ORIENTAL GAS CO. LTD. & ORS. versus STATE OF WEST BENGAL
Supreme Court of India | Decided 12 September 1978 | [1979] 1 S.C.R. 617 | 1978 INSC 163
Key facts
- Decided
- 12 September 1978
- Bench
- Y.V. CHANDRACHUD*, R.S. SARKARIA, N.L. UNTWALIA, O. CHINNAPPA REDDY, A.P. SEN
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 343/1972
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1979] 1 S.C.R. 617
- Neutral citation
- 1978 INSC 163
Text of the judgment
617
ORIENTAL GAS CO. LTD. & ORS.
v.
STATE OF WEST BENGAL
September 12, 1978
[Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., R. S. SARKARIA, N. L. UNTWALIA,
0. CHINNAPPA REDDY AND A. P. SEN, JJ.]
B
Oriental Gas Company Act, 1970-s. 8(1) (b) Capitalisation of net income
for determining compensation payable-Validity of-Principles for determining
compensation payable on acquisition of Public Utility Undertakings discussed.
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In 1958, the Government of West Bengal, being of the view thM the appel·
!ant company which enjoyed a monopoly in the supply of gas in Calcutta
was negligent in looking after the interest of the consun1ers appointed a
Committee to enquire into the unsatisfactory condition of supply of gas in
Calcutta and to suggest remedial measures, including valuation of the Under·
taking for the purpose of taking it over. The Committee reported that the
distribution system was in a bad state of disrepair and that the maintenance
system \Vas in a very poor sta.te. It recommended that the distriblltioa system
should be taken over immediately under the management of the Government
to ensure and maintain supply of gas to consumers in CaJcutta.
On the basis of this recommendation, the Oriental Gas Company (West
Bengal Act XV of 1960) was paosed by the State Legislature. Section 3 of
the Act provided for the taking over for a limited period of the management
and control and subsequent acquisition of the Undertaking of the Company,
Section 7 provided for the acquisition of the Undertaking of the Company at
any time within a period of five years. Section S(l)(b) provided for payment
of compensation for the acquisition of the Unclertaking of the Company, by
the method of cost less depreciation or the method of capitalisation whichever
was less. Section. 9(2) provided that the compensation should be paid in
bonds carrying interest at 3 % p.a. from the date of issue and payable in 20
equal annual instalments. The Act wa.s amended in 1968. The amei\ded
Act provided for the determination of compensation on the basis of full marKet
value Of the Undertaking and payment of compensation in the shilpe of bonds
carrying interest from the date of enactment of the 1968 Act. In 1970 the
Act was aga.in amended. It provided for the determination of compensation
by the method of oo.pitalisation and payment of compensation in bonds carry·
ing interest from the date of acquisition.
Aggrieved by the method of determination of compensation the appellant
filed a writ petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution questioning the vires
of s. 8(1)(b) and s. 9(2) of the Act.
The petitioner contended that (1) the principle of capita-Hsing net profit
as the sole factor for determining compensation payable for the aCqulsitton
of a public utility undertaking was not a relevant principle because a public
utility concern was utider an obligation to provide services to the community
irrespective of whether its activities resulted in profit or loss; (2) the choice
of the period of five yea.rs immediately preceding the take over Of the management and control of the company for the purpose of calculating the average
annual income was arbitrary; (3) at the time when the Undertaking was
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] 1 S.C.R.
A _ocquired in 1962 the gilt edged securities were fetching 6% p.a. and therefore
a higher multiplier than eight should ha.ve been provided and ( 4) the metlic:id
of payment of compensation in the shape of bonds payable in twenty years 3.t
3% interest had the effect of reducing the compensation to less than half
of what was determiaed.
Dismissing the petition,
B
HfilD : (I) (a) The principles specified by the law for determination ot
compensation are beyond the pale of challenge, if they are relevant to the
determination of compensation and are recognised principles applicable in the
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determination of compensation for property compulsorily acquired and if the
principles are appropriate in determining the value of the class of property
sought to be acquired. The science of valuation of property recognised several
principles or methocj's for determining the value to be paid as compensation
to the owner for loss of his property. If an appropriate method or principle
for determination of compensation was applied, the fact that by the application
-Of another principle which was also appropriate a different value was reached,
would not justify the Court in entertaining the contention that out of the two
appropriate methods, one more generous to the owner should have been applied
by the Legislature. If several principles were appropriate and one was selected
for determination of the value -of the property to be acquired, selection of that
principle to the exclusion of other principles was not open to challenge since
the selection to be left to the wisdom of the ParliMDent. [633 F-HJ
R. C. Cooper v. Union of India, [1970] 3 SCR 53() followed.
Case law discussed.
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(b) It is well established that tangible and intangible property of a pu5lic
utility undertaking may not necessarily be valued separately and it is a sound
principle, to treat them as indivisible a11d value the undertaking as an integrated
whole. The authorities also treat capitalisation of net profit as one of the
recognised principles of valuation of Public Utility Undertakings, though it may
not be the best in the sense that it may not yield that result which is most
advantageous to the owner of the underta_.king. Any purchaser will put himself
the question what profit does the undertaking make ? and ho\V much should
he invest to get the return. He may pay more if the prospects of better
income in the future are bright and if the plant, machinery and buildings
are in an excellent condition. He may pay less if the future is not so bright
and if the pla·nt, machinery and buildings are in a poor state and require
replacement and repair. He may pay more if the undertaking is possessed of
substantial, unencumbered properties. He may pay less if the ]ease of land
on which the factory is located is about to expire. Thus the price may vary
depending on various factors but the basic consideration is bound to be the
profit-yielding capacity of the undertaking. [639 E, G-H]
In the instant case there is nothing in the writ petition to indiCate tbat
lands were purchased by \Vay of investment and not for the purpose of gas
\\'Orks or that the lands \Vere capable of being sold independently of the
Undertaking. The petitioner's assertions a·re not borne out by any statement
to that e·cect in the petition. Therefore, there would be no justification now
to allow the petitioner to amend the petition filed in 1971. Had there been
}
ORIENTAL GAS co.
/
v. WEST BENGAL (Chinnappa Reddy, J.)
619
any substance in this ass~on the petitioner would have mentioned it prominently Jn the petition itself. It would not have taken it so many years to
disOOver a circumstance claimed to be so very vital. The case of the petitioner
right through had been that the principle of -capitalisation of income was
irrelevant. [640 C-El
(2) (a). There is no force in the charge of arbitrariness. There is nothing
wrong with the choice of the period of five years preceding the take-over
for the purpose of calculating the average annual income. [640 F-G]
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(b) If the legislature wnnted to be unfair to the company, the previous
year's profit could have been taken as criterion on the ground that the value
to be ascertained was the value on the date of take-over and not some hypotheticol ar.iterklr date, or instead of taking the average of the period of the proceeding five years the legislature could well have taken the average of the preceding three years. If either of these courses had been adopted compensation
would be much I ess. Instead, the legislature fairly adopted a five year period
for calculating the average annual iru:ome. It may be that in the hlstorical
P"'t the undertaking was making much profit It may be that in the past
there were lean years. Neither a specially fat nor a specially lean period from
the past could properly be ta.ken into account as that would be irrelevant.
The legislature was concerned with the value of the undertaking on or about
the date of acquisition. It, therefore, very properly chose the period of five
years immediately preceding the take-0\er. [640 H; 641 A-Bl
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Appleton Water Co. v. Railroad Commission, 154 Wis. 121, 14g, 142, N.W.
476, 47 L.R.A. (N.S.) 770 referred to.
Eminent Domain by Alfred Jahr, Valuation by Bright, Principles and Prilc~
tice of Ratinf! Valuation by Roger Emeny and Hector M. Wilks referred to.
(3) There is equally no force in the argument that the legislature should
have specified a· higher multiplier than 'eight' in fixing the compensation. If
the legislature thought that a return of 12t% in the case of a large industrial
undertaking such as the petitioner's was reasonable and on that basis adopted
the multiplier 'eight', it is not for this Court to sit in judgment over that
decision and attempt to determine a more appropriate multiplier. The use
of the term 'normal cases' used in Cooper's case where this Court pointed out
that capitalisation of the net annual value of the property at a rate equal
in norl1Ull cases to the return from gilt-edged securities was an imoortant
method of determination of compensation, showed that it was not intended
to lay down any invariable rufe that whenever a method of capitalisation of
net profits was adopted, return from gilt-edged securities was to be the basis.
That should depend on a variety of circumstances such as the naoture of the
property, the normal return which could be expected on like investment, the
state of the copital market and several such factors. [641 G-H; 642 A]
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ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 343 of 1n2.
(Article 32 of the Constitution.)
A. K. Sen, Anil Bhatnagar, K. Khaita11, S. R. Aganval and Praveen
Kumar for the Petitioners.
A. P. Chatterjee, Govind Mukhoty and G. S. Chatter;ee for the
Respondent.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] ! S.C.R.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
CHINNAPPA REDDY, J. The old question "what is compensation"
is back again. Fortunately, Constitutional Amendments and Judicial
precedents have narrowed the scope for controversy. The question
has arisen this way :
B
The appellant, the Oriental Gas Company Ltd. was originally
constituted in England by a deed of settlement in April 1853, as
the Oriental Gas Company for the purpose of manufacture, supply
It was later indistribution and sale of fuel gas in Calcutta.
corporated in accordance with the provisions of the English Joint
Stock Companies Act, 1862. By a subsequent arrangement the control and management of the Company passed from British into Indian
hands. Over the course of the years the Company acquired extensive
properties and became the owner of large plants, machinery, buildings,
lands pipelines, stores etc. The total market value of the appellant's
industrial undertaking was estimated by the appellant as on 22nd March,
D 1962, at Rs. 7,00,00,000/-. In 1958, the Government of West
Bengal, being of the view that the Company which enjoyed a monopoly in the supply of Gas in Calcutta was negligent in looking after the
interest of the consumers, appointed a Committee to inquire into the
unsatisfactory condition of supply of gas in Calcutta and to suggest
remedial measures including valuation of the undertaking for the purE pose of taking over the gas supply undertaking. The Members of the
Committee were : the Chief Secretary, the Sheriff of Calcutta, the
Secretary, Commerce and Industries Department, the Administrator,
Durgapur Project and the Director, Central Fuel Research Institute.
The Committee was assisted· by several experfs. The Committee reF ported that the present Gas Works in Calcutta including the distributing
system was in a bad state of disrepair and a very poor state of maintenance. The Committee recommended that the Gas Works and the
distribution system should be taken over immediately under the management of the State Govt. in order to ensure and maintain the supply of
gas to the con§umers in Calcutta. After th~ report of the Committee
was received by the Government of West Bengal, the West Bengal
Legislature enacted the Oriental Gas Company Act (West Bengal Act
XV of 1960) providing for the taking over for a limited period, of
the management and control and the subsequent acquisition of the
undertaking of the Oriental Gas Co. Ltd. The "undertaking of the
Company" was defined to mean "the properties of the company, movfl able or immovable other than cash balances and reserve fynds bnt
includinig works, workshops, plants, machineries, furniture, equipments
and stores, and lands appertaining thereto, actually in use immediately
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ORIENTAL GAS co. v. WEST BENGAL
(Chinnappa Reddy, l.)
621
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before the commencement of this Act, or intended to be used, in connection with the production of gas or supply thereof in Calcutta and
its environs;". Section 3 of the Act provided for the taking over of the
management and control of the undertaking of the Company for a
period of five years from the .date specified in a notification to be
issued. Section 7 provided for the acquisition of the undertaking of B
the Company at any time within the period of the said five years.
Section 8 (1 )(a) pmvided for the payment of annual compensation
during the period of the take over of the management and control of
the undertaking of the Company. Section 8 (I )(b) provided for the
compensation payable for the acquisition of the undertaking of the
Company. In the present appeal we are concerned with the compen- c
sation payable for the acquisition of the undertaking of the Company,
that is, we are concerned with Section 8 ( 1) (b) only. Section 8 ( 1) (b)
as originally enacted was as follows :
"8(1) (b) in the case of acquisition of the undertaking of
the company, the total compensation payable shall be,-a
sum representing the purchase price of the undertaking of the
company reduced by such depreciation as may be allowed by
the Tribunal referred to in sub-section (2) after considering
the period and the nature of the use and the present condition of the properties concerned on the date of vesting in the
State Government under Section 7, or a sum representing
eight times the average net income of the undertaking of the
company over a period of five complete years preceding the
year in which the undertaking of the company has been
transferred to the State Government under clause (a) of
Section 4 for ·the purpose of management and control,
whichever is less.
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Explanation-In this sub-section (i) "Purchase price of the undertaking of the company"
means the aggregate of the prices of the different parts of the
undertaking of the company at the respective dates on which
parts were purchased, acquired or constructed by the Company;
(ii) "net income of the undertaking of the Company"
means the difference between the amount of gross revenue,
receipts and other general receipts, accountable in the assess·
men! of Indian Income-tax arising from, and ancillary or
incidental to, the business o1' the compapy and the amount
of expenditure incurred -0n the following -
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(a) rents, rates and taxes,
(b) interest on Joans and security deposits,
( c) maintenance and repair,
( d) collection charges,
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( e) cost of management, including the remuneration of
managing agents, if any,
(f) other expenses admissible under the law for the time
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being in force in the assessment of Indian income-tax
and arising from, and ancillary or incidental to, the
business of the Company, and
(g) snch other expenses as may be prescribed by rules
made under this Act''.
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Section 8(2) provided that the compensation was to be determined by a Tribunal to be appointed by the State Government. The
decision of the Tribunal was subject to an appeal to the High Conrt.
Section 9(2) provided that the amount of compensation was to be paid
by the State Government in bonds carrying interest at the rate of 3 %
per annum from the date of issue and payable in 20 equal annual
instalments.
Pursua11t to the provisions of the Oriental Gas Company Act, 1960,
a notification dated 3rd October, 1960, was issued to take over the
management and control of the undertaking for a period of five years.
Later by a notification dated 22nd March, 1962, the undertaking of the
Oriental Gas Company Ltd., was acquired by the Government pursuant
to the power vested in it by Section 7 of the Oriental Gas Company
Act. In the meanwhile the Company filed a petition under Article 226
of the Constitution before the Calcutta High Court challenging the vires
of the Act on various grounds. The Calcutta High Court dismissed
the Writ Petition upholding the validity of the Act. Ray, J. (as he then
was) held : (1) The appellant has no legal right to maintain the
petition (2) The appellant could not question the validity of the Act
on the ground that its provisions infringed its fundamental rights under
Articles 14, 19, and 31 in view of Article 31A(l) (b) of the Constitution; (3) The West Bengal Legislature had the legislative competence to pass the impugned Act by virtue of Entry 42 of List III of the
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution; ( 4) Entry 25 of List II also
conferred sufficient authority and power on the State Legislature to
make laws affecting gas and gas works; and (5) even if the Act inci-
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ORIENTAL GAS
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co. v. WEST BENGAL (Chinnappa Reddy, J.)
623
dentally trenched upon any production aspect, the pith and substance
of the legislation was gas and gas-work within the meaning of entry
25 of List IL
The Company preferred an appeal to the Supreme Court. The
question relating to fundamental rights was not raised before the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, while upholding the locus standi
of the Company to file the Writ Petition, rejected the contention of
the Company relating to the co111petence of the West Bengal State
Legislature to pass the impugned Act. The decision of the Supreme
Court was rendered on 5th February, 1962, and is reported in The
Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. v. The State of West Bengal
and Others(').
As mentioned by us earlier, the undertaking of the Company was
acquired on 22nd March, 1962, by a notification of that date. By
further notifications issued under Section 8 of the Act a Tribunal was
constituted for the purpose of detennining the compensation payable in
respect of the acquisition of the undertaking. In August 1965, the
Oriental Gas Company Ltd. filed a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution challenging the provisions of the Act relating to compensation. The Writ Petition was, however, dismissed as withdrawn in
May 1969 as ·the Qriental Gas Company Act, 1960 was amended in
the meanwhile by the President's Act 15 of 1968; the Oriental Gas
Company (Amendment) Act 1968. The Amending Act substituted a
different provision for what was the original Section 8 (1) (b). Section
8(1) (b) as amended by the President's Act 15 of 1968 was as
follows:
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"8 ( 1)(b) In the case of acquisition of the undertaking
of the Company, the compensation payable by the State
Government shall be determine<! in accordance with the
principles specified in the Schedule".
The schedule referred to in the amended Section 8 (1) (b) was
as follows :
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"THE SCHEDULE
[See Section 8 (1) (b)]
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Principles fifr determining compensation for acquisition of the under'
taking of the company.
Paragraph 1 :-The compensation to be paid by the State Govern
ment to the Company in respect of acquisition of the undertaking
thereof shall be an amount equal to the sum total of the value of the
(1)[1962] Suppl. 3 SC.R. 1.
6-549 SCI/78
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1979] 1 S.C.R.
.....
properties and assets of the Company as on the date of acquisition
of the undertaking of the Company calculated in. accordance with
the provisions of paragraph II Jess the sum total of the liabilities and
obligations of the Company as on that date calculated in accordance
with the provisions of paragraph III, together with the interest on such
amount calculated in accordance with the provisions of paragraph IV.
Paragraph II :-(a) The market value on the date of acquisition
of the undertaking of the company;
(i) of any land or buildings;
c
(ii) of any plant, machinery or other equipment;
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(iii) of any shares, securities, or other investments held
by the Company;
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(b) the total amount of the premiums paid by the Company up
to the date of acquisition of the undertaking of the Company in respect of all leasehold properties reduced in the case of each such
premiums by an amount which bears to such premium the same proportion as the expired term of the lease in respect of which such
premium shall have been paid bears to the total term of the lease;
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( c) the amount of debts due to the Company on the date of
acquisition of the undertaking of the Company, whether secured or
unsecured, to the extent to which they are reasonably considered to
be recoverable;
(d) the amount of cash held by the. Company on the date of
acquisition of the undertaking of the company, whether in deposit with
a Bank or otherwise;
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( e) the market value on the date of acquisition of the undertaking
of the company of all tangible assets and properties other than those
falling within any of the preceding clauses.
Paragraph III :-The total amount of liabilities and obligations incurred by the Company in connection with the
fomrntion, management and administration of the undertaking of the Company and subsisting immediately before the
date of acquisition of the undertaking of the company;
Provided that any of the properties, assets, liabilities or
obligations of the Company as on the date of acquisition of
the undertaking of the Company shall not include such properties or assets as were added, invested or acquired and such
liabilities or obligations as were incurred in connection with
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<JRIENTAL GAS co. v. WEST BENGAL (Chinnappa Reddy,!.)
625
Gov:
such addition, investment or acqui;ition by-the-stateA
ernmcnt during the period of management and control of the
undertaking of the company.
·
Paragraph IV :-The interest referred to in Paragraph I
~hall be on the amount mentioned in the said paragraph for
the period commencing from the date of v~sting of the underB
taking of the Company under sub-section (2) of Section 7
and ending with the date immediately before the date of
enactment of the Oriental Gas Company (Amendment) Act,
1968, · calculated at the average bank rate during the said
period".
It should also be mentioned here that Section 9(2) was also amended c
and it was provided that the Bonds should carry interest from the date
of enactment of the amending Act and not from the date of issue.
The main provisions of the amending Act relating to the determination ·
and payment of compensation were, however, short lived. · In 1970
the West Berigal Legislature passed the Oriental Gas Company
{Amendment) Act, 1970 (West Bengal Act 6 of 1970) once again D
substituting a new Section 8(1) (b) and Sci:tibn 9(2). The new
Section 8 (I) ( b) was as follows :
"8(1) (b) In the case of acquisition of the undertaking
of the Company, the compensation payable by the State Government s_hall _be a snm representing eight times the average
net income of the undertaking of th~ Company over a period
of five. complete years preceding the year in which the under·taking of the Company has been transferred to the State Gove
ernmen l under clause (a) of Section 4 for the purpose of
management and control.
Explanation :-In this sub-section, "net-annual income
·of the undertaking of the Company" means the difference
between the amount of gross revenue receipts and other
general receipts accountable in the assessment of Indian
income-tax arising from, and ancillary or incidenfal to, the
business of the Company and the amount of expenditure
incurred on the following-(a) rents, rates and taxes,
· . (b) interest. on loans and security deposits,
(c) maintenance and repair,
{ d) collection charges,
( e) cost of management, incjuding the remuneration of
Managing Agents, if Jiny,
.
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· (f) other expenses admissible under the law' for the time
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626
being in force in the assessment of Indian income-tax
and arising from, and ancillary or incidental to, the
business of the Company".
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[1979] 1 S.C.R.
The amended Section 9(2) provided foT interest on the bonds from the
date of vesting of the Undertaking of the Company under Section 7.
It is thus seen that the provisions of the Oriental Gas Company
Act as originally enacted in 1960 provided for the determination of
compensation by the method of cost less depreciation, or the met11od
of capitalisation and directed the' payment of whichever was less, in the
shape of bonds carrying interest at 3 % from the date of issue of the
bonds. The Act as amended in 1968 provided for the determination
of compensation on the basis of the full market value of the undertaking and the payment of the compensation in the sh.ape of bonds
carrying interest from the date of the enactment of the Amendment
Act of 1968 i.e. 7th May, 1968. The Act as finally amended in
1970 aud as it now stands provides for the determination of the
compensation by the method of capitalisation and the payment of the
compensation in bonds carrying interest from the date of the acquisition. The appellant Company is aggrieved by the method of determination of compensation under the Act as amended in 1970 arid has
filed the present Writ Petition in this Court questioning the vires of
Sections 8(1) (b) and 9(2) of the Act.
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The submissions of Shri A. K. Sen, learned Counsel for the appellant were as follows: Article 31(2) of the Constitution as it stood on
the date of the acquisition of the undertakin_g required the Legislature
to specify the principles on which compensation, i.e. a 'just equivalent'
of what the owner had been deprived of, had to be determined. The
principles so specified had necessarily to be relevant to the determination of such compensation. The principle of capitalising net profit as
a sole factor was not a relevant principle in determining the compensation payable for the acquisition of a public utility undertaking. It
might be a relevant principle to determine the value of the intangible
assets of a public utility undertaking but was wholly irrelevant to
determine the value of the tangible assets of a public utility undertaking. Section 8 ( 1) (b) of .the Oriental Gas Company Act, as
amended in 1970, therefore, offended article 31 (2) of the Constitution. The choice of the period of five years immediately preceding
the take over for the purpose of calculating the average rumual net
profit was inappropriate as it did not reflect the true earning capacity
of the undertaking. · There were special reasons why the profits were
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ORIENTAL GAS co. v. WEST BENGAL
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6 27
low during the two or three years immediately preceding the takeover.
The choice of the multiplier of eight was also not based on any relevant principle. The provision for payment in bonds payable in twenty
years and carrying interest at 3 % per annum at once had the effect of
reducing the compensation in such a manner as not to approximate
to what was determined. This too was violative of Article 31 (2).
Shri Sen relied upon the decision of this Court in Rustom Cavas jee
Cooper v. Union of India(') and passages from Alfred Jahr's Eminent
Domain, Valuation and Procedure, American Jurisprudence Vol. 27
and American Law Reports 2nd series, Vol. 68.
A resume of Constitutional history and the story of the ding-dong
legal battles that were fought may not be out of place here. It may
help us to understand and, perhaps ev~ to solve the problem before
us. It will enable us to appreciate the relevance or irrelevance of
the principle specified for determining compensation. Clauses ( 1)
and (2) of Article 31 of the Constitution, as they stood originally,
were as follows :
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"31. Compulsory acquisition of property.( 1) No person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law.
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(2) No property, movable or immovable, including any
interest in, or in any company owning, any commercial or
industrial undertaking, shall be taken possession of or acquired
for public purposes under any law authorising the taking of
such possession or such acquisition, unless the law provides
for compensation for the property taken possession of or
acquired and either fixes the amount of the compensation,
or specifies the principles on whieh, and the manner in which,
the compensation is to be determined and given".
The word 'compensation' occurring in Article 31 (2) was not qualified
by any adjective such as 'just' or 'fair' unlike Section 51 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act and the 5th Amendment to
the Constitution of America, in both of which provisions, the qualifying
adjective 'just' is used.
Even, so, in Bela Banerjee's case(') t11e
Supreme Court introduced the concept of a 'just equivalent' and held
that compensation meant 'a just equivalent of what the owner had
(I) [1970] 3 S.C.R. 530.
(2) [1954]
S.C.R. 558.
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[1979] 1 S.C.R.
been deprived of'. It was said that the principles to be laid down by
the legislature to determine the compensation were to be subject to
the 'basic requirement of full indemnification of the e1'propriated owner'.
If the principles did not t~e into account 'all the elements which
make up the true value of the property appropriated' the legislation
was liable to be struck down. In other words what was to be given
was full compensation on the basis of the market value of the property
11cquired. The decision was capable of creating great difficulty in the
sense of discomfiting legislation for the taking over of big estates and
the nationalisation of large industrial undertakings. In the words
of Shah, J., in State of Gujarat v. Shri Shanti/al Mangaldas & Ors.('),
the decisions in Bela Banerjee's case and Subodh Gopal Bose's(') case,
>
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" ..... were therefore likely to give rise to formidable
problems, when the principles specified by the Legislature as
well as the amounts determined by the application of those
principles, were declared justiciable. By qualifying 'equivalent' by the adjective 'just', the enquiry was made more
controversial; and apart from the practical difficulties, the
law declared by this Court also placed serious obstacles in
giving effect to the directive principles of State policy incorporated in Art. 39".
..
So it was that Article 31 was amended by the Constitution 4th Amendment Act in 1955. The second clause of Article 31 as amended by
the Constitution 4th Amendment Act was as follows :
"No property shall be compulsorily acquired or requisitioned save for a puplic purpose and save by authority of a
law which provides for compensation for the property so
acquired or requisitioned and either fixes the amount of the
compensation or specifies the principles on which, and the
manner in which, the compensation is to be determined and
given; and no such law shall be called in question in any
court on the ground that the compensation provided hy that
law is not adequate."
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The true effect of the amendment was that the adequacy of the
Again
compensation provided by the law was made non-justiciable.
in the words of Shah, J., in Shanti/al'.< case, "A challenge to a statute
that the principles specified by it do not '.!Ward a just equivalent will
be in clear violation of the Constitutional declaration that the inadequacy
of the compensation provided is not justiciable". The intended effect
(1) [1969] 3 S.C.R. 341.
(2) [1954] S.C.R. 587.
•
ORIENTAL GAS co. v. WEST BENGAL
(Chinnappa Reddy, J.)
6 29
of the amendment had, however been previously nullified to a large
extent by the decisions in P. Vajravelu Mudaliar v. Special Deputy
Collector, Madras & Anr.(') (p. 614) and the Union of India v. The
Metal Corporation of India Ltd. & Anr.( 2 ) where it was reiterated that
the word 'compensation' signified a. 'just equivalent' of what the owner
has been deprived of.
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In Vajravelu's case it was observed (at p. 626)
"The fact that Parliament used the same expressions,
namely, "compensation" and "principles" as were found in
Art. 31 before the Amendment is a clear indication that it
accepted the meaning given by this Court to those expression&
in Mrs. Bela Banerjee's case. It follows that a Legislature
in making a law of acquisition or requisition shall provide for
a just equivalent of what the owner bas been deprived of or
specify the principles for the purpose of ascertaining the
'just tquivalent' of what the owner has been deprived of. If
Parliament intended to enable a Legislature to make such a
law without providing for compensation so defined, it would
have used other expressions like 'price' 'consideration' etc."
Having said that, Subba R~o, J ., however, went on to say that
the argument that because the word compensation meant 'just equivalent' for the property acquired, therefore, the Court could ascertain
whether it was a 'just equivalent' would render the amendment of the
Constitution nugatory. He observed that neither the principles prescribing the 'just equivalent' nor the 'just equivalent' could be questioned
by the Court on the ground of the inadequacy of the compensation
fixed or arrived at by the working of the principles. The matter was
illustrated by the statement that the value of a' house which was acquired could be fixed in many ways : estimate by an Engineer, value
reflected hy comparable sales, capitalisation of rent etc.
The appliNo one
cation of different principles might lead to different results.
could insist that only that principle which yielded the highest result
should he. adopted. On the other hand the value of land acquired in
1950 could not. be fixed on the basis of its value in 1930 or though 100
acres \I/ere acquired compensation would be given orily for 50 acres.
Subba
Principles so fixing the compensation would be irrelevant.
Rao, J., summarised the position thus (at p. 629)
"If the Legislature makes a law for acquiring a property
by providing for an illusory compensation or by indicating
the principles for ascertaining the compensation which do not
(1) [1965] I S. C. R. 614.
(2) [1967) 1 S. C. R. 255.
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relate to the property acquired or to the value of such property at or within a reasonable proximity of the date of
:icquisition or the principles are so designed and so arbitrary
that they do no't provide for compensation at all, one can
easily hold that the Legislature made the law in fraud of its
powers.
Briefly stated the legal position is as follows :
If the question pertains to the adequacy of compensation, it
is not justiciable; if the compensation fixed or the principles
evolved for fixing it disclose that the legislature made the
law in fraud of powers in the sense we have explained, the
question is within the jurisdiction of the Court".
In Vajravelu' s case. the compensation to be paid was the value of
the land at the date of the publication of the notification under the
Land Acquisition Act or an amount equal to the average market value
of the land during the five years immediately preceding such date,
whichever was less.
It was also provided that compensatior. was to
be determined on the basis of the use to which the land was actually
put on the date of publication of the n_otification and not on the basis
of any potential value of the acquired land. This Court held that
in the context of continuous rise of land prices owing to abnormal circumstances it could not be said that the fixatioo of average price
during the preceding five years was not a relevant principle for ascertaining the value of the land on or about the date of acquisition. It
was also held that though the potential value of the acquired land
was generally an element to be considered in valuing land, the excluconsideration merely related to the inade-sion of such an element
quacy of the compensation and did not constitute a fraud on power
so as to invalidate the provision. The decision amounted to this
that while the principles specified should aim at the ascertainment of
a just cqu'valent, the principles so aimed could not be said to
be
irrelevant merely because the application of some other principles
might have yielded results more favourable to the owner of the acquired property.
)
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In the case of Metal Corporation of India & Anr., Subba Rao,
C. J., observed : "The law to justify itself has to provide for the payment of a 'just equh:alent' to the land acquired or lay down principles
which will lead to that result. If the principles laid down are relevant
to the fixation of compensation and are not arbitrary, the adequacy of
the resultant product cannot be called in questioo in a Court of law.
The valiu1ty of the principles, judged by the above tests, fall~ within
judicial scrutiny, and if they stand the tests, the adequacy of the product falls outside its jurisdiction". Judging by those tests, the two
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ORIENTAL GAS co. v. WEST BENGAL
(Chinnappa Reddy, J.)
631
principles specified for the ward of compensation in the Act impugned
in that case, namely "(i) compelnsation equated to the cost price in
the case of unused machinery in good condition, and (ii) written down
value as understood in the Incometa'{ law as the value of used machinery" were held to be irrelevant to the fixation of the vnlue of the
machinery on the date of acquisition.
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The case of Vajravelu and Metal Corporation of India & Anr. were
The decision in
both considered in great detail in Shantilal's case.
the ~ase of Metal Cor[JO'ration of India was expressly overruled and
the two principles which were found to be irrelevant in Metal
Corporation of India's case were held to be relevant principles
for
deterrnL~ation of compensation. The observations in Vajravelu' s
case suggesting that compensation meant a 'just equivalent' and that
the principles to be specified must relate to ascertainment of a 'just
equivalent' were held to be obiter. The effect of the amendment of
Article 31(2) made by the Constitution 4th Amendment Act 1955
was stated to be as follows :
"It clearly follows from the terms of Art.
31 ( 2) as
i;mended that the amount of compensation payable, if fixed
by the Legisl\lture, is not justiciable, because the challenge
in such a case, apart from a plea of abuse of legislative power,
would be only a challenge to the adequacy of compensation.
If compensation fixed by the Legislature-and by the
use of the expression 'compensati.on · we mean what
the
Legislature justly regards as proper and fair recompense for
compulsory expropr'i;ition of property and uot something
which by abuse of legislative powe.- though called compensation is not a recompense at all or is something illusory
is not jnsticiable, on the plea that it is not a just equivalent
of the property compulsorily acquired, is it open to the Courts
to enter upon an enqniry whether the principles which are
specified by the Legislature for determining compensation do
not award to the expropriated owner a just equivalent ?
In .our view, such an enq.uiry is not open to the Courts under
the statutes enacted after the amendments made in the Constitution by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act.
If the quantum of compensation fixed by the Legislature is
not liable to be canvassed before the Court on the ground
that it is not a just equivalent, the principles specified for
determination of compensatio_n will also not be open to
challenge on the plea tl!at the compensation determined by
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the application of those .principles is not a just equivalent.
The right declared by the Constitution guarantees that compensation shall be given before a person is compulsorily expropriated of his property for a public purpose. What is
fixed as compensation by statute, or by the application of
principles specified for determination of compensation
is guaranteed : it does not mean however that something fixed or determined by the application of specified
principles which is illusory or can in no sense be regarded
as compensation must be upheld by the Courts, for,
to do so, would be to grant a charter of arbitrariness,
and permit a device to defeat the constitutional
guarantee.
But compensation fixed or determined on
principles specified by the Legislature cannot be permitted to
he challenged on the som~'\'hat indefinite plea that it is not a
juot or fair equivalent. Principles may be challenged on the
ground that they are irrelevant to the determination of compensation, but not on the plea that what is awarded .as a
result of the application of those principles is not just or fair
compensation. A challenge to a statute that the principles
specified by it do not award a just equivalent will be in clear
violation of the constitutional declaration that inadequacy of
compensation provided is not justiciable".
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After :Shantilal's case, the effect of the amendment of Article 31(2)
by the Constitution 4th Amendment Act again fell to be considered
by this Court in R. C. Cooper v. Union of India(') a decision of the
Full Court. There is a controversy whether this case was a retreat
from the position taken in Shanti/al' s case. Later in Keshavananda
Bharti's(2) case Shelat, Hegde, Grover, Jaganmohan Reddy and
Mukherjee JJ., expressed the view that Cooper's case did not overrule Shantilafs case while Dwivedi and Chandrachud, JJ. expressed
the view that Shantilal's case was in substance overruled by Cooper's
case. This uncertainty which is said to have resultaj from the decision in Cooper's case led to the 25th Amendment of the Constitution.
As a result of the 25th Amendment 6rticle 31(2) came to read as
follows
"31 (2) No property shall be compulsorily acquired or
requisitioned save for a public purpose and save by authority
of a Jaw which provides for acquisiticn or requisitioning of
(l) [1970] 3 S.C.R. 530.
(2) [1973] Suppl. S.C.R. 1.
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ORIENTAL GAS co. v. WEST BENGAL
(Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 6 33
the property for an amount
which may be fiKed by
such law or which may be determined in accordance with
such principles and given in such manner as may be specified
in such law; and no such law shall be called in question in
any court on the ground that the amount so fixed or determined is not adequate or that the whole or any part of such
amount is to be given otherwis~ than in cash :
\
Provided that in making any law providing for the compulsory acquisition of any property of an educational institution established and administered by a minority referred to
in clause ( 1) of article 30, the State shall ensure that the
amount fixed or determined under such law for the acquisi·
tion of such property is such as would not restrict or abrogate the right guaranteed under that clause".
So much for Constitutional history. We are not .concerned in this
case with the 25th Amendment.
We are concerned with Article
31 ( 2) ·as it stood after the 4th Amendment and before the 25th Amendment.
On a questian of interpretation of Article 31(2) the decision
in Cooper's case, therefore, has the final word. In Cooper's case Shah,
J., who spoke for the Court 1ecog11ised the apparently conflicting views
expressed in Vajravelu's case and Shantilal's case but held, that both
the lines of thought converged in the ultimate result that the principles
specified by the Jaw for determination of co'mpensation were bey0nd
the pale of challenge, if they were relevant to the dete~mination of
compcc.rntion and were recogniwl principles applicable in the determinati<'n of compensation for property compulsorily acquired and if
th,, principles were appropria'e in determining the value df9he cla~s
of prnpcrty sought to be acquired.
The provisions of the Banking
Cumpr.nies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act 22 of
1969 wt re struck down on the ground that relevant principles were
not specified for the determination of compensation. Instead of
providin~ for valuing the entire undertaking as a unit. the Act provided
for determining the value, reduced by the liabilities, of only some of
It also provided
the component> which constituted the undertaking.
for different methods of determining compensation in respect of different
componrnts.
Since the undertaking was sought to be acquired as a
going concern the goodwill an1 the value of the un·-expired long term
leases had also to be included in the assets of the banks. These
It was,
important components of the Undertakings were excluded.
therefore, held that the principles specified were irrelevant for
the
determination of compensation of Banking Companies.
The Court,
however, observed that the science of valuation of property recognised
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several principles or methods for determining the value to be paid
as compensation to the owner for :oso of his property and that if an·
appropriate method or principle for determination of, compensation
was _applied, the fact that by the application of another principfo which
wa_s also appropriate, a different value was reached, would not justify
the Court in entertaining the contenti;in that out of the two appropriate
methods, one more generous to the owner should have been applied
by the Legislature. . It was observed that if several principles were
appropriate and one was selected for determination of the value of
the prcperty to be acquired, selecti.on of !hat principle to the exclusion of other principles was not open to challenge since the selection
The Court then
had to be left to the wisdom of th~ Parliament.
went on to refer to some of the important methods of determination
of compensation, and observed. (at p. 600 and 601) : .
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' "The important rnethods of determination of compensation
are-(i) market value determined from·sales of comparable
properties, proximate in time to the date of acquisition;similarly situate, and possessing the same or similar advantages
and subject to the sa_me or similar disadvantages.
Market
~~Jue is the price the properly may Mch in lh~ ·open market
if sold by a willing seller unaffected by the special needs of
· a particular purchase; (ii) capitalization of the net annual
profit out of the property at. a rate equal in normal cases to
the return from gilt-edged securities. . Ordinarily value of
the property may be determined by capitalizing the net annual
value obtainable in the market at the date of the notice of
acquisition; (iii) where the property is a house, expenditure
likely to be incurred for constructing a similar house, and
1educed by the depreciation for the number of years since it
V'as constructed; (iv) principle of .reinstatement where it is
satisfactorily established that reinstatement in some other
i:Jace is bona fide intend~d, there being nd general market for
the property for the purpose for which it is devoted (the pur-_
pcm being a public purpose) and would have continued to
be devoted, but for compu!sncy acquisition.
Here compen. ~ation will be assessed on the basis of reasonable cost of
reinstatement; (v) when th~ property· has outgrown its utility and it is reasonably incapable of economic use, it may be
valued as land plus the break-up value of the structure. But
the fact that the acquirer does not intend to use the property
for which it is used at the time of acquisition and desires
to demolish it or use it for other purposes is irrelevant;
anu (vi) the property to be acquired has ordinarily to be
...
ORIENTAL GAS co. v. WEST BENGAL (Chinnappa Reddy, !.) 635
valued as a uuit. Normally an aggregate of the value of
different components will not be the value of the unit.
These are, however, not the only methods. The method
of determining the value of property by the application of
an appropriate multiplier to the net annual income or profit
is a satisfactory method of valuation of lands with buildings,
only if the land is fully developed, i.e., it has been put to full
cse legally permissible and economically justifiable, and the
income out of the property is the normal commercial and not
a controlled return, dr " return depreciated on account of
special circumstances. 1f the property is not fully developed, or the return is uot commercial the method may yield a
misleading result.
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But when an undertaking is acquired as a unit the principle• for determination of compensation must be relevant
ancl also appropriate to the acquisition of the entire undertaking. In determining the appropriate rate of the net profits the return from gilt-edged securities may, unless it is
otherwise found unsuitable, be adopted".
It is worthy of notice that Shah, J., very carefully refrained, through-
out the discussion, from using the expression 'just compensation' or
'just equivalent' nor did he draw inspiration from any American or
Australian cases. Realising the implication of the use of adjectives
like 'iust' or 'fair', he was content to nse the expression 'compensation' ~nd to say that the principle 'specified must be relevant for determination of compensation.
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Dealing with the question whether oompensation might be provided
in the form of bonds, the Court said (at p. 608-609) :
"Compensation may be provided under a statute, otherwise than in the form of money : it may be given as equivaknt of money, i.e., a 11ond. But in judging whether the
law provides for fompensation, the money value at the date
of expropriation of what is given as compensation, mu~t be
considered. If the rate of interest compared with the ruling
commercial rate is low, it will reduce the present value of the
bond. The Constitution guarantees a right to compensation-an equivalent of lhc property expropriated and the
right to compensation cannot be converted into a loan on
terms which do not fairly compare wit~ the prevailing com ..
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mercial terms. If the statute in providing for compensat;on
devises a scheme for payment of compensation by giving it
in the form of bonds, and the present value of what is determined to be given is thereby sub8tantially reduced, the statute impairs the guarantee of compensation.
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A scheme for payment of compensation may take many
forms. If the pr~sent value of what is given reasonably approximates to what is determined as compensation according
to the principles provided by the statute, no fault may be
found. But if the law seeks to convert the compensation
determined into a forced loan, or to give compensation in
the form of a bond of which the market value at the date
of expropriation does not approximate the amount determined as compensation, the Court must consider whether
what is given is in truth compensation which is inadequate,
or that it is not compensation at all. Since we are of the view
that the scheme in Sch. II of the Act suffers from the vice
that it does not award compensation according to any recognized principles, we n~ed not dilate upon this matter further".
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We may now examine the submissions of Shri A. K. Sen in the
light of the principles enunciated in Cooper's case without confusing
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ourselves with imported expr~ssions like 'just compensation' or 'just
equivalent'. Shri A. K. Sen's primary submission was that the principle .o~ capitalising net profit as the sole factor" for determining the
c(>mpensition payable for the acquisition of a Public Utility Undertaking was not a relevant principle. According to him a Public Utility
was under a_n obligation to provide services to the comUndertaking
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munity irrespective of whether its activities resulted in profit or loss.
It was subject to a rigid price control.
It did not have the freedom
to extend or curtail its activities based on consideration of profit. An
Undertaking like the appellant's, he said, was bound to render services
even in unprofitable line~ of supply and areas. Therefore, the method
of capitalising income was not relevant to determine the compensation payable to a Public Utility Undertaking. It might be relevant to
assess the value of the intangible assets of the Public Utility Undertaking but it was not relevant for valuing its tangible assets. Shri Sen
invited our attention to certain passages from Alfred Jahr's· Eminent
Domain-Valuation and Procedure, Valuation by Bright, American
u Jurisprudence 2nd Edn.-Vol. 27 and American Law Reports-2nd
series, Vol. 68.
It is hardly necessary to point out that American
.autborities are not of any avail on the question before us since the
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ORIENTAL GAS co. v. WEST BENGAL
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(Chinnappa Reddy, J.)
637
basic assumption of the Americau authorities is that what is payable
i~ a 'just compensation' and every and all principles necessary to arrive
at a 'just compensation' have l•> be applied.
That, as we have s'en,
is not the position in India. What we have to see is whether the
particular principle specified by the statute is a relevant principle.
These
Even so we will refer to the authorities cited by Shri Sen.
authorities themselves show that the method of capitalisation of net
profit is an unquestionably relewmt principk in assessing compensation.
In fact the very argument of Shri Sen that the principle
of
capitalisation of net profit as a sole factor to determine compensation
is not relevant, appears to us to imply that it is a relevant principle
alongwith others.
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Alfred Johr in his Eminent Domain Valuation and Procedure,
states in Section 66 : "At the outset, we must bear in mind that when
private property is acquired for public use under the power of eminent
domain, just compensation must be paid to the owner. How is lhe
just compensation determined ? That is the problem which we will D
discuss at some length". Dealing particularly with the question of
valuation of Public Utilities, the author mentions the reasons why the
principles of valuation in the case of acquisitio-n of Public Utilities are
sometimes different from those pertaining to the usual acquisitions.
Then he proceeds to say that in estimating a 'just compensation' of
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Utility property consideration must be given to two types of properties,
the tangible properties and the intangible properties. Tangible property
such as land may be valued at the market value while property like
plant etc. may have to be valued on the basis of original cost, cost of .
In the case of intangireproduction, allowance for depreciation etc.
ble property the author states that the Courts do not indicate the F
method used in reaching the intangible item of 'going concern value'
and confesses that "there probably is none". After remarking that
valuation of a going concern based on capitalisation of net earnings
assumes too many contingencies, the author refers to the case of
Appletqn Water Co. v. Railroad Commission [154 Wis. 121, 148, 142,
N.W. 476, 47 LR.A. (N.S.) 770], where the Court said that the fun- G
damental difficulty with an attempt to set a definite sum as representing going concern value is "that it is an attempt to divide a thing
which is in its nature practically indivisible.
The value. of the plant
and business is an indivisible gross amonnt. It is not obtained by
adding up a number 01' separate items, but by taking a comprehensive
view of each and all of the elements of property, tangible and intangi- H
ble, including property rights, and considering them all, not as separate
things, but as inseparable parts of one harmonious entity".
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Bright in his 'Valuation', deaL< \Vith the question under the heading
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'Capitalized Earning Power Versus So-Called Physical value as
measure of just compensation'. After referring to various difficulties'
in arriving at the iust compensation on the basis of the method of
capitalisation, the author ends th~ statement :
"No doubt the practical objections urged by the courts
against capitalized earnings as a basis of valuation are well
founded.
But valuations based on replacement cost are
indefensible if judged by the assumed objective of an award
in condemnation, which is to indemnify the owners of the
property for the loss.
Difficult as it is to determine fairly
the value of a business enterprise by estimating its future earnings, no alternative method of valuation is acceptable, unless one is content to use the market prices of outstanding
stocks and bonds".
In American Jurisprudence, 2nd Edn. Vol. 27, the discussion of
in
the question of 'Measure and elements of compensation' starts
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paragraph 266 with the sentence ". . . . the right of Eminent Domain
cannot be exercised except upon condition that just compensation be
made to the owner". In paragraph 339 the valuation of Public Utility
Properties is considered and the unique problems presented are menIt is then said : "no rigid measures can be prescribed for
tioned.
of 'iust com pcnsation' under all circumstances and
the
determination
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in all cases. . . . . . . . The amoant of net income actually received by
a public utility company may and shouUI be considered as a factor in
determining the valuation, although snch earnings are not conclusive,
especially if a large snm would be necessary to put the plant in good
Capitalization of wmiugs, or the "economic" value, is a
condition.
method
of
appraisal
in condemnation cases which has met with approF
val in some jurisdictions, although usually rejected as a sole test. This
test has its limitations (primarily because of the speculative factors
involved), but is unquestionably relevant, particularly when attempting
to measure the intangibles of a public utility".
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In American Law Reports-2nd series-Vol. 68, at pages 398399 it is stated that in valuing utility property various tests have been
applied, alone and in combination, the usual method being the ascertainment of market value.
It i~ then pointed out that there is
a
difference in ascertaining the market value for the purpdse of condemnation proceedings and for the purpose of rate-making. It is said :
"In condemnation proceedings just compensation is the market value
of the property taken. In rate-making cases, the standard or market
valne of the investment cannot be applied in determining just compensation, for the simple reaso'n that market value is dependent upon
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-ORIENTAL GAS co.
v. WEST BENGAL (Chinnappa Reddy,!.)
639
earning capacity and fluctuates with that capacity; consequently in
determining what earning capacity is just, the market value of
the
investment which is a result of earning capacity cannot be utilised as
a basis for the determination of what constitutes the reasonable or
just earning capacity of the plant".
We may also refer to Principles and Practice of Rating Valuation
by Roger Emeny and Hector M, Wilks. At page 197 of the 3rd edn.,
public utility undertakings are considered and it is said :
'Public Utility Undertakings were prior to 1950 valued
by the profits method. This method was used because public utility undertakings were not generally speaking let, added
to which they enjoyed some element of monopoly .... insofar
that there a.re public utility undertakings or quasi public uti·
lity undertakings which are not covered by a formula, and in
1hc absence of rental evidenc~, it is probable that the profits
method of valuation would be applicable. There is no shortage of case law lei help th~ valuer when using the profits
method for public utility undertakings".
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It is thqs clear from the very authorities cited by Shri Sen that tangible and intangible property of a public utility undertaking may not
necessarily be valued separately and it is a· sound principle to treat
them as indivisible and valu~ the undertaking as an integrated whole. E
The authorities also treat the capitalisation of net profit as one of
the 1ecognised principles of vubation of Public Utility Undertakings,
though it may not be the best in the sense that it may not yield that
result which is most advantageo11s to the owner of the undertaking.
But V>e are not concerned with the question which principle will yield
the result most advantageous to the owner of the undertaking but with F
the question whether the particular principle is a relevant principle
at all.
Jn the language used in 'American Jurisprudence' the principle
of capitalisation of net income is "unquestionably ··elevant" even in the
case of Public Utility Undertakings. Tn our view, it requires no authority to say that capitalisation of net income is a sound principle of
valuatior.. Any purchaser will immediately put himself the question G
'what profit does the undertaking make and how much should I
invest to get the return' ? He may pay more if the prospects of better
income in the future are bright and if the plant, machinery and buildings are in excellent condition. He may pay Jess if the future is not
so bright an.d if the plant, machinery and buildings are in a poor state
and require immediate replacement and repair.
He may pay more H
if the undertaking is possessed of substantial, unencumbered properties.
He may pay less if the lease of the land on which t11e factory
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is located is about to expire. Thus the price may vary depending
on various factors but the basic consideration is bound to be the profit yielding capacity of the undertaking.
Shri Sen asserted that ihe
lands belonging to the company which were purchased by way o'f
investment, can fetch a price of Rupees six to seven crores. There
is nothing in the petition to indicate that any lands were purchased
by way of investments and not for the purpose of gas works or that
the lands are capable of being sold independently of the undertaking.
Perhaps, no one will come forward to purchase land next to a gas
works. Perhaps there are other factors which make the land unsaleable or which depreciate the value of tJ;ie land. We do not know.
Suffice it to say that the assertion of Shri Sen is not borne out ·by any
statement to that effect in the Writ Petition. Shri Sen suggested that
the petitioner might be given an opportunity to amend the Writ Petition. We do not think we can do that. The acquisition was made
in 1962. The impugned Act was passed in 1970. The Writ Petition ~as filed in 1971 and has been pending in this Court for seven
years. If there was any substance in the present assertion, the petitioner would surely h\!ve mentioned it prominently in the Writ Petition. It would not have taken the petitioner so many years to discover a circumstance claimed by his Counsel to be so very· vital. We
do not think we will be justified in permitting any amendment at this
stage.
The case of the ·petitioner right through has been that the
With that subprinciple of capitalisation of inccme was irrelevant.
mission we emphatically do not agre~.
·
Shri Sen's next submission was that the choice of the period of
five years immediately preceding the take over of the management
F and control of the Compa·ny for the purpose of calculating the
average annual income was arbitrary as those five years were particularly lean years for the Company because of some special circumstances. The charge of arbitrariness is baseless. The five years
immediately preceding the take over of the control and management
of the Company were the years 1955-56, 1956-57, 1957-58, 1958-59
1959-60 during which years the profits according to the balance
and
G
sheets of the Company, were Rs. 15,86,789, Rs. 13,81,177, Rs.
7,50,582, Rs. 1,64,158 and Rs. 1.82,123/- respectively. Now, if
the Legislature wanted to be unfair to the Company, the last year's
profit could have been taken as the criterion on the ground that
the value to be ascertained was the value on the date of take over and
II not some hypothetical anterior date. Or, instead of taking the
advantage of the period of the preceding five years, the Legislature
could well have taken the average of the preceding three years. If
}
ORIGINAL GAS co. v. WEST BENGAL (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 641
either of these courses had been adopted, the compensation would
be much Jess. Instead, the legislature very fairly adopted a five
year period for calculating the average annual income. It may be
that in the historical past the undertaking was making large profits.
It may be that in the past also there were lean years. Ndther a
specially fat nor a specially lean period from the past could properly
be taken into account as that would be irrelevant. The legislature
was concerned with the value of the undertaking 'at or· about the
date of acquisition' (in the words of Subba Rao C.J., in Vajravelu's
case). The legislature, therefore, very properly chose the period
of five years immediately preceding the taking over. After all
one cannot shut one's eyes to the report of the Committee which was
appointed in 1958 to enquire into the working of the Company.
The report had said "The Committee feels that as the plant and
equipment in the Gas works as well as the distribution system are
in a very poor state of maintenance, the valuation made at this stage
may not hold good even in the near future. . . . . . The Committee
is of the opinion that the present gas works in Calcutta, including
the distributing system, is in a very bad state of disrepair ...... " It
appears from the affidavit filed on behalf of the Government of West
Bengal that they had to spend the huge sum of Rs. 84,00,000/- for
replacement, renovation and expansion. We are unable to find anything wrong with the choice of the period of five years preceding
the take over. We are of the view that the period chosen is. fair to
the Company.
y
r
The next target of Mr. Sen's attack was the choice of the
multiplier. He submitted that in the year 1962 gilt-edged securities
. were fetching no more than six per cent per annuin and therefore,
not eight, but some other higher multiplier should have been
specified.
· The argument of Shri Sen is based on the observation of Shah, J.,
in Cooper's case that 'capitalisation of the net annual value of the
property at a rate equal in normal cases to the return from gilt edged
securities' was an important method of determination of compensation. The very use of the word normal by Shah, J ., indicates that
it was not intended to lay down any invariable rule that whenever a
method of capitalisation of net profit was adopted, the return from
gilt· edged securities was to be the basis. That should depend on a
variety of circumstances snch as the nature of the property, · 1he
normal return which may be expected on like investment, the state
of the capital market and several sllch ~factors. For example, it is
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[1979] 1 s.c.R.
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well known that a large investment yields a higher return than a
smaller investment and similarly a fong term investment yields a
better return than a short term investment. A different principle
and a different multiplier may have to be applied to different kinds
of property, such as, agricultural land, residential buildings, industrial
undertakings etc. In the case of a going business or industrial underB
taking the appropriate multiplier may be deternrined on the basis of
the annnai return of an undertaking with similar capital investment.
If the Legislature thinks that a return of 12t% in the case of a large
industrial undertaking such as the petitioner's is reasonable and on
that basis adopts the multiplier 'eight', it is not for this Court to sit
in
and attempt to determine a more appropriate multiplier.
c Wejudgment
are unabie to see how the adoption of the particular multiplier in
the present case is the result of the application of any irrelevant
· principle. We do not, therefore, agree with the submission of Shri
Sen.
Shri Sen's final submission was in regard to the method of payment in the shape of bonds payable in twenty years and carrying
investment @ 3 % per annum, which, he said, at once, had the effect
of reducing the compensation to less than a half of what was determined. He submitted that this was violative of Article 31(2) of the
Constitution. He relied on the passage in Cooper's case at p. 608609 of [1970] 3 S.C.R., already extracted by us earlier in this
E
judgment. There appears to be some force in the submission of
Shri Sen. If the submission of Shri Sen is accepted it will result
in our striking down Section 9 (2) of the Act. Though Shri Sen
argued that Section 9(2) was not severable from the remaining
provisions of the Act and therefore, the entire Act would go with
F Section 9(2), we do not have the slightest doubt that Section 9(2)
is severable from the rest of the Act. It is patently so. It is
impossible to hold that the remaining provisions of the Act are so
inextricably bound up with Section 9(2) that what remains cannot
independently survive; nor can it be assumed that the Legislature
would not haYe enacted what survives without Section 9(2). If 8ecG tion 9 (2) is severable, as it undoubtedly is, and if it is ·struck down
the consequence would be that the State would now have to make
the payment in cash instead of in bonds. Having regard to the
eighteen year period which has elapsed since the date of taking over
of the Company this would have the effect on the Company losing
even the interest of 3 % per annum for this period. When this was
pointed out to Shri Sen he agreed that if we considered that Section 9(2) was severable from the rest of the Act he would not ask
us to strike down Section 9(2) as ultra vires. We will leave it at
!
D
.
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•
ORINTAL GAS v. WEST BI:NGAL (Chinnappa Reddy, l.)
64 3
that. Wc should not however be understood as having decided that
Section 9(2) offends Article 31(2) of the Coustitution. Shri Chatterjee, learned Counsel for the Stafo of West Bengal, argued that the
earlier decision of the Calcutta High Court in the petition under
Article 226 of the Coustitution operated as res judicata. In the view
that we have taken on the main question it is unnecessary to consider
this argument except to say that there does not appear to be any
substance in it. In the result the Writ Petition is dismissed wlih
costs.
. .,....
.
P.B.R.
.
-)
Petition dismissed.
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