UNION OF INDIA versus SHRI GOPAL CHANDRA MISRA AND ORS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 15 February 1978 | [1978] 3 S.C.R. 12 | 1978 INSC 32
Key facts
- Decided
- 15 February 1978
- Bench
- R.S. SARKARIA*, A.C. GUPTA, N.L. UNTWALIA, S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, JASWANT SINGH
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 2644/1977
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1978] 3 S.C.R. 12
- Neutral citation
- 1978 INSC 32
Text of the judgment
12
A
UNION OF INDIA
v.
SHRI GOPAL CHANDRA MISRA AND ORS.
February 15, 1978
B
[R. S. SARKARIA, A. C. GUPTA, N. L. UNTWALIA, JASWANT SINGH
AND S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, JJ.J
(~011stitution of India, Art. 217(1) proviso (a) "resign his office", interpretation-Iligh Court Judge's resignation letter intin1ati11g to have effect from a
future date, whether receipt by President, 1nakes resignation fait accompliRevocation of resignation prior to intimated date of effect, validity ofDoctrine of public policy, applicability to iudicial decisions.
c
D
The second respondent (appellant in CA 2655/77) Shri Salish Chandra
\vrote to the President of India, on May 7, 1977, intimating his resignation
from the office of Judge of the Allahabad High Collrt, with effect from August
1, 1977. On July 15, 1977, he again wrote to the President, revoking his
earlier communication, and commenced deciding matters in Court from July
16, 1977. On August 1, 1977 the first respondent Shri Misra, an advocate· of
the High Court. filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, contending that the resignation of Shri Satish Chandra, having been duly communicated to the President of India, in accordance with Article 217(,1) Proviso (a)
of the Constitution, was final and irrevocable, and that the continuance of respondent No. 2 as a High Court Judge thereafter, was an usurpation of public
office. The High Court allowed the petition holding that Shri Satish Chandra
was not competent to revoke his resignation letter.
'
Allowing the appeal by certificate,
HELD:
Per R. S. Sarkaria on behalf of (A. C. Gupta, N. L. Untwalia, Ja.nvant
E
SinRh, JJ and himself).
F
1. Resigning office necessarily involves relinquashment of the office which
implies cessation or termination of, or cutting asunder from the office. A
complete and effective act of resigning office is one which severs the link of the
resigner with his office and termina.tes its tenure. In the context of Art. 217(1)
this assumes the character of a decisive test, because the expression "res;gn his
office'' occurs in a proviso which excepts or qualifies the substantive clause fixing
the office tenure of a judge upto the age of 62 years. [21 E-F)
-
2. Jn the absence of a legal, contractual or constitutional bar, an intimation
in writing sent to the appropriate authority by an incumbent, of his intention
or proposal to resign his office/post from a future specified date, can be withdrawn by him at any time before it becomes effective i.e., before it effects
termination of the tenure of the office/post, or employment. Thi.<; general rule
G
equally applies to Government servants and constitutional functionaries. In the
case of a Government servant, normally, the tender of resignation becomes
effective and his service. terminated, when it is accepted by the appropriate authority. In the case of a High Court Judge·, who is a constitutiona1 fun~tionary
having under Art. 217(1), Proviso (a). a unilateral right or privilege to resign,
his resignation becomes effective on the date· from which he, of his own volition
·
chooses to quit office. [27 E-G]
Jai Ram v. Union of India, A.J.R. 1954, SC 584 and Raj Kumar "· Union
of India. [19681 3 S.C.R. 857 followed.
H
M. Kunjukrishnan Nadar v. Hon'ble Speaker, Kerala Le7islative Assembly,
1064 Kerala 194: Y. K. Ma·thur v. The Mrtnicipa Corporation of
Deflu. A.J.R. 1974 Delhi 58, Sankar Datt Shrtkla v.. President, Municipal Board
Auraiya and Anr., A.J.R. 1956 All. 70 Bahorilal Paliwal v. Dist. Magistrat~
A.I.~.
..
UNION v. G. c. MISRA (Sarkaria, J.)
13
Bulandshahr A.l.R. 1956 All. (511) F.B. : 1.L.R. (1956) 2 All. 593-F.B..
Bhairon Singh Vislnvakarma v. Civil Surgeon Narsifnhapur, 1971 Labour
Industrial Cases 127 M.P. approved.
A
Rev. Oswald Joseph Reichal v. The Right Rev. John Fielder, Lord Bishop
'
oj Oxford, 14 A.C. 259, distinguished.
3. A High Court Judge's letter addressed to the President intimating or notifying the writer's intention to resign his office as Judge, on a future date, does
noc and cannot forthwith sever the· writer from the office of the Judge, or terminate bis tenure. Such a 'prospective' resignation does not, before the indicated
future date is reached, become a complete and operative act of resigning his
office by the Judge within the contemplation of Proviso (a) to Article 217(1).
[22H, 23Al
4, Public policy can be a very unsafe, questionable and unreliable ground
for judicial decision. This doctrine can be applied only in a case where clear
and undeniable harm to the public is made out. [24C-E]
B
c
Gherulal v. Malwdeo Das [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R., 406, applie<l.
5. In substance, the Jetter dated May 7, 1977, addressed by appellant 2 to
the President, amounted to a proposal or notice of intention to resign at a future
daJte., and, before the arrival of that date (August 1, 1977), it did not constitute
a complete act of resignation having the jural consequence of severing the link
of the appellant v;ith the office of the Judge. and hence it had been validly
withdrawn by him as per his letter dated July 15, 197'7 addressed to the President,
there being no constitutional or legal bar to such withdrawal. [33D-E]
D
Per S. Murtaza Fnzal Ali, J. (Dissenting)
-r
-
1. Where the effectiveness of a resignation by a Judge does not depend upon
the acceptance by the President, and the resignation acts ex·proprio vigore on
the compliance of the conditions mentioned in Art. 217(1)(a), the resigner
completely ceases to retain any control over it and becomes functus officio,
though thei resignation may take effect from the date mentioned i.n the letter, or
"if no such date is mentioned. from the date of the letter itself''. [54 EG]
E
The principles flowing as a logical corollary from the nature and character
of the privilege, right or power conferred by the Constitution on a Judge of a
High Court or other constitutional functionaries are : I. The concept o.f the accep:ance of resignation subn1ittcd by a High
Court Judge· is con1pletely absent from Article 217(1) (a), and the
effectiveness of the resignation does not deipend upon the acceptance
of the resignation by the President.
F
II. In view of the provisions of Article 217 ( 1) (a) and sin1ilar provision_~
in re~pect to high cons.titutional functionaries, the resignation once
submitted and communicated to the appropriate •authority, become..o;;.
complete and irrevocable and acts ex proprio vigore.
Ill Th~ resignation may be effective from a particular date but the
restgnor completely ceases to retain any control over it and becon1es
functus officio once the resignation is submitted and communicated
co the. appropriate authority.
G
IV. The resignation contemplated by Art. 217(1)(a) is purely a unilateral
act and takes effect ipso facto once intention to resign is communicated to the President in writing and addres:;ed to him.
V. On a true· _interpretation of ~rticle 217(1)(a), a resignation having
been submitted and .con1mun1cated to the Presidt:nt, cannot be re~alled even though 1t .may be prospective in nature so as to come
into effect from a particular date.
H
14
A
B
c
(1978] 3 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
VI. The Constitution contains an express and clear provision for the inod.~·
in which a resignation can be made. It has deliberately omitted:to
provide for revocation or withdrawal of a resignation once submitted
and con1municated te the Pr~ident.
In the absence of such a provisiOn, the doctrine of in1plied po\vers cannot be
invoked to supply the omission. [56 C.H, 57 A-BJ
Rev. Oswald Joseph Raichal v. The Right John Fieldt'r, Lord Bfa!iop (}f
Oxford, 14 A.C. 259, Finch v. Oake (189.6) 1 Ch.D. 409, People of the State of
Illinois Ex. Ra/. B.S. Adarnowaki v. Otto Kerner, 82 A.L.R. 2nd Series 140~
G/ossop V. Glossop (1907) 2 Ch. D. 370; Bidi, Bidi Leaves and Tobacco Merchants Association, Gandia & Anr. v. The Slate of Bombay & Ors., A.I.R. 1962
S.C. 486; applied.
Sukhdeo Narayan and Ors. v. Municipal Conunissioner of Arrah Municipality
and Ors., A.I.R. 1956 Patna 367 and 373; and S1nt. Raisa Sultana Beg1un and
Ors. v. Abdul Qadir and Ors., A.I.R. 1966 All. 318 "t 321 Approved.
Y. K. Matbur v. The Municipal Corporation of Delhi. A.LR. 1974 Delhi 58,
distinguished.
O
M. Kunjukrishnan Nadar v. Hon'ble Speaker, Kerala, Legislative Assenibly,
A.LR. 1964 KeraJa 194, Ba/lorilal Paliwal v. District Magistrate, Bulandshahr
A.LR. 1956 All. 511 F.B. =I.LR. (1956) 2 All. 593 F.B. and Bhairon Singh
Vishwakanna v. Civil Surgeon, Narsirnhapur, 1971 Labour Industrial Cases 127
M.P. disagreed with.
Union of India v. S.H. Sheth and Anr., (1977) 4 SCC 193, Corpus Juris
Secundum, Vol. 48 p. 973 and Vol. 67 p. 227; Jurisprudence by Paton 3rd Ed.
by Derham; Jurisprudence by Salmond, 12th Ed. by Fitzgerald, and American
Constitution edited by Corwin; referred to.
E
F
2. It is manifestly plain that there is no relationship of inr:.ster nnd servant,
employer and employee. between the President arid the Judge of the liigh Court,
because a Jud~ is not a Government servant so as to be governed by Article
310 of the Constitution. A Judge of the High Court appointed under Art. 217
ha5 a special status and is a constitutional functionary appointed under the provisions of the Constitution by the President. The n1ere fact that the President
appoints him does not make him an employer of the Judge, in appointing a
Judge, the President exercises certain constitutional functions a'> contained in
Article 217(1). It is, therefore, indisputable that a Judge of the High Court
enjoys a special status under the Constitution, because of the very high position
that he holds and the, digniity and decorum of the office that he has to maintain.
[37 D-HJ
1
Union of India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth & Arlr., [1978] 1 S.C.R. 423;
followed.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 2644 & 2655
of 1977.
G
(From the Judgment and Order dt. 28th October, 1977 of the
Allahabad High Court in ·Civil Misc. Writ No. 1172 of 1977).
S. V. Gupte, Attorney General and Soli J. Sorabjee, Addi. Solicitor General for the Appellant in C.A. No. 2644 & R. P. Bhat, R. N.
Sachthey & Girish Ch1N1dra for the Appellant in C.A. Nti. 2644 &
Respdt. 2 in C.A. 2655/77.
H
· F. S. Nariman, S. P. Gupta, Harish Chandra, H. K. Puri, M. C.
D/lingra and Vivek Sethi for the Appellant iil C.A. 2655 & Respdt. 2
in CA 2644/77. .
.
'
UNION
v. G. c. MISRA (Sarkaria, J.)
15
Jagdish Swarup (in CA 2655 /77), Yogeshwar Prasad (in CA
2644/77) and G. N. Verma, A. N. Srivastava, Mool Behari Saxel!fl,
Pramod Swarup, Miss Rani Arora & Miss Meera Bali for Respondent
No. 1 in both appeals.
A
The following Judgments were delivered
SARKARIA, J.-By a short Order, dated December 8, 1977, we (by
majority) accepted these two appeals and announced that a reasoned
judgment shall follow in due course. Accordingly, we are now rendering the same.
,
Whether a High Court Judge, who semis to the President,' a letter
in his own hand, intimating to resign his office with effect from a
future date, is competent to withdraw th•o same before that date is
reached-is the principal question that falls for consideration in these
two appeals, directed against a judgment, dated October 28, 1977, of
the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, allowing the writ petition
of Shri Gopal Chandra Misra, respondent herein, and issuing a direction under Article 226 of the Co'nstitution, restraining Shri Salish
Chandra (hereinafter referred to as Appellant 2) from functioning as
a Judge of the Allahabad High Court.
Appellant 2 was appointed to the High Court of Allahabad as
Additional Judge on October 7, 1963, and a permanent Judge on
September 4, 1967. He will be attaining the age of 62 years on
September 1, 1986. On May 7, 1977, he sent a letter under his hand
addressed to the President of India, through a messenger. This letter
may be reproduced as below :-
C'
D
E
"To
The President of India,
New Delhi.
I beg to resign my office as Judge High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad.
I .will be on leave till 31st of July, 1977.
effective on 1st of August, 1977.
G
My resignation shall be
With my respects.
Yours faithfully,
Sd/- Salish Chandra."
H
16
A
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1978] 3 S.C.R·
On July 15, 1977, Appellant 2 wrote to the President of Indi!l
another letter in these terms :41TO
The President of India,
New Delhi.
B
Sir,
I beg to revoke and cancel the intention expressed by me to resigru
on 1st of August, 1977, in my letter dated 7th May, 1977. That com!llunication may very kindly be treated as null and void.
c
D
p
G
H
.
),
Thanking you and wishing to remain.
Yours sincerely
Sd/· Salish Chandra."
The receipt of this letter of revocation or withdrawal, dated July
15, 1977, was acknowledged by Shri T. C. A. Srinivasavardhan,
Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice & Company Affairs, New Delhi.
as per hiB D.O. No. 2/14/77.Jus., dated July 28, 1977. By a separate
letter, Appellant 2 cut short his leave and resumed duty aB a Judge
of the Allahabad High Court on July 16, 1977, and from July 18,
1977, he commenced sitting in the Court and decidiqg cases.
On August 1, 1977, Shri Gopal Chandra Misra, an Advocate of
the High Court, filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution,
contending that the resignation, dated May 7, 1977, of Appellant 2,
having been duly communicated to the President of India in accordance with the provisions of Article 217 ( 1), proviso (a) of the Constitution, was final and irrevocable, and as a result, Appellant 2 had
ceased to be a Judge of the Allahabad High Court with effect from
May 7, 1977, or, at a·ny rate, with effect from August 1, 1977; therefore, his continuance to function as a Judge from and after August 1,
1977, was usurpation of the office of a High Court Judge, which was
a public office. On these premises, the writ petitioner prayed for
a writ, order or direction in the nature of quo warranto calling upon
Mr. Salish Chandra to show under what authority he was e'ntitled to
function and work as a Judge of the High Court. The petition came
up for final hearing before a Bench of five learned Judges of that
Court, which by a majority of 3 against 2, allowed the writ petition
and issued the direction aforesaid. Against that judgment, these two
appeals, on a certificate granted by the High Court under Articles 132
and 133 ( 1) of the Constitution have been filed before this Court.
Civil Appeal No. 2644 of 19.77 has been preferred by the Union of
India, and Civil Appeal No. 2655 of 1977 by Shri Salish Chandra.
A preliminary objection was raised by Shri Yogeshwar Prasad,
learned counsel for the respondent, Shri Gopal Chandra Misra, that
the Union of India has no locus standi to prefer an appeal against the
-
UNION v. o. c. MISRA (Sarkaria, J.)
17
Order of the High Court. Simultaneously, with the raismg of this
objection at the bar, a petition to that effect was also presented to us,
directly. The grounds of this objectio'n, as canvassed by Shri Yogeshwar Prasad, arc :(a) That the Union of India was joined merely a pro
forma party in the writ petition, inasmuch as no
relief was claimed against it;
I
A
B
(b) That the Union of India is not a party aggrieved by
the Order of the High Court, because no relief has
been granted agai'nst it;
(c) That the Union of India is rrot a person
interested;
~
(d) That the appeal by the Union of India will not further any public policy; that it has already incurred
heavy expenditu!:\' in defe'nding the action of an individual person after he has relinquisl>od his office.
Such expenditure is not permissible and should not be
encouraged.
c
D
We find no merit in this objection.
The Union of India was impleaded as a responde'nt in the case
before the High Court by the writ petitioner, himself. It filed a
counter-affidavit contesting the writ petitioner's claim.
\
Mr. Soli Sorabji, Additional Solicitor-General, addPossed arguments
before the High Court on behalf of the Union of India. No objection
to the locus standi of the Union of India to contest the writ petition
was raised, at any stage, before the High Court. It is, therefore, not
correct to say that the Union of India was not a contesting party in the
CO'Urt below.
E
As rightly pointed out by the learned Attorney General, the Union
of India is vitally in~erested i'n the case. It is the President of India
who had appointed Appellant 2 as a Judge, and the stand of the
Union of India throughout has been that the withdrawal of the intimation to resign by the Judge, is valid and therefore, he continues to hold
the office of a Judge even after August 1, 1977, but the High Court
has !1eld otherwise. The Union of India, therefore, has reason to feel
aggrieved by the decision of the High Court.
F
In order to give a person locus standi to appeal on a oortificate
granted under any clause of these Articles, it is necessary that he was
a "party in the case before the High Court". The Union of India was
admittedly such a party having a stake in the dispute. The substantial
questio'n of law involved in the case, is of general importance and
concerns the interpretation of the Constitution.
We an;, not concerned with the matter of incurring expenditure
by the Union of India; whether it is justified, proper or not. We are
G
H
18
SUPREME <;OURT REPORTS
[1978] 3 s.c.R.
A
surely of the view that the Unioh bad a substantial interest in this proceeding. Thus, from every point of view, the Union of India is entitled to come in appeal to this Court and question the correctness ot
the High Court's finding on the question of law involved. We, therefore, overruled the preliminary objectio'n, and requested the learned
Attorney-General to proceed with his address.
B
The contentions advanced by the learned Attorney-General, Mr.
Gupte, on behalf of the Union of India, may be summarised as
follows
c
D
(i) 'Resignation' within the contemplation of Proviso
(a), to Article 217 (I), takes place on the date on
which the Judge of his own volition chooses to sever
his connection with his office, and not on any o:her
date. Since in terms of the letter, dated May 7,
1977, the Judge proposed to sever his link with his
office with effect from August 1, 1977, he could bot
b~ said to have resigned his office within the meaning
of Proviso (a) on May 7, 1977, or at any time before
the arrival of the prospective date indicated by him.
(ii) The letter, dated May 7, 1977, written and sent by
Appellant 2 to the President, read as a whole, is a
mere intimation of an intention to resign from a
future date. Before the arrival of that date, it was
not final and complete, nor a "'juristic" act, because
E
it had no legal effect and could not sever the link of
the Judge with his office or cut s;.>art its tenure.
F
(iii) Since the mere sending of the lette1, dated May 7,
1977 to the President, did not constitute a final and
complete ag of resignation, nor a juristic act, it could
be withdrawn at any time before August 1, 1977 upto
which date it was wholly inoperative and ineffective.
(iv) The withdrawal by Appellant 2 of his proposal to
ro~sign, does not offend public interest. The common law doctrine of public policy cannot be invoked
in such a case [Gheru Lal v. Mahadeo Das(')].
G
H
a
(v) The general principle is that in the absence of provision prohibiting withdrawal, an intimation to resign
from a future date can be wthdrawn at a'ny time before it operates to terminate the employment or the
connection of the resignor with his office.
This principle, according to Mr. Gupte, was enunciated by the
Supreme Court as far back as 1954 in Jai Ram v. Union of lndia(');
and followed by the Allahabad, Kcrala, Delhi and Madhya Pradesh
(!} [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 406,
(2) A.LR. 1954 S.C. 584.
I
j
UNION v. G. c. MISRA (Sarkaria, !.)
19
y
High Courts in these cases: Sanker Dutt Shukla v. President, Municipal
Board, Auraiya & Anr. (1); Bahori Lal l'aliwal v. District Magistrate,
Bulandshahar('); M. Kunjukrishnan Nadar v. Hon'ble Speaker, Kerala
Legislative Assembly & Ors( 3 ); Y. K. Mathur & Anr. v. The Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Ors.('); Bhalron . Si~igh
Vishwakarma v. Civil Surgeon, Narsimhapur('). The same prmc1ple
has been reiterated in Raj Kumar v. Union of lndia( 6 ).
I
A
B
Mr. Gupte further referred to the case, Rev. Oswald Joseph Rdchal v. The Right Rev John Fielder, Lord Bishop of Oxford('), decided by the House of Lords in England, which has been relied upon by
the High Court-and submitted that Reichel's case stood on its own
facts and was clearly distinguishable.
Mr. F. S. Nariman, appearing for Appellant 2, adopted the arguments of Mr. Gupte. He reiterated with emphasis, that the expression
C
"resign his office" used in Proviso (a), J!!eans "relinquish or vaca.te his
office", and the requirement of this expression is uot satisfied unless and
until the writing sent by the Judge effects severance of the link between
the Judge and his office and terminates his tenure. It is submitted that by
holding that though the letter of resignation in its terms, would effect
termination of the tenure prospectively from 1-8-77, yet it would be
deemed to have caused immediately on its despatch to and receipt by the
President on 7-5-77, itself, curtailment of the Judge's tenure of office
up till 1-8-77, the High Court has engrafted in Proviso (a), a wholly
unwarranted fiction.
D
As a~ainst the above, Mr. Jagdish Swarup, learned counsel for the
Respondent has substantially reiterated the same arguments which found
acceptance with the High Court (majority).
E
Article 217 ( 1) fixes the tenure of the office of a High Court Judge
It provides that a Judge shall hold office; until he attains the age of 62
years. The three clauses of the Proviso to Article 217(1) indicate that
this tenure can be terminated before the Judge attains the age of 62
years, in four contingencies, namely, where he-
F
(i) resigns his office in the manner laid down in its clause (a);
(ii) is removed from his office in the manner provided
Article 124(4) [vide its clause (b)];
in
(iii) is appointed a Judge of the Supreme Court [vide its clause
(c)];
G
(iv) is transferred to any other High Court in Jnd1a.
A.LR. 1956 All. 70.
(2) A.LR. 1956 All. 511 F.ll.~I.L.R. (1956)2 All. 593 F.B.
(3) A.l.R. 1964 Kcrala 194.
(4) A.LR. 1974 Delhi 58.
(5) [1971] Labour Industrial Cases 127 M.P.
(6) [1968] 3 S.C.R. at p. 860.
(7) . 14 A.C. 259.
(1)
II
20
A
B
c
D
E
J'
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1978) 3 S.C.R·
Here, in this case, we have to focus attention on clause (a) of the
Proviso. In order to terminate his tenure under this clause, the Judge
mnst do three volitional things : Firstly, he should execute a "writing
under his hand". Secondly, the writing should be "addressed to the
President". Thirdly, by that writing he should "resign his office". If any
of these things is not done, or the performance of any of them is not
complete, clause (a) will not operate to cut short or terminate the tenure
of his office.
The main reasoning adopted by the learned Judges at the High Court,
(per R. B. Misra, M. N. Shukla and C. S. P. Singh, JJ.) appears to be
that since the act of Appellant 2 in writing and addressing the letter,
dated the 7th May, 1977, ta the President, fully satisfied the three-fold
requirement of clause (a) of the Proviso, and nathing more was required to be done under that clause either by the "Judge" or by the President
at the other end, the resignation was "complete", "final" and "absolute".
Ct was a complete "juristic" act as immediately on its receipt by the
President on the 7th May 1977, itself, it had the effect of cutting short
the tenure of the Judge up till the 1st August 1977; and, in the absence of
a constitutional provision warranting that course, it could not be withdrawn or revoked even before the date, August 1, 1977, on which in
terms of the letter dated the 7th May, 1977, the resignation was to be
effective. Withdrawal is always linked with acceptance. Where no
acceptance is required and the resignation has been made in accordance
with the prescribed procedure, the process gets exhausted and the resignation becomes a fait accomp!i. Article 217(1), Proviso (a) of the
Constitution is a self-contained provision. It gives the Judge a unilateral
right tci cut short his tenure by following the procedure prescribed therein, of his own volition. Such a resignation to be effective does not
require acceptance by the President. Article 217 does not give a right
to withdraw the resignation, once given in accordance with the manner
prescribed therein. Since Article 217 ( 1), Proviso (a) ~els out a complete machinery with regard to the resignation by a Judge, the right to
withdraw a resignation cannot be implied, the maxim being "expressum
facit cessare tacitum" (when there is express mention of certain things,
then anything not mentioned is excluded). Recognition of a right of
withdrawal of resignation will leave the door wide open to abuse and
offend public policy.
It may be observed that the entire edifice of this reasoning is founded
on the supposition that the "Judge" had completely performed everything which he was required to do under Proviso (a) to Article 217(1).
We have seen that to enable a Judge to terminate his term of office by
his own unilateral act, he has to perform three things. In the instant
case, there can be no dispute about the performance of the first two,
namely : (i) he wrote a letter under his hand (ii) addressed to the President. ' Thus, the first two pillars of the ratiocinative edifice raised by the
High Court rest on sound foundations. But, is the same true about the
third, which indisputably is the chief prop of that edifice ? Is it a co~
pleted act of resignation within the contemplation of Proviso (a) ? Th~s
is the primary question that calls for an answer. If the answer to this
UNION v. G. c. MISRA (Sarkaria, !.)
21
question is found in the affirmative, the appeals must fail. If it be in the
negative, the foundation for the reasoning of the High Court will fail
and the appeals succeed.
A
Well then, what is the correct connotation of the expression "resign
his office" used by the founding fathers in Proviso (a) to Article 217(1) ?
'Resignation' in the Dictionary sense, means the spontaneous relinquishment of one's own right. This is conveyed by the maxim:
Resionatio est juris propii spontanea refutatio (See Carl Jowitt's
Dictionary of English Law). In relation to an· office, it connotes the
act of giYing up or relinquishing the office. To "relinquish an office"
means to "cease to hold" the office, or to "loose hold of the office
(cf. Shorter Oxford Dictionary); and to "loose hold of office", implies
to "detach", "unfasten", "undo or untie the binding kllot or link"
which holds one to the office and the obligations and privileges that
go with it.
I
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In the general juristic sense, also, the meaning of "resigning office"
is not different There also, as a rule, both, the intention to give up or
relinquish the office and the concomitant act of its relinquishment, arc
necessary to constitute a complete and operative resignation (see, e.g.
American Jurisprudence, 2nd Edn., Vol. !SA, page 80), although the
act of relinquishment may take different forms o< assume a unilateral
or bilateral character, depending on the nature of the office. and the
conditions governing it. Thus, resigning office necessarily involves relinquishment of the office which implies cessation or termination of, or
cutting asunder from the office. Indeed, the completion of the resignation and the vacation of the office, are the casual and effectual aspects
of one and the same event
From the abovle dissertation, it emerges that a complete and
effective act of resigning office is, one which severs the link of the
resignor with his office and terminates its tenure. In the context of
Article 217 (I), this test assumes the character of a decisive test, because the expression "resign his office"-the. construction of which is
under consideration-occurs in a, Proviso which excepts or qualifies
the substantive clause fixing the, office-tenure of the Judge upto the age
of 62 years.
Before applying this test to the case in hand, it is necessary to
appreciate the true nature of the letter, dated May 7, 1977, sent by
the Judge to the President.
The substantive body of this letter (which has been extracted in full
in a foregoing part of this judgment) is comprised of three sentences only.
In the first sentence, it is stated: "I beg to resign my office as Judge,
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad." Had this sentence stood
alone, or been the only content of this letter,. it would operate as a
complete resignation in praesenti, involving immediate relinq~is~ment
of the office and termination of his tenure as Judge. But this is not
so. The first sentence is immediately followed by two more, which
read:
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"I will be on leave till 31. 7 .1977. · My resignation shall be effective on 1.8 .1977.", The first sentence cannot be divorced from the
context of the other two sentences and construed in isolation. It has
to be read along with the succeeding two which qualify it. Construed
as a whole according to its tenor, the. letter dated May 7, 1977, is
merely an intimation or notice o~ the writer's intention to resign his
office as Judge, on a future date, viz., August 1, 1977. For the sake
of convenience, we might call this communication as a prospective or
porerilial resignation, but before the arrival of the indicated future date;
it is certainly not a complete and operative resignation because, by
itself, it did not and could not, sever the writer from the office of the
Judge, or terminate his tenure as such.
Thus tested, sending of the letter dated May 7, 1977 by Appellant
2 to the President, did not constitute a complete and operative resignation within the contemplation of the expression "resign his office" used
in Proviso (a) to Article 217(1). Before the arrival of the indicated
future date (August l, 1977), it was wholly inert, inoperative and ineffective, and could not, and in fact did not, cause any jural effect.
The learned Judges of the High Court (in majority) conceded that
Appellant 2 "cannot be taken to have resigned on a date prior to !st
August, 1977", and "the vacation of a seat may be on (the) future
date", "because he made his choice to resign from !st August 1977",
yet, they hold that "the factum of resignation became com..rlete the
moment respondent 1 (Shri Salish Chandra) in his handwriting, sent a
letter of resignation to the President of India" and on 7 . 5 . 77, itself,
cut short the date of retirement of the Judge from 1-9-86 to 1-8-77,
and there could be "no withdrawal of the same unless the Constitution
so provided."
With respect, we venture to say that this reasoning is convoluted
logic spiralled up roupd a fiction for which there is no foundation in the
statute. To say that the resignation or relinquishment of his office by
the Judge could not take place before 1 . 8 . 77, and yet. the factum of
resignation became complete on 7-5-77, would be a contradiction in
terms. To get over this inherent contradiction, the High Court (by
majority) has introduced a two-fold fiction: (1) That if a written communication to the President. the Judge chooses to resign his office. from
a future date, the resignation will be deemed to be effective and complete from the moment the communication is sent to the President and
received by him. (2) That since it has not been provided in Proviso
(a) or elsewhere in the Constitution. that such communication of a
"prospective" resignation can be withdrawn, its withdrawal would be
deemed to have been prohibited, on the maxim 'expressum facit cessare
taciturn.
No. 1 is manifestly incompatible with the letter and intendment of
Article 217 ( 1), since by deeming the resignation to have taken place
on a date different from the date chosen by the Judge it subverts bis
exclusive Constitntional right to resign, his office with effect front a
date of his choosing. No. 2 is equally unjustified. There is nothing in
Proviso(a) or elsewhere in the Constitution which expressly or implied-
'
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UNION v. G. c. MISRA (Sarkaria, !.)
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Jy forbids the withdrawal of a communication by the Judge to resign his
office before the arrival of the <late on which it has intended to take
effect. Indeed, such a futuristic communication or prosp;x:tive resignation does not, before the indicated future date is reached, become a
complete and operative act of 'resigning his office' by the Judge within
the contemplation of Proviso (a) to Article 217 ( 1).
A
Thus considered, it is clear that merely by writing the Jetter to the
President on May 7, 1977, proposing to resign with effect from August
1, 1977, the Judge had not done all which he was required to do to
determine his tenure, of his own volition, under Proviso (a) to Article
217 ( 1). He had not, as yet, resigned his office on May 7, 1977, itself,
he had not done everything which was necessary to complete the requirement of the expression "resign his office". He had not relinquished
his otfice and thus delinked himself from it. He had not-as the
learned Judges of the High Court have erroneously assumed-crossed
the Rubicon-Ribicon was still afar, 85 days away in the hazy future.
At any time, before that dead line (August 1, 1977) was reached, the
Judge could change his mind and choose not to resign, and withdraw
the communicaiton dated May 7, 1977.
B
We have already seen that there is nothing in the Constitution or
any other law which prohibits the withdrawal' of the communication
to resign from a future date, addressed by a Judge to the Presideni,
before it becomes operative. Could he then be debarred from doing so
on the ground of public policy ?
D
In this connection, Shri Jagdish Swarup contended that, but for
the words "President aJ11] Vice-President", the language of Proviso
(a) to Article 217(1) is identical with that of Proviso (a) to Article
56( I) of the Constitution which gives an identical right to the President to resign his office by writing under his hand, addressed to the
Vice-President. If this Court envolves a principle--proceeded the argu-.
ment-·-whereby it permits a Judge who is a Constitutional functionary
of the same class as the President or the Vice-President, whereby he
can withdraw his resignation, it will lead to startling results. The
Constitutional functionaries would misuse such implied power of
withdrawal of resignation. The President may hold the Parliament to
ransom and make a farce of Parliamentary sovereignty and the functioning; of the Constitution. On these premises, it was urged that public
policy demands that no such interpretation should be put on these Constitutional provisions which would lead to abuse of power by the Constitutional functionaries.
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The contention appears to be misconceived.
..
The argument assumes that a tender of prospective resignatlon is
always motivated by sinister considerations and, therefore, to permit its
withdrawal is never in the public interest. We are unable to conce\le
this _as a rule of universal application. Any number of cases are conceivable where a prospective resignation is tendered with the best of
motives. A Judge renowned for his conscientiousness and forensic skill
may send an fotimation under his hand to tlie President proposing to
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resign from a future date, 2 months away, covering this interregnum by
two. months' leave due to him, in the belief, founded on his doctor's
advice, that he is stricken with a malady which will progressively n;.nder
him deaf in two months' time. The motive behind the tender is, that the
Judge feels that he will no longer be able to discharge his official duties
to the entire satisfaction of his conscience. But before the date on which
the prospective resignation is to take effect, a surgical operation completely and permanently cures him of the disease and restores his full
hearing power, and the Judge immediately thereupon, sends a communication withdrawing the tender of his resignation. Will not such withdrawal be in the interest of the public and justice to the Judge? Conversely, will not refusal of such withdrawal deprive the public of the
benefit of his forensic talents in exposition of law and at the same time
work hardship and injustice to the Judge?
It must be remembered that the doctrine of public policy is only a
branch of the common law, and its principles have been crystallised and
its scope well delineated by judicial precedents. It is sometimes des-,
cribed as "a very unruly horse". Public policy, as Burroughs, J. put it
in Fauntleroy's case, "is a restive horse and when you get astride of it,
there is no knowing where it will carry you". Pubilic policy can, therefore, be a very unsafe, quesiionable and unreliable ground for judicial
decision and Courts cannot, but be very cautious to mount this treacherous horse even if they must. This doctrine, as pointed out by this Court
in Gherulal Parekh's case (ibid), can be applied only in a case where
clear and undeniable harm to the public is made out. To quote the
words of Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) : "Though theoretically it
may be permissible to evolve a new head (of public palicy) under exceptional circumstances of a changing world, it is advisable in the
interest of stability of society not to make any attempt to discover new
heads in these days". There are no circumstances, whatever, which
would show that the withdrawal of the resignation by the appellant
would cause harm to the public or even to an individual. The contention, therefore, is repelled.
F
II
Shri Jagdish Swarup's argument that a right to withdraw such a
resignation will have Wide and unhealthy repercussions on the other
Constitutional functionaries, particularly the President, and encourag-e
them to abuse this right, appears to be a false alarm. Wc arc here
considering the case of withdrawal of a 'prospective resignation' by
a Judge of a High Court and not of any other Constitutional functionary.
It mav not be correct to say that whatever principle we evolve with
reference to the interpretation of Article 217(1), Proviso (a), will
automatically govern the withdrawal of such a prospective resignation
by the President of India because the provisions of Article 56 relating
to a resignation by the President are not, in all rcspeci,5, identical with
those of Article 217. There is no provision in Article 217 corresponding to clause (2) or clause (1) (c) of Article 56, and in this case
in accordance with the well-settled practice of the court, we refrain
from expressing any opinion with regard to th!' interpretation and effect
of these distinctive provisions_ in Article 56.
UNION v. G. c. MISRA (Sarkaria, J.)
25
We are also unable to agree with the High Court that the mere sending of the letter, dated May 7, 1977 by the Judge to the President and
its receipt by the latter, constituted a complete juristic act. By itself, it
did not operate to terminate the office tenure of the Judge, and as such,
did not bring into existence any legal effect. For the same reason, the
principle underlying section 19 of the Transfer of Property Act is not
attracted.
The general principle that emerges from the foregoing conspectus,
is that in the absence of anything to the contrary in the provisions
governing the terms and conditions of the office/post, an intimation in
writing sent to the competent authority by the incumbent, of his inten. tion or proposal to resign his office/post fmm a. future specified date,
can be withdrawn by him at any time before it becomes effective, i.e.
before it effects termination of the tenure of the office/post or the
employment.
This principle first received the imprimatur of this Court in the
context of a case of a self-sought retirement from service, in Jai Ram v.
Union of India (supra). In that case, the plaintiff entered the service of
the Government as a Clerk in the Central Research Institute, Kasauli, on
May 7, 1912. Rule 56(6) (i) of Chapter IX of the Fundamental
Rules, which regulated the Civil Services, provided that a ministerial servant may be required to retire at the age of 55, but should ordinarily
be retained in service if he continues efficient, till the age of 60 years,
The plaintiff was to complete 55 years on November 26, 1946. On
the 7th May 1945, he wrote a letter to the Director of the Institute to
the following effect :
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"Sir, having completed 33 years' service on the 6th ins-·
tant, I beg permission to retire and shall feel grateful if allowed to have the leave admissible."
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The Director refused permission on the ground that the plaintiff
could not be spared at that time. The plaintiff renewed his prayer by F
another letter, dated 30th May 1945, and also asked for leave preparatory to retirement-four months on average JXIY and the rest on
half average pay-from 1st of June 1945, or the date of his availing the
leave, to the date of superannuation which was specifically stated to be
the 26th of November 1946. This request was also declined. To
subsequent requests to the same effect, also met the same fate.. On
May 28, 1946, plaintiff made a fourth application repeating his request. G
This time, the Director of the Institute sanctioned the leave preparatorv
to retirement on average pa'y for six months from 1-6-1946 to
30-11-1946, and on half average pay for five months and 25 days thereafter, the period ending on 25-5-1947. Just 10 days before this period
of leave was due to expire, the plaintiff on May 16, 1947 sent an application to the Director stating that he had not retired and asked for permission to resume his duties immediately. In reply, the Director inH
formed him that he could not be permitted to reswne his duties as he
had already retired, having voluntarily proceeded on le.ave preparatory
3-211 SCI /78
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to retirement. The plantiff made representations.
Ultimately, the
Government of India, by a letter dated 28-4-48 rejected his representation, repeating the reasons intimated by the Director earlier to the
plaintiff.
In special appeal before this Court, two points were urged on behalf
of the plaintiff-appellant. Fi¥st, that under Rule 56(b) (i), the age ot
retirement is not 55 but 60 years, and before a Government servant
could be required to retire at 55, it is incumbent upon the Government
to give him an opportunity to represent against his premature retirement in accordance with the provisions of Section 240 ( 3) of the
Government of India Act, 1935; and since this was not done, the prder
terminating his services, was invalid. Second, that although the plaintiff on his own application, obtained leave preparatory to retirement, yet
there was nothing in the Rules which prevented him from changing his
mind at any subsequent time and expressing a desire to continue in
service, provjded he indicated this intention before the period his leave
expired.
B. K. Mukherjee, J. (as he then was), speaking for the Court,
negatived the first contention on the ground that since the.plaintiff had
himself sought permission for retirement at the age of 55 years, it w~
a useless formality to ask him to show cause as to why his services
should not be terminated. While disposing of the second contention,
which had lost its force in view of the Court's decision on the first point,
the Court made these crucial observations :
"It may be conceded that it is open to a servant, who has
expressed a desire to retire fron1 service and applied to his
superior officer to give him the requisite permission, to change
bis mind subsequently and ask for cancellation of the permission thus obtained; but, he can be allowed to do so as long
as he continues in service and not after it has terminated."
The rule enunciated above was reiterated by this Court in
Kumar v. Union of lndia('I), in these words :
•
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"When a public servant has invited by his letter of resignation determiriatiort of h,is employment, his .services normally
stand) terminated from the date on which the Jetter of resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority, and in the
absence of any law or rule governing the conditions of his
service to the contrary, It will not be open to the public servant to withdraw his resignation after it is accepted by the
appropriate authority. Ttll the resignation is accepted by the
appropriate authority in conson~nce with the rules governing
the acceptance, the public servant concerned has locus
poenitentiae but not thereafter."
It was also observed that, on the plain terms of the resignation letters of
the servant (who was a member of the I.A.S.), the resignation became
effective as soon as it was accepted by the appropriate authority.
[1968] 3 S.C.R. 857.
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UNION v. G. c. MISRA (Sarkaria, J.)
27
The learned Judges of the High Court (in majority), if we may
say so with respect, have failed to appreciate correctly the amplitude
and implications of this rule enunciated by this Court in Jai Ram v.
Union of India (supra). R. B. Misra, J. bypassed it casually on the
short ground that the above extracted observation was only "casually
made" by the Supreme Court in a case of retirement, M. N. Shukla, J.
did not even refer to it. C.S.P. Singh, J. tried to distinguish it with the
summary observation :
_J
"Jai Ram's case was a case of retirement, and the request for
retirement required acceptance. The act was not complete
till accepted. In such a situation, the request could definitely
be withdrawn. This case is not helpful in case where no
acceptance is required."
Before us, Shri Jagdish Swarup has reiterated tl1e same argument.
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In onr opinion, none of the aforesaid reasons given by the High
Court for getting out of the ratio of Jai Ram's case, (supra) is valid.
Firstly, it was not a casual enunciation. It was necessary to dispose of
effectually and completely the second point that had been canvassed on
behalf of Jai Ram. Moreover, the same principle was reiterated ·o
pointedly in 1968 in Raj Kumar's case. Secondly, a proposal to
retire from service/office and a tender to resigu office from a future
date, for the purpose of the point under discussion stand on the same
footing. Thirdly, the distinction between a case where the resignation
is required to be accepted and the one where no acceptance is requ;red makes no difference to the applicability of the rule in Jai Ram's case.
_r-,
It will bear repetition that the general principle is that in the absence
of a legal, contractual or constitutional bar, a 'prospective' resignation
can be withdrawn at any time before it becomes effective, and it
becomes effective when it operates to terminate the employment or
the office-tenure of the resignor. This general rule is equally applicable to Government servants and constitutional functionaries. In
the case of a Government servant/ or functionary who cannoj,-under
the conditions of his service/or office, by his own unilateral act ot
tendering resignation, give up his service/or office, normally, the
tender of resignation becomes effective and his service/or office-tenure
terminated, when it is accepted by the competen~ a?thority. ~n the
case of a Judge of a High Court, who is a conslitullonal functionary
and under Proviso (a) to Article 217(1) has a unilateral r:ghr or
privilege to resign his office, his resigu~tion becomi;s effective..and
tenure terminated on the date from which he, of his own vo!tt1on,
chooses to quit office. If in term~ of t~e writing 1;1nder hi~ hand
addresed to the President. he resigns zn praesantz, the res1gna!ton
termi1iiltes his office-tenure forthwith, and cannot therefore, be withdrawn or revoked thereafter. But, if he by such writing chooses to
resign from a future date, the act resigning office is not complete
because it does not terminate his tenure before such date and the
Judge ca'n at any time before the arrival of that prospective date
011 which it was intended to be effective, withdraw it, because the
Constitution does not bar such withdrawal
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The learned Attorney-General has cited authorities of the
Allahabad, Kerala, Delhi and Madhya Pradesh High Conrts, wherein the rule in Jai Ram's case was followed. The High Court has tried
to distinguish these cases and in regard to some of them, said that
they were not rightly decided. We do not want to burden this
judgment with a discussion of all those decisions. It will be sufficient to notice two of them, in which issues analogous to those which
arise before us, were pointedly discussed.
The first of those cases is, M. Kunjukrishnan Nadar v. Hon'blc
Speaker, Kera/a Legislative Assembly (supra). The petitioner in
that case became a member of the Kerala Legislative on election in
February 1960. On November 23, 1963, he wrote to the Speaker.
"Sir,
As I wish to devote more time for meditation and religious purposes, I shall not be able to continue as a Member
of the Legislative Assembly, Kerala. So, I request you to
kindly accept this letter as my resignation as a Member of
this Assembly, to take offect from 1-12-1963."
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On November 29, 1963, the petitioner wrote to the Speaker:
"Sir,
In my letter dated 23-11-1963, I .have expressed my
intention to resign my membership of the Legislative
Assembly from the 1st of December, 1963. After mature consideration, I feel that it will be proper not to resign at this juncture.
letter of resignatmn
This letter was received by the Speaker on November 30, .1963.
Thi5 letter· was not given heed to, and a Notification was published
in the Kerala Gazette dated December 10, 1963, saying that the petitioner "has resigned his seat in the Kerala Legislative Assembly from
1st December 1963". The petitioner challenged this Gazette 'Notification, praying that it be declared null and void and of no effect·
He claimed a further declaration that he continued to be a Member of
the Kerala Legislative Assembly.
On these facts, Article 190(3) of the Constitution, as it stood
prior to its amendment by 'Constitution Amendment (Thirty-third
Amendment Act, 1974, came up for interpreiation. At that time,
the material part of Article 190(3) ran as under :
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On November 26, 1963, the Speaker read the letter in the Assembly, announcing thereby the petitioner's resignation to take effect on
December 1, 1963.
I therefore hereby withdraw my
dated 23-11-1963."
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"(3). If a member of a House of the Legislature of a State-(a) becomes subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in cl. (1) of Art. 191; or
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UNION v. G. c. MISRA (Sarkaria, J.)
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(b) resigns his seat by writing nnder his hand addressed to
the Speaker or the Chairman, as the case may be.
his seat shall thereupon become vacant."
It will be seen that at that time, there was no provision in this Article requiring such resignation to be accepted by the Speaker before
it could become effective. Clause (b) of Article 190(3), as it stood
at that time, was, but for the words "the Speaker or the Chairman"
and the last phrase "his seat shall thereupon become vacant", identical with clause (a) of the Proviso to Article 217(1). Indeed, what
is expressly provided by adding the words "his seat shall thereupon
become vacant" in clause (b) of Art. 190(3), is implicit in clause
(a) of the proviso to Article 217 (1).
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Two questions arose for determination : (i) Whether the letter
dated 23-11-63, constituted a valid resignation under Article 190(3);
and (ii) if so, whether it could be withdrawn by the Member before
the future date on which it was intended to be effective. A learned
single Judge of the High Court answered these questioll§ in the affirmative, with these observations :
C
" ........ the petitioner's Jetter of November 23, 1963,
has to be held a letter resigning his seat in the Assembly on
December 1, 1963, deposited with the Speaker on November 23, 1963. It remains a mute letter till December 1,
1963, when alone it can speak with effect. On November
29, 1963, the petitioner has withdrawn that letter by writing
under his hand addressed to the Speaker himself; ..... .
It is in effect the neutralization of the latent vita!ITy il1 the
former letter deposited with the Speaker. The withdrawal
nullifies the entrustment or deposit of the letter of resignation in the hands of the Speaker, which must tliereafter be
found to have become non est in the eye of law. The absence of a specific provision for withdrawal of prospective
resignation ii! the Constitution or the Rules is immaterial
as basic principles of law and procedure must be applied
wherever they are relevant."
D
R. B. Misra, J. felt "difficulty in agreeing with the observation
(in the above case) that the letter of resignation to be ell'ective on
a future date remains deposited with the Speaker or remains a mute
letter till the arrival of that date when alone it can speak wltli.effect".
Singh, J. also expressed that this Kerala case had not been decided
on correct principles.
In our opinion, what has been extracted above from the decision
in the Kerala case, correctly ennnciates the principles that prospective resignation remains mute and inoperative till the date on
which it was intended to take effect is reached, and can be withdrawn
anrl rendered 1um est at any time before such date.
The next decision worthy of notice is Y. K. Mathur v. The "1'!nicipal Corporation of Delhi (supra). In that case, two Mumc1pal
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Councillors of the Corporation of Delhi serit their resignation letters
on November 16, 1972 to the Mayor of the Municipal Corporation,
resigning their seats. One of those letters was a resignation in
praesenti and was dated November 16, 1972. The other Jetter of
resignation sent by 0. P. Jain, reads as under
"T resign from my seat.
B
[1978] 3 s.c.R.
Please accept.
Sd/Om Prakash Jain
16. 12."
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F
This letter being in the nature of a post-dated cheque, was construed
as a Jetter of resignation to be effective from future date, viz. December 16, 1972. On these premises, question arose whether this resignati01; could be withdrawn by the Member concerned before that
date. Sachar J., speaking for the Division Bench, answered this
question, in these terms :"It is the free volition of the councillor concerned as
to the date from which he wishes to resign. There is no
logic in saying that even though a councillor deliberately
mentions in his resignation letter that it should be effective
from a given future date, he would nevertheless be deemed
to have resigned from an earlier date i.e. date on which the
letter is delivered. This would be contrary to the deliberately expressed intention of the councillor to resign from a
particular future date. But is there any prohibition that
once the resignation letter has been sent which is to be effective from a future date it cannot be withdrawn even before
that date ? The statute does not in any way limit the authority of the councillor who has sent his resignation from a
prospective date to withdraw it before that date is reached.
The resignation which is to be effective from a- future date
necessarily implied that if that date has not reached it would
be open to the councillor concerned to withdraw it."
In support of this enunciation, the learned Judge relied on the ratio
of the decisions of this Court in Jai Ram v. Union of India, and
Raj Kumar v. Union of India (ibid).
·G
It was also contended-as has been argued before us-that if a
resignation has been sent prospectively, the only effect is that the
seat would become vacant from that date, but the resignation would
be effective from the date it was delivered to the competent authority. The Court repelled this argument with these pertinent observations : -
"Under Section 33(1) (b), both the resignation and
the vacancy of the seat are effective from the same time.
There cannot be different times, one for resignation and the
other for vacation of seat. Vacancy will only occur when
', "'--
UNION v. G. c. MISRA (Sarkaria, !.)
31
resignation is effective, and if it is from future date both
resignation and vacation of seat will be effective simultaneous!y."
A
The approach adopted to the problem by the Delhi High Court
appears to be correct in principle, and meets our approval.
We do not want to add more to the volume of our judgment by
noticing the numerous decisions of the English and American Courts
that have been referred to by the High Court in the judgment. It
will suffice to notice one of those cases, which appears to have beer;
relieJ upon by the High Court "as the best authority" in support of
its reasoning that the letter of resignation, dated May 7, 1977, by
Appellant 2, had become "final or irrevocable" on that very day
when it was received by the President, "thongh he could not be
asked to actually relinquish his post prior to 1-8-1977." That
English case is Reichal v. Bishop of Oxford(1).
B
C
The facts of that case were as follows :
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Scandal having arisen with regard to the conduct of a Vicar, he
was informed by the Bishop. that he must either submit to an inquiry or cease to hold his benefice. Thereupon, in accordance with
a proposal made by the Bishop in the interests of the parish and
in mercy to the Vicar, the Vicar on the 2nd of June executed before witnesses, but not before a notary, an unconditional deed of
resignation and sent it to the Bishop's Sicre(!lry on the understanding
that the Bishop would postpone formal acceptance until the 1st of
October. On the 10th of June the Vicar executed a deed cancelling
and revoking the deed of resignation and on the 16th of July he
communicated the fact to the Bishop's Secretary. The Bishop after
the revocation, signed a document dated the 1st of October accepting
the resignation and declaring the vicarage void.
The Vicar brought an ,iction against the Bishop and the patrons
of the benefice, claiming a declaration that he was Vicar, the resignation was void,_ and an injunction to restrain the defe11dai:tts from
treatinz the benefice as vacant.
The House of Lords, affirming the decision of the Court of
Appeal (35 Ch. D. 48), held that the resignation was voluntary,
absolute, validly executed and irrevocable and that the action could
not be maintained.
The principal contention canvassed before the House of Lords
by the appellant Vicar was that assuming the resignation to be valid,
it was naught without the Bishop's acceptance. The acceptance of
the Ordinary is absolutely necessary to avoid a living. Until_ acceptance the effect of the incumbents' resignation is to make the oenefice
voidable, not void; be remains incumbent with all his powers and
rights, including the power of revocation; he is in the position (at
the utmost) of one who has made a contract to resign.
(l) [1889] 14 A.C. 259.
D
E
F
G
H
32
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1978] 3 S.C.R·
The Noble Lords rejected this contention.
observed:
Lord Halsbnrv L. C.
"The arrangements for resigna!Ion on the one side and
acceptance on the other seem to me to have been consum·
mated before the supposed withdrawal of the resignation of
Mr. Reichal. It is true the Bishop agreed not to execute
the formal document to declare the benefice vacant till the
following 1st of October; but I decline to decide that when
a perfectly voluntary and proper resignation has once been
made and by arran~ement a formal declaration of it is to
be postponed, that is not a perfectly binding transaction
upon both the parties to it; and I doubt whether in -any
view of the law such an arrangement could have been put
an end to at the option of only one of the parties."
Lord Watson further amplified :
"His resignation was delivered in pursuance of a mutual
agreement which rendered formal or other acceptance altogether unnecessary; the terms of the agreement showing
plainly tliat the Bishop not merely was ready to accept, but
insisted upon having it, in order thit it might receive full
effect upon the .1st of October following. The agreement
was perfectly lawful, it being entirely within the discretion
of the Bishop to judge whether the adopted of proce~dings
against the appellant, or his unconditional resignation as
from a future date, would most conduce to the spiritual
interest of the parish. The appellant assented to the
arrangement, and on the 2nd of June 1886 did all that lay
in his power to complete it. ..... He cannot in my opinion
be permitted to upset the agreement into which he voluntarily agreed ...... upon the allegation that there was no formal acceptance of his resignation till 1st of October 1886."
Lord Herschell opined :
"I do not think the word "acceptance" means more
than the assent of the Bishop, or that it need take any particular form. Now, in the present case, the Bishop had
intimated to the plaintiff that he was willing to assent to
his resignation, and it was in pursuance of this iiitimation
that the resignation was placed in the hands of the Bishop.
At the time .... the Bishop received it, and thenceforward
down to and after the time of the alleged revocation, the
Bishop was an assenting party to the resignation.''
While declining the contention of the appellant, the Noble Lord
closed the discussion on the point with this significant reservation :
H
"It is, however, unnecessary in the present case to go
to the length of saying that a resignation can never be
withdrawn without the consent of the Bishop, for I am of
opinion that it certainly cannot be so under circumstances
such as those to which I have drawn attention."
-
UNION v. G. c. MISRA (Fazal Ali, J.)
33
Reichal is no authority for the proposition that an unconditional
prospective resignation, without more, normally becomes absolute
and operative the moment it is conveyed to the appropriate authority. The special feature of the case was that Reichal had, of his
own free will, entered into a "perfectly binding agreement" with
the Bishop according to which, the Bishop had agreed to abstain
from commencing an inquiry into the serious charges against Reichal
if the latter tendered his resignation. In pursnance of that lawful
agreement, Reichal tendered his resignation and did all to complete
it, and the Bishop also at the other end, abstained from instituting
proceedings against him in the Ecclesiastical Court. The agreement
was thus not a nudem pactum but one for good consideration and had
been acted upon and "consummated before the supposed withdrawal of
the resignation of Mr. Reichal", who could not, therefore, be permitted "to upset the agreement" at his unilateral option and withdraw the resignation "without the consent of the Bishop". It was
in view of these exceptional circumstances, Their Lordships held
Reichal's resignation had become absolute and irrevocable. No
extraordinary circumstances of this nature exist in the instant case.
In the light of all that has been said above, we hold that the
letter. dated May 7, 1977 addressed by Appellant 2 to the President,
both in point of law and substance, amounts but to a proposal or
notice of intention to resign at a future date (1-8-1977) and not being
an absolute, complete resignation operative with immediate effect,
could be and, in fact, had been validly withdrawn by the said Appellant through his letter, dated Jnly 15, 1977, conveyed to the President.
Accordingly, we allow these appeals, set aside the majority
judgment of the High Court and dismiss the writ petition, leaving the
parties to bear their own costs throughout.
FAZAL Au, J. : These two appeals by certificate are directed
against an order of the Allahabad High Court issuing a writ of Quo
Warranto against Justice Satish Chandra, a Jndge of the Allahabad
High Court on the ground that. he ceased to be a Judge with effect
from 1st August, 1977 as he was not competent to withdraw the
re>ignation submitted by him earlier. Appeal No. '2644/1977 has
beeu filed by the Union of India supporting the case of the second
respondent Salish Chandra while appeal No. 2655/1977 has been
filed by the second respondent Salish Chandra himself against the
order of the High Court as indicated above. As the points involved
in the two appeals arc identical and arise from the same jndgment, l
propose to deal with the two appeals by a common judgment.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
The facts of the case lie within a narrow compass and the whole
case turns upon the interpretation of Article 217 (1 )(a) of the Con.
stitution of India. I would also like to mention that the question
of law that lias to be determined in this case in one of first impression and no direct authority of any court in India or outside appe.ars H
to be available in order to decide this case. There are however
number of authorities from which certain important principles can
be deduced which may assist me in adjudicating the point in issue.
[1978] 3 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
34
A
Justice Satish Chandra hereinafter referred to as the second respondent was a practising lawyer of the Allahabad High Court. He
was appointed as a Judge of the Allahabad High Court on 7th
October, 1963 and was later made permanent on 4th September,
1967. Since then he had been continuing as a Judge of the said
High Court.
B
On 7th May, 1977 the second respondent wrote a letter to the
President of India resigning his office with effect from 1st August, 1977.
The second respondent however indicated to the President that he
would proceed on leave from 7th May, 1977 to 31st July, 1977 the
period intervening between the application and the date from which
the resignation was to be effective.
C
D
I
~
On 15th July, 1977 however the second respondent wrote another fetter to the President by which he revoked the resignation which
he had sent on the 7th May, 1977 and prayed that the communication containing the resignation may be treated as null and void.
In order to understand the exact implication of the intention of the
second respondent it may he necessary to extract the two letters in
extenso :
"To
The President of India,
New Delhi.
Sir,
E
I beg to resign my office as Judge, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.
I will be on leave till 31st of July, 1977.
shall be effective on !st of August, 1977.
My resignation
With my respects,
Yours faithfully,
F
Sd/- Salish Chandra".
''To
_j
/
The President of India,
New Delhi.
G
Sir,
I beg to revoke and caned the intention expressed by me
to resign on 1st of August, 1977, the office of Judge, High Court at
Allahabad, in my letter dated 7th May, 1977. That communication may very kindly be treated as null and void.
·u
Thanking you and wishing to remain.
Yours sincerely,
Sd/- Salish Chandra".
UNION v. G. C. MISRA (Fazal Ali, J.)
35
A c.areful perusal of the first letter leaves absolutely no room for
doubt that the Judge had clearly intended to resign his office with
effect from 1st August, 1977. Similarly, the second letter shows the
unequivocal intention of the second respondent to revoke the resignation sent by him earlier. The reaso11s for the resignation have
been given neither in the first letter nor in the second. The question
that has been mooted before the High Court was whether or not
having resigned his office the second respondent had any jurisdiction
to revoke his first letter sending his re~ignation. · It might also be
mentioned that it is common ground that before the second letter
was written to the President the first letter bad not onli been communicated to but was actually received by the President as found by
the majority judgment of the High Court. Thus, the sole question to
be determined in this case is whether it was within the competence
of the second respondent to revoke the resignation sent by him to
the President by bis letter dated 7th May, 1977 after the same bad
been communicated to and received by the President. The stand
taken by the Attorney General before us was that as the second respondent bad categorically expressed his intention in the :first letter
that he would resign only with effect from 1st August, 1977, it was
open to him to withdraw his resignation at any time before the crucial date was reached and there was no provision in the Constitution
which debarred the appellant from doing so.
A
B
c
D
The Attorney General, however, conceded before us that having
regard to the provisions of Article 217 there is absolutely no question of the resignation of a Judge being effective only on the acceptance
of the same by the President. In other words, the Attorney General
submitted that the resignation would become effective from the date E
mentioned therein and the question of the acceptance of resignation
. by the President would not arise in case of constitutional functionaries like Judges of the High Courts. Thus, in view of the concession of the Attorney General and the provisions of Article 217
any resignation submitted by a Judge was not depeiidenC on its
acceptance by the President and would operate ex proprio vigore from F
the date mentioned in the letter of resignation. It appears that after
the second respondent sought to revoke his resignation an application
praying for a writ of quo warranto was filed by the respondents
Gopal Chandra Misra & Ors. before the Allahabad High Conrt on
1he g~ound that the second respondent had no right to withdraw the
resignation. · The writ was heard by a Full Bench consisting of. R.
B. Misra, M. N. Shukla, Hamid Hussain, S. B. Malik ancfC. S. P. G
Singh, JJ. and the High Conrt by a majority judgment accepted the
writ petition and issued a writ of quo warranto holding that the
second respondent ceased to be a Judge as he was not competent
to withdraw his resignation once the same had been communicated to
and in fact reached the President. The learned Judges who took the
maj0rity view against the second respondent were R. B. Misra,
M. N. Shukla and C. P. S. Singh, JJ. whereas Hamid Hussain and H
s. B. Malik, JJ. were of the view that it was open to the second respondent to withdraw his resignation at any time before tlie date
from which the resignation was to be effective and were, therefore,
)
36
A
B
c
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
of the opinion that the writ petition should be dismissed. It seems
to me that the High Court has devoted a considerable part of its
judgment to the consideration of two questions which were
really not germane for the decision of the point in issue.
Secondly, the High Court appears to have exhaustively considered
the question of the theory of pleasure which obviously did not apply to
a Judge of the High Court appointed under the Indian COnsfitution
and after the said Constitution had come into force. In other words,
a Judge appointed under Article 217 cannot be said to hold jhis
assignment at the pleasure of the President, but under the proVisions
of Article 217 he was to hold his office until ihe following contingencies arose :
·
J. The Judge attained the age of 62 years;
2. The Judge was removed from his office under Article
124 of the Constitution;
3. The Judge was transferred to another
under Article 222;
D
E
(1978] 3 S.C.R·
High
Coun
4. The Judge resigned his office by writing a letter under
his hand addressed to the President.
·
It is needless to state that a Judge vacates his office the moment
he dies, and although this contingency is not mentioned in Article
217 yet it follows from the very nature of things. It would thus be
clear that the constitutional provisions embodied in Article 217 have
expressly provided for the various contingencies in which a Judge of
the High Court may vacate his office or cease to bei a Judge. The
relevant part of Article 217 may be extracted thus:
"217 : Appointment and conditions of the office of a
Judge of a High Court :
F
G
(1) Every Judge of a High Court shall be appointed b}'
the President by warrant under his hand and seal after
consultation with the Chief Justice of India, the Governor
of tl1e State, and, in the case of appointment of a Judge
other than the Chief Justice, the Chief Justice of the High
Court, and shall hold office, in the case of an additional
or acting Judge, as provided in Article 224, and in any
other case, until he attains the age of sixty-two years:
Provided that( a) a Judge may, by writing under his hand addresed to
the President, resign his office;
H
(b) a Judge may be removed from his office by the President in the manner provided in clause ( 4) of Article 124
for the removal of a Judge of the Supreme Court;
( c) the office of a Judge shall be vacated by his being
appointed by the President to be a Judge of the Supreme
"·
UNION v. G. c. MISRA (Fazal Ali, J.)
~
37
Court or by his being transferred by the President to any
other High Court within th~ territory of India".
While analysing the various clauses of Article 217 it is pertinent
to observe that while clause (a) contains an express provision mopowering a Judg<1 to resign, there is absolutely no provision which
confers upon him any power to withdraw or revoke his resignation once
the same has been submitted to the President.
,
~·
:I
k
'
-<,
This is one of the moot points that has engaged the attention of
the High Coort as also of this Court in deciding the issue. The
majority view was of the opinion that in the absence of any express
provision to empower the Judge to revoke his resignation, the Judge
was not competent to withdraw his resignation having 011ce submitted the same. The minority view of the High Court which has
been relied upon by the Attorney General and the second respondent
proceeds on the doctrine of implied powers under which it is said that
the power of submitting a resignation carries with it the power of
revoking the same before the resignation becomes effective.
I shall deal with these points a little later and before that I would
like to indicate the position and the status conferred by the Constitution on a High Court Judge. The first thing which is manifestly
plain is that there is no relationship of master and servant, employer
and employee between the President and the Judge of the High Court,
because a Judge is not a Government servant so as to be governed by
Article 310 of the Constitution. A Judge of the High Court appointed under Article 2.17 has a special status and is a constitutional
functionary appointed under the provisions of the Constitution by the
President.
The mere fact that the President appoints him
does not make him the employer of the Judge.
In appointing
a Judge of the High Court, the President is discharging certain constitutioual functions as contained in Article 217(1). This aspect of
the matter was considered by this Court in the case of Union of
India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth & Anr.(1) where Krishna Iyer,
J. dwelling on this aspect observed as follows :
"So it is that we must emphatically state a Judge is not
a government servant but a constitutional functionary.
He stands in a different category. He cannot be e_quated
with other 'services' although for convenience certain rules
applicable to the latter may, within limits, apply to the
former. Imagine a Judge's leave and pension be]ng made
precariously dependent on the executive's pleasure: To
make the government-not the State-the employer of a
~uperior court Judge is to unwrite the Constitution".
It is, therefore, indisputable that a Judge of the High Court
enjoys a special status under the Constitution, because of the very
hiuh
position that
he
holds
and the dignity and decorum of the office
0
•
•
that he has to mamtam.
(!) (19781 I S.C.R. 423.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
38
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 3 s.c.R.
The special guarantees contained in Article 217 are for the purpose of ensuring the independence of the judiciary as observed by
Chandrachud, J. in the case of Union of India v. S. H. Sheth & Anr.
(supra) :
"Having envisaged that the judiciary, which ought to
act as a bastion of the rights and freedom of the people,
must be immune from the influence and interference of the
executive, the Constituent Assembly gave to that concept
a concrete form by making various provisions to secure
and safeguard the independ~nce of the judiciary".
The High Court Judges are the repasitory of the confidence of the
people and the protectors of the right and liberty of the subjects.
HaYiug regard, therefore, to the onerous duties and the sacro§anct
functions which a Judge of the Higb Court has to discharge he has
to act or behave in a manner which enhances the contfdence of the
people in the judiciary. The Constitution itself contains a number
of provisions for promoting an independent judiciary and striving for
a complete separation of the Judiciary from the Executive.
, Having regard to these circumstances therefore once a Judge
decides to accept the high post of a High Court Judge he has to abide
by certain fixed principles and norms as also some self imposed restrictions in order to maintain the dignity of the high office which
he holds so as to enhance the image of the court of which he is a
member and to see that the great confidence which the people have
in the courts is not lost. To resign an office is a decision to be
taken once in a life time and that too for very special imd cogent
reasons because once such a decision is taken it cannot be recalled
as a point of no return is reached. Indeed, if Judges are allowed to
resign freely and recall the resignation at their will this privilege may
be used by them as a weapon for achieving selfish ends or for striking p0litical bargains. Not that the Judges are likely to take resort
to these methods but even if one Judge does so at any time the image
of the entire court is tarnished. It was, in my opinion, for these
reasons that the High Court Judges have been assigned a special place
by the constitution and are not equated with other services, however
high or important they may be. Thus, in these circumstances, therefore, it is manifest that any decision that the Judge may take in regard
to resigning his office must be taken after due care and caution, full
and complete deliberation and circumspection, so that the high office
which he holds is not held to ridicule. The power to resign is not
intended to be used freely or casually so as to render the .same as a
farce because after a Judge resigns important and far-reaching consequences flow. Shukla, J. in the judgment under appeal has very
aptly and adroitly observed as follows : "Therefore, if a Judge is permitted to recant..his resignation, born of free volition, it would savour of a precipitance which would not redound to his credit. A voluntary
resignation of a High Court Judge deserves to be looked
UNION v. G.
/
c. MISRA (Fazal Ali, J.)
39
upon with utmost sanctity, and cannot be treated lightly as
if it was the outcome of a momentary influence ....... .
In other words, a Judge may resign and then with impunity
rescind his resignation and thus go on repeating the process
at his sweet will. That would be ridiculous and reduce
the declaration of resignation by a Judge to a mere farce."
A
I find myself in complete agreement with the observations made by
the learned Judge and fully endorse the same. What is g,ood of
Article 217 equally applies to other similar constitutional functionaries
like the President, the ·Vice-President, the Speaker, the Deputy
Speaker. and the Supreme Court Judges. So far as the President is
concerned, Article 56(a) contains a provision identical to Article
217 (a) and runs thus :
B
"The President may, by writing under his hand addressed to the Vice-President, resign his office".
c
So far as the Vice-President is concerned, the provision is contained
in Article 67(a) and runs thus:"A Vice-President may, by writing under his hand addressed to the President, resign his office".
D
So far as the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker are concerned, the provision is contained in Article 94 which runs thus : "Vacation and resignation of, and removal from, the
offices of Speaker and Deputy Speaker : A member holding
office as Speaker or Deputy Speaker of the House of the
people-
-
E
( a) shall vacate his office if he ceases to be a member of
the House of the People;
(b) may at any time, by writing.under his hand addressed,
if such member is the Speaker, to the Deputy Speaker, and if such member is the Deputy Speaker, to
the Speaker, resign his office, and
F
( c) may be removed from his office by a resolution of the
House of the People passed by a majority of all the
then members of the House :
Pro-dded that no resolution for the purpose of clause (c)
shall be moved unless at least fourteen days' notice has been
given of the intention to move the resolution :
Provided further that, whenever the House of the People
is dissolved, the Speaker shall not vacate his office ~until immediately before the first meeting of the House of the people
after the dissolution".
So far as the Supreme Court Judges are concerned, the provision is
contained in Article 124(2) (a) which runs thus:
G
H
)
40
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1978] 3 s.c.R.
A
"A Judge may, by writing under his hand addressed to
the President, resign his office".
For all these constitutional functionaries a special procedure has
been prescribed by the Constitution regulating their resignation and in
each one of these cases two things are conspicuous. · First, that there
is absolutely no provision for revocation of, a resignation, and, secondly,
that there is nothing to show that in the case of these functionaries the
B resignation wonld become effective only on being accepted by the
authority concerned. It was contended by Mr. Jagdish Swamp, counsel
for the respondents that if any of these functionaries are allowed to
withdraw the resignation at their will they may use the powers of the
Constitntion by treating the resignation as a bargaining counter. For
instance, it was suggested that where a President is not happy with a
Bill passed by Parliament, he may submit his resignation and
c particular
thus pressurise Parliament to withdraw the Bill and after that is done,
he could withdraw the resignation also. Such an action will lead to
a constitutional crisis of a very extraordinary nature. The argnment is
based on pure speculation yet it merits some consideration. Thus, on
a parity of reasoning the same principles have to be applied to other
constitutional functionaries including a High Court Judge and that will
D create a very anomalous situation. I think, it must have been this
important consideration that must have heavily weighed with the founding fathers of the constitution in not providing for an express power to
withdraw the resignation or a provision for the1 acceptance of the resignation by any particular authority. From this point of view also the
irresistible inference that arises is that the absence of power in Article
217(1) (a) or the other Articles in the case of other constitutional funcE tionaries indicated above is deliberate, and, therefore, a Judge has no
power to revoke his resignation, after having submitted or communicated the same to the President.
Another important aspect which may reveal the intention of Parliament is to be found in Article 101 (3) sub-clause (b) of the Constitution which runs thus :
"101(3) If a member of either House of Par!iamentF
(b) resigns his seat by writing under his hand addressed
to the Chairman or the Speaker, as the case may be,
his seat shall thereupon become vacant."
It would be seen that like other constitutional functionaries mentioned
above even a member of either House of Parliament could resign his
seat
by writing under his hand addressed to the Chairman or the
G
Speaker, as the case may be and once that is done the seat would become vacant. A similar provision exists so far as the members of the
Legislature of a State are concerned which is contained in Article
190(3) (b) which runs thus:
"190(3) If a member of a House of Legislature of a
Stat<>H
(b) resigns his office by writing under his hand addressed
Jo the Speaker or the Chairman, as the case may be,
his seat shall thereupon become vacant".
'
I
,.
•
,.
.....
":
•
"'"
~
,
UNION v. G. c. MISRA (Fazal Ali, l.)
41'
By virtue however of the Constitution 35th Amendment Bill 1974
Parliament amended both Articles 101(3) (b) and 190(3)(b) and
made the resignation being effective dependent on the acceptance of
the same by the Speaker' or the Chairman concerned. The amended
provisions run thus :
,
"101 (3) If a member of either House of Parliament(b) resigns his seat by writing under his hand addressed
to the Chairman,or the Speaker, as the case may be, and his
resignation is accepted by the Chairman or the Speaker, as
the case may be, his seat shall thereupon become vacant :
Provided that in the case of any resignation referred to in
sub-clause (b), if from infocmation received or otherwise and
after making such inquiry as he thinks fit, the Chairman or
the Speaker, as the case may be, is satisfied that such resignation is not voluntary or genuine, he shall not accept such
resignation".
A
B
c
"190 ( 3) If a member' of a House of the Legislature of a
State(b) resigns his seat by writing under his hand addressed
to the Speaker or the Chairman, as the case may be, and his
resignation is accepted by the Speaker or the Chairman, as
the case may be, his ·seat shall thereupon become vacant :
Provided that in the case of any resignation referred to in
sub-clause (b), if from information received or otherwise and
after making such inquiry as he thinks fit, the Speaker or the
Chairnial), as the case may be, is satisfied that such resignation is not voluntary or genuine, he shall not accept such
resignation".
:
E
The Statement of Objects and Reasons of this Bill mentions why this
amendment was brought about and the relevant portion may be extracted thus :
"In the recent past, there have bee.n instances v1here coer-
cive measures have been resorted to for compelling members
of a Legislative Assembly to resign their membership. If this
is not checked, it might become difficult for Legislatures to
function in accocdance with the provisions of the Constitution. It is therefore proposed to amend the above two articles
to impose a requirement as to acceptance of the resignation
by the Speaker or the Chairman and to provide that the resignation shall not be accepted by the Speaker or the Chairman,
if he is satisfied after making such inquiry as he thinks fit
that the resignation is not voluntary or genuine".
This aspect of the matter has been adverted to by Shukla, J. who
observed as follows : "This provision made the resignation of a member o~ the
Legislature self-executing. No acceptance was reqmred.
4-211 SCI /78
G
H
)
42
A
B
c
D
E
F
-G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 3 S.C.R.
Later, however, political events created a situ!llion in which
it became imperative not to let a resignation become effective
until it was accep'.ed by the Chairman or the Speaker and he
was satisfied on enquiry that it was voluntary or genuine. In
some States there was political turmoil leading to 'en masse'
resignat10ns of the members of Legislature. Some of these
resignations were also faked and engineered by interested
factions in order to_serve their political ends. So it was felt
necessary to provide in the Constitution that the seat of a
member of Parliament shall become vacant only after his resignation had been accepted. That is why articles 101 (3)(b) & 190(3) (b) were suitably amended by the Constitution
(Thirty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1974... The notification is
indicative of two things firstly, in the absence of any such
provision acceptance was not to be read into Ar,ticle 101
when it talked of the resignation of a member of Parliament.
Secondly, as soon as the Parliament intended that a resignation
should not ta.1<:e effect until it _received assent or acceptance,
it introduced a specific provision to that effect".
It would be noticed, therefore, that at the time when Articles 101 (3)
and 190(3) were being amended by the Constitution (Thirty-fifth)
Amendment Act the Constitution makers had also other similar provisions like Articles 217, 94, 67 and 124(2)(a) etc. before them and if
they really intended that acceptance was made a condition precedent
to the effectiveness of a resignation in case of constitutional functionaries
under Article 217 and other Ar.tides then such an amendment could
have also been incorporated in the Thirty-fifth Amendment Bill as well
either by conferring a power of revocation on the constitutional functionaries or by introducing a provision for acceptance of the resignation.
The very fact that no such amendment was suggested or brought about
in Article 217 and other Articles clearly reveals that the Constitutionmakers intended no change so far as the other Articles were concerned.
This is a very important circumstance which fortifies my conclusion
that the power of revocation or withdrawal of resignation once communicated to the President has been deliberately .omitted by the founding fathers from Article 211 and other similar Articles.
Coining now to the second point regarding the application of implied powers to the facts of a case, the matter was considered in the case
of Union of India v. S. H. Sheth & Anr. (supra) where this Court was
construing the provisions of Article 222 of the Constitution of India
and the case turned upon the question as to whether or not when a
Jndge was transferred from one High Court to another it wa~ necessary
for the President to take his consent. This Court by majority of 3 : 2
held that consent could not be implied in Article 222 in the absence
of an express provision. Krishna Iyer, J. while expounding this aspect
of the matter and speaking for himself and Fazal Ali, 1. observed as
follows:-
"It would be seen that there is absolutely no provtSion
in this Article requiring the consent of the Judges of the High
-
,
.UNION v. oG. c. MISRA
(Faza/ Aii, J.)
43
Court before transferring them from one High Court to another. Indeed, if the intention was that such transfers could
be made only with the consent of the Judges then we should
have expected a proviso to Article 222 (1) in some such
A.
tern1s as:
Provided that no Judge shall be transferred
High Court to another without his consent.
,
from
one
The absence of such a prO'Vision shows that the founding
fathers of the Constitution did not intend .to restrict the transfrr of Judges only with their consent. It is difficult to impose
[imitations on the constitutional provisions as contained in
Article 222 by importing theJ concept of consent which is con·spicuously absent therefrom".
_.,.-
'1f consent is imported in Article 222 so as to make it
a condition precedent to transfer a Judge from one High
Court to another then a Judge, by withholding consent, could
render the power contained in Article 222 wholly ineffective
and nugatory. It would thus be impossible to transfer a Judge
if he does not give his consent even though he may have
great personal interests or close associations in his own State
or by J;iis conduct he brings about a stalemate in the judicial
administration where the Chfof Justice would become more
or less powerless. · In our opinion, the founding fathers of the
constitution could not have contemplated such a situation at
all. That is why Article 222 was meant to take care of such
contingencies."
:f
B
c
D
E
Similarly, Chandrachud, J. took the same view and observed :
"The hardship, embarrassment or inconvenience resulting
to a Judge by reason of his being compelled to become a litigant in his own conrt, cannot justify the addition of words
to an article of the Constitution making his consent a precondition of his transfer. In adding snch words, we will be
confusing onr own po)icy views with the command of the
constitution".
-
Jn view of the decision of this Court which is binding on us, can
it be said that if the power of revocation of resignation is not expressly
contained in the Constitution the same may be supplied by the application of the doctrine of implied powers. The question as to how far
the doctrine of implied powers can be invoked has also been .considered
by this Court in several cases. To quote one, viz., in the case of Bidi,
Bidi Leaves and Tobacco Merchants' Association, Gondia & Ors. v.
The State of Bombay & Ors. (1) where Gajendragadkar, J. speaking for
the Constitution Bench of this Court observed as follows : "'Jlie definition of the term 'wages' postulates the binding character of the other terms of the contract and brings
within the purview of the Act only one term and that relates
.(1)
A.LR. 1962 S.C. 486.
F
G
H
44
A
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 3 s.c.R:.
B
to wages and no other. That being so, it is difficult to hold
that by implication the very basic concept of the term 'wages'
can be ignored and the other terms of the contract can be
dealt with by the notification issued. under the relevant provisions of the Act. When the said other terms of the contract
are outside the scope of the Act altogether how could they be
affected by the notification under the Act under the doctrine
of implied powers".
c
"Therefore the Act has made a specific provision for the
enforcement and implementation of the minimum rates of
wages prescribed by notifications .... That is another reason
why the doctrine 9f implied powers cannot be invoked in
support of the validity of the impugned clauses in ihe notification".
D
Thus, an analysis of this decision would clearly reveal that where express provisions are made by a statute the doctrine of implied powers
cannot be invoked to supply the provisions which had been deliberately
omitted. Same view has been taken by the Patna High Court in
Sukhdeo Narayan & Ors. v. Municipal Comm'ssioners of Arrah Municipality & Ors.(") where the Court observed as follows:"I hold, accordingly that the withdrawal of the resignation
of the Chairman (Oppositer Party No. 2) as expressed in his
letters, has no effect in law and th~ Municipal Commissioners,
in their meeting on 19-1-1956 had jurisdiction to proceed on
the question whether they should accept it or not."
E
I fully endorse these observations. For these reasons, I am clearly of
the opinion that in the absence of any express provision in Article 217
empowering a Judge to revoke his resignation, it is difficult to accept
the view that the power of resigning which has been conferred on the
Judge under Article 217(a) carries with it the inherent power to withdraw his resignation. In this view of the matter I am afraid, I am not
in a position to accept the submission of the Attorney General ori this
F
poin~.
G
H
I might mention that the High Court had gone into the question as
to 1¥hether the act of submitting resignation by the Judge to the President was a juristic act, and, therefore, once the position was altered, it
could not be recalled. For the purposes of the present case and having
regard to the reasons that I have already given, I would refrain from
going into this question as it is hardly necessary to do so. Furthermore,
it seems to me that the act of resignation by a Judge is a matter personal to him and however careful or cautious he may be in exercising
this power, the concept of juristic.act cannot be assigned to a document
which is nothing but a letter of resignation, pure and simple. However,
I do not want to dilate on this point, because in view of my finding that
there is no express provision in Article 217 empowering a Judge to
withdraw his resignation after the same is communicated to and submitted to the President, it is not necessary for me to spell out the con~
cept of a juristic act.
(!) A.LR. 1956 Patna 367, 373.
.....
~- -
.
...
,,.
•'
1
UNION v. G. c. MISRA
,
:f
•
(Fazal Ali, J.)
45
Another important angle of vision from which the point in issue A
can be approached is this. Once it is conceded that the resignation becomes complete without the necessity of the President accepting the
same, the very concept of withdrawal of the resignation disappears.
In other words, the question of withdrawal of a resignation arises only
if the resignation has to be accepted by au employer, because so long
as a resignation is not accepted it remains au incomplete document and
totally ineffective. In such c:_ircumstances, it is always open to the B
resignor to withdraw his resignation which has npt reached the stage
of completion. Such are the cases of resignation given by persons who
are governed by usual master and servant relationship. It appears that
in America even though a provision for resignation is there, there is an
additional provision that the resignation has to be accepted by a particular authority and it is only in the context of this peculiar relationship
that the American authorities have taken the view that a resignation c
can always be withdrawn until it is accepted. This state of affairs is
completely foreign to the provisions of our Constitution are concerned
which do not at all require the President to accept the resignation of a
Judge. If once the concept of acceptance of resignation is totally
absent, in my opinion, the question of withdrawal of the resignation
does not arise at all, because the resignation having been submitted and
D
communica~ed to the President becomes complete and irrevocable once
it is communicated to and received by the President. In fact, Article
217 d~ not envisage or enjoin a conditional or prospective resignation.
But assuming that the power to resign carries with it the power to resign
from a particular date, the conclusion appears to me to be inescapable
that once the resignation is communicated to the authority concerned
· viz .. the President in the instant case, the resignation will become irrevocable and will take effect automatically ex proprio vigore from . the E
date mentioned in the letter. The mere fact that the resignor mentions
a particular date from which he wants to resign does not at all
empower hiin to withdraw or revoke his resignation at any time before
the date is reached. Such a conclusion would have been possible only
if the completeness of a resignation depended on the acceptance of the
resignation by the authority concerned, because in such a case until the
resignation was accepted it was no resignation in the eye of law and F
could always have been recalled. But where the concept of acceptance
of resignation is totally absent, it seems to me to be a contradiction in
terms to. say that even though .the resignation has been submitted to the
proper authority and recieved by hinI still it .can be recalled before the
date is reached. I am not in a position to hold that a resignation revealin_g an intention to resign from a particular date is a conditional
resignation. It is only a prospective resignation, but in view of the G
peculiar provisions of Article 217(1) (a) it becomes irrevocable the
moment it is received by the President or is communicated to him
though it may take effect from the date mentioned in the Jetter or if
no such date is mentioned from the date of the Jetter itself.
.
I now turn to the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court
in the case of Bahori Lal Paliwal v. District Magistrate, Rulandshahr
&: Anr. (1) which is being relied on by the appellant. Chaturvedi, J,
(1) A.l.R. 1956 All. 511.
H
46
A
B
C
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978) 3 s.c.R.
while drawing a distinction between the Indian law tlllder the U.P.
Town Areas Act whic_h was the subject matter of review by .the Court
and the English Law on the subject observed as follows : "The Indian Law under the U.P. Town Areas Act, however, bas not followed the English statutory law in this respect because the provisions of S.8-A of the Indian Act provide for acceptance of the resignation by the District Magistrate, which clearly shows that the resignation is not effective
till it is accepted".
Furthermore, it would appear that µrider the provisions of the s!<ltute
in that case the· resignation had to be accepted by the appropriate
authority and it was on this basis that the Court held that the person
had a right to withdraw his resignation before it was accepted or before
his office had come to an end. The Court further observed as follows : "A resignation which depends for its effectiveness µpan
the acceptance by the proper !luthority is like an offer which
may be withdrawn befor,e it is accepted".
D
E
F
G
H
•
These observations do not help the case of the appellant but fortify
the conclusion that I have reached. It is manifest that where effectiveness of a resignation depends upon acceptance of the same by the proper authority it can always be withdrawn until accepted because the
resignation is not complete in the eye of law. This is what has been
held by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the aforesaid
case.
Another decision to which our attention was drawn by counsel for
the appellant is the case of Bhairon Singh Vishwakarma v. The Civil
Surgeon, Narsimhapur & Ors.( 1) This case also contains the same
principle which has been_ enunciated in the Allahabad case referred to
above, viz., that where a resignation is dependent for its effectiveness
on the acceptance by the proper authority, it can. be withdrawn at any
time before the acceptance is given. This case was also dealing with
a public servant to whic:h Article 311 applied and the resignation had
to be accepted by the Director of Public Health. I do not see how this
case helps the appellant in any way.
Thuo. th<" posi.tion that emerges from the aforesaid decisions is that
where a resignation given by a Government servant is dependent for its
effectiveness on the acceptance by the appropriate authority, the government servant concerned has an unqualified right to withdraw the resignation until the same is accepted by the authority. In other words, the
position is that where the resignor has a right to resign but the resignation can be effective for only after aeceptance, it is a bilateral act.
That is to say, resignation by one authority and acceptance of the resignation bi the other authority. Unless the two acts are completed, the
transaction remains in an inchoate form. That is to say a resignation
sent by a servant is no resignation in the eye of law until accepted by
the employer and so long as it is not an effective resignation, there can
(I) [197lj Lab. I.C. 121.
'
,.
,
UNION v. G. c. MISRA (Fazal Ali, J.)
47
be no bar to withdrawing the same. The same however cannot be said
of a resignation tendered by a High Court Judge under Article 217(1)
or other constitutional functionaries referred to hereinbefore because
in cases of such functionaries the act of resignation is a purely an unilateral act and once the resignation is written and communicated to
the President it acts ipso facto and becomes fully effective without there
being any question of acceptance by the President. I have already
held that where a particular date is given in the letter of resignation,
the resignatio"n will be effective from that particular date, but it does
not mean that the resignor had any right to recall his resignation merely
because he has chosen a particular date from which the resignation is
On the other hand, the resignation becomes complete
to take effect.
and irrevocable and ca"nnot be recalled either tdore or after the date
mentioned is reached Having signed the resignation and put the same
in the course of transmission to the President the Judges loses all control over the same and becomes functous officio and the resignation
becomes effective as soon as the date arrives without leaving any room
or scope to the resignor to change his decision.
This appears to be
the constitutional scheme prescrib~d for the resignation of High Court
Judges, Supreme Court Judges and other constitutional functionaries.
In fact, all the cases cited by the appellant excepting some are cases
where the effectiveness of the resignation depends on the acceptance
of the resignation.
A
}l;
C
D
I am fortified in my view by the observations made i"n the Am~rican
Jurisprudence Vol.
53 page 111 section 34 where the following observations are to be found :
"'The contract of employment is terminated where the
employee tenders his resignation and the proffer (sic) is
accepted by the employer".
-
E
These observations clearly illustrate that a contract of emplo1111e'nt can
by
only be terminated by a bilateral act, that is to say, resignation
the empioyee and acceptance by the employer.
In short, it se•ems to me that a resignation contemplated by Article
217(1)(a) is a unilateral act which may be compared to an action
of withdrawing a suit by the plaintiff under Order 23 Rule 3, C.P.C.
Once a plaintiff files an application withdrawing a suit, the suit stands
withdrawn and becomes effective as soon as it is withdrawn. In the case
of Smt. Raisa Sultana Begam and Ors. v. Abdul Qadir and others(') a
Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court observed as follows
"Si"nce withdrawing a suit is a unilateral act to be done by
the plaintiff requires no perntission or order of the Court
and is not subject to any condition, it becomes effective as
soon as it is done jnst as. a compromise does ......... The
act is like a point and not continuous like a line havi"ng a
beginning and an end.
Either it is done or not done; there
is nothi"ng like its being done incompletely or ineffectively.
The consequence of an act of withdrawal is that the plaintiff
ceases to be a plaintiff before the court" ..
(l)
A.LR. 1966 All. 318, 321.
F
G
H
).
48
A
B
c
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1978] 3 S.C.R.
The same princi~le applies to resignation submitted by a High Court
Jndge under Article 217(1)(a).
The resignation, which is a unilateral act, becomes effective as soon as it is communicated to the President.
The appellant jlowever, placed great reliance on a decision of the ·
Kerala High Court in the case of M. Kunjukrishna Nadar v, Hon'ble
Speaker Kera/a Legislative Assembly, Trivandrum and Ors.('). This
was a case under Article 190(3) of the Constitution by a member of
~he f\ssembly "'.ho addres~ed a communic_!l.tion to the Speaker tendermg his r>~s1g'.nat10n. A Smgle Judge of the Kerala High Court held
that the letter of resignation could not be effective until the date prescribed therein had reached and the notification published in the Gazette
regarding the vacancy of the seat of the rnember was not warranted
by law. In the first place, the Court was really concerned with the
point of time as to when the actual vacancy of the member would
arise and the seat would become vacant so as to justify a notification
for fresh election.
The point which is in issue before us did not
arise in this shape in· the Kera:a case at all.
In this connection, the
learned Judge observed as follows :-
D
"I hold therefore that it is open to a member of the Legislature to tender his resignation on a prior date to take effect
on a subsequent date specified therein. The letter of resignation has then to be construed as having been deposited
with the Speaker on the earlier date, to be given effect to only
on the date specified by the Member therein".
E
''The withdrawal nullifies the entrustment or deposit of
the letter of resignation in the hands of the Speaker, which
must lhereafter be found to have become non-est in the eye
of law. The absence of a specific provision for withdrawal
of prospective resignation in the Constitution or the Rules is
immaterial as basic principles of law and procedure must be
applied wherever they are relevant."
F
G
H
While I find myself in complete agreement with respect to the first
portion of the observation of the learned Judge, viz., that it was open
to the Member to submit his resignation to be effective from a subsequent date, I express my respectful dissent fro~ the vie':" t~en by
the learned Judge that a withcjrawaJ would nulhfy the resignation completely and even if there was no provision for withdrawal of the resignation the same will become non-est after it is withdrawn. The
Judge has not at all discussed the Jaw on the subject nor has he referred to the constitutional provisions relating to resignation In fact,
the 35th Amendment Act itself shows that the concept of a"5'eptance
of resignation was completely absent before the amendrnent
was
brought about and the legal position before the amendment was that
the re>1gnation would operate ipso facto and ex proprio vigore and
could not be withdrawn. That is why a specific power of acceptance
(l)
A.LR. 1964 Ker. 194.
"""--·
UNION v. G. c. MISRA (Fazal Ali, J.)
49
was introduced by virtue of the amendment. As however Parliament
did not intend to disturb the position in case of other constitutional
functionaries like the High Court Judges, Supreme Court Judges,
President, Vice-President, Speaker etc. no such amendment by introducing the concept of acceptance of the resignation was brought about in
Article 217 and other similar Articles.
I'ndeed, if Parliament really
intended that the resignation given by a High Court· Judge or other
constitutional functionaries indicated above could withdraw the re·~ignation after communicating the same to the appropriate authority er
even before the date from which the resignation was to operate,
a
~uitable amendment could have been made in these Articles so as to
confer an express power on the constitutional functionaries to do so.
The fact that no such provision was made confirms my view that Parliament clearly i'ntended that the resignation of constitutional functionaries being a sacrosanct act should remain as it was intended by the
founding fathers of the Constitution, viz., once a resignation is submitted
or communicated to the President, it becomes final a'nd irrevocable
and cannot be recalled by the functionary concerned.
Thus, Parliarrnnt maintained the unilateral nature of the act of resignatio'n. · In
these circumstances, therefore, I am not able to place any reliance on
the judgment of the Kerala High Court cited by counsel for the appellant.
;;I
,
The Full Bench decision of the Delhi High Court i'n the case of
Y. K. Mathur & And. v. The Commissioner, Municipal Corporation
of Delhi & Ors. (1) appears to have been the sheet-anchor of the
arguments of the Attorney General for the proposition that a prospective resignation submitted to the appropriate · authority could
be
withdrawn by the resignor at a'ny time before the dab! mentioned in
the letter of resignation is reached. I have. carefully perused the
aforesaid decision and I am unble to agree with the view taken by the
Delhi High Court for the reasons that I shall give hereafter.
To begin with, the Court was considering the provisions of section
33(1 )(b) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act which may be extrncted thns : -
A
B
c
D
E
F
"33 (l) If a cou'ncillor or an ald·~rman :(a) ............... .
r
(b resigns his seat by writing under his hand addressed to
the mayor and delivered to the commissioner his seat shall
thereupon become vacant''.
G
It was vehmently contended. by the appellant that section 33(l)(b)
(supra) was in absolute pari-materia with Article 217(1) (a)
and
ther~fore, the intcrpretatio'n placed by the Delhi High Court ~n this
-secl!on would clearly apply to the facts of the present case which
depends on the interpretation of Article 217(l)(a).
In the first
P.l~ce, I am unable !o. agree with the A torney General th;it th•e prov1s1on,s of .the Murnctpa.J ~ct can be equated with the provisions H
<:ontamed m the Const1tu!Jon of India. There is a world of diffe{I) A.LR. 1974 Delhi 58.
50
SUPREME COURT. REPORTS
(1978] 3 S,C.R·
A rence between a constitutional functionary which has been assigned
B
a special status and given a high place under the constitutional
provisions and a municipal councillor elected under the local
Municipal Act.
It is obvious that in both these cases the self same
considerations and identical principles cannot be applied because of
the nature of the position held by these two authorities. The High
Court held that as the statute did not limit the authority of
the
councillor to resign from a prospective date, the authority concerned
had the undoubted power to withdraw it before the date is reached ..
In this connection, the Court observed as follows : "The statute does not in any way limit the authority of
the councillor who has sent his resignation from a prospec-.
tive date to withdraw it before that date is reached.
The
resignation which is to be effective from a future date neoessarily implied that if that date has not reached it would be open
to the councillor concerned to withdraw it''.
c
D
These observations suffer from an apparent fallacy. In the first
place, the Court seems to assume that there is an implied power to
withdrm; the resignation where the resignor gives a particular date
from which the resignation is effective. In the absence of any expre55 provision conferring such a power, it was not open to the High
Court to invoke the doctrine of implied powers as pointed out by me
earlier. An implied power cannot be conferred on an authority by
a proceS5 of legal assumptions in the absence of any express provi-
sion.
E
Another argument which weighed heavily with the High Court
was that there was no law which compelled a councillor to give his
resignation if he did not want it, and, therefore, if a councilli>r chose
to resign, he could not be debarred from withdrawing it at any time
before the date from which the resignation was to be effectively reached. This argument fails to take into consideration the hard realities
of the situation contemplated, both by section 33 ( 1) (b) and Article
F 217 ( l )(a) of the Constitution. There is no question of there being
any compulsion on the resignor to submit his resignation. In fact,.
both section 33(l)(b) and Article 217(l)(a) merely conferred a
privilege en the resignor to offer his resignation if he so desired. It
depends upon the sweet will of the councillor to resign or not to resign.
From this however it cannot be inferred that where once a resignation
is submitted and results in certain important consequences, ·namely,
G that the resignation acts ex proprio vigore, yet the resignor can still
. withdraw his resignation and thus nullify the effectiven.ess of the resignation as contemplated both by section 33(1)(b) and Article
217 (1 )(a). Such an interpretation appears to be a contradiction
in terms and against a plain interpretation of section 33 ( 1) (b) of
the Municipal Act and Article 217 (1 )(a) cf the Constitution. Furthermore, the proviSion of section 33 (1 )(b) does not app~ar to b~
ff in complete pari-materia wi.th those of Article 217(l)(a) i~asmucn
as section 33 (1) (b) provides that as soon as the resignation was
delivered to the Commissioner the seat of the councillor shall become
UNION v. G. c. MISRA (Fazal Ali, J.)
51
vacant. On the interpretation of this provision the Delhi High Court
hel<:l that the vacancy could occur only when the resignation became
effective anci if the resignation was fro111 a future date both the resignation and the vacation of the seat could be simultaneous. In this
co:rncction, the Court observed as follows. : '"!Jnder section 33( 1 )(b) both the resignation and the
vacancy of the seat are effective from the same time......
A
B
Vacancy will only occur when resignation is effective, and
if it is from future date both resignation and vacation of
seat will be effective simultaneously".
So far as Article 217(1)(a) is concerned it is differently worded
and the consequence of the resignation is not at all indicated in this
Article. Thus, the provisions of Article 217 (1 )(a) cannot be said
to be in complete per; materia with section 33(1) (b) of the Mwiicipal Corporation Act.
Thirdly, as I have already pointed out the consideration by which
the Court is governed and the principles which it may seek to apply
to a municipal councillor cannot by any process of reasoning or
principle of logic be applied to a High Court Judge or other Constitutional functionaries governed by constitutional provisions. Fourthly,
the Delhi High Court has applied the.. doctrine of implied powers
which as discussed above cannot apply where there is no express provisiou justifying a particular situation. For !hese reasons, with due
deference to the Judges constituting the Full Bench of the Delhi High
Court I find myself unable to agree with the view taken by them.
In my opinion, the Delhi case referred to above is either distinguishable or even if it be taken to be directly in point, it is wrongly decided.
L'
On the other hand, there are some English cases which throw a
flood of light on the view that I propose to take in this case and
which have been relied upon by the majority judgment of the Allahabad Hgh Court. In the case of Reichel v. Bishop of Oxford(')
it was held that a clerk who had tendered his' resignation to the
Bishop car.not withdraw it, even before acceptance, if, in consequence
of the tender, the position of any party has been altered. In that
case the Bishop had been thereby induced to abstain from commencing proceedings in the Ecclesiastical Court for the deprivation of the
clerk, in view of his resignation. Lord North after considering all
the aspects of the case observed as follows :
"Applying that to th~ present case, the Plaintiff, by
sending in his resignation, procured a postponement of legal
proceedings against himself, and thereby, according to ecclesiastical law, incapacitated himself from withdrawing it during the interval before the 1st of October; and this result
would follow, even if the true view of the facts he, that the
Bishop did not accept the resignation until that date.
( l)
(1887) Ch. D. 48.
C
D
E
F
G
52
A
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[J 978] 3 S.C.R.
Under these circumstances, it appears to me that the
plaintiff's attempt to withdraw his resignation fails entirely,
and that, having failed on all points, the action must be
dismissed with costs".
a
This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal and it was held
that the resignation was validly executed and irrevocable. In the
Appeal Case Lord Halsbury observed as ·follows :
c
"But there was no condition here at all. As I have already said, I find as a fact that Mr. Reichel agreed absolutely to resign rather than undergo the inquiry which the
Bishop would have felt himself otherwise compelled to
institute. Neither in form nor in substance was the resig11ation conditional".
:.-Lord Herschell observed as follows :
D
"In these circumstances it is idle to consider what the
.appellant's position might have been, if there had been no
such .arrangement, and he merely had sen_t in his resignation
without knowing whether it was to be accepted or not. He
cannot in my opinion be permitted to upset the agreement
into which he .voluntarily entered, and which he has done
all that he could to complete, upon the allegation that the!e
was no formal acceptance of the resignation until the 1st of
October, 1886".
Lord Herschell observed as follows :
E
F
H
"It was argued further by the appellant that inasmuch
as his resignation was tendered to the Bishop on the understanding that it was not to be ac;cepted until a subsequent
date, the resignation was a conditional one, and therefore
void. I can see no ground for such a contention. The
resignation was absolute. It was intended to take effect
in any event".
These observations also show that merely because the resignation
is to take effect from a particular date, it does not become a conditional resignation and its absolute nature is not changed at all, because the Law Lords as also the Chancery Division proceeded on
the footing that ·even though the resignation of the clerk was to take
effect from a certain date it was not conditional but absolute. The
learned counsel for he appellant sought to distinguish this case on
the ground that in the Bishop's case (supra) a material _change had
already taken place, which could not be reversed and that is why it
was held that the resignation could not be withdrawn. It is true
that this was one of the grounds taken both by the Chancery Division Court and the Appeal Court, but the same reason will apply
to the present case also because once a resignation was submitted ~y
Salish Chandra to take effect from the 1st August, 1977, the President was clearly entitled to fill up the vacancy of the Judge from 1st
August, 1977 and may take steps accordingly. Thus, by virtue of
UNJON v. G.
c. MISRA (Fazal Ali, J.)
53
his resignation Salish Chandra had invited the President to take steps
to fill up the vacancy which will arise on 1st August, 1977. By
virtue of this representation, therefore, a material change undoubtedly
took place. For these reasons, therefore, I am not in a poSi'tion to
accept the arguments of counsel for the appellant on this score.
In the case of Finch v. Oake(') a member under Trade Protection Society was entitled to retire at any time without the consent
of other members. On the receipt by the society of a letter from a
member stating his wish to retire, he at once ceased to be a member
without the necessity of the acceptance by the society of his resignation. It ""s held that the member could not withdraw his resignation even before acceptance and he could only become a member
again after re-election. It would be seen that the principles decided
in th;s case apply directly to the facts of the present case where also
under the provisions of Article 21 7 the effectiveness o( resignation
does not depend upon the acceptance of the same by the appropriate
auiliority. In the aforesaid case Lindley, L.J. observed as follow§:-
"By paying his subscription he no doubt acquires certain rights and benefits. But what is there to prevent him
from retiring from the association at any momerit il' he
wishes to do so'? Absolutely nothing. In my opinion no
acceptance of his resignation is required, though of course
he cannot get back the 10s.6d. which he has paid ...... .
I can see no principle of law which entitles him to withdraw
his resignation".
Kay, L. J. observed as· follows : ;J
"It is said that, before his resignation had been accepted by the association, he withdrew it. But why was any
consent to his withdrawal from the society required? As
a voluntary member of a voluntary society he had said,
"I do not wish to continue a member any f6nger ....... .
In my opinion, after his letter of resignation had been receiv. ed, the plaintiff could not become, a member of the society
again without being re-elected".
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In my opinion, the principles laid down by this case seem to be in
all fours with the facts of the present case.
fn the case of People of the State of ·Illinois Ex. Rel. Benjamin
S. Adamowski, v. Otto Kerner(') what happened was that a County
Judge submitted his resignation to the Governor which was to become operative on a specified date. But the Judge sought to .withdraw the resi1mation before the date mentioned in the resignation
and before the Governor had acted thereon. It was held by the Illinois
Supreme Court that the resignation could not be withdrawn. In this
conne~tion. Davis, J. while delivering the opinion of the court observed as follows : -
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(!) [1896] l Ch. D. 409.
(2)
82 A.L.R. 2nd Series 740.
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"However, public policy requires that there be certainly
as to who are and who are not public officers ...... Therefore, the resignation of an officer effiective either forthwith
or .at a. future date may not be. withdrawn after such resignatmn 1s received by or filed with the officer authorized by
law to fill such vacancy or to call an election for such purpose".
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
It is true that Schaefer, J. and Hershey, J. dissented from the view
taken by Davis, J., but I would prefer to follow the view taken by
Davis, J. which falls in line with the tenor and the spirit of the constitutional provisions which we_ are called upon to interpret here.
Similarly, in the case of Glossop v. Glossop(') it was held that
the managing director could not withdraw the resignation without
the consent of the company, and by his letter of resignation be vacated his office. Neville, J. while adumbrating the aforesaid principles
observed as follows : "I have no doubt that a director is entitled to relinquish
his office at any time he pleases by proper notice fothe company, and that his resignation depends upon his notice and
is not dependent upon any acceptance by the company,
because I do not think they are in a position to refuse acceptance. Consequently, it appears to me that a director, once
having given in the proper quarter notice of his resignation
of his office, is not entitled to withdraw that notice, but, if
it is withdrawn, it must be by the consent of the company
properly exercised by their managers, who are the directors
of the company".
It would appear, from a conspectus of the authorities cited above and
on a close and careful analysis of the provisions of Article 217 (1)
of the Cm1stitution of India having regard to the setting of the spirit
in which this provision was engrafted that the more acceptable view
seems to be that where the effectiveness of a resignation by a Judge
does not depend upon the acceptance by the President and the resignation acts ex proprio vigore on the compliance of the condi!ions
mentioned in Article 217(l)(a) (that is by writing under his hand
addressed to the President and being communicated the same to the
President) the Judge has no power to revoke or recall the aforesaid
resignation even though he may have fixed a particular date from
which the resignation is to be effective. In other words,_ the act of
resignation is a purely unilateral act and the concept of wi!hdrawal
or recalling or revoking the resignation appears to be totally foreign
/
to the provisions of Article 217 (1) (a).
Counsel for the appellant relied on Corpus Juris Secundum,
American Jurisprudence and other books of eminent authors, which
do not appear to me to be very helpful in deciding the point in issue
in the present case. In the first place the provision of the American
Consfaulion as regards resignation of Judges is quite different. In
(I)
(1907) 2 Ch. D. 370.
UNION v. G. c. MISRA (Fazal Ali, J.)
55
fact, there_ is no provision at all in the American Constitution entitl- A
ing a Judge to resign. Article 3 section l of the American Con_stitution as edited by Corwin shows that although Article 3 Section 1
of the American Constitution confers judicial powers on the United
States in one Supreme Court and other inferior Courts as may be
established by the Congress it provides that Judges both of the
Supl_em0 Court and inferior Courts shall holtl their office during good
behaviour. Apart from this provision there is no provision in . the B
Constitution regarding the mode and manner in which the Judges
cou!J resign their bffice. In the absence of any such provision, the
general principles have been applied which includes cases where a
Judge tenders his resignation either prospectively or with a condition
attached to the same and such a resignation has to be accepted by
the Pres".dent and can be withdrawn at any time before the date fixed
is reached .. 'f.hese principles, however, cannot be applied to our
Constitution where a definite mode and a prescribed procedure has
been formulated for the resignation of a Judge and the consequences
fiowin~ thereof. In these circumstances, therefore, we can derive
little help from the provisions "f the American Constitution on the
question at issue. In the absence of any express provision, the courts
have applied the common law which is to the effect that in the absence
of a statute providing for resignation, the resignation becomes effec- D
tive on its acceptance by the proper authority. Similarly, it is laid
down that a prospective resignation may be withdrawn at any time
before it< acceptance vide Corpus Juris Secundurh Vol. 48 p. 973
para 25 wl1ich runs thus : "The term or tenure of a judge, with respect to the incumbent, may become terminated by reason of his resignation. In the absence of a statute providing otherwise,
a resignation becomes effective on its acceptance by !lie proper authprity, but in order to become effective it _must be
accepted. A prospective resignation may be withdrawn at
any time before it is accepted, and after it is accepted it
may be withdrawn by the consept of the accepting authority,
at least where no new rights have intervened".
Similarly, in Corpus Juris Secundum Vol. 67 p. 227 para 55
following observations are to be found :
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"However, under a statute providing that a resignation
shall take effect on due delivery to the officer to whom it is
addressed without making provision for a prospective resi_gnation, a resignation to take effect 'at a future date is not
permissible, and such resignation becomes effective Oh due
delivery and creates a vacancy as of the date of delivery".
...
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These observations do not seem to be directly in point but come as
close as possible to the view taken by me.
The learned counsel for respondent No. 1 Mr. Jagdish Swarup
too~ us through extracts of a number of books including Paton's
Junsprudence and Salmond's Jurisprudence with a view to explain
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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the incidents and qualities of a legal right. The extracts, however,
do not appear to me to be relevant to the facts of the present
case where we are dealing with a codified rjght which has to be
performed within the four corners of the constitutional provisions.
The general principles contained in the book of the eminent
jurists referred to by Mr. Jagdish Swarup cannot be disputed. The
main question, however, is as to wliat is the effect of the provisions
of Article 217(1) (a) of the Constitution of India, which prescribes
a particular mode for the resignation of High Court Judges. I, therefore. do not think it necessary to advert to the books referred to by
the High Court or by counsel for the first respondent.
',
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Thus, from the conclusions arrived by me on the questions involved in this appeal the following propositions in my opinion emerge :
·'"""'-·
·1. That the concept of the acceptance of resignation submitted by
a High Court Judge is completely ab,sent from Article 217 (1 )(a)
and the effectiveness of the resignation does not at all depend upon
the acceptance of the resignation by the President nor does such
question ever arise. This is how the Executive Government bas
implemented the law for wherever notifications regarding the resignation of High Court Judges or Supreme Court Judges have been made
they have merely mentioned the date of the resignation and nOf the
fact of acceptance. The High Court has elaborately dealt with this
question.
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2. That in view of the provisions of Article 217(1)(a) and similar
provisions in respect to high constitutional functionaries like the
President, Vice-President, Speaker etc. the resignation once submitted
and communicated to the appropriate authority becomes complete and
irrevocable and acts ex proprio vigore.
3. That there is nothing to show that the provisions of Article
217(l)(a) exclude a resignation which is prospective. That is to
say, a resignation may take effect from a particular date Even so,
the resignation may be effective from a particular date but the resig- ·
nor completely ceases to retain any control over it and becomes functus officio once the resignation is submitted and commnnicated to the
appropriate anthority.
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4. That the resignation contemv.Iated. by Article 2l~ClH!t) is
purely an unilateral act and takes effect 1pso facto once mtent1on to
resign is communicated to the President in writing and addressed to
him.
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5. That on a true interpretation of Article 217(1)(a) a resignation havino once been submitted and communicated to the President
cannot be recalled even though it may be prospective in nature so as
to come into effect from a particular date. It is npt possible to hold
that such a resignation can be withdrawn at any time before the date
frmn which the resignation is to be effective is reached.
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UNION v. G. c. MISRA (Fazal Ali, J.)
57
.6. That as the Constitution contains an express and clear provi:sion for the mode in which a resignation can be made it has deliberately omitted to provide· for revocation or withdrawal of a resignation
.once submitted and communicated to the President. In the absence
of such a provision, the doctrine of implied powers cannot be invoked
to supply an omission left by the founding fathers of the Constitution
deliberately.
·
The principles enunciated above flows as a logical corollary from
the nature and character of the privilege, right or power (whatever
name we may choose to give to the same) conferred by the Constitution on a Judge of the High Court or other constitutional functionaries mentioned hereinbefore. Salmond on Jurisprudence (12th Ed.
by Fitzgerald) describes a species of legal rights thus : "All these are legal rights-they are legally recognised
interests-they are advantages conferred by Jaw .... They
.resemble liberties, and differ from rights stricto sensu, inasmuch as they have no duties corresponding to them ...... A
power may be defined as ability conferred upon a person
by the Jaw to alter, by his own will directed to that end,
the rights, duties, liabilities or other legal relations, either
of himself or of other persons ........ Power is either ability
to determine the legal relations of other persons, or ability
to determine one's. own. The first. of these-pow~r oiner
persons-is sometimes called authority; the second-power
.over oneself-is usually termed capacity".
'Similarly, Paton on Jurisprudence (3rd Edition by Derham) while
· illustrating the right of liberty observed as follows : "I have liberty to breathe, to walk in my own fields, to
play golf in my private links. Here no precise relationship
to others is in question, save that the law will protect_my
liberty if others interfere with its exercise. But it is more
accurate to say that I have a liberty to play than that I have
a claim, for I may exercise my liberty without affecting
others, whereas my claim can be enforced only by coercing
another to act or forbear".
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It would thus appear that the privilege or power enshrined in
Article 217(1)(a) is an absolute one and not relative. In other
words, the aforesaid power is an independent one and has no corTesponding rights to be performed by any other authority. The G
only. privilege given to a Judge of the High Court is to resign without
there_ being any corresponding right to the President_ to accept the
same, nor is there any power in the resignor to recall or revoke the
resignation once it becomes effective. The ' provisions of Article
217(l)(a) really contemplates that the decision of a Jugge to resign
his office must be taken with due deliberation after considering all
lhe pros and cons of the matter and not under any emotional insti~ct H
or inspired by undue haste or momentous fury. One of the es~en~ial
qualities of a judicial power is restraint and a Judge before res1gnmg
S-"2l! SCI178
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must be prepared to take a decision once for all so that having taken
the .decision he is not in a position to repent on the same or to brood
over it. The decision once taken ~Y the Judge in this regard IS irrevoc.abl~ and immutable and is just like an arrow shot from the bow
whi~:1 cannot be recalled or a bullet having fired and having reached
its destination cannot come back to the barrel from wbich it was
shot.
•
Thus having regard to the letter of resignation in the present case,
there can be no doubt that Satish Chandra had in his letter dated
7th May, 1977 indicated his. unequivocal intention to resign in the
clearest possible terms to the President with effect from 1st August,
1977 and the letter having been communicated to the President and
received by him, it was not open to Satish Chandra to withdraw or
revoke that letter. Consequently, the letter dated 15th July, 1977
addrerned to the President by Satish Chandra revoking· his resignation was null and void and must be completely igiiored.
The pcsition, therefore, in my opinion, is that Salish Chandra
ceased to be a Judge cf the High Court with effect from 1st August,
1977. For these· reasons, therefore, I fully agree with the majority
view of the High Court (Misra, Shukla and Singh, JJ.). I am unable
to persuade myself to agref1 with my Brother Judges who have taken
a contrary view. I, therefore, uphold the judgment of the High Court
and dismiss the appeals. We have already pronounced the operative portion of the order on 8th December, 1977 and we have now
given the reasons for the order pronounced. In the circumstances,
there would be no order as to costs.
M.R.
Appeals allowed.
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