MOHD. YASIN SHAH versus ALI AKBAR KHAN
Supreme Court of India | Decided 14 April 1976 | [1976] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 1 | 1976 INSC 111
Key facts
- Decided
- 14 April 1976
- Bench
- P.N. BHAGWATI*, A.C. GUPTA, S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 1141/1974
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1976] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 1
- Neutral citation
- 1976 INSC 111
Text of the judgment
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MOHD. YASIN SHAH
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v.
ALI AKBAR KHAN
April 14, 1976
"IP. N. BHAGWATI, A. c. GUPTA AND s. MuRTAZA FAZAL Au, JJ.]
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<Cf.
Jammu & Kashmir Representation of the People Act, S. 47(2)(c)-Scooe
Section 47(2) of the Jam.mu & Kashmir Representation of the People
Act enacts that the Returning Officer shall examine the nomination papers
:.and shall decide all objections which may be made to any nomination and
may, either on such objection or in his own motion, after such summary
enquiry, if any, reject any nomination on the ground, among others, that
the signature of the candidate or the proposer on the nomination paper is
.not genuine.
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For the general election to the State. Assembly the appellant and the
Tespondent (petitioner) filed nomination papers. The nomination paper of
the respondent was rejected by the Returning Officer on the ground that when
his nomination was called neither he nor anyone on his behalf was present.
After the words 'Hence rejected' recorded on the nomination paper the
Returning Officer had also added that the signature of the proposer was not
genuine. In the election that ensued the appellant was declared elected. The
respondent ili his election petition alleged (i) that though at the time of scru-·
tiny the Returning Officer was informed by his proposer that the respondent
had gone out to ease and requested him to wait for a while, the Returning
Officer rejected the nomination paper and refused to reopen the matter even
-on the respondent's request immediately thereafter and (ii) that the Returning Officer committed forgery by subsequently adding certain \vords in the
order of rejection and by over-writing the signature of the proposer on the
nomination paper.
The High Court held (i) that .the Returning Officer '\Vas not justified in
law in rejecting the nomination paper of the respondent on the ground that
he was not present at the time of scrutiny, and (ii) that the Returning Officer
having become functus officio any subsequent observations which he ~ight
have made was irrelevant and since1 the nomination paper was illej?3.lly re1ected
the election was void and was liable to be set aside under s. 108 ( 1) ( c) of the
Act.
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Allowing the appeal to this C.Ourt,
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HELD : The judgment otf the High COU!rt is erroneous bpth on fact
and in law and is agaihst the weight of evidencei on record and ,preponderance of
probabilities. [27 DJ
(!) Although the appellate Court should be slow to disturb a pure finding of fact based on appreciation of evidence by the- Trial Court, it is well
settled that the sanctity and purity of elect0ral processes must be maintained.
The election of a duly eleCted candidate cannot be set at naught oh the
basis of interested or partisan evidence not backed by cogent circumstances or
unimpeachable documents. [6 HJ
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Rahim Khan v. Khurshid Ahmed & Ors. [1975J 1 S.C.R. 643, 656 and
D. Venkata Reddy v. R .. Sultan & Ors. [1976J, 3 S.C.R. 445, referred to.
In the instant case the approach of the High Court was not correct. It
had overlooked many essential features. Secondly the High Court had observed that issue No. 1 was wide enough to include the appellant's plea that even
if the order of the Returning Officer in rejecting the nomination paper on
the ground of absence of the ca111didate or his proposer was wrong, it could
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still ~e sµppo~ed on the. groun~ that the SignattJ.re of the proposer was not
genuine. Yet it had not determined this aspect of the matter. (27 C]
(2) The order of the Returning Officer read as a whole clearly shows
t~at the no-!Ilination pdper. was r~ect~· ,,not only on the ground that the can·
d1date or his proposer was not present but also on the ground that the signa··
tore of the proposer on the nomination paper was not genuine. It is true
that the Retummg Officer had not given any clear finding on this point bul
s. 47 of the Act did not require, a well reasoned decision. All that was
necessary was that the Returning Officer should apply his mind and deter.
mine th~ question. in a summary manner. Even if the ground on which
the nomination paper had been actually rejected was not a permissible ground·,
if the successful candidate could make out a case that the nomination paper
could have been properly rejected on one of the grounds mentioned in s. 4'7
the rejection would not be improper and the election would be upheld.
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N. T. Veluswami Thevar v. G. Raja Nainar & Ors. [1959) SUj>p. 1 S.C.R.
623 followed.
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(i) In the instant case the fact that P.W. 4 had stated in his evidence th1t
when the Returning OffiC"..er called the name of the petitioner no one on his
behalf responded knocks the bottom out of the respondent's story that the
proposer had been instructed to request the Returning Officer to wait :>r
that the Returning Officer had not acceded to his request. [8 DJ
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(ii) On a perusal of the Returning Officer's original order it was clear
that the entire order had been written in the same ink, with the same pen
and appears to have been written in one sitting. There_ is nothing to show
that the second part of the order was added subsequently because the strokes
of the letters, the ink used and tire i;teneral tenor of the writing are the same
throughout. [20 BJ
(iii) As regards that portion of the Returning Officer's order written by
him after writing "Hence rejected" his explanation was that while he ~vas
writing his order and had not completed the same, objection Yl"as taken by
the appellant regarding the genuineness of the proposer's signature and since
the clerk had by then put the seal, he had recorded the appellant's objection
in this space Jeft and completed his order ahd signed above the seal. This was
corroborated by independent witnesses and there is no reason why the Returnin~ Officer should have added a part of the orde" 9ubsequently. [20E, 2l A]
(iv) The Returning Officer, while indicating the appellant's objection
re-"arding the genuinenessi of the signature of the proposer also observed tha~
it c was not possible to verify the signature of the proposer in the abs·~nc.e
of the candidate as well as the proposer. Thus the absence of the cc.nchdate and the proposer had been used, not for th~ purpose of re}ectin.e: the
nomination paper, but for the purpose of supporting the concluslon of the
Returning Officer that the signature wa5 not genuine. [22; Fl
(v) It has been satisfactorily proved that the signature of the prO;Joser
which contained' ovenvriting was not his: gehuine signature and, therefore, the
nomination paper had been properly rejected and the election could nCJt be
assailed under s. 108 (1 )(c) of the Act From the fa~ts fom1d it .was clear
that the over-writing present in the signature at the time of scrutmy ·:brew
considerable doubt on the genuineness o! the proposer's signature. Th€- fact
that the proposer and the respnndent were ab9ent at the time! of sc·_·utiny
lends sufficient support to the inference that the signature of the proposer was
not genuine. [26 C..DJ
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1141 of
l974.
Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated l 0th June 1974 of the
Jammu & Kashmir High Court at Srinagar in Election Petition ~o. 4
of 1972.
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MOHD. YASIN
v. ALI AKBAR (Fazal Ali, J.)
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A. K. Sen, Altai Ahmed and M. Veerappa, for the appellant.
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G. S. Pathak, 0. C. Mathur, Shri Narain and J. B. Dadachanji, for
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the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
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FAZAL ALI, J.-This is an· election appeal against the judgment of
the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir dated June 10, 1974, by which
the learned Judge allowed the election petition filed before him by the
respondent Ali Akbar Khan and set aside the election of the returned
candidate Mohd. Yasin Shah who is the appellant before us. The returned candidate will, for short, be referred to by us as 'the appellant'
and the respondent Ali Akbar Khan will be referred to as 'the petitioner' .
It appears that during the elections held in the year 1972 in the State
of J ammu & Kashmir both the appellant and the petitioner were the
candidates for election to the Karnah Assembly Constituency of the
District of Baramulla in the State of J ammu & Kashmir. There were
other candidates also some of whom had withdrawn. One Mohd Yunis
was the Congress candidate for this constituency but he was defeated.
The petitioner, according to the appellant, was merely a covering or a
shadow candidate for the Congress candidate Mohd Yunis. The
petitioner filed his nomination paper on February 7, 1972 and his
proposer was P.W. 1 Ghulam Mohiuddin. According to the petitioner
tlie nomination paper was presented to the Returning Officer R.W. 3
Abdul Rehman Mir on February 7, 1972 by the petitioner who was
accompanied with his proposer Ghulam Mohiuddin who had signed
as the proposer. The Returning Officer received the nomination paper
and granted a receipt for the same. A sum of Rs. 250/- being the
election deposit was also deposited and other formalities were duly
observed. February 9, 1972, was the last date fixed for the scrutiny
of the nomination papers of all the candidates. Aocording to the
petitioner he reached the office of the Returning Officer at about
10 A.M. on February 9, 1972 but as he was suffering from dysentery
he went to attend the call of nature and instructed his proposer P.W. 1
Ghulam Mohiuddin to take time on his behalflf the name of the
candidate was called out. The petitioner's case before the High Court
was that the Returning Officer aft.er scrutinising the nomination papers
aocepted all of them but rejected the nomination paper of the petitioner
on the ground of l)is absence in spite of the fact that P.W. 1 Ghulam
Mohiuddin requested him to wait for the petitioner who had gone
to attend the call of nature. It was further alleged that when the
t>etitioner returned he beseeched the Returning Officer not to reject
his nomination paper but the Returning Officer refused to reopen the
matter as the nomination paper of Mohd. Yunis the Congress candidate had been accepted. The nomination paper of Mohd Yasin Shah
the appellant was also accepted. Thereafter the poll was held on
March 8, 1972 and the results were declared on March 12, 1972. The
appellant Mohd Yasin Shah was declared elected, while Mohd Yunis
was defeated. After the results were declared the petitioner awlied
for a certified copy of the order of rejection of his nomination paper
on April 1, 1972, and according to him the Returning Officer tried to
avoid giving thC copy of the said order which was ultimately given
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to him on April 3, 1972, A~ 2, being a Sunday. The sheet-anchor
of the case of the petitioner was that the Returning Officer was particularly biased. against him and he rejected the nomination paper in
order to support the returned candidate in whom he was interested.
The petitioner further pleaded that the only ground on which the
nomination paper. was rejected was that the petitioner did not appear
when the Returrung Officer called out his. name at the time of the
scrutiny of his nomination paper. The petitioner further averred that
under the law the Returning Officer could not have rejected his nomination paper on the ground of his absence even if it was so. Not
content with these allegations the petitioner went to the extent of
making a serious and irresponsible allegation against the Returning
Officer by averring that the Returning Officer had committed forgery
by subsequently adding certain words in the order of rejection and
overwriting the signature of the proposer Ghulam Mohiuddin on the
nomination paper. Thus, in short, according to the petitioner as his
nomination paper was improperly rejected by the Returning Officer,
the election of the appellant was void on that ground alone.
The petitioner filed the present election petition with the allegations aforesaid on April 12, 1972. It was alleged that at the time
when P. W. 1 Ghu!am Mohiuddin was examined as a witness there was
some overwriting on the signature of Ghulam Mohiuddin the proposer
of the petitioner on the nomination form. Accordingly the petitioner
made an application to the Court for permission to file an amended
petition by incorporating the fact that the overwriting was brought
into existence after the scrutiny of the nomination papers was over and
behind the back of the petitioner. The learned Judge, after hearing
the parties, ultimately allowed the application and accordingly an
amended petition was filed by the petitioner where the allegations
regarding interpolation etc. were made. The appellant was also given
an opportunity to file his additional written statement.
The petition was stoutly resisted by the appellant who denied,
inter alia, all the allegations made by the petitioner and contended that
there was absolutely no overwriting on the signature of Ghulam
Mohiuddin nor was any forgery committed by the Returning Officer.
It was further averred that as neither the petitioner nor his proposer
was present when the scrutiny of the nomination paper of the petitioner was taken up by the Returning Officer and as the appellant
himself raised the objection that the signature of Ghu!am Mohiuddin
on the nomination paper was not genuine the Returning Officer having
applied his mind upheld the objection and rejected the nomination
paper on the ground that the signature of Ghnlam Mohiuddin was
not genuine as it could not be verifie_d. The appella~t also vel1em~ntly
denied the allegation that the Returmng Officer was m any way biased
or prejudiced against the petitioner.. On the other hand it was_ averred
that the Returing Officer was an mdependent officer and smce the
petitioner was a candidate of the Congress if the Returning Officer
could have any leaning at all it would be towards the petitioner rather
than the appellant who was an independent _candidate .opposing the
Congress party. The learned Judge, after taking the evidence of the
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MOHD. YASIN v. ALI AKBAR (Fazal Ali, !.)
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parties, came to the conclusion that from the order of the Returning
Officer_ it \llOU!d. appear that the nomination paper of the petitioner
was reiected mainly on the ground of his absence which was not a
lawful ground on which the nomination paper could have been rejected
under s. 47(2) of the Jammu & Kashmir Representation of the People
Act. On the question of the overwriting the learned Judge held that
there was no doubt that there was overwritillg -on the signature of
P. W. 1 Ghulam Mohiuddin on the nomination form of the petitioner
and perhaps the overwriting was made some time after the scrutiny.
But the learned Judge refrained from giving any finding as to who
made the interpolation and in what circumstanees. As regards the
allegation that the Returning Officer had committed forgery the learned
Judge does not appear to have accepted the same or given any clear
finding on this point, and he steered clear of this fact by observing
that as the first part of the order of the Returning OJficer rejecting
the nomination paper was based on the ground of the -absence of the
petitioner, the Returning Officer became functlfs officio and any
subsequent observation which he may have made was irrelevant. The
learned Judge further seems to have held that the petitioner was not
present when the scrutiny of his nomination paper was taken up and
the Returning Officer was not justified in law in rejecting his nomination paper on that ground alone. On these findings the learned Judge
held that as the nomination paper of the petitioner was illegally rejected
the election of the appellant was void and was liable to be set aside
under s. 108 (1 )( c) of the J ammu and Kashmir Representation of the
People Act-hereinafter referred to as 'the Act', as amended upto date.
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In support of the appeal Mr. Altaf Ahmed learned counsel for the E
appellant who was followed by Mr. Asoke Sen submitted that the
learned Judge has misconstrued the order passed by the Returning
Officer rejecting the nomination paper of the petitioner and that the
judgment of the High Court is against the weight of the evidence on
the record. It was also argued that the learned Judge completely
overlooked some of the essential features appearing in the case which
completely demolished the petitioner's case.
Mr. G. S. Pathak
appearing for the petitioner, however, supported the judgment of the F
High Court and contended that the order of the Returning Officer
was mainly passed on the ground of the absence of the petitioner
which was not justified by the provisions of s. 47(2) (c) of the Act.
He also submitted that a bare perusal of the order of the Returning
Officer would clearly show that the second part of the order reu~rdi~g
the genuineness of the signature of the proposer Ghulam Mohm~dm
appears to have been inserted subsequei;tly. Lastly, it was s;ibmitte? G
that although this Court could reappraise the evidence for itself 1t
should not interfere with the judgment of the ~ Court ~n . facts
unless the High Court had committed an error m its apprecrnhon of
evidence or overlooked any material fact. It was further argued that
this Court should keep in mind the slowness of !11~ appe!lat~ court to
di t b a ure finding of fact based on appreciation of eV1d_ence by
ths '!}rial tourt which had the initial advantage of watchmg_ the H
de':neanour of the witnesses examined by it. 1;11kre ~an be no 1~):1~~
with the propositions adumbrated by Mr. Pat a " ut we wou
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to mention tl]at it is well settled that the sanctity ilild purity of electoral process in the conntry must be maintained. The election of a
duly returned candid·:ue cannot be· set at naught on the basis of
interested or partisan evidence which is not backed by cogent circumstances or unimpeachable documents. In Rahim Khan v. Khurshid
Ahmed & Ors.( 1) this Court observed as follows :
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"We must emphasize the danger of believing at its face
value oral evidence in an election case without the backing
of sure circumstances or indubitable documents.
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There is no x-ray whereby the dishonesty oI the story can be
established and, if the Court were gullible enough to gulp
such oral versions and invalidate elections, a new menace to
our electoral system would have been invented through the
judicial apparatus. We regard it as extremely unsafe, in the
present climate of kilkennycat election competitions and partisan witnesses wearing robes of veracity, to upturn a hard
won electoral victory merely because lip service to a corrupt
practice has been rendered by some sanctimonious witness.
The Court must look for serious assurance, unlying circumstances or unimpeachable documents to uphold grave charges
of corrupt practices which might not merely cancel the election result, but extillo"Uish many a man's public life."
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In D. Venkata Reddy v. R. Sultan & Ors.( 2 ) this Court, in which
one of us (Fazal Ali, J.) was also a party, reiterated the principles in
the following words :
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"In a democracy such as ours, the purity and sanctity
of elections, the sacrosanct and sacred nature of the electoral proc.ess must be preserved and maintained. The valuable
verdict of the people at the polls must be given due respect
and candour and should not be disregarded or set at naught
on vague, indefinite, frivolous or fanciful allegations or on
evidence which is of a shaky or prevaricating character. It
is well settled that the onus lies heavily on the election petitioner to make out a strong case for setting aside an election.
In our conntry election is a fairly costly and expensive venture and the Representation of the People Act has provided
sufficient safeguards to. make the elections fair and free. In
these circumstances, therefore, election results cannot be
lightly brushed aside in election disputes."
We would now proceed to discuss the various aspects of the case
in the light of the principles enunicated by this Court in the aforesaid cases. To begin with, we might mention that most .o.f the facts
on which evidence appears to have been led by_ the petitioner we_re
not pleaded in the election petition at all. For mstance, the defirote
case made out by the petitioner in hls evidence was that at the ti~e
of the scrutiny of the nomination papers when the name of the petitioner was called ont P.W. 1 Ghulain Mohiuddin the proposer of the
(1) [1975] I S. C.R., 643, 656.
(2) 11976] 3S.C.R.445, 450
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MO.HD. YASIN v. AU AK:llAR (Fazal Ali, ],)
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petiti~er was present who drew the attention 0£ the Returning Officer
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to the fact that. the petitioner had gone to attend tile call of nature
and that he should Vf:ait for him but the Returning Officer refused to
wait and rejectid the nomination paper on the ground of the absence
-0f the petitioner. It was further sought to be proved in the evidence
that on return the petitioner tried to persuade the Returning Officer
to reopen th\' matter and in fact filed an application before him for
recalling the order of rejection of the nomination paper but the Returning Officer was so much prejudiced against him that he tore off
the petition submitted before him by the petitioner. It will be noticed
that neither in the original pet~tion nor in the amendecl one there. is
any mention of the fact that P. W. 1 Ghulam Mohiuddin drew attention of the Returning Officer and asked him to wait, nor is there any
mention of the facit that the petitioner on his return submitted a petition to the Returning Officer which was tom into pieces by the Returning Officer. We shall show that these facts are also not proved even
by some of the witnesses examined by the petitioner. It may be
pertinent to note here that while in paragraph 14 it was mentioned
that when the nomination form of the petitioner was taken up it was
reported to the Returning Officer that the petitioner had gone to attend
the call of naiture, but significantly enough it is not mentioned therein
as to who was the person who had drawn the attention of the Retmning Officer. It seems to us that even at the time of filing his amended
petition which was filed after the ttrial had started the petitioner was
not certain of his case and had not yet decided to allot this part to his
proposer Ghulam Mohiuddin. P.Ws. 1, 2 and 6 have no doubt
asserted in their evidence that P.W. 1 Ghulam Mohiudclin requested
the Returning Officer to wait for the petitioner who haJ gone to attend
the call of nature. P.W. 1 Ghulam Mohiuddin who was the proposer
of the petitioner and therefore the most interested witness in this case
has no doubt testified to the fact .that he had drawn the attention of
the Returning Officer when the nominaiion paper of the petitioner was
taken up for scrutiny,. but the Returning Officer did not heed his
request and rejected th~ nomination paper. This witness also stated
that petitioner himself told the Returning Officer that he was going to
attend the call of nature and that he should wait for him. But the
witness does not appear to be sure of his statement as he immediately
voluntee.red to state that as there was Jot of noise at that time evidently
the Returning Officer did not hear him. The petitioner also says the
same thing.
P.W. 2 Qazi Mohammad Abdullah also ,tries to support the fact
that at the time of scrutiny the petitioner was not present and Ghulam
Mohiuddin P.W. 1 informed the Returning Officer that the petitioner
had gone to attend the call of nature. This witness, however, did not
support the allegation of the petitioner that a petition was submitted
by him before the Returning Officer which was torn by him. The
witness stated thus :
"The petitioner die! not submit any petition before the
Returning Officer in my preseni:e on the day of scrutiny.
There was no such incident in my presence such as the filing
of a petition before the Returning Officer and the tearing off
that 'petition by him."
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P.W. 6 the petitioner himself no doubt supported his s:~se that he
had gone to attend the call of n$ure when the scrutiny of his nomination paper was taken up and had instructed P.W. 1 Gbulam Mohiuddin to remain present and to ask the Returning Officer to wait.
Thus this fact is J!.Ot proved by any independent witness.
On the other hand the fact that Ghulam Mohiuddin did not respond to the call even though he was instructed, as the petitioner would
have us believe, is admitted even by a witness of the petitioner, namely,
P.W. 4 Ghulam Qadir Mir, who deposed as follows :
"At the time when the scrutiny of the nomin,;tion paper
of Ali Akbar Khan was taken up, be himself was not present
there. His proposer Ghulam Mohi-ul-Din was present there.
The name of Ali Akbar Khan was called out but no one
responded and so the Returning Officer wrote down that the
candidate was absent and his nomination paper was being
rejec~ed. In my presence nothing else happened there."
It would therefore appear from the evidence of this witness that even
thongh Ghulam Mohiuddin was present he did not at all respond when
the name of the petitioner was called out. This knocks the bottom
out of the story put forward by the petitioner that Ghulam Mohiuddin
had been instructed to ask the Returning Officer to wait or that
Ghulam Mohiuddin stood up and requested the Returning Officer to
wait for the j)etitioner. Thus the entire story given out by P.Ws. 1,
2 and 6 on this point is falsified by one of the witnesses examined by
the petitioner himself.
There is yet another circmnstance which throws considerable
doubt on this part of the story of the petitioner. P.W. 5 Girdhari Lal
counsel engaged by the petitioner at the time of scrutiny according to
whose evidence Ghulam Mohiuddin bad signed the nomination form in
his presence, was also present at the time when the scrntiny of the nomination paper of the petitioner was taken up and in spite of this fact
when the name of 1the petitioner was called out and according to the
witness the Returning Officer announced that since he was absent bis
nomination paper was rejected this witness did not enter a protest
on behalf of bis client, the petitioner, th~ the Returning Officer could
not have rejected the nomination paper on the ground of the absence
of the petitioner. This somewhat unusual conduct on the part of
the witness who is a lawyer of some experience clearly shows that
neither Ghulam Mohiuddin was present nor the petitioner was present
and it is therefore extremely doubtful if this witness was also present
at the time when the scrutiny of the nomination paper of the petitioner
was taken up by the Returning Officer.
As against this contradictory and discrepant evidence there is consistent evidence of the appellant's witnesses R.Ws. 1, 2, 3 and 4 lo
the effect that neither the petitioner nor his proposer Ghulam Mobiuddin was present when the scrutiny of the nomination paper of the
petitioner was taken up. R.W. 3 is the Returning Officer himself
and he appears to us to be an absolutely independent witness being
a high Government officer of sufficient experience and there is abso-
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MOHD. YASIN v. ALI AKBAR (Fazal Ali, 1.)
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lntely no reason for him'to depose falsely against the petitioner. The
Returning Officer stated thus :
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"When in spite of repei\ted calls neither the petitioner
nor his proposer turned up before me, then I began to
write out the order on the back of <the nomination form."
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R.W. 1 Mohammad Anwar Shah Masoodi also appears to be an
independent witness who was an active Congress worker but he did
not see eye to eye with the Congress on the candidature of Mohd Yunis·
for the constituency in question. There is nothing to show that this·
witness was in any way interested in the appellant. This witness
also rn'.egorically stated that neither the petitioner nor the proposer
of the petitioner turned up at the .time when the name of the petitioner was called out.
R.W. 2 Ghulam Hassan Malik who was also one of the candidates from the Karnah Assembly Constituency and who is a lawyer
also corroborated the evidence of the Re!turuing Officer and of R.Ws.
1 & 3 that no one stood up on behalf of the petitioner when the
name of the petitioner was called o~t and that the proposer of the
petitioner was also not present at that time in the room. This witness has further stated that no one brought it to the notice of the
Returning Officer that the petitioner was ill or that he would be coming soon. The evidence of the witnesses examined by the appellant,
therefore, is fully corrobor~ted by the evidence of P.W. 4 Gulam
Qadir Mir a witness of the petitioner as shown above.
Furthermore we find it difficult to believe why the Returning
Ofiicer who was an independent person and a Government Officer
would refuse to wait for the petitioner if his attention was really
drawn to the fact that 1the petitioner was ill and had gone to attend
the call of nature by Ghulam Mohiuddin or any body on behalf of
the petitioner. This fact, therefore, clearly shows that the case of
the appellant that neither !the petitioner nor his proposer was present
at the time when the scrutiny of the nomination paper of the petitioner was taken up is true. Even the learned Judge is also inclined
to accept 1this part of the case of the appellant. On a consideration
of the evidence of the parties referred to above we are clearly of the
opinion that the petitioner has failed to prove that at the time when
the scrutiny of his nomination paper was taken up by the Returning
Officer either the petitioner or his proposer Ghulam Mohiuddin was·
present and made any request to the Returning Officer to wait which
was not acceded to by the Returning Officer.
Apart from the interested testimony of P.W. 1, 3 and 6 that the
petitioner had subrnHted a petition to the Returning Officer which
was torn out by him there is no reliable evidence to prove this fact.
To begin with, this fact is ne\t at all mentioned even in the election
petition filed by the petitioner even after amendment. The petitioner
admits in his statement that he did not mention this fact while instructing his lawyer. Furthermore, if indee.(\ the Returning Officer actually
behaved in the manner as the petitioner would have us believe, then
it was a very serious matter and the petitioner is not likely to have
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slept over the matter but would have filed a 'regular complaint against
the Returning Officer to his higher superiors. Iu fact when there
was a delay of only one day in the giving of the copy of the rejection
order the petitioner made a great fuss and furore over this petty lapse.
Is it possible to believe that the petitioner would sit quiet if the
Returning Officer had behaved in such a manner with him by tearing
off the petition which was submitted to the Returning Officer? Apart
from that P.W. 3 Mohammad Maqbool Mir at p. 87 of the Paper Book
has clearly admitted that in his presence no petition was filed by Ali
Akbar Khan before the Returning Officer. Even P.W. 5 who was
the lawyer of the petitioner staj'.ed that he cannot say that Ali Akbar
Khan presented any petition before the Returning Officer which the
latter tore off. P.W. 4 also says tha¢ he did not see the petitioner
Ali Akbar Khan or his proposer presenting any application to the
Returning Officer which the latter tore off. Thus the mischievous
allegation made by the pe,'.itioner against the Returning Officer is
completely disproved not only from his own conduct but also by the
evidence of his, own witnesses as discussed above.
Finally even though a very serious allegation was made against the
Returning Officer personally, yet, when he was deposing as a witness
for the appellant, no suggestion was put to him that any petition was
presented to him which he tore off instead of taldng any action thereon. Further while P.W. 1 Ghulam Mohiuddiu categorically stated
in his evidence that the petition which· was submitted to the Returning
Officer was scribed by Abdul Ahad the petltion writer, yet the petitioner made no attempt to examine Abdul Ahad in order to prove this
part of his case. In these circumstances, therefore, we disbelieve this
part of the case of the petitioner that he had filed any petition to
1the Returning Officer for reopeniug the order rejecting his nomiuatio:1 paper. It seems to us that this allegation was a made up story
and appears to have been invented in order to make out a case that
the Returning Officer was biased against the petitioner and 1that is
why the nomination paper of the petitioner was illegally rejected by
him. The petitioner has however miserably failed to prove this part
of the case. If this story is found Ito be false, it would also demonstrate the falsity of the main allegation made by the petitioner regarding the overwriting on the signature of Ghulam Mohiuddin as also
interpolation in the order passed by the Rd\U.rning Officer rejecting
the nomination paper of the IJetitioner.
This brings us now to the question as to the nature of the order
passed by the Returning Officer which is Ext. RW 3/3. Before,
however, taking up this matter it may be necessary to dispose of the
case of the petitioner rel'}lrding the overwriting alleged to have been
made subsequently on the signature of Ghulam Mohiuddin on the
nomination paper Ext. PW 5 /2. The definite case of the petitioner
was that at the time when the nomination paper was filed before the
Returning Officer R.W. 3, or even at :the time of the scrutiny on
February 9, 1972, there was no overwriting at all which appears to
have been made snbsequently. On the other hand the case of the
appellant is 'that the overwriting was already there from before an~
in fact it was deliberately made so as to afford a ground to the pet1-
'
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MOl!D. YASIN V. ALI AKBAR
(Fazal Ali, !.)
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tioner to set aside the election of (the appellant in case he was duly
elected. It was suggested that this lacuna was deliberately left so as
to invite the Returning Officer to reject the nomination paper and then
use this infirmity to upset the eleclion of the appellant. In support
of this case the appel!ant relied upon !he following circmill!tances :
"' ·, .• ~~ .• ;·'.,:~,:r_:.j J.~·vt~ ··&··· ... ,·.• ..
(i) that the petitioner ·was a mere covering or shadow candidate
of the Congress and was not at all interested in contesting the election;
(ii) that once the nomination paper of Mohd Yunis who was the
official candidate of the Congress was accepted the petitioner was not
at all interested in pursuing his election and it was for this reason
that when the scrutiny of !he nomination paper of the petitioner was
taken up neither the petitioner nor his proposer was present and an
imaginary story was invented that the petitioner was ill and had gone.
to a'.tend the call of nature and Ghulam Mohiuddin the proposer
asked the Returning Officer to wait but he rejected !he nomination
paper of the petitioner; and
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(iii) !hat P.W. 1 Ghulam Mohiuddin the proposer of !he petitioner
has in an unguarded moment admiUted in his statement that on the
very day when !he nomination paper was rejected i.e. on February
9, 1972, !he petitioner informed the witness that he will file a case
in !he Court against Mohd Yasin !he appellant. P.W. 1 deposed thus:
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"The petitioner had only •then informed me after !he
rejection i:e. on 9-2-1972 !hat he will now file a case in the
Court against Mohammad Yasin respondent."
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Tltis statement clearly lets the cat out of !he bag and shows that the .
M'itioner's intention really was to prepare a ground for setting aside
!he election of !he appellant if he was duly elected. Unless this was
so, it is not understandable why the petitioner should have made such
a statement to P.W. 1 on the date when the nomination paper was
rejected and when he obviously did not know whether or not tme
appellant would succeed iri the election.
E
We shall now deal with each of these circumstances relied upon
by the appellant in support of his case that the entire story o~ overwriting etc. was a figment of the imagination of the petitioner's mind
and perhaps the whole thing was stage-managed so as to invite the
Returning Officer to reject the nomination paper of the petitioner.
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The appellant has clearly stated in his evidence that the petitioner
was merely a covering candidate of the Congress and was put up only
as a shield to take the place of Mohd Yunis if the nomination paper
of Mohd Yunis was rejected. R.W. 1 who, as we have already
pointed out,, was an independent wi~s and was an active worker
of the Congress at one time bas also categorically asserted that the
petitioner was a covering candidate of the Congress. The .witness
stated !hus :
set
"The petitioner wai i Caildldate
up by the Congress
that. is to say he was a covering candidate. The congress
had given the mandate to Kb. Mohd Yunis but the latter
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had set up the petitioner as
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a candidate by way of pre-
The evidence of this witness appears to have a ring of truth in it.
He has clearly $lated that he did not agree with the Congress Orgamzation when a mandate was given to Mohd Yunis to stand from the
Assembly constituency of Karnall, because in his opinion Mohd Yunis
had lost his popularity and there was little chance of his being
elected. The result of the election demonstrated that the apprehension of this witness was und0ubt.edly correct, because while the
appellant was duly returned, Mohd Yunis was defeated. In these
circumstances we do not see any reason to distrust the evidence of this
witness on this point.
•
R.W. 2 Gulam Hassan Malik who was a lawyer and also a candidate has also stated 11hat the petitioner Ali Akbar Khan was a covering candidate of Mohd Yunis.
The appellant also in his evidence categorically asserted that the
petitioner was a covering candidate of the Congress for Mohd. Yunis.
It is true that ,the petitioner has not admitted this fact, but the somewhat contradictory stand taken by him on this point clearly shows
that he was undoubtedly a covering candidate. The witness
(petitioner) said that if his nomination paper had been accepted he
would not have contested as an independent candidate but he had
been assured that if the nomination paper of Mohd. Yunis as also oj
the petitioner were accepted ihen the Congress was to dec.ide as to
who would contest the election. At the same time the petitioner
·admitted thait the mandate of the Congress was given to Mohd Yunis
prior to the filing up of the nomination forms. Indeed if the mandate
was given by the Congress party to Mohd. Yunis alone, the petitioner
was bound to be a dummy candidate only. Another intrjµsic circumstance that supports this fact is that while Mohd Yunis and other
candidates filed a number of nomination papers so that if one of them
was rejected on the ground of any defect or infirmity the remaining
nomination forms may be accepted and the candidature of the candidates would not nm into difficulty, the petitioner admittedly filed only
one nomination paper and did not think it necessary to file another
nomination paper. These facts taken together with the subsequent
conduct of (the petitioner and his proposer Ghulam Mohiuddin in not
being present at the time of the scrutiny of the nomination paper as
found by us lends sufficient support to the case of the appellant tha.t
the petl'.ioner was merely a dummy candidate.
As regards the other circumstances that after the nomination paper
of Mohd. Yunis was accepted, the petitioner was not at all interested
in fighting the elections, we find that there is overwhelming evidence
to support this inference. We have already pointed out that from the
evidence Jed by the parties it has been established that neither the petitioner nor his proposer were present at the time when the scrutiny of
nomination paper was tqken up by .the Returning Officer on February
9, 1972. In these circumstances. therefore. it follows as a logical
corollary that the story of the petitioner that a request made to - the
Returning Officer by Ghulam Mohiuddin to wait for the petitioner or
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MOHD. YASIN v. ALI AKBAR (Fazal Ali, J.)
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that any petition was filed before the Returning Officer which was
torn by him is a complete myth and bas been invented to give credence to the made up story bolstered up by the petitioner. Another
intrinsic circumstance which shows that t.he petitioner was not at all
interested in pursuing his election is the fact that the two important
persons who were very much interested in his nomination paper not
being rejected did not lodge any protest before the Returning Officer
or took the trouble of drawing the attention of the Returning Officer
that the nomination paper could not be rejected due to U1e absence Jf
the petitioner. One of these persons was no one else but Girdhari
Lal the counsel of the petitioner himself. According to bis evidence
he knew full well that P.W. 1 Ghulam Mobiuddin bad signed the
nomination paper in his presence and yet when the nomination paper
was taken up for scrutiny he did not care to tell the Returning Officer
that as the proposer had signed in his presence there was no que;tion.
of rejecting his nomination pape_r. Similarly Mohd. Yunis who was
the official candidate of the Congress also remained completely silent
and did not draw the attention of the Returning Officer when the
nominat10n paper of the petitioner who was also a Congress candidate
was rejected. AU these facts, therefore, lead to the inescapable conclusion that the petitioner was not at all interested in contesting the
election and by his deliberate conduct he created a situation in which
the nomination paper could be rejected so that if necessary he could
use this lacuna to upset the election of the appellant.
As regards the last circumstance, namely, that the whole thing
appears to have been stage-managed by Mohd. Yunis in order to
furnish a ground for setting aside the election of the appellant in case
he was elected appears to be probable, particularly in view of the
admission made by P.W. 1 Ghulam Mohiuddin to which a reference
bas already been made. The best person to explain these facts
would have been Mohd. Yunis himself and the petitioner has not
examined him as a witness at all. It appears from the order-sheet
that Mohd. Yunis was summoned and he was present but the petitioner did not choose to examine him. It seems to us that Mohd.
Yunis being fully aware that he was the architect of the whole drama
did not want to face the Court.
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Apart from this circumstance, the evidence led by the petitioner
on the question that there was some overwriting in the signature of
his proposer P.W. 1 Ghulam Mohiuddin on the nomination form
subsequent to the date of the scrutiny is far from convincing.
In view of our finding that neither the petitioner P.W. 6 nor
Ghnlam Mohiuddin P.W. I were present on February 9, 1972 when
the nomination paper of the petitioner was taken up for scrutiny by
the Returning Officer, these two witnesses are not at all competent to
depose as to whether or pot on that date there was any overwriting
in the signature of P.W. I. In these circumstances, therefore, the
evidence of P.W. 1 and 6 will have to be excluded on this point. Even
so it will be interesting to note that the petitioner P. W. 6 does not say
that there was any overwriting on the signature of P.W. 1 Ghnlam
Mohiuddin on the nomination form but he states that on a perusal of
the nomination paper it appears that some ink was spread over his
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signature. An examination of the signature of Ghuiam Mohiuddin
would reveal to the naked eye that there ts no question of the sprnading of any ink over the signature but what has been done is thal there
is clear overwriting on the signature.
P.W. 2 Qazi Mohammad Abdullah appears to be a close acq11aintance of the petitioner and had helped him in engaging the services
of Girdhari Lal for the purpose of filling up the nomination paper
which was also done at his own house. This witness also states that
Ghulam Mohiuddin had affixed his signature in his presence with the
fountain-pen of the petitioner. He further asserts that on the date
of his deposition he found that there was an overwriting over the
signature of Ghulam Mohiuddin. This witness was one of the proposers of Mohd. Yunis who had set up the petitioner as his dummy
candidate as held by us. Jn these circumstances, therefore, this
witness was interested and has tried to help the petitioner. Moreover he does not say that on February 9, 1972 when the scrutiny of
the nomination paper of the petitioner was taken up by the Returning
Officer he had an opportunity to inspect the nomination paper in
order to find out whether there was any overwriting on the signature.
His evidence, therefore, does not. exclude the possibility of the overwriting having been made after Ghulam Mohiuddin had signed the
nomination paper at the residence of the witness and before the nomination paper was filed or its scrutiny taken up. Furthermore, the
witness admits that he is also a Congress worker and knew the petitioner for the last four years. For these reasons, therefore, in the
first place the evidence of this witness is interested, and secondly it
does not appear to be of any assistance to the petitioner.
The other witness examined on this point is P.W. 3 Mohd.
Maqbool Mir. A· perusal of the evidence of this witness convinces
us that he is an utterly unreliable witness. Although a lawyer of
sufficient experience the witness seems to have scant regard for the
purity of the legal profession or the norms of professional ethics. He
was a counsel of the appellant and had ,been engaged by him at the
time of filing of the nommation paper and its scrutiny. He was present on February 9, 1972 before the Returning Officer on behalf of
the appellant. He further admits that he had also agreed to become
the agent of other contesting candidates. The order Ext. R W 3/3
clearly mentions that the witness did raise objection on behalf of the
appellant regarding the genuineness of the signature of P.W. 1
Ghulam Mohiuddin and yet the witness who appears to have transferred his loyalty to the petitioner deposes with impunity that he did
not raise any objection regarding the genuineness of the signature of
Ghulam Mohiuddin and that the overwriting did not exist at the time
of the scrutiny. The dramatic manner in whiCh he has made his
appearance as a witness for the petitioner speaks volumes against the
credibility of his testimony. He admits that he had never appeared
before the High Court and he happened to come to Srinagar on
November 13, 1972 to make some purchases for his uncle who was
proceeding on a pilgrimage to Mecca. As he happened to be in the
Court premises his name was called out and he was directed to appear
as a witness without receiving any summons from the Court. The
'
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MOHD. YASIN
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v. ALI AKBAR (Fazal Ali, J.)
15
appellant has categorically stated in his evidence that he had inform·
ed this witness that he might have to be examined on his behalf in the
trial before the High Court and yet the witness knowing full well that
he was the retained counsel of the appellant readily agreed to depose
for the petitioner. Finally the witness admits that he deals with
about I 00 cases per month and yet he does not pay any income-tax.
In view of these circumstances, therefore, we are not in a position to
place any reliance on the evidence of this witness. In fact the learned Judge was also not inclined to place implicit reliance on the testimony of this witness and in this connection the learned Judge
observed as follows :
'
"There have been great comments made with regard to
the veracity and dependability of the statement of this witness and if the matter had rested only on the testimony of
this witness, then it could have been said that some how or
other this witness had changed sides and has come to depose
but his testimony and the statements made by him have to
be judged in the light of the other evidence and the facts
:and circumstances of the case.~
+
We are now left with the evidence of P. W. 5 Girdhari Lal. This
witness was admittedly counsel for the petitioner and was therefore
thoroughly interested in supporting the case of the petitioner. The
witness has also stated that the nomination paper bore the signature
of Ghulam Mohiuddin but ·at the time when he was deposing there
was some overwriting in his signature. The witness says that he was
present at the time of the scrutiny and had inspected the nomination
form and found that the signature of Ghulam Mohiuddin did not contain any overwriting at that time. He, however, admits that the petitioner Ali Akbar Khan was not present when the scrutiny was taken
up and his nomination paper was rejected by the Returning Officer.
Indeed if this was so, as a retained counsel for the petitioner, it was
his dnty to point out to the Returning Officer that under s. 47 of the
Act the Returning Officer was not legally competent to reject the
nomination paper merely on the ground of the absence of the petitioner or his proposer. He, however, remained absolutely silent
This clearly shows that either he was aware that the overwriting on
the signature of Ghulam Mohiuddin was already there at the time of
the scrutiny or that he did not know about it, nor did he care to
examine the nomination paper at that time. The witness admitted
at p. 106 of the Paper Book that the rejection of the nomination paper
on the ground of the absence of the candidate or his proposer was in his
opinion improper under s. 47 of the Act. In spite of this fact it is not
at all understandable why he did not draw the attention of the
Returning Officer to this fact, if the Returning Officer had rejected
the nomination paper merely on the ground of the absence of the
petitioner or his proposer. In these circumstances, therefore, there
appears to have been a method in his silence which indicate that he
was a privy to the whole show put up by the petitioner and wanted
that somehow or the other the nomination paper of the petitioner
may be improperly rejected so as to afford a ground to his client to
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upset the election of the successful candidate. In these circumstances, therefore, we are not in a position to place any reliance on
the evidence of this witness.
This is all the evidence that the petitioner has led in support of
his case that the overwriting on the signature of Ghulam Mohiuddin
was made subsequent to the scrutiny of the nomination form.
As against this there is clear and categorical evidence of the
appellant Mohd. Yasin Shah R.W. 4 who stated thus :
"After examination of the nomination form, I raised
objection that the signature of the proposer appeared to be
doubtful and I also said that probably it is not his signature. No one at that time appeared to rebut this objection
of mine and to assert that it was the signature of the proposer."
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His evidence was fully corroborated by the Returning Officer Abdul
Rehman Mir, R.W. 3, who has clearly stated thus :
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"The nomination form already marked Ext. P.W. 5/2
was presented before me in the same condition in which it
is at present. I was also the Returning Officer of Lolab,
Kupwara assembly constituencies besides the Karnah
assembly constituency."
We have already pointed out that R. W. 3 is an independent witness
being a high Government officer. The allegations made by the petitioner against him have not at all been substantiated and appear to
be totally unfounded .as found by us. There is neither any suggestion
nor any evidence to show that he was in any way interested in the
appellant or biased against the petitioner. On the other hand,
R.W. 3 being an independent Government officer would naturally
have no leanings towards either party. Furthermore, the most
important question to be determined was, if any overwriting was made,
who would be interested in making the same ? It is obvious that the
Returning Officer had absolutely no motive to make any overwriting
on the signature of P.W. J. The Returning Officer has also admitted
in his statement that after the scrntiny the record was deposited by 11im
personally with the District Treasury Officer, Baramulla, as per the
directions of the Deputy Commissioner, Baramulla, who was also the
District Eelection Officer. In these circumstances, therefore, why
should the Returning Officer have taken the grave risk of tampering
with the record after the same was deposited with the District Treasury Officer on the directions of the Deputy Commissioner, Baramulla, and why should he at all do it ? Perhaps it was for this reason that the learned Judge did not like to go into this question at all
and refrained from making any observation on this aspect of the
matter but casually observed that the overwriting might have been
brought inte existence after the scrutiny. We think that there is
absolutely no evidence to support this fact.
Finally there is another intrinsic circumstance which shows that
the overwriting must have been there when the nomination paper
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MOHD. YASIN v. ALI AKBAR (Fazal Ali, J.)
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was filed or was taken up for scrutiny by the Returning Officer. The
order of the Returning Officer Ext. R.W. 3/3 clearly shows that an
express objection was taken by Mohanunad Maqbool Mir on behalf
of Mohanunad Yasin· that the signature of the proposer was not
genuine. If the overwriting would not have been there, there was
absolutely no occasion for the appellant to have raised any such
objection. We have examined the signature purported to be of
Ghulam Mohiuddin, P.W. 1, and we find that there is clear overwriting by which various letters of the signature of Ghulam Mohiuddin have been tampered with. The Returning Officer has also
deposed that he bad given time to the candidates to examine the
nomination papers at the time of the scrutiny in order to submit objections, if any. The appellant and bis counsel examined the nomination paper of the petitioner and did raise an objection regarding
the genuineness of the signature of his proposer P.W. 1. This objection bas been recorded in the order passed hy the Returning Officer.
In view of these circumstances we see no reason at all to distrust
the evidence of the Returning Officer R.W. 3 on the point that the
nomination paper was in the same condition at the date of the scrutiny as it was on the date when he was deposing.
A
There is yet another matter on which there appears to be a
serious controversy between the parties. The petitioner's case was
that the appellant Mohd. Yasin had not at all raised any objection
to the genuineness of the signature of P.W. 1. Ghulam Mohiuddin on
the nomination form and that the aforesaid objection was subsequently
incorporated by the Returning Officer in his order by committing interpolation. On the other hand the appellant's definite case was that
after inspecting the nomination paper he raised a clear objection before
the Returning Officer regarding the genuineness of the signature of
the proposer Ghulam Mohiuddin and this objection was not only
recorded by the Returning Officer at that very time but was also sustained. The case of the appellant is substantially corroborated by
the recitals in Ext. R.W. 3 /3 the order passed by the Returning
Officer which must be presumed to be genuine as there is nothing to
show that it was either interpolated or brought into existence subsequently. The petitioner's case, however, rests purely on the oral evidence of a few interested witnesses. To begin with, so far as the
evidence of P.W. 1 Ghulam Mohiuddin and P.W. 5 the petitioner is
concerned the same would be of no assistance in deciding thls question because as held by us these two persons were not present at the
time of the scrutiny and therefore they were not competent to depose
whether or not any objection was taken by the appellant regarding tht
genuineness of the signature of Ghulam Mohiuddin. It is tme that
P.W. 3 Mohammed Maqbool Mir. who was the counsel for the appellant has stated that he never raised any objection on behalf Jf •he
appellant at the time of the scrutiny. We have already discussed the
evidence of this witness and held that he was an utterly unreliable
witness for the reasons which we have already given. Moreover he
appears to be a turn-coat type of witness and has changed sides as
obse_rved by the learned Jud~e. Finally his evidence is clearly cont~ad1cted by the document Ext. R.W. 3/3 wherein it is clearly menl!oned that the witness Mohd. Maqbool did raise objection regarding
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the genuineness of the signature of P.W. I Ghulam Mohiuddin on
behali of the appellant before the Returning Officer at the time of the
scrm.ny. In these circumstances, therefore, we are not able to place
any reliance on the evidence of this witness.
c
The last witness on the point is P.W. 4 Gulam Qadir Mir who
has no doubt stated that no objection was taken by any body at the
conc1:rn:..:u L11ne. 'fh1s witness, however, was an agent c·f a d.tierent
candidate and was not at all interested in the appellant and as, according to him, he was at some distance from the Returning Officer it is
possible that he may not have heard the objection taken by the appellant before the Returning Officer. At any rate, the evidence of this
witness by itself is not suJ!icicnt to demolish other circumstances
appearing in the case, particularly the recitals in the document
R.W. 3/3.
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As against this, R.W. I, whc, as wc have already pointed out, is
an independent witness, and being a candidate himself was present at
the time when the scrutiny of the nomination took place, and his
interest was by no means identical with the appellant and, therefore,
had no reason to depose falsely to help the appellant. This witness
has categorically stated thus :
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"Respondent No. I (appellant) at that time raised an
objection that he was challenging the signature of the proposer on the nomination paper of the petitioner .
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When there was an objection to the nomination paper
of the petitioner by Mohd. Yaseen then he (Returning
Officer) scrutinised the nomination paper and passed an
order which was announced in the absence of the petitioner."
Similarly, R.W. 3 the Returning Officer has also clearly deposed that
an objection was raised by the appellant which was reccrclcd in his
order. The evidence of R.Ws. I and 3 fi~ds amole corroboration
from the recitals in the document Ext. R.W. 3/3. · Apart from this
R.W. 2 who is no doubt a counting agent of the appellant has testified
to the fact that the appellant had raised an objection regarding the
genuineness of the signature of P.W. I Ghulam Mohiuddin. As the
evidence of this witness is corroborated by two independent witnesses
R.Ws. 1 & 3 we see no reason to disbelieve him. Lastly there is the
categorical statement of the appellant himself that he did raise an
objection. In these circumstances, therefore, we are satisfied that the
evidence led by the appellant far outweighs the interested oral testimoney led by the petitioner. In these circumstances, therefore, we
find that it has been proved beyond doubt that the appellant did raise
an objection regading the genuineness of the signature <if P.W. I
Ghulam N!ohiuddin hcfnrc the Rf:turn;ng Officer 0n
1972, at the t:mc of the scrutiny of nomination papers.
1"ebru~1ry
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It is, therefore. cstabl'shed that at the time when the nominalivll
paper of the petitioner was taken up for scrutiny the overwriting on
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MOHD. 'JASIN v. ALI AKBAR (Fazal Ali, J.)
19
the signature of P.W. I Ghulam Mohiuddin was already there and
there is a strong possibility that the overwriting had been deliberately
made at the instance of the petitioner so as to furmsh a ground ior
setting aside the election of the successful candidate if the official
candidate of the Congress failed to win the election.
Mr. Pathak learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that a
bare perusal of the order of the Returning Ofticcr would clearly show
that there has been some tampering. Before examining this contention we may mention that from the evidence and circumstances discussed above, the following facts emerge :
I
(i) that the petitioner was a dummy candidate of
Congress;
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(ii) that R.W. I Mohd. Anwar Shah Masoodi had
e;{pressed his clear apprehension that there was very
iittle chance of Mohd. Yunis the official candidate
of the Congress to win the election, and, therefore,
there was every motive for the petit;oner to have
prepared some ground for asailing the election of the
appellant in case he was successful;
(iii) that on th.e date of the scrutiny of the no111ination
papen neither the petitioner nor his proposer were
present before the Returning Officer;
(iv) that at the time of the scrutiny the appellant either
personally or through his counsel definitely raised
an objection about the genuineness of the signature
of P.W. l Ghulam Mohiuddin on the nomination
paper Ext. P. W. 5 /2; and
(v) that the overwriting on the signature ~f P.W. I
Ghulam Mohiuddin was present even at the date of
the scrutiny and perhaps even on the date when the
nomination paper was filed before the Returning
Officer.
In the background of these proved facts, we would now examine
whether or not the contention raised by the learned counsel for the
petitioner is correct. The order passed by the Returning Officer
rejecting the nomination paper of the petitioner which is Ext. R.W.
3/3 runs thus:
"The candidate and the proposer are not present. Hence
rejected, also an objection has been raised to the genuineness of the proposer's signature by one Mohd. Maqbool
counsel for Mohd. Yasecn Shah candidate. I could not
verify it fnr absence of candidate and the proposer."
It was contended by Mr. Pathak that this order runs into t\\o parts.
By the first part of the order the Returning Officer appears to have
rejected the nomination paper merely on the ground of the absence
of the candidate and the proposer. By the second part, which
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according to the counsel for the petitioner appears to have been
added subsequently, the objection taken by the appellant regarding
the genuineness of the proposer's signature has been record~<l, and
even so, the Returning Olhcer has not given any decision on this
point. We have perused the original order passed by the Returning
Officer very carefully, bnt we find that the entire or<ler has been
written in the same ink with the same pen and appears to have been
written in one sitting. There is nothing to show that the second part
of the order was added subsequenly because the strokes of the letters,
the ink which has been used and the general tenor of the writing
appears to be the same throughout. In these circumstances, therefore, we reject the contention of the petitioner that the second part of
the order was added subsequently. We accordingly hold that the
ailegations made by the petitioner against the Returning Offi~er in
paragraph-26 of the election petition are totally unfounded and the
petitioner has miserably failed to prove the same. The entire order
of the Returning Officer was written in one sitting and there can be
no question of any interpolation having been made by him nor had
the Returning Officer any motive to do so. Nevertheless it is true
that after having written the order "Hence rejected", the Returning
Officer appears to have recorded the fact that an objection was raised
regarding the genuineness of the proposer's signature. For this R.W.
3 the Returning Officer appears to have given a very convincmg and
reasonable explanation. He says that while he was writing his order
and had not completed the same, an objection was taken by Mohd.
Maqbool counsel for Mohd. Yaseen regarding the genuineness of the
signature of the proposer. At that time the clerk had already put
the seal and, therefore, the Returning Officer recorded the objection
raised by the appellant in the space left and completed his order and
thereafter he signed above the seal. The Returning Officer R.W. 3
in this connection stated thus :
"When in spite of repeated calls neither the petitioner
nor his proposer turned up before me, then I began to write
out the order on the back of the nomination form ...... .
After the scrutiny by them, Mohammed Yaseen as well as
his counsel brought this fact to my notice that the signature
of the proposer on the nomination form of the petitioner
was not genuine. . . . . . . . . . . . The portion in my order
regarding the non-appearance of the petitioner or his proposer as well as the portion regarding the objection about
the genuineness of the signature were written by me contemporaneously at the time of passing the order on the
nomination form in respect of the scrutiny. The seal is
not below my order but it is just in the midst of the portion
of my order and the reas1\n for this is that at the time of the
scrntiny when I was passing the order, my clerk was also
standing by my side and he was affixing the seal and it so
happened that while I was hearing the objection in respect
of this nomination form, the clerk affixed the seal at that
place."
The Returning Officer further stated in his evidence that he upheld
the objection of the appellant as there was no body on behalf of the
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(Fazal Ali, J.)
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candidate to rebut the objection raised by the appellant. The
explanation given by the Returning Officer is fully corroborated by
the evidence of the appellant and his witnesses, particularly R.W. 1,
who is undoubtedly an independent witness. As we have aiready
held that the Returning Officer was an independent witness and a
Government official, there is absolutely no reason why he should have
added.a part of the order subsequently.
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It was then contended by Mr. Pathak
that even though the
Returning Officer recorded the objection taken by the appellant he
has not expressed any final opinion or taken any decision in the
matter. Our attention was drawn to s. 47(2) (c) of the Act which
runs thus :
"47. (2) The returning officer shall then exan1ine the
nomination papers and shall decide all objections which
may be made to any nomination and may, either on such
objection or on his own motion, after such summary
enquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary, reject any nomination on any of the following grounds : -
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( c) that the signature of the candidate or the proposer
on the nomination paper is not genuine."
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It was submitted that the Returning Officer has nowhere held as a
fact that the signature of the proposer was not genuine. He has
merely indicated the objection raised by the appellant but has not
examined the validity of that objection and, therefore, the order must
be read as having rejected the nomination paper merely on the ground
of the absence of the candidate and his proposer. It is true that
under s. 47(2) (c) which is the only relevant provision which applies
to this case it was not open to the Returning Officer to reject the
nomination paper merely on the ground of the absence of the candidate or his proposer. The learned Judge seems to have accepted the
petitioner's argument that on his interpretation of the order and found
that the nomination paper was rejected merely on the ground of the
absence of the candidate and his prop9ser. The learned Judge has
also held that having rejected the nomination paper any subsequent
observations which the Returning Officer made would have to be
ignored as he became functus officio. This interpretation of the
learnecl. Judge has been adopted by Mr. Pathak learned counsel for
the petitioner. On a close and careful reading of the order of the
Returning Officer, as a whole. we are unable to agree with the interpretation put by the learned Judge or adopted by the learned counsel
for the petitioner. We have already pointed out the facts proved
which clearly show that at the time when the Returning ORicer pas<ed
the order he had before him the signature of Ghulam Mohiuddin with
an overwriting. Both P. W. 1 Ghulam Mohiuddin and coun<el for
the petitioner have categoricallv admitted in their statements that the
signature in the present form with the overwriting was not the signature of Ghulam Mohiuddin. P.W. 1 at p. 66 of the Paper Book
deposed as follows :
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"Question : Do you accept this signature to be )'Oun;
in its present form as it stands 1
Answer : I do not accept this to be my signature in the
form as it stands at present."
Similarly P.W. 5 who is counsel for the petitioner and in whose presence P.W. I had signed the nomination paper also admits in clear
terms thus :
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"In the present form I do not accept that it is the 'ignature of Ghulam Mohi-ul-Din."
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Thus if the person who had signed the nomination paper "nd the
lawyer in whose presence Ghulam Mohiuddin had signed the nomination paper were convinced that the signature as overwritten was
not the signature of Ghulam Mohiuddin, how can we find fault with
the Returning O.'ficer if he also, on a bare perusal of the nomination
paper, doubted the genuineness of the signature? The suspicion of
the Returning Officer regarding the genuineness of the signature of
the proposer ·was further reinforced .hy the fact that a specific objection on ;his point was taken hy counsel for the appellant as recorded
in the order itself. Thus the order read as a whole clearly shows that
the nomination paper was rejected not only on the ground that the
candidate or his proposer was not present but also on the ;;rnund that
the si!!'lature of the proposer on the nomination paper was not
genuine. It is true that the Returning Officer has not given any clear
finding on this point, but s. 47 of the Act does not require well reasoned decision. All that is necessary is that the Returning Officer
should apply his mind and determine the question in a summary
manner. The Returning Ofltcer has, in the instant case, indicated
objection taken by the appellant regarding the genuineness of the
signature of the proposer and has also clearly observed that in view
of the objection it is not possible to verify the signature in the absence
of the candidate and the proposer. Thus the absence of the candidate
and the proposer has been used not for the purpose of rejecting the
nomination paper but f0r the purpose of supporting the conclusion of
the Returning Officer that the signature of the proposer was not eenuine.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the Returning Officer had
in effect and in substance rejected the nomination paper on the fround
of the absence of the candidate and the proposer which was not a
valid ground for rejection of the nomination paper. this does not put
an end to the controversy. There is abundant authority for the proposition that even if the ground on wbkh the nomination paper has
been actually rejected is not a permissible ground. if the successful
candidate can make out a case that the nomination paper could have
been properly rejected on one of the grounds mentioned in s. 4 7 of
the Act. the reiection would not be improper and the election would
be upheld. This Court considered this question in N. T. Veluswami
The"ar v. G. Raia Nainar & Ors.(') and observed as follows :
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"The argument is that -if the jurisdiction of the Tribunal
is co-extensive with that of the returning officer, then the
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v. ALI AKBAR (Fazal Ali, l.)
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enquiry before it must be confined to the grounds which
were urged before the returning officer. Now, the observations quoted above were made statedly with reference to
R. 47, and assuming that they apply to an enquiry unuer
s. 100(1 )( c), the question still remains, what is the jurisdiction of the return,ng officer in hearmg objections to nomination papers'? His jurisdiction is detined in s. 36(2),
and the Tribunal rimst therefore have jurhdiction to decide
all the questions which can be raised under that section.
The fact that a particular ground which could have been
raised was not, in fact, raised before the returning . ,,fficer
does not put an end to his jurisdi~tion to decide it, and
what he could have decided if it had been raised, could be
decided by the Tribunal, when raised." p. 635.
"They held, with one solitary exception, that 1t i> per1hissible, and indeed, it is stated in Mengh Ra1 v. B111nwndas-( 1952) 2 E.L.R. 301, 310-as settled law that the
rejection of a nomination paper can be sustained on grounds
not raised before the returning officer. If the legislature
which must be taken to have knowledge of the law as interpreted in those decisions wanted to make a departure from
it, iL would have said so in clear terms, and in the absence
of such an expression, it would be right to interpret
s. 100(1) (c) as not intended to alter the law as laid down
in those decisions." p. 636.
"The question now under consideration came up directly
for decision before the High Court of Rajasthan in Tej
Singh v. Election Tribunal, Jaipur-( 1954) 9 E.L.R.
193-and it was held that the respondent to an election
petition was entitled to raise a plea that the nomination of
the petitioner rejected on one )!;round by the returning officer
was defective on one or more of the other grounds mentioned in s. 36(2) of the Act, and that such a plea, 1f !&ken,
must be enquired into by the Election Tribunal." p. 637
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"An unreported judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High
Court in Badrivishal Pitti v. /. V. Narsing Rao-Special
Appeal No. 1 of 1957- has been cited before us, and that
also takes the view that in an enquiry before the Election
Tribunal, it is open to the parties to support an llrder of
rejection of a nomination paper on grounds other than those
which were put forward before the returning officer. We
are in agreement with these decisions." p. 637
Mr. Pathak learned counsel for the petitioner sought to distinguish
this decision on the ground that while it is open to the Tribunal. or
the High Court in the instant case, to examine -other grounds on which
the nomination paper could have been rejected. yet in the ore•ent
state of pleadings no such question appears to have been raised before
the High Court. This argument does not appear to be factually
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correct. This plea was specifically raised by the appellant in paragraph-8 of his written statement relevant part of which may be
extracted th us :
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"The answering respondent challenges the genuineness
of the signature of the proposer of the petitioner which
could neither be rebutted nor challenged by the petit:oner
or his proposer as both were absent and hence the rejection
of the petitioner was announced by the Returning Officer,
who under the circumstances was justified under section 4 7
of the R.P. Act to reject the nomination paper of the petitioner and as such this rejection cannot be deemed to be in
law as improper rejection and the petitioner cannot now
challenge the same as there is no infirmity in the order of
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rejection by the Returning Officer."
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Furthermore in the additional written statement, filed by the appellant after the learned Judge allowed the petitioner to amend his election petition, this point was reiterated in paragraph 2(iv) thus:
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"That the signature of the proposer on the nomination
form as was also challenged before the Returning Officer is
not genuine and the rejection is not improper."
In paragraph-4 of the said additional written statement it was stated
thus:
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"That the signature of the proposer Ghulam Mohi-uddin not being genuine on the nomination form the rejection
is not improper and the petition is liable to be dismissed."
The learned Judge had framed issue No. 1 in the widest possible
terms which includes rejection of the nomination paper even on the
ground that the signature of the proposer was not genuine which is
undoubtedly a valid ground under s. 47(2) (c) of the Act. The issue
framed by the learned Judge was as follows :
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"1. Whether the nomination paper of the petitioner was
improperly and illegally rejected? O.P.P."
It is manifest that this issue covers the decision on the question as to
whether various grounds on which the nomination paper could have
been improperly rejected including the ground mentioned in s. 47(2)
(c) of the Act, namely, the fact that the signature of the proposer
was not genuine. Even the learned Judge clearly understood the
pleadings of the appellant to include the fact t11at the nomination paper
was rejected because of the genuineness of the signature of the proposer. In this connection the learned Judge in his order dated
November 7. 1972 observed as follows:
"It appears from the petition that the ground was the
absence of the petitioner at the time of the scrutiny of the
nomination paper but it also appears from the written
statement filed by the respondent as well as from the order
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MOHD. YASIN v. ALI AKBAR (Fazal Ali, J.)
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of the Returning Officer that the nomination paper had
also been rejected because of the genuineness of the signature of the proposer. The nomination paper can be rejected on the question of the genuineness as contemplated by
clause (c) of Section 47 of the J & K Representation of the
People Act of the State."
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It was for these reasons that the learned Judge did not think it necessary to recast the issue, because he thought that the plea taken by the
appellant in his written statement was fully covered by the issue already
framed. In these circumstances, it is clear that the appellant had
clearly raised the question that the nomination paper of the petitioner
could be properly rejected under s. 47(2)(c) of the Act even on the
ground that the signature of the proposer was not genuine. The
learned Judge committed an error in not deciding this particular plea
taken by the appellant when he found that the Returning Officer had
improperly rejected the nomination paper on the ground of the absence
of the candidate and the proposer.
We have, however, examined the various aspects of this question
and from the facts found by us it is clear that the overwriting in the
signature which was present at the date of the scrutiny also throws
considerable doubt on the genuineness of the signature of the proposer
Ghulam Mohiuddin as clearly admitted by him and the lawyer of the
petitioner himself. The fact that the proposer and the petitioner were
both absent on the date of the scrutiny lends sufficient support to the
inference that the signature of the proposer Ghulam Mohiuddin on
the nomination form does not appear to be genuine. It is also clearly
established as found by us that the appellant did raise an objection
regarding the genuineness of the signature of the proposer Ghulam
Mohiuddin on the nomination form and that there was no one present
on behalf of the· candidate to rebut or refute the objection taken by
the appellant. On the other hand P.W. 5 who was the counsel for
the petitioner and in whose presence the proposer Ghulam Mohiuddin
had signed the nomination form was actually present at the time o!
the scrutinv and yet, for reasons best known to him, he did not choose
to stand up and point out to the Returning Officer that the objection
raised by the appellant was not tenable because the proposer had
signed the nomination form in his presence. Lastly the siimature
which contains the overwriting ex facie shows that it was not genuine:
In these circumstances, therefore, the only irresistible inference that
could be drawn would be that the signature containing the overwriting
in the present form, which was in existence even at the time of the
scrutinv. could not have been the signat11re of P.W. I Ghulam Mol1iuddin. To add to this is the fact that P.W. I himself clearly admitted
that in the present form, namely, the siJ?llature containing the over-,
writing, he was not in a position to admit that it was his signature.
This as,ertion was fully supported hy P. W. 5 Girdhari Lal counsel !or
the petitioner in whose presence P.W. I is said to have sirned the
nomination form. The learned Judge appears to have entered into
the domain of speculation by brushing aside the clear and categorical
admission made by P.W. 1 on the ground that the question put to him
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had placed him on the horns of a dilemma. Once it is proved that
the signature in the present form existed even at the time of the scrutiny, then the question put to the witness P.W. I was most relevant and
the answer given by the witness was both clear and unambiguous.
We do not see any vagueness or ambiguity in the answer given by the
\\itness. Instead of taking the clear admission of P.W. 1 on its face
value the learned Judge tried to brush it aside on purely speculative
grounds. In these circumstances we are unable to agree with the view
taken by the learned Judge which is based on a misreading and misinterpretation of the evidence of P.W. I. For the same reason, we
reject the contention of Mr. Pathak that the admission of P.W. l was
vague. In these circumstances, therefore, we hold that it has been
proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the signature of P. W. l
Ghulam Mohiuddin which contained the · overwriting was not his
genuine signature. The nomination paper of the petitioner, therefore,
could have been properly rejected on the ground that the signature
of the proposer was not genuine. Thus the rejection of the nomination paper by the Returning Officer could be supported even on a
ground different from the one which may have been taken by the
Returning Officer. This being the position the rejection of the nomination paper was proper, and the election of the appellant could not
be assailed under s. 108 (1 )( c) of the Act under which the election
could be declared void only if there was an improper rejection of the
nomination paper. In the instant case, the rejection of the nomination
paper by the Returning Officer being proper one, s. 108 (1) ( c) was
not at all attracted.
It was lastly contended by counsel for the petitioner that this Court
ought not to interfere with the decision of the learned Judge unless
there were special reasons for doing so. In support of his contention
the learned counsel relied upon a deci,ion of this Court in Laxminarayan tmd another v. Returning Officer and others(') where this Court
observed as follows :
"Section l l 6A of the Act provides for an appeal to this
Court from an order of the High Court dismissing an election
petition. The appeal lies both on issues of law and of facts
................... The power of the appellate Court is
very wide. It can reappraise the evidence and reverse the
trial court's findings of fact. But like any other power it is
not unconfined : it is subject to certain inherent limitations
in relation to a conclusion of fact. While the trial court has
not only read the evidence of witnesses on record but has also
read their evidence in their faces, looks and demeanour. The
aonellete Court is confined to their evidence on record.
aooellate Court is confined to their evidence on record.
bilitv Hes is entitled to great weiQht." (See Saraveeraswami
v. Talluri-A.I.R. 1949 P.C. 32). However, the appellate
court may interfere with a finding of fact if the trial court is
shown to have overlooked any material feature in the evi(1) [1974] 1. S. C.R. 822.
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MOHD. YASIN v. ALI AKBAR (Fazal Ali, ].)
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dence of a witness or if the balance of probabilities as to the
credibility of the witness is inclined against the opinion of the
trial Court."
The propositions enunciated by the Court are well established and
there can be no dispute with the propositions mentioned above. In
the instant case, however, we find that the approach of ~he learned
Judge was not correct. We have already pointed out a number of
salient features appearing in the evidence which have rendered the
case of the petitioner inherently improbable. The learned Judge
appears to have overlooked these essential features. Further, the learned Judge himself had observed that issue No. 1 which he had framed
was wide enough to include the plea of the appellant, and even if the
order of the Returning Officer in rejecting the nomination paper on
the ground of the absence of the candidate or his proposer was wrong,
it could still be supported on the ground that the signature of the proposer was not genuine. The learned Judge has not determined this
aspect of the matter. In these circumstances, therefore, we feel that
the judgment of the High Court is erroneous both on fact and in law
and although the appellate Court is extremely slow in disturbing the
findings of fact, in the instant case, we are satisfied that the juJgment
of the High Court is against the weight of the evidence on record am!
prep.onderance of probabilities.
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For the reasons given above, the appeal is allowed, the orc1er of
the High Court setting aside the election of the appellant Mohd. Yasin
Shah is quashed and the election petition filed by the petitioner is
hereby dismissed. The appellant will be entitled to his costs throughout.
P.B.R.
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Appeal allowed.
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