EXCEL WEAR ETC. versus UNION OF INDIA AND .ORS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 29 September 1978 | [1979] 1 S.C.R. 1009 | 1978 INSC 192
Key facts
- Decided
- 29 September 1978
- Bench
- Y.V. CHANDRACHUD*, R.S. SARKARIA, N.L. UNTWALIA, A.D. KOSHAL, A.P. SEN
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 644/1977
- Disposal
- Case Allowed
- Citation
- [1979] 1 S.C.R. 1009
- Neutral citation
- 1978 INSC 192
Text of the judgment
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1009
EXCEL WEAR ETC.
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UNION OF INDIA AND .ORS.
September 29, 1978
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[Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., R. S. SARKARIA, N. L. UNTWALIA,
A. 0. KOSHAL AND A. P. SEN, JJ.J
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llldustrial Dispures Act. 1947-Sections 25(0) and Section 25(R)-Constitu·
lional Validity of-Whether right to close down an undertaking a fundamental
. <ight.
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'fhe facts of only one petition are set out because they are similar to f~ts
in other petitions. Excel Wear is a partnership firm manufacturing garments for
uport. About 400 workmen were employed in the petitioners' factory. The
case ot the petitioners is that the relations. between the .aiana.gement and the
employe.. started deteriorating and became very straioed from 1976. The work·
men became very militant, aggressive, violent and indulged in unjustifiable or
illegal strikes. Various incidents have been mentioned in the Writ P!tition in
'tUpport of the said allegations. However, since those facts were s.eriouslY
challe.aged and· disputed by the workmen, the Court did not refer to them in
.any detail nor expressed any view one way or the other.
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(2) According to the petitioners it became almost impossible to carry on.
the business. T.he petitioners, therefore, served a notice dated 2nd 1'-fay, 1977 on
the Government of ~faharashtra, respondent No. 2 for previous approval of the
intended closure of the undertaking in accordance with section 25(0)(1). The
S'tate Government refused to accord the approval on the ground that the
intended closure was prejudicial to public interest.
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(3) The petitioners contended :
(a) A right to close down a business is an integral part of the right to carry
<Jn a business guaranteed under Art. 19 (I )(g) of the Constitution. The im·
pugned law imposes a restriction on the said fundamental right which is highly
unreasonable, excessive and arbitrary. It i! not a restriction but almost amounts
1o the deatructien or negation of that ri:ht. The restrictions imposed is mani~
festly beyond the permissible bounds of Art. 19(6) of the Constitution.
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(b) A right to carry on a business includes a right not to carry on a business whic:h is like any other right mentioned under Article 19(1) such as the
Tight to freedom of speech includes a ri&ht not to speak and the right not to
form an association is inherent under the right to form association.
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(c) The restrictions are unreasonable because(i) Section 25(0) does not require ,ti\'ing of reasons in the order.
(ii) No time Ii1nit is to be fixed while refusing permission to close down.
{iii) Even if the reasons are adequate and sufficient, approval can be
denied in the purported public interest of security of labour. L&bour
is bound to su!fer because of unemployment brought about in almost
every case of closure.
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(iv) It has been left to the caprice and whims of the authority to decide
one way or the other. No guidelines have been given.
(v) Apart from the civil liability which is to be incurred under sub-section
(5), the cloSure, however, compulsive it may be, if brought about
against the direction given under sub-section (2) is visited with penal
consequences as provided in section 25-R.
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(vi) There is no deemed provision as to the according of approval
sub-section (2) as in sub-section ( 4).
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(vii) RefusaJ. to accord approval would merely mean technically that the
business continues but a factory owner cannot be compelled to l.!arry
on the business anJ go on v; ith the production and thus one of the
objectives sought to be achieved by this provision cannot be achieved.
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(viii) There is no provision of appeal, revision or review of the order even
after· sometime.
(ix) Restriction being much more excessive than is necessary . for
the
achievement of the object is highly unreasona.ble.
(x) There may be several other methods to regulate and restrict the
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right of closure by providing for extra compensation over and·_ above
the retrenchment compensation if the closure is found to be mala
fide and unreasonable.
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(xi) To direct the employer not to close down is ai negation of the right
to !=lose.
It is not regulatory.
(xii) If carrying on any business is prohibited in public interest, a person
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can do another business. But to prohibit the closure of a running
business is destructiOn of the right tO close.
(xiii) The reasonableness of the impugned restrictions must be examined
both from procedural andl substantive aspects of the law. Sub-
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section (2) of s. 25-D does not make it oblig>tory for any higher
authority of the Government to take a decision. It may be taken
even by a lower officer in the hierarchy.
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( 4) The respondents• contentions : (a) Some counsel for the respondents did not dispute that the right to close
down a. business is an integral part of the right to carry on a business. fhey
however, contended that the restrictions imposed by the impugned law are quite
reasonable andl justified to put a stop to the unfair Jabour practice and for the-welfare of the work.men. It is a progressive legislation for the protection of a
weaker section of society.
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(b) Some other counsel for the respondents, however, did not accept that
a right to close down a business is an integral part of the right to carry on any
business. According to them, the total prohibition of closure only affects a
part of the right to carry on the business and not a total annihilation of thi.s.
The restriction imposed was in public interest and there ·is a presumption of
reasonableness in favour of a statute. Reliance was aJso placed on social and
welfare legislation as expounded by renowned jurists and judges abroad. It
was also contended that the legisla.tion was protected' by Arlicle 31 C of the
Constitution.
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EXCEL WEAR v. UNION
(Untwalia, I.)
1011
. W Allowing the petitions, the Court
HELD : The right to close down a business •cannot be equated with a right
not• to 'start or carry on a business at all. The extreme proposition urged oi::J.
beJfalf of the employer by equating the two rights and placing them at par is not
qu'ite apposite and sound. If one does not start a business at all> then P'erhaps
under no circumstances, he can be compelled to Start one. Such a D.egative
aspect of a right to carry on a business may be equated with the negative aspect
of the right embedded in the coocept of the right to freedom of speech, to form
an association or to acquire or hold property. Perhaps under no circumstinces,
a person can be compelled' to speak, to form an association or to acquire or
hold a property. But by imposing reasonable restrictions, he coo be con1pelled
not to speak, not to form an association or not to acquire or not to hold pro~
P.erty .' A total prohibition of business is possible by putting reasonable restric·
tion,s under Artic1e 19(6) on the right to carry on a business. [1027 B-D,
10.28 A]
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Cooi·erjee B. Bharucha v. The Excise Commissioner and the Chief Commi~
sioner; Ailner & Ors.; [1954] SCR 873; Narendra Kumar & Ors'. v .. The Union
of India & o;;. [1960] 2 SCR. 375 relied on.
Ho.wever, the greater the restriction, the more the need for strict scrutiny
by the Court. The contention put forward on behalf of the labour unions that
the right to close down a business is not an integral part of the right to carry
on a. bu.siness or that it is not a fundamental right at all is ahlo wrong. In one
sense~ the right dOes appertain to property. But such a faint overlapping of the
night io property engrafted in ArL 19(1)(!) or Art. 31 must not be allowed
to ·cast any shade or eclipse ori the si.tnple nature of the right. However, the
right to close down is not an absolute right. It can certainly be restricted,
regul3.tect or controlled by law in the. interest of the general public. [1027 E,
1028 A-CJ
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Concept of socialism or socialistic stat.e has undergone changes from time
to time, from country to country- and from thinkers to thinkers. But some basic
concept still holds the field. In the case of Akadasi Padhan the question for
consideration was whether a law creating a state monopoly is valid under the
latter part of Article 19(6). The Court pointed out the difference between the
doctrinaire approach to the problem of socialism, and the pragmatic one. But
so long as the private ownership of an industry is recognised governs an over~
whelmingly Jarge proportion of our economic structure, it is not possible to say
that principles of socialism and social justice can be pushed to such an extreme
so as to ignore completely or to a very large extent the interests of another
s~_ction of the public namely the private owners of the undertakings. [1030 G~H.
1031 E-GJ
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Akadasi Padhan v. State of Orissa, [1963] Suppl. 2 SCR 691 referred to.
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There are creditors and depositors and various other persons connected with
er having dealings with the undertaking, whose rights are also affected by the
impugned legislation. [1031 G]
Section 25-G (2) does not require the giving of reasons in the order. In
two of. the orders in the present cases, it is merely stated that the reasons for
the intended closure are prejudicial to public interest suggesting thereby that the
reasons given by the employers are correct, adequate and sufficient, yet they are
prejudicial to the public interest. In cases of hon~ fide closuros, it would be
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generally so. Yet the interest of labour for the time being is bound to sµ,ffer
because it makes a worker unemployed. Suctil a situation as far as reasonably
possible should be prevented. Public interest and social justice do require the
protection of the labour. But it is not reasonable to give them prote.:tion against
all unemployment after affecting the interests of so many pcrscns interested
iru::luding persons who have· no connection with the management. It is not
pa&sible to compel the employers to manage the undertaking even if they find
that it is not safe or practicable to do· so. They cannot be asked to go on
facing tremendous difficulties. of management even at the risk of their perron and
property. They cannot be compelled to go on incurring losses year after year.
[1032 C-FJ
In the third Writ Petition, the Government has given two reasons, for refus~
ing to grant permission. Both of them are too vague to give an exact idea in
support of the refusal of permission, to, close down. It says that the reasonA
arc not adequate and sufficient and that the intended closure is prejudicial to
the public interest. The latter reason will be universal in all cases of closure.
The former demonstrates. to what extent the order can be unreasonable. If the
reasons given by the petitioner in great detail are correct, as the impugned order
suggests they are, it is preposterous to sa.y that they are not adequate and Ruffi~
cient for a closure. Such an unreasonable order was possible to be passed
because of the unreasonableness of the law. Whimsically and capriciously, the
authority can refuse permission to close down. [1033 B·E]
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If' the Government Order is not communicated to the employer within 90
days, strictly speaking, criminal liability in section 25(R) ma.y not be attracted,
if on the expiry of that period an employer closes down the undertaking, But
it seems the civil liability under Section 25(0) (5) will come into play even
after the passing of the order of refusal of permission to close down on the
expiry of the period of 90 days. Provision in Chapter V(B) of the Act sug.
gests that the object of carrying on production can be achieved by the refusal
to gra.nt permission although in the .objects and reasons of the amending act
such an object seems. to be there although remotely and seccndly it i'J highly
unreasonable to achieve the object by compelling the employee not to close
down in public interest for maintaining production. The order passe<l by the
authority is not subject to any scrutiny by any higher authority or tribunal
either in appeal or revision. The order cannot be reviewed either. [1033 F-H,
1034 A-B]
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It is not always easy to strike the balance between the parallel and conilicting interest, and it is not fair to unreasonably tilt the balance in favour of one
interest by ignoring the other. In the case of fixation of minimum wages this
Court has repeatedly rejected the contention of the employers that he has no
capacity to pay minimum wages and therefore hi~ right to carry on the business is atfectod. [1034E, 1035 A-Bl
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U. Unichoyi & Ors. v. The Stat< of Kera/a. [1962] I SCR
relied on.
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But this principle, rather, in contrast, illustrates the unreasonableness of the
present impugned law. Nobody has got a right to carry on busines1 if he
cannot pay evan the minimum waae!. He must then retire from business. But
to tell him to pay and not to retire if he caanot pay is pushing the matter to
an extreme. It has been observed that where an industry had been closed· and
the closure was real and bona fide, thert cannot be an industrial di~pute after
closur1. [1035 B-D]
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EXCEL WEAR v. UNION ( Untwalia, !.)
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Pipraich Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pipraich Sugar Mills Mazdoor Union,
[1966] SCR 872 referred to.
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The law may provide to prevent and regulate unfair unjust' or mala fide closure•
[1036 CJ
The reasonableness has got to be tested both from the procedural and substantive aspects of the Jaw. It is true that Chapter V(B) deals with certain eom·
paratively bigger undertakings and for a few types only but with all this it has
not made the law reasonable. It may be a reasonable law for saving the law
from violation of Art. 14 but certainly- lt does not make the restriction reason·
able within the meaning of Art. 19(6). Not to permit the employer to close
down is essentially an interference with the fundamental right to carry on the
business. [1036 D, H. 1037 A, G]
If a law is otherwise good and does not contravene any of the fundamental
rights uf the non-citizens, non.citizens cannot take advantage of the voidness
of law for the reason that it contravenes the fundamental rights of the citizens
and daim that there is no law at all In the case of .1.1nbica Mills this Court
has oot said that even if there is violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed
by Art. 19(1)(b) and not saved by clause (6) of the said right has been conferred only on the citizens of Indja and not upon the corporate bodies like a
company. [1038 A-DJ
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State of Gujarat and Anr. v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., Ahmedabad,
etc., [1974] 3 SCR 760 explained.
Bennet Coleman & Co. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (1973]
2 SCR 757, Rust.om Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, [1970] 3 SCR
530 relied on.
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It was laid down in the case of Bennet Cole1nan & Co. & Or.r. and Rustom
Cawasjee Cooper that if a shareholder's right is impaired the State cannot impair
the right of the sha.reholder as well as of the company and the Court can strike
down the la\v for violation of fundamental right guaranteed only to the citizens
if the challenge is by the company as well as by the shareholders. The partners:
can challenge the validity in the name of firm. Jn the present case where company is petitioner a shareholder has also been joined with the company to
challenge the law. [1038 E-F, H, 1039 A]
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The impugned law is not for giving effect to the policy of the State· towards
securing any of the principles in Articles 39(1) or 41. The law does not fit
in with the said directive principles. The argument thM it is protected by Art.
31 (C) is not sustainable. The amendment was prospective and not r~trospec·
tive. [1039 H, 1040 A-B. El
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The argument that when the amendment was brought the proclamation of
emergency was in operation and thereafter before emergency was lifted, the
amend article 310 had come into force and thus by the continuous process
the latter became immune on the ground of violation of Art. 19 is not n1ain·
tainable. [1042 CJ
As soon as the emergency is lifted the law becomes bad be<:ause it was bad
when it was enacted, although it could not be-taken to be so during the period
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of Emergency. Therefore, Art. 31C cannot protect the laYl. Apart from the
fact that Art. 3IC has no application the law was bad for violation of Art.
19 ( 1) (b) when it was enacted but it was not taken to be bad during the period
of emergency. Its invalidity sprouted out with full vigour on the lifting of
emergency. [1041 H, 1042 C-D]
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Keshavan Madha1•a Menon v. The State of Bombay, [1951] 2 SCR
228; Dhirubha Devi Singh Gohil v. The State of Bombay [1955] I SCR
691; M. P. V, Sunderara1nier & Co. v. The Stale of A. P. & A.nr.,
[1958] SCR 1422, Jagannath etc., etc. v. Authorised Officer, Land Re-
. forms and Ors. etc., [1972] 1 SCR 1055; distinguished.
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Bhikaji Narain Dhakras and Ors. v. The State of M.P. & Anr.,
[1955] 2 SCR 589; Basheshar Nath v. The Co1n1nissioner of lnco"1e
1'ox, Delhi and Rajasthan and Anr., [1959] Suppl. 1 SCR 528; Deep
Chand v. The Stale of U.P. & Ors., [1959] Suppl. 2 SCR 8; Mahendra
Lal laini v. The Stale of U.P. and Ors., [1963] Suppl. I SCR 912
referred to.
The Court declared section 25 ( 0') as a whole and Section 25R in so far
as it relates to the awarding of punishment for infringement of the provisions
of Section 25(0) constitutionally bad and invalid for violation of Art. 19(1)
of the Constitution. The Court declared the impugned order passed in all the
cases to be void and restrained the respondents from enforcing them. The
Court however did not express any opinion on the merits of the case, since the·
orders fall on the ground of constitutional invalidity. [1046 A-C]
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION :
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Writ Petition No. 644 of 1977.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)
AND
Writ Petition No. 917 of 1977
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(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)
AND
Writ Petition Nos. 959 and 960 of 1977
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F. S. Narima11, M. F. D. Damania, G. D. Dave and
Nath for the Petitioners in W.P. 644 of 1977.
Rameshwar
F. D. Dama11ia, K. L. Talsa11ia, I. N. Shroff, H. S. Parekh and M.
R. p_ Kapur, for the Petitioners in W.P. 917 /77.
K. K. Singhvi, F. D. Damania, I. R. Joshi, P. H. Parekh and M.
Mudgal for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 959-960/77.
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U. R. Lalit (for Union of India), M. C. Bhandare (for the State
of Maharashtra), E. C. Agrawala and M. N. Shroff for RR. 1-'i! in
W.P. Nos. 644, 959, 960 and 917 of 1977.
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EXCEL WEAR v. UNION (Untwalia, J..)
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S. !. Deshmukh, Mrs. S. Bhandare, Miss Leela Mehta, A. N.
Karkhanis and Miss Malini Podvel for R. 3 in W.P. No. 644 of 1977.
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J. Ramamurthi and Miss Vaigai for R. 3 in W.P. 959-960/77.
M. K. Ramamurthi, A. K. Ganguli and G. S. Chatterjee for the
Intervener in W.P. Nos. 959-960 (State of West Bengal).
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C. G. Nadkarni and K. L. Hathi for the intervener in W.P. 917 /77
(Mazdoor Congress).
F. S. Nariman and 0. C. Mathur for the Intervener in W.P. No.
' 644/77 (Tube Investment).
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M. K. Ramamurthi and K. M. K. Nair for the Intervener in W.P.
644/77 (State of Kerala).
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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
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UNTWAL!A, J. By these four Writ Petitions the employers challenge the constitutional validity of Sections 25-0 and 25-R of The
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter to be referred to as the
Act). The facts of the different cases are of a similar nature. It is
not necessary to state them in any detail for the purposes of deciding
the constitutional question. We may, however, just refer to a few in
order to indicate the nature of the dispute between the parties.
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WRIT PETITION NO. 644 OF 1977
The petitioner in this case is Excel Wear, a Registered partnership
firm, the partners of which are citizens of India. The petitioner has a
factory at Bombay where it manufactures garments for exports. About
• 400 workmen were employed in the petitioner's factory. According
to its case the relation between the petitioner management and its
-~employees started deteriorating from the year 1974 and had become
very much worse from 1976. From August, 1976 the workmen
became very militant, aggressive, violent, indulged in unjustifiable or
~ illegal strikes and the labour trouble in the factory became of an unprecedented nature. Various incidents have been meritioned in the
Writ Petition in support of the above allegations. But since the facts
, are seriously challenged and disputed on behalf of the Labour Union,
which was subsequently added as a party respondent in the Writ petition, we do not propose to refer to them in any detail and express our
• views in regard to them one way or the other. The various facts
alleged in the petition may be correct-may not be correct. We do
not think it necessary to adjudicate upon them for the purpose <if deciding the constitutional question. Suffice it to say that it is legitimate to
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take notice of the fact that various kinds of situation, such as, Jabour
trouble of an unprecedented nature, a factory nmning in a recurring
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loss, paucity of adequate number of competent and suitable persons in
the family of the partners, shareholders or the proprietors of a parti- ~
cular factory, or even outsiders, for the purpose of management, nonavailability of raw-materials, insurmountable difficulty in the replacement of damaged or worn.Jout machineries and so on and so forth, may •
arise and are said to have arisen in one form or the other in the cases
before us. Although the facts pleaded in all the Writ petitions are
instances of one or more of such difficulties, we shall advert to the con,
sideration of the constitutional question on the justifiable assumption
that in a given case they may exist. No body could deny the possibility or probability of the existence of such facts in a particular industry.
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Excel Wear, accor.ding to its ca!re, finding it difficult, almost impossible, to carry on the business of the factory any longer served a notice
dated May 2, 1977 on the State Government of Maharashtra, respondent no. 2 for previous approval of the intended closure of the undertaking in accordance with Section 25-0 ( 1) of the Act. The State
Government refused to accord the approval and communicated their
decision in their letter dated the 1st August, 1977. It would be
appropriate to quote here the relevant portion of this letter : -
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"And whereas the Government of Maharashtra, after
ctlllsidering the aforesaid notice is satisfied that the reasons
for the intended closure are prejudicial to public interest.
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Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by
sub-section (2) of Section 25-0 of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 the Government of Maharashtra hereby directs
the Excel Wear, Bombay-400025 not to close dowu the said
undertaking."
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The petitioner challenges the validity of the order aforesaid.
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Mr. F. S. Nariman appeared for the petitioner in this case. The
Union of India, respondent no. 1, was represented by Mr. U. R. Lalit
and Mr. M. C. Bhandare appeared for respondent no. 2. The case
of the Labour Union, th~ third respondent, was presented by Mr. S. J.
Deshmukh. In the petitions under consideration Mr. N adkarni
appeared for an intervener Labour Union and Mr. M. K. Ramamurthi
for two intervener States of West Bengal and Kerala.
WRIT PETITION NO. 917 OF 1977
In this case the first petitioner is Acme Manuf~cturing Co. Ltd. and
the second petitioner, citizen of India, is one of its shareholders. Mr.
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llXCEL WEAR
v. UNION (Untwalia, J.)
1017
Damania, learned counsel for the petitioners briefly drew our attention
to the facts of this case which were of a nature adverted to above.
The Wadala unit of the petitioner company is engaged in the business
<>f manufacturing and selling Diesel Oil Engines, Mechanical Lubricators, Engine Valves and Push Rods etc. The petitioners were obliged
• to decide to close down the undertaking due to huge losses incurred by
them on account of low productivity, serious labour unrest and indiscipline resulting in various incidents of assaults or the like. The
Company, therefore, applied to the State Government of Maharashtra
<>n May 2, 1977 under section 25-0(1) of the Act for approval of the
~ intended closure. The State Government communicated their refusal
in their letter dated the 29th July, 1977 enclosing therewith a copy of
their order couched in identical terms as those in the case of Excel
Wear.
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WRIT PETITIONS 959 AND 960 OF 1977
Mr. K. K. Singhvi, appearing for the petitioners in this case apart
from supporting the argument of Mr. Nariman drew our attention to
• the facts of this case which were more or less of a similar nature as in
the case of Acme Manufacturing Co. Ltd. Petitioner No. 2 is a citizen
of India and is a shareholder of Apar Private Ltd., petitioner No. 1.
The Company owns a factory at Vithalwadi, Kalyan (Bombay) which
manufactures aluminum rods, AAC and ACSR conductors, P.Y.C.
cables and welding electrodes. Feeling compelled to take a decision
to close down the factory, the Company served a notice on the State
Government under section 25-0(1) of the Act on September 16,
1976: The Order of the State Government refusing permission to the
petitioner company to close down the undertaking is dated the 23rd
• December, 1976. The reasons for refusal given in this Order are
~slightly different. They are as follows : .
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"And whereas the Government. of Maharashtra after considering the aforesaid notice is satisfied that the reasons for
the intended closure of the said undertaking are not adequate
and sufficient and the intended closure is prejudicial to the
public interest;"
Broadly speaking the contention on behalf of the employers in all
these cases is that a right to close down the business is an integral part
of the right to carry on the business guaranteed under Article 19 ( 1) (g)
of the Constitution of India. The impugned law imposes a restriction
on the said fundamental right which is highly unreasonable, excessive
and arbitrary. It is not a restriction but almost amounts to the destruction or negation of that right. The restriction imposed is manifestly beyond the permissible bounds of clause (6) of Article 19 of the
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Constitution. The proposition canvassed for our consideration was sometimes too bald and wide. It was submitted that a right to carry
on the business includes a right not to carry on the business, just like ~
any other right mentioned in clause (1) of Article 19, such as, the
right to freedom of speech includes a right not to speak and the right
not to form an association is inherent in the right to form associations. ,
Similarly a right to acquire and hold property embraces within it a
right not to acquire or hold property. The submission was that no
body can be compelled to speak or to form an association, to acquire ,
or hold property and similarly no body can be compelled to carry on ·
any business.
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M/s. Lalit and Bhandare did not dispute the propo;ition that the
right to close down the business is an integral part of the right to carry
on the business. They, however, strenuously urged that the restrictions imposed by the impugned law are quite reasonable and justified
to put a stop to the unfair labour practice and for the welfare of the
workmen. It is a progressive legislation for the protection of a weaker
section of the society. Mr. Deshmukh, however, did not accept that ,
a right to close down a business is an integral part of the right to carry
on any business. He submitted that a right to closure is appurtenant
to the ownership of the property, namely, the undertaking. The total
prohibition of closure only affects a part of the right to carry on the
business and not a total annihilation of this. The restriction imposed
was in public interest and there is a presumption of reasonableness in
its favour. Mr. Nadkarni endeavoured to submit with reference to the
high philosophies of Jurisprudence in relation to the social and welfare
legislations, as expounded by renowned jurists and judges abroad, that
the action of closing down a business is no right at all in any sense of •
the term. Mr. Ramamurthi while supporting the main arguments put
forward on behalf of others led great stress in the point that the law is,,>-protected by Article 31-C of the Constitution, a point which was merely
touched by them but was seriously taken over by Mr. Ramamurthi.
Before we enter into the focus of the discussion of the main point< •
and their important aspects and facts it would be advantageous to refer
to the relevant history of the development of this branch of the law.
•
The Act being Central Act 14 of !947 was passed in the year
1947. In 1953, an Ordinance was promulgated followed by Amending Act 43 of 1953 inserting Chapter VA containing Sections 25A to •
25J. New definitions of "Lay-Off" and "Retrenchment" were fur-·
nished in· the Act in clauses (kkk) and ( oo) of Section 2. The heading of Chapter VA is "Lay-Off and Retrenchment". The relevant
provisions of this Chapter were not meant to cover the small industrial
EXCEL WEAR v. UNION
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1019
establishments in which less than 50 workmen were cmpio}ed or establishments of a seasonal character. Section 25C made a provision for
certain amounts of compensation for workmen in case they are laidoff. Section 25F imposes certain conditions on the employers which
are conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen, such as, the
giving of one me>nth's notice or wages in lieu thereof. Provision has
also been made for payment e>f retrenchment compensation. Section
25FF dealt with compensation te> we>rkmen in case of transfer of
undertakings. In Hariprasad Shivshankar Shukla v. A. D. Divikar(')
this Court had occasiop. to consider the meaning of the term "retrenchment". It was opined that the word "retrenchment" means the discharge of surplus labour or staff by the employer for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary
action and de>es not include termination of services of all workmen on
a bona fide closure of an industry. The question posed at page 134
by S. K. Das J ., who delivered the judgment on behalf of the Constitution Bench of this Court was whether the definition clause of the
word 'retrenchment' covers cases of closure of business when the
closure is real and bona fide? The answer given at page 137 was in
the negative. Discharge of workmen on bona fide closure of business
was held to be not retrenchment. On the view that Section 25F of the
Act had no application to a closed or dead industry, no pronouncement was made in regard to the constitutional validity of the section if
it were to take within its ambit a case of closure also.
After the decision of this Court in the case of Hariprasad Shivshanker (supra) was handed down the law was amended by an Ordinance followed by Amending Act 18 of 1957 with retrospective effect
frcm November 28, 1956. Section 25FF was amended to make a
provision for payment of compensation to workmen in case of transfer
of nndertakings and a provision was made in Section 25FFF for payment of compensation to workmen in case of closing down of an
undertaking. It will be of use to read here sub-section ( 1) of Section
25FFF for the purpose of deciding some of the contentious questions
in this case. It reads as follows : "Where an undertaking is closed dowu for any reason
whatse>ever, every workman who has been in continuous service for not less than one year in that undertaking immediately before such closure shall, subject to the provisions of
sub-section (2), be entitled to notice and compensation in
accordance with the provisions of section 25F, as if the
workman had been retrenched.
( 1) [1957] S. C. R. 121
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Provided that where the undertaking is closed down on
account of unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of
the employer, the compensation to be paid to the workman
under clause (b) of section 25F, shall not exceed his average
pay for three months.
Explanation-An undertaking which is closed down by
reason merely of(i) financial difficulties (including financial losses); or
(ii) accumulation of undisposed of stocks; or,
\.
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(iii) the expiry of the period of the lease or licence granted
to it; or
(iv)
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in a case where the undertaking is engaged in mining
operations, exhaustion of the minerals in the area in
which operations are carried on;
shall not be deemed to be closed down on account of nnavoidable circumstances beyond the control of the employer
within the meaning of the proviso to this sub-section."
It would be rwticed from the provision extracted above that normally
it became necessary for an employer in a case of closure for any reason
whatsoever to give notice and compensation to the workmen in accordance with the provisions of section 25F as if the workman had been
retrenched. But the proviso clearly postulated that an undertaking
may have to be closed down on account of unavoidable circumstances
beyond the control of the employer. In that event a ceiling was put
in the proviso on the amount of normal compensation payable. The
explanation added by Amending Act 45 of 1971 merely indicates that
the reasons enumerated in clauses (i) to (iv) of the Explanation will
not be deemed to be a closure brought about on account of unavoidable reasons beyond the control of the employer within the meaning of
the proviso. Factually and really the said reasons may be said to fall
within the expression "unavoidable circumstances beyond the control
of the employer." But the said reasons will not be deemed to be such
that a workman should be made to get only a limited compensation
a~d not the full normal compensation provided in section 25F.
The constitutional validity of section 25FFF(l) came to be considered by this Court in M/s Hatisingh Mfg. Co. Ltd. and another v.
Unitm of India and Ors.('). The provision was construed in a manner
which saved it from the attack on its vires. Since we are on this case.
(!) [1960] · ~.C.R. 528.
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EXCEL WEAR
v. UNION (Untwalia, !.)
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at this very stage we may refer to some very important views expressed A
therein which are decisive of some of the points raised in this case and.
of great help in deciding some others. Shah J., as he then was, speaking for the Court pointed out at page 535 :-"By Article 19 ( 1) (g)
of the Constitution freedom to carry on any trade or business is guaranteed to every citizen, but this freedom is not absolute." "In the
interest of the general public", says the learned Judge, "the law may B
impose restrictions on the freedom of the citizens to start, carry on or
close their undertakings." This clearly indicates, and the whole ratio
of the case is based upon this footing, that the right to carry on any
business includes a right to start, carry on or close down any undertaking. It has further been pointed out on the same page that "by
c
s. 25FFF( 1), termination of employment on closure of the undertaking without payment of compensation and without either serving
notice or paying wages in lieu of noitce, is, not prohibited. Payment of compensation and payment of wages for the period of notice
are not therefore conditions precedent to closure." This is one of the
main reasons given in the judgment to repel the attack on the constitu- D
tional validity of the provision. We, however, must hasten to add that
it does not necessarily follow therefrom that if such payments are made
conditions precedent to closure the provision will necessarily be bad.
While judging the question as to whether the restrictions imposed by
Sections 25-0 and 25-R are reasonable or not within the meaning of
clause (6) of Article 19, we will have to keep in mind the principles E
enunciated in Hatising's case at page 535 thus:"Whether an impugned provision imposing a fetter on
the exercise of the fundamental right guaranteed by Art.
19 ( 1) (g) amounts to a reasonable restriction imposed in the
interest of the general public must be adjudged not in the
background of any theoretical standards or predeterrninate
patterns, but in the light of the nature and incidents of the
right the interest of the general public sought to be secured
by imposing the restriction and the reasonableness of the
quality and extent of the fetter upon the right."
,
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At pages 536-37 are to be found some important obseryations in the
interest of the labour and we respectfully agree with them. They are
as follows : -
•
"Closure of an industrial undertaking involves termination of employment of many employees, and throws them into
the ranks of the unemployed, and it is in the interest of the
general public that misery resulting fro!ll unemployment
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should be redressed. In Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. v. The
Workmen-[1960] 2 SCR 32 this Court considered the
reasons for awarding compensation under s. 25F (though not
its constitutionality). It was observed that retrenchment
compensation was intended to give the workmen some relief
and to soften the rigour of hardship which retrenchment
brings in its wake when the retrenched workman is suddenly
and without his fault thrown on the streets, to face the grim
problem of unemployment. It was also observed that the
workmen naturally expects and looks forward to security of
service spread over a long period, but retrenchment destroys
his expectations. The object of retrenchment compensation
is therefore to give partial protection to the retrenched employee to enable him to tide over the· period of unemployment. Loss of service due to closure stands on the same
footing as loss of service due to retrenchment, for in both
cases, the employee is thrown out of employmeut suddenly
and for no fault of his and the hardships which he has to face
are, whether unemployment is the result of retrenchment or
closure of business, the same."
'
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In case of retrenchment only a specified number of workmen loses
their employment while in closure all the workmen become unemployed.
By Amending Act 32 of 1972 section 25FFA was inserted in Chapter VA of the Act providing for the giving by the employer of 60 days'
prior notice to the appropriate Government of his intention to close
down any undertaking. Failure to do so entailed a liability to be
punished under section 30A inserted in the Act by the same Amending
Act.
Chapter VB was inserted in the Act by Amending Act 32 of 1976
with effect from the 5th March, .1976. Under section 25K the provisions of this Chapter were made applicable to comparatively bigger
industrial establishments in which not less than 300 workmen were
employed. Only three kinds of industries were roped in for the purpose of the rigour of the law provided in Chapter VB by defining
"industrial establishment" in clause (a) section 2SL to mean : "(i) a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of
the Factories Act, 1948;
(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section
of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952; or
(1}
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EXCEL WEAR v. UNION
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(Untwalia, /.)
1023
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of
the Plantations Labour Act, 1951."
Section 25M dealt with the imposition of further restrictions in the
matter of lay-off. Section 25N provided for conditions precedent to
retrenchment of workmen. In these cases the vires of neither of the
two sections was attacked. Rather, a contrast was made between the
said provisions with those of section 25-0 to attack the latter. The
main difference pointed out was that in sub-section (3) of Section
25M the authority while granting or refusing permission to the employer to lay-off was required to record reasons in writing and in subsection ( 4) a provision was made that the permission applied for shall
be deemed to have been granted on the expiration of the period of two
months. The period provided in sub-section (4) enjoins the authority to pass the order one way or the other within the said period.
Similarly in sub-s. (2) of section 25N reasons are required to be
recorded in writing for grant or refusal of the permission for retrenchment and the provision for deem.ed permission was made in sub-s. ( 3) ·
on the failure of the governmental authority to communicate the
permission or the refusal within a period of three months.
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We must now read section 25-0 impugned provision in full : "(I) An employer who intends to close down an undertak-
ing of an industrial establishment to which this
Chapter applies ·shall serve, for previous approval at
least ninety days before the date on which the intended
closure is to become effective, a notice, in the presnibed manner, on the appropriate Government stating
clearly the reasons for the intended closure of the
undertaking :
E
F
Provided that nothing in this section shall apply
to an undertaking set up for the construction of buildings, bridges, roai!s, canals, dam·s or for other construction work.
I
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(2) On receipt of a notice under sub-section ( 1) the appropriate Government may, if it is satisfied that the reasons for the· intended closure of the undertaking are
not adequate and sufficient or such closure is prejudicial to the public inte~est, by order, direct the employer not to close down such undertaking.
(3) Where a notice ha·s been served on the appropriate
Government by an employer under sub-section ( 1) of
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section 25FFA and the period of notice has not expired at the commencement of the Industrial Disputes
(Amendment) Act, 1976, such employer shall not
close down the undertaking but shall, within a period
of fifteen days from such commencement, apply to the
appropriate Gove.rnment for permission to close down
the undertaking.
'
( 4) Where an application for permission has been made
under sub-section (3) and the appropriate Government does not communicate the permission or the
refusal to grant the permission to the employer within
a period of two months from the date on which the
application is made, the permission applied for shall
be deemed to have been granted on the expiration of
the said period of two months.
(5) Where no application for permission under sub-section
(I) is made, or where no application for permission
under sub-section (3) is made within the period
specified therein or where the permission for closure
has been refused, the closure of the undertaking shall
be deemed to be illegal from the date of closure and
the workman shall be entitled to all the benefits under
any law for the time being in force as if no notice had
been given to him.
(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-'section
(I) and sub-section ( 3), the appropriate Government
may, if it is satisfied that owing to such exceptional
circumstances as accident in the undertaking or death
of the employer or the like it is necessary so to do,
by order, direct that the provisions of sub-section (I)
or ·sub-section (3) shall not apply in relation to such
undertaking for such period as may be specified in
the order.
(7) Where an undertaking is approved o.r permitted to be
closed down under s.ub-section (I) or sub-section
( 4) , every workman in the said undertaking who has
been in continuous service for not less than one year
in that undertaking immediately before the date of
application for permission under this section 'shall be
entitled to notice and compensation as specified in
section 25N as jf the said workman had been retrenched under that section."
•
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EXCEL WEAR
v. UNION (Untwalia, J.)
1025
Special provision as to the restarting of an undertaking closed down
before the commencement of the Amending Act 32 of 1976 was made
in section 25P. Whether the said provision i's constitutionally valid or
invalid does not fall for determination in these cases. What is, however,
of some importance to point out is that only on the existence of the
four situations mentioned in clauses (a) to ( d) of section 25P the
undertaking could be directed to be rnstarted within such time (not
being less than one month from the date of the order) as may be
specified in the order. Section 25Q provides for penalty for Jay-off and
retrenchment without previous permission and section 25-R deals with
the question of imposition of penalty for closure under certain circumstances. Section 25-R reads as follows : -
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"(!) Any employer who closes down an undertaking without com plying with the provisions of sub-section ( 1)
of Section 25-0 shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or
with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees,
or with both.
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(2) Any employer, who contravenes a direction given
under sub-section (2) of section 25-0 or section 25P,
shall be punishable with imprisonment 'or a term
which may extend to one year, or with fine whicl1 may
extend to five thousand rupees, or with both, and
where the contravention is a continuing one, with a
further fine which may extend to two thousand rupees
for every day ·during which the contravention continues after the conviction.
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(3) Any employer who contravenes the provisions of subsection (3) of section 25-0 shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to one
month, or with fine which may extend to one thousand
rupees, or with both."
F
Let us now analyse the provisions of section 25-0. Sub-section (I)
requires 90 days notice to the appropriate Government for previous
approval of the intended closure. Our attention was drawn to the
Bombay Industrial Rules and the form prescribed therein for the filing
of an application for permission to close down an undertaking. A
very comprehensive history of the undertaking and many facts and
figures in relation thereto, apart from the reasons to be stated for the
intended closure of the undertaking, are requi.red to be given in the
application form. Under sub-section (2), if in the opinion of the
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A
appropriate Government, the reasons for the intended closure are not
adequate and sufficient or if the closure is prejudicial to the public
interest, permission to close down may be !efused. The reasons given
may be correct, yet permission can be refused if they are thought to
be not adequate and sufficient by the State Govermnent. · No reason
is to be given in the order granting the permission or refusing it. The
8
appropriate Government is not enjoined to pass the ruder in terms of
sub-section (2) within 90 days of the period of notice. Sub-section (3)
is a special provision in respect of an undertaking where an employer
had given a notice under section 25FFA(l) before the commencement
of Act 32 of 1976. In that event he is required to apply within a certain
for permission to close down an undertaking. Unde! sub-section
c period
( 4) in a case covered by sub-section ( 3) it is incumbent upon the
Government to communicate the permission or the refusal within a
period of two months, otherwise the permission applied for shall be
deemed to have been granted. Sub-section (5) brings about the real
object of the impugned provisions by stating that the closure of the
unde!taking
shall be .deemed to be illegal from the date of the closure
D
if the undertaking has been closed down without applying for permission
under sub-section (1) or ·sub-section ( 3) or where the permission for
closure has been refused. In that event the workman shall be entitled
to all the benefits under any law for the time being in force as if no
notice had been given to him. It is to be noticed that sub-section ( 5)
E does not say as to whether the closure will be illegal or legal in case
a notice unde! section (1) has been given by the employer but in
absence of any communicatioll' from the Government within a period
of 90 days granting or refusing permission, the employer closes down
the undertaking on the expiry of the said period. Sub-section ( 6)
postulates that there may be a sudden closure of an undertaking due to
F some exceptional circumstances as accident in the undertaking or death
of the employer m the like. In such a situation the appropriate Government is empowered to direct that the provisions of sub-section (1) or
sub-section (3) shall not apply in relation to such undertaking for
such period as may be specified in the order. Under sub-section (7)
where an undertaking is approved or permitted to be closed down, then
G
the workman becomes entitled to notice and compensation as spec;fied
in seetion 25N as if the said workman had been retrenched under that
section. In other words requirement of section 25N is to be complied
with on the grant "f the permission to close.
H
Section 25-R while prov.iding for awarding of punishment to an
employer who closes down an undertaking without complying with
the provisions of sub-section ( 1) of section 25-0 or who contravenes a
direction given nnder section 25-0(2) is silent on the question of
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EXCEL WEAR v. UNION
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1027
entailing any penal consequences in case where an employer had A
applied for permission under sub-section ( 1) of section 25-0_ but the
Government had failed to communicate its order to him within a period
. of 90 days and the undertaking is closed down on the expiry of the
5aid period.
We propose first to briefly dispose of the two extreme contentions
B
put forward on either side as to the nature of the alleged right to close
down a business. If one does not start a business at all, then, perhaps,
under no circumstances he can be compelled to start one. Such a
negative aspect of a right to carry on a business may be equated with
the negative aspects of the right embedded in the concept of the
right to freedom of speech, to form an association or to acquire or
c
hold property. Perhaps under no circumstances a person can be
-compelled to speak; to form an association or to acquire or hold a
property. But by imposing reasonable restrictions he can be compelled not t0- speak; not to form an association or not to acquire
or hold property. Similarly, as held by this Court in Cooverjee
Bharucha v. The Excise Commissioner and the Chief Commissioner, D
Ajmer, and Ors.('); Narendra Kumar & Ors. v. The Union of India
and Ors.(2) total prohibition of business is possible by putting
reasonable restrictions within the meaning of Article 19 ( 6) on the
right to carry on the business. But as pointed out at page 387 in
the case of Narendra Kumar (supra) "The greater the restriction,
the more the need for strict scrutiny by the CourC' and then it is said E
-further :
"In applying the test of reasonableness, the Court has
to consider the question in the background of the facts and
circumstances under which the order was made, talcing into
account th•e nature of the evil that was sought to be reF
medied by such law, the ratio of the harm caused to individual citizens by the proposed remedy, to the beneficial
effect reasonably expected to result to, the general public.
It will also be necessary to consider in that connection
whether the restraint caused by the law is more than was
necessary in the interests of the general public."
G
But then, as pointed out by this Court in Hatisingh's case (sup:a)
the right to close down a business is an integral part of the r1gbt
to carry it on. It is not quite correct to say that a right to close
,down a business can be equated or placed at par as high as the
right not to start and carry on a business at all. The extreme proposition urged on behalf of the employers by equating the two rights H
(I) [19541 S. C.R. 873.
(2) [1960] 2 S. c. R. 375.
SUPREME COURT REPQRTS
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and then placing them at par is not quite apposite and sound. Equally so, or rather, more emphatically we do reject the extreme contention put forward on behalf of the Labour Uniohs that right
to close down a business is not an integral part of the right to carry
on a business, but it is a right appurtenant to the ownership of the
property or that it is not a fundamental right at all. It is wrong
to say that an employer has no right to close down a business once
he starts it. If he has such a right, as obviously he has, it cannot
but be a fundamental right embedded in the right to carry on any
business guaranteed under Article 19 (I) (g) of the Constitution.
In one sense the right does appertain to property. But such a faint
overlapping of the right to property e'ngrafted in Article 19 ( 1) ( f)
or Article 31 must not be allowed to cast any shade or eclipse on
the simple nature of the right as noticed above.
•
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We now proceed to examine whether the restriction imposed
under the impugned law are reasonable within the meaning of
Article 19(6). This is undoubtedly on the footing, as held by us
above, that the right to close a busi'ness is an integral part of the
fundamental right to carry on a busin~s. But as no right is absolute
in its scope, so is the nature of this right. It can certainly be
restricted, regulated or controlled by law in the interest of the general public.
On behalf of the petitioners, the restrictions imposed by the
impugned law are said to be unreasonable because(i) Section 25-0 does not require giving of reasons in
the order.
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(ii) No time limit is to be fixed while refusing permission to close down.
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(iii) Even if the reasons are adequate and sufficient,
approval can be denied in the purported public
interest of security of labour. Labour is bou'nd to
S\)ffer because of unemployment brought about in
almost every case of closure.
(iv) It has been left to the caprice and whims of the
authority to decide one way or the other. No guidelines have been given.
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(v) Apart from the civil liability which is to be incurred
under sub-section (5), the closure, however, compulsive it may be, if brought about against the direc-
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EXCEL WEAR v. UNION
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(Untwalia, !.)
1029
tion given under sub-section (2) is visited with
penal consequences as provided in section 25-R.
(vi) There is no deeined provision as to the according
of approval in sub-section (2) as in sub-section
(4).
(vii) Refusal to accord approval would merely mean
technically that the business continues but a factory
owner cannot be compelled to carry on the business
and go on with the production and thus one of the
objectives sought to be achieved by this provision
cannot be achieved.
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(viii) There is no provision of appeal, rev1s10n or review
of the order even after sometime.
(ix) The· employer is compelled to resort to the provisions of Section 25N only after approval of the
closure.
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(x) Restriction being much more excessive than is
necessary for the achievement of the object is highly
unreasonable.
(xi) There may be several other methods to regulate and
restrict the right of closure by providing for extra
compensation over and above the retrenchment
compensation if the closure is found to be mala fide
and unreasonable.
(xii) To direct the employer not to close down is altogether a negation of the right to close. It is not
regnlatory.
(xiii) If carrying on any business is prohibited in public
interest, a person can do another business. But to
prohibit the closure of a running business is destruction of the right to close.
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(xiv) That reasons should be adequate and sufficient from
whose points of view is not indicated in the Statute.
(xv) The reasonableness of the impugned restrictions
must be examined both from procedural and substantive aspects of the law. Sub-section (2) of
sertion 25-0 does not make it obligatory for any
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higher authority of the Government to take a decision. It may be taken even by a lower officer in
the hierarchy.
On behalf of the respondenllS a'nd the interveners all the above
arguments were combated and it was asserted that the restriction
imposed is reasonable in the interest of the general public. The
dominant interest was of labour but the other interests are also
protected by the restriction, such as, interest of anci11'ary industry
a'nd preventing fall in production ,of a particular commodity which
may effect the economic growth. The application form requires the
employer applying for permission to close down to give such comprehensive and detailed information that it will enable the appropriate Government to take appropriate decisions Ill appropriate
cases. It was also urged that the word "Socialist" has been added
in the Preamble of the Constitution by the Forty Second amendment
and the tests of reasonableness, therefore, must change and be
necessarily different from the dogmatic and stereo-type tests laid
down in the earlier decisions of this Court. Apart from invoking
the bar of Article 31 C in terms, it was also urged that the spirit
behind the said Article for the progress of the law mea'nt for social
justice has got to be kept in view while judging the reasonableness
of the restriction in the light of its endeavour to advance the directive principles enshrined in Part-IV of the Constitution. In order
to overcome the various obvious lacunae in the section, we were
asked, by a rule of construction, to read down the section and save
its constitutionality. It was urged that successive applications can
be made on the change of a situation. No amount of compensation
can be a substitute for the preve'ntive remedy of the evil of unemployment.
We now proceed to deal with the rival contentions. But befope
we do so, we may make some general observations. Concept of
socialism or a socialist state has undergone changos from time to
time from ccmntry to country and from thinkers to thinkers. But
some basic concept still holds the field. fn the case of Akadast
Padhan v. State of Orissa(') the question for consideration was
whether a law creating a State monopoly is valid under the latter
part of Article 19 ( 6) which was introduced by the (first Amendment) Act, 1951. While considering that question, it was pointed'
out by Gajendragadkar J., as he then was, at page 704 :
(1) [1963] Suppl. 2 S. C.R. 691.
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EXCEL WEAR v. UNION
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(Untwalia, !.)
I 031
"With the rise of the philosophy of Socialism, the
doctrine of State ownership has been often discussed by
political and economic thinkers.
Broadly speaking, this
discussion discloses a difference in approach. 1;Q . the
socialist, nationalisation or State ownership I is a
matter of principle and its justification is the general
notion of social welfare. To the rationalist, nationalisation
or State ownership i's a matter of expediency dominated
by considerations of economic efficiency and increased output of production. This latter view supported nationalisation o'nly when it appeared clear that State ownership
would be more efficient, more economical and more productive. The former approach was not wry much influenced by these considerations, and treated it a matter
of principle that all important and nation-building industries should come under State co'ntrol. The first
approach is doctrinaire, while the second is pragmatic.
The first proceeds on the general ground that all national
wealth and means of producing it should come under
national control, whilst the second supports nationalisatio·n
only on grounds of efficiency and increased output."
The difference pointed out between the doctrinaire approach to the
problem of socialism and the pragmatic one is very apt a'nd may
enable the courrn to lean more and more in favour of nationalisation
and State ownership of an industry after the addition of the word
'Socialist in the Preambb of the Constitution. But so long as the
private ow'nership of an industry is recognised and governs an
overwhelmingly large proportion of our economic structure, is it
possible to say that principles of socialism and social justice can
be pushed to such an extp"me so as to ignore completely or to a
very.large extent the interests of another section of the public namely
the private owners of the undertakings ? Most of the industries are
owned by limited compa'nies in which a number of shareholders,
both big and small, holds the shares. There are creditors and
depositors and various other persons conll'~cted with or having dealings with the undertaking. Does socialism go to the extent of not
looking to the interests of all such persons? In a State owned
undertaking the Governmont or the Government company is the
owner. If they are compelled to close down, they, probably, may
protect the labour by several other methods at their command, ewn,
sometimes at the cost of the public exchequer. It may not be
always advisable to do so but that is a different question. But
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ih a private sector obviously the two matters involved in rnnning it
arc not on the same footing. , One part is the management of the
business done by the owrr,rs or their representatives and the other
is miming the business for return to the owner not o"nly for the
purpose of meeting his livelihood or expenses but also for the purpose
of tbo growth of the· national economy by formation of more and
B more -capital. .. Does it stand to reason that ·by such rigorous provisions' like those ·contai·ned in the impugned sections all these interests .
should be completely or substantially ignored ? The qll'3stions posod
··are suggestive of· the 'answers.
-,
In contrast to the other provisions, section 25-0(2) docs not
: C · / require the giving of reasons in the order. In two of the impugned
orders communicated to the petitioners, Excel \Vear alld Acme
Manufacturing Co. Ltd., it is merely stated that the reasons for the
in~'nded closure arc prejudicial to public interest suggesting thereby
that the' reasons given by the employers are correct, adequate . and
sufficient, yet they arc prejudicial to the public interest In . cases
__
D nf bona fide closures it would be generally so. · Yet the interest of
labour for the time being is bound ta suffer because it .makes a
worker unemployed. Such a situation as far as reasonably possible,
should be prevented. Public interest. and social justice do require
the protection of the labour. But is it reasonable to· give them
protection against all unemployment after affecting the interest5 of
. E so many persons interested and co·nnected with the management
apart from the employers ? Is it possible to compel the employer
to manage the undertaking even when they do not find it safe and
practicable-to manage the affairs ? Can they be asked to go on
facing tremendous difficulties of manageme·nt even at the risk of
their P'orson and property ? Can they be compelled to go on incurF. · ring ·losses year after year? As we have indicated earlier, in
section 25FFF ·retrenchment compensation was allowed in cases of
·closure and if closure was nccasio·ned on account of unavoidable
.. circumstances beyond the control of the employer a ceiling was put
on the. amount of compensation under the proviso. The Explanation postulates the financial difficulties including financial losses or
G accumulatioll of undisposed stocks etc. as the closing of an under., . taking on account of unavoidable circumstances beyond the control
. · ··of the employer but by a deeming provision only the ceiling in the
matter of compensation is not made applicable to the closure of an
l
undertaking for such reaso·ns. Jn 1972 by insertinn of section·
25FFA in Chapter VA
the .Act, an employer was 'enjoined to
H
give notice to the Gov•,mment of an intended closure. But gradually
the net was cast too wide. and the freedcn of the emrloyer tightened to such an extent by introduction of the impugned provisions that
of
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EXCEL WEAR v. UNION
(Untwalia, J.)
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it has come to a breaking point from the point of view of the
employers. As in the instant cases. so in many others, a situation
may arise both from the point of view of law and order and the
financial aspect that the employer finds it impossible to carry oi1
the business any longer. H~ mnst not be allowed to be whimsica:
or capricious in the matter ignoring the interest of the labour al' together. But that can probably be remedied by awarding different slabs of compensation in different sitnations. It is not quite
correct to say that because compensation is not a substitute for the
• remedy of prevention of unemployment, the later remedy must be
'.. · the only one. If it were so, then in no case closure can be or
~ should be allowed. I'n the third case namely that of Apar Private
Ltd. the Government has given two reasons, both of them being too
vague to give any exact idea in support of the refusal of permission
to close down. It says that the reasons are 11ot adequate and
sufficient (although they may be correct) and that the intended
closure is prejudicial to the public interest. The latter reason will
be universal in all cases of closure. The former demonstrates to
what extent the order can be unreasonable. If the reason given by
the petitioner in great detail are correct, as the impugned order
suggests they are, it is preposterous to say that they are not adequate and sufficient for a closure. Such an unreasonable order was
possible to be passed because of the unreasonab~~ness of the law.
Whimsically ab.d capriciously the authority can refuse permission to
close down. Cases may be there, and those in hand seem to be of
that nature, where if the employer acts according to the direction
given in the order ho will have no other alternative but to face
ruination in the matter of personal safety and on the economic
fro\J.t. If he violates it, apart from the civil liability which will be
of a recurring nature, he incurs the penal liability not only under section
25-R of the Act but under many other Statutes.
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We were asked to read in section 25-0(2) that it will be incumbent for the authority to give reasons in his, order and we were
also asked to cull out a deeming provision thereib.. If the Government order is not communicated to the employer within 90 days,
strictly speaking, the criminal liability under section 25-R may not
be attracted if on the expiry of that period the employer clooes down
the undertaking. but it seems the civil liability under section 250(5) will come into play even after the pussing of the order of
refusal of permission to close down on the expiry of the period of
90 days. Intrinsically no provision in Chapter VB of the Act
suggests that the object of carrying on the production can be achieved by the refusal to grant permission although in the Objects and
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Reasons of the Ame"nding Act such an object seem> to be there,
although remotely, and secondly it is highly unreasonable to achieve
the object by compelling the employer not to close down in public
interest for maintaining the production.
The order passed by the authority is not subj•"ct to any scrutiny
by any higher authority or tribunal either in appeal or revision. The
order cannot be reviewed either. We were again asked to read
into the provisions that successive applications can be made either
for review of the ord·~r or because of the changed circumstances.
But what will the employer do even if the continuing same circumstances make it impossible for him to carry on the business any
longer ? Can he ask for a review ?
E
Again, by interpretation we were aske.d to say that steps under
section 25N can be· taken simultaneously when a notice under section 25-0(1) is given. Firstly, the language of sub-section (7) does
not warrant this constructio"n. The action of giving notice and compensation in accordance with section 25N is to be taken when an
undertaking is approved or permitted to be closed down and not
before that. Secondly, it is not practicable to give three months
notice in writing or wages for the said period in lieu of notice or
to pay the retrenchment compensation in advance as required by
s<:ction 25N before the employer gets an approval from the Govern- ·
ment.
F
It is not always easy to strike a baJa·nce between the para;Jcl and
conllicting interests. Yct it is not fair to unreasonably tilt the
balance in favour of one interest by ignoring tho other. Mr. Nadkarni relied upon the following passage of Frankfurter J .. while expressing his view oh "Balance of Interest" :
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"I cannot agree in treating what is essentially a problem
of striking balance between the competing interest "' an
exercise in absolutes."
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Learned counsel also referred to a note on 'Government and liberty'
from 'Paradoxes of Legal Science' by Banjamin Cardozo which is to
the following effect : "As the social conscience is awakened, the Gonception
of injury is widened and insight into its cause is deepened
the area of restraint is therefore increased."
No body can have a quarrel with these basic principles however, high
sounding or unreasonable they may appear to be on their face. But
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.Yet no jurisprudence of any country recognizes that the concept of
injury is widened and the area of restraint is broadened to an extent
'that it may result in the annihilation of the person affected by the
restraint.
In case of fixation of minimnm wages the plea of the employer
that he has not got the capacity to pay even minimum wages and,
therefore, such a restriction on his right to carry on the business is
unreasonable has been repeatedly rejected by this Court to wit
U. Unirhoyi and Ors. v. The State of Kerala. (') But the principle,
rather in contrast, illustrates the unreasonableness of the present
impugned law. No body has got a right to carry on the business if
he cannot pay even the minimum wages to the labour. He must then
retire from business. But to tell him to pay and not to retire even
·if he cannot pay is pushing the matter to an extreme. In some cases of
this Court, to wit Pipralch Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pipraich Sugar Mills
Mar.door Union(') it has been opined that where the industry had
been closed and the closure was real and bona fide, there cannot be
an industrial dispute after closure. At page 881 Venkatarama Ayyar
'J ., has said : -
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"Therefore, where the business has been closed and it
is either admitted or found that the closure is real and bona
•
fide, any dispute arising with reference thereto would, as
held in K. N. Padmanabha Ayyar v. The State of Madras
(supra), fall outside the purview of the Industrial Disputes
Act. And that will a fortiori be so, if a dispute arises-if
one such can be conceived-after the closure of the business
between the quondam employer and employees."
But the observations at page 882 indicate that if the dispute relates
·to a period prior to closure it can be referred for adjudication even
after closure. The very apt observations are to the following
effect:-
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"H the contention of the appellant is correct, what is
there to prevent an employer who intends, for good and
commercial reason, to close his business from indulging on
a large scale in unfair labour practices, iu victimisation and
in wrongful dismissals, and escaping the consequences
thereof by closing down the industry? We think that on a
true construction of s. 3, the power of the State to make a
rI) [1962] l S. C.R. 946.
'(2) [1956] S. C.R. 872.
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reference under the section must be determined with reference not to the date on which it is made but to the date on
which the right which is the subject-matter of the dispute
arises, and that the machinery provided under the Act
would be available for working out the rights which had
accrued prior to the dissolution of the business."
It y;ould thus be seen that in the matter of giving appropriate and
reseasonable relief to the labour even after the closure of the business
the facts which were in existence prior to it can form the subject matter
of an industrial dispute. Even assuining that strictly speaking all
such matters cannot be covered in view of the decisions of this Court
we could understand a provision of law for remedying these drawbacks. The law may provide to deter the reckless, unfair, unjust or
ma/a fide closures. But it is not for us to suggest in this judgment
what should be a just and reasonable method to do so. What we are
concerned with at the present juncture is to see whether the law as
enacted suffers from any vice of excessive and unreasonable restriction. In our opinion it does suffer.
•
The reasonableness has got to be tested b'oth from the procedural
and substantive aspects of the law. In the case of State of Bihar v.
K. K. Misra & Ors. (I) it has been said at page 196 : E
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"As observed in Dr. Khare v. State of Delhi, (1950)
SCR 519 and reiterated in V. G. Row's case--(1952) SCR
597 that in considering reasonableness of laws imposing
restrictions on fundamental rights both substantive and procedural aspects of the law should be examined from the
point of view of reasonableness 'and the test of reasonableness wherever prescribed should be applied to each individual statute impugned and no abstract standard or general
pattern of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable
to all cases. It is not possible to formulate an effective test
which would enable the court to pronounce any particular
restriction to be reasonable or unreasonable per se. All the
attendant circumstances must be taken into consideration
and one cannot dissociate the actual contents of the restrictions from the manner of their imposition or the mode ·of
putting them into practice."
It is no doubt true that Chapter VB deals with certain compara-
H
tively bigger undertakings and of a few types only.
(1) [1970] 3 S. C. R.181.
But with all this
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EXCEL WEAR V. UNION
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difference it has not made the law reasonable. It may be a reasonable classification for saving the law from violation of Article 14 but
certainly it does not make the restriction reasonable within the meaning of Article 19(6). Similarly the interest of ancillary industry C'allnot be protected by compelling an employer to carry on the industry
although he is incapacitated to do so. All the comprehensive and
detailed information given in the application forms are of no avail to
the employer if the law permits the authority to pass a cryptic, capricious, whlln_sical and one-sided order.
Mr. Deshmukh relying upon the decision of this Court in the
case of Akadasi Padhan (supra) urg>~d that there will be presumption
of reasonableness in a legislation of this kind. But reliance upon this
principle enunciated in the case of State Monopoly of Kendu leaves
seems to be misconceived. Gajendragedkar J., pointed out at page
704 : "The amendment made by the Legislature in Art. 19(6)
shows that according to the Legislature, a law relating to
the creation of State monopoly should be presumed to be
in the interests of the general public. Art 19(6) (ii)
clearly shows that there is no limit placed on the power of
the State in respect of the creation of State monopoly."
This proposition cannot be pressed into service in a case of the kind
which we are dealing with.
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Mr. Deshmukh's argument that a right to close down a business
is a right appurtenant to the ownership of the property and not an
integral part of the right to carry on the business is not correct.
We have already said so. The properties are the undertaking and
the business assets invested therein. The owner cannot be ~sked to
part with them or destroy them by not permitting him to close down
the undertaking. In a given case for his mismanagement of the
undertaking resulting in bad relationship with the labour or incurring
recurring losses the undertaking may be taken over by the State.
That will be affecting the property right with which we are not concerned in this cas·~. It will also be co'nsistent with the object of
making India a Socialist State. But not to permit the employer to
close down is essentially an interference with his fundamental right
to carry on the business.
On the basis of the decision of this Court in The State of Gujarat
and Anr. v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., Ahmedabad, etc.("') it was
(I) [1974] 3 S .C. R. 760.
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urged that even. if there is a violation by impugned law of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1) (g) and not r,aved by
clause (6) thernof, the said right has been conferred only on the
citizens of India and not upo'n the corporate bodies like a company.
Counsel submitted that the company cannot challenge the law by
a writ petition merely by making a shareholder join it. Nothing of
the kind was said by Mathew J., who spoke for the Court in the
above case. The question which was posed at page 773 was whether
a law which takes away or abridges the fundamental right of citizens
nnder Article 19 ( 1) (f) would be void and, therefore, non-est as
respects non-citizens. On a consideration of a number of authorities
of this Court the principle which was culled out and applied in the
case of Ambica Mills (supra) at page 780 is in these words-"For
our purpose it is enough to say that if a law is otherwise good a'nd
does not contravene any of their fundamental rights, non-citizens
cannot take advantage of the voidness of the law for the reason that
it contravenes the fundamental right of citizens and claim that there
is no law at all." Contrary to the above submission there ar•e
numerorus authorities of this Court directly on the point. A reference
to the case of Bennet Coloman & Co. & Ors. v. Union of India
& Ors.('.) will be sufficknt. Following the decisio'n of this Court
in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India(') it was held that
if a shareholder's right is impaired the State cannot impair the right
of the shareholders as well as of the company and the Court can
strike down the law for violation of a fundamental right guaranteed
only to the citizens of the challe'nge is by the company as well as
the shareholder. Referring to the bank nationalisation c3'e it is
said at page 773 by Ray J., as he then was :
·'A shareholder is entitled to protection of Article 19.
That individual right is not lost by reason of the fact that
he is a shareholder of the company. The Bank Natio'nalisation case (supra) has er,tabliskd the view that the fundamental rights of shareholders as citizens are not lost when
they associate to form a company. When their fundamental rights as shareholders are impaired by State action
thdr right1s as shareholders are protected. The reason is
that the shareholders' rights are equally and necessarily
affected if the rights of the company are affected."
Excel Wear is a partnership co'ncem. The partners in the name of
the firm can challenge the validity of the law. In each of the other
(I) [1973] 2 S. C.R. 757.
(2) [19701 3 s. c. R. 530.
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EXCEL WEAR
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v. UNION (Untwalia, J.)
1039
two petitions, as already stated, a shareholder has joined with the
company to challenge the law. The contention of Mr. Ramamurthi,
therefore, must be rejected .
Now w~ proceed to consider whether the law is saved by Article
31C of the Constitution. This point, as indicated earlier, was just
touched in passing by other counsel. llut Mr. Ramamurthi endeavoured to advance a full-dressed argument on this aspect of the
matter. His submission was that Article 31C ins•~rted in the Constitution by the (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971 as amended by
the (Forty-second Amendment) Act. 1976 makes the law beyond
the pale of challe'ng~ on the ground of violation of Article 19.
Mr. Ramamurthi's argument proceed:~ thus. A declaration of
Emergency on the ground o[ external danger was made by the
President in 1971. While th•e imposition of external Emergency was
in force, internal Emergency was also imposed on June 25, 1975.
The Emergency-both external and internal, was lifted on March 21,
1977. Article 31C, as originally inserted read as follows :
"Notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13, no
law giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing
the principles specified in c!aUJse (b) or clause (c) of article 39 shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is
inconsiste'nt with, or takes away or abridges any of the
rights conferred by Article 14. Article 19 or Article 31 ....
...... " [We have omitted from this quotation that part of
Article 31 C which was declared void by majority decision
in the case of His Holiness Kesavananda Bharat; Sripadaga/avaru v. State of Kcrala-(1973) Suppl. S.C.R. 1.]"
'
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The Forty-second Amendment made the application of the Article
more comprehensive by substituting the words "all or any of the
principles laid down i'n Part-IV" in place of the words "the principles
specified in clause (b) or claus·c ( c) of Article 39." A feeble
attempt in the first instance was made to show that the impugned
law was covered by clause (b) or clause ( c) of Article 39. But this
attempt could not be pursued with any force or success. What was,
however, strenuously contended was that surely the law is for giving
effect to the policy of the Stat•e towards securing the principles laid
down in Articles 39(1), 41 and 43 of Part-IV a'nd thus within the
ambit of the amended Article 31 C. No attack on the validity of
the law, therefore, could be made. In the first instano~, we may
point out that we arc not impressed with the argument and do not
accept it as correct that the impugned law is for giving ef!P..ct to the
policy of the State towards securing any of the principles ih Articles
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39(a) or 41. Clause (a) of Article 39 concerns itself with the
policy towards securing "that the citivens, men and women equally,
have the right to an adequate means of livelihood." The impugned'
law obviously does not fit in with this directive principle. Article 41
deals with right to work, to education and to public assistance in
certain cases. The impugned law is not concerned with this policy.
The directive principle which might be brought nearest to the impugned law is to be found in the following words of Article 43"The State shall endeavour to secure, by suitable legislation ..... .
to all workers ... : work ...... " without deciding the question,
whether the impugned law ca·n be said to be a law giving effect to
the directive principle enshrined in Article 43 or not, we shall assume
in favour of the respondents and the interveners that it is so. Yet
we shall presently show that the amended Article 31 C cannot put
this law beyond the pale of challenge.
Chapter VB was i'ntroduced by Amending Act 32 of 1976 with
effect from 5th of March, 1976. The amendment aforesaid made
in Article 31 C was with effect from 3rd January, 1977. Section 4
of the (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976 which brought about
the amendment merely uses the expression "the words and figures ..
. . . . . . shall be substituted." It did not say, and probably it could
not have said so, that "they will always be de,,med to have been
substituted." It is, therefore, clear that the amendment was prospective in operation and was not made retrospectiv''· To overcome
this difficulty Mr. Ramamurthi advanced an ingenious argument. He
submitted that Chapter VB was inserted in the Act when the Emerg,ncy was in operation. Under Article 358, the State during the
period of Emergency was competent to enact the impugned law even
though it violated Article 19. By the time the Emergency was lifted
arn,nded Article 31 C had come into operation. Thus by the continuous process the latter became immune from challenge on the
ground of violation of Article 19. Counsel relied upon the following
decisions of this Court, apart from some others which are not necessary to be referred to, viz.-(1) Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The
State of Bombay(1); (2) Dhirubha Devisingh Gohil v. The State of
Bombay('); (3) M. P. V. Sundararamier & Co. v. The State of
Andhra Pradesh & Anr( 3 ); ( 4) Jagannath etc. etc. v. Authorised
Officer, Land Reforms & Ors. etc.(') We shall presently point out
(I) [1951] 2 S. C.R. 228.
(2) [1955] 1 s. c. R. 691.
3) [1958] S. C. R.1422.
( 4) [1972] IS. C.R. 1055.
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EXCEL WEAR
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1041
the fallacy in the argument and show that none of the decisions
supports the contention. Rather, in contrast, some of them demolish
jt, Article 358 says :
•
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"While ·a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation,
nothing in Art. 19 shall restrict the power of the State as
defined in Part III to make any law or to take any executive
action which the State would but for the provisions contained in that part be competent to make or to take, but a'ny
law so made shall, to the extent of the incompetency,
cease to have effect as soon as the Proclamation ceases to
operate, except as respects things done or omitted to be
done before tbe law so ceases to have effect :"
sometimes a distinction has been drawn between the lack of
[egislative competency of a State to make and enact a law on a
particular topic covered by a'ny of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule
and its incompetency to make a law abridging or abolishing the
fundamental rights or in violation of any other provisions of the
Constitution. When there is a lack of legislative competence, the
law made is void ab initio, non-est and a still born law. But Article
13(2) also says :
"The State shall iot make any law which takes away or
abridgos the rights conferred by this Part and any law made
in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the
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contravention, be void."
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Such a law is void to the extent pf the contrave'ntion and in case
of Article 19 the contravention is of the fundamontal rights guaranteed to a citizen. It has been said in some different contexts
that for non-citizens the law is not void but it is merely unenforoeable. Article 358 says that a law made in contravention of Article 19 during the operation of Proclamation of Emergency is not to
be treated incompetently made by the State. Bnt as soon as the
Proclamatio'n ceases to operate the law so made ceases to have
effect to the extent of the incompetency. In other words, the Article
dearly postulates that the law which was incompetently made and bad
for violation of Article 19 will not be taken to be so during the
period of Emergency. But as soon as the Emergency is lifted the
law becomes bad because it was bad when it was enacted, although
it could not be taken to be so duri'ng the period of Emergency. The
amended Article 31 C says. that if the law gave effect to the policy
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of the State towards securing any of the principles laid in Part-IV it
shall not be deemed to be void on the ground of violation of Article
19. The law which was enacnod in March, 1976 could, by no
stretch of imagination, be said to be a law giving effect to the policy
of the State towards securing ahy of the principles laid down in
Part-IV within the meaning of the amended Articb 31C which came
B into force in January, 1977. The Legislature could not have
thought of enacting a law within the meaning of amended Article
31C at a point of time when the Article stood uname'nded. It is,
therefore, difficult to accept the argument of the learned counsel
that the law was not bad during the operation of the Emergency
because of Article 358 and the same position was continued by
c Article
31C by its amendment by the (Forty-second Amendment)
Act. The purport, content and the principles underlying the two
Articles is so very different that it is difficult to tag the •offects of
the two together and make it a continuous effect like a relay-race in
a game. In our view the law was bad for violation of Article 19 (1)
D (g) when it was enacted. but it was not to be taken to be so
during the period of Emergency: its invalidity sprou'ed out with full
vigour on the lifting of the Emergency. The amended Article 31C
did not save it.
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In Keshavan's case (supra) Das J., as he then was, in the majority
judgment of this. Court was interpreting clause (I) of Article 13
and while doing so, he said at page 234 : - •
"fn other words, on and after the commencement of
the Constitution no existing law will be permitted to stand
in the way of the exercise of any of the fundamental rights.
Therefore, the voidness of the existing law is limited to the
future exercise of the fundamental rights. Art. 13 (I)
cannot be read as obliterating the entire operation of the
tnconsistent laws, or to wipe them out altogether from
the statute book, for to do so will be to give them retrospective effect which, we have said, they do not possess.
Such laws exist for all past transactions and for enforcing
all rights and liabilities accrued before the date of the
Constitution."
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This case is of no help to the respondents. In Dhirubha's case
(supra) the wordings of Article 31 B were being construed. Bo::cause
of the presence of the wordc "or ever to have become void" in the
said Article it was said at page 696-97 :
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EXCEL WEAR v. UNION
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(Untwalia, ].)
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"The i"ntention of the Constitution to protect each and
every one of the Acts specified in the Ninth Schedule
frQID. any challenge on the ground of violation of any of the
fundamental rights secured under Part III of the Constitution, irrespective of whether they are pre-existing or new
rights, is placed beyond any doubt or questidn by the very
emphatic language of Art 31-B which declares that none
of the provisions of the specified Acts shall be deemed to
be void or ever to have becomo void on the ground of the
alleged violation of the rights : ............ "
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In com.cast to the language of Article 31C which merely uses the
phrase "shall be dc,"med to be void" and not the phrase "or ever
to have become void" as used in Article 31B the decision of this
Court n Dhirubha's case, rather, goes against the contention of the
learned counsel. 1\1 the Sundararamier's case (supra) Venkatarama
Aiyar J ., summed up the result of the various authorities at page
1474 thu> :
"Where an enactment is unconstitutional in part but
valid as to the rest. assuming of course that the two
portions arc severable, it cannot be held to have bee'n wiped
0nt of the statute book as it admittedly must remain there
for the purpose of enforcement of the valid portion thereof,
and being on the statube book, even that portion which is
unenforceable on the ground that it is unconstitutional will
operate proprio vigore when the constitutional bar is removed. and there is no need for a fresh l'egislation to give
effect thereto."
.
A
These ob,ervations were made in connection with the removal of the
constitutionol bar of imposition of sales tax under Article 286. The
distinction so drawn in the above case is not of universal application. In the legislativ,e field there is nothing like "void or voidable".
The applicotion of the principle has been restricted later to only a
limited field, namely, in connectio'n with the question whether the
legislation requires fresh enactment or not when the bar of incompetency is f'emoved. This Court has considered the question whether
an enactment subsequently saved by Article 31B by being included in
fresh legislation to make it valid .
the Ninth Schedule requires
The answer given was in the negative. ·In the case of Ambica Mills
(supra), Mathew, J., referred to some of the cases aforesaid and the
principles decided therein as also the decision of this Court in
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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Bhikaji Narain Dhakras & Ors. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and
Anr.(') wherein Das, Acting C.J., has •said at pages 599-600:
"All laws, existing or fnture, which are inconsistent
with the provisions of Part III of our Constitution are, by
the express provision of Article 13, rendered void "to the
extent of such inconsistency". . Such laws were not dead
for all purposes. They existed for the purposes of pre'
Constitution rights and liabilities and they remained operative, even after the Constitution, as against non-citi21~ns. It
is only as against the citizens that they remained in a
dormant or moribund condition."
;
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Referring to Sundaramaier's case the learned Judge said at page 775
m Ambica Mills case :-
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"The proposition laid down by the learned Judge was
that if a law is enacted by a ~~gislature on a topic not within its competence, the Jaw was a nullity but if the law was
on a topic within its compete'nce but if it violated some
constitutional prohibition, the law was only unenforceable
and not a nullity. In other words, a law if it lacks legislative competence was absolutely null and void and a subsequent cession of the legislative topic would hot revive the
Jaw which was still-born and the law would have to be reenacted; but a Jaw within the legislative compe1'~nce but
violative of constitutional limitation was unenforceable but
once the limitation was removed, the law became effio..ctive."
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But later on he hinted at the restricted application of this principle.
It may also be pointed out here that in the case of Basheshar Nath v.
The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Delhi & Rajasthan & Another,( 2 )
Subba Rao J., as he then was, held that there was no distinction
between lack of legislative competence and violation of constitutional
limitations. Subba Rao J., reiterated the same view in the case of
Deep Chand v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others(•). In the
case of Mahendra Lal Jaini v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and
others(') :
(I) il955] 2 S. C.R. 589.
(21 [1959] Suppl. 1 S. C.R. 528.
(3) [1959] Sunpl. 2 S. C.R. 8.
(4) [1963] Stppl. 1 S. L. R. 912.
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EXCEL WEAR
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v. UNION (Untwalia, !.)
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"the Supreme Court again reviewed the authoriti•,s,
and held (i) that the doctrine of eclipse applied only to.
pre-Constitution and not to post-Constitution laws; (ii)
that 'the words "to the extent of th~ inconsistency" or "to
the extent of the contravention" were designed to save
parts of a Jaw which did not contravene, or were not inconsisn~nt with, fundamental right; (iii) that the meani'ng
of the word "void" in Art. 13 (I) and (2) was the same;
{iv) however, pre-Constitution laws violating fundamental
rights were valid when enacted and could therefore be
revived under the doctrine of eclipse, whereas post-Constitution laws violating fundamental rights were "still-born"
and non-est and could not be reviYed. In dealing with the
argument, based on Supreme Court decisions, that a law
Yiolating Art. 19 would be void qua citizens but valid qua
.. n~n-citizens, Wanchoo J. said:
A
Theoretically the laws falling under the latter category
(i.e. contravening Art. 19) may be valid qua non-cmzens;
but that is a wholly unrealistic consideration and it seems to
us that such notionally partial valid existence of the said
laws on the strength of hypothetical and pedanic considerations cannot justify the application of the doctrine of eclipse
to them." (Vide Seervai's Constitutio'nal Law of India,
2nd edition, pa~o 180).
D
Of' course, in none of the three cases aforesaid the decision of this
Court in Sundararamaier's case was considered. For our purpose we
have merely pointed out the divergence of opfoion on this aspect of
the matter, although for the decision of the point at issue, even
Sundararamaier's case does not make good the submission of Mr.
Ramamurthi. Mr. Ramamurthi was not right in pressing this
ratio in support of his contention. The content of Article 358 and
31 C iS entirely different. The former Article, rather, works in
the reverse gear. It docs not lift the ban in the way of th~ State
to enact a law in violation of Article 19. It puts the ba'n under
suspension during the period of Emergency and the suspension comes
to an end on its lifting. Articlei 31 C has no words to indicate that
the ban is removed by it. It merely saves the law enacted afocr
comrng into force of the said Article. We, tl1erefore, must reject
th·~ argument of Mr. Ramamurthi with reference to Article 31 C of
the Constitution.
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In the result all the petitions are allowed and it is declared that
Section 25-0 of the Act as a whole and Section 25-R in so far as
it relates to the awarding of punishment for infraction of the provisions of Section 25-0 are constitutionally bad and invalid for violation of Article 19 ( 1) (g) of the Constitution. Consequently, the
impugned orders passed under sub-section (2) of Section 25-0
in all the cases are held to be void and the respondents are restrained
from enforcing them. We must. however, make it clear that since
the orders fall on the ground of the constitutional invalidity of the
law under which they have been made, we have not thought it fit
to express any view in regard to their merits otherwise. We make
no order as to costs in any of the petitions.
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P.H.P.
Petitio11s allowed.
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