N. K. CHAUHAN & ORS . versus STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 1 November 1976 | [1977] 1 S.C.R. 1037 | 1976 INSC 275
Key facts
- Decided
- 1 November 1976
- Bench
- P.N. BHAGWATI*, V.R. KRISHNA IYER, S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 463/1976
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1977] 1 S.C.R. 1037
- Neutral citation
- 1976 INSC 275
Text of the judgment
1037
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N. K. CHAUHAN & ORS .
v.
STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
November I, 1976
[P. N. BHAGWATI,.V. R. KRISHNA IYER ANDS. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI,
JJ.]
B
Constitution of India-Articles 14-16-Civil Service-Seniority-Direct
Recruits and Promotees-Quota-Whether roster implicit-Benefit of ServiceWor~~& Phrases-"As far as ptacticab/e".
\
The appellants are the promotee Deputy Collectors in the State of Gujarat.
The conlf'sting respondents are the direct r ~cruits to the parent cadre of Deputy
Collectors. 7 Deputy Collectors who are the contesting respondents in this
appeal and who were directly recruited as Deputy Collectors in and after 1963
claimed that they were senior to the appellants who were the promotees promoted as Ueputy Collectors between the years 1960 and 1963 by tiling a Writ
Petition in the High Court. The routine source of recruitment to the posts of
Deputy Collectors used to be Mamlatdars who were promoted as Deputy Collectors. In 1939, direct recruitment policy was also evolved for this post. By an
order of 1941 the mode of determining seniority bdween direct recruits and
promotees was settled. As far as the direct recruits were concerned, their
seniority was to run from the date of their appointment on probation and in the
case of promotees such service was to begin with promotion in substantive
vacancy if continued without break. During the year 1950 to 1959 the direct
By the Bombay Government Re"olutinn dated
recruitment was discontinued.
30-7-1959, the mode of direct recruitment was again started and the proportion
in which the recruitment from the two sources, namely, the direct recruits and
the promotees, was fixed as 50 : 50 as far as practicable.
On 1-5-1960, the Bombay State was bifurcated into Gujarat and Maharashtra. On 1-5-1960, a circular was issued by the Gujarat Government adopting the rules, resolutions, notifications etc. of the Bombay State. By a further
clarificatory resolution dated 27-5-1960 Gujorat Government provided that
nothing contained in the circular dated 1-5-1960 shall apply to appointments of
officers, authorities or persons which may be made by the Government on or
after 1-S-1960. During the year 1959-62, no direct recruitment was made but
many promotions were effected. The Writ Petition filed by the direct recruits
was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court. The Divi,ion
Bench of the High Court, however, accepted the appeal of the contesting
respondents.
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In an appeal by Special Leave the appellants contended :
1. The expression 'as fai;. as practicable' in the resolution of 1959 prov.ides a sensible safety valve. Therefore,, t~e rule is neither except10n-proof ngr abstractly absolute but reahsttc and flexibly true to life.
2. The mandate of equality in Articles 14 and 16 does not require pushing down the promotees in the seniority list in the fact of their actual
service and legal appointment.
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3. Rotation is not implicit in quota. Quota without rotation is also
ren,onnble and constitutional at< mu~h as ouota with ro•a•ion. The
choice, both being permissible and fair, is left to the Administration.
4. The contesting respondents contended
(i) The ru 1e of Jaw is the enemy of ·arbitrary absolutism and the dis-
cretion to dis0bey is a doctrine of
subscribed to by a Court.
despotism
and
cannot
be
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(ii) 'As far as practicable' does not pennit the State to deviate from
it. It merely authorises. provisional variations or adlboc solutions
or emergency arrangements to meet the difficulty of the Administration without making formal or regular appointments to the posts
in question.
(iii) Rotational system is implicit in quota.
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(iv) Any deviation from rotational system is violative of Articles
and 16 of the Constitution.
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Allowing the appeal held :
1. The State in tune with the mandate of the quota rule must make
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serious effort• to secure hands to fill half the number of Vai:tncies
from the open market. If it does not succeed despite honest and
serious effort, it qualifies for departure from the rule. If it has become non-feasible, impracticable to get the requisite quota af direct
recruits having done all that it could, it was free to fill the post by
promotion of suitable hands, if the filling up of the vacancies was
administratively necessary and could not wait. The sen-e of the
rule is that as far as possible the quota system must be kept up and if
not practicable promotees in place of direct recruits or direct recruits
in place of promotees may be inducted applying the regular procedures without suffering the seats to lie indefinitely vacant.
[1050 F-H, 1051 Al
(a) The quota system does not necessitate the adoption of the rotational rule in practical application. Many ways of working out
'quota' prescription can be devised of which rota is certainly one.
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(b) While laying down a quota when filling up vacancies in a cadre
from more than one source, it is open to Government. subject to
tests under Art. 16, to choose 'a year' or other period of the
vacancy by v~acancy basis to work ont the quota among the sources.
But once the Court is satisfied, examining for const;tntionality
the method proposed, that there is no invalidity, administrative
technology may have free play ine choosing one or other of the
familiar p~ocesses of implefl!enting the quota rule. We, as Jud!!es,
cannot stnke down the particular scheme b&cause it is unpalatable
to forensic taste.
(c) Seniority, normally, is measured bv length of continuou<. officiating service-the actual is easily accepted as the legal. This doe~
not preclude a different prescription, constitutionality tests being
satisfied.
(d) Promotees regularly appointed during period 1960-62 in exces• of
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2. The Government sent a requisition for 12 posts of Deputy Collectors
to the Gujarat Public Service Commission as early as in October, 1960.
On account of commission having raised various queries including
requirements of adequate knowledge of Marathi and Gujarati, the
examination could not be held during the years 1960-1962. The
explanation given by the Government is prima facio good and not
rebutted as got up. Since the Government took active steps in the
direction of direct recruitment, the exception to the Government
Resolution comes into operation. The Government in the present caso
did all that it conld. [1051 A-Fl
3. Quota is not inter-locked with Rota. [1052 Al
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their quota, for want of direct recruits can claim their whole length
of service for seniority.
.
(e) Promotees appointed in 1963 and onwards in excess of their quota
should be pushed down and absorbed in vacancies in their quota
during subsequent years. [1057 E-H, 1058 A-CJ
;.
N. K. CHAUHAN v. GUJARAT (Krishna Iyer, J.)
1039
Mervyn Coufindo & Ors. v. Colleclor of Cus1oms, Bombay [19671. 3. s.c;.R.
distinguished~ Badami v. S11ue of Mysore & Ors. [1976] 1 S.C.R. 815 dtstmgu1sh-
A
ed, Govind Dattaray Kelkar and Ors. v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports
& Ors. [1967] 2 S.C.R. 29 distinguished and doubted.
,
/
S. G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India [1967] 2 S.C.R. 703 distinguished.
Bishan Sarup Gupta v. Union of India [1975] Supp. S.C.R. 491, Union of
India v. Bishan Sarup Gupta [1975] 1 S.C.R. 104 and A. !{. Subbraman & Ors.
v. Union of India [1975] 2 S.C.R. followed.
The Court directed the Government to draw up expeditiously a fresh seniority list in the light of the observations made in the Judgment. [105& HJ
01'iter : (Lengthy legal process, where administrative immediacy is the desideratum is a remedy worse than the malady. The fact that the present case has
taken around 5 working days for oral arguments is a sad commentary on the
legal syfiem. To streamline and to modernise Court management is a _cinderella subject in India, as elsewhere. We too have miles to go for law ancl 1ust1ce
to meet).
B
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CNIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 463/76.
(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
11/12-11-1975 of the Gujarat High Court in L. P. A No. 113/74).
D. V. Patel, P. H. Parekh and Miss Manju Jetley for the
lants.
M. C. Bhandare, S. P. Nayar and M. N. Shroff, for
Gujarat.
·
Appel-
D
the State of
R. K, Garg and S. C. Agarwala, for Respondents Nos.
8-11.
5-6 and
M. N. Shroff, for the State of Maharashtra.
E
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KRISHNA hER, J.-This is a typical 'service' appeal, by special
leave, which prompts the topical question : Is it wiser national policy
to process disputes regarding seruority, promotion, termination and
allied matters affecting the public services, through the docket-bound,
formalised, methodology of the judicature adopting its traditional,
time-consuming, tier-upon-tier system and handicapped by absence of
administrative expertise, accessibility to critical information and other
limitations on the mode and extent of relief, or, alternatively, through
built-in, high-powered, but credibility-wise less commanding, agencies
of composite skills• and processes and flexible remedial jurisdictions ?
'Justice and Reform' is a recurrent interrogation.
I '
· Our civil services, if only the static and stratified system were
transformed and the men properly oriented and activated, may well
prove equal to the dynamic challenges of our times but for the pathetic phenomenon of numbers of officials being locked in long forensic
battles. This litigative pathology of the members of the public services deplorably diverts the undivided energies, sensitive understanding and oeople-based disposition demanded of them for the fulfilment
of the Nation's Tryst with Destiny through implementation of massive
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and multiform developmental plans. Hopefully, constructive thinking on impregnable, competent and quick-actmg (but not tlerobed or
devalued) mtra-structures and procedures for improving and accelerating the system of justice to the public services is currently under
way.
Now to the merits. The briefs are big and the arguments long,
but the factual matnx and the legal contl1cts lend themselves to be
condensed without detriment. The competition between two categories ot members borne on the cadre of Deputy Collectors of the State
of Gujarat viz .. direct recruits and in-service promotees, on the_ilisue
of seruority inter-se, with its futuristic career overtones, is the crunch
question in this civil appeal. The grey area of 'service jurisprudence'
covered before us encompasses several decisions and if 'b~ good
disputing shall the law be well known', there has been so much disputation of learned length at the bar that the legal points should have
been more pellucid than the precedents read and re-read made us
feel. 'The aid of the purifying ordeal of skilled argument' when too
lapidary and finical reaches a point of RO return, despite Megarry J
to the contrary in Cordell v. Second Clanfield Properties Ltd.(').
Seven Deputy Collectors, arriving by direct recruitment in, and
after 1963, claim to be ahead, in the gradation list, of their more
numerous counterparts, former mam!atdars, whose promotional incarnation as Deputy Collectors, dates back to the years 1960-63. The
title of these younger incumbents to be elder in the Civil List is
primarily founded on a basic Resolution of Government of July 30,
1959 regulating recruitment to the Deputy Collectors' cadre by the
then Bombay State adopting a quota basis. The Gujarat State, carved
out of Bombay and formed on May 1, 1960, continued the system;
and so, simplistically presented, the fate of the 'seniority' struggle critically turns on the construction the Bombay Resolution of 1959 bears,
the rival versions having been alternately frowned upon or favoured
at the original and appellate docks of the High Court. There are
other matters of moment debated at the bar and we will pass on some
of them at later stages. In administrative and legal terms, this case
is the projection of the common rivalry for promotional positions between fresh, young recruits and old, seasoned promotees, between alleged excellence of talented youth and tastoo explilrience of mellowed
age. Sympathies may sway either way and reasons often spring from
sympathies.
•
To be captiously wise in retrospect may itself border on vice. Even
so, we are constrained to observe that when government orders, as
here, have the flavour of law and impact upon the fundamental rigl1ts
and equal opportunities of citizens, they have to be drafted with the
case that legal orders deserves lest avoidable litigation should thrive
for no better reason than that administrative orders or subsidiary legislation have been drawn up with a casualness that betrays the skills of
insoucience. Law must be precise, simple, clear, comprehensive and
(1) (1968] 3 All E.R. Ch. Dn. 746.
N. K. CHAUHAN v. GUJARAT
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(Krishna Iyer, l.)
1041
there is a duty on the law-maker at every level not to injure the com-·
munity b:ftengled webs of rules, orders and notifications whose meaning is revealed only through transcendental meditation .or constant
litigation. In a socialistic pattern of society there is hardly any part
of national life or personal life which is not affected by some legal
rule or other. When men have to look to the law from the cradle to
the grave, making of even subsidiary laws demands gr,eateilt attention.
A
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To begin with the legal beginning is best done with the Bombay
Government Resolution of 1959 after giving a thumbnail sketch of
the relevant service structure and other minimal particulars .
••
The composite Bombay State, for purposes of Revenue Administratio~ had been divided into Divisions which were separate units for
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promotional prospects, liability to transfer etc., of deputy collectors.
The routine source of recruitment to these posts used to be mamlatdars
who were transferred as deputy collectors by promotion. As early as
1939, a different recruitment policy had been evolved for picking
suitable hands from the open market by direct nomination.
The
inevitable concomitant of a plurality of recruitment categories is the
evolution of a workable rule of inter se seniority. So, by an order
of 1941, the mode of determining seniority between 'nominees' and
'promotees' was settled. Service, for seniority purposes, so far as
direct recruits were concerned, was to run from the date of their appointment on probation and, in the case of promotee officers, such
service was to begin with promotion in substantive vacancies, if continued without break. For reasons obscure, the direct recruitment
scheme of infusion of fresh blood-to use the usual validating vascular
metaphor-to invigorate the Administration, hibernated from 1950
until 1959. However, the crucial government decision of July 30,
1959 not merely re-activated the mode of direct recruitment but fixed
the promotion in which recruitment from the two sources was to be
made, referred to conveniently as the quota system. The heart of the
debate before us is whether a quota prescription, willy nilly, does
postulate ex-necessitate a rota process in practice. We may here read
the resolution itself :
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Deputy Collector :
Recruitment of probationers
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60VERNMENT OF BOMBAY
REVENUE DEPARTMENT
Resolution No. RTC. 1157 /99153-D
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Sachivalaya, Bombay, 30th July 1959
Read-Government Resolution No. 9313/45, dated the 6th February 1950.
Government Resolution No. 9313/45, dated the 24th July
1951.
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[1977] 1 S.C.R.
RESOLUTION :
Government had for sometime under consideration the qtestion of
reviving the system of direct recruitment to the cadre of Deputy Collectors. It has now been decided that in the interest of administration the revival of that system is quite necessary. Government is
accordingly pleased to cancel the orders contained in Government Resolution No. 9313/45, dated 6th February 1950 and those in Government Resolution No. 9313/45, dated the 24th July 1951, in so
far as they relate to the recruitment of Bombay Civil Service Executive
Branch Deputy Collectors (Upper Division) and to direct that, as far
as practicable, 50 per cent of the substantive vacancies occurrin~ jn
the cadre with effect from 1st January 1959 should be filled in by
nomination of candidates to be selected in accordance with the Rules
appended herewith.
•
x
x
x
x
x
By order and in the name of the Governor of Bombay,
G. L. Sheth
Secretary to Government"
We may also extract the portion from the annexed rules of recruitment pertinent to our purpose :
"Appointment to the posts of Deputy Collector shall be
made either by nomination or by promotion of suitable
Mamlatdars :
Provided that the ratio of appointment by nomination
and by promotion shall, as far as practicable, be 50 : 50."
The raw materials government proceedings needed for our discussion
will be complete if the 1941 Resolution also were .read at this stage:
"GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY
Political & Services Department
Resolution No. 3283/34
Bombay ~astle, 21st November, 1941.
x
x
x
RESOLUTION :
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Government is pleased to direct that the following principles
should be observed in determining the seniority of direct recruits and
promoted Officers in the provincial services (except the Bombay
services of Engineers, Class 11)
(i) · In the case of direct recruits appointed substantively
on probation, the seniority should be determined
with reference to the date of theii; appointment on
probation.
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(ii) In the case of
officers promoted to substantive
vacancies, the seniority should be determined with
reference to the ( 1) Date of their promotion to the
(2) substantive vacancies (3) provided there has
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N. K. CHAUHAN v. GUJARAT
(Krishna Iyer, J.)
1043
been no break in service prior to their confirmation
• in those vacancies.
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By order and in the name of the Governor of Bombay
G.f.S. Collins,
Chief Secretary to the Govt. of Boplbay
Political and Services Department"
Flowing out of the fixation of the ratio between the two species
of recruits and having a bearing on the issue of seniority is another
Resolution of the Bombay Government (continued during the relevant
pe~~ in Gujarat also by virtue of an omnibus circular of May 1,
1960) of February 3, 1960. This step became primarily necessary
on account of the Reorganisation of States and the abolition of Divisions.• The legal fiction of 'deemed dates of commencement of service' for the purpose of inter se seniority of personnel drawn from
different pre-Reorganisation States and from the Divisions within the
State on conversion of the deputy collectors' cadre into a State-wide
one has been crystallised in this rule of February 1960.
One more clarificatory proceeding of Government, dated May 27,
1960 has loomed large in Shri Patel's submissions, especially the Explanation portion thereof and, in a sense, it lends some push to the
problematic conclusion. We therefore read the relevant Government
Circular right here :
No. GSF-1060-F
Government of Gujarat
General Administration Department
Sachivalaya, Ahmedabad, 27th May 1960
CIRCULAR
Read: Government Circular No. GSF-1060, dated the 1st May 1960.
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Doubts have arisen as respects the directions given
under Government Circular No. GSF-1060 dated the 1st
May, 1960. . . . . To remove any doubt in that behalf,
therefore, Government is pleased to direct that the following
Explanation shall be and shall be deemed always to have·
been added to the said circular, naniely-
F
Explanation :-]'\othing herein shall apply to appointments of officers, authorities or persons or to the constitution
of tribunals ~r other bodies which may be made by Government on or after the 1st May, 1960 and the conditions of
service of the officers, authorities or persons appointed or the
members of the Tribunals or bodies so constituted.
G
By order and in the name of the Governor of Gujarat.
Sd/- V. Isvaran
Chief Secretary to the Government."
Reliance has been placed on the Explanation quoted above to
emancipate Government from compliance with the Bombay rules
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regarding appointments of officers or their conditions of service, an
aspect we will expand, if needed. Prima facie, while we ~gree that
the new State is not bound by administrative directions of the parent
State and may free itself from it by appropriate steps, an unguided
power is suspect and a carte blanche in doing what Government fancies with any of its servants is· subversive of ordered societies. We
have no further probe to make into this Resolution in the present
case and leave it at that.
The fact of the matter is that during 1959-62, no direct recruitments were made but many promotions were effected. Afterwards,
i.e., in 1963 and later, direct recruits were appointed who, contrar3.to
their legal aspiration, were not assigned seniority over earlier promotees of 1960-63 vintage, having regard to Lhe factual position. The
further hope that for post-1963 recruits, dates of appointrnent,e and
running of service with effect therefrom, on the basis of a quota allocation and rota system telescoped into it, proved a plain dupe in the
seniority list prepared by government. The doubly chagrined direct
recruits moved the High Court for relief, as stated earlier.
The anatomy, in outline, of the deputy collector's cadre in the
Gujarat Government and the grievances of the writ-petitioners (respondents before us) thus emerge. On a 50 : 50 basis the vacancies
in the cadre are filled from two sources viz., direct recruitment and
promotion from among mamlatdars. Once appointed, their seniority
gains saliency and turns on length of service, and though no specific
provision to count commencement of service is made in the 1959 Resolution, it has been understood as set out in the 1941 Resolution earlier mentioned. The contesting respondents plead for pushing down
prornotees, based on the strict roster system of 1 : 1 going by each
vacancy and demur to taking the year as a unit for adjustment of
ratio. Which view should prevail? Force, there may be, in the rival
versions, individual injustice there can be whichever view were accepted and precedential pushes and pressures may also be brought into
play by either side if we surrender to scriptural literality of decisions
of this Court and miss the thrust of the ratio therein. In a finer sense,
and within the frame of reference of leading precedents, each case has
an individuality and is a law unto itself.
Strictly speaking, the priinary problem is one of fair interpretation of the basic government Resolution of 1959, illumined by the
purposes and motivations of good government and unravelling the
implications embedded therein, against the background of the administrative structure, service pattern and seniority prin~iples, prevalent
The .
contemporaneously, as gleaned from the records of the case.
milieu aids the meaning although lawyer's law leans heavily, even
lop-sidedly, on judicialized lexicography. Counsel naturaUy took us
through rulings bearing on the meanings of words and canons of construction which merely re-stated time-honoured principles and dictionary culls and did not make us any the wiser in corning nearer to a
resolution of the conflict here. Likewise, arguments galore on the connotation of the quota system of recruitment, with abstractions, propositions and illustrations based on decided cases, were addressed to us,
although we 'came out by the same door as in we went' ! Common-
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N. K. CHAUHAN v. GUJARAT
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(Krishna Iyer, J.)
1045
sense is the first aid in the art of interpretation. The only sure ap- A
proach thi!t judges make when confronted by complexity in construction and necessity for rationalisation is on the lines justice Cardozo
frankly stated : (1)
"We may figure the task of the judge, if we please, as the
task of a translator, the reading of signs and symbols given
from without. None the less, we will not set man to such a
B
task, unless they have absorbed the spirit, and have filled
themselves with a love, of the language they must read."
Two groups, the promotees who came from the lesser stations of life
an~the direct recruits who have had better advantages of higher education, fight for berths in the musical chair. In such situations, w'.1ile
consti;.uing rules, sub-conscious forces have to be excluded and ob1ectificat10n must be attempted. Even so, the beautiful candour of c
Benjamin Cardozo whispers to us that we judges
"are ... ever and always listening to the still small voice
of the herd, and are ever ready to defend and justify its
instructions and warnings, and accept them as the nature
results of our own reasoning. This was written, not of
judges specially, but of men and women of all classes. The
training of the judge, if coupled with what is styled t~e
judicial temperament, will help in some degree to emancipate hinl from the suggestive power of individual dislikes and
prepossessions." ( 2 )
Our effort in unlocking the meaning of the controversial Government Resolution of July 1959 and of other official notifications may
inarticulately, minimally and unwittingly, be moulded by these broad E
under-currents. Other facts relevant for discussion of specific points
urged and other legal issues germane to the grounds of attack and defense formulated by counsel may be filled in as and when those points
are taken up by us, instead of inartistically cluttering up or en massee
lugging together many government proceedings, sequences of events
and clarification of difficulties following on the division of Bombay into
Gujarat and Maharashtra, even at this preliminary stage.
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The pivotal questions---()ne an interpretative exercise and the
other a facet of the fundamental right of equal opportunity-around
which revolve the other arguments may first be set out: (1) If the
Gujarat Government ha1>, by an administrative guideline or statutory
rule directed that open market recruits and in-service promotees will
be appointed 011' a 50 : 50 basis with the qualification that this principle shall be adhered to, as far as practicable, is Government free to G
ignore such a rule of conduc't as if it were no inflexible directive, violation of which spells illegality on the appointments made, or does this
clause obligate the State fiarly to try and comply, but if surprise circumstances or insurmountable exigencies arise which make recourse to
the rule impracticable, deviate from it without the risk of courts
branding such deviant appointments void? In short, how far can
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(1) Benjamin N. Cardozo: The Nature of the Judicial Process: Yale University
Press, P. 174.
(2) Cardozo (supra) pp, 175-176.
1046
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administrative pragmatics influence, without invalidation, the recruitment mechanics where a narrow rider providing for imJ1bnderable
exigencies written into the rule, provides for departure? (2) Assuming there has to be a proportion of 50-50 as above indicated, how is
it to be worked out ? On a rotational basis of the direct recruits inexorably getting the first, the third, the fifth and such like vacancies or
as an entitlement to half the total number of vacancies arising in the
B cadre in a particular year or other conventional period ? Again, does
it further imply an imperative obligation on the part of Government to
keep unfilled all vacancies allocable to direct recruits so that ,they may
be available to be filled up in later years with retroactive reperc~
sions and, if such ear-marked posts are, for administrative exigenc!es,
filled regularly, not ad hoc, in substantive vacancies, not ex cadre
posts by selection and promotion, they must be treated as prov~onal
c notionally
filled by direct recruits who may arrive long later? And
consequentially, in counting seniority, reckon their (i.e., direct recruits) deemed dates of entry as prior to those actually officiating
promotee deputy collectors by importing a sort of legal fiction that the
direct recruits must be allowed to count service from the date when
the entitled vacancy for direct recruits arose? May be a diffusive, digressive discussion can be obviated and the focus turned on specific
D issues if we start with a formulation of the major points urged by Sri
D. V. Patel, counsel for the appellant, hotly controverted, of course, by
Shri R. K. Garg for the contesting respondents. Elimination of the
minor clears the ring for the major bouts.
The appellants represent the group of promotee deputy collectors
and the contestants are deputy collectors directly recruited. The
E Gujarat State lines up with the former, more or less.
We now set out sequentially the six-point propositional formulation made by Shri Patel, for the appellants, although salience suggests
the third item as first-and, if we anticipate our conclusion, the last in
importance.
The cornerstone of the case, as noted earlier, is the Bombay Government's Resolution of 1959 fixing the proportion between direct reF cruits and promoted candidateis, with an emergency escape route to
jump out of the fixed ratio. Shri Patel's first point is that once the
new State of Gujarat was formed, mere administration proceedings of
the former government of Bombay State ceased to be in force proprio
vigore unless Gujarat adopted or continued or ptherwise modified them.
subject to statutory regulations anq constitutional limitations_. Th.e
State of Gujarat had plenary executive power, grante<t by the ConstiG
tution, to fill up administrative posts in any manner it chose.
The
clarificatory government Resolution of May 27, 1960 issued by the
Gujarat Government becomes significant in this context as it contains
an explanation which specifically provides that the adoption of the
Bombay Government Resolution of 1959 does not, in any way, fetter
the Gujarat Government in making appointments of officers on or
after May 1, 1960 nor does the said 1959 Resolution in any manner
H
restrict the conditions of service of such officers. Therefore, it is
perfectly open to the Guiarat Government to make fresh appointments
to the posts of Deputy Collectors untremmelled by the ratio or other
t
·N: K. CHAUHAN v. GUJARAT (Krishna Iyer, J.)
't
10~7
restrictive conditions which may be read inio the Bombay Government A
Resolution of 1959. In this view his clients cannot suffer even if the
Bombay Resolution has been breached. (2) ·Assuming that point No. 1
has no force, Shri Patel submits that the various government Resolutions of the Bombay and Gujarat Governments referred to -by the
parties are purely administrative_ directions and cannot have the binding status of statutory rules. Therefore, no rights can be derived therefrom by the direct recruits or potential direct appointees and breach of B
such directives or rules cannot invalidate appointments made.
(3)
On the further assumption that point no. (2) above is bereft of substance and the Government Resolutions referred to have statntory character, the ·very terms of the 1959 Government Resolution provide a
· sensible safety value, wisely anticipatory when we remember the pragmatic considerations and administrative exigencies that the slow-moving'
apparatus of the Government of a newly formed State h~ to face or C
be puzzled with. The 1959 Resolution which is the 'founding document' of the rights of the direct recruits itself states that the proportion
between the two categories is to be applied 'as far as practicable'. Therefore, the rule is neither ·exception-proof nor abstractly absolute but
realistic and flexible true to life. Rigidly to read the rule is surely to
misread it. · Since" it contemplates special situations of impracticability,
it is but right for the Court so to construe the Resolution, in the light D
of the explanation offered by the State for non-recruitment directly until 1963, as to make it administratively viable and reasonably workable.
If such an imaginative and informed judicial insight plays upon the
rule, the difficulties in making immediate recruitments from the open
market by the Public Service Commission may sufficiently absolve the
State from the supposed violation of Government Resolution.of 1959.
So viewed, the orders of promotion of the appellants are in order and E.
unassailable. (4) & (5) The mandate of equality en<conced in Arts.
14 and 16 cannot handcuff justice by pushing down the promotees in
the Seniority List in the face of their actual service and legal appointment. The attack based on Art. 16 that the roster methn<l 0f fi!Fng
up posts is inte=l to the quota ·system is baseless. Quota without rotais also reasonable. and constitutional as much as quota plus rota. The F
choice, both being permissible and fair, is left to the Administration, the
Court not ferrettino- or dissecti<i:: .1... 'detect deadly \races 0f di>Crimination or unreasonableness. ·( 6) The· assignment of "deemed dates' of
--- cnmmencement of service is not unreason ahie but i< often adopted by
Governments when intel'fllting into a common cadre officers drawn.
from different States or Departments or divisions. Nnvel comoulsion·s
deman<l novel solutions and law accept~ Ffe's expeclie-ncv save where G
the oublic power has been obliquely exercised or unreasonobleness is
writ large on the fo~e of the process. S"cp ~ sti!!ma beini al>.ient the
promotees cannot be dislodged from their notche; in the ladder. '
We are mercifully absolved from.making the discu«ional. journey
over. a long mileage covenng the. poly-oointed formulation: since two
·essenthl isrnes .m•v virtuolly be. decisive of the ca<e. Both side~ have
agreed to this ahbrevfotion .and the other. grounds.hove dropped out
of effective contest in the long course of arguments. . Enough upto the
day!
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1977] 1 S.C.R.
A
It is fair to state even at this stage that be the Bombay G.O. of
1959 merely administrative or really statutory, both the learned Single
Judge and the Division Bench have held the Gujarat State bound by it.
The rule of Jaw 1s the enemy ot arbitrary absoluusm and the dlscreuon
to disobey is a doctrine of despotism and cannot be subscribed to by a
Court merely because the ::.tace chooses to label a rule of conuuct afiecting the rights of others an administrative regulation. In a constituB
tional order governed by the rule of law, whun or humour, even if
. ben.gnly motivated, masquerading as executive discretion is anathema to
law. When power is vested under the Constitution or other statute
in the State to promulgate rules of conduct affecting others, such rules
must ordinarily govern the State· and subject alike. When there are
service rules affecting the public services, they may either be in
exercise of the executive power of the State under Art. 162 or rules
c with legislative colour framed under the proviso to Art. 309 of the
Constitution. It is fair for the Administration in a democratic system
employing expanding armies of government servants,· whose lot in
life and career prospects will be governed by recruitment, conduct
and disciplinary rules, to respect, beyond suspicion, the rule of law
by exercising statutory power as distinguished from executive power,
even where it has an option. Of course, in exceptional situations,
D
or sudden exigencies and for new experiments to be tried, the framing of statutory rules under Art. 309, proviso, may be postponed and
executive orders immediately promulgated. The best judge is the
State Government exercising its power justly and efficiently. For
_ the art of government is beset with the perils of a journey through
life's jungle and textbook prescriptions can prove ruinous. We may
point to another problem. It has often been difficult to discover
E
whether a particular set of rules is framed under the proviso to Art.
309 or, in mere exercise of Art. 162, although it is desirable that
the State makes it explicit We are, however, not called upon to
investigate this perplexing aspect because, as stated earlier; the
High Court has held that the State is bound by the Bombay G.0. of
1959. Counsel for the appellants, Shri Patel, and counsel for the
State, Shri . Bhandare, have rightly acquiesed in that position and
F proceeded with their arguments on that footing. This point (which is
the first) therefore, does not n,eed _our pronouncement.
. The :other ·Pein~', pedentically c~pible of being separately dealt
with, highlight what we have earlier indicated as the two telling questions of law that settle the outcome of the appeal. We will seek the
light of common sense to solve them and later test the conclusions with
reference to binding rnlings of this Court.
G
The first question that falls for considerations, therefore, is as to
whether· the 50: 50 •ratio as between direct recruits and promoted
hands is subejct to the saving clause 'as far as practicable'. Can Government vary the ratio? Ordinan1y, no.
Is it permissible at all?
Probably, yes, given proof of the government's case that it was not
practicable for the State to recruit from the open market qualified perH
sons through the specialised agency of the PnbJ;c Service Commission.
The factiial ba•is for this plea of extenuation wm be examined presently but, according to Shri R. K. Garg, appearing for the contestants,
•'
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N. K. CHAUHAN v. GUJARAT
•
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(Krishna Iyer, J.)
1049
even if the alibi of the State were true, it furnished no legal justification for t!eviation from the application of the rule. He i~terp~eted,
'as far as practicable' occurring in the Government Resolut!on,. m a
very different way and submitted that to adopt the appellants y1ew on
this aspect was to subvert the substance and nullify the conscience of
the binding Bombay Resolution of 1959 .
A
Shri Garg argued that the language of ~e critical.G.O: was peremptory, that for the high pur~ose of improvmg adm1msti;-at1ve efficiency
a balanced mix of old expenence (gamed by long service) and young
abilities (proved by competitive selection) was hit upon as half-andh:!li from each category and the Court could not fall for any construction of the words 'as far as practicable' which would frustrate this
goal of overall efficiency unless the semantic search left no other
optio~. Far from there being no alternative interpretation, the benignant purpose of the Resolution pressed forward to a reasonable meaning that 'as far as practicable' related not to the tampering with the
proportion of the mix but in permitting provisional variations or ad
hoc solutions or emergency arrangements to meet a difficulty of the
Administration without making formal or regualr 'appointments' to
the posts meddling irrevocably with the proportion in the prescription.
Later, when direct recruits were secured, they would be entitled to
their quota vacancies and commencement of seniority from the date
of their appointment.
B
Logomachic exercises are the favourite of the forensic 'system but
too barren to fascinate the Court and too luxurious, in our penury of
time, to indulge. Should we chase decisions and dictionaries and finer
verbal nuances with explorative industry ?, The sense of the setting,
the 'why' the author whispers through his words and the warning 'not
this. not thi's' that the objective understanding of the totality of the
socially relevant scheme instils-these light up the interpretative
track along the criss-cross woods of case-law and lexicons. Led by
that lodestar, we will eye the situation afresh. In doing so, we must
first set down the meaning Shri Patel suggests, and Shri Bhandare
supports, and the manner in which these appellants claim that their
appointments and seniority are sequestered by the saving words 'as
far as practicable'.
'
'
What does 'as far as practicable' or like expression mean, in simple
anglo-'sa1-01f"I Practicable, feasible, possible, performable, are more
or Jes~ interchavgeable. A skiacraph of the 1959 Resolution reveals
that the revival of the direct recruitment method was motivated by
'the interest of administration'-an overriding object which must cast
the benefit of doubt if two meanings with equal persuasiveness contend. Secondly, going by the text, 50% of the substantive vacancies
occurring in the cadre should be filled in by ·selection in accordance
with appended Rules. 'As far as practicable' finds a place in the Resolution ancl the Rule. In the context what does it oualifv? As far
as possible 50% ? That is to sav. if 50% is not readily forthcoming,
then less ? Within what period should be impracticabilitv to felt ?
What is the c0ntent of 'impracticabilitv' in the Piven anministr~tive
'setting ? Contrariwise, can you not contend that impracticability is
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1050
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1977] 1 S.C.R.
no~ a license ~o. dev~ate, a di~cretion. to disobey or a liber~ with the
ratio ? Adm1mstrative tone 1s too important to be neglected but if
su~cient numbers. to fill the. direct recruits' quota are not
readily
available, substantive vacancies may be left intact to be filled up
when direct recruits are available. Since the exigencies of administration cannot wait, expediency has a limited role through the use of
the words 'as far as practicable'. Thereby Government is authorised
to make ad hoc appointments by promotion or by creation of ex cadre
posts to be filled up by promotees, to be absorbed in the 50% portion
falling to the promotional category in later years. In short 'as far as
practicable' means; not interfering with the ratio which fulfils thee •nterest of administration, but flexible provision clothing government
with powers to meet special situations where the normal process of the
government Resolution cannot flow smooth. It is, a matter of '1ccent
and import which affords the final te1st in the choice between the two
parallel interpretations.
We have given close thought to the competing contentions and are
inclined to the view that the former is the better. Certainly, Shri
Garg is right that the primary purpose of the quota system is to ,improve administrative efficiency. After all, the Indian administration
is run for the service of the people and not for opportunities for promotion to a few persons. But theories of public administration and
experiments in achieving efficiency are matters of governmental policy
and business management. Apparently, the State, having given due
consideration to these factors, thought that a blended brew would
serve best. Even so, it could not have been the intention of government to create artificial situations, import legal fictions and complicate
the composition of the cadre, by deviating from the natural course.
The State probably intended to bring in fresh talent to the extent
reasonably available but not at the sacrifice of sufficiency of hands at
a given time nor at the cost of creating a vacuum by keeping substantive vacancies unfilled for long. The straight forward answer seems
to us to be that the State, in tune with the mandate of the rule, must
make serious effort to secure hands to fill half the number of vacancies
from the open market. If it does not succeed, despite honest and
serious effort, it qualifies for departure from the rule. If it has become non-feasible, impracticable and procrastinatory to get the requisite quota of direct recruits, having done all that if could, it was free
to fill the posts by promotion of suitable harxls if the fi~g up of the
vacancies was administratively necessary and could not wait. \'~prac
,ticable' cannot be equated with 'impossible'-nor ~th unplatable--and we cannot agree with the learned judges of the High Court in
construing it as colossally incapable of compliance. The short test,
therefore, is to find out whether the government, in the present case,
has made effective efforts, doing all that it reasonably can, to recruit
from the open market necessary numbers of qualified hands. We
do not agree that the compulsion of the rule goes to the extreme extent of making government keep the vacancies in the quota of the
direct recruits open and to meet the urgent needs of administration
by creating ex-cadre posts or making ad hoc appointments or resorting to other out-of-the-way expedients. The sense of the rule is that
as far as possible the quota system must be kept up and, if not prac-
•
,
N. K. CHAUHAN v. GUJARAT
(Krishna Iyer, J.)
1051
1icable, promotees in the place of direct :recruits or direct recruits in
the place ~f promotees may be inducted applying the regular proce.cJures, without suffering the seats to lie indefinitely vacant.
)
The next question then. is as to whether government has satisfied
the Court that efforts had been made Ito secure direct recruits and
failure to secure such hands is the explanation for resort. to promo<tions of mamlatdars. The reason for delay in making appointments
of direct recruits during the year 1960, 1961 and 1962 has been set
·out by the. State before us. It appears that a requisition for 12 posts
of deputy collectors was sent to the Gujarat Public Service Commissio•.on October 31, 1960 but the Commission raised some linguistic
queries regarding the requirement of adequate knowledge of Marathi
and Gujarati by the candidates. Anyway, various points were raised
from ltme to time in the correspondence between the Commission
and Government and, eventually, the former held a ·Competitive examination for the posts of deputy collectors in July 1962, declared
the results in January 1963 and sent up its recommendations in the
following February. Government issued orders for appointment of
the candidates so selected by the Public Service Commission in May
1963. This is a working explanation, prima facie good and not rebutted as got up. If it is not necessary for the State Government to
.have recourse to recondite_ processes of ad hoc appointments and
creation of ex cadre posts and if government has taken active steps in
the direction of direct recruitment, the exception to the Government
Resolution comes into operation. Direct recruitment ordinarily involves processing by the Public Service Commission, an independent
body which functions at its own pace. If Government had excluded
the posts of Deputy Collectors from the purview of the Public Service Commission with a view to achieve expeditious recruitment, it
might have been exposed to the criticism that the normal method was
being by-passed with oblique motives. Having looked at the matter
from a pragmatic angle, we are •convinced that the government did
what it could and need not haVle done what it ordinarily should not
have done.
Therefore the conclusion is inevitable~although Shri
<Garg's argument to the contrary is ingenious-that the State had
tried, as far as practicable, to fill 50% of the substantive vacancies
from the open market, but failed during the years 1960-62 and that
therefore it was within its powers under the relevant rule to promote
marnlatdars who, otherwise, complied with the requirements of
efficiency. ./""
•
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Nm".,....{mov~ on to the more thorny question of quota and rota.(' G
Shri Garg urges that the rotational mechanics is implicit in the quota
system and the two cannot be ddinked. To shore up this submis'sion he relies on what he propounds as· the correct command of the
rule of 'quota'. In his view, 1 : 1 simply means one direct recruit or
promotee followed, vacancy by vacancy, by the other. To maintain
the propqrtion in compliance with the quota fixture, Government must
go by each post as it falls vacant and cannot circumvient this necesH
sity by year-war reckoning of vacancies and keeping up the ratio. The
.counter-view put forward by Shri ·Parekh,. for the appellant, is that
17-J33SSCJ/76
1052
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1977] 1 S.C.R.
quota and rota are ·not indissolubly wedded and are separate and
separable. In the present case, according to him it is an error to
. import 'rota' where the rule has spelt out only 'quota' as a governing
principle. The usual practice, sanctioned by rulings of this Court,
is to go by the year as a unit for working out the quota.
A
Here again, we are not disposed to hold, having special regard to
the recent decisions of this Court cited before us, that 'quota' is so
interlocked with 'rota', that where the former is expressly prescribed,
the latter is impliedly inscribed. Let us logicise a little. A quota
necessarily postulates more than one source of recruitment. But does
it demand the manner in which, each source is to be provided for after
recruitment, especially in the matter of seniority ? Cannot quota
stand independent of rota ? You may fix a quota for each category
but
that fixes the entry. The quota methodology may itself take many
c forms-vacancy-wise
ratio, cadre composition-wise proportion
period-wise or numberwise regulation. Myriad ways can be conceived of. Rotational or roster 'system is a commonly adopted and easily
understood method -of figuring out the placement of officers on entry.
It is not the only mode in the code and cannot be read as an inevit·
able consequence. If that much is logical, then what has been done
·n here is legal. Of course, Shri Garg's criticism is that mere 'quota' is
not viable without provision for ~eniority and, if nothing more is
found in the rule, the quota itself must be understood to apply to each
post as and when it falls to be filled. If exigencies of administration
demand quick posting in the v!acancy and one source (here, direct
recruitment) has gone dry for a while, then the proper course is to
wait for a direct recruit and give. him notional date of entry as of the
quota
vacancy and manage to keep the wheels of government moving
E
through improvised promotions, expressly stripping such ad hocist of
rights flowing from temporary occupancy. We have earlier dealt with
the same submission in a slightly different form and rejected it. Nothing more remains to be said about it.
B
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H
What follows and matters on entry into service is seniority .which
often settles the promotional destiny of the various brands of incumbents. Naturally, the inter se struggle turns how best to bend the
rules to one's good account. Shri Garg criticised the thoughtways apparent in the argument, backed by some rulings, that, quota being delinked from rota, annual intake is the unit for adjusting the seniority
among candidates from the two sources. This is an innovation de
hors the rule, he says. We do not think so. The question is not
whether the year being taken as the unit is the only course but whether there is anything in the rule prescribing Government taking it as
the unit or prescribing some other specific unit. - It· is obvious that
the Resolution of 1959 is-silent on how to allocate or reckon the quota
as also on how to compute seniority and Government has a good alibi
for taking ·the year as the unit and length of continuous service as
determining seniority. The first is evident from the reading of the
1959 Resolution in the light of some ruling of this Court and the
second from the 1941 Resolution. Moreover, there is nothing in the
Resolution of 1959 preventing Government from treating a year as
the unit.
-
.
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N. K. CHAUHAN v. GUJARAT
(Krishna Iyer,. ·~--I.)
- . 1053
We therefore resi:h .the following conclusions :
1. The' promotions of mamlatdars made by Government ·
between 1960 and 1962 are saved by the :'as far as
practicable' proviso and therefore valid. Here it falls to
be noticed that in 1966 ·regular rules ha\le been framed
for promotees and direct recruits flowing into the pool
o.f. Deputy Collectors on the same quota basis but with
a basic difference. The saving provision 'as far as practicable' has been deleted in the 1966 rules. The consequence bears upon seniority even if the year is treated
as the unit for quota adjustment.
·
2. If any promotions have been made in excess of the quota
set apart for the mamlatdars after rules in 1966 were
made, the direct recruits have a legitimate right to claim
that the appointees in excess of the allocable ratio from ·
among mamlatdars will have to be pushed down to later.
years when their promotions can be regularised by being
absorbed in their lawful quota for those years. To simplify, by illustration, if 10 deputy collectors' substantive
vacancies exist in 1967 but 8 promotees were appointed
and two direct recruits alone were secured, there is a
clear transgression of the 50 : 50 rule. The redundancy
of 3 hands from among promotees cannot claim to be
regularly appointed on a permanent basis. For the time
being tl)ey occupy the posts and the only official grade
that can be extended to them is to absorb them in the
subsequent vacancies allocable to promotees. This will
have to be worked out down the line wherever there has
been excessive representation of promotees in the annual
intake. Shri Parekh, Counsel for 'the appellants has
fairly conceded this position.
3. The quota rule does not, inevitably, invoke the application of the rota rule.-· The impact of this position is that
if sufficient number of direct recruits have not been for. thcoming in the years since 1960 to fill in the ratio due
to them and those deficient vacancies have been filled
up by promotees, later direct recruits cannot claim
'deemed' dates of appointment for seniority in service
. with effect from the time; according to the rota or 'turn,
the direct recruits' vacancy arose. Seniority will depend
on the length of continuous officiating service and cannot be upset by. later arrivals from the open market save
to the extent to which any excess promotees may have to
be pushed down as indicated earlier. ·
These formulations based on the ·commonsense understandint. of
the Resolution of 1959 have to be tested in the light of decided cases.
After all, we live in a judicial system where earlier curial wisdom,
unless competently over-ruled, binds the Court. · The decisions cited
A
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1054
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1977] 1 S.C.R.
c
before us start with the leading case in Mervyn Coutindo & Ors. v.
Collector of Customs, Bombay(') and closes with the last pronouncement in Badami v. State of Mysore & Ors. ('). This time-span has
seen dicta go zi~ag but we see no difficulty lin tracing a common
thread of reasoning. However, there are divergencies in the ratiocination between Mervyn· Coutindo (Supra) and Govind Dattaray Kelkar & Ors. v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports & Ors.(':) on
the one hand and S. G. Jaisinghani v. Union of lndia( 4 ) ,Bishan Sarup
Gupta v. Union of lndia,( 5 ) Union of India & Ors. Vi. Bishan Sarup
Gupta( 6 ) and A. K. Subbraman & Ors. v. Union of lndia(1) on the
other, especially on the rota system and the year being regarded as
a unit, that this Court may one day have to harmonize the disootdance unless Government wakes up to the need for properly drafting
its. service rules so as to eliminate litigative waste of its servants' energ1es.
·
D
In Mervyn Coutindo the validity of the rotational system :as applied in fixing the seniority inter se between promotees and direct
recruits fell for decision in the context of the specific rule applicable
to Customs' appraisers. One of the principles in the circular which
contained the rules related to the comparative seniority of the two
categories. 'It provides', says the Court in summarizing the rule,
B
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"that relative seniority of direct recruits and promotees
sh~ll be determined according ta the rotation of vancancies
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between direct recruits and promotees which shall be based
on the quota of reservation for direct recruitment and promotion respectively in the recruitment rules. It was further
explained that a roster should be maintained based on the
reservation for direct recruitment and promotion in the recruitment rules. Where, for example, the reservation for
each method is 50 per cent, the roster will run as follows( 1) promotion, (2) direct recruitment, (3) promotion, (4)
direct recruitment, and so on. Appointments should be
made in accordance with this roster and seniority determined accordingly. A question has been raised whether the
circular of 1940 to which we have already referred survived after this circular of 1959; but in our opinion it is unnecessary to decide that question, for the circular of 1959
itself lays down that seniority shall be determined accordingly, i.e. in accordance with the rotati.Pnal system, depending upon the quota reserved for direct recruitment and promotion respectively. It is this circular which, -according to
the respondent, has been followed in determining the seniority of Appraisers in 1963".
In the face of such a plain directiv·e in the relevant rule regarding
relative seniority for the solution of the problem that arises before us
where such a seniority provision is absent and the relevant seniority
H
[1966] 3 SCR 600.
(2) (1976] 1 SCR 815.
(3) [1967] 2 SCR 29.
(-4) [1967] 2 SCR 703.
(5) (1975] Supp. SCR 491.
(6) [1975] 1 SCR 104.
(7) [19751 2 SCR 979.
(1)
N. K. CHAUHAN
,
/
v. GUJARAT (Krishna Iyer, !.)
1055
provision is .,different, Mervyn Coutindo (supra) cannot be of any A
assistance. That case is authority for the proposition it decides in
the matrix of the special facts and rule therein. In view of the words
of the Circular 'that seniority as between direct recruits and promotees should be determined in accordance with the roster which has
also been specified . . . ' the inextricable interlinking between quota
and rota springs from the specific provision rather than by way of any
general proposi.!,ion. Mervyn Coutindo (Supra) cannot therefore res- B
cue the respondents. Nor does the reference to a 'service' being divided into two parts, derived from two sources of recruitment, help
Shri Gl_rg's clients. The rule of 'carry forward' struck down in T. '-,,,
Devadasan v. Union of India & Anr.(') has no relevance to a situation where the whole cadre of a particular service is divided into two ·
parts. Apart from the fact that it is doubtful whether Devadasan's
case survives State of Kerala v. N. M. Thomas & Ors.(') there is no C
application of the 'carry forward' rule at all in fact-situations where
two sources of recruitment are designated in a cettain proportion and
shortfalls occur in the one or the other category. In such a case,
what is needed is conformity to the prescription of the proportion and
no question of carrying anything forward strictly arises. It is true
that Mervyn (Supra) does not support the year by year intake as the
yardstick; but the reason is obvious-the rule is specific.
D
Kelkar (Supra) also dealt with the ratio prescribed as between
direct recruits and promotees. Many grounds of attack were levelled
there, one of which was that the rotational ·system would itself violate the principle of equal opportunity enshrined in the Constitution
(Art 16( J) ) . The Court repelled this contention. Of course, promotions made on an ad hoc basis confer no rights to the posts on E
the appointees, as was clearly pointed out in that decision. In the
·instant case it is common ground that the appointments are not on a
purely ad hoc. basis but have been regularly made in accordance with
the rules to fill substantive vacancies except that the promotees have
exceeded their quota, direct recruits being unavailable. K elkar
(supr11) stands on a different footing, and hardly advances the position advanced by Shri Garg.
F ·
Jaisinghani (Supra) which has had a die-hard survival through
Bishan Sarup Gupta v. Union of lndia( 3 ) and Union of India & Ors.
v. Bishan Sarup Gupta( 4 ) (if one may refer to the two cases flowing out of Jaisinghani (supfa) in that fashion), has been referred to
by both sides at th(\ bar. It was relied on by Mr. Garg for the strong
observation of Ramaswami, J. that the absence of arbitrary power is
the first essential of the rule of law upon which our constitutional G
system is based. He has also drawn attention ,to the suggestion made
in that decision 'to the' government that for future years the roster
system should be adopted by framing an appropriate rule for working out the quota between direct recruits and the promotees ...... '.
We may straightway state that our Constitutional system is very allergic to arbitrary power but there is nothing arbitrary made out in .
the present case against the government. The second obserVlation in
H
-fo [l964J 4 SCR- 680.
(1) [1975] Supp. SCR 491.
(2) [19761 l SCR 906.
(4) [19751 1 SCR 104.
1056
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[1977] 1 S.C.R.
Jaisinghani (Supra) is of a suggestion .that for future years the roster system linking up quota with rota, may well be adopted by government. It is not the interpretation of. any existing rule nor laying
down of a rule of law, so much so we· cannot have any guideline
therefrom to apply to the present case. The Government could no
doubt, if it so thought expedient, frame a specific rule incorporating
the roster system so as to regulate seniority. But we should not forget that seniority is the manifestation of official experiencc,-the process of metabolism of service, over the years, of civil servants, by the
Administration-and, therefore, it is appropriate that as far as possible• he who has actually served longer benefits better in the future.
Moreover, the search for excellence receives a jolt from the rule of
equality and the State is hard put to it in striking a happy balance
between the two criteria without impairment of administrative efficiency. Broadly speaking, the Court has to be liberal and circumspect where the area is trickly or sensitive, since administration by
cour~ writ may· well run haywire.
Moving on, we may start off with the statement that the last case
Badami (Supr"°) lays down the incontrovertibly harmless principle
that quotas that are fixed are inalterable according to governmental
exigencies. But there, unlike here, no saving provision 'as far as
practicable' existed and here post-1966 promotees have to suffer a
push down wh"rc their appointments are in excess of the promotee
quota. Nothing directly bearing on our controversy could be discerned by us in that decision .
. Gupta I (Supra) an off-shoot of laisinghani (Supra), proceeds
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on the assumption that the quota is for .a year. Whether the rule
stated so or not, that was probably the practice and there was nothing
unreasonable in it. Even if the rule as such had expired, it could,
according to that decision, be followed as a guideline. Government
had to follow some guiding principle and not be led by its fancy, as
each occasion arose. Palekar, J. expressed the view of the Court
thus :
"When the.rule is followed as a guideline and appointments made, a slight deviation from the quota would not be
material. But if there is an enormous deviation, other considerations may arise."
In the present case, prior to 1963, there was departure from the quota
system and that was sanctioned by the rule itself because of special
circumstances. For subsequent periods, if by taking the year as a
unjt there have been surplus promotees beyond their allocation even
after taking into account impracticability of getting direct recruits
upto 1966 when new statutory rules were enacted, then such spillovers, could a11d should, as indicated by this Court, be set off and
absorbed in the later allocable vacancies, the pro tempore illegal appointment~ being thus regularised.
Of course, appointees on an
ad hoc basis are never clothed with any rights and have to quit when
the exit time arrives but here there are none. In Gupta II (Supra)
the Court ruled :
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N. K. CHAUHAN
v. GUJARAT (Krishna Iyer, J.)
1057
"If there were promotion in any year in excess of the
quota •those promotions were merely invalid for that year
but they were not invalid for all time. They can be regularised by being absorbed in the quota for the later years.
That is the reason why this Court advisedly used the ex•
pre'ssion 'and onwards' just to enable the Government to push
down excess promotions to later years so that these promotions can be absorbed in the lawful quota for those years."
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Such is the essence of the two Gupta cases (Supra). Law conceptualis~ anew every time life inseminates it with new needs and we have
in G~pta the innovation of temporary invalidity of an appointment-·clinically dead but later resuscitated ? Jurisprudence burgeons from
the lefi. necessitj_es of society.
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A. K. Subbaraman (Supra) relying on Gupta II (Supra) and
going further, has silenced the direct recruits with reference to the
precise contention now urged by Shri Garg that rota being imbedded
in the womb of the quota system their co-existence could not be snapped. While quota and rota may con'stitutionally co-exist their separation is also constitutionally permissible, if some 'reasonable' way,
not arbitrary whim, were resorted to". Even what is 'reasonable'
springs from sort of reflexes manifesting social sub-consciousness, as
it were. Nothing absolutely valid exists and rationality and justice
themselves are relative. Within these great mental limitations, the
Court's observation's in Subbaraman (Supra) have to be decided.
This brief and quick survey of decided cases, and the submissions
considered by us in the judicial crucible, yield the following conclusions, leaving aside the question of 'confirmation' in service which,
in the Gujarat set-up, leaves our controversy untouched :
'(a) The quota system does not necessitate the adoption
of the rotational rule in practical application. Many
ways of working out 'quota' prescription can be devised of which rota is certainly one.
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1(b) While laying down a quota when filling up vacancies
in a cadre from more than one source, it is open to
Government, subject to tests under Art. 16, to
_choose 'a yeal"' or other period or the vacancy by
vacancy basis to work out the quota among the
source'!>. But once the Court is satisfied, examining
for constitutionality the method proposed, that there
is no invalidity, administrative technology may have
free play in choosing one or other of the familiar
procr.sses of implementing the quota rule.. We, as
Judges, cannot strike down the particular scheme
becau'se it is unpalatable to forensic taste.
(c) Seniority, normally. is measured by length of continuous, officiating service-the actual is easily accepted as the legal. This does not preclude a different
prescription, constitutionally tests being satisfied.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1977] 1 S.C.R.
(d) A perio~isation is needed in the case to settle ri@;htly
the relative claims of promotees and direct recruits.
1960-62 forms period A and 1962 onwards forms
per~od B.. Promotees r~gularly appointed during
penod A m excess of their quota, for want of direct
recruits (reasonably sought but not secured and because tarrying longer would injure the administration) can claim their whofo length of service for
seniority even against direct recruits 'who may turn
up in succeeding periods.
(e) Promotees who have been fitted into vacancies be- ••
yond their quota during the period B-the year being
regarded as the unit-must suffer survival as invali~
appointees acquiring new life when vacancies in their
quota fall to be filled up. To that extent they will
step down, rather be pushed down as against direct
recruits who were later but regularly appointed within
their quota.
On this basis, the judgment o~ the High Court stands substantially
modified, but preparation of a new seniority list becomes necessitous.
We set aside the judgment under appeal but direct the State Government to draw up de nova a gradation list showing inter se seniority
on the lines this judgment directs. The subject has been pending so
long that very expeditious administrative finalisation is part of justice.
Officials live in the short run even if Administrations live in the long
run. We direct the State to act quickly. Lack of adequate articulation of simple points regarding rotation and seniority, and the amber
light shed by case-law on the questions raised, warrant the direction
that partie"s shall bear their costs throughout.
The unlovely impact of these protracted and legalistic proceedings
makes us epilogue, an unusual step in a judgment, but pathetically
necessitous for the renovation of the judicial process. Law is not a
'brooding omnipotence in the sky' nm' a sort of secretariat asoterica
known only to higher officialdom.
But lengthy legal process,
where administrative immediacy is the desideratum, is a remedy worse
than the malady. The fact that the present case has taken around 5
working days for oral arguments is a sad cop-unentary on the system,
wbich compels litigent~ to seek extra-curial forums. Judge Brian
Mckenna was right (and the Indian judicial proces~ needs systemic
change 'since his wise words apply also to our judicature) when he
said
"The fault is that the rules of our procedure which by
their discouragement of written argument make possible extensively protracted hearings in open court. Those responsible might think more of changing them. In civil cases a
written argument supplemented by a short oral discussion,
would sometimes save a great deal of time."
To streamline and to modernise court-management is a Cinderella
subject in India, as elsewhere. We conclude, by repeating what Chief
N. K. CHAUHAN v. GUJARAT
(Krishna Iyer, J.)
1059
Justice W~rran Burger of the U.S. Supreme Court said, in 1970, in
his address to the AmeriCan Bar Association :
"In the final third of the century we are still trying to
operate the courts with fundamentally the same basic
methods, the same procedures and the same machinery,
Roscoe Pound said were not good enough in 1906. In the
super-market age we are trying to operate the courts with
craker-barrel corner grocer methods and equipment-vintage
1900."
·~e too have miles to go for law and ju~tice to meet.·
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· Appeal allowed.
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