annexed to lhe reference. It is no answer then that the Bill might eventually emerge
from the legislature in a shape very different from that in which it has
been considered by us. As observed by Zafrulla Khan J., (page 343)
in such a case, the opinion of the court will always be read with
reference to the proposal placed before it and there will be no clanger
of its being read with reference to the form which the legislation Jmally
takes. We will only add that the Constituent Assembly having thought
fit to enact article 143 of the Constitution, it is not for us to refuse
to answer the reference on the ground that it is generally inexpedient
to exercise the advisory jurisdiction. The argument relating to the
inexpediency of advisory jurisdiction was known to the eminent architects of the Constitution and must be deemed to have been considered
and rejected by them. The difficulty of answering a reference in a
(I)
[l944] F.C.R. 317, 322.
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given case by reason of the defective frame of questions. msufficiency
of data or the like is quite another matter which, as we have indicated,
presents no insurmountable difficulty in this reference.
V~'e do fiOt consider it necessary to discuss the An1crican decisions
like Baker v. Carr(!) and Powell v. McCormack(') which were cited in
support of the argument that the Court ought not to answer 11ypothetical
questions. We have already disposed of that contention by pointing
out that there. is nothing hypothetical or speculative about the reference
made b) the President in this case. But apart from that, the American
decisions have no application because of three main considerations :
The American Constitution does not contain any provision under which
the President can make a reference to the American Supreme Court for ~· ~
obtaining its opinion. Secondly, there is a rigid separation of powers
under the American Constitution; and thirdly, article III, section 2(1)
of the American Constitution provides that the judicial power of the
United States which, by section 1 ol that article is vested in the Supreme
Court, shall extend to all "cases" and "to controversies to which the
L:nited States shall be a party;-to controversies between two or more
States-between a State and citizens of another Statebe~\veen citizens of different States, and between a St1_te, or
the ci;iLens thereof, and foreign States, citizens or subjects". In mattcn
ari'iing under the advisory jurisdiction where there is no Tis property so
E
called. there is neither a "case" nor a "controversy" between party
and party. That is why the American Supreme Court has taken the
view that "The rule that the United States Supreme Court lacks appelbtc jurisdiction to consider the merits of a moot case is a branch of
the constitutional command that the judicial power extends only to
cases or controversies; a case is moot when the issues presented are
F
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no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the
out1.:0111e." (=1 ).
That disposes of the preliminary objection to the maintainability
of the reference. For reasons above mentioned, we over-rule that
objection and proceed to answer the reference, limiting our opinion to
the two points mentioned earlier.
Out of the two principal questions which we propose to consider
in this reference, the first pertains to the legislative competence of the
Parliament to enact certain provisions of the Bill. The main argument
on legislative competence was made by Shri Shiv Shankar who appears
H
(I) 7 L.Ed., 2d, 663.
(2) 23 L.Ed., 2d, 491.
(3) 23 L.Ed., 2d, 491, 493.
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RE : SPECIAL COURTS BILL
513
(Chandrachud, C. /.)
<0n behalf of the State of Andhra Pradesh. Since the contentions of
~he other counsel on that question only highlight different facets of that
.argument it will be enough to set out and den! with the main argument.
A
The attack on Parliament's power to legislate on. matters contained
in the Bill raises three issues : (I) Has the Parliament legislative com-
...
I
petence to provide for the creation of Special Courts as enacted by
dause 2 of the Bill? (2) Has the Parliament legislative compctenw
to confer appellate powers on the Supreme Court from judgments and
orders of Special Courts as provided in clause 10(1) of the Bill? and
(3) Is it competent to the Parliament to confer jurisdiction on the
Supreme Court to entertain and decide appeals and revisions pending
before any other court on the date of declaration, as provided in clause
6 of the Bill ?
To recapitulate briefly, clause 2 of the Bill provides that the Central
-Government shall by notification create adequate number of courts to
be called Special Courts. Clause 10(1) of the Bill provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 an appeal shall lie as of right from any judgment or order of
the Special Court to the Supreme Court both on fact and on Jaw. By
clause 6 of the Bill, if at the date of the declaration in respect of any
offence, an appeal or revision against any judgment or order in a
prosecution in respect of such offence is itself pending in any court of
appeal or revision, the same shall stand transferred for disposal to the
Supreme Court.
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Shri Shiv Shanker's argument runs thus :
(a) Articles 124 to 147 which occur in Chapter lV,
Part V of the Constitution, called "The union Judiciary" contai• an exhaustive enumeration oE the ch.1ss
of matters over which the Supreme Court possesses or
may be empowered to exercise jurisdiction. Article
131 confers original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court
in certain matters, articles 132, 133 and 134 confer
appellate powers upon it in civil, criminal and other
proceedings, article 135 saves its jurisdiction and
powers, until Parliament by law otherwise provides,
with respect to any matter to which the provisions of
articles 133 and 134 do not apply if jurisdiction 8nd
powers in relation to that matter were exercisable by
the Federal Court immediately before the commencement of the Constitution under any existing law,
article 136 empowers it to grant, in its discretion,
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special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree,
determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter
passed or made by any court or tribunal in fodia
other than a court or tribunal constituted by or under
any law relating to the Armed Forces, article 137 confers upon it the power to review any judgment pronounced or order made by it, article 139A confers upon it
the power in certain circumstances to withdr:tw cases
pending before the High Court for its own decision,
article 142(2) confers upon it the power, inter alia,
in regard to investigation or punishment of any contempt of itself and finally, article 143 confers upon it
advisory jurisdiction in matters mentioned therein.
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, whether
appellate or of any other kind, cannot be cxteillled to
matters other than those expressly enumerated in these
articles. Clause I 0 of the Bill which confers appellate
power on the Supreme Court from judgments and
orders of Special Courts is therefore unconstituticnal.
Chapter IV, Part V, empowers the Parliament by
various articles to pass laws for the purpose of conferring further jurisdiction on the Supreme Court, in
addition to that conferred upon it expressly by the
other provisions of that Chapter. For example.,
article 133(3) provides that notwithstanding anything
contained in the article, no appeal shall lie to the
Supreme Court from the judgment, decree or final
order of one J udgc of a High Court (in a civil proceeding), unless Parliament by law otherwise provides.
The Parliament thus is given the power to pass a
law providing that, in civil proceedings, an appeal
shall lie to the Supreme Court from the judgment,
decree or final order of one Judge of a High Court.
Article 134 ( 2) empowers the Parliament to ccmfer
by law on the Supreme Court any "further rowers"
than those conferred by clause I of the article, to
entertain and hear appeals from any judgment, final
order or sentence in a criminal proceeding of a High
Court subject to such conditions and limitations as
may be specified in such law. By article 138(1), the
Supreme Court shall have such further Jurisdiction
and powers with respect to any of the matters in the
union List as Parliament may by law confer. By
RE : SPECIAL COURTS BILL
...
I
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(Chandrachud, C. J.)
article 138(2), the Supreme Court can exercise such
further jurisdiction and powers with respect to any
matter as the Government of India and the Government of any State may by special agreement confer,
if Parliament by law provides for the exercise of such
jurisdiction and powers by the Supreme Court.
Article 139 empowers the Parliament by law to confer
on the Supreme Court power to issue directions, ocders
or writs for any purposes other than those mentioned
in article 32(2). Under article 140, Parliament !Ylay
make a law for conferring upon the Supreme Ccurt
such supplemental powers not inconsistent with any of
the provisions of the Constitution as may appear to
be necessary or desirable for the purpose of ei!abling
the Court more effectively to exercise the jurisdiction
conferred upon it by or under the Constitution.
These provisions being exhaustive of the cases and
circumstances in which additional powers or jurisdiction may be conferred on the Supreme Court,
Parliament has no competence to pass a law conferring upon the Supreme Court appellate powers against
the judgments and orders of Special Courts, which is
a matter neither envisaged nor covered by any of the
aforesaid provisions of Chapter IV. Clause IO of
the Bill is therefore beyond the legislative power of
the Parliament to enact.
(c) Though Parliament has the power. and exclusively,
to legislate on matters enumerated in List I, that
power, as provided in article 245 ( 1), is "subject to
the provisions of" the Constitution. Accordingly, the
power of Parliament to legislate on matters mentioned, for example, in entry 77 of List I (Constitution, organisation, jurisdiction and powers of the
Supreme Court ... ) , entry 95 (jurisdiction and
powers of all courts, except the Supreme Court, with
respect to any of the matters in List I ... ) , and
entry 97 (any other matter not enumerated in List II
or List III ... ) has to be exercised consistently with
and subject to the other provisions of the Constitution. The law made by the Parliament by virtue of its
power to legislate on matters enumerated in Lists I
and III will not be v;llid, if it contravenes any other
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provision of the Constitution, apart from the provisions of Part III on Fundamental Rights.
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( d ), Considering the width of the provisions contained in
article 136 ( 1), it might have been open to the
Parliament to provide that the Supreme Court may,
in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any
judgment or order of the Special Court. But since,
the outer limits of the Supreme Court's powers ~re
exhaustively dealt with in that article and in the other
articles which occur in Chapter IV, Part V of the
Constitution, Parliament cannot confer upon any
person the right to file an appeal to the Supreme Court
from judgments or orders of Special Courts.
(e) By parity of reasoning, the provision contained in
clause 6 of the Bill for the transfer of pending appeals
and revisions to the Supreme Court is ultra vires the
provisions of Chapter IV, Part V of the Constitution.
The constitutional scheme contained exhaustively in
Chapter IV does not contemplate the exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the Supreme Court and therefore, the conferment of that jurisdiction by clause 6
is beyond the Parlia111ent's co1npetence.
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If revisions
transferred to the Supreme Court are considered as
falling within the special jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court under article 136(1), clause 6 of the Bill will
offend against the provisions of that article because
the pre-requisite for the exercise of the jurisdiction
under that article is the grant of special leave by
the Supreme Court.
The main plank of the reply of the learned Attorney General aud
the learned Solicitor General in answer to these contentions is that
the provisions of Chapter IV, Part V of the Constitution are not
exhaustive of the class of matters in which the Supreme Court possesses
jurisdiction or in which the Parliament, by law, can confer jurisdiction
upon it. The provisions of Chapter IV, it is argued, cannot olVerride
the power conferred by the Constitution on the Parliament to legislate
on matters which fall within Lists I and III ad' the Seventh Schedule.
That is to say, Chapter I of Part XI of the Constitut[on which deals
with 'Distribution of Legislative Powers' must be permitted to have
its full sway and nothing containing [n Chapter IV, Part V can be construed as derogating from that power. No implications can arise from
the provisions of that Chapter so as to nullify the legislative competence
RE : SPECIAL COURTS BILL
517
(Chandrachud, C. J.)
of the Parliament to legislate on matters which fall v.ithin the Union
and the Concurrent Lists. Therefore, it is argued Parliament's power
to enlarge the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, quantitatively and
qualitatively, is unquestionable so long as the law creating or conferring
that jurisdiotion is with respect to matters enumerated in List I or List
III. Learned counsel rely on the provisions of article 138(1) and
articlo 246 (1) and on entries 77 and 97 of List I for sustaining the
Parlia:·nent's power to enact clauses 6 and 10(1) of the Bill. As regards
the power to enact clause 2, reliance is1 placed on entry 11A of List III
as suf.porting Parliament's competence to provide for the creation of
Specia i' ·courts.
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Tl e challenge to the legislative competence of Parliament to provide c
for th!.' creation of Special Courts is devoid of substance. Entry 1lA
of the Concurrent List relates to "Administration of justice; constitution
and ot ganisation of all courts, except the Supreme Court and the High
Court.' By virtue of article 246(2), Parliament has clearly the power
to maLe laws with respect to the constitution and organisati0n, that is
to say,, the creation and setting up of Special Courts. Clause 2 of the
Bill is therefore within the competence of the Parliament to enact.
Th~ field of legislation covered by entry 11 A of List III was originally a part of entry 3 of List II. By section 57(b)(iii) of the 42nd
Amcm·,ment Act, 1976 which came into force on January 3, 1977 that
part was omitted from entry 3, List II and by clause (c) of section 57,
it was, inserted into list III as item 1 lA. This transposition
has le1l to the argument that the particular amendment introduced by
section 57(b)(iii) and (c), is invalid since it destroys a basic feature
of the Constitution as originally enacted, namely, federalism. We are
unabfo to appreciate how the conferment of concurrent power on tlie
Parlimnent, in place of the exclusive power of the States, with respect
F
to the constitution and organisation of certain courts affects the principle ol federalism in the form in which our Constitution has accepted
and adopted it. But assun:Wng for the sake of argument that ;·esting
of sue h power in the States was a basic feature oi the Constitution,
we ha•re to take the Constitution as we find it for the purposes of this
referelice. The plainest implication of the question referred to us by G
the P1esident is whether, on the basis of the existing constitutional
provisions, the Bill or any of ils provisions, if enacted, would b~ invalid.
We cannot, therefore, entertain any argument in this proceeding that a
constit;tional provision introduced by an amendment of the Constitution i• invalid.
l-faving seen that the Parliament has legislative competence to R
create Special Courts, the next branch of the argument which falls
for consideration is whether it is competent to the Parliament to confer
518
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appellate jurisdiction on the Supreme Court so as to enable or require
it to hear appeals from judgments and orders of Special Courts. 1'he
argument, pu\ in another form, is that it is not competent to the
Parliameut to confer upon a litigant the right of filing an appeal to
the Supreme Court from the judgment or order of a Special Court.
The provision for appeal, it is contended, might at the highest have
been made subject to the pre-condition of the grant of special leave
to appeal by the Supreme Court, as under article 136 of the Constitution.
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The very foundation of this argument is fallacious. The argument
rests on the plea that the provisions of Chapter IV. Part V of the
Constitution are exhaustive and therefore. no more and no greater
jurisdictioa can be conferred on the Supreme Court than the provisions of that Chapter authorise or warrant. It is impossible to accede
to the contention that any such implications can <lri<c out of the
provisions of Chapter IV. The contention if accepted, will result in
the virtual abrogation of the legislative power conferred on the Parliament by article 246(1) and (2) of the Constitution. Such a
construction which renders illusory or nugatory othc:· important provisions of the Constitution must be avoided, especially when it seeks
its justification from a mere implication arising out of the fasciculus
of articles contained in Chapter IV. The Constitution docs not provide that tiotwithstanding anything contained in article 246(1) and
(2), the Parliament shall have no power or competence to enlarge the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, quantitatively or ~ualitatively, except in accordance with and to the extent to which it " permissible to
it to do so under any of the provisions of Chapter IV Part V. The
provisions of that Chapter must therefore be read in harmony and conju"ction with the other provisions of the Constitution and not in
derogation thereof.
A pertinent question was posed by Shri Shiv Shanker or this aspect
of the matter. He asked : If Parliament is to be conceded. the power
to enlarge the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in the manner impugned herein, what was the object and purpose behind provisions like
those contained in articles 133(3), 134(2). 138(1), 138(2). 139 and
article 140? What these articles empower the Parliament to do could
with equnl competence and validity have been done by the Parliament
in the exercise of its powers under article 246(1) and (2). The
reason why, according to the learned counsel, the framers· of the
Constitution thought it necessary to incorporate specml provisions in
the Constitution empowering or enabling the Parliament to pass laws
fa respect of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction was to 1irnit its powers
...
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RE : SPECIAL COURTS BILL
519
( Chandrachud, C. J.)
in that behalf to specific matters and circumstances mentioned expressly
in those special provisions. In other words, the contention is that
specific provisions of the Constitution under which the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court can be enlarged must override the general provisions under which Parliament can pass laws in respect ol matters
enumerated in Lists I and IH of the Seventh Schedule.
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We consider it impossible to accept the argument that the conferment of power to pass laws on specific matters limits the Parliament's
power fo pass laws to those matters only and take> 1Way its power
to pass laws on matters which are otherwise within its legislative competence. The language of article 246(1) and (2) is clear and explicit
and admits of no doubt or difficulty. It must, therefore, be given its
due effect. In the first place, therefore, no implicatioas can be read
into the provisions of Chapter JV, Part V of the Constitution which
their language does not warrant; and secondly, the attempt has to be
to harmonize the various provisions of the Constitution and not to treat
any part of it as otiose or superfluous. Some amount of repetitiveness
m overlapping is inevitable in ~ Constitution like ours which. unlike the
American Constitution, is drawn elaborately and runs into minute
details. There is, therefore, all the greater reason why, while construing our constitution, care 1nust be taken to see that po\VCrs conferreU
by its different provisions are permitted their full play and any one
provision is not, by construction. treated as nullifying the existence
and effect of another. Indeed, if it be correct that the specific powers
conferred by some of the articles in Chapter JV, Part V arc exhaustive
of n1atters in \Vhich Parlian~ent can confer jurisdiction on the Suprc1nc
Court, it was wholly inappropriate and unnecessary to provide by
'1rticle 138 (I) that the Supreme Court shall have such further jurisdiction and powers with respect to any of the matters in the Union List
as Parliament may by law confer. This article is re'.1ed upon heavily
as showillg that if, even without it, it was competent to the Parliament
by virtue of its power under article 246( I) and (2) to enlarge the
Supreme Court's jurisdiction, no purpose could be served and nothing
gained by enacting that article. The answer to this contention is two,
fold as indicated above. Besides, the bbject of article 138(1) is to
further enlarge the Parliament's power to confer jurisdiction on the
Supreme Court even in matters already dealt with specifically in Chapter IV, Part V. For example article 136(2) provides that nothing in
clause (I) shall apply to any judgment. determination, sentence or
order passed or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under
any Jaw relating to the Armed Forces. But by virtue -0f article 138(1)
read with entry 2 an~ entry 93 of List I, it may be cumpetent to the
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Parliament to remove the fetter on the Supreme Court's jurisdiction t()
grant special leave and extend that jurisdiction to the judgment, determination, sentence or order passed or made by any court or tribunal
constituted by ar under any law relating to the Armed Forces. Likewise, acting under article 138 (1), the Parliament may enlarge the
original jurisdiction conferred upon the Supreme Court by article 131.
Even assuming that article 138(1) may not have been intended to
achieve any purpose as aforesaid, its object could at least be to
empower the Parliament to confer any special kind oi jurisdiction and
powers on the Supreme Court with respect to a matter in the Union
List. If the argument regarding the exhaustiveness of the provisions
contained in Chapter IV, Part V were correct, by parity of reasoning,
it will be in competent to the Parliament to pass a law in respect of
matter< mentioned in entry 72 of Lis! I (Ele<:tion ............ to the
offices of President and Vice-President ..... ) , by reason of the fact
that article 71 of the Constitution empowers the Pariiament specifically
to regu!ate by law any matter relating to or connected with the election of a President or Vice-President, including the grounds on which
such elect10ri may be questioned. Article 71, as mdeed many other
articlts, shows that there are overlapping provisions in our Constitution. The Parliament, therefore, has the competence to pass laws in
respect of matters enumerated in Lists I and III notwithstanding the
fact that by such laws. the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is enlarged in a manner not contemplated by or beyond what is contemplated
by the various articles in Chapter IV, Part V. Preventive detention,
for example, is the subject matter of entry 3 in List III. As contended by Shri R,_am Jethmalani, it is competent to the Pa1Iiament to legislate upon that topic by virtue of its powers under article 246(2) and
also to provide by virtue of its powers under article 246 ( l) read with
entry 77 of List I that an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from
an order ol detention passed under a Jaw of preventive detention.
What now remains to be seen is whether there is any entry in List
I or List III of the Seventh Schedule which covers the subject matter
G
of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court ~o that Parliament can have
the con;pelcnce to pass a law ;,,,ith respect to that matter. This question
hardly presents any difficulty. Entry 77 of List I reads thus:
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Constitution. organisation, jurisdiction and powers ofi
the Supreme Court (including contempt of such Court), and
the fees taken therein; persons entitled to practise before the
Supreme Court.
RE: SPECIAL COURTS .BILL
(Clt111drachud, CJ.)
521
Once the argument regarding the exhaustiveness of the provisions
of Chapter IV of Part V is rejected, Parliament clearly has the competence to provide by clause 10 (1) of the Bill that notwithstanding
ani·thing contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 an appeal
shall lie as of right from any judgment or order of a Special Court to
\he Supreme Court both on fact and on law. A law which confers additional powers on th© Supreme Court by enlarging its jurisdiction is
evidently a law with respect to the "jurisdiction and powers" of that
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Entry 77 of List I presents, as contended by the learned Attorney
General, a striking contrast with entry 95 of List I, entry 65 of List
.-~ 1I and entry 46 of List IIJ. The operation of the th1eo last-mentioned
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entries is expressly limited by a qualifying clause, which limits the fkid
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of legislation to the matters mentioned in the particular list in which
the entry appears. Entry 95 of List I relates to jurisdiction and
p01vers of all courts, except the Supreme Court, "with respect to any
of the matters in this List". Entry 65 of List II relates to jurisdiction
and powers of all courts, except the Supreme Court, "with respect to
any of the matters in this List''. Entry 46 of List III relates to jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except the Supreme Court, "with
respect to any of the matters in this List''. A refercn.:e may also be
made in passing to article 323B to which Shri Ram Jethmalani drew
our attention, which provides that the appropriate Legislature may, by
law, provide for the adjudication or trial by tribunals of any disputes,
complaints, or offences "with respect to all or any of the m:;.tters specified in dause (2) with respect to which such Legislature has power
to ·make laws". Entry 77 of List I stands out ill its uniqueness
amongst cogioate entries in the legislative Lists by its wide and unqualified language. The field of legislation covered b: it is not
circumscribed by the qualification. "with respect to any of the matters
in this List", that is, List 5. This contrast emphas,sos that the power
of the Parliament to legislate with respect to a matter contained in
entry 77, which, in the instant case, is ''jurisdicticm and powers of the
Supreme Court" can be exercised without reference to any of the
matters contained in List I or in any other List. Ther~ ca.n be no
justification. to revert to the argument already disposed of by us. foc
curtailing the amplitude of the Parliament's power in relation to the
subject matter of entry 77 by reason of anything contained in Chapter
IV, Part V.
The problem is of a twin variety and has two interlaced facets. If
there is power in the Parliament to establish a new .court, as undoubtedly there is by virtue of article 246(2) read with entry l lA of List III,
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it would be strange that the Parliament should not possess the wholesome power to provide for an appeal to the Supreme Court from the
decision of that Court. Loopholes and lacunae can conceivably exist
in any Jaw or Constitution but, as pointed out by us above, our Constitution has not only provided for the power to create new Courts but, it
has taken care to confer upon the Parliament the power to provide that
an appeal shall lie from the decision of such court directly to the
Supreme Court. In the exercise of its power to establish a new Court,
Parliament may by reasons of exigency consider it necessary to create
a Court which does not conform to an established pattern in the
hierarchy of existing courts. The status of the newly created Court
may by such by reason of its composition or the nature of matters
which may come before it that an appeal can justly be provided from
its judgments and orders to the Supreme Court only. That explains
the justification for the amplitude of the legislative field covered by
entry 77, List I.
It must follow as a logical corollary that Parliament also possesses
the legislative competence to provide by clause 6 of the Bill that if at
the date of the declaration in respect of any offence, an appeal or
revision against any judgment or order in a prosecution in respect of
luch offence is pending in any court of appeal or revision, the same
shall stand transfe.rred to the Supreme Court. The provision contained
in clause 6 falls squarely within the field of legislation delineated by
entry 77 of List I. The subject-matter of clause 6 is the jurisdiction
and powers of the Supreme Court. Entry 2 of List III, "Criminal
procedure, including all matters included in the Code of Criminal
Procedure at the cammencemcnt of this Constitution" will also take
'Care of clause 6. Indeed, that entry, giving to it the widest possible
meaning, may even support the provision in clause J O(l).
In view of our conclusion that Parliament has the legislative competence to enact clauses 6 and 10 ( 1) of the Bill, it is unnecessary to
consider the argument of the learned Solicitor General that, everything
else failing, Parliament would have the competence to legislate upon
the jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court by virtue of article
248 (I) tcad with entry 97 of List I. The residuary power of legislation earl be resorted to only if any particular matter, on which it is
proposed to legislate, is not enumerated in the Concurrent or State
List.
To sum up, we are of the opinion that clauses 2, 6 and 10(1) of
•he Bill are within the legislative competence of the Parliament. That
,. to say. Parliament has the competence to provide for the creation
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RE: SPECIAL COURTS BILL (Cl1mdrachud,
C.J.)
523
Qf Special Courts as clause 2 of the Bill provides, to empower the
Supreme Court to dispose of pending appeals and revisions as provided for by clause 6 of the Bill and to confer jurisdiction on the Supreme
Court by providing, as is done by clause 10(1), that an appeal shall
lie as of right from any judgment or order of a Special Court to the
Supreme Court both on fact and on law.
Though the Parliament's legislative competence to create Special
Courts, for the purpose in the instant case of trying criminal cases,
cannot be denied for reasons set ouf above, it is necessary to advert
to an offshoot of the argument to the effect that, in any event, Parliament has no power to create a court outside the hierarchy of Courts
..- -recognized by the Constitution. It was suggested during the course of
arguments on the question of legislative competence that the Constitution
contains a complete code of judicial system which provides for
>
the Supreme Court at the apex and for the High Courts, the District
Courts and subordinate courts next in order of priority. Article 124
provides that there shall be a Supreme Court of India, article 214 that
there shall be a High Court for each State. article 231 (1)
that Parliament may by law establish a common High Court
for two or more States or for two or more States and
a union territory while Chapter VI of Part VI of the Constitution proviJes by articles 233 & 234, for the District Courts
and courts subordinate thereto. To complete the picture, a.rticle 236
(a) defines a "district judge" to include the judge of a city civil court,
additional district judge, joint district judge, assistant district judge,
chief judge of a small cause court, chief presidency magistrate, addi~ tional chief presidency magistrate, sessions judge, additional sessions
judge and assistant sessions judge. Finally, article 237 empowers the
Governor to apply the provisions of chapter VJ and any rules made
thereunder to any class or classes of magistrates. The Constitution
having provided so completely and copiously for a hierarchy of Courts.
it is urged that it is impermissible to the Parliament to create
a court or a class of courts which does not fall within or fit in that
scheme. An important limb of this argument which requires serious
consideration is that the creation of a trial court which is not subjact
to the control and superintendence of the High Court is detrimental
to the Constitutional concept of judicial independence, particularly
when the Bill empowers the Central Government by clause 5 to
designate the Special Court in which a prosecution shall be instituted
·or to which a pending prosecution shall be transfe.rred.
We are nnable to accept this argument. What is important in the first
place is to inqu,ire whether the Parliament has legislative competence
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to create Special Courts. If it has, the next question is whether there is
anything in the Constitution which limits that power to the setting up
of yet another Court of the same kind and designation provided for
in the Constitution's hierarchical system of courts. We see nothing in
lite Constitution which will justify the imposition of such a limitation
on the Parliament's power to create Special Courts. Indeed, the
argument P.artakes of the same character as the one that no greater or
different powers can be conferred on the Supreme Court than are to
be found or provided for in chapter IV, part V of the Constitution.
The implications of the Constitution ought not to be stretched so far
and wide as to negate the exercise of powers which have been expressly and advisedly conferred on the Parliament. The words of entry
llA of the Concurrent List which relates to "Administration of ~
Jutice; constitution and organisation of all courts, except the Supreme
Court and the High Court" are sufficiently wide in their amplitude to
enable the Parliament not merely to set. up Courts of the same kind
and designation as are refer.red to in the provisions noticed above but
to constitute and organize, that is t~ say, create new or Special Courts,
subject to the limitation mentioned in the entry as regards the
Supreme Court and the High Courts.
It is true that the Special Courts created by the Bill will not have
the Constitutional status which High Courts have because such courts
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are not High Courts as envisaged by the Constitution. Indeed, there
can but be one High Court only for each State, though two or more
States or two or more States and a union territory can have a
common High Court. It is also true to say that the
Special Courts are not District Courts within the meaning of article .._
F 235, with the result that the control over them will not be vested
in any High Court. But we do not accept that by reason of these
considerations, the creation of Special Courts is calculated to damage
or destroy the constitutional safeguards of judicial independence. Our
reasons for this view will become clearer after we deal with the questions. arising under articles 14 and 21 but suffice it to say at this
G stage that the provision in clause 10(1) of the Bill for an.appeal to the
Supreme Court from every judgment and order of a Special Court and
the provision for transfer of a case from one Special Court to anothec
(which the Bill does not contain but without which. as we will show,
the Bill will be invalid) a.re or will be enough to ensure the independence of Special Courts. Coupled with that will be the consideration, as
H we will in course of our judgment point out that only sitting judges
of the High Courts shall have to be appointed to the Special Courts.
A sitting judge of the High Court, though appointed to the Special:
RE: SPECIAL COURTS BILL (Chandrachud, C.J.)
52 5
Court, will carry with him his constitutional status, rights, privileges
and obligations. There is no reason to apprehend that the mere
change of venue will affect his sense of independence or lay him open
to the influence of the executive. One may also not be unmindful
of the benign presence of article 226 of the Constitution which may
fa appropriate cases be invoked to ensure justice.
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Equally important as the Parliament's legislative competence, to
enact these provisions and of greater social significance is the question
whether the Bill violates the guarantee of equality contaiqed in article
14 of the Constitution. That article provides :
The State shall not deny to any person equality before the
law or the equal protection of the laws within th& territory
of India.
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Several objections, from sublime to not so-sublime, have been
taken against the provisions of the Bill in the context of article 14.
But, broadly, that challenge is directed against the validity of the
classification which the Bill makes and the lack of relationship
between the basis of that classification and the object of the Bill. The
Bill, it is further contended, creates administrative tribunals for trying offences which is against the basic tenet of the guarantee of
equality. The Bill leaves it open to the executive to discriminate
between persons situated similarly by picking and choosing some of
them for being tried by the Special Courts, leaving others to be tried
by the regular hierarchy of courts. The procedure prescribed by the
Bill for trial before the Special Courts is alleged to be onerous in
comparison with the procedure which ordinary courts generally adopt,
subjecting thereby a class of persons, left to be chosen by the executive with an evil eye, to hostile and unfavourable treatment. The
Bill, it is contended, furnishes no guidance for making the declaration
under section 4(1) for deciding who and for what reasons should be
sent up for trial to the Special Courts and such guidelines as it purports to lay down are vague and indefinite.
These arguments are met by the learned Attorney General, the
learned Solicitor General, the various Advocates General and Shri
Ram J ethmalani by pointing out that the Bill is not by any manner
an instance of class legislation; that it provides for making a classification with reference to the nature of the offences, the public position
occupied by the offenders and the extraordinary period during which
the offences are alleged to have been committed; that the provisions
of the Bill and the recitals of the preamble provide sufficient and
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definite guidance for making the requisite declaration for deciding
who should be sent up for trial to the Special Courts; that, in the
context, the Bill does not vest arbitrary or uncanalised power in the
Government to pick and choose persons for being tried by Special
Courts; that the procedure prescribed by the Bill for trial before the
Special Courts, far from being more onerous than the ordinary procedure, is in certain important respects more beneficial to the accused;
and sipce, in any event, the procedure of the Special Courts is not more
onerous than the ordinary procedure, the provisions of the Bill involve
no discrimination violative of article 14.
A brief resume of the decisions of this court bearing on laws
whici1 provi<led for the creation of special courts will facilitate
1
clearer perception of the true position and a better appreciation of the
points for and against the Bill. The written brief of the Union
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Government contains a pithy account of Special Courts, from which
it would appear that such courts were set up during the British regime
on a number of occasions, more especially nnder what may broadly
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be termed as Security laws like the Rowlatt Act, 1919, the Bengal
Provincial Law (Amendment) Act, 1925, the Sholapur Martial Law
Ordinance 1930, the Bengal Criminal Law (Amendment) Acts, 1930
and 1932, the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, the Bombay
Public Safety Measures Act, 1947, the C.P. and Berar Public Safety
E Act and the U.P. Maintenance of Public Order Act. These laws
were draconian in nature and we.re characterised by a denial of the
substance of a fair trial to those who had the misfortune to fall within
the sweep of the truncated procedure prescribed by them. They
provided a summary procedure for deprivation of the right to life ~
and liberty without affording to the aggrieved person the opportunity
F 'to carry an appeal to the High Court for a dispassionate examination
_.
of his contentions. Special Courts were set up under these laws
mostly to suppress the freedom movement in India. They were not
set up purportedly to save a democracy in peril. Therefore, they inevitably acquired a sinister significance and odour.
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After the advent of independence and the enactment of our
Constitution, Special Courts were set up under various laws to deal
with threats to public order and to prevent corruption amongst public
servants. In the years following upon the inauguration of the Constitution in 1950, this Court had to consider the validity of laws under
which various State Governments were empowered by the State
Legislatures to set up Special Courts for the trial of such offences or
classes of offences or cases or classes of cases as the State Governments may by general or special order in writing direct. The earliest
RE: SPECIAL COURTS BILL
(Chandrachud, C.J.)
527
case, after the Constitution came into force, which refers to the
setting up of special Tribunals is lanardan Reddy & Others v. State
of Hyde,Pbad & Others(') in which the Military Governor of
Hyderabad, by virtue of the powe.rs delegated to him by the Nizam,
constituted Special Tribunals which consisted of three members
appointed by him for trying offences referred to them by the
Governor by a general or special order. But the decision in that case
turned on the question whether the judgment of the Hyderabad High
Court which was pronounced before January 26, 1950 and which had
a_cquired a finality could be reopened before the Supreme Court undef'
the provisions of the Constitution. That question was answered in the
negative and no argument arose or was made regarding the violation
of article 14.
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The contention that the special procedure prescribed for trial
before Special Courts violated the guarantee of equality conferred by
article 14 was raised specifically and was considered by this Court in
The State of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar, (') Kathi Ronin~
Rawat vs. The State of Saurashtra,( 3 ) Lachmandas Kewalram Ahu;a D
& Anr. vs. The State of Bombay,(') Syed Qasim Razvi vs. The State of
Hyderabad & Ors., CJ Habeeb Mohamed vs. The State of Hyderabad,(") Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh & A nr. vs. The State of Vindhya Pradesh,(') Kedar Nath Bajoria vs. The State of West Bengal(') and
Asgarali Naizarali Singaporawalla vs. The State of Bombay ( "). The 1 E
procedure prescribed by the various laws in these cases was, almost '
without exception, held to be discriminatory, about which no serious
dispute could reasonably be raised. Since the special procedure was
more harsh and onerous than the ordinary procedure prescribed for the
· trial of offences, the further question which this Court was required
to consider was wheTher ilie classification permissible under the partiF
cular Jaws was valid. If the classification was valid, persons who "
were grouped together and who were distinguished from others who
were left out of the group on an intelligible differentia could legitimately be tried by a different procedure, even if it was more onerous,
provided the differentia had a rational relation to the object sought
to be achieved by the statute in question.
[1951] S,C.R. 344.
(2) [1952] S.C.R. 284.
(3) [1952] S.C.R. 435.
(4) [1952] S.C.R. 710.
(5) [1953] S.C.R. 589.
(6) [1953] S.C.R. 661.
(7) [1953] S.C.R. 1188.
(8) [1954] S.C.R. 30.
(9) [1957] S.C.R. 678.
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In Anwar Ali Sarkar (supra) it was held by the majority that
section 5( l) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950 was wholly
void since it conferred arbitrary powers on the Government io classify
offences or cases at its, pleasure and the Act did not lay down any
policy or guidelines for
the exercise by the Government of
its discretion to classify cases or offences. It may be mentioned
that the Act was a Yerbatim copy of the Ordinance which was framed
before the Constitution had come into force and as observed !\}'
Fazal Ali J. (page 308), article 14 could not have been present to the
minds of those frnmed the Ordnance. As regards the reference
in the preamble to the necessity for speedier trial of offences, it was
c held that even if the words of the preamble were read into section
S (I), the expression "speedier trial" was too vague, uncertain and
elusiYc to afford a basis for rational classification. Das J. held the
section to be partially void in so far as it empowered the Government to direct "'cases" as distinguished from "classes of cases" to be
tried by a Special Court. According to the learned Judge, the proviD sion for speedier trial of certain offences was the object of the Act
which was a distinct thing from the intelligible differentia which had
to be the basis for the classification. The differentia and the object
being different elements, the object by itself could not be the basis
for classification of offences or cases. "Speedier trial" was indeed
desi,ra ble in the disposal of all cases or classes of offences or classes
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of cases. Patanjali Sastri C.J. in his dissenting judgment upheld the
validity of the entire section on the view that it was impossible to
say that the State Government had acted arbitrarily or with a discriminatory intention in referring the cases .to the Special Court since
there were special features which marked off the particnlar group of
cases as requiring speedier disposal than was possible under the
F ordinary procedure.
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Kathi R,wing Rawat(supra) was decided by the same bench a~
Anwar Ali Sarkar. The two cases were heard partly together but
the former was adjourned to enable the State Government to file an
affidavit explaining the circumstances which led to the passing of
the particular Ordinance. Section 11 of the Saurashtra State Public
Safety Measures (Third Amendment) Ordinance, 1949 which was
impugned in Kathi Raning Rawat (supra) was similar to section 5(1)
of the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950. It referred to
.four distinct categorieil, namely, "offences", "classes of offences",
"cases" and "cla•ses of cases" and empowered the State Government
to direct any one or more of these categories to be tried by the Special
Court constituted under the Ordinance. It was held by the majority
RE : SPECIAL COURTS BILL
(Chandrachud, C.J.)
52 9
v that the preamble to the Ordinance which referred to "the need to
provide for public safety, maintenance of public order and the preservation of peace and tranquillity in the State of Saurashtra" together
with the affidavit filed by the State Government explaining the cir<:nmstances under which the impugned order was passed, afforded a
basis for distinguishing the case from Anwdr Ali Sarkar,(supra) since
it was clear tlmt the Government had sufficient guidance for classifying offences, classes of offences or classes of cases for being tried by
,the Special Procedure. Therefore, according to the majority, Sec,tion 11 of the Ordinance in so far as it authorized the State Government to direct offences, classes of offences or classes of
cases to be tried by the Special Court was not violative
~ · vf article 14 and
the notification which was issued under
that pa.rt of the Ordinance was not invalid or ultra vires
Mukherjee J. and Das J, who delivered two out of the four majority
judgments pointed out the distinction between the notification issued
in Anwar Ali Sarkar(supra) and that issued
in Kathi Raning
Rawat( supra) (see pages 454-455 and page 470). Whereas, the
former was issued under that part of section 5 (1) of the West Bengal
Special Courts Act which authorized the State Government to direct
particular "cases" to be tried by the Special Court, the latter was
issuea under that part of section 11 of the Saurashtra Ordinance
which authorized the State Government to direct "offences", "classes
-0f offences'', or "classes of cases" to be tried by the Special Court.
In Lachmandas Ahuja,(supra) a Bank dacoity case was referred
for trial to a Special Judge by the Bombay Government under section 12 of the Bombay Public Safety Measures Act, 1947 which was
precisely in the same terms as section 5 (1) of the West Bengal Act
and section 11 of the Saurashtra Ordinance. The question was
squarely covered by the ratio of the decisions in Anwar Ali Sarkar
and Kathi Raning Rawat (supra) by the apJJlication of which the
majority held that, on a parity of reasoning, section 12 was unconstitutional to the extent to which it authorized the Government to direct
particular "caieS" to be tried by .a Special Judge. Patanjali Sastri
C. J. did not differ from the majority on this aspect of
the matter. He held that, granting that the particular part of section 12 was discriminatory in view of the decision in Anwar Ali
Sarkar,(supra) the trial which had already started could not be
vitiated by the Constitution coming into force subsequently. Indeed.
the learned Attorney General who appeared for the State of Bombay
did not controvert the legal position regarding the invalidity of the
relevant part of section 12.
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[1979] 2 S.C.R.
IN Sytd Qasim Razvi, Habeeb Mohamed and Rao Shiv Bahadur
Singh,(snpra) the trials had commenced p.rior t• the date when the
Constitntion came into force. It was held by the majority in the
first of these cases and by a nnanimons Conrt in the other two, that
article 13 of the Constitution had no retrospective effect, that
a pre-Constitution law must be held to be valid for all past transactions
and therefore, the Special Tribunal or Special Conrt had validly taken
cognizance of the cases before them. What remained of the trial
after the Constitntion came into force was held not to deviate from
the normal standard in material respects so as to amount to a denial
of the equal protection of laws within the meaning of article 14.
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Kedar Nath Bajoria (supra) the case of the appellant
and two others was allotted by the State Government to
the Special Conrt which was constituted by the Government nnder
section 3 of the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1949.
The trial commenced on January 3, 1950 and nine prosecution witnesses were examined in chief before January 26 when the Constitution came into force. The order of conviction was recorded by the
Special Court on August 29, 1950 under sections 120B and 420 of
the Penal Code and section 5(2) of the Preventive Corruption Act,
1947. The appellants' contention that section 4 of the Act under
which the State Government had allotted their case to the Special
Court violated article 14 by the application df the ratio in Anwar Ali
Sarkar (supra) was rejected by the majority, Bose J. dissenting,
on the ground that having regard to the underlying purpose and
policy of the Act as disclosed by its title, preamble and its provisions,
the classification of the offences for the trial of which the Special Court
was set up and a special procedure was laid down could not be said
to be unreasonable or arbitrary. In coming to this conclusion, the
Court relied on what was de~cribed as "well known" that during the
pest-war period, several undertakings which were established for distribution and control of essential supplies gave special opportunities
to unscrupulous persons in public services, who were put in charge of
such undertakings, to enrich themselves by corrupt practices. Viewed
agai~st chat background, the Court considered that offences mentioned
in the Schedule to the Act were common and widely ?revalent during
the particular period and it was in order to place an effective check
upon those offences that the impugned legislation was thought necessary. Such a legislation, according to the majority, under which Special Courts were established to deal with special typ~s of cases under
a shortened and simplified procec!ure, was based on a perfectly intelligible principle of classification having a clear and reasonable relation
l
RE: SPECIAL COURTS BILL (Chandrachud, C.J.)
to the object sought to be attained. It was contended on behalf of
the appellants that the Act conferred an unfettered discretion on the
State Government to choose any particular case of an individual
accused and send it for trial to the Special Court. This argument was
rejected on the ground that it was competent to the legislature to leave
it to an administrative authority to apply a law selectively to persons
or things within a defined group by indicating the underlying policy
and purpose in accordance with which and in fulfilment of which the
administrative authority was expected to select the persons or things
. to be brought within the operation of the law. The mere circumstance, according to the majority, that the State Government was not
compellable to allot all cases of offences set out in tile Schedule to
Special Judges but was vested with a discretion 1n the matter and could
choose some cases only for trial before the Special Court did not
offend against article 14.
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Jn Asgarali Nazarali Singaporawalla. (Supra) the Criminal Law
Amendment Act, 1952 enacted by the Parliament came into force
whilsr the appellant along with others was being tried before the Presidency Magistrate, Bombay, for offences under section 161 read with
section 116, etc. of the Penal Code. The Act provided for the trial
of offences of bribery and corruption by the Special J udgcs and for
the transfer of all pending trials to such Judges. The Presidency
Magistrate continued th« trial despite the passing of the Act and
acquitted the appellants. It was held by this Court unanimously that
the Act did not violate article 14 since the offences of bribery and
corruption by public servants could appropriately be classified in one
group or category. The classification which was founded on an intelligible dif!erentia was held to bear a rational relationship with the object
of the Act which was, to provide for speedier trial of certain offences.
An argument was pressed upon 'this Court which was based on the
obcrvations of Mahajan J. and Mukherjea J. in Anwar Ali Sarkar
(Supra) at pages 314 and 328 respectively, that the speedier trial of
offences could not afford a reasonable basis for classification. That
argument apparently did not find favour with the Court which said
(page 691) that the particular observation:/, of the learned Judges in
·Anwar A Ii Sarkar might, standing by themselves, lend support to the
argument but the principle underlying those observations was not held
to be conclusive by this Court in Kedar Nath .Bajoria. (Supra)
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This analysis will be incomplete, without reference to a recent
decision of this Court in Magan/al Chhagganlal (P) Ltd. vs, Municipal
532
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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(1979] 2 S.C.R.
Corporatwn of Greater Bombay & Ors.(') Jn that case two parallel
procedures, one under Chapter VA of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 and the other under the Bombay Government Premises tEvdion) Act, 1955, were available for eviction of persons
from public premises. The constitutional validity of the relevant proB visions of the two Acts was challenged on the ground that they contravened article 14, since the procedure prescribed by the two Acts
was more drastic and prejudicial than the ordinary procedure of a civil
suit anct it was left to the arbitrary and unfettered discretion of the
authorities to adopt such special procednre against some and the ordinary remedy of civil suit against others. It was held by this Court
that where a statute providing for more drastic procedure different
from the ordinary procedure covers the whole field covered by the
ordinary procedure without affording any guidelines as to the class of
cases in which either procedure is to be resorted to, the statute will be
hit by article 14. However, a provision for appeal could cure the
defect and if from the preamble and the surrounding circumstances
D as well as the provisions of the statutes themselves, explained and
amplified by affidavits, necessary guidelines could be spelt out, the
statutr will not be hit by article 14. On the merits of the procedure
prescribro by tlte two Acts it was held by the Court that it was not so
harsh or unconsionable, as to justify the conclusion that a discrimina·
tion would result if resort to them is had in some cases and to the
E
ordinary procedure of civil courts in others. By a separate but concurring judgment two of us, namely, Bhagwati, J. and V. R. Krishna
Iyer J. held that it was ine,vitable that when a special procedure is
prescribed for a defined class, of persons, such as occupiers of municipal or government premises, discretion which is guided and controlled
by
the underlying policy and purpose of the legislation has necessarily
F
to be vested in the administrative authority to select occupiers of municipal or government primises for bringing them within the operation of
the special procedure. The learned Judges further observed that
minor differences between the special procedure and the ordinary procedure ii; not sufficient for invoking the inhibition of the equality clause
and that it cannot be assumed that merely because one procdure proG
vides the forum of a regular court while the other provides for the
forum of an administrative tribunal, the latter is necessarily more
drastic and onerous than the former. Therefore, said the ]earned
Judges, whenever a special machinery is devised by the legislature entrusting the power of determination of disputes to an authority set up
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by the legislature in substitution of regular courts of law, one should
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[1975] I S.C.R. I.
RE : SPECIAL COURTS BILL (Chandrachud,
C.J.)
533
not react adversely against the establishment of such an authority
merely because of a certain predilection for the prevailing system of
administration of justice by courts of law. In the context of the need
for speedy and expeditious recovery of public premises for utilisation
for importJlllt public uses, where dilatoriness of the procedure may
defeat the very object of recovery, the special procedure prescribed by
the two Acts was held not to be really and substantially more drastic
and prejudicial than the ordinary procedure of a civil court. The special
pr<'!Cedure prescribed by the two Acts. it was observed, was not so
substantially and qualitati\·dy disparate as to attract the vice of discri-
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mination.
There are numerous cases which deal with different facets of problems arising under article 14 and which set out principles applicable
to questions which commonly arise under that article. Among those
may be mentioned the decisions in Budhan Chaudhry and Others vs.
The State cf Bihar.(') Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia vs. Shri Justice S. R.
Tendolkar & Others.(') Sri C. L. Emden vs. The State of U.P.(3)
Kangsari Haldar & Another vs. The State of West Bengal,(') Jyoti
Persad vs. The Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi(') and
The State of Gujarat and Another vs. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd.,
A hmedabad, etc.(') But. as observed by Mathew J. in the last mentioned case, "it would be an idle parade of familiar learning to review
the multitudinous cases in which the constitutional assurance of
equality before the law has been applied". We have, therefore, confined our attention to those cases only in which special tribunals or
courts were set up or Special Judges were appointed for trying offences
or classes of offences or cases or classes of cases. The survey which
we have made of those cases may be sufficient to give a fair idea of
the principles which ought to be followed in determining the validity
of classification in such cases and the reasonableness of special procedure prescribed for the trial of offenders alleged to constitute a separate
or distinct class.
As long back as in 1960, it was said by this Court in Kangsuri
Haldar (Supra) that the prepositions applicable to cases arising under
article 14 "have been repeated so many times during the past few years
that they now sound almost platitdinous". What was considered to
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
[1955] (1) s.c.R. 1045
[1959] S.C.R. 279.
[1960] (2) S.C.R. 592.
[1960] (2) S.C.R. 646.
(S) [1962] (2) S.C.R. 125.
(6) [1974] (3) S.C.R. 760.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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be platitudinous some 18 ye.ars ago has, in the natural course of
events, become even more platitudinous today, especially in view of
the avalanche of cases which have flooded this Court. Many a learned Judge ol this Court has said that it is not in the formulation of
principles under article 14 but in their application to concrete cases
that difficulties g~nerally arise. But, considering that we are sittlng
in a larger Bench than some which decided similar cases under article
14, and in view of the peculiar importance of the questions arising in
this reference, though the questions themselves are not without a precedent, we propose, though undoubtedly at the cost of some repetition,
to state the prepositions which emerge from the judgments of this
Court in so far as they are relevant to the decision of the points which
arise for our consideration. Those propositions may be stated thus :
l . The first part of article 14, which was adopted from the
Irish Constitution, is a declaration of equality of the civil
rights of all persons within the territories of India. It
enshrines a basic principle of republicanism. The second
part, which is a corollary of the first and is based on the
last clause of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment of the American Constitution. enjoins that equal
protection shall be secured to all such persons in the
enjoyment of their rights and liberties without discrimination of favourtism. It is a pledge of the protection of
equal laws, that is, laws that operate alike on all persons
under like circumstances.
2. The State, in the exercise of its governmental power, has
of necessity to make laws operating differently OJl different
groups or classes of persons within its territory to attain
particular ends in giving effect to its policies, and it must
possess for that purpose large powers of distinguishing
and classifying persons or things to be subjected to such
laws.
3. The Constitutional command to the State to afford equal
protection of its laws sets a goal not attainable by the
invention and application of a precise formula. Therefore, classification need not be constituted by an exact
or scientific exclusion or inclusion of persons or things.
The Courts should not insist on delusive exactness or
apply doctrinaire tests for determining the validity of
classification in any given case. Classification is justified
if it is not palpably arbitrary.
RE: SPECIAL COURTS BILL (Chandrachud, C.J.)
535
4. The principle underlying the guarantee of article 14 is not
that !he same rules of law should be applicable to all
persons within the Indian territory or that the same remedies should be made available to them irrespective of
differences of circumstances. It only means that all
persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike both
in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. Equal
laws would have to be applied to all in the same situation, and there should be no discrimination between one
person and another if as regards the subject-matter of the
legislation their position is substantially the same.
5. By the process of classification, the State has the power
of determining who should be regarded as a class for
purposes of legislation and in relation to a law enacted
on a particular subject. This power, no doubt, in some
degree is like! y to produce some inequality; but if a law
deals with the liberties of a number of welt-defined
classes, it is not open to the charge of denial of equal protection on the ground that it has no application to other
persons. Classification thus means segregation in classes
which have a systematic relation, usually found in common properties and characteristics. It postulates a
rational basis and does not mean herding together of
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certain persons and classes arbitrarily.
6. The law can make and set apart the classes according to
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the needs and exigencies of the society and as suggested
by experience. It c~n recognise even degree of evil, but
the classification sh.ould never be arbitrary, artificial or
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evasive.
7. Th~ classification must not be arbitrary but must be
rational, that is to say, it must not only be based on some
qualities or characteristics which are to be found in all
the persons grouped together and not in others who are
left out but those qualities or characteristics must have a
reasonable relation to the object of the legislation. In
order to pass the test, two conditions must be fulfilled,
namely, (I) that the classification must be founded on
an intelligible differentia which distinguishes those that are
grouped together from others and (2) that differentia
must have a rational relation to the object sought to be
achieved by the Act.
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8. The differentia which is the basis o~ the classification and
the object of the Act are distinct things and what is
necessary is that there must be a nexus between them.
In short, while Article 14 forbids class discrimination by
conferring privileges or imposing liabilities upon persons
arbitrarily selected out of a large number of other persons
similarly situated in relation to the privileges sought to be
conferred or the liabilities proposed to be imposed, it does
not forbid classification for the purpose of legislation,
provided such classification is not arbitrary in the sense
above mentioned.
9. If the legislative policy is clear and definite and as an
effective method of carrying out that policy a discretion
is vested by the statute upon a body of administrators or
officers to make selective application of the law to certain
classes or groups of persons, the statute itself cannot be
condemned as a piece of discriminatory legislation. In
such cases, the power given to the executive body would
import a duty on it to classify the subject-matter of legislation in accordance with the objective indicated in the
statute. If the administrative body proceeds to classify
persons or things on a basis which has no rational relation to the objective of the legislature. its action can be
annulled as offending against the equal protection clause.
On the other hand. if the statute itself does' not disclose
a definite policy or objective and it confers authority on
another to make selection at its pleasure, the statute
would be held on the face of it to be discriminatory,
irrespective of the way in which it is applied.
10. Whether a law co1ferring discretionary powers
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on an
administrative authcrity is constitutionally valid or not
should not be detennined on the assumption that such
authority will act in an arbitrary manner i11 exercising the
discretion committed to it. Abuse of power given by law
does occur; but. the validity of the law cannot be contested
because of such an apprehension. Discretionary power is
not necessarily a discriminatory power.
11. Classification necessarily implies the making of a distinction or discrimination between persons classified and those
who are not members of that class. It is the essence of
a classification that upon the class are cast duties and
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RE : SPECIAL COURTS BILL (Chandrachud, C.J.)
••
537
burdens different from those resting upon the general public. Indeed, the very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere
fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality.
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12. Whether an enactment providing for special proce<lure for
the trial of certain offences is or is not discriminatory and
violative of article 14 must be determined in each case as
it arises, for no general rule applicable to all cases can
safely be laid down. A practical assessment of the operation of the law in the particular cricumstanccs is necessary.
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13. A rule of procedure laid down by law comes as much
within the purview of article 14 as any rule of substantive law and it is necessary that all. litigants, who are
similarly situated, are able to avail themselves of the
same procedural rights for relief and for defence with like
protection and without discrimination.
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By the application of these tests, the conclusion is irresistible that
the classification provided for by the Special Courts Bill is valid and
no objection can be taken against it. Since the Bill provides for trial
before a Special Court of a class of offences and a class oi offenders
only, the primary question which arises for consideration is whether E
the Bill postulates a rational basis for classification of whether the
classification envjsagcd by it is arbitrary and artificial. By clause 5
of the Bill, only those offences can be tried by the Special Courts in
respect of which the Central Government has made a declaration under clause 4(1). 'Illnt declaration can be made by the Central
F
Government only if it is of the opinion that there is prima facie evidence of the commission of an offence, during the period mentioned
rn the preamble, by a person who held a high public or political office
in India and that, in accordance with the guidelines contained in the
preamble to the Bill, the said offence ought to be dealt with under the
Act. The classification which section 4(1) thus makes is both of G
offences and offenders, the fonner in relation to the period mentioned
in the preamble, that is to say, from February 27, 1975 until the expiry of the prcclamation of emergency dated June 25, 1975 and in
relation to th.c objective mentioned in the sixth paragraph of the Preamble that i'. is imperative for the functioning of parliamentary democracy and the institutions created by or under the Constitution of H
Inilla that th~ commissio1;1 of such offences should be judicially determined with the utmost dispatch; and the latter in relation to their
16-978 SC!/78
53 8
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status, that is ta say, in relation to the high public or political office
held by them in India. It is only if both of these factors co-exist that
the prosecution in respect of the offences committed by the particular
offenders can be instituted in the Special Court.
The promulgation of emergency is not and cannot be a matter
of normal occurrence in a natior.'s life and indeed a proclamation of
emergency cannot but be claimed to have been necessitated by an
extra-ordinary situation. Article 352 of the Constitution under which
the emergency was declared in June, 1975 occurs in Chapter XVIII
called "Emergency Provisions". That article empowers the Pres; dent
to issue a proclamation if he is satisfied that a "grave emergency"
exists whereby the security of India or of any part of the territory
thereof is threatened, whether by war or external aggression or internal
disturbance. Under article 358, while a proclamation of emergency is
in operation, the State can make a law or take any executive action
even if it violates the provisions of article 19. That is a consequence
which ensues ipso facto on the declaration of an emergency. The
declaration of emergency on June 25, 1975, was followed by an order
passed by the President on June 27 under article 359, suspending the
enforcement of the right to move any court for the enforcement of
fundamental rights conferred by articles 14, 21 and 22 of the
Constitution.
During the period of emergency, several laws of far-reaching
consequence were passed by the Parliament and various notifications
and orders were issued by or under the authority of the Central
Government, affecting the rights and liberties of the people. They
are : The Defence of Indian (Amendment) Act, 1975; The Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities
(Amendment) Act, 1975; The Maintenance of Internal Secnrity
(Amendment) Act, 1975; The Election Laws (Amendment) Act,
1975; The Constitution (Thirty-eighth and Thirty-ninth Amendment)
Acts, 1975; The Maintenance of Internal Security (Amendment)
Act, 1976; The Maintenance of Internal Security (Second Amendment) Act, 1976; The Press Counsil (Repeal) Act, 1976; The
Prevention of Publication of Objectionable Matter Act, 1976; Parliamentary Proceedings (Protection of Publication) Repeal Act, 1976;
The Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment) Act, 1976; The Representation of the People (Amendment) Ordinance, JQ77; The
Disputed Elections (Prime Minister and Speaker) Ordinence, 1977;
and, the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections (Amendment)
Ordinance, 1977. After tlic declaration of emcrpency, vario'JS re.gulator~' -rncP"urcs were taken witlt 1 view to imposing pres~ censorship.
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RE : SPECIAL COURTS BILL (Chandrachud, C.J.)
53 9
The orders and directions in that behalf are dated June 26, July 5,
July 6, July 13 and August 5, 1975. On Jannary 8, 1976, a Presidential Order was issued under article 359(1) suspending the right
to move any court for the enforcement of the fundamental rights conferred by article 19 of the Constitution. These and other measures
taken during the period of emergency have been summarised by one
of us, Faza! Ali, J. in the State of Rajasthan & Ors. vs. Union of
India( 1 ) thus :
( 1) A grave emergency was clamped
country;
in
the
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(2) Civil liberties were withdrawn to a great extent;
( 3) Important fundamental rights of the people
suspended;
were
( 4) Strict censorship on the press was placed; and
( 5) The judicial powers were crippled to a large extent.
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The third clause of the Preamble to the Bill contains a precise re-production of these five factors.
On May 28, 1977, the Government of India, in its Ministry of
Home Affairs, issued a Notification under section 3 of the Commission
of Inquiry Act, 1952 appointing Shri J. C. Shah, a retired Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, as a Commission of Inquiry for enquiring jnto "several aspects of allegations of abuse of authority, excesses and malpractices committed and action taken or purported to
be taken in the wake of the Emergency proclaimed on the 25th
June, 1975 under Article 352 of the Constitqt_ion". The Commission
has snbmitted its report in two parts dated March 11 and April 26,
1978, which contains its findings on what is generally called the
'excesses' alleged to have been coll.1mitted during the period of emergency by persons holding high public or political offices in India and
by others in association or collaboration with them or with their connivance. A few other Commissions were also appointed for the same
purpose. The first recital of the preamble to the Bill refers to the
reports rendered by these Commissions of Inquiry disclosing the existence of prima facie evidence of offences committed by persons who
held high public or political offices in the country and other connected
with them during the operation of the emergency dated June 25, 1975
aad the preceding period commending on February 27, 1975.
(!) {1978] l S.C.R. I, 118.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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We will deal with the relevance of the latter date in due course, but
the facts and circumstances which we have narrated above leave no
doubt that offences alleged to have been committed during the period
of emergency constitute a class by themselves and so do the persons
who are alleged to have utilised the high public or political offices
held by them as a cover or opportunity for the purpose of committing
those offences. We are not concerned with the truth or otherwise of
the allegations, the narrow question before us being whether, in the
first instance, the classification is based on some qualities or characteristics which are to be found in all the persons grouped together and
not in others who are left out. The answer to that question can be
one and one only, namely that offences alleged to have been committed during the emergency by persons holding high public or politi~~
cal offices in India stand in a class apart. The cover of emergency,
so it is alleged, provided a unique opportunity to the holders of such
offices to subvert the rule of law and perpetrate political crimes on
the society. Others left out of that group had neither the means nor
the opportunity to do so, since they lacked the authority which comes
from official position. Thus, persons who are singled out by the Bill
for trial before Special Courts possess common characteristics and
those who fall outside that group do not possess them.
This is not to say that persons who fall outside the group cannot
ever commit or might not ever have committed crimes of great magnitude by exploiting their public offices. But those crimes, if at all,
are of a basically different kind and have generally a different motivation. In the first place, no advantage can be taken of the suppression of human freedoms when the emergency is not in operation. The
suppression of people's liberties facilitates easy commission of crimes.
Public criticism is a potent deterrent to misbehaviour and when that
is suppressed, there is no fear of detection. Secondly, crimes which
are alleged to have been committed during extraordinary periods like
the period of emergency are oblique in their design and ~elective in
their object. They are generally designed to capture and perpetuate
political power; and they are broadly directed against political opponents. The holder of a high public office who, in normal times,
takes a bribe has no greater purposes in doing Bo than to enrich himself. That, unque,:;tionably, deserves the highest condemnation and
there is no reason why such crimes should n.ot also be tried speedily
in the interest of public decency and morals. But those crimes are
not woven out of the warp and woof of political motivations. Equal
laws! have to be applied to all in the same situation and legislature
is free to recognise the degree of harm or evil. Parliamentary demo-
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RE: SPECIAL COURTS BILL (Chandrachud,
C.J.)
541
cracy will see its halcyon days in India when law will provide for a
speedy trial of all offenders who misnse the public offices held by
theIJ!. Purity iu public life is a desired goal at all times and in all
situations, emergency or no emergency. But, we cannot sit as a
super legislature and strike down the instant classification on the
ground of under-inclusion on the score that those others are left untouched, so long as there is no violation of constitutional restraints.
In this context, it cannot be over-emphasized that :
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"If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt,
it is not to be overthrown because there are other instances
to which it might have been applied.
There is no doctrinaire requirement that the legislation should be couched :n all
embracing terms''.
(See West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish)(').
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The next point which must be considered is whether the classification bears a rational nexus with the object which the Bill seeks to achieve.
The object of the Bill is to ensure a speedy trial of the offences and
offenders who, as we have pointed out, constitute a single and special
class. The close relationship between the basis of the classification and
the object of the Bill is clear from the very face of the Bill. As stated
in the 5th paragraph of the Bill's preamble, ordinary criminal courts,
due to congestion of work, cannot reasonably be expected to bring the
prosecutions contemplated by the Bill to a speedy termination. The
congestion in Courts, the mounting arrears and the easy and
unconcerned dilatoriness
which
characterise
the
routine
trials in our Courts are well-known facts of contemporary life. They
are too glaring to permit of dispntation.
Seminars and symposiums
are anxiou'sly occnpied in finding ways and means to solve what seems
to be an intractable and frustrating problem. The Bill, therefore, justifiably provides for a method whereby prosecutions falling within its
scope may be t!'rminated speedily. It is no answer that speedier trial
is a universal requirement of every trial.
The recital of the 6th paragraph of the preamble shows the true
nexus between the basis of classification under clause 4(1) and the object of the Bill. That paragraph says that it is imperative for the functioning of the Parliamentary democracy and the institutions created by
or under the Constitution of India that the commission of offences referred to in the preamble should be' judicially determined with the utmost dispatch. If it be true, and we have to assume it to be true, that
offences were committed by persons holding high public or political
(1)
300 U.S. 379, 400.
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offices in India under cover of the declaration of emergency and in the
name of democracy, there can be no doubt that the trial of such persons
must be concluded with the utmost dispatch in the interest of the functiouiniJ of democracy in our country and the institutions created by our
Llingcr these trials will tarry, assuming the. charges to
Constitution.
be justified, greater will be the impediments in fostering democracy,
which is not a plant of easy growth. If prosecutions which the Bill
envisages are allowed to have their normal, leisurely span of anything
between 5 to 10 years, no fruitful purpose will be served by launching
them.
Speedy termination of prosecutions under the Bill is the heart
and ·soul of the Bill.
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Thus, both the tests are fulfilled in the instant case, namely, that ( 1)
the classification is founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes those which are grouped together from others who are left out and
(2) the said diffcrcntia has a rational relation with the object sought to
be achieved by the Bill, namely, speedy termination of prosecutions initiated in pursuance of the declaration made under clause 4( 1) of the
Bill.
If the clas·sification is valid and its basis bears a reasonable relationship with the object of the. Bill, no grievance can be entertained under
E article 14 that the procedure prescribed by the Bill for the trial of offences which fall within its terms is harsher or more onerous as compared
with the procedure which governs ordinary trials. Classification necessarily entails the subjection of those who fall within it to a different set
of rules and procedure, which may conceivably be more disadvantageous than the procedure which generally applies to ordinary trials. In
F almost a\] of the decisions bearing on the question which arise for our
consideration and which we have reviewed, the special procedure prescribcd by the particular Jaws was distinctly and indisputably more onerous than the procedure which would have otherwise governed the trials.
. But once a classification is upheld by the application of the dual test,
\ subjection to harsher treatment or disadvantageous procedure loses its
G
relevance, the reason being that for the purposes of article 14, unequals
cannot complain of unequal treatmmt. One of the propositions formulated by us in the course of our judgment, namely, proposition No. 11 is
to the effect that "Classification necessarily implies discrimination between persons classified and thcise who arn not members of that class. It
is
the essence of a classification that upon the class are cast duties and
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burdens different from those resting upon the, general public.
Indeed
the very idea of classification is that of inequality, 'so that it goes with-
RE : SPECIAL COURTS BILL (Chandrachud,
C.J.)
543
out saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the
matter of constitutionality". It is, therefore, unnecessary to catalogue,
while we are on article 14, the various points of difference between the
procedure prescribed by the Bill and the ordinary procedure in order to
find whether the former is more disadvantageous than the latter. We
will only add that some of the provisions of the Bill, to which we will
presently turn, cast upon the accused arraigned before the Special Court
certain disadvantages as compared \vith the accused who are put up
for trial before the ordinary courts, even as some other pruvisiolls give
to them certain advantages which are denied to others.
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It ought to be mentioned that there is no scope for the argument in
the instant case that the Bill leaves it to the arbitrary and uncanaliscd
discretion of the Central Government to pick and choose persons for
trial before the Special Courts and leaves the rest to be tried by the
ordinary procedure in the regular courts. Were it so, it would have
become necessary to examine, in the context of article 14, whether the
procedure prescribed by the Bills is more onerous tha~ the procedure
which governs ordinary trials. But under the Bill, the Government is felt
with no choice or alternative in the matter of forum of trial since, if the
conditions of clause 4 ('1) arn satisfied, the prosecution has to be instituted in the Special Court. By that clause, if the Central Government is of the opinion that there is prima fade evidence of the commission of an offence during the period mentioned in the preamble by a
person who held public or political office in India and that in accordance
with tk guidelines contained in the preamble the said offence' ought to
be dealt with under the Act, the Central Government shall make a declaration to that effect in every case in which it is of the aforesaid opinion.
Thus, formation of the requisite opinion casts on the Government on
obligation to make the declaration in every case, without exception,
in which the opinion is formed. Upon the making of the declaration,
another consequence follows compulsively under clanse 5. That clause
provides that on a declaration being made under clause 4 (1), any
prosecution in respect of the particular offence shall be instituted only
in the Special Court. Not only is there no scope for initiating prosecutions before an ordinary court in matters which fall within the scope
of clause 4(1), but clause 5 goes a s;ep further and provides that
even pending prosecutions in respect of the offences specified in clause
4 (1) shall stand transferred to the Special Court. Clause 6, which is
an extension of the same concept, provides that if on the date of the
declaration in respect of any offence, an appeal or revision against any
judgment or order in a prosecution in respect of such offence, whether
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pending or disposed of, is itself pending in any court of appeal or
revision, the same shall stand transferred for disposal to the Supreme
Court. The Bill, in short, excludes the existence of two parallel jurisdictions in the same field and ensures effectively that all offences which
fall within its scope shall be tried by the Special Court only and by
no other court or tribunal.
That !eave's one more point for consideration for the purposes of
article 14 which, though last, is not the least in point of importance.
That point pertains to the relevance of the date mentioned in the preamble, namely, February 27, 1975. The reasons constituting the justification for the Bill are contained in the eight paragraphs of its preamble
out of which paragraph one is relevant for the present purpose. It says
that certain Commissions of Enquiry were appointed under the Comis'sions of Enquiry Act, 1952 which had rendered reports disclosing the
existence of prima facie evidence of offences committed by persons who
had held high public or political offices in the country and by others connected with the commission of such offences, during the operation of the
Proclamation of Emergency dated 25th June,, 1975 "and during: the preceding period commencing 27th February, 1975 when it became apparent that offenders were being screened by those whose duty it was to
bring them to book".
While explaining this recital, it was urged by the learned Solicitoc
General and Shri Ram Jethmalani that a clear trend to protect excesses
and illegalities became apparent on the particular date. Reliance, was
placed in support of that contention on a pair of questions and answers
exchanged on the floor of the House between a member of the Lok Sabha
and the then Prime Minister.
According to the Lok Sabha Debates
(5th Series, Vol. 48, page 258, dated February 27, 1975), this is what
transpired between the two :
"'Sim Janeshwar Mishra (Allahabad) : \\ hc>t about
Maruti ? Shrimati Indira Gandhi : Th•,re is no corruption in
Maruti. Since the hon. Member has raised it, I can say that
every question that has been asked has been replied to; nothinr; wrong has been done; no SP''cial favour should be, or has
beeu, given because it is concerned with the Prince Ministcr's son.
H
What I was saying is that we are just as anxious as anybod;• else to remov.e corruption. I do not want to go into the
detans. I have earlier spoken about the stage by stage actions
we have taken. I have said rt in public meetings and I have
discussed it with leaders. But today there seems to be a very
selective type of campaign or accusation. Corruption will not
RE: SPECIAL COURTS BILL (Chandrachud, C.J.)
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545
go in <his way. If the real intention is to remove corruption,
thrn it must be an honest way of dealing with it at every
level. ...
Shri Shyamnandan Mishra : A certificate of honesty
should come from you? Shrimati Indira Gandhi: Not at all".
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The daim that the tendency to protect the excesses and illegalities
became apparent because of these answers or that the particular
answers created a new awareness that offenders were being screened
by those whose duty it was to bring them to book is too naive for our
acceptance. Even assuming that there is any credible basis for the
same, the grouping together of persons who are alieged to have committed olknces during the period of emergency with others who are
alleged to have engaged themselves in screening certain offenders prior
to the declaration of emergz:ncy is tantamount to clubbing together, in
the same class, persons who do not possess common qualities or
characterislics. It is unquestionably reasonable for lhe legislature to
think that the suppression of human liberties during the period of
emergency furnished an opportunity to persons holding high public or
politir-:i l offices to commit crin1es of grave magnitude which were
calculated to destroy democratic values. Tbo premise that the suspension, especially, of preferred freedoms engineers callous defiance of
laws and the Constitution is easy to und•erstand. That is why offences
alleged to have been committed during the period of e!nergency can be
treated ;:is sui generis. The same cannot, however, be said of activities,
even assuming that they are unlawful, which preceded the declaration
of emergency. Those doings were open to public criticism and were
unprotected by the veil of emergency. It is true that one ought not to
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insist on abstract symmetry or delusive cxactn·~ss in
the
matter
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clas-sificafon. Therefore, eschewing a doctrinaire appro~ch, one shouid
test the validity of a classification by broad conside,·ations, particularly
F
\Vhen the charge is one of und1~r-inclusiveness. The Govcrntncnt) as it
is ooid. must be permitted a little free play in the joints since. there
is no mathematical formula for determining why those who are left
ont of a class should not be included within it. But persons possessing
widely diikrmg characteristics, in the context of their situation in rela- G
tio1i to tbc period of their activiti•es, cannot by any reas01iable criterion
be herded in the same class. The ante-dating of the emergency, as it
were, from June 25 to February 27, 1975 is wholly unscientific and
proceeds from irrational considerations arising out of a supposed dis'COvery in the matter of screening of offenders. The mclusion of offences
and off.enders in relation to the period from February 27 to June 25, H
1975 in the same class as those whose alleged unlawful activities cover'ed lhe period of emergency is too artificial to be sustained.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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While iustifying the extended classification, counstl drew our attention to certain findings of the Shah Commission of Enquiry (Vol. I,
items 8, pages 59 to 64) on the alleged misuse of power by the then
Prime Minister prior to the declaration of emergency. Those findings,
according to us, are beside the point for the present purpose. The
qucsiion before us is not whether anyone, high or low, committed any
excess of power before the declaration of emergency. The question is
whether, those who arc alleged to have committed offences prior to the
emergency can be put in the same class as persons who are alleged to·
have ccmmittcd offences during the period of emergency. The answer
to that question has to be in the negative.
We Jrc accordingly of the view that the classification provided for
by clause 4 (1) of thoe Bill is valid to the limited extent to which the
Central Government is empowered to make the declaration in respect
of oJicnces alleged to have been committed during the period of
emergency, by persons holding high public or political offices. The
classification is invalid in so far as it covers offences committed by
such persons between February 27 and June 25, 1975. No declaration
can lhcrnfore be made by the Central Government in regard to those
offences and offenders under the present classification.
That disposes of the question as regard the validity of the classi-
E fication pru~ided for by clause 4(1) of the Bill. Those who are wrong-
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ly included in the classification can have nothing more to say because
they cannot be tried by the Special Courts. As regards those who are
rightly grouped together, we have already indicated that since the
classification is valid, it is unnecessary for the purposes of article 14
to eonsoder whether the procedure prescribed by the Bill is more onerous
than the ordinary procedure. That observation, it shall have been
noticed, is expressly limited to the purposes of article 14. The reason
for so limiting it is that the assumption underlying the judgment of the
majority in A. K. Gopalan vs. State of Madras(!) that ce11ain articles
of the Constitution exclusively deal with specific matters no longer
holds Jhe field A. K. Gopakm (supra) was in that respect c;:pressly
over-ruled by the majority in R. C. Cooper vs. Union of India,(")
known generally as the Bank Nationalisation case. In San1bhu Nath
Sarkar vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors.,( 3 ) it was held by a scvenJndge Dench that the law of preventive detention has Lo meet the challenge not only of articles 21 and 22 but also of articLc 19(1) (d). fa:
(1)
(2)
(3)
[1950] S.C.R. 88.
[1970] 3 S.C.R. 530, 578.
[197411 S.C.R. l.
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RE: SPECIAL COURTS BILL (Chandrachud,
<;;.!.)
547
Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of fodia(') it was observed by one of us,
Bhagwali, J. that the :aw must be now taken to be weli-settied that
article 2 l does not exclude article 19 and that even if there is a Jaw
prescribing " procedure for depriving a person of personal liberty and
there is co:1scquently no infringement of the fundamental right co!'forred hy article 21, such law, in so far as it abridges or takes away any
f1111d1m~ntal right under article 19, would have to meet the chall•onge
of t!iac adiclc. The view, which was accepted by the majority, is that
the rights dealt with in different articles contained in Part III o: tho
Constitution do not represent separate streams of rights but are parts
of w1 integrated corn;titutional scheme. It is thus beyond the pale of
controve"y r.ow, that the various articles in part III of the Constitution c-unno~ be treated as mutually exclusive.
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~l~on that vie\v, it is not su:fficlent to say that since the classifica-
tion is valiJ, it is not necessary to consider whether the procedure prescribed by the Bill is more onerous, than the ordinary procedure. The
onerousness of the special procedure would be irrelevant in consideraticns arising und•or article 14, for the reason that the classification is
valid (to lhc extent indicated). But the Bill has got to meet the challenge d ether provisions of the Constitution also, in so far as any
particular provision is attracted. The theory thrrt articles conferring
fundamental rights are mutually exclusive and that any particular article m part III corn;titutes a self-contained code having been discarded,
it becomes necessary to examine whether the procedure prescribed by
the Bill is violative of any other provision of the Constitution
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Article '.:l is the only other provision of the Constitution which
is appcsitc in this context. It provides that no person shall be deprived
of his life or personal liberty except ·according to the procedure estab- F
lishcd by !c.w. In Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India( i), it was held
by the majc · ity that the procedure contempla~od by article 21 must be
"right and just and fair and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive; otherwise, it would be no procedure at all and the requirement of article 21
would not be satisfied''. It is ther,fore imperative to examine whether\
the pr<,ccdure prescribed by the Bill is just and fair or is in any respect G
arbitrary or oppressive.
An infinite variety of grievances has been made against the provisions of the Bill. Some of them are so unsubstantial that we consider
it 1111neccsscry to catalogue them. We will refer to a few of them only
as a sample of the many that were made. ' It is urged that a person put
(I)
(!)
fl978] 2 S.C.R. 621.
[1978] 2 S.C.R. 621, 674.
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up for trial before the Special Court is denied the benefit of section
439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, nnder which a High Court or
a Court of Sessions may relea.Se an accused on bail; that it is permissible
to the Government under the provisions of the Bill to choo.>e a situs
of trial which is inconvenient to the accused, denying thereby to him
the benefit of section 177 of the Code; that the Bill virtualiy abolishes
the court's supervisory jurisdiction over the investigation conducted by
the police; that the accused is denied the right of trial before courts
with limited powers of punishment; that the warrant procedure prescribed by the Bill for the trial of offences is, in the circumstances, needlessly cumbersome; that there is no provision for coufu-ming the sentence of death, if any is passed, by the Special Court, that the Bill
confers the right of appeal in every case, as much on the State as on
the accused and thereby enlarges the rights of the State and imposes
uncalled for burden on the accused; that whereas the Code of Criminal Proce<lure requires the State to obtain the leave of the court before
filing an appeal against an order of acquittal, the Bili imposes no such
pre-condition, and so on aud so forth.
We have given our anxious consideration to these and similar other
grievances and apprehensions but we see no substance in them, except
to the extent to be indicated later. By clause 9 of the Bili, an accused
put up for trial before the Special Court has to be tried by th;, procedure prescribed by the Code for the trial of warrant cases before a
magistrate. The trial, save as otherwise prescribed has to be governed
by the said Code. In Syed Qasim Razvi (snpra) it was held by this
Court that the warrant procedure is in no sense prejudicial to the interest
of an accnsed. As regards bail, it is open to the accused to ask for it and
in appropriate cases, the Special Court would be justifietl in enlarging
him on bail. As regards the situs of trial, it is unfair to make an assumption of mala tides and say that an inconvenient fornm will be chosen
deliberately. Besides, the provisions of chapter XIII of the Code
containing section 177 to 189, which deal with "Jurisdiction of the
criminal courts in Inquiries and Trials", are not excluded by the Bill.
Those provisions will govern the question as to the situs of trial. The
grievance regarding absence of provision for the confirmation of death
sentence is unreal because under clause 10 (1), every accused has a
right of appeal to this Court. There is no reason to suppooe that this
right is in any sense nan ower than the right of an accused to ask the
High Court to examine the correctness of the death sentence impo•ed
by the Sessions Court. In so far as the other grievances are concerned,
they are loo trivial to justify the charge that the procedure prescribed
by the Bill is unjust or nnfair. In fact most of the other grievances in
this category were made on behalf of the accused in Syed Qasim
RE: SPECIAL COURTS BILL (Chandrachud,
C.J.)
549
Razi and Habeeb Mohamed (supra) but they were rejected by this
Court. Every variation in procedure is not to be assumed to be unjust
and indeed as observed by this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Silish(supra)
which was followed in Union of India vs. Sukumar Pyne,(1 ) a person
accused of the commission of an offence has no vested right to be
trkd by a particular court or a particular procedure el\cept in so far as
there is any constitutional objection by way of discrimination or the
violation of any o!her fundamental right is involved. In Sanjay Gandhi!
vs. Un:on of Jndia,( 2 ), one of us, Krishna Iyer J., said that no party to
a criminal trial has a vested right in slow motion ju;tice. This has to be
constantly kept in mind without, of course, overlooking the Constitu-.
tional inhibitions.
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Though this is so, the provisions of the Bill appear to us to be unfair and unjust in three important respects. In the first place, there is
no provision in the Bill for the transfer of cases from one Special Court
to a!1other. 1 he manner in which a Judg~ conducts himself may disclose " bias, in which case the interest of justice would require that
the trial of the case ought to be withdrawn from him. TI1e;e are other
cases in which a Judg~ may not in fact be biased and yet the accused
may entertain a reasonable apprehension on . account of attendant
circumstances that he will not get a fair trial. It is of the utmost
importnr;ce that justice must not only be done but must be seen to be
done. To compel an accused to submit to the jurisdiction of a Court
which, in fact, is biased or is reasonably apprehended t0 be biased is
a violation of the fundamental principles of natural justice and a denial
of fair play. There are yet other cases in which exped;cncy or convenience :nay require the transfer of a case, even tf no bias is involved.
The abs•oncc of provision for transfer of trials in appropriate cases may
undermiqe the very confidence of the people in the Special Courts as
an institution set up for dispensing justice.
The second infirmity from which the procedural part of the Bill
sulfors is that by clause 7, Special Courts are to be presided over
either by a sitting Judge of a High Court or by a person who has held
office as Judge of a High Court to be nominated by the Central Government in consultation with the Chief Justice of India. The provision
for the appointment of a sitting High Court Judge as a Judg·~ of the
Special Court is open to no exception. In so far as the alternate source
(1) [1966] 2 S.C.R. 34, 38.
(2) A.l.R.' 1978 S.C. 514.
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is concerned, we entertain the highest respect for i'otired Judges of
High Courts and we are anxious that nothing said by us in our judgment should be construed as casting any aspersion on them as a class.
Some of them have distinguished themselves as lawyers once again, some
as members of administrative tribunal, and many of them arc in
demand in important walks of life. Unquestionably they occupy a
B position of honour and respect in society. But one car.not shut one's
cy.cs to the constitutional position that whereas by article 217, a sitting
ll(fodge of a High Court enjoys security of tenure until he altains a particular age, the retired Judge will hold his office as a Judge of the Special
Court during the pleasure of the Government. The pleasure doctrine is
C ,,.subversive of judicial independence.
A retired Judge presiding over a Special Court, who displays
strength and independence may be frowned upon by the Government
and there is nothing to prevent it from terminating his appointment as
"' and when it likes. It is said on behalf of the Government th~t if the
D appointment has to be made in consultation with lh·c Chief Justice of
India, the termination of the appointment will also require similar conV sultation. We are not impressed by that submission. But, granting that
the argument is valid, the process of consultation has ils own limitationc;
and they are quite well-known. The obligation to conrnlt may not
necessarily act as a check on an executive which is determined to
E remove an inconvenient incumbent. We are, therefore, of the opinion
that clause 7 of the Bill violates article 21 of the Constitution to the
extent that a person who has held office as a Judge of tho High Court
can be appointed to preside over a Special Court, merdy in consultation
with the Chief Justice of India.
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Yet another infirmity from which the procedure prescribed by the
Bill suffers is that the only obligation which clause 7 imposes on the
Central Government while nominating a person to preside over the
Special Court is to consult the Chief Justioo of India. This is not a
proper place and it is to some extent embarrassing to dwell upon the
pitfalls of the consultative process though, by hearsay, one may say
that as a matter of convention, it is in the rarest of rat•:! cases that the
advice tendered by the Chief Justice of India is not accepted by the
Government. But the right of an accused to life and liberty cannot bo
made to depend upon pious expressions of hope, howsoever past experience may justify them. The assurance that conventions are seWom
broken is a poor consolation to an accused whose life and honour are
at stoke. lndeed, one must look at the matter not so much from the
point of view of the Chief Justio" of India, nor indeed from the point
of view of the Government, as from the point of view of the accusad
RE : SPECIAL COURTS BILL ( Chandrachud, C.J.)
5 51
and the expectations and semitivitics of the society. It is of the greatest
importance that in the name of fair and unpolluted justice, the proceJure for appointing a Judge to the Special Conrt, who is to be nominated to try a special class of cases, should inspire the confidence not
only of the accused but of the entire community. Administration of
justice has a social dimension and the soci,~ty at large has a stake in
impartial and even-handed jnstice.
These, in our opinion, are the three procednral infirmities from
wbich the Bill suffers and which are violative of article 21 of the Constitution, in the sense that they make the procedure prescribed by the
Bill unjust and unfair to the accused.
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These points wore highlighted during the course of lhe hearing of
the reference, whereupon the learned Solicitor General flied a stateme'!t in the Conrt to the following effoct :
"I. That in the course of written snbmissions already
filed, it has been contended on behalf of the Union of India
that the procedure for trial envisaged in the Bill under Reference is more liberal and ensures a fair trial.
2. That the last recital in the Preamble to the Bill atales
that some procedural changes were being made whereby
avoidable delay is eliminated without interfering with the
right to a fair trial.
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3. That in ¢e course of arguments, certain ob.:;ervations
were made by this hon'ble Conrt indicating certain changes
which might ensure fairer trial and inspire greater confidence about the working of Special Courts.
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4. That in the light of the proceedings in the Comt, certain suggestions were communicated by the Solictor General
to the Government.
5. That after careful consideration, the Government
accepts the suggestion that only a sitting Judge of the High
Court would be appointed to preside over a Speciai Court
and that the Government also agrees that the appointment will
be made with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of India.
6. That the Government also agrees to the suggestion that
the Supreme Court will be specifically empowered to transfer
a case from one Special Court to another notwithstanding any
other provision in the Bill.
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7. That the Government of India have authoriseu the Solicitor General to make a statement to the Court on the above
1'ines.
Sd/- S. N. Kacker
Solictor General of India 25"9-78
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Tho learned Solicitor General assured us that the Government
is .committe.Vto making appropriate changes in the bill as mentioned
in para%raph 5 and 6 above. Though we appreciate the response of
the Government it has to be remembered that appropriate amendments
shall have to be passed by the logislaturc. The assurance that such
amendments will be proposed by the Government and the prospect that
they may be passed by the legislature cannot relieve us from dischargini;
our duty to pronounce upon the Bill as it stands to-day. So long as
· the Bill contains the three offending provisions which we have pointed
out above, the procedure will be violative of article 21, being unjust
and unfair. The other objectivns are withuut any substance, particularly
D ' in view of the fact that the trial is to be held by no Jess a person than
a Judge of a High Court and there is a right of appeal to this Court.
These two are the outstanding, nay, rhe saving safeguards of the Bill.
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There is one more provision of the Bill to which we must refer while
we are on this question. Sub-clause ( 1) of clause 4 provides for th~
i; making of the declaration by the Central Government while subclausc (2) provides that "Such declaration shall not be called in question in any court". Though the opinion which the Central Government has to form under clause 4(1) is subjective, we have no doubt
that despite the provisions of sub--clause (2) it will be open to judici2! review al least within the limits indicated by
this Court in
F Khudiram Das vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors.(') lt was observed in that case by one of us, Bhagwati J., while speaking for the
Court, that in a Government of laws "there is nothing like unfettered
discretion immune from judicial reviewability". The opinion has tG be
formed by the Government, to say the least, rationally and in a bonafide manner.
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There was some discussion before us on the question as to
whether the opinion rendered by this Court in the exercise of its
advisory jurisdiction under art. 143 ( 1) of the Constitution is binding
as Jaw declared by this Court within the meaning of art. 141 of the
Constitution. The question may have to be considered more fully
H on ~ future occasion but we do hope that the time which has been
(1)
[1975] 2 S.C.R. 832, 845.
...,.,
RE: SPECIAL COURTS BILL (Chandrachud, C.J.)
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553
spent in determining the questions arising in thls reference shall not
have been spent in vain. In the cases 9f Estate Duty Bill('), U.P.
Legislative Assembly('), and St. Xaviers College,(') the view was expressed that advisory opinions do not have the binding force of law.
In Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for Canada(')
it was even said by the Privy Council that the opinions expressed by
the Court in its advisory jurisdiction "will have no more effect than
the .opinions of the law officers". On the o'ther hand, the High
Court of Calcutta in Ram Kishore Sen v. Union of India(') and the
High Court of Gujarat in Chhabildas Mehta v. The Legislative
Assembly, Gujarat State( 6 ) have taken the view that the opinion
rendered by the Supreme Court under art. 143 is law declared by
it within the meaning of art. 141. In The Province of Madras v.
Messrs Boddu Baidanna(') the Federal Court discussed the opinion
rendered by it in the Central Provinces case ( 8 ) in the same manner
as one discusses a binding judgment. We are inclined to the view
that though it is always open to this Court to re-examine the question
alreJdy decided by it and to over-rule, if necessary the view earlier
taken by it insofar as all other courts in the territory of India are
concerned they ought to be bound by the view expressed by this
court even in the exercise of its advisory jurisdiction under art.
143(1) of the Constitution. We would also like, to draw attention
to the observations made by Ray, CJ., in St. Xaviers College (supra)
that even if the opinion given in the exercise of advisory jurisdiction
may not be binding, it is entitled to great weight. It would be strange
that a decision given by this Court on a question of law in a dispute
between two private parties should be binding on all courts in this
country but the advisory opinion should bind no one at all even if
as in the instant case, it is given after issuing notice to all interested
parties, after hearing everyone concerned who desired to be heard,
and after a full consideration of the questions raised in the
reference. Almost everything that could possibly be urged in favour
of and against the Bill was urged before us and to think that our
opinion is an exercise in futility is deeply frustrating. While saying
this, we are not nmnindful of the view expressed by an eminent
(I)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
[1944] F.C.R. 317, 320, 332, 341.
(196511 S.C.R. 413, 446-47.
[1975] I S.C.R. 173 201-202.
[1912] A.C. 571, 589.
A.I.R. 1965 Cal 282.
(1970) II Gujarat Law Reporter 729.
[l942] F.C.R. 90.
[1959] F.C.R. 18.
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writer that although the advisory opinion given by the Supreme Court
has high persuasive authority, it is not Jaw declared by it within the
meaning of artjcle 141. (See Constitutional Law of India by
H.M. Seervai, 2nd Edition, Vol. II, page 1415, para 25.68).
We have upheld the creation of Special Courts on the touchstone
of the Constitution. We have also expressed the view that appointment of sitting Judges of the High Court to the Special Courts, with
the concurrence of the Chief Justice of India, will meet the requirement of article 21. But we cannot rei;ist the observation which was
made during the course qf arguments that investing the High Courts
with jurisdiction to try cases under the Bill may, in the circumstances,
afford the bei;t solution from every point of View. The Chief Justices
of High Courts will, in their discretion, assign and allocate particular
cases to Judges of their Courts, as they do in the normal routine of
their function. To avoid delays and to ensure speedier trial no other
work may be assigned to the Judge nominated by the Chief Justice to
try a case or cases under the Bill. llis will obviate the nomination
by the Central _Government, of a particular Judge to try a particular
case. Law is not the whole of life and the propriety of an action,
though not fpr the Court to decide, ought to be a matter of paramount consideration for those who desire to govern justly and fairly.
Courts of Justice caunot afford even to risk the charge of bias and
no Judge wants it to be said of him that he was specially nominated
by the Government to try a particular individual. The community
must retain its confidence in the judiciary, which has to decide not
merely consl!itutional matters but a large variety of other matters in
which law toncncs the life of common men at many points. As said
by Prof Finer in 'The Theory and Practice of Modem Government'
(pp. J 51-152). "The multitude does not minutely discriminate, and
when it mistrusts for one thing it may mistrust for another though the
cases are poles asunder". The deeply thoughtful observations made
in this behalf by our learned Brother, Shinghal J, ought to receive
the most careful consideration at the hands df the Government.
In conclusion, our answer to the reference is as follows :
( 1) The Parliament has the legislative competence to
create Special Courts and to provide that an appeal shall lie
as of right from any judgement or order of a Special Court
to make a declaration under Clause 4(1) of the Bill in respect
to the Supreme Court. Clauses 2 and 10(1) of the Bill
are, therefore, within the Parliament's legislative competence;
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( 2) The classification prqvided for in Clause 4 (1) of
the Bill is valid to the extent to which the Central Government is empowered to make a declaration in respect of
offences alleged to have been committed during the period
of Emergency by persons who held high public or political
offices in India. Persons who are alleged to have committed offence prior to the declaration of Emergency cannot
validly be grouped along with those who arc alleged to
have committed offences during the period of Emergency.
It is, therefore, not competent to the Central Government
to make a declaration under Clause 4(1) of the Bill in re~pect of persons who are alleged to have committed offences
between February 27, 1975 and June 25, 1975.
( 3) The procedure prescribed by the Bill for the trial of
offences in respect of which a: declaration can be validly
made by the Central Government under Clause 4(1) of
the Bill is just and fair except in regard to the following
matters :
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(a) the provision in Clause 7 of the Bill, under which
a retired Judge of· the High Court can be appointed as a Judge of the Special Court;
(b) the provision in Clause 7 under which the appointment of a Judge to the Special Court can be made
by the Central Government in consultation with but
without the concurrence of the Chief Justice of
India; and
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( c) the absence of a provision for transfer of a case
from one Special Court to another.
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( 4) The Bill is valid and constitutional in all other respects.
KRISHNA IYER, J.-Not a note of absonance but a stroke of emphasis is my main intent in appending this separate opinion confined to
a few fundamentals. It is fair to make clear at the outset that all the
legal conclusions reached by the learned Chief Justice command my
concurrence but, on certain key issues, my ratiocination diverges,
sounding harsher and striking harder maybe. However, the final confluence and considerable consonance cut down my coverage. The price
of unanimity is not taciturnity where individual articulation may make
distinctive contribution.
Right at the beginning, an exordial enunciation of my socio-legal
perspective which has a constitutional bearing may be set out. I lend
judicious assent to the boarder policy of social justice behind this
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The greatest trauma of our times, for a developing country of
urgent yet tantalising imperatives, is the dismal, yet die-hard, poverty
of the masses and the democratic, yet graft-riven, way of life of powerwielders. Together they blend to produce gross abuse geared to
personal aggrandizement, suppression of exposure and a host of other
horrendous, yet hidden, crimes by th~ summit executives, pro tem, the
para-political manipulators and the ~betting bureaucrats. And the
rule of law hangs limp or barks but never bites. An anonymous poet
sardonically projected the social dimension of this systemic deficiency:
"The law locks up both man and woman
Who steals the goose from off the common,
But lets the greater felon loose
Who steals the common from the goose."
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Bill.' AS< I read it, this measure is the em]Jryonic expression of a
necessitous legislative project, which, if full-fledged, will work a relentless break-through towards catching, through the compulsive criminal
process, the higher inhabitants of Indian public and political decks,
who have, in practice, remained 'untouchable' and 'unapproachable'.
to the rule of law. 'Operation Clean-Up' is a 'consummation devoutly to be wished', although naive optimism cannot obfuscate the obnoxious experience that laws made in terrorem against those who belong to the top power bloc prove in action ,to be paper tigers. The
pathology of our public law, with its class slant, is that an- unmincing ombudsman or sentinel on the qui vive with power to act against
those in power, now or before, and offering legal access to the informed citizen to complain with immunity does not exist, despite all the·
bruited umbrage of political performers agairu,t peculations and perversions by higher echelons. Law is what law does. not what law
says and the moral gap between word and deed menaces people's
faith in life and law. And then, the tragedy-democracy becomes a
casualty.
The impact of 'summit' crimes in the Third World setting is more
terrible than the Watergate syndrome as perceptive social scientists
have unmasked. Corruption and repression-cousins in such situations-hijack developmental processes. And, in the long run. lagging national progress means ebbing people's confidence in constitutional means to social justice. And so, to track down and give
short shrift to these heavy-weight criminaloids who often mislead the
people by public moral weight-lifting and multipoint manifestoes is
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RE: SPECIAL COURTS BILL
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an urgent legislative mission partially undertaken by the Bill under
discussion. To punish such super-offenders in top positions, sealing
off legalistic escape routes and dilatory strategies and bringing them
to justice with high speed and early finality, is a desideratum voiced
in vain by Commissions and Committees in the past and is a dimension of the dynamics of the Rule of Law. This Bill, hopefully but
partially, breaks new ground contrary to people's resigned cynicism
that all high-powered investigatio·.as,
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end in legislative and judicative futility, that all these valiant exercises
are but sound and fury signifying nothing, that 'business as usual' is
the signature tune of public business, heretofore, here and hereafter.
~ · So this social justice measure has my broad assent in moral p:·inciplc
and in constitutional classification, subject to the serious infirmities.
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from which it suffers as the learned Chief Justice has tersely sketched.
Whether this remedy will effectively cure the malady of criminal summitry is for the future to tell.
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All this serves as a backdrop. Let me unfold in fuller argumentD
tation my thesis that the Bill, good 50 far as it goes, is bad so far
as it does not go-saved though by a pragmatic exception I will presently explain. Where the proposed law excludes the pre-and post-emer-'
gency crime-doers in the higher brackets and picks out only 'Emer- 1
gency' offenders, its benign purpose perhaps becomes a crypto cover-',
up 0;f like criminals before and after. An 'ephemeral' measure to E
meet a perennial menace is neither a logical step nor mitional fulfilment. The classification, if I may anticipate my conclusion. is
on the brj_nk of constitutional break-down at that point and becomes
almost vulnerable to the attack of Art~ 14
The Court's advisory opinion is sought, not on social policy but
on constitutionality. Here, however, it is my very endorsement of
the basic policy of the Bill, the apparent motive of the mover, the
trne principle of the measure and the urgent relevancy of the legislation-swifts, sure, yet fair justice to apex offenders in public and
political life-that compels me to be critical of a few provisions on
grounds too basic to .be slurred over. I start with the assumption
that an Act of this nature, with the major changes mentioned by the
'Chief Justice to avert collision with Art. 21 and with wider coverage
to come to terms with Art. 14, is long overdue and, if passed into
law and enforced peremptorily, may partly salvage the sunken credibility of the general community in democracy-in-action, already demoralised, since Independence, by the perversion of power for oblique
purposes as evidenced by periodical parliamentary debates arid many
Commission Reports still gathering dust.
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To drive home my point, a little divagation is needed. Development, in a State which directs the economy, means public expenditure on an unprecedented scale for publia weal and this national
necessity is sometimes covertly converted into personal opportunity
by people in lofty offices vested with authority for decision-making.
The realistic rule of law must reckon with the pernicious potential of
f;Uided missiles in the hands of misguided men. especially when the
victim is a 'soft' State, and must rise to meet the menace and manacle the delinquent, be he ever so high. I have said enough to justify
the contention that these offenders perfectly fill the constitutional bill
as a separate class which deserves speedy prosecution and final punishment by high judicial agencies if restoration of the slumping credence
in the constitutional order and democratic development were to be
sustained among the masses in Third .World countries. The Preamble to the Bill is revelatory of this orientation and the mover of the
Bill, Shri Ram Jethmalani, appearing in person, indicated as much.
No erudite pedantry can stand in the way of pragmatic grouping
of high-placed office-holders separately, for purposes of high-speed
criminal action invested with early conclusiveness and inquired into
by high-level courts. The differentia of the Bill rings irresistibly
~S£!!!JQ. And failure to press forward such clean-up undertaJODgmay
be a blow to the rule of law and the rule of life and may deepen the
crisis of democracy among the millions-the men who make our
nation-who to-day are largely disenchanted. So it is time, if peaceful transformation is the constitutional scheme, to begin by pr•~-emp
tive steps of quick and conclusive exposure and conviction of criminals in towers of power-a special class of economic offenders with
abettors from the Bureaucracy and Big Business, as recent Commis:r sion Reports trendily portray and portent. Such is the simple, sociologic!l! substance of the classificatory descrimen which satisfies the
e~itarian conscience of Art. 14. What better designs-engineering
can there be than to make a quick example of master-criminals and
tainted caesars with public office as protective mantle ? The funda:nental dynamics of Public Power-great trust and sure accountabiG
lity-rank high in a people-oriented scheme of the rule of law.
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I hold that in this generalised version, there is a reasonable classification implicit in this legislation, but venture further that it i5 perilously near being lll!der-inclusive and, therefore, unequal. For it is
a truncated projection of a manifetsly wider principle that ~:xalted
offenders shall be dealt with by the criminal law with emergent speed
so that the common man may know that when public power is abused
for private profit or personal revenge the rule of law shall rapidly
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RE: SPECIAL COURTS BllL
(Krishna Iyer,!.)
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run them down and restore the faith of the people in democratic
institutions through speedy justice according to law. It is in this sense
that very important persons wielding iarge administrative powers shall,
with quick despatch, be tried and punished, if guilty. Prompt trial
and early punishment may be necessary in all criminal cases. But,
raw realism suggests that in a decelerating situation of slow motion
justice, with courts chocked by dockets, there is a special case for
speedier trial and prompter punishment where the offender sits at the
top of the administrative pyramid. Leizurely justice, year after the
long-drawn-out commission proceedings, hardly carries conviction
when man's memories would have forgotten the grave crimes, if
any, committed and men's confidence in the rule of law would have
been wholly demolished by seeing the top brass continuing to hold
such offices despite credible charges of gross crimes of misuse. The
common people watch the fortunes of these favoured species when
they violate the norms of the criminal law and. if they are not punished forthwith, lose faith in the system itself. The cynicism about 'equal
justice under the law' sours into 'show me the man and I will show
you the law'. The democratic system must ensure that the business
of power-public power-shall not be doing business.
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The social philosphy and philosophy of law in this area emphatically
require that offices of public power, especially in a couutq of poverty,
shall not be the workshop of personal gain.
The immediate correctional process is the court, not the once-in-a-few years ballot. Be you
ever so high the law will watch you, catch you, convict you if guilty and
that, swiftly but fairly.
The crucial test is 'All power is a trust', its holders are 'accountable
for its exercise', for 'from the people, and for the people, all springs, and
all must exist'. By this high and only standard the Bill must fail morally if it exempts non-Emergency criminals about whom prior Commission Reports, now asleep in official pigeon holes, bear witness
and
future Commission Reports (who knows ?) may, in time, testify.
In
this larger perspective, Emergency is not a substantial differentia and
the Bill nearly recognises this by ante-dating the operation to February
27, 1975 when there was no 'Emergency'.
Why ante-date if
the
'emergency' was the critical criterion ?
It il; common knowledge that currently in our country criminal courts
excel in slow-motion. The procedure is dilatory, the dockoti are
heavy, even the service of process is delayed and, still more exasperating,
there are appeals upon appeals and revisions and supervisory jurisdictions,, baffling and baulkini: speedy termination of prosecutions, not to
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speak of the contribution to delay by the Administration itself by ne~
Ject of the basic necessaries of the judicial process. Parliamentary and
pre-legislative exercises spread over several years hardly did any-thing
for radical simplification and streamlining of criminal procedure and
virtually re-enacted, with minor mutations, the vintage Code making
forensic flow too slow and liable to hold-up& built into the law. Courts
are Jess to blame than the Code made by Parliament for dawdling and
Governments are guilty of denying or delaying basic amenities for the
judiciary to function smoothly. Justice is a Cinderalla in our scheme.
Even so, leaving V. V. I. P. accused to be dealt with by the routinely
procrastinating legal process is to surrender to interminable delays as
an inevitable evil. Therefore, we should not be finical about absolute
processual equality and must be creative in innovating procedures compelled by special situations.
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But the idiom of Art. 14 is unmistakeable.
The power status of
the alleged criminal, the nature of the alleged crime vis-a-vis public
confidence and the imperative need for speedy litigative finality, are the
'Speedy trial'
telling factors.
Every difference, is not a differentia.
of offences of a public nature 'committed by persons who have held high
public or political offices in the country and others connected with the
commission of such offences' is the heart of the matter.
I.et us take a close look at the 'Emergency', the vices it bred and
the nexus they have to speedier justice, substantial enough to qualify for
reasonable sul>-classification.
Information flowing from the proceedings and reports of a bunch of high-powered judicial commissions shows
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that during that hushed spell, many suffered shocking treatment.
the words of the Preamble, civil liberties were withdrawn to a great extent, important fundamental rights of the people were suspended, strict
censorship on the press was placed and judicial powers were curtailed
to a large extent.
Before proceeding further, the Legislative and Judicative frontier's
must be perceived with perspicacity, as set out in Murthy Watch Works
etc. etc. v. The Asst. Collector of Central Excise, etc.(')
"Every differentiation is uot a
discrimination.
But
classification can be sustained only if it is founded on pertinent
and real differences as distingui'shed from irrelevant and artificial ones.
The constitutional standard by which the sufficiency of the differentia which form a valid basis for classification may be measured, has been repeatedly stated by the
(I) [1974] 3 S.C.R. 121 at 130.
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RE : SPECIAL COURTS BILL
(Krishna Iyer, J.)
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courts. If it rests on a difference which bears a fair and just
relation to the object for which it is proposed, it is constitutional.
To put it differently, the means must have nexus
with the ends.
Even so, a large latitude is allowed to the
State for classification upon a reasonable basis and what is
reasonable is a question of practical details and a variety of
factors which the court will be reluctant and perhaps illequiped to investigate. In this imperfect world perfection even in
grouping is an ambition hardly ever accomplished.
In this
context,, we have to remember the relationship between the
legislative and judicial departments of Government in the determination of the validity of classification.
. ..... A power
to classify being extremely broad and based on diverse considerations of executive pragmatism, the judicature cam10t rush
in where even the legislatiire warily treads."
The core question, however, i's what reasonable relation Emergency, as
the basis of classification, has to the object of the legislation.
This takes us to two telling aspects which deserve careful examination,
What are the special factors relied on for classification and what is the
legislative goal and then-that gut issue-what is the correlation between the two ? The integral yoga of means and ends is the essence of
valid classification.
An excellent classification may not qualify for
exemption from equality unless it is yoked to the statutory goal. This
is the weak link in the Bill.
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The Objects and Reasons are informative material guiding the court
about the purpose of a legislation and the nexus of the differentia, if
any, to the end in view. Nothing about Emergency period is adverted
to there as a distinguishing mark. If at all, the clear clue is that all
abuse of public authoritY by exalted public men, whatever the time of
commission, shall be punished without the tedious delay which ordinarily defeats justice in the case of top echeloilS whose crimes affect the
credentials of democratic regimes.
The Court in Mohammad Shujat Ali & Ors. v. Union of India &
Ors.(') has explained the constitutional facet of classification :
"This doctrine recognises that the legislature may classify
for the purpose of legislation hut requires that the classification must be reasonable.
It should ensure that persons or
things similarly situated are all similarly treated.
The measure of reasonableness of a classification is the degree of its
succes' in treating similarly those similarly situated.
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(1) [1975] I S.C.R. 449 at 477.
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But the question is : what does this ambiguous and crucial
phrase 'similarly situated' mean ? Where are we to look for
the test of similarity of situation which determines the reasonableness of a classification ?
The inescapable answer is
that we must look beyond the· classification to the purpose of
the law. A reasonable classification is one which includes all
persons or things similarly situated with respect to the purpose
of the iaw:·
After having stated the general proposition the Court struck .1 note
of warning which is the main crux of the present controversy : (')
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"The fundamental guarantee is of equal protection of th·e
laws and the doctrine of classification is only a subsidiary rub
evolved by courts to give a practical content to that guarantee
by accommodating it with the practical needs of the society and
it should not be allowed to submerge and drown the. precious
guarantee of equality.
The doctdne of classification should
not be carded to a point where instead of being a useful servant, it becomes a dangerous master, for otherwise, as pointed
out by Chandrachud, J. in State of lammu & Kashmir v.
Triolki Nath Khosa (2) "the guarantee of eqnality will be submerged in class legislation masquerading as laws meant to
govern well-marked classes characterised by different and distinct attainments." .......... That process would inevitably end in substituting the doctrine of classification for the
doctrine of equality : the fundamental right to equality before the law and equal protection of the laws may be replaced
by the overworked methodology of classification.
Our approach to the equal protection clause must, therefore, be guided by the words of caution uttered by Krishna Iyer, J. in
State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Trilnki Nath Khosa(2) "Miniclassifications based on micro-distinctions are false to our
egalitarian faith and only substantial and straight forward classificd:jon plainly promoting relevant goals can have constitutional validi:y. To overdo classification is to undo equality."
(emphasis added)
Mo.thew, J., in Ambica Mills( 3 ) placed the same accent from the
aape of under-inclusion :
Ibid at 478.
(2) [197411 s.c.c. 19.
(3) State of Gujarat & Anr. v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd. Ahmedabad [l974J
3 S.C.R. 760 &t 782.
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"The equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.
But laws may classify ........ A reasonable classification is one which includes all who are similarly sitll11ted and none who are not. The question i's what
does the phrase 'similarly situated' mean? The answer to the
question is that we must look beyond the classification to the
purpose of the law.
The purpose of a law may be either
the elimination of a public mischief or the achievement of some
positive public good.
A classification is under-inclusive when all who are inc'uded in the class are tainted with the mischief but there are others
also tainted whom the classification does not include. In other
words, a classification is bad as under-inclusive when a State
benefits or burdens persons in a manner that fnrthers a legitimate purpose but does not confer the same benefit or plac:o the
same burden on others who are similarly situated.
A classi··
fication is over-inclusive when it includes not only !hos" who
are similarly situated with respect to the purpose but others
who are not so situated as well."
(emphasis added)
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Herc, what is the similarly circumstanced class which, according to
the mandate of Art. 14, must be similarly treated ? Is there any substantial differentiation between corrupters of public power before and
after February 27, 1975 or before and after Emergency ? Are they
not 'birds of a feather' who must 'flock together', tried alike and receive
fae fruits of justice equally ? What genetic distinction justifies a dissection between bribe-taking ministers of yesterday, to-day and tomorrow
so far as-and this is the water mark--exemplary immediacy and instant finality of judicial processing are concerned ?
The prologuic part of the Bill states that the hushed spell of the
Emergency era was haunted by a hundred vampirish villainies which
held vital freedoms in thraldom.
Fazal Ali, J. condensed them .in
State of Rajastha11 & Ors, etc. v. Union of India etc.(') and these observations are borrowed in the Preamble to the Bill-and stated
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"(2) that civil liberties were withdrawn to a great extent;
(13) that important fundamental rights of the peoplo were
suspended;
( 4) that strict censorship on the press was placed; and
(1) [1978] I S.C.R. I at 118.
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( 5) that the judicial powers were crippled to a large extent"
The question is not whether the tragic quadruplex of vices did
exist-we must, in law, assume they did-but what is the. substantial
linkage between the then prevalent morbid conditions and the unavailability of normal processes of prosecuting corrupt or oppresive administrators in the criminal courts. Whern magistrates and Sessions Judges
forbidden from taking cognisance of cases of bribery if the
accused
happened to be ministers or their collaborators? Were criminal
misuses of power by high functionaries deleted from the court':; jurisdiction ? Were witnesses banned from testifying or the police prohibited from investigating ? No. Top political power-wielders had in
the past often escaped, even after judicial commissions had found
a
prima facie case against them. The pathology of their escape from
the coils of the judical process cannot be misdiagnosed as due only to
the Emergency virus.
That approach side-tracks the solution and
serves to continue the sickness.
For instance, secrecy and authority
are th(' armoury of dubious and arrogant power.
The right to know
is a fundamental facet of free' action and the Official Secrets Act is
often a shield of the corrupt. Fearless investigation is a sine qua non
of exposure of delinquent 'greats' and if the investigative agencies
tremble to probe or make public the felonies of high office white cellar
offenders in the peaks may be unruffled by the law. An· independent
investigative agency to be set in motion by any responsible citizen is a
et al, are not to be ignored in the incessant
desideratum.
These
din of 'Emergency Excesses'.
The relevancies n'lied on in the Preamble bearing on Emergency
and its nexus to. speedier trial may be analysed. Civil liberties were
suppressed, press censorship was clamped down and judicial powers
were curtailed.
Asspming civil liberty was a casualty during
the
Emergency, as it was, how did it obstruct trials of super-political criminals ? If faith in domocratic institutions is the victim in
case
there is undue delay in punishing high public and political offenders,.
that holds good, regardless of Emergency. Likewise, if the Press had
been suppressed during Emergency what had that to do with political
criminals being brought to book by filing complaints before courts ?
If judicial powers were crippled by the Proclamation and the follow-up
notification, they affected the High Courts' and Supreme Court's jurisdictions to grant relief against preventive detention or denial of certain
freedoms .. What had that to do with prompt prosecution in trial courts
of high political criminals-that perennial post-Independence species ?
If substantial relation between the distinguishing criterion and the goal
of the law be the only clas·sificatory justification qualifying for exemp-
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RE : SPECIAL COURTS BILL
(Krishna Iyer, J.)
56 5
lion from equal treatment. Emergencey does not segrega(e corrupt
ministers and elected caesars into two categories. They are a common
to
enemy with continuity in space and time and, for social justice
show up, mnst be tracked down by a permanent statute.
Even if liberty had
Let ns view the pJoblem slightly differently.
not been curtailed, press not gagged or writ jurisdiction not cut down,
criminal trials and appeals and revisions would have taken their own
interminable delays. It is the forensic delay that has to be axed and
that has little to do with the vices of the Emergency.
Such crimes
were exposed by judicial commissions before, involving Chief Ministers
and cabinet minister's at both levels and no criminal action followed
except now and that of a select group. It was lack of will-not Emergency--that was the villain of the piece in non-prosecution of cases
revealed by several Commissions like the Commission of Enquiry appointed by the Government of Orissa in 1967 (Mr. Justice Khanna),
the Commission of Enqniry appointed by the Government bf J&K in
1965 (Mr. Justice Rajagopala Ayyangar), the Mndholkar Commission
against 14 ex-United Front Ministers appointed by the Government
of Bihar in 1968 and the T. L. Venkatarama Aiyar Commission of Inquiry appointed by the Government of Bihar, 1970--to mention but
some. We need hardly say that there is no law of limitation for crin1inal prosecutions. So1nehow, a few manage to be. 1above the ]aw and
the many remain below the law. How ? I hesitate to state.
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My point is that high-powered public and political offenders are
not a peculiar feature of the Emergency but has been a running stream
for Jong and bids fare to flow on, sometimes subterraneously, sometimes gushing through a mountain gorge. Therefore, a corrnpt continuity cannot be cut up without better justification.
F
Moreover, the 'human' rights dimensions of Art. 21 have a fatal
effect on legislative truncation of fair procedure. The contribution of
Maneka Gandhi case(') to humanization of processual justice is substantial.
I do not dilate on this aspect as the leading judgment has
dealt with it.
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The question, then,. is whether there is constitutional rationale for
keeping out of the reach of speedy justice non-emergency criminals in
high public or political offices. Such a Bill, were it a permanent addition to the corpus juris and available as a jurisdiction for the public
to compel government, if a prima fade case were made out even against
a minister in office, to launch a prosecution before a 'sitting High
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Court Judge, would be a wholesome corrective to the spreading evil of
It is apt to recall the words of Mr.
corruption in power pyramids.
Justice Khanna, Chairman.of the Law Commission.(')
"Every system of government requires that those wielding
power should use it for public good and should not make it
an instrument of self-seeking. All power is like a trust.
Those who derive it from the people are accountable tn show
that it has been exercised for the people. To repeat what I
said recently, abuse of authority by those in power inevitably
causes mass disillusionment and results in public frustration.
Nowhere is it more true than in a democratic set-up because
in democracy it is the people themselves who entrust power
to those whom they elect.
Abuse and misuse of authority
It can result in self-aggrandisement
can take many forms.
by the acqnisition of more authority by those put in power
and tlic use of that authority for eliminating political and personal opponents.
Such abuse of authority paves way to
Power can likewise be
authoritarianism and dictatorship.
abused by making it a source of personal enrichment. Corruption percolates and if those in power at the top tum corrupt, we would soon find that corruption and graft become
ubiquitous in all spheres of administration at lower levels.
Although corruption anywhere is reprehen8ible, developed
countries can somehow afford this vice, despise it how they
may, because their economy is already well-developed. In
the case of developing countries, corruption arrests and often
retm-ds the process of development and the nation pays a
value's.
Nothing
heavy price in terms of loss of moral
causes greater public dismay and shakes more the faith of the
people in democratic process and undermines their confidence in its working than the sight of these entrusted with
power by being elected to office by the people u·sing their
authority for self-aggrandisement and personal enrichment.
Purity of administration has much greater significance in
of
countries recently freed with economies in the process
development."
Having stated the case against the Emergency-oriented sub-classification, I still think that on constitutional principles, sanctified by decisions, it is possible to sustain or salvage this temporary measure which
isolates crimes and criminals during a pernicious period from the rest
(1) 18th Feroz Gandhi Memorial Ltcture.
RE: SPECIAL COURTS BILL
(Krishna Iyer,!.)
567
who share the same sinister properties.
When a salvationary alter- A
native is available, the Court should opt for it when the attack is under
Art. 14, provided the assuruptions of fact desiderated by the alternatives me plausible, not preposterous. The anatomy of the Emergency
as X-rayed in the Preamble, is all dark shadows which,, when read
imaginatively, leads to situations plausible, even probable :md readily
presumable.
Imagine, then, the ubiquitous police, acting under the B
inscrutable yet omnipotent powers of the MISA, seizing humans allergic to Authority and casting them into interminable incarceration in
hidden prisons, without any justiciable reasons or for sheer whim! No
court to call illegality to order or halt horrendous torture or challenge
high-handed uureason ! If this be a potential peril, naturally a dangerous situation develops, and unaccountable power once unsheathed,
ihe inauguration and escalation of such abuse becomes a
compulsive cqntinuum. Constitutioual tyranny is anathema to
decent democracy. In that state of nervous breakdown of the people,
sans speech, sans movement, sans security all of which are precariously dependent on a few psychotics in de facto power, the right to go to D
court and prosecute an absolutist in authority for corruption or misuse
of power is illusory.
If you speak up against crimes in high positions, if you complain to court about abuse of power, you may be
greeted with prompt detention and secret torture, with judicial relief
jettisoned and Press publicity lock-jawed.
If these macabre maybes
were assumed, there could be a noxious nexus between the Emergency , E
~eason and the sinister crimes covered by this Bill.
Maybe,, these
'scary assumptions are exaggerated but the Enquiry Reports produced
and Fazal Ali, J's observations earlier quoted do not permit a Judge
to dismiss them as imaginary.
It follows that a nexus between the
dilferentia and the object is not too recondite to be inferred.
To illustrate briefly may concretise clearly. If an Emergency F
authoritarian had a criminal 'deal' cognisable under anti-corruption
legislation and a knowledgeable citizen did file a complaint in court
or a writ petition challenging as ma/a fide an executive action motivated by graft it was quite on the cards that his way backhome might be
diverted into a hcispitable lock-up or hungry detention camp or horren- G
If a man's building was broken up by a heartless
dous torture c~ll.
bulldozer steered by a criminal authoritarian with police fanfare how
could information of criminal trespass oc grave mischief be laid before
the same police oc case launched before a magistrate if manacles are the
consequence ? The rule of law may survive on paper but panicked
into hiding where the wages of invocation of the legal process i'• un- H
questionable incarceration.
You may go to court but be sure or
tenancy in a penitentiary when you come out. These perilous possi-
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bilities might have been exaggerations but had some foundation, and
fear folds up the book of remedies. Thus the scary scenario of
'emergency excesses' bad a nexus with non-action against persons in
hi!Jh against authority and escalation of corruption and repression.when
judicial checks on abuse bad gone to sleep.
When men realise that
speech is iron and silence pieces of silver they become deaf and dumb,
law books notwithstanding.
Another good reason for upholding the classification is the legality
of the State's power to pick out a hectic phase, a hyper-pathological
period, a flash flood and treat that spell alone, leaving other like offensive periods well alone because of their lesser trauma. It is a question
of degree and dimension. This Court in Ambica Mills (I) observed :
"Mr. Justice Holmes,. in urging tolerance of under-inclusive classification, stated that such legislation should not be
disturbed by the Court unless it can clearly see that there is
no fair reason for the law which would not require with equal
force its extension to those whom it leaves untouched. What,
then, are the fair reasons for non-extension ? What should
a court do when it is faced with a law making an under-inclusive classification in areas relating to economic and tax matters.
Should it, by its judgment, force the legisiature to
choose between inaction or perfection ?
The legislature cannot be required to impose upon administrative agencies tasks which cannot be carried out or which
must be carried out '" a large scale at a single-stroke.
"If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt,
it is not to be overthrown because there are other instances
to which it might have been applied.
There is no doctrinnairn requirement that the legislation should be couched in
all em bracing terms."
(See West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish)(')
The Emergency was witness to criminal abuse of power, so says
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the Prean1ble, on a scale unheard of before or after. Therefore, this omi-
nous period lends itself to legislative segregation and special treatment.
Mr. Justice Mathew has e.xplored the jurisprudence of selective treatment as consi'stent with the pragmatism of eglitarianism. The present
Bill is a textbook illustration of the dictum : ( 3 )
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(!) [1974] 3 S.C.R. 760 at 783.
(2) 300 U.S. 379, 400.
(3) Guiarat v. Ambica Mills Ltd. [1974] 3 S.C.R. 760 at 782-783.
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RE : SPECIAL COURTS BILL (Krishna Iyer, /.)
56 9
"The piecemeal approach to a general problem permitted
by under-inclusive classifications, appears justified when it is
considered that legislative dealing with such problems is
usually an experimental matter. It is impossible to tell how
successful a particular approach may be, what dislocations
might occur, what evasions might develop, what new evils
might be generated in the attempt. Administrative expedients must be forged and tested.
Legislators, recognizing
these factors, may wish to proceed cautiously, and courts must
.allow them to do so 0supra).
Administrative coovenience in the collection of unpaid accumulations is a factor to be taken into account in adjudging
whether the classification is reasonable.
A legislation may
take one step at a time addressing itself to the phase of the
problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind. Therefore, a legislature might select only one phase of one field for
application or a remedy.(')
It may be remembered that article 14 does not require that
every regulatory statute apply to all in the same business; where
size is an index to the evil at which the law is directed, discriminations between the large and small are permissible, :md
it is also permissible. for reform to take one step at a time, ad·dressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most
acute to the legislative mind.
A legislative authority acting within its field is not bound
to extend its regulation to all cases which it might possibly
Teach.
The legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm
and it may confine the restrictions to those classes of cases
where the need seemed to be clearest (see Mutual Loan Co.
v. Martell) ( 2 ).
In short, the problem of legislative classification is a perennial one, admitting of no doctrinnaire definition.
Evils in
the same field may be of different dimensions and proportions requiring different remedies. Or so the legislature may
think (see Tigner v. Texas)('').
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Once an objective is decided to be within legislative
competence, however, the working out of clas·sification
has been only infrequently impeded by judicial negatives.
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(2) 56 L.Ed. 175, 180.
(3' 310 U.S. 141.
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The Courts attitude cannot be that the state either has to regulate all busine·sses, or even all related businesses and in the
same way, or, not at all.
An effort to strike at a particular
economic evil could not be hindered by the necessity of carrying in its wake a train of vexatious, trouble some and expensive
regulations covering the whole range of connec'.ed or similar
enterprises.''
"All or nothing" may lead to unworkable rigidity. Principled compromises are permissible in law where non-negotiable fundamentals are
not tampered with.
The Bill in question, viewed in this light, passes
the constitutional test.
The fabric of the offences before and during the Emergency is the
same, the motivation and the te.xture of the crime is no different. But,
in my view, what validates the special legislation is the abnormality of
the then conditions, th" intensive phase of corrupt operations and the
inexpediency of digging up old crimes. Ambica Mills (supra) is the
judicial justification for the classification.
To sum up, the Bill hovers perilously near unconstitutionality (Art.
14) in certain respects, but is surely saved by application of pragmatic
principles rooted in precedents. Nevertheless, justice to social jtlstice
is best done by a permanent statute to deal firmly and prGmp.Iy wi h
super-political offenders, since these 'untouchable' and 'unapproachable'
powerwielders have become sinister yet constant companions of Development in developing countries.
More remains to be done if
the
and
right to know and the right to express and expose arc to be real
access to remedies available,, absent which the rule of law shines
in
libraries, not among the people.
A brief reference to Chaganbl Magganlal('), presenting it in a light
somewhat different from the approach made by the learned
Chief
Justice, is apposite before I wind up because there was a strand of argument that if both procedures were substantially fair and equal in their
onerous process the provision was beyond constitutional cavil on the
score of classificatory discrimination. This, with great respect, is specious. It is understandable that given a valid classification, the opportunity for using one or the other alternative procedures is good--a la
Chagan/al Magganlal. In that case, speedy recovery of public property
was the basis for grouping and, within that group, one of two alternative
procedures, more or less similar in burden or facility, was held s9und.
(1) Chaganlal J,Iagganlal (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Gr~ater Bon1bay
& Ors. [I 975] I S.C.R. I.
RE : SPECIAL COURTS BILL
(Krishna Iyer, J.)
57 I
Absent the initial classifiability on a rational footing rela'ed to the goal
of easy ejectment, Chaganlal Magganlal (supra) would have run a different course.
A brief excursion into Chaganlal is desirable here. I do not read
Chaganlal in such manner as to make its core redundant. That case first
justified the classification on the ground that public property was a class
by itself and that differentia had a rational releation to the goal of speedy
recovery. Another limb of the Chaganlal ratio is that a valid classification is no passport to oppressive or arbitrary procedure.
That is
taken care of by holding that the prescribed special procedure is not too
onerous.
And thirdly, within the class picked out for special treatment there is no discrimination because both are substantially fair and
similar. To understand that ruling in the sense that once the procedures are substantially equal, no que·stion of discrimination and valid
classification can arise is to make much of the discussion redundant. To
hold the whole discussion relevant we have to view its three limbs holistically. So, basic fairness of procedure is necessary. A valid classification with an intelligible differentia and intelligent nexus to the object is
needed.
The third part of the triangle is that within the class there
should be no .possibility of using a more burdensome procedmc for
one and a substantially different one for another. Arbitrariness in this
area also violaks Art. 14.
Even in our present case, assuming that the facilities under the Bill
and under the ordinary Code arc equa!ly fair, could the Government
have indicted one or the other in the ordinary court or the special court
on the basis of drawing lots or the first letter of their names, the colour
of their skins or like non-sense? No. The wisdom of Art. 14 will not
tolerate such whim.
Classify or perish, is the classic test of valid
exemption from inflexible equality under the Constitution.
Before I conclude,, I must admit the force of the reasoning in Shinghal, J's powerful plea against nominated judges. I am persuaded to
the view that the sure solution to the tangled web of problems raised by
the Reference, consistently with the present object of the Bill, is to make
the High Court the custodian of the new jurisdiction. This suggestion
cropped up even as the argument sailed along but counsel for the Union
of India assured the Court that respectful consideration, not more,
would be given to the tl!ntative idea expressed from the Bench. The
risk of constitutional litigation defeating the purpose of quick justice
may well be the price of ignoring the considered' suggestion.
It is
for the wisdom of Parliament to trust the High Courts or the hand-picked
Judges from the High Courts and face constitutional adjudication.
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say no more. There is something to ponder, for those who cherish accountable judicial autonomy, in the apprehension express~d by Shinghal,
J. that subtle encroachments on independence of this instrumentality may
eventuate in temporising with a fundamental value. While I am imoressed with the reasoning of the learned Judge, I deSist from pr0noun~ing on the point.
I concur with the learned Chief Justice although I give some diverJ::ent reasons .
UNTWAL!A J.-I fully concur in the opinion delivered by the learned
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Chief Justice except in regard to one matter, which in my view, is oE a
vital and fundamental nature.
I, therefore, proceed to deliver my
~eparate opinion on that question.
During the course of the hearing of the Reference to obviate some
technical objections raised on behalf of the interveners and others four
suggestion's were given by the Court. Three were accepted in writing
by the Solicitor General appearing for the Government of India which,
to all intents and purposes, would mean the President. Regarding one,
we were told that that was still under conside.ration of the Government.
It appears to me that the three suggestions of the Court which
W·~re
accepted were to obviate all possible challenges to the constitutional
validity of the Bill on one ground or the other. The fourth one largely
concerned the wisdom behind some of the provisions of the legisla ion.
My learned Brother Shinghal J ., has recorded his separate opinion on
a point in connection with which the fourth suggestion was given by the
I do not agree with his opinion, and I say so
Court just in passing.
with great respect, in that regard. In my opinion the Bill does not suffer
from any invalidity on that account. I need not deal with this point
in any detail as I respectfully agree with all that has been said in the majority opinion in that respect too. In none of the earlier references answered
either by the Federal Court or by this Court a precedent is to be found
resembling or identical to what happened in this Special Re[erence. I
see no harm in adopting the method of giving some suggestions from
the Court which may obliterate a possible constitutional attack npon the
vires of a Bill. It may not be necessary or even advisable to adopt such
a course in all References under Article 143 of the Constitution. But
if in some it becomes expedient to do so,. as in my opinion in the instant
pne it was so, I think, it saves a Jot of public time and money to remove
any technical lacuna from the Bill if the Government thinks that it can
agree to do so. Of course the Bill by it~Jf is not a Jaw. It would be
a law when pa·ssed by the Parliament. But even at the stage of the
Bill when opinion of this Court is asked for, it seems to me quite appro-
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RE: SPECIAL COURTS BILL (Shinghal, !.)
573
priate in a given case to make some suggestions and then to answer the
Reference on the footing of acceptance by the Government of such of
the suggestions as have been accepted. Otherwise, according to me, it
is incongruous for thi's Court to answer the Reference as it is without
taking into account the concessions made on behalf of the Government
vis-a-vis the suggestions of the Court. It is manifest that all the three
infirmities pointed out in the majority opinion in answer no. 3 vanish
after the acceptance in writing by the Government that the three suggestions made by the Court vis-a-vis the alleged three infirmities, namely,
3(a), 3\b) and 3(c) would be removed from the Biil.
.,,
I would, however, like to add without elaborately dealing with the
point that as regards the merits of the said infirmities I agree that 3 (c),
namely, that the absence of a provision for transfer of a case from one
Special Court to another, makes the procedure• unjust or arb"trary. But.
as at present advised, I do not agree that the alleged infirmities 3(a)
and (ib) make the procedure unjust or arbitrary. I have grave doubts
whether it is so on that account. Any way, in my opinion, there is no
question of the procedure being unjust or arbitrary in respect of any
of the three infirmities (a), (b) and (i;) enumerated in answer 3 in view
of the acceptance by the Government of India of the suggestions emanating from the Court during the course of the hearing of the Reference. I
see no difficulty in holding that the Reference stands amended in view
of those concessions and we are now required to answer the amended
Reference which means the Reference as if the Bill as proposed incorporates the three concessions made by the Government. Thus the procedure
prescribed in the Bill, undoubtedly, becomes just and fair and no longer
remains arbitrary in any sense.
SHINGHAL J.,-I had the advantage of going through the judgment
of my Lord the Chief Justice and I concur with the conclusion arrived
at by him in regard to the maintenance of the reference, the legi&lative
competence of the Parliament and the arguments which were raised
with reference to article 14 of the Constitution. I also agree that the
Bill suffers from the three defects mentioned at (a) to (c) of sub-paragraph (3) of the concluding paragraph of my Lord's judgment. It
however appears to me that the question whether the Bill or any of
its provisions is otherwise unconstitutional, is equally within the scope
of the question under reference and requires cons'deration in the light
of the other arguments which have been advanced before us. In fact
I am of the opinion that, for reasons which follow, clauses 5 and 7
of the Bill are, in any case, constitutionally invalid even if the three
offending provisions pointed out by the Chief Justice are amended on
the lines stated by learned Solicitor General.
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A reference to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill
shows that it is meant to create "additional courts" which will "exclusively deal" with the class of offences mentioned in it. While justifying
the, necessity for the creation of such Special Courts, it has been stated
that the "court calendars" are· "congested" and "po¥.rerful accused"
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are capable of causing much delay in the disposal of cases and that it
was necessary that the true character of the persons who had held high
political or public offices in the Country and had committed offences
"must be known to the electorate as early as possible if democratic
institutions are to survive and political life is to remain clean." The
Preamble of the Bill does not refer to the capacity of the "powerful
accused" to cause much de.lay in the disposal of cases, but refers to
"congestion of work" and recites that there were "other reasons" for
which it could not be reasonably expected that the prosecut\ons of the
persons who had held high public or political offices would be brought
to a "speedy termination." It is therefore obvious that if the "ordinary
criminal courts" were not congested with work, they would have been
allowed to try the cases with "some procedural changes" referred to in
the eighth recital of the Preamble. There is no reference to "procedural changes" in the Statement of Objects and Reasons, and they did
not form the basis of that Statement. In any case the reason for excluding the ordinary. criminal courts from trying the class of offences
referred to in the Bill within their respecfae jurisdiction, in accordance
with the provisions of section 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973, is congestion of work and not their inferior status or incapacity
to deal with those cases. The object of the Bill would therefore have
been served by the creation of additional courts of the same category
as the "ordinary criminal courts" and the making of any procedural
changes which may have been considered necessary in that context to
exclude avoidable delay in the trials.
There would have been nothing unusual if such additional courts
had been created to save the ordinary congested criminal courts frcm
the burden of more work and to bring the contemplated prosecutions
to speedy termination. That was permissible under the existing law
and it would not have been necessary to introduce the present Bill in
Parliament. And even if some "procedural changes" were consider·ed
necessary, they could have been worked out within that frame work
and incorporated in a different Bill for that limited purpose.
But that has not been considered satisfactory, and the Bill provides
for the creation of "Special Courts." Clauses 2 and 7 which bear on
the point' under consideration, read as follows.-
;.. '
RE : SPECIAL COURTS BILL (Shinghal, J.)
57 5
"2. The Central Government shall by notification create
adequate number of courts to be called Special Courts.
7. A Special Court shall be presided over by a sitting
judge of a High Court in India or a person who has held office
as a judge of a High Court in India and nominated by the
Central Government in consultation with the Chief Justice of
India."
The Special Courts envisaged in the Bill are therefore courts the like
of which has not been provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure or
any other law, and are in fact unknown to the criminal law of the
Country. The question is whether our Constitution envisages the creation of such Courts.
Part V of the Constitution deals with "The Union", while Chapter
I thereof deals with "The Executive", Chapter II deals with "Parliament" and Chapter IV deals with "The Union Judiciary". Article
124(1) provides that there "shall be a Supreme Court of India", which
shall have original, appellate and other jurisdiction and powers provided
in the subsequent articles, in addition to the power to issue directions
or orders or writs mentioned in article 32. Article 141 spedfically
provides that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding
on all courts within the Country, and article 144 makes it olear that all
authorities, civil and judicial shall act in aid of the Supereme Court.
"That Court is therefore the supreme "Union Judiciary" under the
Scheme of the Constitution, and Chitpter IV of Part V of the Constitution provides all that is necessary for that purpose.
Part VI deals with the States. Chapter II thereof deals with "The
Executive", Chapter III with "The State Legislature" and Chapter V
with "The High Courts in the States." Article 214 provides that there
shall be "a High Court for each State", so that it is not permissible to
have two or more High Courts in any state although it is permissible
to establish a common High Court for two or more States (article
231). The High Court of a State has thus been assured an unparalleled
position in the State or States for which it has been established. Article
225 provides for the jurisdiction of, the law agministered in any existing
High Court and the respective powers of the Judges thereof in relation
to the administration of justice in the Court. Article 226 deals with the
power of the High Court "throughout the territories in relation to
which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any government, within those territories
directions, orders or writs for the purposes mentioned in clause ( 1).
Article 227 vests the power of superintendence in every High Court
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over all courts subject to its appellate jurisdiction. Power of withdrawing cases to itself has also been given to the High Court in the circumstances mentioned in article 228. The High Court has thus been
vested with all the necessary jurisdiction and powers to stand out as the
repository of all judicial authority within the State, and it is not contemplated by the Constitution that any civil or criminal court in the
State should be outside its control.
·
Then comes Chapter VI which deals with "Subordinate Courts" in
the States. Article 233 provides for the appointment of district judges
and article 234 for the recruitment of persons other than district judges
to the State Judicial Service. Article 235 vests the control over all
district courts and courts subordinate thereto, in the High Court. The
Constitution thus contemplates that all civil and criminal courts in a
State, other than, the High Court, shall be no other than the subordinate courts over which the High Court shall exercise the fullest
superintendence and control, and that the presiding officers of those
courts (other than the magistrates referred to in article 237) shall be
under the control of the High Court and of no other authority. That
is in fact necessary to ensure the independence of every court dealing
with civil and criminal matters. It may be permissible to create or
establish civil and criminal courts in a State with designations other
than those expressed in article 236, namely, those covered by the expression '"district judge", or by any existing designation in the Codes
of Civil and Criminal Procedure, but that is far from saying that it is
permissible to establish a hierarchy of courts other than that envisaged
in the Constitntion.
The Constitution has thus made ample and effective provision for
the establishment of a strong, independent and impartial judicial
administration in the Country, with the necessary complement of ci\il
and criminal courts. It is not permissible for Parliament or a State
Legislature to ignore or bypass that Scheme of the Constitution by p;oviding for the establishment of a civil or criminal court parallel Lo a
High Court in a State, or by way of an addir:onal or extra or a second
I-Iigh Court, or a court other than a court subordinate to the High Cc,urt.
Any such attempt would be unconstitutional and will strike at the independence of the judiciary which has so nobly been enshrined in the
Constitution and so carefully nursed over the years.
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There is another reason for this view. Articles 233 and 235 provide for the appointment of district judges and other judicial officers
in the States. The provisions of these articles have been interpreted
by this Court in a number of cases including The State of West Bengal
RE : SPECIAL COURTS BILL (Shinghal, J.)
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v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi,(') Ch1ndra Mohan and others v. State of
Uttar Pradesh and others, (') State of A5'am etc. v. Rangu Mahammad and others,(') The State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra
and others, (') State of Assam and another v. S. N. Sen and another,
(') Shamsher Singh and another v. Sta':e of Punjab,( 6 ) High Court
of Punjab 11nd Haryana v. State of Haryana and others etc.,( 1 ) State
of Bihar v. Madan Mohan Prasad and others,(') State of Haryana v.
Inder Prakash Anand(') and Chief Justi.ce of Andhra Pradesh a•'d
others v. L. V. A. Dixitulu and others.(' 0 ). It has been declared in
these decisions that it is the High Court which is the sole custodian
of the control over the State Judiciary. That is in fact the life blood
of an independent judicial administration, and the very foundation of
any real judicial edifice. For if it were permissible to appoint officers
other than those under the control or subordination of the High Court
to be presiding officers of civil and criminal courts, or in other words,
if it were permissible to appoint as judge' or magistrates persons outside
the control of the High Court, and answerable to the State Executive,
that will amount to serious encroachment on a sphere exclusively reserved for the High Court under the constitutional scheme, for the laudable
and cherished goal of providing an independent judiciary. It may be
that Executive Magistrates and District Magistrates do not
belong to the judicial service of a State, but their courts are "inferior",
and are amenable to the appellate or revisional jurisdiction of the Courts
of Session and the High Court. Even as ie is, the existence of such
courts of Executive Magistrates has not been viewed with favour in the
Constitution, and article 50 specifically directs that the State shall take
steps to separate the judiciary from the executive in the public services
of the State. Then there is article 23 7 which provides that the Governor
may by public notification direct that the "foregoing" provisions of
Chapter VI (which deal with the subordtinate courts) and any rules
made thereunder shall apply in relation to any class or classes of
magistrates (i.e. Executive Magistrates) in a State as they apply in
relation to persons appointed to the judicial service of the State. It is
therefore quite clear that the ConstituV:on has not considered the exis(1) [1966] l S.C.R. 771.
(2) [1967] 1 S.C.R. 77.
(3) [1967] l S.C.R. 454.
(4) [1968] 2 S.C.R. 154.
(5) [1972] 2 S.C.R. 251.
(6) [1975] l S.C.R. 814.
(7) [1975 J 3 S.C.R. 365.
(8) [1976] 3 S.C.R. 110.
(9) A.l.R. 1976 S.C. 1841.
(10) [1979] l S.C.R. 26.
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tence or continuance of those magistrates who are outside the control
of the High Court to be desirable, and their continuance cannot be said
to be a matter of credit for those concerned. It is beyond any doubt
or controversy that the Constitution does not permit the establishment
of a criminal court, of the status of, a court presl[ded over by a. "district
judge" as defined in article 235, which is not subordinate to the High
Court, and, as has been shown, jt does not penni~ the establishment of
a court similar to the High Court or a court parallel to the Hii~ Court.
It has been argued that section 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
permits the constitution of criminal courts other than the High Courts
and courts of the classes mentioned in the section. Attention has also
been invited to section 6 of the Criminal Law Amendment A:t, 1952,
for showing that Special Judges can be appointed as and whi!n necessary. But both these provisions do not justify thtj argument that
Special Courts of the nature conl'emplated in the Bill can be created
under the Scheme of the Constitution. What section 6 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure states is that besides the High Court and "the
courts constituted under any law, other than this Code", there shall be,
in every State, the classes of criminal courts mentioned in it, namely,
the Courts of Session, Judicial Magistrates first class and, in any
Metropolit·an area, Metropolitan Magistrates, Judicial Magistrates of
the second class, and Executive Magistrates. So all tb;lt the section
states is that the five classes of criminal courts stated in it shall be in
addition to the High Courts and courts that may be constituted .under
any other Jaw, and it cannot be said with any justification that it provides for the constitution of courts parallel to or on the same footing
aq the High Courts, or of criminal courts which are not subordinate
to the High Courts. On the other hand sub-section ( 1) of section 4
of the Code provides that all offences under the Indian Penal Code
shall be in ;estigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with
according to the provisions contained in it. And sub-section ( 2)
provides that all offences under any other law shall be investigated,
inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the "same
provisions'', subject only to any enactment for the time being in force
regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying
or otherwise dealing with such offences. But that is correlated to
clause (4) of section 2 which defines "offence" to mean any act or
omission tri!lde punishable by any law for the time being in force including any act in respect of which a complaint may be made under
section 20 of the Cattle-trespass Act. Section 6 of the Code docs
not therefore justify t 1he creation of Special Courts of the na.ure con-
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RE : SPECIAL COURTS BILL (Shinghal, J.)
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templated in the Bill, and the argument to the contrary is quite
un!enable.
A reference to section 6 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act,
1952, is equally futile. While that section provides for the appoin~
ment of special Judges for the trial of some offences, sect10n 9 specifically proviJes that the High Court may exercise, so far as they may
be applicable, all the powers conferred by Chapters XXXI and
XXXII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, on oa High Court
"as if the court of the specia\ Judge were a Court •Jf Session tiying
cases without a jury within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the
. -r High Court." The special Judges appointed under section 6 are
therefore subordinate to the High Court and fit in the scheme of the
independence of judicial courts and officers contained in the Constitution.
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An attempt has also been made to justify the provision in the Bill ·
for the creation of Special Courts by a reference to Part XIV A of the
Constitution which provides for the establishment of Administrative D
Tribunals. But such tribunals are not meant for the trial of offences
referred to in the Indian Penal Code, and may well be said to be
quasi-judicial.
It will thus appear that the Special Courts contemplated by crause
2 of the Bill will not be on the same footing as the High Courts, and
will, to say the least, be lesser or inferior courts.
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Clause 7 of the Bill however provides that a Special Court shall
be presided over by a "sitting judge" of a High Court" and in examining it I hoave presumed that the Bil will be so amended as to exclude
the nQmination of "a person who has held office as a judge of a High
Court" as the presiding judge of a Special Court. It will not, how- F
ever, be permissible or proper to appoint a "sitting" Judge of a High
Court to preside over a Speci•al Court which is lesser or inferior to
the High Court.
In all probability, "sitting" judges of High Courts
will refuse to serve as presiding judges of the Special Courts, and
there is no provision in the Constitution under which they can i:Je
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compelled, or ordered against their will, to serve there. That eventuality will make the provisions of the Bill unworkahic---c-ven if it were
assumed_ for the sake of argument that they are otherwise valid and
cons11t~t1onaL At any rate, the possibility that the "sitting" High
Court Judges may not agree to serv" as presiding Judges of the Special
Courts is re di, and their very refusal will ·embarass the judici•al admi- H
mstrat10n and luwer the prestige of the judiciary for clause 7 of the
Bill provides for the nomination of the presiding judge of a Special
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Court in consultation with (or with the concurrence of ?) the Cuief
Justice of India. This is also a factor which should caution those
concerned with the Bill and its enactment, that it is not only unconstitutional but is not likely to work well and may not serve the avowed
purpose of discharging their "commitment to the Rule of Law" to
which reference has been made in the Statement of Objects and
Reasons of the Bill.
There is another reason for this view. Equality before the law,
or, speaking in terms of the present controversy, equality in criminal
justice, is the universal goal of all democratic forms of government,
for no one can ever deny that all persons charged with crime must,
c in law, stand on the same footing at the Bar of justice. Such an
equality should be assured not only between one accused and anothec
but also between the prosecution and the accused. 111is is not a
· mere "rights explosion" but, as will appear, it is what our Constitution
has carefully, assuredly and fully prov1ded for every citizen of the
Country. Article 21 of the Constitution is, by itself, enough to bring
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this out.
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The article provides that no person shall be deprived of his lifo
or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.
I am here avoiding any reference to article 14 of the Constitution because that is not necessary when the scope and the meaning of artick
21 have been defined by this Court in a number of decisions includmg
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of lndia.(') 1t will be enough for me to
refer to the following opinion of Chandrachud J., as he then was ,-·
"But the mere prescription of some kind of procedure
cannot ever meet the mandate of article 21. The procedure
prescribed by law has to be fair, just and reasonable, not
fanciful, oppressive or arbitmry. The question whether the
procedure prescribed by law which curtails or takes away
tbc personal liberty guaranteed by article 21 is reasonabce or
not has to be considered not in the abstract or on hypothetical considerations like the provision for a full-dressed hear-
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ing as in a Court-room trial, but in the conteYJ, primarily,
of the purpcse which the Act is intended to achieve and of
urgent situations which those who are charged with the duty
of admin'stering the Act may be called upon to deal with:'
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Bhagwati J., undertook a detailed examination of the meaning and
content of "personal liberty" in article 21. He has taken the view
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[1978] 2 S.C.R. 621.
RE : SPECIAL COURTS BILL (Shingha/, J.)
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that the expression is of the "widest amplitude and it covers a variety
of rights which go to constitute the personal liberty of man." While
examining the procedure prescribed by the Passports Act, 1967, he
has expressed his views and the views of the other Judges as follows,"Is the prescrip'ion of some sort of procedure enough
or must the procedure comply with any particular requirements? Obviously, procedure cannot be arbitrary, unfair
or unreasonable. This indeed was conceded by the learned
Attorney General who with his usual candour frankly
stated that it was not possible for hiin to contend that any
procedure howsover arbitrary, oppressive or unjust may be
prescribed by the law. There was some discussion in A. K.
Gopalan's case in regard to the nature of the procedure
required to be prescribed under Article 21 and at least three
of the learned Judges out of five expressed themselves strongly
in favour of the view that the procedure cannot be any arbitrary, fantastic or oppressive procedure. Faw! Ali, J., i;ho
was in a minority, went to the farthest limit iu saying d1at
the procedure must include the four essentials set out in
Prof. Willis' book on Constitutional Law, namely, notice,
opportunity to be heard, impartial tribunal and ordinary
course of prooedure. P>atanjali Sastri, J., did not go as far
as that but he did say that "certain basic principles emerged
as the constant factors known to all those procedures and
they formed the core of the procedure established by law."
Mahajan, J., also observed that Article 21 requires that
"there should be some form of proceeding before •a person
can be condemned either in respect of his life or his liberty"
and "it negatives the idea of fantastic, arbitrary "nd oppressive forms of proceedings." But apart altogether from these
observations in A. K. Gopalan's case, which have great
weight, we find that even on principle the concept of reasonableness must be projected in the procedure contemplated by
Article 21, having regard to the impact of Article 14 on
Art_icle 21."
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In order to fulfil the guarantee of article 21, the procedure prescribed by law for the trial of a criminal case has therefore to be fair,
just and reasonable, and not fanciful oppressive or arbitrary.
Clauses 5, 7 and 8 of the Bill, however, provide as follows,"5, On such declaration being made any prosecution
in respect of such offence shall be instituted ouly in a Special
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Court designated by the Central Government and any prosecution in respect of such offence pending in any court iu
India shall stand transferred to a Special Court designated
by the Central Government.
7. A Special Court shall be presided over by a sitting
judge of a High Court in India or a person who has helu
offire at •a judge of a High Court in India and nominated
by the Central Government in consultation with the Chief
Justice of India.
8. A Special Court shall have jurisdiction to try any person concerned in the offence in respect of which a declaration is made under section 4 either as principal, conspirator
or abettor and all other offences and accused persons as can
be jointly tried therewith at one trial in accordance with the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973."
Taken toge<hcr, the clauses provide for the trial of the accused only
by
Special Courts to be presided over by a judge nominated by the
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Central Government and clauses 4, 5 and 7 vest the power of designating L'1e Special Court in which an accused is to be tried exclu;ively
in that go\'crnment. Speaking in practical terms, the Bill thus enables the Cet1tral Government to decide which of it£ nominated judges
shall try which accused or, in other words, which of the accused will
E be tried by which of its nominated judges. It has in fact been stated
at the Bar by Mr. J ethamalani that most of the Special Courts envisaged in t!ie Bill will be located in Delhi. So if several courts arc
created by the Central Government in Delhi, and they are all presided
over by judges nominated by the Central Government, the power of
nominating the judge for any particular case triable in Delhi shall ve>t
F in the CentrJl Government. As will appear, such a proce<i.ttre cannot be said lo be fair, just and reasonable within the meaning of article 21 and amounts to serious transgression on the independence of
the Judiciary.
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Reference has already been made to the scheme provided in the
Constitution for the creation of the civil and criminal judicial courts
and the independence of the judges and the magistrates presiding
over those GOurts. So far as the Supreme Court and the High Courts
are concerned, the question of the Central or the State Governments
nominating tl1e judge who shall deal with a particular case does not
and cavnot arise. As regards the subordinate courts, section 9(2)
of the Code of Crimir:al Procedure provides that every Court of
S~ssion shall be presided over by a Judge to be appointed by the
High Court, and section 11 (2) makes a similar provision regarding
. RE : SPECIAL C6URTS BILL (Shinghal, J.)
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Judicial Magistrates. The same care has been taken in regard to 1he
appointment of Chief Judicial Magistl'ltes, Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrates and Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrates, and the conferring of powers on Special Judicial Magistrates. It is not therefore
permissible for the Executive to appoint a particular judge or magistrate to preside at the trial of a particular accused under the Code of
Criminal Procedure. That is fair, just and reasonable and relieves
the accused of any possible oppression.
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It has to be appreciated that the problem is of much greater significance in the case of triahl before the Special Courts envisaged in
the Bill. As is obvious, a trial by the fiat of a successor government,
-· however justified, is noticed with an amount ol scepti,iw1. If one
may be permitted to say so, a "snccessor trial," brnadly speaking,
seeks to hit the adversary a second time after his initial rliscumfiture
and displacement from power or authority and in the case of an
accused who has held a high political status, it may have the effect
of destroying his political future. It is, by the very nature of things,
difficult to disabuse the mind of such an accused of the lurking suspicion that the trial is motivated by political considerations and will
not be just and fair, or to convince him that it will ultimately lead to
justice. It should therefore be the effort of those ordenrg the trial
to do nothing that may, even remotely, j,1stify such a suspicion. They
should in fact do all they can to convince every one concerned including the accused, that they had the best of intentions in ordering the
trial and had provided a fair and straight-forward procedure, and the
cleanest of judges, for the trial, in an open and fearless manner. That
will not only foreclose avoidable criticism but uphold the majesty of
the Rule of Law in its true sense.
Moreover, if the result of the trial has to carry conviction with the
people as a whole, and is meant to acquaint them with the "true
character" of the persons who have committed the offences for the
survival of the democratic institutions and cleanliness of the political
life, as professed in the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bili,
ii is in the interest of those making the declaration referred to in
clause 4 of the Bill to convince everyone, including the accused, that
the trial is not spectacular in purpose and does not expose those facing
it to a risk greater than that taken by any other accused at an ordinary trial, under the ordinary law. That kind of assurance, that there
is no prearranged result, and that the accused have nothing to fear
from the presiding judge of the Court, is the basic requirement of a
"successor trial". Human dignity is a concept enshrined in the Preamble of our Constitution -and runs through all that it provides. It
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But the clauses of the Bill referred to above are in derogation of
the majesty of the judicial edifice so gloriously and assuredly built up
by the Constitution, and is a serious inroad on the independence of
the judiciary.
Reference in this connection may be made to Uyanage and others
v. Regina('). In that case, the appellants were not tried by a
judge and jury in accordance with the norma·l procedure, but by three
judges of the Supreme C011rt of Ceylon nominated by the Minister of
J usticc. A preliminary objection was taken that the nomination and
the section under which it was made were ultra vircs the Constitut1011.
The three judges of the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the objection on the ground that the power of nomination conferred on the
Min'ster was an interference with the exercise by the judges of the
Supreme Court of the strict judici·al power of the State vested 'm them
by virtue of their appo'n~ment or was in derogation thereof, and was
a power which had till then been "invariably exe1C1sed by the Judicature as being part of the exercise of the judicial power of the State,
and could not be reposed in any one outs'de the judicature.''' The
Jaw was •amended thereafter, and it was made permissible for the
Chief Jusfce to nominate the three judges. But the Privy Council,
on appeal against conviction after the amended provision had taken
effect, upheld the conclusion of the Supreme Court in principle, and
held that the power of the judicature could not be "usurped or
infringed" by the execut:ve or the legislature. The Privy Council
examined the other objectionable provisions ol the amended Act and
held that they were invalid. Those provisions are not relevant for
purposes of the present case, but I cannot help extracting the following note of caution struck by their Lordships,-
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"what is done once, if it be allowed, may be <lone again
and in a lesser crisis and less serious circumstances; and thus
judicial power may be eroded."
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is therefore nece;sary that this treasure should be the priceless possess'on and the solid hope of all our fellow citizens mcluding those who
have to face trials for the offences charged against them.
An attempt like the one made in the present Bill to usurp an impor ·
tant judicial power and vest it in the executive, is a serious inroad
on the independence of the judiciary and is fraught with serious consequences. It has therefore necessarily to be put down at the very
inception for it may otherwise give rise to a prospect too gruesome to
(I)
[1966] l All E.R. 650.
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RE : SPECIAL COURTS BILL (Shinghal, !.)
585
envisage and too dangerons to be allowed to have the sanction of
law.
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My answer to the question referred by the President will therefore
be that apart from the three defects pointed out by my Lord the Chief
Justice, clauses 5 and 7 of the Bill are constitutionally invalid, and I
would report my opinion accordingly.
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