U.P STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD AND ORS. versus HARL SHANKER JAIN AND ORS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 28 August 1978 | [1979] 1 S.C.R. 355 | 1978 INSC 145
Key facts
- Decided
- 28 August 1978
- Bench
- V.R. KRISHNA IYER*, D.A. DESAI, O. CHINNAPPA REDDY
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 2199/1977
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1979] 1 S.C.R. 355
- Neutral citation
- 1978 INSC 145
Text of the judgment
355
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U.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD AND ORS.
v.
HARL SHANKER JAIN AND ORS.
August 28, 1978
[V. R. KRISHNA IYER, D. A. DESAI ·AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, J.1.J
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industrial En1ployn1e111 (Standing Orders), 1946 (Act 20.), S. 138, ,1cope of
--11"/iether the provisions of the Electricity Supply Act, 1948 prevails over the
pro1'isio11s of Industrial E1nploy111cnt (Stan.ding Orders) Act or vice versaScopr: of the rule of ejusde111 gencris exp'lained--,\faxi111-Generafis specialibus
non dcrogant, applicability of.
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]l{cspondents \Vere two workmen originally cn1ployed by Mis Seth Ram
(Joyal and Partners, who were licensees for the distribution of electricity under
the Electricity Act, 1910. There \Vere certified Sta·nding Orders for the industrial
est..1bl1shment of the said licensees; but they did not prescribe any age of
superannuation for the employees with the result the workmein could continue
to work as long as they were fit and able to discharge their duties. Pursuant
to the purchase by the appellant with effect fron1 l 5-12-1964 of the electricity
undertnking of M/s S~th Ram Gopal, the employees1 in their industrial esta•blishment including the respondents became the employee of the appellant. The
appellant board which is admittedly an industrial establishment to which the
Indu"·trial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 applies, neither n1ade nor
got .::ertified any standing orders as it was· bound so to do under that Act. The
Board however considered the certified Standing Orders of the establishment o[
Seth ]~an1 Gopal as applicable to their employees even after the purchase of t.he
undertaking by the Board.' Ho\vever, on May 28, 1970 the Governor of Uttar
Pradesh notified under Section .13-B of the Industrial En1ployment (Standing
Ord~rs) Act, 1946. a regula•tion n1ade by the U.P. State Electricity Board under
&ct'ion 79( c) of, the Electricity Supply Act, 1948 fixing the age of ~uperannuation
as 58 and 60 on a par with the other State Govt. employees. Acting in pUrsuance of the regulation as notified by the Governor the appellant sought to
retire. lhc respondents on July 2. 1972 and July 7, 1972 respectively 011 Lhcir
attaining the age of 58 years. The respondents filed a· Writ "Petition in the
Allahllhfld High Court chrillenging the regulation n1aJe by the Board and its
notiflc-.1tion by the Governor which tvas disn1issed. But the Division Bench
which heard the special appeal preferred by them, referred three Questions to
a Fnll Rench\ The Full Bench a'lls\vered the questions as folloY/s:
"(.1) The Industrial" Employment (Standing Orders) 1946 applies to the
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industrial establishment of the Slate Electricity Board.
(2) The Standing Orders framed, in an industrial establishment by an
electrical undertaking, do not cease to be operative on the purchase
of the undertaking by the Board or on framing of the Regulations
under Section 79(c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 and
(3) Section 13-B Of the Industrial Employment (Standing O'rders) A.ct.
1946, applies only to the industrial establishn1ents of the Government
and to no other establishments .
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[\979] [ S.C.R.
Following the opinion of the Full Bench, the Division Bench allowed the
special Appeal and issued a \Vrit quashing the notification dated May 28, 1970
an~ directing the appella-nt :not to enforce the regulation against the respond.::nts.
The appellant obtained, a certificate under Art. 133(1) of the Constitution anct
has preferred the appeal.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD : 1. The Industrial Etnployn1ent (Standing Orders) Act, 1946
(Act 20) is a special la\V in regard to the n11auers enumerated in the schedule
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and the regulations n1ade by the Electricity Board with respect to any of those
n1atlers are of no effect, unless such regulations are either notified by the Governn1cnt under Section 13-B or certified by the certifying officer under Section 5
of the Industrial Employment (St11nding Orders) Act, 1946. Tn regard to
n1a1ters in respect of whi.ch regulations made by the Board h<1've not been
notified by the Governor or in respect of which no regulations have been
n1ade by the Board, the lndustiial Employn1ent (Standing Orders) Act shaU
continue to apply. Jn the present case, the regulation made by the Board -..vith
regard to the age of s11perannua·tion having been duly notified by the Go'!erifrnent, the regulation s·~all have effect, notwithstanding the fact that it is a
matter which could be the subject matter of Standing Orders under the Industrial
Employment (Standing Orders) Act. The responUents were, therefore, properly
retired \Vhen they rittaincd the age of 58 years. [37IA-F]
2. The Jndustria·l En1ployment (Standing Orders) Ac1 is an A.ct specially
designed to define the terms of employment of workmen in indu..,tria\ establishment, to give the workn1cn a collective voice in defining the tern1s of ernployn1ent and to subject the ten11s of en1ployn1ent to the scrutiny of quasi-judicial
authorities by the application of the test of fairness and reasonableness. It
is an Act giving recognition and hard-"'on and precious right of \VOrkmen. It
is a Special Act expressly a·nd exclusively dealing v..rith the schedu:ie-eilun1erated
conditinns of service of ~~'orkn1en in industrial establishments. [364E-G]
Asso(;iatcd Cenient Co. Ltd. v. P. D. T7yas, [1960] 2 S.C.R. 974; Rohtak
Rissar District Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. anr! Ors., [1966] 2
S.C.R. 863; 1.Yestern India lvlatch Co. Ltd. v. Work111e11, [19741 l S.C.R. 434;
referred to.
3. The Electricity S'upply Act does not presume to be an Act to regulate
the conditions of service of the cn1ployees of State Electricity Board. It i~ an
act to regulate the coordina·ted development of electricity. It is a special Act
in regard to the subject of development of electricity, even as the Industrial
En1ployment (Standing Orders) Act is ·a special act in regard to the subject ot
conditions of service of 'vorkmen in industrial establishments. If section 79 of
the Electricity Supply Act generally provides for the n1aking of regulations
providing for the conditions of service of the employees of the Board, it can
only be regarded as a general provision \Vhich n1u:.t yield to the spcci;ll. provisions
of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act in respect· of matters
covered by the latter Act. [365D-F]
4. The reason for the rule "Generalis Specialibus non derogant'', that a
general provision should yield to specific provision is this : In passing ·a special
Act, Parliament devotes its en!ire consideration to at particular subject. When a
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U.P. STATE. ELECTY. !BOARD V. IL S. JAIN
357
General Act. is subsequently passed, it is logical to presun1e that Parliament has
not repealed or modified the former special Act unless it appears that the Special
Act agJin 1eceived consideration from Parliament, [366B-Dl
The provisions of the Standing Orders Act, therefore, must prevail over
Section 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act in regard to matters to which the
Standing Orders Act applies. It is impossible to conceive that Parlian1ent sought
to abrogate the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act,
embodying as they do hard-won and precious rights of \VOrkmen a·nd prescribing
as they do an elaborate procedure, including a quasi-judicial determination, by
a general, incidental provision like_ Section 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act.
lt is obvious that Parliament did not have before it the Standing Orders Act,
when it paBsed the Electricity Supply Act and Parliament never meant that
the Standing Orders Act should stand pro tanto repealed by Section 79(cJ of
-the Electricity Supply r\ct. [366F-H]
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Suk!zdev Singh v. Bhagat Ram, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; Rajasthan Electricity
Board v. Mohan Lal, [1967) 3 S.C.R. 277; held inapplicable.
5. The true scope of the rule of "ejusde1n generis" is that words of a general
nature following specific a·nd particular \vords should be so construed as limited
to things \Vhich are of the same nature as those specified. ~ut the~rule is one
'\Vhich has to be "applied with caution and not pushed too far". It i-; a rule
which must be confined to narro\v bounds so as not to unduly or unnccessririly
limit general and comprehensive words. If a broadwbased gc.nus could consistently be discovered there is no \Varrant .t.o cut down general \VOrds to dwarf
-size. lf giant it cannot be, dwa.rf it need not be. [369 A-BJ
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It is true that in Section 13-B the specie specifically n1entioned happen to
.be Government servants. But they also possess this common characteristic that
they are all public servnnts enjoying a statutory status and governed: by statutory
nJ!es and regulations. .If the legislature intended to confine the applicability of.
Section 13-B to industrial undertakings employing governn1ent servants only
nothing \vas easier than to say so instead of referring to various rules specitica liy
::incl follo\ving it up with a general expression like the one, in the insrnnt
case. [369B-DJ
6. The \vords 'rules and regulations' have con1e to acquire a· special meaning
when used in statutes. They are used to describe subordinate legi:Slation made
·1~y authorities to \vhom the statute delegates that function.
The \VOrds can have
110 other meaning in Sec. 13-B. Therefore, the expression '\vorkmen ... to
·whom ... any other rules or regulations that nla-y be notified in this beharf
means, in the context of Sec. 13-B, workmen enjoying a statutory status, in
respect of \vhose conditions of service the relevant statute authorises the making
·Of rules or regulations. The expression cannot be construed so narrowly as to
mean Government servants only; nor can it be constn1ed so broadly as to mean
workmen employed by \Vhomsoever including private employers. so long as their
.conditions of service are notified by the Govt. under Sec. 13-B [369D-F]
The \VOrds 'nothing in this Act shall apply' are not to be interpreted too
fitcrally as to lead to absurd results. The only reasonable construction that
.can be put upon the language of Section 13-B is that a rule of regulation, it
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notified by the Government, will exclude the applicability of the Act to the
extent th:it the rule or regulation covers the field. To that extent land to that
extent C1nh' "nothing in the Act shall apply". [307 F-G]
Rania// 1\la111bis.1·(111 1·. State Electricity Board [19671 I L.L.J. 252 and
Thinn·cnkataswan1i v. Coitnbatore Mu11icipnlity, [1968] 1 L.LJ. 361 explained.
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2199 of 1977.
From the Judgment and Decree dated 29-11-1976 of the Allaha..
bad High Court in Special Appeal No. 378 of 1974.
G. B. Pai and 0. P. Rana for the Appellant.
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R. K. Garg, V. J. Francis, Madan Mohan, K .P. Aggarwal and
Mrs. Manju Gupla, for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.
Manoi Swamp and Miss Lalita Kohli for the Intervener.
The J udgmcnt of the Court was delivered by
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CHJNNAPPA REDDY, J. The case is primarily concerned with the
age of retirement of two obscure workmen but it raises questions of
general importance concerning workmen employed by most statutory
bodies and corporations. It is on such chance cases that the development ol' our law depends.
The two workmen were originally employed by Messrs Seth RGm
Gopal and Partners who were licensees for the distribution of electricity under the Indian Electricity Act, 1910. There were certified
Starn.ling Orders for the industrial establishment of M/s. Seth Ram
Gopal and partners. The certified Standing Orders did not prescribe
ony age of superannuation for the employees. That, according to the·
workmen, meant that they could continue to work as Jong as they
were fit and able to discharge their duties. The electricity undertJbng
of M/s. Seth Ram Gopal and Partners was purchased by the U.I'.
State Electricity Board, with effect from 15-12-J 964, under the prnvisions of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. The employees of Seth
Ram Gopal and Partners became the employees of the U.P. State
Electricity Board. The U.P. State Electricity Board, which it i.\ no
longer disputed is an industrial establishment to which the Industrial'
Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, applies, neither made nor
got certified any Standing Orders as it was bound so to do under that
Act. But it is evident, though not' admitted from two letters, one from
the Superintending Engineer in reply to a Jetter dated 31-12-1966
from th<l Executive Engineer and the other from the Certifying Officer
for Standing Orders and Labour Commissioner to the General Secretary of the Employees' Union that the Board and the workmen considered the certified Standing Orders of the establishment of Seth Ram
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U.P. STATE ELECTY. 'BOARD V. H. S. JAIN
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Gopal ;ind Partners as applicable to them even after the purchase of A
the undertaking by the Board. This, however, is not very material.
Tlie Board, as we said earlier, made and got certified no standing
orders either in regard to age of superannuation or in regard to llDY
other matter mentioned in the schedule to the Standing Orders Act.
. We may mention here that by reason of a notification dated 17-11-1959
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'"age of superannuation or retirement, rate of pension or any other
fadlity which the employers may like to extend or may be agreed
upon between the parties" is one of the matters in respect ol which an
employer to whom the Standing Orders Act applies is bound to make
Standing Orders and get them certified. However, on May 28, 1970.
the Governor of U!tar Pradesh notified, under Section U-B of tl1c
Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, a regulation
made hy the U.P. State Electricity Board under Section 79(c) of the
Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. The notification was as foliows:
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"No. 3822-2/70/XXIIJ-PB-15EH-67
May 28, 1970.
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Jn pursuance of the provision of Section 13-13 o! the
Industrial Employment' (Standing Orders) Act 1946 .(Act
No. 20 of 1946), the Governor is pleased to notify in !be
official Gazette that the U.P. State Electricity Board has
made the following Regulations under sub-section ( c) of
Section 79 of the Electricity (Supply Act, 1948) (Act l'-<·o.
54 of 1948)"Not\vithstanding any rule if one order or practice hitherto
followed, the date of compulsory retirement of an employee
of the Board will be the date 011 which he attains the age of
58 years; provided that(i) in the case of the inferior servants of the Board,
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\V'hosc counterparts under State Govcrnn1ent are at present
entitled to serve upto the age of 60 years, the age of compulsory retirement will be the date 011 which they attain the
age of 60 years.
(ii) the Board or its subordinate appointing authority
niay require an employee to retire after he attains or has
attained the age of 55 year, on three months' notice or three
months' salary in Jicu thereof without as~igning any rerison".
Acting in pursuance of this regulation as notified by tile Governor, the
Board sought to retire the two respondents on July 2, 1972 and July
7, 1972 respectively on their attaining the age of 58 years. The respondents thereupon filed a writ petition in the Allahabad High Court
chrille.nging the regulation n1ade l1y the. Board an<l its notification by
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[1979] 1 S.C.R.
the Governor. Their contention was that the Board was not competent to make a regulation in respect of a matter covered by the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act. The writ petition was
dismissed by a learned Single Judge. The respondents preferred a
special appeal and the Division Bench which heard the Special Appeal
in the first instance referred the following three questions to a Full
Bench :
" ( 1) Whether the Industrial Employment (Standing
Orders) Act, 1946 applies to the Industrial establislummts
of the State Electricity Board ?
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(2) Whether the standing orders framed for an Industrial
cstablishnient of an electrical undertaking cease to be operative on the purchase of the undertaking by the Eoard or on
the framing of regulations under section 79 ( c) of the Elevtricity (Supply) Act, 1948?
(3) Whether section 13-B of the Industrial Emplo)ment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, applies only to industrial establishments of the Government or also to otl>er
industrial establishments ?
The Full Bench answered the questions as follows:
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"1. The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act
1946 applies to the industrial establishments of the State
Electricity Board.
2. The Standing Orders framed in an industrial c>lahlishment by an electrical undertaking do not cease to be
operative on the purchase of the undertaking by the Board
or on framing of the regulations under section 79 ( c j o[ the
Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948.
3. Section 13-B of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, applies only to the industrial establishments of the government and to no other establishments".
Following the opinion of the Full Bench, the Division Bench allowed
the Special Appeal and issued a Writ quashing the notificatioll dated
May 28, 1970 and directing the U.P. State Electricity Board not to
enforce the regulation against the appellants before them. The U.P.
State Electricity Board, having obtained a Certificate from the High
Court under Article 133(1) of the Constitution, has preferred this
·appeal.
U.P. STATE ELLCTY. BOARD l'. H. S . .JAIN
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Shri G. B. Pai learned Counsel for the appellaut did not canvass
the correctness of the answer of the Full Bench to the first question
iefrrred to it. He confined his attack to the answers to the second
and third questions. Relying upon the decisions of thi' Court in
S'ukhdev Singh v. Bhagat Ram('), and Rajasthan Electricity Board
v. Mohan Lal('), Shri Pai argued that the U.P. State Electricity Board
was an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution
and that the regulations made by the Boa.rd .under Section 79(c) of
the Act had the 'full force and effect of the statute and the force of
law" so as to displace, over-ride or supersede Standing Orders made
and certified under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act,
which, he submitted were mere contractual conditions of service subjected to a quasi-judicial process and which, therefore; could not tak"
precedence over legislative processed regulations. The learned Counsel further submitted that Section 79(c) of the E!cctricity Supply Act
was a special law and that it prevailed over the provisions ol the
Industrial Employment Standing Orders Act. Alternately, he submitted, the notifying of the regulation regarding age of superannuation under Section 13-B of the Industrial Employment Standing Orders
Act excluded the applieahility of that Act in regard to the subject of
age of superannuation. He urged that Seeton 13-B was not confmcd
in its application to (Jovernn1ent undertakings only or to cases where
there were comprehesinve sets of rules, as was thought by the High
Court.
Shri R. K. Garg, for the Workmen contended that the lndustrial
Employment (Standing Orders) Act was an act specially designed to
define and secure reasonable conditions of service for work1nen in
industrial establishments employing one hundred or more workmen
and to that end to compel employers to make Standing Orders and to
ret them certified by a quasi-judicial authority. It was, therefore,
a special Act with reference to its subject matter. The Electricity
Supply Act, on the other hand, was intended "to provide for the
rationalisation of the production and supply of electricity, and generally for taking measures conducive to electrical development." It
was not specially designed to define the conditions of service of
empolyees of Electricity Board or to displace the Standing Orders Act.
The power given to an Electricity Board under Section 79 ( c) to
make regulations providing for "the duties of officers and servants of
the Board and their salaries, allowances and other conditions of service" was no more than the usual, general power possessed by every
(1) [1975] 3 SCR 619.
(2) [19671 3 SCR 377.
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employer. Shri Garg argued that the Industrial Employment St<uiding Orders Act was a special Act which dealt with the special subject
of conditions of employment of workmen in industrial establishments
and, therefore, in the matter of conditions of employment u[ workmen in industrial establishments, it prevailed over the provisiops of
the Electricity Supply Act. He urged that under Sect1un 13-13 of the
Standing Orders Act, Government undertakings which had a comprehensive set of rules alone could he excluded from the applicabi111y
of the Act. Me submitted that to permit a single rule or regulation
made for a limited purpose to be notified under Sec. 13-B would have
the disastrous effect of excluding the applicability of the whole of the
Standing Orders Act.
Before examining the rival contentions, we remind oursdvos 1hat
the Constitution has expressed a deep concern for the welfare of
workers and has provided in Art. 42 that the State shall make provision for securing just and humane conditions of work and in Art. 4 3
that the State shall endeavour to secure, by suitable icgislation or eco-
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nomic organisation or in any other \Vay, to all workers, agricultural,
industrial or otherwise, work, a living wage, conditions oi. \VorK ensur-
ing a decent st'andard of life and full enjoyment of kisurc etc. Tbesc
ore among the "Directive Principles of State Policy". The mandate
cf Article 37 of the Constitution is that while the Dircciivc Principles
0! State Policy shall not be enforceable by any Court, the principles
are 'neverthe1ess fun<lan1cntal in the governance of the country' and '!t
shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles i11 making laws' .
..\ddressed to Courts, \Vhat the injunction n1cans is that while Couns
are not free to direct the inaking of legislation: Courts are bound to
evolve, affir1n and adopt principles of interpretation \vliich vviH further
and not hinder the goals set out in the Directive Principles of St<1lc
Policy. This command of the Constitution must be ever present in
the n1inds of judges when interpreting statutes which cvnccrn thcn1sclves directly or indirectly \:Vith n1atters set out in the Directive Pri111.:iplcs ~f State Policy.
Let us riow cxan1in~ the various Statutory provisions in their
proper context with a view to resolve the problem before us. First,
the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act. 1946. Before
the passing of 'the Act conditions of service of industrial cnip!oyces·
were invariably ill defined and were hardly ever known with even a
slight degree of precision to the employees. There was no uniformiti'
of conditions of service for employees discharging identical duties in
the same establish~1ent. Conditions of service were generally ad-hoc
and the result of oral arrangements which left the employees at the
n1ercy of the employer. With the growth of the trade union n1ovc-
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U.P. STATE ELECTY. BOARD v. H. s. JAIN
(Chinnappa Reddy !.)
363
men! and the right of collective bargaining, employees started putting
forth their demands to end this sad and confusing state of affairs.
Recognising the rough deal that was being given lo workers by
employers who would not define their conditions of service and the
inevitability of industrial strife in such a situation, !he legislature intervened and enacted the Industrial Employment Standing Orders Act.
It was stated in the statement of objects and reasons;
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"Experience has shown that "Standing Orders" defining
the conditions of recruitment, discharge, disciplinary action,
holidays, leave etc., go a long way towards ln111nn1s1ng
friction between the management and workers in industrial
undertakings. Discussion on the subject at the tripartite
Indian Labour Conferences revealed a consensus of opinion
in favour of legislation. The Bill accordingly seeks to provide for the framing of "Standing Orders" in all industilal
establishments employing one hundred and more workers".
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It was, therefore, considered, as stated in the preamble "expedient to
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require employers in industrial establishments to define with su1licicnt
precision the conditions of employment under them and to make the
said conditions known to workmen employed by them". The scheme
of the Act, as amended in 1956 and as it now stands, requires every
employer of an industrial establishment as defined in the Act to submit
to the Certifying Officer draft Standing Orders, that is, "Rules relating
to matters set out in the schedule", proposed by him for adoption in
his industrial establishment. This is mandatory. It has to be done
within six months after the commencement of the Act. Failure to do
so is punishable and is further made a continuing offence. The draft
Standing Orders are required to cover every matter set out in tlie
schedule. The schedule enumerates the matters to be provided in the
Standing Orders and they include classification of workmen, shift
working, attendance and late corning. Leave and holidays, termina-
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tion of employment, suspension or dismissal for misconduct, means of
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redress for wronged workmen etc. Item No. 11 of the Schedule is
"Any other matter which may be prescribed". By a notification dated
17-11-1959 the Government of Uttar Prade.sh has prescribed "Age of
superannuation or retirement, rate of pension or any other faci1ity
which the employer may like to extend or may be agreed upon between
the parties" as a matter requiring to be provided in the Standing
Orders. On receipt of the draft Standing Oders from the employee,
the Certifying Officer is required to forward a copy of the same to the
trade union concerned or the workmen inviting them to prefer oujections, if any. Thereafter the Certifying Officer is required to give a hearing to the employer and the trade union or workmen as the case may be
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and to decide "whether or not any modification of or addition to the
draft submitted by the e!nployer is necessary to render the draft Standing
Orders certifiable under the Act'. Standing Orders are certifiable
under the Act only if provision is made therein for every matter set out
in the schedule, if they are in conformity with the provisions of the
Act and if the Certifying Officer adjudicates them as fair and reasonable. The Certifying Officer is invested with the powers of a Civil
Court for the purposes of receiving evidence, administering oaths,
enforcing the attendance of witnesses etc. etc. The order of the Certifyi_ng Officer is subject to an appeal to the prescribed app".llate authority.
The Standing Orders as finally certified are required to be entered in a
Register maintained by the Certifying Officer. The employer is required
to prominently post the Certified Standing Orders on special boards
maintained for that purpose. This is the broad scheme of the Act. The
Act also provides for exemptions. About that, later. The Act, as origin~lly enacted, precluded the Certifying Officer from adjudicating upon
the fairness or reasonableness of the draft Standing Orders submitted by
the employer but an amendment introduced in 1956 now casts a duty
upon the Certifying Officer to adjudicate upon the fairness or reasonableness of the Draft Standing Orders. The Scheme of the Act has been
sufficiently explained by this Court in Associated Ce111e111 Co. Ltd. v.
P. D. Vyas('), Rohtak Hissar District Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v.
State of U.P. & Ors.('), and Western India -Match Co. Ltd. v. Workmen('). The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act is thus seen
to be an Act specially designed to define the terms of employment
of workmen in industrial establishments, to give the workmen a
collective voice in defining the terms of employment and to subject
the terms of employment to the scrutiny of quasi--judicial authorities
by the application of the test of fairness and reasonableness. It is
an Act giving recognition and form to hard-won and precious rights
of workmen. We have no hesitation iu saying that it is a Special Act
exp~essly and exclusively dealing with the schedule-enumerated conditions of service of workmen in industrial establishments.
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Turning next to the Electricity Supply Act, it is, as its preamble
says. An Act to provide for the rationalisation of the production and
supply of electricity, and generally for taking _measures conducive to
electrical development". The statement of objects and reasons and a
glance at the various provisions of the Act show that the primary object
(I) [1960] 2 SCR 974
(2) [1966] 2 SCR 863
(3) [1974] I SCR 434
U.P. STATE ELECTY. BOARD v. H. s. JAIN (Chinnappa Reddy J.) :J65
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of the Act is to provide for the coordinated, efficient and economic A
development of electricity in India on a regional basis consistent with
the needs of the entire region including semi-urban and rural areas.
Chapter II of the Act provides for the constitution of the Central Electricity Authority and Chapter III for the constitution of State Electricity
Boards. Chapter IV prescribes the powers and duties of State Electricity Boards, and Chapter V the Boards' works and trading procedure. B
Chapter VI deals with the Board's finance, Accounts and Audit. Chapter VII (from S. 70 to S. 83) which is headed "Miscellaneous" contains varjous miscellaneous provisions amongst which are S. 78 which
empowers the Government to make rules and S. 79 which empowers
the Board to make regulations in respect of matters specified in clauses
c
(a) to (k) of that Section. Clause (c) of S. 79 is "the duties of Officers and servants of the Board, and their salaries, allowances and other
conditions of service". This, of course is no n1ore than the orcHnary
general power, with which every employer is invested in the first instance, to regulate the conditions of service of his employees. It is an
ancillary or incidental power of every employer. The Electricity Supply D
Act does not presume to be an Act to regulate the conditions of service
of the employees of State Electricity Boards. It is an act to regulate
the coordinated development of electricity. It is a special Act in regard
to the subject of development of electricity, even as the Industrial Employment (Standing Ord<ers) Act is a speci~I Act in regard to the subject
of Conditions of Service of workmen in industrial establishments. If E
Sec. 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act generally provides for the making of regulations providing for the conditions of service of the employees of the Board, it can only be regarded as a general provision
which must yie.ld to the special provisions of the Industrial Employment
(Standing Orders) Act in respect of matters covered by the latter Act.
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The maxim "Generalia specialibus non deroganf' is quite well
known. The rule flowing from the maxim has been explained in Mary
Seward v. The Owner of the "Vera Cruz"(') as follows :
"Now if anything be certain it is this, that where there
are general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and
sensible application without extending them to subjects
specially dealt with by earlier legislation, you are not to hold
that earlier and special legislation indirectly repealed, altered, ·
or derogated from merely by force of such genera1 words,
without any indication of a particular intention to do so".
(l) [ 1884] 10 AC
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The question in Seward v. Vera Cruz was whether Sec. 7 of the Admiralty Court Act of 1861, which gave jurisdiction to that Court over
"any claim for damage done by any ship" also gave jurisdiction over
claims for Joss of life which would otherwise come under the Fatal Accidents Act. It was held that the general words of Sec. 7 of the Admiralty
Court Act did not exclude the applicability of the Fatal Accidents Act
and therefore, the Admiralty Court had no jurisdiction to entertain a
claim for damages for loss of life.
The reason for the rule that a general provision should yield to a
specific provision is this : In passing a Special Act, Parliament devotes
its entire consideration to a particular subject. When a General Act
is subsequently passed, it is logical to presume that Parliament has not
repealed or modified the former Special Act unless it appears that the
Special Act again received consideration from Parliament. Vide London
and Blackwall Railway v. Limehouse District Board of Works(') and
Thorpe v. Adams('). In J. K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co.
Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh('), this Court observed (at p. 1174)
"The rule that general provisions should yield to specific
provisions is not an arbitrary principle made by lawyers and
judges but springs from the common understanding of men
and women that when the same person gives two directions
one covering a large number of matters in general and another to only some of them his intention is that these latter
directions should prevail as regards these while as regards all
the rest the earlier direction should have effect''.
We have already shown that the Industrial Employment
(Standing Orders) Act is a Special Act dealing with a
Specific subject, namely the conditions of service, enumerated in the
Schedule, of workmen in industrial establishments. It is impossible to
conceive that Parliament sought to abrogate the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act embodying as they do
hard-won and precious rights of workmen and prescribing as they do an
elaborate procedure, including a quasi-judicial determination, by a
genera!, incidental provision like Sec. 79 ( c) of the Electricity Supply
Act. It is obvious that Parliament did not have before it the Standing
Orders Act when it passed the Electricity Supply Act and Parliament
never meant that the Standing Orders Act should ~tand pro tanto repealed by Sec. 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act. We are clearly of
the view that the provisions of the Standing Orders Act must prevail
over S. 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act, in regard to matters to
which the Standing Orders Act applies.
(1) 26 L. J. Ch. 164 ~ 69 E.R. 1048.
(3) A.!. R. 1961 S. C. 1170.
(2) (1871) L. R. 6 C. P. 125
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U.P. STATE ELECTY. BOARD v. H. s. JAIN (Chinnappa Reddy l.)
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Shri G. B. Pai, relying on what was said in the Rajasthan State
Electricity Board case and Sukhdev Singh & Ors.'s case argued that the
regulations made under Sec. 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act being
statutory in nature stood on so high a pedestal as to override, by their
very nature, the ·standing Orders made under the Standing Orders Act.
The observations on which he relied are, in the Rajasthan State Electricity Board case :
"The State, as defined in Art. 12, is thus comprehended
to include bodies created for the purpose of promoting the
educational and economic interests of the people. The
State, as constituted by our Constitution, is further specifically
empowered under Art. 298 to carry on any trade or business:
The circumstance that the Board under the Electricity Supply
Act is required to carry on some activities of the nature of
trade or commerce 'does not, therefore, give any indication
that the Board must be excluded from the scope of the word
"State" as used in Art. 12. On the other hand, there are
provisions in the Electricity Supply Act which clearly show
that the powers conferred on the Board include power to give
directions, the disobedience of which is punishable as a
criminal offence. In these circumstances, we do not consider
it at all necessary to examine the cases cited by Mr. Desai
to urge before us that the Board cannot be held to be an
agent' or instrument of the Government. The Board was
clearly an anthority to, which the provisions of Part III of the
Constitution were applicable".
and in Sukhdev Singh's case (at p. 627) :
"Rules, regulations, schemes, Bye-laws, orders made
under statutory powers are all comprised in delegated legislation"
(at p. 628)
"Subordinate legislation has, if validly made,
force and effect of a statute" .
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"Rules and Regulations of the Oil and Natural Gas
Commission, Life Insurance Corporation, Industrial Finance
Corporation have the force of law .
The employees of these statutory bodies have a statutory
status and they are entitled to a declaration of being in
employment when their dismissal or removal is in contravention of statutory 'provisions.
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These statutory bodies are authorities within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution".
The proposition that Statutory Bodies are 'authorities' within the
meaning of Art. 12 of the, Constitution, that the employees of these
bodies have a statutory status and that regulations made under the
statutes creating these bodies have the force of law are not in dispute
before us. The question is not whether the employees and the Board
have a statutory status; they undoubtedly have. The question is not
whether the regulations made under Sec. 79 have the force of law;
again, they undoubtedly have. The question is whether Sec. 79 (c) of
the Electricity Supply Act is a general law and therefore, regulations
cannot be made under it in respect of matters covered by the Industrial
Employment (Standing Order) Act, a special law. That question we
have answered and the answer to that question makes irrelevant the
submissions based on the statutory status of the employees and the
statutory force of the regulations.
Next, we turn to the submission based on the notification made
under Sec. 13-B of the Standing Orders Act. Section 13-B reads as
follows :
"13B. Nothing .in this Act shall apply to an industrial
establishment in so far as the workmen employed therein are
persons to whom the Fundamental and Supplementary Rules,
Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules;
Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, Revised Leave
Rules, Civil Service Regulations, Civilians in Defence· Service
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules or the Indian
Railway Establishment Code or any other rules or regulations
that may be notified in this behalf by the appropriate
Govermnent in the Official Gazette, apply".
The notification made by the Government has already been
extracted by us. Some doubts were expressed whether the U.P. State
Electricity Board had in fact made the regulation and whether the
Government merely notified the regulation without appyling its mind.
The learned counsel appearing for the Board and the Government
placed before us the relevant records and note-files and we are satisfied
that the Board did make the regulation and the Government did apply
its mind.
The High Court expressed the views that the expression "any other
rules or regulations" should be read ejusdem generis with the expressions "Fundamental and Supplementary Rules", "Civil Services, Control, Classification and Appeal Rules" etc. So read, it was said, the
provisions of Section 13-B could only be applied to industrial establish-
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U.P. STATE ELECTY. BOARD v. H. s. JAIN
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ments in which the workmen employed could properly be described as
Government servants. We are unable to agree that the application
of the ejusdem generis rule leads to any such result. The true scope
oi the rule of "ejusdem generis" is that words of a general nature
following specific and particular words should be construed as limited
to things which are of the same nature as those specified. But the rule
is one which has to be "applied with caution and not pushed too far".
It is a rule which must be confined to narrow bounds so as not to
unduly or unnecessarily limit general and comprehensive words. If
a broad-based genus could consistently be discovered, there is no
warrant to cut down general words to dwarf size. If giant it cannot
be, dwarf it need not be. It is true that in Sec. 13_-B the specie spcci~
fically mentioned happen to be Government servants. But they also
possess this common characteristic that they are all public servants
enjoying a statutory status, and governed by s(atutory rules and regulations. If the legislature intended to confine the applicability of Sec.
13-B to industrial undertakings employing Government servants only
nothing was easier than to say so instead of referring to various rules
specifically and following it up with a general expression like the one
before us. The words 'rules and regulations' have come to acquire a
special meaning when used in statutes. They are used to describe
subordinate legislation made by authorities to whom the statute delegates that function. The words can have no other meaning in Sec.
13-B. Therefore, the expression "workmen .... to whom ..... any
othe-r rules or regulations that may be notified in this behalf means, in
the context of Sec. 13-B, workmen enjoying a statutory status, in respect of whose conditions al' service the relevant statute authorises the
making of rules or regulations. The expression cannot be construed
so narrowly as to mean Government servants only; nor can it be construed so broadly as to mean workmen employed by whomsoever
including private employers, so long as their conditions of service are
notifie<l by the Government under Sec. 13-B.
Slm Garg relied on certain observations of the Madras High Court
in Raman Nambissan v. State Electricity Board('), and Thiruvenkataswami v. Coimbatore Municipality('). In Raman Nambissmz's case
it was held that the mere fact that the Electricity Board had adopted
the rules and regulations of the Government of Madras as its transitory
rules and regulations did not bring the workmen employed in industrial establishments under the Board within the mischief of Sec. 13-B
of the Industrial Establishment's (Standing Ordet) Act. In Thiru ·
venkataswami' s ca·se it was held that mies made by the Government
(I) [1967] 1 L.L.J. 252.
(2) [1968] 1 L.L.J. 361
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under the District Municipalities Act could not be considered to be
rules notified u:idfr See. 13-B of the Standing Orders Act merely
because the rules were made by the Government and published in the
Government Gazette. We agree with the conclusion in both cases.
In Thiruvenkataswami's case Kailasam J., also observed that the
Industrial ~mployment (Standing Order) Act was a· special act
relating exclusively to the service conditions of persom employed in
industrial establishments, and, therefore, its provision~ prevailed over
lhe provisions of the District Municipalities Act. We entirely agree.
Bul, the learned judge went on to• say "S. 13-B cannot be availed of
for purposes of framing rules to govern the relationships in an industrial establishment under private management or in a Statutory Corporation. This rule can apply only to· industrial establishments in
respect of which the Government is authorised to frame rules and regulations relating to the conditions of employment in industrial establishments". There we disagree. Our disagreement is only in regard to
induslrial establishment in Statutory Corporations a11d not those under
private management. Our reasons are mentioned in the previous
paragraph.
Shri Garg suggested that the rules. and regulations specific mention
of which has been made in Sec. 13-B were all comprehensive sets o!
rules and, therefore, "any other rules or regulations" that might be
notified by the Government should also satisfy the test of comprehensiveness. He argued that a single rule or regulation could not be notified under Sec. 13-B as it would be too much to say, he said, that the
notifying of a single rule or regulation would exclude the applicability
of all the provisions of the Standing Orders Act. We do not think
that the notifying of one or many regulations has the effect that Shri
Garg apprehends it has. The words 'Nothing in this Act shall apply'
are net to be interpreted too literally as to lead to absurd results and
to what the legislature never intended. In our view the only reasonable construction that we can put upon the language of Sec. 13-B is
that a rule or regulation, if notified by the Government,. will exclude
the applicability of the Act to the extent that the rule or regulation
e-0vers the field. To that extent and to that extent only 'nothing in
the Act shall apply'. To understand Sec. 13B in any other manner
will lead to unjust and uncontemplated results. For instance, most of
the· Service Rules and Regulations expressly mentioned in Sec. 13-B
do not deal with a large number of the matters enumerated in the
schedule such as 'Manner of intimating to workmen periods and hour
of work, holidays, pay-days and wage rates', 'shift working', 'Attendance and late coming', 'conditions of, procedure in applying for, and
1[Je autlwrity which may grant· leave and holidays'. 'Closing and
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U.P. STATE ELECTY. BOARD v. H. s. JAIN
(Chinnappa Reddy J.) 371
reopening of Sections of the industrial establishments ana temporary
stoppages of work and the rights and liabilities of the employer and
workmen arising therefrom' etc. To exclude the applicability of
Standing Orders relating to all these matters because the Fundamental
Rules, the Civil Service Rules or the Civil Services Control, Classification- aud Appeal Rules provide for a few matters like 'Classification of
workmen' or 'suspension or dismissal for misconduct' would be to
reverse the processes of history, apart from leading to unjust and untoward results. It will place workmen once again at the mercy of the
employer be he ever so benign and it will certainly promote industrial
strife. We have indicated what according to us is the proper construction of Sec. 13-B. That is the only construction which gives
meaning and sense to Sec. 13-B and that is a construction which can
legitimately be said to conform to the Directive Principles of State
Policy proclaimed in Articles 42 and 43 of the Constitution.
We, therefore, hold that the Industrial Employment (Standing
Orders) Act is a special law in regard to the matters enumerated in
the schedule and the regulations made by the Electricity Board with
respect to any of those matters are of no effect unless such regulations
are either notified by the Government under Sec. 13-B or certified by
the Certifying Officer under Sec. 5 of the Industrial Employment
(Standing Orders) Act. In regard to matters in respect of which
regulations made by the Board have not been notified by the Governor
or in respect of which no regulations have been made by the Board,
the fodustrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act shall continue to
apply. In the present case the regulation made by the Board with
regard to age of superannuation having been duly notified by the
Government, the regulation shal! have effect notwithstanding the fact
that it is a matter which could be the subject matter o[ Standing Orders
under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act. The respondents were therefore, properly retired when they attained the age of 58
years. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The Writ Petition fled in
the High Court is dismissed. The appellants will pay the costs of the
respondents as directed by this Court on 28-9-1977. The costs are
quantified at Rs. 3,500/-..
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