HARBANSLAL JAGMOHANDAS & ANR. versus PRABHUDAS SHIVLAL
Supreme Court of India | Decided 12 March 1976 | [1976] 3 S.C.R. 628 | 1976 INSC 53
Key facts
- Decided
- 12 March 1976
- Bench
- A.N. RAY*, M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG, JASWANT SINGH
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 282/1971
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Citation
- [1976] 3 S.C.R. 628
- Neutral citation
- 1976 INSC 53
Text of the judgment
628
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HARBANSLAL JAGMOHANDAS & ANR.
v.
PRABHUDAS SHIVLAL
March 12, 1976
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[A. N. RAY, C.J., M. H. BEG AND JASWANT SINGH, JJ.]
Bombay Rents Hotel anti Lodging House J?ates Control Act 1947-Exp/a11ation I to s. 12-Sec. 11-12(3)(a)(b)-Whether a tenant must raise dispute
as to standard rent within one month fron1 receipt of notice or whether can be
raised in written statement.
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Both the appeals raise a common question as to whether a tenant in order
to resist passing of a decree of eviction under the provisions contained in
'· 12(3 )(a) of the Bombay Rent Act 1947 must dispute the standard rent within one month from the date of receipt of the notice from the landlord terminating the tenancy on the ground of arrears of rent or \Vhether a tenant can
raise such a dispute in the written statement. The Gujarat High Court toot a
view that the dispute as to standard rent has to be raised within one month
from the service of the notice on the tenant. The Bombay High Court ha,,
taken a contrary view and held that the tenant can raise a dispute as to standard rent in his written statement in answer to the suit and in such a case the
provisions of s. 12(3) (a) of the Act will apply. Jn the Gujarat case. the
High Court found that the tenant did not raise the dispute within one montll
of the service of the notice terminating the tenancy inter alia, on the ground
of arrears of rent for more than 6 months. In the Bombay appeal the dispu1c
was not raised within one month from the date of the receipt of the notice. It
was, however, raised in the written statement. Under s. 11 of the Act. the court
has power to determine standard rent when there is a dispute between the landlord and tenant regarding the amount of standard rent.
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1-IELD: (1) Under s. 12 of the Act the landlord is not entitled to recover
possession of the premises so long as the tenant pays or is ready and willing to
pay the amount of standnrd rent and !Jermitted increases. Section 12(2) provides that no suit for recovery of possession shall be instituted by a landlord
against a tenant on the ground of non-payment of the standard rent. until the
expiration of one month next after notice in writing of the payment of the
standard rent. Section 12(3) (a) provides for passing a decree for cvictiOn of
the tenant is in arrears for a period of 6 months and neglects to make t_he
payment after the expiration of the notice period provided there is no dispute
regarding the amount of standard rent. Clause 12(3)fa) provides that in any
other. case no decree for eviction should be pac;sed if the tenant pays or tender«
in the court the standard rent and permitted increases which is due and thereafter continues to pay or tender in court regular1y such rent till the suit isfinally decided. Explanation I to s. 12 provides that where there is a dispute
as to the amount of standard rent or permitted increases recoverable under
this Act the tenant shall be deemed to be ready and wi11ing to pay such amount
if before the expiry of the period of one month from the receipt of the notice
he makes an application under s. 11 for the fixation of the t'ltandard rent and
thereafter pays the rent fixed by the Court. [632-B, GJ
(2) The Bqmbay High Court view overlookc; the limitation of time within
which a dispute is to be raised as to standard rent. The view of the Bombay
High Court that dispute within one month of the service of the notice terminatin•
the tenancv is one mode of raisin):! a dispute and there i<i nnother mode of
raising the -dispute at anv stage of the suit. nullifies the provisions contained in
s. 12 and explanation thereto and confers a right on the tenant where the
1ea:is1ation does not contemplate such right. The provisions in s. 11 (3) of the
Act deal with orders which may be passed by the court during the pendency
of the application disputing the rent. Provisions of s. 11 ( 4) of the Act deal
with orders \vhich may be passed consequent upon dispute as to rent. It is
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HARBANSLAL v. PRABHUDAS (Ray, C.J.)
629
only when a~ application disputing the rent fa made wit~i.~ the time cont~mplated by Explanation I to s. 12 of the Act that the provisions on sub-secttona
(3) and (4) of s. 11 are attracted. [635F-H, 636AJ
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CIVIL APPELLA:rE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 282 of 1971.
Appeal by special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
22-U-70 of the Gujarat High Court in C.R.A. No. 1353 of 1970 and
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CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2068/71
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Appeal by Special Leave from the fodgment a~d. Order. dated
the 31-3-71 of the Bombay High Conrt m Special Civil Apphcat10n
No. 859 of 1967.
D. V. Patel, S. K. Dholakia and R. C. Bhatia for Appellants in
C. A. 282/71
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V. S. Desai, Makohn F. A. Pereize and H. S. Parihar for Appellants in C. A. 2068/71
V. S. Desai, H. S. Parihar and I. N. Shroff for Respondent in
C.A. 282/71
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
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RAY, C.J.--Civil Appeal No. 282 of 1971 referred to as the
Guiarnt Appeal is by special leave from the order dated 22 December,
1970 of the High Court of Gujarat rejecting a revision application
agaimt the judgment and decree passed by the Extra Assistant Judge
on 17 September, 1970.
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Civil Appeal No. 2068 of 1971 hereinafter referred to as the
Bombay Appeal is by special leave from the judgment and order dated
21 March, 1971 of the High Court of Bombay.
Both the appeals raise a common question as to whether the
provision contained in section 12 (3) (a) of the Bombay Rents,
Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 194 7 hereinafter
referred to as the Act applies. The Gujarat High Court took the view
that the provisions of section 12 (3) (a) of the Act apply to the suit.
The Bombay High Court took the view that the provisions contained
in section 12 (3) (a) of the Act do not apply to the suit, but that
the suit is governed by the provisions contained in section 12 (3)
(b) of the Act.
The principal question is whether on receipt of a notice from the
landlord terminating the tenancy on the ground of arrears of rent
dispute as to standard rent has to be raised before the expiry of the
period of one month after the service of the notice.
The Gujarat High Court has taken the view that the dispute as
to standard rent is to be raised within one month from the service
of the notice on the tenant.
The Bombay High Court has taken a
contrary view and held that the tenant can raise a dispute as to
standard rent in his written statement in answer to the suit and in
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such a case the provisions of section 12 (3) (b) of the Act will
apply.
In the Gujarat appeal the respondent filed a suit for recovery of
possession of a portion of the ground floor of a building on the
ground that the appellant was iri arrears of rent from 1 September,
1964 and also on the ground that the respondent bonafide required
The Third Joint Civil Judge in
possession of the premises in suit.
the trial court gave a decree in favour of the respondent for possession of the premises.
The trial court held that the appellants were
in arrears of rent from 1 September, 1964 an,t that they were not
The trial Court further held
ready and willing to pay the rent.
that the contractual rent in respect of the premises was not unreasonable and excessive.
The appellants in the Gujarat appeal filed an appeal in the court
of District judge of Surat.
The Appellate Court by judgment
dated 17 September, 1970 confirmed the judgment and decreed the
suit.
The appellants thereafter filed a revision application before the
Gujarat High Court on the ground that the court should have held
The High
that the case fell under section 12 (3) (b) of the Act.
Court rejected the revision application at sight.
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The facts found in the Gujarat appeal are as follows:
The
appellants paid rent to the respondent up to 31 August, 1964. The
respondent landlord by notice dated 14 November, 1966 terminated
the tenancy of the appellants, inter alia, on the ground that the
appeUants were in arrears of rent for more than six months. The
appellants received the notice on 6 December, 1966.
The respondent filed the suit on 2 February, 1967.
In the Gujarat appeal appellants contended that they raised· the
dispute about the standard rent by their letters dated 17 November,
1966; 19 December, 1966 and 11 February, 1967, and therefore,
there was a dispute as to standard rent and the provisions contained
The Appellate
in section 12 (3) (a) of the Act do not apply.
Court found that the letters dated 17 November, 1966 and 19
December, 1966 alleged to have been written by the appellants to the
respondent were manufactured by the appellants and the certificate.!
of posting were obtained by unscrupulous means. As to the alleged
letter of the appellants dated 11 February, 1967 the Appellate Court
found that in that letter the appellants referred to the letters dated
17 November 1966 and 19 December, 1966.
The respondent by
his reply dat~d 16 February, 1967 denied that the respondent ever
received any Jetter dated 17 November, 1966 or 19 December, 1966.
On this evidence the Appellate Court found that there was no dispute
as to rent within one month of the service of the notice terminatini
the tenancy.
In the Bombay Appeal the notice terminating the tenancy was
dated 5 April, 1963 to deliver possession on the expiration of 15
May, 1963. The suit was filed on 11 September, 1963. The
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HARBANSLAL
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v. PRABHUDAS (Ray, CJ.)
63 1
appellants landlords alleged that the tenants were in arrears from 15
Mardi, 1960 to 15 March, 1963, viz., for over six months. In the
Bombay appeal the trial Court gave a decree for possession. The
In an
Appellate Court confirmed the judgment of the trial Court.
application under Article 227 of the Constitution the Bombay High
Court held that when the respondent paid all arrears and costs of the
suit on 23 December, 1964 it could not he said that the respondent
did not comply with the provisions of section 12 ( 3) (b) of the Act
The Bombay High Court took the view that the Full Bench of the
Bombay High Court in Dattu Subhana Panhalkar v. Gajanan Vithoba
Bob hate & A nr. (') held that a tenant could raise a dispute as to
standard rent by raising an issue as to standard rent in the written
statement.
The provisions contained in sections 12 (3) (a) and (b) of the
Act are as follows:
"(3) (a) Where the rent is payable by the month and
there is no dispute regarding the amount of standard rent
of permitted increases, if such rent or increases are in
arrears for a period of six months or more and the tenant
neglects to make payment thereof unlil the expiration of
the period of one month after notice referred to in subsection (2), the Court shall pass a decree for eviction in
any such suit for recovery of possession .
(b) In any other case no decree for eviction shall
be passed in any such suit if, on the first day of hearing
of the suit or on or before such date as the Court may fix
the tenant pays or tenders in Court the standard rent and
permitted increase• then due and thereafter continues to
pay or tender in Court regularly such rent and permitted
increases till the suit is finally decided and also pays costs of
the suit as directed by the Court."
Explanation I to section 12 of the Act is as follows : "In any case where there is a dispute as to the amount
of standard rent or permitted increases recoverable under
this Act the tenant shall be deemed to be ready and willing
to pay such amount if, before the expiry of the period of
one month after notice referred to in sub-section (2) he
makes an application to the Court under sub-section (3)
of section 11 and !hereafter pays or tenders the amount
of rent or permitted increases specified in the order made
by the Court."
The following provisions with regard to standard re1_1t ~re found
in section 11 of the Act. The Court may, upon an application made
to it for that purpose, or in any suit or proceedings, fix the standard
rent, inter alia, where there is any dispute between the landlo'.d ~nd
the tenant regarding the amo~nt of standard rent. If any apphca.tion
for fixing the standard rent 1s made by a tenant who has received
a notice from the landlord under sub-section (2) of section 12,, the
Court shall forthwith specify the amount of rent or permitted
(l) A.l.R. 1971 Born. 396 .
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increases which are to be deposited in Court by the tenant and make
an order directing the tenant to deposit such amount in Court cir
at the option of the tenant make an order to pay to the landlord
such amount thereof as the Court may specify, pending the final
decision of the application. Out of any amount deposited in Court,
the Court may make an order for payment of such reasonable sum
to the landlord towards payment of rent or increases due to him as
it thinks fit. If the tenant fails to deposit such amount or, as the
case may be, to pay such amount thereof to the landlord, his application shall be dismissed.
Under section 12 of the Act the landlord shall not be entitled to
the recovery of possession of any premises so long as the tenant pays,
or is ready and willing to pay, the amount of the standard rent and
permitted increases, if any, and observes and performs the other
conditions of the tenancy, in so far as they are consistent with the
provisions of the Act. Sub-section (2) of section 12 of the Act
states that no suit for recovery of possession shall be instituted by a
landlord against the tenant on the ground of non-payment of the
standard rent or permitted increases due, until the expiration of one
month next after notice in writing of the demand of the standard
rent or permitted increases has been served upon the tenant in the
manner provided in section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.
Clause (a) of sub-section (3) of section 12 of the Act provides for
the passing of a decree for eviction first, where the rent is payable
by the month; second, there is no dispute regarding the amount of
standard rent or permitted increases; third, the rent or increases are
in arrears for a period of six months; and fourth, the tenant neglects
to make payment thereof until the expiration of the period of one
month after notice referred to in sub-section (2) of section 12 of the
Act. Clause (b) of sub-section (3) of section 12 of
the
Act, states that in any other case, no decree for eviction shall be
passed in any such suit if, on the first day of hearing of the suit or
on or before such other date as the Court may, fix, the tenant pays
or tenders in Court the standard rent and permitted increases then due
and thereafter continues to pay or tender in Court regularly such
rent and permitted increases till the suit is finally decided and also
pays costs of the suit as directed by the Court.
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Explanation I to section 12 of the Act provides that where there
is a dispute as to the amount of standard rent or permitted increases
recoverable under this Act the tenant shaII be deemed to be ready
and willing to pay such amount if, before the expiry of the period of
one month after notice referred to in sub-section (2), he makes an
application to the Court under sub-section (3) of section 11 and
thereafter pays or tenders the amount of rent or permitted increases
specified in the order made by the Court.
Counsel for the appellant in the Gujarat appeal relied on the
Bombay view that there is no limitation of time during which a disc
pute must be raised and none can be implied from the Explanation.
The Bombay High Court has not agreed with the view of the Gujarat
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HARBANSLAL V. PRABHUDAS (Ray, C./.)
6·33
High Court in Amba/a/ v. Badaldas('). The Bombay view is that the
dispute in section 12(,3) (a) is not limited only to a dispute raised
within one' month of the notice as contemplllted in section 12(3) (b)
of the Act. The Bombay High Court relied on section 11 ( 4) of the
Act the provisions whereof are as follows : -
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"Where at any stage of a suit for recovery of rent
whether with or without. a claim for possession of the premises, the Court is satisfied that the tenant is withholding
the rent on the ground that the rent is excessive and
standard rent should be fixed, the Court Shall
and in any other case if it appears to the Court
that it is just and proper to make such an order the Court
may make an order directing the ~nant to deposit in Court
forthwith such amount of the rent as the Court considers
to be reasonably due to the land_lord, or at the option of the
tenant an order directing him to pay to the landlord
such amount thereof as the Court may specify. The Court
may further make an order directing the tenant to deposit
in Co·urt periodically, such amount as it considers proper as
interim standard rent, or at the option of the tenant an order
to pay to the landlord such arnonnt thereof, as the Court
may specify, during the pendency of the suit. The Court
may also direct if the tenant fails to comply with any order
made as aforsaid, within such time as may be allowed by it,
he shall not be entitled to appear in or defend the suit except with leave of the Court, which leave may be granted
subject to such terms and conditions as the Court may
specify."
The Bombay High Court held that to limit raising a dispute within one month from the service of notice would render the provisions
of section 11 ( 4) nugatory. The Bombay High Court held that the
effect of sections 11 and 12 of the Act is to give the tenant a right to
dispute the standard rent in the event of a suit and if the tenant raises
a dispute in answer to a suit for recovery of rent it would be a dispute within the meaning of section 12(3) (a) of the Act and would
take the suit out of the provisions of that sub-section.
The Gujarat High Court in the decision in Ambalal's case
(supra) and in Chum/al Shiv/al v. Chimanlal Nagindas(') took the
view that in order to avoid the operation of section 12(3) (a) of the
Act the dispute in regard to standard rent or permitted increases must
be raised at the latest before the expiry of one month from the date
of service of notice nnder section 12(2) of the Act and it is not
enough to raise a dispute for the first time in the written statement.
In Ambalal's case (supra) the question was as to what Should be stage
at which the dispute in regard to standard rent or permitted increases
must be raised in order to take the case out of ~ection 12(3) (a) of
the Act. The Gujarat High Court held that.the dispute is one which
is in existence at the date of the notice or at any rate before the ex-
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(I) A.1.R. 1964 Guj. 9.
8-608SCI/76
(2) (1966) VII Gujarat Law Reporters 945.
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piry of one month from the date of.its service and not the one raised
subsequently in a written statement with a view to avoiding the operation of section 12(3) (a) of the Act.
Counsel for the appellants' in the Gujarat appeal contended that
the decision in Vora Abbasbhai v. Haji Gulamnabi(') has overruled Amblal's case (supra). In Vora Abbasbhai's case the notice
terminating the tenancy was dated 1 December, 1956. - The tenant
by reply dated 7 December, 1956 contended that the contractual rent
was excessive. The tenant·made an application on 5 Janvary 1957
for fixation of standard rent nnder section 11 (1) of the Act. While
the application was pending the landlord filed the suit on 27 January,
1957 for ejectment. The tenant in the written statement reiterated the
contention that the contractual rent was excessive and- that the
standard rent should be fixed by the Court. On these facts the question in Vora Abbasbhai's case (supra) was whether the case fall within section 12(3) (a) or section 12(3) (b) of the Act.
The only point in controversy in Vora Abbasbhai's case (supra)
was whether the second condition in section 12(3) (a) of the Act,
viz., that there was no dispute regarding the amount of standard rent
was fulfilled. The landlord's contention was that the dispute concerning standard rent is oue which must have been raised before service of the notice and since there was admittedly no dispute in regard
to standard rent or permitted increases at the date of service of the
notice under section 12 -(2) of the Act the second condition in secThis Court
tion 12(3) (a) that there was no dispute was satisfied.
did not accept the landlord's contention there and held that the defendant in that case raised the contention by reply dated 7 December,
1956 that the contractual rent was excessive and raised the same contention in the application filed for fixation of standard rent.
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The Gujarat High Court in Ambalal's case (supra) held that in
order to attract the applicability of section 12 (3) (a) of the Act
there must be non-existence of the dispute at the date of the notice
and such non-existence must continue right up to the expiration of one
month from the date of service of the notice so that if the dispute is
raised at any time prior to the expiration of the said period on one
month, the operation of section 12(3) (a) would be excluded. The
latest point of time when according to Ambalal's case (supra) the dispute in re.gard to the standard rent must be raised in order to avoid
the operation of section 12(3) (a) of the Act is the expiry of one
month from the date of service of the notice. Ambalal's case (supra)
rl!d not say that the dispute concerning standard rent must be raised
before service of the notice in order to repel the applicability of section 12(3) (a) of the Act. If the dispute is in existence prior to
the expiry of one month after service of the notice though subsequent to
the date of th!' notice that would be sufficient to oust the operation of
section 12(3) (a) of the Act. The decision of this Court in Vora
Abbasbhai's case (supra) has not overruled the decision in Ambalal's
case (supra). In Ambalal's case (supra) the conclusion is a single
(1) [1964] 5 S.C.R. 157.
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HARBANSLAL V. PRABHUDAS
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63 5
one and it is that in order to exclude the operation of section 12(3)
(a) of the Act the dispute must be in existence latest within one month
after service of the notice.
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The question as to when a dispute is to be raised
came up for consideration in Shah Dhansukhlal Chhangan/al v. Dalichand Virchand Shroff & Ors.(').
The appelThe landlord
lant fell into arrears of rent in that case.
gave a notice to the tenant on 18 April, 1955 demanding the arrears
of rent and also terminating the tenancy of the defendant with effect
from 31 May, 1955. The notice was received by the defendant on 21
April, 1955, The suit for ejectment was filed on 15 March, 1956 on the
ground that the defendent was in arrears of payment of rent and permitted increases and as such not entitled to the protection of the Act.
This Court held that section 12 (1) of the Act must be read with Explanation and so read it means that the tenant can only be considered
to be ready and willing to pay if, before the expiry of the period of
one month after notice referred to in sub-section (2), he makes an
application to the Court under sub-section ( 3) of section 11 and thereafter pays or tenders the amount of rent or permitted increases specified
by the Court. This Court found in Chhaganlal's case (supra) that
the tenant made no payment within the period of one month of the
notice of ejectment and further that although in his written statement
he raised a dispute about the standard rent he made no application in
terms of section 11 (3) of the Act. The tenant can claim protection
from the operation of section 12(3) (a) of the Act only if the tenant
makes an application within one month of the service of the notice
terminating the tenancy by raising a dispute as to standard rent.
The view of the Bombay High Court overlooks the limitation of
time within which a dispute is to be raised as to standard rent. The
view of the Bombay High Court is that disputing within one month of
the service of the notice terminating the tenancy is one mode of raising
a dispute and there is another mode of raising the dispute at any stage
of the suit.
The view of the Bombay High Court nullifies the provisions contained in section 12 and Explanation thereto and confers a
right on the tenant where the legislation does not contemplate such a
right.
The provisions in section 11 (3) of the Act deal with orders which
may be passed by the Court during the pendency of the application
disputing the ren(. Provisions in section 11 ( 4) of the Act deal with
orders which may be passed consequent upon dispute as to rent. It is
(I) [1968j 3 S.C.R. 346.
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only when an application disputing rent is made within the time contemplated by Explanation I to section 12 of the Act that the provisions in
sub-section (3) and (4) of section 11 are attracted.
For the foregoing reasons we uphold the view of the Gujarat High
Court and we do not accept the view of the Bombay High Court. We
dismiss Civil Appeal No. 282 of 1971 with costs. We accept Civil
Appeal No. 2068 of 1971 and the judgment of the Bombay High Court
is set aside. The decree passed by the Civil Judge on 31 October,
1964 and affirmed by the Assistant Judge on 27 September, 1966 is
restored. The appellants will be entitled to costs.
P.H.P.
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C. A. No. 282 of 1971 dismissed.
C. A. No. 206& of 1971 allowed.
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