PATHUMMA AND OTHERS versus STATE OF KERALA AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 16 January 1978 | [1978] 2 S.C.R. 537 | 1978 INSC 7
Key facts
- Decided
- 16 January 1978
- Bench
- M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG*, P.N. BHAGWATI*, V.R. KRISHNA IYER, S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, P.N. SHINGAL, JASWANT SINGH, V.D. TULZAPURKAR
- Bench size
- 7
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 420/1973
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1978] 2 S.C.R. 537
- Neutral citation
- 1978 INSC 7
Text of the judgment
l
537
PATHUMMA AND OTHERS
A
v.
STATE OF KERALA AND OTHERS
January 16, 1978
[M. H. BEG, C.J., P. N. BHAGWATI, v. R. KRISHNA lYER; s. MURTAZA
FAZAL Au, P. N. SHINGHAL, J.-\SWANT SINGH AND
V. D. TULZAPU.RKAR, JJ.]
8
_Kerala A.r:rlculwri.fts Dl'bt Relief Act. 1970 .~. 20-Scop,· of-Section 20
clllllles .cle~ror~ t~ reco••er proputil's .~old to rmrcllasers i11 t'.Tt'L'Iitio11 of d~crt?e
passed m llqt~rclatiiiJ: the ~t·br owed by the ogriculturist-Rt•J•tricrion if reasonab/~-1! dt?pm·es rh_e crf(/1/ors of rlu!!'r ri.ffllt to property--Sub s. 3-/f purchaser
f!l prop~rty at auct1o!l lS _str~mg;r, properry to be retumed o!fricult11rist d~htor
'!purchase mo~u:y patd wulmt .su momlt.s--Sub-.'- (6) a bona jitle alienee purchasm;: from aucllOil purcha'ier before the date of tile Act e.tempt jrom opl!ration
of the Act-Sub-s. (3 )-If \•iolar/l•t> of Art. 14.
C
to
.,..
-~
The statement of objects ;~nd reasons to the Kcrala Al!riculturists• Debt
Relief Act. 1970 states that the b~nefit~ conferred by Kern\~ Acr 31 of I 951S
were nvnilable only in r~~ct of d~bts incurred by the agriculturists before the
date of commencement of the Act. namdy Jui}' 14. 1958. And since even after
this date agricultural indebtedness among the poorer sections continued to be
on the: incren~e the legisla ture consider(d it necessary to gh·e relief to the a_;!n-
D
cultunst~ a gam-;t whom suit!! had been filcLI for recovery of debtll accrued atter
the commencement of the 1958 AcL
-·..._
.... •
#
•
Se.:tion 20 (I) of the Act provides th~t where MY immo\·ablc property in which
the agriculturist had nn interest has been '>old in cxeC111ion of any decree for
recovery of a debt but possession has not actually passed from the judgmc:nt
debtor to the purchuser and the decree-holder is the purchaser then such
judgment-debtor may deposit one haJf of the purchase money a.nd ap ply to the
Court to set aside the sale of the property and the Court shall order the sate to be
set aside and further order payment of the balance of the purchase '?toney m
kn equal insmlments in accordance with the procedure !'et out the~rn. Sub·
section (2) provide<l that where any immo\'able property in which tbe agriculluri.st had an intere~t hu been sold in e.' \ecution of nny decree for orre::u'll of
rent and the pMses.qion of the property ha!! nctually passed from the . judgment
debtor to the purchaser during t he periods mentioned therein then s uch JUdgment·
debtor may d~posit one half of the purcha~e money nnd apply to th~ Court
to !et a.-.ide the sale of the properly and the court !!hall order the setttng ns1de
of the sale and for the payment of the b~llance of the rurch:1~ mon~y according to the proceduro ~t out in the sl!ction. S\lb·scction (3) prOVIdes that
where property sold in the execution of any deere~ for the reco\·cry of a debt
t~nd the decree holder is not the purchaser su-.:h JUd~m~nt-debtor may depo.<at
the purchn~e monev and apply to the court to set aside the sale of the pro~rty
und the: Court shall order the snle to be set nside. Sub-section (.S) prov~;~e
that where imprm·ement~ have been ellect~d on l~e property sold after the be
of snl~ the value of t~uch improvement u~ dctermrned by . the Courts !!bimll 1. n
•
•
t
h
·tion .,urch·tser
u -o;ec
de~11ed by the a pphcant for payment ~ l e nu~.:
,.
• · · shall
not tobe
3
(6 ) provides that nn ord~r under sul?·sl!ctro_n~ II) or (2) or eli~ ·
urch.:~scr
deemed to llffccl the ri~hl!i of bona fule ohenee!l of . the auc n r
deriving rights bdore the daltl of publication of the llJII.
F
G
I tl
I . cJ
mort,:·rce decree n8ain!lt the
~>tame. u
d. btor wa!l not able to
jud~menl debtor, who \\·a~ nn a~ ricultu n~t. Smce th~~al~ of th~ ' property wn•
pay the dccret!ll <~mount in inslnl~ents, 0, decree: fo{.ciioned and purchased by
pas'ICd by the Court. The debtors prOp\:rly ~:.s ~omc cosei decrc\!s were
the l_lPPdl!lnl who w~ not th~ dccree· h?.!fer. 1 ·on their fail ure to ray the
ohlatned by the crrottors tl~atnst the 0 ~u 0~ an
.
In the in.,lnnt cnscs a cn:d•tor
E
1:1
J
H
538
. S'IJPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 2 s.c.R.
in!>tnlments property was purchased at the auction by the d~cree-holdcrs themselws. After the purchase, improv~mcnts were rnnde by them in the propert1es.
When the debtors launched proceedings under the Act for restoration o f possession o f the property on pnyment of the decretal amount, the appellants cha~lcn
!!~:d the constitutional validity of the Act. T he H igh Court upheld the val 1dtty
s. 20 and d ismissed the wril pc!titions. .
or
B
·C
In appeal to this Court, it wac; contended o n behnlf o f th~ appella nts that
( l) the appclhm ts having acquired valid title to the property ••ftcr p urc~ase nt
uuction sale in execution of a dec[\!e, s. 20 which deprives them of thc1r nght
to hold property was violative of Art. 19(1 )(f), (2) though the ob\ ious obJeCt
of the Act was to give relief to debtors who filed suils for r ecovery of debts
· afte r the commencement of the 1958-Act it travel~ beyond the statement ot
obJects nnd reasons, giving a blimkct power to the Court to set aside the: .s;.~lc
compl eted even before the pas~ing of the Act nntl ( 3) s- 20(3} and ( 6) arc
viol:uive of Art. I 4 because the stmnccr dccrcc-holtlcr was selected for hosltl:!
discrimination whercns a bona ficlc alienee was exempted from the opcmtion ut
the Act.
'
•
Dismissing the <~ppcals,
( per Ueg, C. J., _Krishna Iycr, S. Murtnza Faz..'ll Ali anJ Jaswant Singh. JJ.)
HELD : There is no constitutional infirmity on the ground that the 1\ct ~~
violative of Art, 19Cl)(f). The rc!itrictions imposed arc ckarly rcasooablt:
within the meaning of cL (6) of that Article. [559 A-D]
D
E
1
..'.t
l(n) In intapreting the constitutional provisions for judging the impact o t
rights of the citizens the approach of the
Courts is to interpret the constitutional ·provisions ngai n'\t the social sl!tting ol
the country so as to show a compl\!te conc;ciuusncss nnu u~ep a ware ness ot the
growing requirements of the society, the incrcn-;ins m.-eds of the nation. the
burning problems of the day nnu lhc complex issues facing the people ~htcb the
lcgislnturl! in its wil,dotn, th rough bl!ncfici;tl Jc gi~lat io n, seeks to solve_ The
judiciul npproach shou ld be d ynamic ra tho.! r th iln :llntic. p mgm;~ ti c r<~thcr than
peda ntic und elastic rather th;m rigid. h m us t ta ~ c into con,.idcm tion the
changing I rends o f economic thought, t he temper of the times and the Ji\·ins
aspira tions und feelings of the people. This Court must stri~c a just bnlnnce
~t-w-e c:n the fu ndamc:nta! rights and th~ larger :.1nd broader interests o f ~;ocu: cy .
~10 cnactm~nt on the fu nd<tmcntal
[534 A·Cl
(b) The lcgb.lat ure i~ in a b~ttcr position to Ulllkrstuml :~nd npprcciate the
or tht: people and tO brinl! <tbout SOCial rdornto; for the unliftmcnt of the
backward and the Wt:..ako:r M:Ctions and for the improvement o( the lot of U\~
poor. T he Court will interfere only \"hen the statute is cl~arly violutive: of the
fuooamcnt;1l. riJ:ht or when the Act is beyond th~ Jcgislacivc competence. Courts
have .ro:COAnJf>ed th.at there i!l alw&IYS u pn:o;umption tn fl\vour of the conslltUtto nallty of a statute :tnd the onus to prove its invulii.lity lies o n the party a~ailing the A ct. [54-1 A -UJ
Ol!c.dS
F
h ·oti l'rc.u-htJd "· The Atlmilli.\trctlor for r/~e! Unimt Tnritorv of Delhi (J9n2)
Bilwr (195~)
SCR 629 rdc:rred to.
2 SCR 125 anti Muhd. f/anif Quare:,/Ji & Ors. v. 1"/u Statr (J/
G
(c) The object of thc Act bdng re moval or agri~ultuml imlchtedncss nml
reduction o f on~ of the important cuu~s of po-..-erty is unc.loubt.::dly in publiC
intcrc~t and t he rc)triction must be prc~umcJ to ~ rd;Jsonahle. (545 B·CJ
Cb) By a lo nl[ line o{ dcd~ion.; this Court has laiJ d~1w n sevc~•l teo;ts nnd
guiJclinc.s for judging the rc;1sorwblcness of restrictions. They nrc ;
J{
~
(i) Fum.I:~mcnta\ RiJ:ht:; anJ D irective Prim:ipk""\ c.:un.. titute the "con.-.dem:cf'
of lhc Comtitu tion.. The purpose or the latter i~ ro fix ccrtnin social nni.l c'on omic go;.t l~ for immc:diatc attainment by bringing ubout 11 non-viol~nt social
revolution. The Constit ution aims :tt bringin~; ubou t a !'lynth~sis bct\\~~n fundamental r ight\ ond uircclive principles by ).!i"llll-! to the former a place of pride
and to lhe Ia Uer a place of permanence. [545 F -Gl
..
PATHUMMA Y.· KBRALA .
539 '
Fttt~chan1 ·Himmatlal & Or.~. v. State of Maltaraslura etc. (1917) 2 SCR
828. ~ts 'Holmess Kesawr~anda Blmrali Sripadagolavaru v. Stare of Kern/a (1973)
Supr. SCR 1. State of Rcrala & A.nr. v. N. M. Thoma.t & Ors. (1976) 2 SCC
310 and The State of Bombay v. R. M. D. Chamarbougwala (1957) SCR 874
nt ~21 r eferred to.
.
ln the instant case · the object of th.: Act being to eradicate ~tral indebtedness nml thereby se~re _the ~ommon sood of the people !ivins in object poverty•
~lcnrly ful~ls the . drrecttvcs ~n ~rts. 38 and 39(b) of the Con.~titutioo. There
IS no conflict between the d1recttves nnd the restrictions sought to be placed by
the Act, [545 E-F, 547 A] ·
,
.
.
B
(ii) The rcstricti<_?ns must not be a·rbitrnry or ex,cssi'-'e in nature ~o ~ to
so ~yo n_tl the requue~ent of th~ interest of the S!!nernl ptlbuc. Wbnt is
req!-urc~ IS. that tht: legiSlaturt.: should tnkc intdligent cure in choosing a cour~
whrch IS dact:ttcd by rc:lSon t\00 good ~onscience SO (l~ to strike a just balance
~
-·
·' '
'' .. '-
r
A
between the freedo m contnincd in Art. J9(1)(f) and the socinl control pcnnitted
by ell. (5) ;md (6) of tbnt Article. [547 B-E]
.
CM11tt11mm Roo v. The State of Madhya Prad~:.~lt (1950 ) SCR 759 nt 763
and M<•s.rr.v. Dwarka PTtiSll(/ l.Axmi Naraitt v. Th~ Sratl' of llllflr rradesil & Or.f.
(1 954) SCR 803 :tt 811-12 referred to.
~
-.
C
(iii) No abstrnct or gencrnt pattern or a tu~ principle can be laid down
which can be of universal application und the s.,me "'ill have to vary from case
to Cilsc and with rcgurd to ~;hanging conditions, tbe values of human life. social ·
philosoph}' of the Constitution, prevailing conditions and the surrounding circumst:mccs, all of which must enter into the judicial verdict. [547 F]
Messrs. Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Naraifl v. The State of Uuur Pradesh & Ors. D
(1954) SCR 803 nt 811-12 Statt' of Madra.~ v. V. C. ~ ow (1952) SCR 597•
.\fnlrd. Hanif Quarc.rlii & Ors. ''· Tltc Suue of Biltar (1959) SCR 629 !lt 660
a nd The Lord Krishna Sugar Millr Ltd. & Anr. v. Th~ Union of India & Anr.
(i9tl0) 1 SCR 39 at 56 ~fcrred to.
Civ) The Court has ro examine the ·n;llurc: and extent, the purport and .content of the right. n ature of the evil sought to be remedied by the statu~. the
harm caused to the citizen .and the benefit 10 be conferred o n the pen;on or the
community for whose ~nefit the legislation is passed . urgency of the evil and E ·
the necessity to rectify the s.1me. ln so doing the Cowl ha.o; to strike a JUSt
balance: between the restriction imposed nnd the social control eo,isaged by_
Art. l 91G). [549 A-B}
Narendra· Kumar & Ors. v. Tbt! Unio11 of lndin & Or.r. ( 1960) 2 SCR 375
:111d BIJ(.:/w n Singh&: Ors. v. Stur~ of Punjab & Ors. (1971) 1 SCC 713 at-718
referred to.
·
(v) Th~re mu.)l be direct :md proximate nexus or a reasonable connection F
between the r~lriclion imposed <Jnd the object sought to be nchiev-ed. In other
words. tllc Court has to see wherher by virtue of the re1triction imposed on
the rii:ht of the citizen the object of the statute is rc:tll}' fulfilled or frustrntcd.
)( there is a <lircct ncXtL" bct\l·ccn the r~triction nn<.l the obj~o-ct of the Act then
a strong presumrtion in fnvour o f the comtitutionality of the Act '";11 nrise.
[549 F-Gl
1\amfappMo Koflarratltil Kodwui & Ors. v. Tl1e State o/ Madrar & Or.-..
( 1960) 3 SCR RR7 111 92K und 0 . 1\. Gllmh & A11r. v. N. 1\. Jo.tcp/1. (1963l
f
'
. .,
•
-..
Supp. 1 SCH. 789 ut 705 refcm:d to.
.
(vi) Courts rTIIIJtt see whclhcr tl1e social control envisaged In (\rt. 19 (6} t~
t-c in~; ciTccluntell by the restriction imposed on the fundamc~~:tl n ght. .If t~e)
look: nl the restricttOm· only from the point of view of the Ctttzoen wh~ ~ nfh:c·
IC'd. it will not be n correct or safe ~tppronch ina....;nwch ns _tbe rcstnctro n IS
bound to be irksome nnd p;tinful to the _citizen even_ ~hough 11 m?Y ~ for the
oublic ~ood. However important the nght of a cltrzcn or an tndl\ rll~al may
be, it hu~ to yield to the lorgcr inter<:sts of the country or the commuortv•
·
{550 G -H, SSt AJ
G ·
r
t
!
H
Jwri 1>r<L)/ra1l v. T ilt< Admilli.t tnuor /or tht• l.'niun T~rritory of Ddlli ( 1962>
2 SCR 125 ttt 148 referred lo.
t)-ll-l ~SC'f.'77
!
f
SUPREME. COURT REPORTS
540
A
(vii) The Court is fuJly entitled to take into consideration matters ot
common report. history of the times and mutters of common knowledge and
the circumstances existtag at the time of legislation. [551 D)
Mohd. Halli/ Quaresld & Ors. v. Tile Srote of
referred to.
B
c
(1978] 2 S.C.P:.
Bihar
(1959)
SCR 629
In the instant case the object of the Act being to protect the agricultunstdebtors from the clutches of the greedy creditors, is undoubtedly a laudable
object. The Act does not take away the property of the purchaser without
compensation and, therefore, his right to hold property has not been destroyed.
No exception can be taken to s. 20(2)(b) which provides for payment of the
purchase money by instalments because the debtor, on account of his poverty,
cannot p;1y the debt in a lump-sum. Secondly having regard to the cconom1c
condition of the peasantry in the State, the object sought to be achieved bemg
to remove agricultural indebtedness and amelioration of the lot of the agrtcul·
turists, it cannot be said tbat the restrictions are in any way arbitrary .or excessive or beyond the requirements of the situation. [558 B, D, F, H, 559 AI
2. The object of the Act mentioned in the first part of the statement ot
objects and reasons clearly shows that it is comprehensive in nature nnd is not
confined to any particular situation. · In view of the clear and unambiguous
provisions of the Act, it is not neces'.iary to delve into statement of objects and
reasons. [559 G·H]
Section 20 is not violath·e of Art. 14 o f the Constitution.
D
E
[562 D]
3(a) Wbat Article 14 forbids is hostile discrimination and not rea.:.onable
classification. Equality before law d~ not mean that the same set of laws
should apply to ull pcr:;ons under every circumstance ignoring differences and
disparitic.~S between men and thing~ . lt .Jg for the State to make
reasonable
classification which mu~t. fulftl two conditions : ( 1) the clnssification must be
founded on an intelligible differentia whkh distinguishes pcrsono; or things that
are grouped together from others left out of the group; und (2) the ditlercntta
mu.o;t have a rea.c;onnble ne,.us to the object sought to be Hchicved by the
statute. [560 C·El
Sl1ri Rmn Kri.~lma D(liiiJ ia v . Shri l u.ttic:e S. R. Tendolkar & Or.r. (1959 )
SCR 279 at. 296-97 uml Slart' o.f 1\nula & Anr. v. N . M. Tltomn.o.; & Ort. ( tn6)2
sec 310 refcm=d to.
F
G
·~
(b) Having regard tu Ou: avov-.w obj~ct of the Act, if ·by r~a.-;oa of tltclr
poverty and economic backwardness the agriculturist--dcblor.s on: trea ted as a
!>Cpa:aw _c ategory or class for preferential treatment in public intefl~t, the classi·
fica tlotJ IS not unn::c.on~blc. In ntal.;ing the: classilic~tion, the !:.tgislnturc can·
not be: cxpectcLI to prov1ue an n.bstraq symmetry. All thut is necessary is that
~e cltJ>scs ha\'e ~o b:: set apart ru.;~rdt'nj; to the ncces:)llie~ and c:\ig~ncics a.o;
thctatcd by expcnencc aoo surroundmg ctrcumo;tanccs nnd tht= clnssilication
should not be arbitrary, artificial or iJiusory. [561 G-H, 562 AJ
to.
State of W"!s/ Bengal v. Anwar A f{ S(lrkar (1952) SCR 284 at 321 referred
,_
~
~-1
•
_(c) It is wdl settled that be!ore 1.1 person can claim to
H
b: discriminah..'\1
agam.st ilnotl.u:r he mw.t llhow that all the other pcr:o.ons a re similurly suuatc
or equully. cu~urmlanced. l.!nl~s. tho nppcllant is able to establish that he i.-.
eq~ott.-d "1th u bona fidt.' _:•ht:n~ ·~ e~·cry respect. Art. 14 " ·ill huvc no appl1~
~atwn. l.n ut.her. w~rJ,. dl~c nmmallon violative of Art. 14 can only t.nko cfi.C1.:t
'~ t}Jerc: h d~cnmJnatron bet\\«n equals nnd not when~ u nequuls nrc llcing
dJfTcr~ntly tren tcd. [S62 C·Dl
Swte u! J & K v. T. N . Kl1osa & A 11r. (1974) l SCR 771 nt 783 Chiranjir
La/ Chowdll!trl
Thr Unior1 of India & Or.Y. ( 1950) SCR 860
91 t and
.So11111un f<,uf•rtt)' Co. v. Green~ 216 U.S. 400, 4 12 referred to.
v.
l
.....
nt
'f
PATHt,JMMA v. KERALA
_, ..;:.,...
541
· · (ci) A stranger· auction purchaser and a bona fide nlienee cannot b: satd
to be similarly situate. [563 DJ
A
ln t_be i~tlmt c~e the stranger auction purchaser who panicipatcs in the
pcoceedmgs 111 execuuon of the decree against the debto.- bns a clear notice ot
the circumstacc1.'S unde r which the decree was pas'.>cd and of the fact that lhe
property ::;old was the property of the debtor, If the legislature nt a 'later stage
passes a law to restore the property to the asricutturist-dcbtor. the auction·
purchaser cannot complain. Secondly, the strnngcr auction-purchaser kno·ws
that be bad purchased the property at a distr(!Ss sale. Thirdly even if the prop.:rty w~ n:'otoro:l tQ the stranger auction-purchaser, he is entitled to get the
entire purchat.e money in lump-sum includinl; the cost before · partjn~ wtth
~CSSIOR of the Jlroperty. This distinguishes the case from that of n dccrceholdcr-purchasl!r. A hom1 fit/~ alienee on the other hand purchases, the pro~rty under negotiation; he has no notice of the d·!bt of the debtor or the c•rcumstances under which the decree was passed. [563 E. H. 564 A} "
B
Per Bhagwa.ti, Shinghal and Tulzapurkar, JJ concurring.
The subjc.:t-maJtcr of the Act is dearly within the purview l.lf Entry 30
(money lending and money lenders; relief of agricultural indebtednc~.<l) m!d the
Act which providL~ for the ..relief o( ind<.!htcd a!,!ricullurio;Is 'in lhc Slate ot
Kcmla.. is within the competence of the .State Legislature. [568 G. 569 Al
fl
J (a) Thc-rc i~ no justification for the contention tlwt Entry 30 i~ o:onfiO<!d
only to .subsc.tmg indebledne.'i.'> nnd would not cover the nccc!l~ity o( provitlmt=
relief of t11~ n~riculturisl'l n·ho had
Utcir immovable prop.:rty bv Conr!
sales in execution of the decree n~;tin'>t th!!m und hnd been rendered destllutc.
Section 20 d~h with n liability owhkh h:tJ ceased nne! diJ not subsist on lh~
date the Act cam~ into force. Hut there is nothing in Entry 30 of List II II"
show tllltl i.t will not be nttractc:.d and would not ennble the State Lcgl!.latun:
to make a law simply because the debt .of the agriculturist h:~d been paid off
under a distres~ s.a.lc. [569 C-El
-1f
,,,,t
- '·
i
~
..
(b) An <ll(ricullurist doc.'i not ce~ to be <10 agriculturist merely because
be hns l~t bis immov:-~blo property. It cannot be ~;aid thnt the State i.'l not
interested in providing him nece<~<~;;~r~· relid merely because he: h:t" l(l!;t his
immovable property. On the othc:r h<~nd bis hr.:lplcss condition call~ for early
solution aml it i,... only nJttun•l that ttu: State l.cgislature should think of rch:1tn·
titating him h}' prm•idint;: the nccess;try relief under nn J\et of the! naltlr~ untter
consideration. There is nothing in th..: working of Entry 30 lo show that the
relief contcmpbtcd by il mu~l ne~L-s'\.:lrily rclalc: to nny subsi!itiMg im.lcbtedn~
ar1d would not cover the quc!ltiDn of rdid' to those who haw }().~l lhe means
of their livelihood becnuse of the dd:Jv in providing them lcgislntive relict
·
[569- F-Cil
-.
c
. )
1
E
F
(c) It cannot be g:.Jin.~;aid thnt :1griculluri't'. and even. ind\!btcJ a!lricul!urists, form tho bulk or, :1t an)' mto a COt;~-~idcr:lble. p~rt of the rur.tl pu~ulallon
10 nn e-;senilidly r!.lr<il economy. nnd ~o rf n re~tr1chon 1~ rca..,onnf:-le m thciY
interest. it wouiJ ~qu:Hdy f<~ll within the purview of cl. (5) of Arl 19.
(570 F·GJ
KawsltJ{>para Ko/laratllil Koclmnl .t Ors. v. The Stat~ of Mrulras and .Ors.
!1960) 3 SCR 8B7 nnd Star,. of Antllrra Pradt•.Yh v. Kamwpalli Cllintta J'c-11/.:ata
Chafamuyya Sturrl { J963) t SCR 156 rd~:rrcd lo.
(d) Thou.saruh of suits were pending OJ!ain!it indebted n~riculh!ri'ls . in
\larious Court~ ond immovable~ propertie-. of n lnrge nu~ber of . ngnct!!!~,::~;~
had been wtc.l r~nd~rin~ them comph:tely hdpless. So tf the _Sl.l te
lh,
1
pa.sl;Cd tho A~.:t in the intcre-~t of t~o .l!cncr~l ,.rm~Hc to •. Prct:•~le;~;c ''r~a:<>on:
nature mention\!.(} in s, 20 tho rf'fllnctton. pto~flic tJcr~~~ 1( of the pun:h.,.;e
~hie". Even 100, tbe section make:-, proyll<lon or rcrr~~ 0 c:l . the purch:~scr
money, the co~ts of ~xcculion nnd lhe tmprovemen~~ ~~~adr.:n 1h)the Hi~h Court
Th ·
t · ·
thcr-forc • rc.-ason~blc tn ewry s~nsc 11 <
-
1
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a
rightl~ ~;~::td,.c ~rgur:eot t~ the contrary. (571 A-Cl
Section 20 ii not violative of Art. 14. [573 Dl
__
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542
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 2 S.C.R.
2(a) A comparison of sub-s-(1) with sub-s. (3) would show that the treatment to a decree-holder-purchaser is different and is less advantageous than the
treatment to a purchaser who is not a decree-holder. The former is treated as
a different class. Decree-holders very often exploit their debtors in many ways
and sales to them are generally viewed with suspicion and disfavour. Under
O.XXI, r.72 CPC, it is not permissible for a decree-holder to bid for or purchase
the property without the express permission of the Court. The decree holder
purchaser has rightly been treated as a class by himself and that classification
obviously has the object of benefiting the agriculturist debtor by permitting
him to deposit only half the purchase money and paying the balance in instalments. [572 A-B]
(b) There is also justification for treating an auction purchaser at a Court
sale differently from a bona-fide alienee of the auction purchaser who derived
his rights before the date of publication of the 1968 Bill. Such an alienee ot
the auction-purchaser could not possibly have been aware of the hazards ot
purchasing the property of an indebted agriculturist at the time of purchase.
~~
(c) It is futile to contend that if the legislature has protected the iaterests
of an alienee by enacting sub-s. (6) it has made a hostile discrimination against
the auction purchaser as a class. [573 D]
·
CrviL APPELLATE JuRISIDICTION : CiviL Appeal No. 420 of 1973.
From the · Judgment and Order dated 17-8-1972 of the Kerala
D High Court in Original Petition No. 5576 of 1970.
T. S. Krishnamoorthy lyer, S. B. Saharya, K. Ram Kumar and
V. B. Salwrya for the Appellants in C. As. 420 and 442-445/73.
V. A. Sayed Muhamed Un CA 420/73) and K. M. K. Nair for
R. 1 in all appeals and R. 2 in C. As. 442, 443 and 445 of 1973.
E
Miss Lilly Thomas RR. 3-10 and CA 445/73.
The following Judgments of the Court were delivered by
F
F AZAL Au, I.-These appeals by certificate granted by the High
Court of Kerala involve a common question of law containing a challenge to the constitutionality of the Kerala Agriculturists' Debt Relief
Act, 1970 (Act II of 1970) {hereinafter referred to in short as the
Act).
The appeaUants have a-ssailed particularly section 20 of the
Act which entitles the debtors to recover the properties sold to purchasers in execution of a decree passed in liquidating the debt owed by
the agriculturists.
G
As the five appeals involve common questions of law we propose
to decide them by one common judgment.
·
Section 20 of the Act was assailed before the High Court oo three
grounds, namely.
1. That the Act was beyond the legisl3;tive competence of
the State legislature and did not fall within entry 30 of
the State List.
H
2. That the provisions of section 20 and the sub-sections
thereof were violative of Article 19 ( 1) (f) of the Constitution of India inasmuch as they sought to deprive the
appellants of their right to hold property;
,.
PATHUMMA v. KERALA
(Fazal Ali, J.)
543
3. That sub-sections 3 anp 6 of section 20 of the Act were
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as the stranger decree-holder was selected
for hostile discrimination whereas a bona fide alienee
who stood on the same footing as the stranger decreeholder was exempted from the operation of the Act.
A
Mr. Krishnamoorty Iyer, learned counsel for the appellants has
not pressed point No. 1 relating to the legislative competence of the
legislature and ha:s fairly conceded that in view of the dcc~sion of this
Court in the case of Fatehchand Himmatlal & Ors. v. State of lv1aharashtra etc. (1) the constitutionality of the Maharashtra Debt Relief Act,
1976 which contained similar or rather harsher pr~wis:ons as the Act
was uphclrf by this Court. . In' these circumstances, it will not be
necessary for us to examine this question any further.
B
B~fore however taking up the other two points raised by counsel
for the appellants which were pressed before us in this Court it may be
necessary to set out the approach which a Court has to make and the
principles by which it has to be guided in such mat!ers.
fCourts Interpret the; constitutional provisions against the social setting of the
country so as to show a complete consciousness and deep awareness
of the growing requirements of the society, the increasing needs of the
l)ation, the burning problems of the day and the complex issues facing
the people which the legislature in it~ wisdom, through beneficia,} legisThe judicial approach should be dynamic
lation, seeks to solve.
rather than static, pragmatic and not pedantic and elastic rather than
rigid. It must take into consideration the changing trends of economic
thought, the temper of the times and the living aspirations and feelings
of the people. This Court while acting as a sentinel on the quivive to
protect fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of the country
must try to strike a just balance between the fundamental ri~hts and
the larger and broader interests of society, so that when such
right
clashes with the ~larger interest of the countrv it must yield to the latter. Emphasising the role of Courts in such· matters this Court in the
case of lyoti Prashad v. The Administrator for the Union Territory of
Delhi(2) observed as follows : -
t.
"where the legislature fulfils its purpose and enacts Jaws,
which in its wisdom, is considered necessary for the solution
of what after all is a very human problem the tests of "reasonableness" have to be viewed in the context of the issues which
faced the legislature. In the construction of such laws and
particularly in judging of their validity the Courts have
necess£lrilv to approach it from the point of view of furthering
the social interest which it is the purpose of the leo:i~lation to
promote, for the Courts are not, in these matters. functi01ling as it were in vacuo. but as parts of a society which is trying, by enacted law. to solve its problems and achieve social
concord and peaceful adiustment and thus furtherino: the
moral and material progress of the community as q whole."
-(i )[1o71jT(C.R. 828.
(2) /1962] 2 S.C.'R. 125 at 14~.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
544
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[ 1978) 2 S.C.R.
It is ob 11ious that the legislature is in the best position w understand
and appredalt lhc needs of the people as enjoim:d by the Con~lltution
to bring abou! social reforms for the upliftment of the backward and
the weaker se<:t!ons of the society and for the improvement of the lot
of poor people. The Court will, therefore, interfere in this process
only when the statute is clearly violative of the right conferred on the
citizen under Part III of the Constitution or when the Act is beyond the
legislative competence of the legislature or ~mch other grounds. It is
for this reason that the Courts have recognised tha~ ther::- ~s ;1lways a
presumption in favOu:( of the constitutionality of a statute :md the onus
to prove its invalidity lies on the party which assails the same. In the
case of Mohd. Hanif Quareshi & Ors. v. The State of Bihar(l) while
adveninl! to tl1is w;peci Das, C.J. as he then was, speaking for 1he Court
uh~erved as follow~ : -
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"The pronouncement of this Court further establish,
amongst other things, that there is 'always a presumption in
favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and that the
burden is upon him, who attacks it, to show that there has
been a clear violation of the constitutional principles. The
Courts, it is accepted, must presume that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need's of its own
people. that its laws are directed to problems made manifest
by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds".
It is in tk light·of these principles that we have to appru~_.,:,n the impact of the Act on the fundamental rights of the citizen conferred on
him by Part Til of the Constitution.
1 he first lJianl of argument by learned Cl)unsel for the appellants
is that the 1\ct was violative of Article 19 (1 ) (f) ~Jf the Constitution
inasmuch as it takes away the right to hold property as guaranteed by
Article 1 ~1(1 )(f). Article 19(1) (f) may be extncted thus : "All citizens shaH have the ri~t
F
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(f) to acquire, hold and dispose of property".
It was contended that in the present case the appellants had acquired
valid title to the property after having purchased it at tho auction sale
in execution of a decree against the debtors. After the sale the propert1~s vested in the appellants and the law which invaded their right
to hold the property was clearly violative of ~~rticle 19(1) (f) of the
Constitution. There can be no doubt that Article 19 guarantees ail the
seven freedoms to the citizen of the country including the right to hold,
acquire and dispose of property. It must, however, be remembered
that :Article 1<) confers an absolute and unconditional right which 1s
sub.iec't oniy 1o reasonable restrictions to be placed by Parliament or
the legislature in pub1ic intere·st. Oause (5) of Article 19 runs thus:
"Notll,ing in sub-clauses (d), (e) and (f) of the said
clause shall effect the: operation of any existing Jaw in so far as
(I) rJ959] S.C. R. 629.
._
/~
PATHUMMA V. KERALA (Fazal Ali, J.)
545
it imposes, or prevent the state from making any law imposing,
reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred by the said sub-c1auses either in the interests of the
general public or for the protection of the interests of any Schd-uled Tribe".
A perusal of this clause manifestly reveals that the right conferred
by Article 19(1) (f) is conditioned by the various factors mentioned in
dause ( 5). The Constitution permits reasonable restrictions. to be
placed on the right in the interest of the general public or for th~ protection of the interest of any Scheduled Tribe. The State in the instant
case daims protection under clause (5) by submitting that th~ provisions contained in the Act amount to. reasonable restrictions for the
general good of rm important part of the community, namely, the poor
agriculturist debtors. The object of the Act, according to the State, is
to remove agricultural indebtedness and thereby to eradicate one of the
important causes of poverty in this country. Such an object is undoubtedly in public interest, and, therefore, the restriction contained
in the Act must be presumed to be a reasonable restriction. This Court
has considered this question on several occasions during the last 2!
decades and has laid down several tests guidelines to indicate what
in a particular circumstance can be regarded as a reasonable restriction. One of the tests laid down by this Court is that, in judging the
reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by dause (5) of Article 19,
the Ccnrt has to bear in mind the Directive Principles of State Policy.
It will be seen that Article 38 contains a clear directive to the State to
promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as possible a social order in which justice, social, economic and
political shall inform aU the institutions of national life. Article 39 (b)
contains a direction to secure that the ownership and control of the
material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good. Indisputably; the object of the Act is to
eradicate rural indebtedness and thereby to secure tl1e common ~ood
of people Jiving in abject poverty.
object, therefore, clearly'- fulfils the directive laid down in Articles 38 and 39(b) of the Constitution
as referred to above.
In fact in the case of His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalavaru v. State of Kerala(l all the Judges constituting the Bench have
with one voice given the Directive Principles contained -in the Constitution a place of honour. Hegde and Mukherjea. JJ. as they then were
have said that the fundamental rights and the Directive Principles constitute the "conscience" of our Constitution. The purpose of the
Directive Principles is to fix certain socio and economic goals for immediate attainment by bringing about a non-violent social revolution.
Chandracbud, J. observed that our Constitution aims at bringing about
a synthesis between 'Funda!mental Rights' and the. 'Directive Prjnci-·
pJe& of State Policy' by giving tD the fanner a place of pride. and to
the latter a place of permanence.
.
In a latter case State of Kerala & Anr. v. N. M. Thomas & Ors.(::)
(1976) 2 S.C.C. 310 one of us (Fazal Ali, l) after analysing the
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(1) [1973] Supp. S.C.R. I.
(2) [1979] 2 s.c.c. 310.
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546
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1978] 2 S.C.R.
Judgment delivered by all the Judges in the Kesvananda Bharati's
case (supra) on the importance of the Directive Principles observed
as follows :
"In view of the principles adumbrated by this Court it is
clear that the Directive Principles form the fundamental
feature and the social conscience of the Constitution and the
Constitution enjoins upon the State to implement these directive principles. The directives thus provide the policy.
the guidelines and the end of socio-ec;onomic freedom of
Art~cles 14 and 16 are the means to implement the policy to
achieve the ends sought to be promoted by the directive
principles. So .far as the courts are concerned where there
is no apparent inconsistency between the directive principles
contained in Part III, which in fact supplement each other,
there is no difficulty in putting a hannonious construction,
which advances the object of the Constitution. Once this
basic fact is kept in mind, the interpretation of Articles 14
and 16 and their scope and ambit become as dear as day".
In the case of The State of Bombay v. R.M.D. ChamarbaugwoW.(l)
this Court while stressing the importance of directive· principles contained in the Constitution observed as follows :
"The avowed purpose of our constitution is to create a
welfare State. The directive principles of State policy set
forth in Part IV of our Constitution enjoin upon the State
the duty to strive to promote the welfare of the. people by
securing and protecting, as effectively as it may, a social
order i:11- which justice, social, economic and political, 8hall
inform all the institutions of the national ltfe".
In the case of Fa,tehchand Himmatlal & Ors. v. State of l\-1aha-
rashtra etc. (supra) the Constitution Bench of this Court observed
as fo1lows :
F
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"lncorporation of Directive Principles of State Policy
casting the high duty upon the State to strive to promote the
welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it may, a social order in which justice--social, ceo~
nomic and political-shaJ! inform all the institution!; of the
national life:, is not idle print but ~ommand to action. We
can never forget, except at our peril, that the Constitution
obligatr·s the State to ensure an adequate means of live'lih0od
to its citizens and to see that the health and strengrh of
workers, men and women, are not abused, that exploitation,
moral and material, shall be extradited. Jn short, State
action defending the weaker sections from social injustice
and all forms of exploitation and raising the standard of living
of the people, nece5sarily imply that economic activities~
attired as trade or business or commerce, can be de-recognised as trade or business."
(1) [1957] S.C.R. 874 at 921.
PATHUMMA v. KERALA
(Fazal Ali} J.)
In the instant case, therefore, we are not able to see any conflict between the directive princples contained in Article 38 and 39(b) and
the rcstr;ctions placed by the Act. In the case of The State of Bombay
& Anr. v. P. N. Bulsara( 1) this Court observed as follows ~-
A
''In judging the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed
by the Act, one has to bear in mind the directive principles
of State policy set forth in Article 47 of the Constitution."
r
Another test which has been laid down by this Court is that restrictions must not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature so as to go beyond the requirement of the interest of the general public. In the case of
Chintaman Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh(2) this Court observed as follows : -
"The phrase 'reasonable restriction' connotes that the limitation imposed on a person in enjoyment of the right should
not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature, beyond what is
..
B
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required in the interests of the public.
The word 'reasonable' implies intelligent care and deliberation, that is, the
choice of a course which reason dictates. Legislation which
arbitrarily or excessively invades the right cannot be said to
contain the quality of reasonableness and unless it strikes a
proper balance between the freedom guaranteed in Article
19(1) (g) and the social control permitted by clause (6) of
ArticJe 19, it must be held to be wanting in that quality."
D
What is required is that the legislature takes intelligent care and
deliberation in choosing a course which is dictated by reason and good
conscience so as to strike a just balance between the freedom contained
in Article 19 (1) and the social control permitted by clauses (5) and
(6) of Article 19. This view, was reiterated in the case of Messrs.
Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.( 3)
E
It has also been pointed out by this Court that in order to judge
the quality of the reasonable-ness no abstract or general pattern or a
fixed principle can be bid down so as to be of universal application and
the same will have to vary from case to case and with regard to changing conditions, the value of human life, social philosophy of the Consti~
t\Jtion, prevailing conditions and the surrounding circumstances
all
of which must enter into the judicial verdict.
In other words, the
position is that the Court has to make not a rigid or dogmatic but an
elastic and pregmatic approach to the facts of the case and to take
an over-all view of aU the circumstances, factors and issues facing the
situation. In the case of State of Madras v. V. G. Row(4 ) the Court
observed as follows : -
"It is important in this context to bear in mind that the test
of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should be applied to
--·-· each individual statute impugned, and no abstract standard,
(l) [1951] S.C.R 682.
(2) [1956] S.C.R. 759 at 763.
(3) [1954} S.C.R. 803 at 811-12.
(4) [1952] S.C.R. 597.
F
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SUPREME COURT ·REPORTS
[1978] 2 S.C.R.
or. general pattern, of reasonableness can be laid down as applicabJe t? all cases. The nature of the right alleged to have
been mfnnged, the underlying purpose of the restrictions impos<:d, the extent . and urgency of the evil sought to be reme<!ted thereby, the disproportion of the jmposition, the prevahlmg conditions at the time, should all enter into th2 judicial verdict.
In evaluating such elusive factors and forming
their own conception of what is reasonable, in all the circumstances of a given case, it is inevitable that the special philo-
~
sophy and the scale of values of the judges participating in
the decision should play an important part.>t
'1
\
This view was endorsed in the case of Mohd. Hanif Quareshi & Ors.
v. The State of Bihar(l) 1959 S.C.R. 629 at 660 where this Court
observed as follows :
"Quite obviously it is left to the court, in case of disput~,
to determine the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by
the law.
In determining that question the court, we con·
ceive, cannot proceed on a genera~ notion of what in reasonable in the abstract or even on a consideration of what is
reasonable from the point of view of the -person or persons
on whom the restrictions are imposed."
Similarly in the case of The Lord Krishna Sugar Mills Ltd. & Anr.
v. The Union of India & Anr. (1) the Court observed that the Court m
judging the reasonableness of a law, will necessarily see, not only the
surrounding circumstances but all contemporaneous legislat1on passed
as part of a single scheme.,
~
•
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)
To the same effect is another· decision of this Court in the case of
Kavalappara Kottarrathil Kochuni & Ors. v. The State of Madrss &
Ors.( 2 ) where this Court observ~ as follows :
F
"There must, therefore, be harmonious balancing between
the fundamental rights declared by Ar:ticle 19 ( 1) and the
social control permitted by Article 19 ( 5). It is implicit in
the nature of restrictions that no inflexible standard can be
laid down : each case must be decided on its facts."
In the case of Jyoti Pershad v. The Administrator for the Union
G
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Territory of Delhi (supra) at 147 Ayyangar, J. speaking for the Court
observed as follows :
"The criteria for d~termining the degree of restriction on
the right to hold property which would be considered reasonable, are by no means fixed or static, but must obviously
vary from age to age and be related to the adjustments necessary to solve the problems which comumnities face from time
to time."
(l) [1952] S.C.R. 597.
(2) [1960J 3 S.C.R. 887 at 928.
,j
PATHUMMA V. KERALA
I
~
(Fazal Ali, J.)
549
The fourth test which has been laid down by this Court to judge
the reasonablenesss of a restriction is to examine the nature and extent,
the purport and content of the right, nature of the evil sought to be
remedied by the statute, the ratio of harm caused to the citizen and
the benefit to be conferred on the person or the community for whose
benefit the legislation is passed, urgency of the evil and necessity to
rectify the same. In short, a just balance has to be struck between
the restriction imposed and tJte social control envisaged by clause ( 6)
of Article 19. In the case of Narendra Ku11Ulr & Ors. v. The Union
of India & Ors. (1) this Court observed as follows;
"In applying the test of reasonableness, the Court has to
consider the question in the background of the facts
and
circumstances under which order was made, taking into account the nature of the evil that was sought to be remedied
by such ~aw, the ratio ot the hann caused to individual citizens by the proposed remedy, to the beneficial effect reasonably expected to result to the general public. It will also be
necessary to consider in that connection whether the restraint
caused by the law is more than was necessary in the interests
of tl1e general public."
J.n the case of Eachan Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & On. c:~)
A
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this Court observed as follows :
"The Court has in no uncertain terms laid down the test
for ascertaining reasonableness of the restriction on the right~
guaranteed under Article 19 to be determined by a reference
to the nature of the right said to have been infringed, the
purpose of the restrictions sought to be imposed, the urgency
of the evil and the necessity to rectify or remedy it all of which
has to be balanced with the Social Welfare or Social purpose
sought to be achieved.
The right of the individual has
therefore to be sublimated to the larger interest of the- general
public."
The fifth test formulated by this Court is that there must be a
direct and proximate nexus or a ressonable connection between the
restriction imposed and the object which is sought to be achieved. In
?ther wotds, the Court has to see whether by virtue of the restriction
1mp0Sed on the right of the citl.zen the object of the statute is really
fulfilled or frustrated. If there is a direct nexus between the restriction and ~he. obje~t of the Act the!l a strong presumption in favour of
the constitutionality of the Act wtll naturally arise.
In the case of
K. K; Kochuni & Ors. v. State of Madras & Ors. (supra) this Court
observed as follows :
. . ..",'But the restrictions sought to be imposed shall not be
.arbitrary, but m';lst have reasonable. relation to the object
sought to be ach~eved and shall be m the interests of the
general public".
(1) [1960] 2 S.CR. 375.
(2) [1971) 1 s.c.c. 713 at 718.
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SUPREME COURT·REPORTS
[1978) 2 S.C.R.
Same view was taken by this Court in the case of 0. K. Ghosh &
Anr. v. E. X. Joseph(l) where Gajendragadkar, J. speaking for the
Court observed as follows :
"A restriction can be said to be in the interests ot
public order only if the connection between the restriction and
the public order is proximate and direct. Indirect or farfetched or unreal connecion between the restriction and
public order would not fall within the purview of the ex- .
pression 'in the interests of public order'."
Another test of reasonableness of restrictions is the prevailing
social values whose needs are satisfied by restrictions meant to protect
social welfare. In the case of The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Kaushaliya & Ors. (2) this Court while relying on one of its earlier decisions in the case of State of Madras v. V. G. Row (supra) observed
as follows : "The reasonableness of a restriction depends upon the
values of life in a society, the circumstances obtaining at a
particular point of time when the restriction is imposed, the
decree and the urgency of the evil sought to be controlled and
similar others".
We have deliberately not referred to the American cases because
the conditions in our country are quite different and this Court need
not rely on the. American Constitution for the purpose of examinlng
the seven freedoms contained in Article 19 because the social conditions
and the habits of our people are different. In this connection, in the
case of Jagmohan Singh v. The State of U.P. ( 3 ) this Court observed
as follows :
"So far as we are concerned in this country, we do not
have, in our constitution any provision like the Ninth
Amendment nor are we at liberty to apply the test of reasonableness with the freedom with which the Judges of the
Supreme Court of America are accustomed' to apply 'the
due process' clause".
Another important test which has been enunciated by this Court is
that so fur as the nature. of reasonableness is concerned it has to be
viewed not only from the point of view of the citizen but the problem
before the legislature and the object which is sought to be achieved by
the statute. In other words the Courts must see whether the social
control envisaged in clause ( 6) of Article 19 is being effectuated by the
restrictions imposed on the fundamental right. It is obvious that _if
'the Courts look at the restrictions only from the pointl of view of the
citizen who is affected it wi1l not be a correct or safe approach in as
much as the restriction is bound to be irksome and painful to the citizen
even though it may be for the public good. Therefore, a just balance
must be struck in relation to the restriction and the public good that is
(I) [1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 789 at 705.
(2) [1964J 4 S.C.R. 1002 at lOD.
(3) [1973] 1 S.C.C. 20 at 27.
PATHUMMA V. KERALA
(Fazal Ali, J.)
551
done -to the people at large. It is obvious that, howe~er important the
right of a citizen or an individual may be, it has to yteld to the larger
interests of the country or the community. In the case of Jyoti Per·
shad v. The Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi (supra)
this Court observed as follows :
"Where the legislature fulfils its purpose and enacts laws,
which in its wisdom, is considered necessary for the solution of what after all is a very human problem and tests of
'reasonableness' have to be viewed in the context of the
issues which faced the legislature. Jn the construction of
such laws and particularly in judging of their validity the
Courts have necessarily to approach it from the point of
view of fl,lfthering the social interest which it is the purpose
of the legisration to promote, for the Courts are not, in these
matters, functioning as it were in vacuo, but as parts of a
society which is trying, by 'enacted Jaw, to solve its problems
'and achieve social concord and peaceful adjustment and
thus furthering the moral and material progress of the community as a whole''.
It has also been held by this Court that in judging ·reasonableness
of restrictions the. Court is fully entitled to take into consideration
matters of common report, history of the times and matters of common knowledge and the circumstances existing at the time of legislation. In this connection. in the case of Mohd. Hanif Quareshi & Ors.
v. The Stcrte of Bihar (supra) the Court observed as follows :
"It must be borne in mind that the legislature is free to
recognise degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to
those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest and
finally that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the Court may take into consideration matters of
common knowledge, matters of comm~n report, the history
of the times and rna~ assume every state o.f facts which can
be conceived existing at the time of legislation".
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We do not mean to suggest that the tests laid down above are completely exhaustive but they undoubtedly provide sufficient guidelines
to the Court to determine the question of re'asonableness of a restriction whenever it arises.
·
We would now like to examine the facts and circumstances of the
principles enunciated above in order to
present case in the light of
find whether or not restrictions imposed by the Act on the rights of
the appellants are unreasonable. Before however going into this question, it may be necessary to give a brief survey of the facts of the
present case and the history of the period preceding the Act as also
the economic position of the debtors prevailing at the time when the
Act was passed. It appears that in Civil Appeal No. 420 of 1973 the
appei!ant was a stranger auction purchaser at a Court sale. The
creditor had obtained a mortgage decree against the debtor which was
tlie
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 2 S.C.R.
to be paid by instalments but as the debtor was not able to pay the
instalment, a decree for sale of the property was passed by the Court
and the property was auctioned and purchased by the appellant who
was not the decree-holder. The rest of the facts are not disputed and
need not be mentioned in the judgment. In the other appeals also
decrees were obtained by the credit9rs against the debtors and on
failure of the debtors to pay the instalments the property was sold
B and purchased at the auction by the decree-holders themselves.
It is
also not disputed that after the purchase of the properties some of the
appellants had built houses, planted trees and made other improvements
in the property.
When however the debtors launche9 proceedings
under the Act for restoration of the possession of the property on
payment of the decretal amount the appellants had challenged the
Act on the ground that it was unconsitutional as indicated above. The
c High Court has pointed out in its judgment that though the Act was
preceded by Act 31 of 195 8 under which benefits were conferred on
the debtors for debts incurred by the agriculturists before 14th July,
1958 but as this date was considered to be inadequate by an amendment in 1961 the date was exended to 14th July, 19 59. In spite of
this concession all the debtors were not able to, pay off their debts as
a result of which they lo_st their property which was sold in execution
D of the decrees brought by the creditors against them. · It was also
found by the High Court that as many as 102867 suits were filed in
various Courts in the St'ate after 14-7-1958 and in most of them no
relief could be given to the debtors because of the expiry of the date.
The very fact that most of the debtors were not able to pay debts and
save valuable propert!cs which were in their possesion. shows the pitiable condition and the object poverty in which they live. The High
E Court ha~ also given the facts, figures and statistics to pro\·.,:
the
economic condition of the agriculturist debtors.
In this connection.
the High Court has pointed out that the All-India Rural Credit Committee's Report, 1954 shews that 51. 77c of the Rural fam~ll.:.'i
in
Kerala arc indebted and out of this, the proportion between cultiv~:lnr-..
and non-cultivators is- 58.6 and 38.6 respectively. The All India
average borrowing per rural family was Rs. 160. The corresponding
F average for the cultivator and non-cultivator was Rs. 210 and R "· 66
respectively.
Of the average borrowing per family of Rs. 309
for
rural households. that of the cultivators was Rs. 358 per family
as
against Rs. 171 for non-cultivators i.e. almost double of that of the
cultivators. Family expenditure accounted for 49.8% in the case of
medium cultivators. 49.2% for large cultivator!\ and 37.2% for big
cultivators.
The rura-l credit survey of 1961-62 shows that 64% of
G the cultivators in Kerala are indebted, which is said to be the second
The aYerage of lmin borrowed by the cultivators in
biggest in India.
Kerala was Rs. 318/- per l10usehold as against Rs. 127 for the nonThe main purpose for the borrowing was for
cultivator household.
household expenditure and the capital expenditure on cultivation was
only 8.6lJ(_.
The report also shows that aggregate of the bormwinl!s
of the a~lculturist households in India have 1ncrease<l from R". 750
H crores in-1951-52 to 1034 crores in 1961-62. In other word~. there
has been an increase of 38% in one decade.
Although the le.vcl of
debt per household, is comparatively low in Kerala and so is the cost
PATHUMMA v. KERALA (Faza{ Ali, J.)
553
A
of cultivation and yet the cultivator is living from hand to mouth and
is not able to make both ends meet.
Consumer's needs and distressed circumstances assume an important role in adding to total debt. The
High Court has then referred to the report of Dr. C. B. Memoria and
has quoted therefrom.
Apart from these facts of history the entire matter was considered
exhaustively by a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of
Fatehchand Himmatlal & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra etc. (supra)
where this Court referred to several reports and Krishna Iyer, J. speaking for the Court and quoting exhaustively from the various reports
made the following observations :
''Quite recently the report published by the AH India
Rurc.1l Debt and Investment Survey relating to 1971-7_2 also
depicts an increasing trend in rural indeqtedness.
It has
been estimated that the aggregate borrowings of all rural
households on June 30, 1971 was Rs. 3921 crores, while the
average per rural household being Rs. 503/-. Fortythree per
cent of the rural families had reported borrowings."
B
c
Quoting Professor Panikar, this Court observed as follows : -
D
"Perhaps, it may be that the need for borrowing is taken
for granted.
But the undisguised fear that the oppressive
burden of debt on Indian fanners is the main hindrance to
progr~ss is unanimous.
There are many writers who depict
indebtedness of Indian farmers as an unmixed evil.
Thus.
Alai Ghosh quotes with approbation the French proverb
that ·credit supports the farmer as the hangman's rope the
E
hanged."
"The economic literature. official and other, on agricu1tura1
and working class indebtedness is escalati.ng and disturbing.
Indc~d.
the 'money-lender' is an oppressive component of
the scheme."
F
"Tl1~
,.
'
condition of loan repayment are as designed that
the debtor is forced to sell his produce to the mahajan at low
prices and purchase goods for consumption and production
at high prices.
In many other ways take advantage of the
poverty and the helplessness of fanners and exploit
them. . . . . . Unable to pay high interest and the principal,
the farmers even lose their land or live from generation to
generation under heayy debt."
\.
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"The harmful consequences or indebtedness· are economic
an.d effect efficient farming, social in that the 'relations between tl1e loan given and loan receivers take on the form of
relations of hatred. poisoning the social life."
Dr. C. B. Memoria in his book 'Agricultural Problems of India'
has stressed that rural indebtedness has long been one of the most
pressing problems of India and observed as follows :
H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 2 S.C.R.
"Rural people have been under heavy indebtedness of the
The burden of this
average money-lenders and Sahukars,
debt has been passed on from generation to generation inasmuch as the principal and interest went on increasing for
most of them. According to Wold, 'The country has been
in the grip of Mahajans. It is the bond of debt that has
shackled agriculture."
Quoting the reasonableness of the restrictions this Court observed
as follows :
D
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"There was much argument about the reasonableness of the
restriction on moneylenders, not the general category as such
but the cruel species the Legi&lature had to confront and we
have at great length gone into the gruesome background of
economic inequities, since the test of reasonableness is not to
be applied in Vacuo but in the context of 1ife's realities."
"Money-lending and trade-financing are indubitably 'trade'
in the broad rubric, but our concern here is blinkered by a
specific pattern of tragic operations with no heroes but only
anti~heroes and victims."
"Eminent economists and their studies have been adverted to
by Jhe High Court and reliance has been placed on a report
of a Committee which went into the question of relief from
rural and urban indebt~ness which shows the dismal economic situation of the rural and farmer and the labourers.
It is not merely the problem of agricultural and kindred
indebtedness, but the menacing proportions of the moneylenders~ activities that have attracted the attention of the
Committee.
Giving facts and iigt)res, which are alanning,
bearing on the indebtedness amongst indu,strial workers and
small holders, the Committee has highlighted the exploitative
role of money-lenders and the high proportion of non-institutional borrowing."
"The subject matter of the impugned legislation is indebtedness, the beneficiaries are petty farmers, manual workers and
allied categories steeped in debt and bonded to the moneySo, in passing on its constitutionality, the
lending tribe.
principles of Developmental Juris prudence must come into
play."
H
"A meaningful, yet minimal analysis of the Debt Act, read
in the light of the times and circumstances which compolled
its enactment, will bring out the human setting of the statute.
The bulk of the beneficiaries are rural indigents and the rest
urban workers. These are weaker sections for whom constitutional concern is shown because institutional credit instrumentalities have ignored them.
Money-lending may be
ancilliary to commercial activity and benignant in its effects,
but money-lending may also be ghastly when it facilitates no
•
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PATHUMMA V. KERAL.~
(Fazal Ali~ J.)
555
flow of trade, n~ m~v~ment of C?mmerce, no promotion of
inter-course, .no serv~c~ng of . busmess, ?ut merely stagnates
A
.,
rural economy, ~tr~ngulates th~ borrowLog community . and
turns ~lign~nt ·~ .Its repercus_stons.n.
:·
·
..Every cause ct~ims i~s m;utyr and if the law, necessitated
bY practical constderattons, makes generalisations which hurt
a few, it cannot be helped ~y the Co_u.rt. Otherwise, tbe'
enforcement of the Debt Relief Act wdl.turn into an enquiry
into scrupulous ~d ~oscrup~ous credi~ors,
frustrating,
through endless litJgatJOn, t.he mstant rehef to the indebted
which is the promise of the legislature."
B
Having regard to ~be hls.tory of econ~mic le~lation in Keraln, the
sad plight of .the agncultunsts. qcbtors tn the State and the fact that c
the agricultunst debtors. ar~ .livmg from hand to mouth and below
sabsistance level, the observations made by this Court as quoted above
apply to the facts of the present case with full force because similar
conditions bad prevailed in l\1aharashtra which led to the passing of
the Maharashtra Debt Rclic;_f Act
We would now examine the particular provisions of the Act which D
have been assailed before us to find out whether the legislature seeks
to strike a just balance between the nature of the restrictions sought to '
be imposed on the appellants and social purpose sought to be achieved
·.
.,
by the Act.
The relevant portions of section 20 of the Act may be extracted
thus :
:'
I
"20. Sales or immovable property to be set asiJe i~ certain
ca~~s : (1) where any imri10vablc. propcrt~ in wh1c.h
an
agnculturist had an interest has been sold m executto~. of
any decree for recovery of a debt or sold under the provJslons
of the Revenue Recovery Act for the time being i~ ~crete
for the recovery of a debt due to a banking company m hqUldation.
E
"
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(a) on or after the 1st day of November, 1956; or
(.b) before the 1st day of November, 1956, but the posses·
t·
I•
Ston of the said property has not actualJy passed before the
?.Oth day of November 1957 from tbe judgment debtor
to the pur~haser, and the d~~rce-.holdcr is . th~ P.urcb~~~·
then, notwithstanding anythmg tn the Llmtta.tton R :
1963 or in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or tn tltc . ~
1
venue Reco\'cry Act for the time being in !\Jrcc, and.
Wl (
· filan<.ling that the sale has been confinncd, .such JU t~~b~~
debtor or the lcJ!a) rcprcscntive of such JUd~rcn ·th the
may deposit one-half of t11e purchase money to.gc\ 1~ed\n the
~<>stshof execution where such costs weretno~thl~ ~ix months
frurc nse money, and npply to the cour WlA~t to set aside
thom the date of the commencement of ~h~l if sntlsficd· that
tr>- c snle of the property, and the court .s a ,
. . .
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556
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 2 s.c.R.
the applicant is an agriculturist, order the sale to be set aside
and the court shall further order that the balance of the purchase money shall be paid in ten equal half-yearly instalments together with the interest accrued due on such balance
oustanding, till the date of payment of each instalment, at
six per cent per annum, the first instalment being payable
within a period of six months from the date of the order of
the Court.
(2) Where any immovable property in which an agriculturist had an interest has been sold in execution of any decree
for arrears of rent or m.ichavaram-
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(a) during the period commencing on the 1st day of November, 1956 and ending with the 30th day of January, 1961
and the possession of the said property has actually passed
on or before the 1st day of Apri1, 1964, from the judgmentdebtor to the purchaser; or
(b) before the 1st day of November, 1956 and the possession of the said property has actually passed during the
period commencing on the 20th day of November, 1957
and ending with the 1st day of April, 1964 from the judgment-debtor to the purchaser, then, notwithstanding anything contained in the Limitation Act, 1963 or in the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908- and notwithstanding that the saie
has been confirmed, such judgment-debtor or the legal representative of such judgment-aebtor may deposit one-half of the
purchase money together ~ith the costs of execution, where
such costs were not included in the purchase money and apply
to the Court within six months from the date of the commencement of this Act to set aside the sale of the property,
and the Court shall, if satisfied that the applicant is an agriculturist, order the sale to be set aside, and the Court shall
further order that the balance of the purchase money shall be
paid in ten equal half-yearly instalments together with the
interest accrued due on such balance outstanding till the date
of payment of each instalment, at six per cent per annum,
the first instalment being payable within a period of six
months from the date of the order of the Court.
(3) Where any immovable property in which an agriculturist had no interest has been sold in execution of any decree
for the recovery of a debt or sold under the proyisions of the
Revenue E.ecovey ..Act for the time being in force for the
recovery of a debt due to a banking company in liquidation
on or after the 14th day of July, 1958 and the decree-holder
is not the purchaser, then, notwithstanding anything in the
Limitation Act, 1963 or in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
or in the Revenue Recovery Act for the time being in force,
and notwithstanding that the sale has been confirmed, such
judgment-debtor or the legal representative of such judgment~
debtor may, deposit the purchase money and apply to the
'
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PATHUMMA V, KERALA. (Fazal Ali, 1.)
5 57
Court within six months from the date of the commencement
of this Act to set aside the sale of the property, and the court
shall, if satisfied that the applicant is an agriculturist, order
the sale to be set aside.
A
( 4) No order under sub--section ( 1) or sub-section (2) or
shall be passed without notice to the decree
holder, the transferee of the decree, if any, the auction-purchaser and any other person, who in the opinion of the
court would be affected by such order and without affording
them an opportunity to be heard.
B
( 5) Where improvements have been effected on the property sold after the date of the sale and before the notice
under sub-section ( 4), the value of such improvement as
determined by the court shall be deposited by the applicant
for payment to the aucti9n-purchaser.
c
sub~section (3)
(6) An order under sub--section (1) or sub-section (2) or
oob-section ( 3) shall not be deemed to affect the rights of
bonafide alienees of the auction-purchaser deriving rights
before the date of publication of the Kerala Agriculturists'
Debt Relief Bill, 1963, in the Gazette."
\ -~
)
An analysis of this section shows· that the statute seeks to create
three different categories of creditors who were liable to restore property to the debtors under circumstances mentioned in the section.
In the first place, where the decree~holder has purchased the property
at an auction sale but has not been able to get possession of the same,
the court has been given power to set asiqe the sale ( 1) if the applicant is an agriculturist and is prepared to deposit half of the decretal
amount immediately and pay the balance in 10 equal half yearly instalments; (2) where the purchaser who purchases the property at the
auction saJe is a stranger and not ~ decree-holder the sale can be set
aside only on the judgment-debtor de.positing the entire purchase money
within six months from the date of _the commencement of the Act.
Sub-section (5) further provides that if any improvements have been
made by the purchaser, the debtor will have to reimburse the purchaser
for the same, (3) A bonafide alienee who has purchased the property
from the auction-purchaser before the date of the publication of the
Act is completely exempted from the operation of the provisions of
the Act. The Act lays down a self-contained procedure for the
mode in which the sale is to be set aside and the conditions on which
this is to be done. Section 21 of the Act provides for an appeal to the
Appellate Court against any order passed under section 20 and where
an order is passed by the Revenue Court an appeal lies to the District
Court. Thus the important features of the Act may be summarised as
follows
·
1. That even if the auction-purchaser was a stranger and
may have purchased the property from a debtor at an
auction sale, he is liable to restore property on payment
of the decretal amount;
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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[1978J 2 S.C.lt.
2. That if the purchaser has made any improvement in the
property the debtor has to deposit the cost of the improvements in court before the sale is set aside.
3. That the debtor has to exercise his option of setting
aside the sale within six months from the date of the
Act.
The avowed object of the Act seems to give substantial relief to
the agriculturist debtors in order to get back their property and earn
their livelihood.
This is undoubtedly a laudable object and the
Act is a piece of social legishition.
As the decree-holder who bad
purchased the property is fully compensated by being paid the amount
for which he had purchased the property, it cannot be said that his
c right to hold the property has been completely destroyed. The purchaser gets the property at a distress sale and is fully aware of the pitiable conditions under which the debtor was unable to pay the debt. In
a Constit~tion which is wedded to a social pattern of society the purchaser must be presumed to have the knowledge that any soci<!J legislation for the good of a particular community or the people in general
can be brought forward by Parliament at any time. The Act, howD ever, does not take away the property of the purchaser without paying
him due compensation.
It is true that section 20 ( 2) (b) provides
for payment of the purchase money by instalments, bu~ no exception can
be taken to this fact as in view of the poverty of the debtor it is not
possible for him to pay the debt in a lump-sum and as the legislation
is for a particular community the provision for payment by instalments
cannot be said to work serious injustice to the decree-holder purchaser,
E A stranger auction purchaser has been treated differently because he
had nothing to do with the decree and is enjoined to return the property to the agri_culturist debtor on payment of entire amount in lumpsum without insisting on instalments. Thus, in short, the position is
that the object of the Act is to protect the poor distressed agriculturist
debtors from the clutches of greedy creditors who have grabbed the
properties of debtors ·and deprived the debtors of their main source of
F sustenance.
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Another object which is said to be fulfilled by the statute is to eradi-.
cate and remove agricultural indebtedness in the State by amelioration
and improvement of the lot of debtors by bringing them to the subsistence level and reducing their borrowings.
The Act does not provide for any drastic or arbitrary procedure as the property is restored
to the debtor only on payment of the purchase money.
The Maharashtra Debt Relief Act of 1970 contained such more drastic provisions
and in spite of that it was upheld by this Court as the restrictions were
held by us to be reasonable restrictions in the interest of the general
public.
To remove poverty by eradicating rural indebtedness is
one of the very important social purposes sought to be achieved by
our Constitution and it cannot be said that the invasion of the right
of the appellants is so excessive as to be branded by the quality of
unreasonableness. Having regard to the economic conditions prevailing in Kcrala before the passing of the Act, it cannot be said that the
•
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PATHUMMA v. KERALA (Fazal Ali, 1.)
559
restrictions are in any way arbitrary or excessive or beyond the requirements of the situation. Thus, all the tests laid down by this Court for
determining reasonableness of a restriction have been amply fulfilled in
this case and we are unable to find any constitutional infirmity in this
case on the ground that the Act is violative of Article 19(l)(f). We
are clearly of the opinion that the provisions of the Act are reasonable
restrictions within the meaning of clause ( 6) of Article 19. It is true
that Article 31 confers a guarantee on a citizen against deprivation of
his property except by authority of law. In other words, under Article
31 the property of the citizen cannot be taken away without there
The law must not only be valid
being a valid law for that purpose.
but it also must not contravene any of the provisions of Article 19
( 1) (f). In the instent case, in view of our findings that the Act is a
valid piece of legislation and amounts to a reasonable restriction within
the meaning of sub-clauses (5) and (6) of Article 19 the law passes
the test of constHutionality. In these circumstances, therefore, Article
31 is not infringed or violated by the Act.
Before closing this part of 1the case we might mention an argument
faintly submitted by learned counsel for the appellants, that having
regard to the statement of objects and reasons of the Act, the provi~
sions ofi the Act appear to be in direct conflict with the same. The
A
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statement of objects and reasons as published in the Kerala Gazette
dated 13th December, 1968 may be extracted thus:
"The Kerala Agriculturists Debt Relief Act, 1958 (31 of
1958) provides for some relief to the· indebted agriculturists
in the State. But the benefits conferred by that Act are
available only in respect of debts incurred by the agriculturists before the 14th July, 1958, on which date the Act cam~
into force. Even after this date the agricultural indebtedness
in the state, especially among the poor sections of the people
continued to be on the increase due to various factors. Several suits have been filed in courts for the recovery of debts
accrued after 14-7-1958 from poor indebted agriculturists.
It is considered necessary to give some relief to such agriculturists also. It is also considered necessary to limit ~e
benefit to any indebted agriculturist whose total amount of
debts does not exceed tv,:enty thousand rupees. It is, therefore, proposed to bring in a more comprehensive legislation
on the subject repealing the existing enactment".
1t was contended that the main object of the Act appears to give
relief only to those debtors who had filed suits for •recovery of debts
after 14th July, 1958. But the Act travels beyond the domain of
the statement ot objects ·and reasons by giving a blanket power to
the Court to set aside the sales which have been completed even
before tire passing of the Act.
We are, however, unable to agree
with this argument because in view of the clear and unambiguous
provisions of the Act, it is not necessary for us. to delve into the
statement of objects and reasons of the Act. Moreover, though the
main purrose may have been to give relief to the agriculturist debtors
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560
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 2 S.C.R.
after 14-7-1958 the object was to bring forward a comprehensive
legislation on various aspects of the matter in order to give relief to
the indebted agriculturists. This object iSI mentioned in the very first
part of the statement of objects and reasons. The words clearly show
that the Act was comprehensive in nature and was not confined to
any particular situation. In these circumstances, therefore, the contention oe learned counsel for the appellants on this score is over-ruled ..
This brings us. to the second branch or the argument relating to
the applicability of Article 14- of the Constitution of India. In this
connection, Mr. Krishnamoorthy Iyer submitted in the first place that
the special treatment afforded to the debtors un.der section 20 of the
Act is wholly discriminatory and is violative of Article 14. Secondly,
c it was argued on behalf of the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 420 of
1973 that they being stranger auction purchasers were selected for
hostile discrimination as against a bonafide alienee who has been given
complete exemption from the. operation of the provisions of the Act.
It is now well settled that what Article 14 forbids is hostile discrimination and not reasonable classification. Equality before law does
not mean that the same set of law should apply to all persons under
D every circumstance ignoring differences and disparties between men
a~d things. A reasonable, classification is inherent in the very concept
of equality, because all persons living on this eoarth are not alike and
have different problems. Some may be wealthy; some may be poor;
some may be educated; some may be uneducated some may
be highly advanced and others may be economically backward. It
is for the State to make a reasonable classification which must fulfi1:
E . two conditions: ( 1) The classification must he founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are
grouped together from others left out of-the group. (2) The differentia
must have a reasonable nexus to the object sought to be achieved by
the statute. In the case of Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri .Justice
S. R. Tendolkar & Ors. (1). The Court after considering a large number
of its previous decisions observed as follows :
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"It is now well established that while Article 14 forbids
class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification
for the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass
the test of permissible classification two conditions must be
fulfilled, namely, (i) that the classification must be founded
on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or
things that are grouped together from others left out of the
group; and (ii) that that differentia must have a rational
relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in
question. The classification may be founded on different
·basis, namely, geographical, or according to objects or
occupations or the like, what is necessary is that there must
be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object
of the Act under consideration".
(1) [1959] S.C.R. 279 at 296-97,
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PATHUMMA v. KERALA (Fazal Ali, !.)
561
This case has been relied upon in a large number of cases right from
1959 upto this date. In the case of State of Kerala & Anr. v. N. M.
Thomas & Ors. (supra) one of us (Fazal Ali, J.) while delivering the
concurring judgment observed as follows regarding the various aspects
of the concept of equality :
A
"It is also equally well-settled by several authorities
of this Court that Article 16 is merely an incident of Article
14. Article 14 being the genus is of universal application
whereas Article 16 is the species and seeks to obtain equality
of opportunity in the services under the State. The theory
of reasonable classification is implicit and inherent in the
concept of equality for t~ere can hardly be any country
where all the citizens would be equal in all respects. 'Equality
of opportunity would naturally mean a fair opportunity not
only to one section or the other but to all sections by removing the handioaps if a particular section of the society suffers
from the same. It has never been disputed in judicial pronouncements by this Court as also of the various High Courts
that Article 14 permits reasonable classification. But what
Article 14 or Article 16 forbid is hostile discrimination and
not reasonable classification. In other words, the idea of
classification is implicit in the concept of equality because
equality means equality to all and not merely to the advanced
and educated sections of the society. It follows, therefore,
that in order to provide equality of opportunity to WI citizens
of our country, every class of citizens must have a sense of
equal participation in_ building up an egalitarian society,
where there is peace and plenty, where there is complete
economic freedom and there is no pestilence or poverty, no
·discrimination and oppression, where there is equal opportunity to education, to work, to earn their livelihood so that
the goal of social justice is ach[evedu.
B
In view of these authorities let us see whether the selection of the
agricultUrists debtors by the State for the purpose of improving and
ameliorating their ~ot can be said to be a permissible classification. While
dealing with ther first argument we have already pointed out the eco,nomic conditions. prevailing in the State and the abject poverty in which
the agriculturist debtors were living. We have also referred to the
Directive Principles of Sl'ate Policy as contained in the Constitution
and have held that it is the duty of the legislature to implement these
directives. Having regard, tl1erefore, to the poverty and economic
backwardness of the agriculturist debtors and their miserable conditions
in which they live, it cannot be said that if they are treated as a
separate category or class for preferential treatment in public interest
then the said classificaion is unreoasonable. It is also clear that in
making the class,ification the Iegislature cannot be expected to provide
an abstract symmetry but the classes have to be set apart according to
the necessities and exigencies of the society as dictated by experience
and surrounding circumstances. AU that is necessary is that the classifi·
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cation should not be arbitrary, artificial or illusory. Having regard
to the circumstances mentioned above, we are unable to hold that
the classification does not rest upon any real and substantial distinction bearing a reasonable and just relation to the thing in respect of
which the same is made. This view was taken in the case of State of
West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar. ('1) In our opinion, both the conditions of reasonable classification indicated above are fully satisfied in
this case. For these reasons, we hold that section 20 of the Act is
not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and reject the first branch
of the argument on this point.
It was lastly contended that the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 42()
of 1973 (who originally was the appellant and after his heirs have
been brought on record appellants No. 1-8) had been selected for
hostile d~scrimination as against a bonafide alienee who also being in
the same position has been exempted from the provisions of the Act.
We have given our anxious consideration to this argument and we find
that it is not tenable. It is well settled that before a person can claim
to be discriminated against another he must show that all the other
persons are similarly situate or equally circumstanced.
The pleading
of the appellant does not at all contain any facts to show how the two
are similarly situate. Unless the appellant is able to establish that he
is equated with the bonafide alienee in all and every respect, Article 14
will have no application. Ia other words, discrimination violative of
Article 14 can only take effect if there is discrimination between equals
and not where unequals are being differently tre-ated vide State of
1 & K v. T. N. Khosa ·& Anr.('2 ).
In the case of Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. The Union of India &
Ors( 3 )this Court observed as follows:-
"lt must be admitted that the guarantee against the denial
of equal protection of the laws does not mean that identically
the same rules of law should be made applicable to all persons
within the territory of India in spite of differences of circumstances and conditions. As has been said by the Supreme
Court of America, equal protection of laws is a pledge of the
protecting of equal laws". Yick Co. v. Hopkins (23) 118
U.S. at 369 and this means ···subjection to equal laws applyin~t like to all in the same situation". Southern Railway
Co. v. Greene (~4) 216 U.S. 400, 412. In other words,
there should be no discrimination between one person and
another it as regards the subject-matter of the legislation
their position is the same".
A similar view was taken in the case of Southern Railway Co. v. Greene
(supra) where the Supreme Court observed as follows:"The legislature undoubtedly has a wide field of choice in
determining and classifying the subject of its Jaws, and if the
(1) {1952] S.C.R. 284 at 321.
(2) [1974] 1 S.C.R. 771 at 783.
(3) 11950] S.C.R. 869 at 911.
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PATHUMMA v. KERALA (Fazal Ali, J.)
563
law deals alike with all of a certain class, it is normally not
obnoxious to the charge of denial of equal protection; but
the classification should never be arbitrary. It must always
rest upon some real and substantial distinction pearing . a
reasonable and just relation to the things in respect of whtch
the classification is made, and classification made without any
substantial basis should be regarded as invalid".
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To the same effect is another decision of this Court in the case of
The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (supra) where this
Court observed as follows :
"It can be taken to be well settled that the principle
underlying the guarantee in ~rticle 14 is not that t?e . same
rules of law should be. applicable to all persons wtthm tbc
Indian territory or that the same remedies sho;,tld be made
available to them irrespectivE!! of differences of cucumstances.
It only means that all persons. similarly circumstanc~d .s?!ill
be treated alike both in privileges conferred and habthtles
imposed. Equal laws would have to be applied to all in the
same situation, and there should be no discrimination
between one person and another if as regards the subjectmatter of the legislation their position is substaritia11y the
same."
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Having regard to the nature; of the rights acquired by the stranger
auction purchaser and the bonafide alienee it cannot -be said that they
are similarly situate or happen to be in exactly the same position. So E
far as the stranger auction purchaser like the appellant is -concerned
three facts stare in the face. First, the stranger auction purchaser
participates in: the proceedings in execution of the decree passed
is
against the debtor and which culminate in the auction sale which
knocked down in favour of the purchaser. Thus, such a purchaser
has a clear notice of the circumstances under which the decree was
passed as also the fact that the property sold was the property of the F
debtor. If, therefore, the legislature at a later stage for the amelioration of the lot of the debtors passes a law to restore the property to
the debtor the stranger auction purchaser cannot be heard to complain.
In fact, his position is more or less the same as that of the decreeholder. Se.cond, the stranger auction purchaser knows that he has
purchased the property at a distress sale and the element of innocence
is completely eliminated. Third, under the provisions of the Act even G
if the property is restored to the stranger auction purchaser unlike the
~ecree-holder ~he P'-:rchaser is entitled to get the entire purchase money
In lump-sum mcludmg the cost before parting with the possession of
the property. This dearly distinguishes the case from that of the
decree~holder purchaser and shows that he is not seriously prejudiced .
On the o~her hand, a bonafide alienee does not purchase· the property
under a d!s:tress. sale but under sale which is negotiated with the vendor H
on the terms accepta~Ie to the purchaser. Secondly a bonafide alienee
has absolutely no notJce of the debt or the debtor or the circumstance
,
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 2 S.C.R.
under which the decree was passed and the property was purchased
by the vendor.
A bonafide alienee acquires a new title under a negotiated and
completed sale and in case the sale is allowed to be re-opened by the
Act it will lead to complicated questions which may cloud the real
issues, and frustrate the object of the Act. That apart even our
common law as a matter of public policy protects the interests of a
bonafide transferee for value without notice against voidable transac:tions. For instance, transfers which could be set aside under section
53 of the Transfer of Property Act or under section 2 7 (b) of the
Specific Relief Act, cannot be set aside or enforced as against such
transferees. The Act follows more or less the same policy nnd protects the bonafide alienee because his purchase is absolutely innocent.
While it is true that the provisions of the Act operate rather harshly on
the stranger auction purchaser but the rigours of the law have been
softened by the fact that under the provisions 'of the Act the auction
purchaser gets his full purchase money with costs for any improvement
that he may have made, At any rate, any discomfort that he might
have suffered as an individual has to be sublimated to the public good
of the community at large, in the instant case, the poor agricul:urist
debtors. Indeed if the bonafide alienee was also brought within the
fold of the Act then the classification might have been arbHr:uy end
unreasonable so as to smack of a draconian measure and might have
exceeded the permissible limits of discrimination contemplated by
Article 14.
For the reasOns given above we are unable to accept the arg1~ment
of Mr. Krishnamoorty Iyer that: the appeliant has been selected for
hostile discrimination under the provisions of section 20 of the Ac:t.
The argument is over-ruled. The result is that the judgment of the
High Court is upheld in all the cases and the appeals are dismissed.
In the peculiar circumstances of these cases, we leave the parties to
bear their own costs in this Court.
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SHINGHAL, J. These appeals against the judgment of the Kerala
High Court dated August 17, 1972 are by certificate under -article
133 (1) .(c) of the Constitution as it stood before the Constitution
(Thirtieth Amendment) Act, 1972. Appe·ais Nos. 442-445 (N) of
1973 arise out of the dismissal of some petitions on the basis of the
judgment in the o:her petitions which is the subject-matter of appcill
No. 420(N) of 1973. It will therefore be enough to refer to the facts
which have given rise to that appeal.
Civil Appeal No. 420(N) of 1973 relates to the dismissal of O.Ps.
No. 5576 and 6466 of 1970 and C.R.P. No. 124 of 1971. O.P. No.
5576 of 1970 was filed by Pathumma who had obtained a decree in
1953, on the basis of a registered deed of mortgage, and had brought
about the sale of some immovable properties of the judgment-debtors
who were agriculturists, as they were not able to pay the instalments
..,.
PATHUMMA V. KERALA (Shinghal, J.)
~·
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565
which were payable under the debt-relief legislation which was then
in force. The properties were purchased by Pathumma 'benami', in
the name of his son. Possession of the properties was taken from the
judgment-debtors during the petiod May 16, 1961 to March 15, 1967.
Pathumma's son executed a deed of surrender in his father's favour on
April 18, 1969 who built a house and effected valuable improvements
on the lands. In the meantime, ·the Keraia Agriculturists' Debt Relief
Act) 1970, hereinafter referred to as the Act, carne into force, and the
judgment-debtors filed a petition for setting aside the sale and redelivery of properties under section 20 (7) . Pathumma therefore challenged the constitutiqnal validity of section 20 of the Act by O.P. No.
5576 of 1970.
In 0. P. No. 6466 of 1970 the judgment debtors, who were agriculturists, committed defaults in the payment of the instalments for the
discharge of the debt under the debt relief law which was then in force.
The creditor purchased the properties under a Court sale on October
18, 1964, Which was duly confirmed, and took delivery of the lands.
The judgment-debtors applied for setting the sale aside and for redelivery of the lands, when the Act came into force. The auction
purchaser,..i-fto his turn, filed the aforesaid writ petition to challenge the
constitutional validity of section 20 of the Act.
In C. R. P. No. 124 of 1971 the decree-holder purchased the land of
the judgment-debtor, who was an agriculturist. The sale was confinned on July 5, 1968. The delivery of the land was taken on August
19, 1968 and the decree-holder made substantial improvements. The
judgment-debtor applied for re-delivery of the land under the provisions of the Act; and his petition was allowed. On appeal, the District
Judge remanded the case for evaluating the cost of the improvements.
While the matter was pending at that stage, the aforesaid petition ( 124
of 1971) was filed to challenge the constitutional validity of the rele-vant provisions of the Act.
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~s the High Court upheld the validity of section 20 of the Act by
the judgment dated August 17, 1972, and also dismissed the petitions
which are the subject of the other appeals Nos. 442-445, the appellants
have come up to this Court as .aforesaid.
The controversy in these. pppeals thus relates to the constitutional
validity of section 20 of the Act which provides, inter ·alia, for the
setting aside of the sale of immovable property in execution of any
decree for the recovery of a debt.
The section reads as follows,20-Sales of property to be set aside in ce:r;t~in cases.(1) Where any immovable property in which an agricu1turist
had an interest bas been sold in execution of any decree for
recovery of a debt or sold under the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act for the time being in force for the recovery of a debt due to a banking company in liquidation( a) on or aEter the 1st day of November, 1956; or
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
l1978) 2 S.C.R.
(b) before the 1st day of November, 1956, but the possession of the said property has not actually passed
before· the 20th day of November, 1957: from the
judgment-debtor to the purchaser, and the decreeholder is the purchaser, then notwithstanding anything in the Limitation Act, 1963, or in the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908, or in the Revenue Recovery
Act for the time being in force, and notwithstanding
that the sale has been confirmed, · such judgmentdebtor or the lega1 representative of such judgmentdebtor may deposit one-half of the purchase money
together with the costs of execution where such costs
were not included in the purchase money, and apply
to the court within six months from the date of the
commencement of this Act to set aside the sale of the
property, and the court shall, if satisfied that the applicant is an agriculturist, order the sale to be set as~de,
and the court shall further order that the balance,
of the purchase money shall be paid in ten equal halfyearly instalments together with the interest accrued
due on such baJarice outstanding till the date of payment of each instalment, at six per cent per annum,
the first instalment being payable within a period
of six months from the date of the order of the court.
(2) Where any immovable property in which an agriculturist had an interest has been sold in execution of any
decree for arrears of rent or michavaram_:_
(a) during the period commencing on the 1st day of
November, 1956 and ending with the 30th day of
January, 1961 and the possession of the said property
has actually passed O!l or before the 1st day of April,
1964, from the judgment-debtor to the purchaser; or
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(b) before the 1st day of November, and ·the possession
of the said property has actually passed during the
period commencing on the 20th day of November,
1957 and ending with the 1st day of April. from tl1e
judgment-debtor to the purchaser;
then, notwithstanding anything contained in the limitation Act, 1963 or in the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908, and notwithstanding that the sale has been confirmed, such judgment-debtor or the legal representative of such judgment-debtor may deposit one-half
of the purchase money together with the costs of
execution, where such costs were not included in the
purchase money and apply to the court within six
months from the date of the commencement of this
Act to set aside the sale of the property, and the court
shall, if satisfied that the applicant is an agriculturist,
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PATHUMMA V. KERALA (Shinghal, J.)
567
order the sale to be set aside, and the court shall further order that the balance of the purchase money
shall be paid in ten equallmlf-yearly instalments together with the intere~t accrued due on such balance
outstanding till the date of payment of each jnstalment,
as six per cent per annum, the first instalment being
payable within a period of six months from the date
of the order of the court
( 3) Where any immovable property in which an agriculturist had an interest has been sold in execution of
any
decree for ·the ·recovery of a debt, or sold under the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act for the time being inforce for the recovery of a debt due to a banking company
in liquidation, on or after the 16th day of July, 1958 and
the decree-holder is not the purchaser, then, notwithstanding
anything in the Limitation Act, 1963 or in the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 or in the Revenue Recovery Act for the time
being in force, and notwithstanding that the sale has been
confirmed, such judgment-debtor or the legal representative of such judgn:tent-debter may, deposit the purchase
money and apply to the cou_rt within six months from the date
of the commencement of this Act to set aside the sale of
the property, and the court shall, if satisfied that the applicant
is an agriculturist, order the sale to be set aside,
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(4) 1'io order under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2)
or sub-section ( 3) shall be passed without notice to the
decree-holder, the transferee of the decree, if any, the auctionpurchaser and any other person who in the opiniob of the
court would be affected oy such order and without affording
them an opportunity to be heard.
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(5) Where improvements ~!_ave been effected on the property sold after the date of the sale and before the notice
under sub-section ( 4), the value of such improvement as
determined by the court shall be deposited by the applicant
for payment to the auction-purchaser.
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( 6) An order under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2)
or sub-section ( 3) shall not be deemed to affect the rights
of bonafide alienees of the auction-purchaser deriving rights
before the date. of publication of the Kerala Agricu~turists'
Debt Relief Bill, 1963, in the Gazette.
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(7) Where a sale is set aside under sub-section (I) or
sub-section (2) or sub-section ( 3) , in case the applicant is
out of possession of the property, the court shall order redelivery of the property to him.
. (8) In respect of any sale of immovable property which
has not been ~onfirmed, the judgment-debtor if he is an agri·
culturist shall be entitled to pay the decree debt in accordance
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 2 s.c.R.
with the provisions of sections 4 and 5 and on the deposit of
the first instalment thereof, the sale shal~l be set aside.
(9) Where the judgment-debtor fails to deposit any of
the subsequent instalme1)ts, the decree-holder shall be entitled
to execute the decree and recover the defaulted instalment
or instalments in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
Explanation I~For the purposes of this section,~
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(a) the expression "court" shall include a revenue court
or authority exercising powers under the Revenue
Recovery Act for the time being in force; and
(b) the expression "judgment-debtor" shall include(i) a debtor from whom money was due to a banking
company in ·liquidation; and
(ii) a person from whom the entire amount due under a
decree has been realised by sale of his immovable property.
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Explanation II.~For the purposes of this section, an applicant shall be deemed to be an agriculturist if he would have
been such an agriculturist but for the sale of the immovable
property in respect of which he has made the application."
It has been argued by counsel for the appellants that section 20 is.
invalid as the Legislature of the Kerala State was not competent to
make the Act It has been urged that section 20 can not be said to
fall within the purview of Entry 30 of List II of the Seventh Schedule
to the Constitution inasmuch as it deals with a debt which had been
paid off by sale of the property in execution of the decree against the
agriculturist and was no longer in extstence.
It is article 246 of the Constitution which deals with the subjectmatter
of the laws to be made by the Parliament and the Legislatures
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of the States. Clause (3) of the Article provides that subject to
clauses (1) and (2) of the Article (with which we are not concerned)
the Legislature of a State has "exclusive power to make laws,--with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II.'' Entry 30
of the List specific~lly states the following matters as being within the
competence of the State Legislature,G
"30-Money-lending ~d money-lenders; relief of agricultural indebtedness."
H
It is therefore quite clear, and is beyond controversy, that the Act
which provides for "the relief of indebted agriculturists in the State
of Kerala" is within the competence of the State Legislature. Clause
( 1) of section 2 of the Act defines an "agriculturist", clause ( 4)
defines a "debt", clause (5) defines a "debtor" and the two Explanations to section 20 define the expressions "court", and ".iudgmentdebtor" and give an extended meaning to the expression "agriculturist"
PATHUMMA v. KERALA (Shinghal ].)
569
so as to include a person who would have been an agriculturist but for A
the sale of his immovable property. The other s~tions provide ~or
the settlement of the liabilities and payment of the debt (along With
the interest) of an agriculturist, including the setting aside of the
sale in execution of a decree, and the bar of suits. The subject-matter
of the Act is therefore clearly within the purview of Entry 30 and
counsel for the appellants have not been able to advance any argument which could justify a different view.
Reference in this connec- B
tion may be made to this Court's decision in Fatehchand Himmatlal and
others v. State of Maharashtra etc.(l) It has however been argued that
the entry would not permit the making of a law relating to the debt of
an agriculturist which has already been paid by sale of his property in
execution of a decree and is not a subsisting debt.
It is true that section 20 of the Act provides for the setting aside
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of any sale of immovable property in which an agriculturist had an
interest, if the property had been sold, inter alia, in ex~ution of any
decree for the recovery of a debt (a) on or after November 1, 1956,
or (b) before November 1, 1956, but posses'Sion whereof has not actually passed before November 20, 1957, from the judgment-debtor to
the purchaser, and the decree-holder is the purchaser, on depositing onehalf of the purchase money together with the cost of the execution D
etc. The section therefore deals with a liability which had ceased
and did not subsist on the date when the Act came into force.
But
there is n_othing in Entry 30 of List II to show that it wiH not be attracted and would not enable the State Legislature to make a law
simply because the debi of ilie agriculturist had been paid off under
a distress sa·le.
The subject-matter of the entry is "relief of agricultural indebtedness" and there is no justification for the contention that E
it is confined only to subsisting indebtedness ari~ would not cover the
necessity of providing relief to those agriculturists who had lost their
immovable property by court sales in execution of the decrees against
them and had been rendered destitute. Their problem was in fact more
acute and serious, for they had lost the wherewithal of their livelihood
and reduced to a state of penury. An agriculturist does not cease
to be an agriculturist merely because he bas lost his immovable pro- F
perty, and it cannot be said that the State is not interested in providing
him necessary relief merely because he has lost his immovable property.
On the other hand llis helpless condition calls for early solution and it is only natural that the State Legislature shouM think of
rehabilitating him by providing the necessary relief under an Act-of the
nature under consideration in th?se cases.
There is in fact nothing G
in the wordings of Entry 30 to show that the relief contemplated by
it must necessarily relate to any subsisting indebtedness and would not
cover the question of relief to those who have lost the means of their
livelihood because of the delay in providing them legislative relief. It
is well-settled, having been decided by this Court in NavincJzandra
Mafatlal v. The Commissioner of Income-tax Bombay City, (2) that
"in construing words in a constitutional enactment conferring legisla- H
tive power the most liberal construction should be put upon the words
(1) [1977) 2 S.C.R. 828.
(2) [1955} 1 S.C.R. 829.
570
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so that the same may have effect in their widest amplitude".
This
has to be so lest a legislative measure may be lost for a mere technica-
'
lity.
The High Court has made a mention of the earlier legislation in
the same field.
lt has also made a reference to Act 31 of 1958
which was quite similar to the Act and has pointed out how the AmendB ing Act of 1961 became infructuous because of the unintended delay
in amending it suitably.
Great distress was therefore caused tc the
indebted agriculturists because of the sale of their immovable properties by court auctions.
Such agriculturists were rendered completely
helpless and it was only proper that the State Legislature should have
thought of coming to their rescue by enacting a law with the avowed
intention of providing them some relief from the difficulties in which
they were enmeshed as a result of their indebtedness, by devising the
necessary means for the restoration of their immovable properties. The plight of those agriculturists was in fact worse than
that of an agriculturist who, while he was groaning under tlw burden
of his debt, had the satisfaction of having his immovable property with
him as a possible means of redeeming the future some day. If the
Legislature could provide relief to agriculturists against their _subsistD ing debts by ·legislation under Entry 30, there is no reason why it should
find itself disabled from doing so in the case of these agriculturists who
had lost their immovable properties in the process of the liquidaticn of
their debts by court sales even though their case called for greater
sympathy and speedier relief.
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It has next been argued that section 20 of the Act is unconstitutional as it impinges on the fundamental right of the decree-holder, or
other auction-purchaser, under article 19(1){f) of the Constitution to
"hold" the property acquired by him at a Court sale and of which he
had become t}le owner by the express provision of section 65 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
It has thus been argued that by vinue of
article 13 of the Constitution, section 20 is void as it is inconsistent
with, or is in derogation of, a fundamental right.
As has been urged on behalf of the State, an answer to this argument is to be found in clause ( 5) of Article 19 which specifically pro- ·
vides, inter alia, that nothing in sub-clause (f) of clause (1) of article
19 shaH "prevent the State from making any law imposing reasonable
restrictions on the exercise of ariy of the rights" conferr~d by the said
sub-clause in the interest of the general public. It cannot be gainsaid
that agriculturists, and even indebted agriculturists, from the bulk or,
at any rate, a considerable part of the rural population, in an essentially rural economy like ours, and so if a restriction is reasonable in
their interest, it would squarely fall within the purview of clause (5).
Reference in this connection may be made to this Court's decision in
Kavalappara Kattarathil Kochuni and Others v. The State of ,\1adras
and others(!) and State of Andhra Pradesh v. Khapperelli Chinna
Venkata Chalamayya Sastri( 2 ) where it has been held that the redress
(1) [1960] 3 S.C.R. 837.
(2) [1963]1 S.C.R. 155.
J
PATHUMMA V. KERALA (Shinghal }.)
571
-of a real and genuine grievance of a section of the community is a
measure in the interest of the general public.
As has been stated, the High Court has made a reference to the
history of the debt relief legislation and the facts and circumstances
which led to the passing of the Act. Thousands of suits were pending against indebted agriculturists in various courts and immovable
properties of a large number of agriculturists had been sold rendering
them completely helpless. So if the State Legislature passed the Act,
in the interest of ihe general public, to provide relief of the nature
mentioned in section 20 in view of the rampant agricultural indebtedness
in the State, and the urgency of the malady, it does not require much
.argument to hold that the restriction provided by that section was
clearly "reasonable".
Even so, the section makes provision for the
repayment of the purchase money, the costs of the execution and the
improvements made by the purchaser. The restriction provided under
section 20 is therefore reasonable in every sense and the High Court
rightly rejected the argument to the contrary.
·~·
It has lastly been argued .that section 20 of the Act is violative of
article 14 of the Constitution as 'it discriminates without reason between(a) a decree-holder, auction-purchaser and a stranger
auction-purchaser (sub-section ( 1) (b) and subsection (3)), and
(b) an auction-purchaser at a court sale and a bona fide
alienee of an auction-purchaser [sub-section ( 6) ].
What Article 14 guarantees is the right to equality in directing that
the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the
equal protection of the laws within the country. The prohibition is
however not absolute in as much as this Court has taken the view that
it incorporates th~ doctrine of "classification)' (See Makhan Lal Malhotra and others v. The Union of India( 1 ). It is therefore equally wellsettled that Article 14 will not prevent the making of a law which gives
rise to a classification based on an intelligible differentia 'having a
rational relation with the object to be achleved thereby:
-~-
Now sub-section (1) of !Section 20 provides that if a decree-holder
is the pur~haser at a cou!t sale, the judgment-debtor (or his legal
Te_Presentatlve) may de~ostt one-half of the purchase money together
wtth the costs of executiOn (where the costs were not included in the
purchase money) and apply to the court within six months from the
-date of commencement of the Act to set aside the sale and the court
shall.set aside the sale and make an order for the paymen't of the balance
o~ the purch~se money in ten equal half-yearly instalments together
:"'Ith accrued n~terest on the balance till the date of payme!lt of each
mstalm.en~ at SlX ~er cent per annum.
As against this, sub-section
{ 3) provides that ~ the deer&?holder. is not the purchaser, the judgment-debtor (or his legal representattve) may deposit the purchase
(1) [1961J 2 S.C.R. 120.
il-1146SCI/77
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572
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 2 S.C.R.
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money and make an application for setting aside the sale and the court
shall set aside the sale. The treatme-nt to a decree-holder purchaser
is therefore different and is less advantageous than the treatment to a.
purchaser who is not a decree-holder.
The decree-holder purchaser
is treated as a diff~rent class (for it is welHmown that) decree-holders
very often exp!oit their debtors in many ways and sales to them are
genera11y viewed with suspicion and disfavour so much so that, as has
B been expressly provided in Order XXI rule 72 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, it is not even permissible for a decree-holder to bid for or
purchase the property without the express permission of the Court. The
decree-holder purchaser has thus rightly been treated as a class by
himself and that classification obviously has the object of benefiting the·
agriculturist judgment-debtor ·by permitting him to deposit only half
the purchase money ap.(,i paying the balance in instalments. It can~
c not therefore be said that the· impugned provision violates article 14of the Constitution on that account.
There is also justification for
treating an auction-purchaser at a court sale differently from a bona
fide alienee of the auction purchaser who derived his rights before the
date of publication of the Kerala Agriculturists' Debt Relief Bill, 1968,
in the State Gazette. Such an alienee of the auction-purchaser could
not possibly have been aware of the hazards of purchasing the property
D of an indebted agriculturist at the time of the purchase, and it is futile
to contend that if the Legislature- has protected his interest by
an
express provision in sub-.section ( 6) of section 20, it has thereby made
a hostile discrimination against the auction-purchasers as a class.
E
There is thus no force in the arguments which have been advanced
on behalf of the appeHants and the appeals are dismissed with costs.
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Appeals dismiss~d~
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