EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF VAISH DEGREE COLLEGE, SHAMLI AND OTHERS versus LAKSHMI NARAIN AND ORS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 12 December 1975 | [1976] 2 S.C.R. 1006 | 1975 INSC 320
Key facts
- Decided
- 12 December 1975
- Bench
- HANS RAJ KHANNA*, P.N. BHAGWATI, S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 1543/1974
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1976] 2 S.C.R. 1006
- Neutral citation
- 1975 INSC 320
Text of the judgment
1006
A
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF VAISH DEGREE COLLEGE,
SHAMLI AND OTHERS
\.',
LAKSHMI NARAIN AND ORS.
B
December 12, 1975
[H. R.· KHANA, P. N. BHAGWATI AND S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, JJ.J
Master and servant-Managing Committee of a college terminating services of Principal of college_..:..Violatio11 of rule requiring Vice-Chancellor's
approval-Rights of Principal.
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Specific Relief-Declaration dfi continuing in service when may be granted.
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The appellant is the Executive Committee of an Educational Institution (a
college) registered under the Registration of Co-operative Societies Act, and
the college was affiliated to a University. The provisions of the University
Act require that every decisiun of the management of an affiliated college to
remove from service a teacher shall be reported forthwith to the Vice-Chancellor and subject to the provisions contained in the Statutes made by the University, shall not take effect unless approved by the' Vice.Chancellor.
The respondent was appointed by the appellant as a Principal of the college
but no agreement, as prescribed by the University Act, and the Statutes, was
executed between the parties. Two 'years after his appointment, the appellant
served a notice on the Principal directing him not to discharge the duties of
the Principal and shortly thereafter terminated his services. Thereafter, the
respondent did not work as Principal. The respondent filed a suit contending
that he must be deemed to be continuing in service, as there was no sanction
of the Vice-Chancellor for the termination of his services, a,nd prayed for an
injunetion restraining the appellant from interfering with his duties as Principal of the institution.
The trial Court dismissed the suit but the first appellate Court reversed the
decision and the High Court affirmed the' decision of the first appellate Court.
F
In appeal to ibis Court, it was contended that : (1) the appellant was no~
a statutory body; (2) in the absence of an agreement the requirement regarding
the approval by the Vice-Chancellor would not apply and the termination of
the respondent's services would be governed by the usual master and servant
relntionship; (3) there are no special circumstances for enforcing the contract
of personal service; and ( 4) the present case was not a fit one for granting the
relief<> prayed for, they being equitable reliefs and in the discretion of the
Court.
Allowing the appeal to this Court,
HELD: (Per Khanna and Fazal Ali, JJ.).
G
H
( 1) Merely because the appellant followed certain statutory provisions of
the University Act or the Statutes made thereunder, it cannot be held to be a
statutory body. [1014 A-Bl
(a) Before an institution can be a statutory body, it must be created by or
under the statute a'!ld owe its existence to a statute. There is a well-marked
dis'linction between a body which is created by the statute and a body which,
after having come into existence, is governed in accordance with the provisions of the statute. The question in such cases to be asked is, if there is no
statute would the institution have any legal existence. If the answer is in the
negative, then undoubtedly it is a statutory body but if the institution has a
separate existence of its own without any reference to the statute concerned.
but is merely governed by the statutory provisions, it cannot be said to be
a statutory body. [1013 D-1014 Al
;
YAISH COLLEGE V. LAKSHMI NARAIN
100 7
x
Suk/1dev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi &
{1975] 3 S.C.R. 619, followed.
Others,
A
( b) Mwely because it was affiliated to the University; that there were
certain mandatory provision9 of the University Act which were binding. on .the
appellant; and the appellant was governed by the Statutes of the Umvers1ty.
would not be sufficient ta alter the ·character and nature of the appellant and
'convert it into a statutory body. [1014 B-C]
(i) The appellant had an independent status having been registered under
the Registration of Co-operative. Societies Act and was a self-governed or an
autonomous body. It was affiliated to the University merely for the sake of
convenience and mainly for the purpose of recognition of its courses of study
·
by the University. [1014 C-D]
(ii) All that Statute, 14A of the University required was that the Managing
Committee of the college must co-opt the Principal of the college and a repre •
. sen!ative of the. teachers. By co-opting them the appellant did not lose its inde·
pendent status but continued to remain a non-statutory and autonomous
body. [1014 F-G]
(iii) Similarly, the fact that the Statutes of the University were adopted
by the appellant and it was, as a matter of convention, bound to follow the
provision~ of the University Act, would not clothe the appellant with a statutory status or character. The adoption of the Statutes was only for better governance and administration and extension of the educational activities of the
institution. [1014 G-H]
Sabhajit Tewc:•·y v. Union of lni:lia· &. Ors. [1975] 3 S.C.R. 616 and Kumari
Repina v. St. Aloysius Higher Elementary School & Anr. [1971] Supp. S.C.R.
6, followed.
(2) The case of P. R. Jodh v. A. L. Pcmde [1965] 2 S.C.R. 713, on which
the High Court relied, is distingui9hable. The High Court has not considered
the basic facts present in that case, but which are not present in· the instant
case, namely, (a) the governin_~ body in Jodh's case was itself a creature of the
statute; (b) in tl)e instant case the Statutes did not apply pronio vigore but
only after an agreement was executed between the employer and the employee as
required by those provisions; and ( c) no agreement was ever executed between
the parties in the prescribed form. [1018 C-D]
B
C
D
E
Vidya Ram Mishra v. Managing Committee, Shri Jai Ne-rain College, [1972]
3 S.C.R. 320, 326, followed.
(3 )(a) A contract of personal service cannot ordinarily be specifically enforced and a Court, normally, would not give a declaration that the contract
subsists and that the employee even after having been removed from service,
ca~ be de~med ~o be in service ag~inst the will and consent of the employer;
This rule 1s snbiect to three exceptions, (i) where a public servant is sought
to be removed from. service in contravention of the provisions of Art. 311 ·
(ii) '\\~1ere a worker after dismissal is sought to be rein9tated under Industrial
Law; and (iii) Where a statutory body acts in breach or violation of the man.
datory provisions of the Act. [1020 E-G]
Sirsi Municipality v. Kam Francis [1973] 3 S.C.R. 348;; Indian Airlines Corporation v. Sukhdeo Rai [1971] Supp. S.C.R. 510, 514; S. R. Tewari v.
District Board, Agra and Anr" [1964] 3 S.C.R. 55, 59, Executive Committee of
U.P. State Warehousing Corporation Ltd. v. Chandra Kiran Tyagi. [1970] 2
S.C.R. 250, 265 and Bank of Baroda v. Jewan Lal Mehrotra [1970] 2 L.L.J. 54,
55, referred to.
. ~ince the appellant is not a statutory body, the present case does not fall
w1thm any of the excepted categories and the respondent is not entitled to any
declaration or injunction. [1020 G-H]
(b) Assuming .that the Sirsi ¥unicipa!ity case has extended the scope of the
exceptions to public or local lliodies even 1f they are non-statutory bodies so that,
the appellant though a non-statutory body, will still be bound by the statutory
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1008
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 S.C.R.
provisions of law, in view of the special circumstances of this case, it wilt not
be a prope1r exercise of discretion to grant a decree for declaration and injunction in favour of the respondent. The grant of specific relief is, under ss. 20
and 34 of the Specific Relief Ac'!, 1963 as well as under the Commori Law, purely
di~crctionary and can be refus~d where. the end> of justice do not require the
relief to be granted. The exercise of' discretion applies as much to a Court
exercising writ jurisdiction as well as in suits. The relief has to be granted
by the Court according to sound legal principles and ex debito justitiae. The
Court has to administer justice between the .varties and cannot convert itself
into an instrument of injustice or an engine of oppression. The Cmtrt must
keep in mind the well-settled principles of justice and fairplay and should exerci>e the discretion only if the ends of justice require it.
[1021 C-D; 1022 A;.
1023 H-1024 D, E-F; 1025 F]
·
Jerome Francis v. Municipal Council/ors of Kuala Lumpur (1962) W.L.R.
1411: A. Francis v. Municipal Counci/lors of Kuala Lumpur (1962) 3 All. E.R.
633, 637 and R. T. Rangachari v. Secretary of State for India in Council, L.R. 64
J.A. 40, 53-54, applied.
•
JI
Malumt il!dra Narain Das v. Maham Gc•nga Ram & Anr., AIR 1965 All.
683, 684 and B/wirabendra Narayn Bhup v. State of Assam, A.LR. J 953 Assam
162, 165, referred to.
Hill v. C. A. Parsons & Co. Ltd. (1971) 3 All. E.R. 1345, distinguished.
rd.
D
E
F
Jn the· present case, neither the first appellate Court nor the High Court,
while decreeing the respondent's suit, consid~red whether it is a fit case in which
the discretion should be exercised in favour of the respondent. [1024 D-E]
(i) The respondent served the institution only for two years. If relief as
prayed for i~ granted to him, he would have to be paid salary and interest for
nine years which: would amount to more than a lakh of rupees, even though he1
had not done any work for the, college during those years; and. (ii) though the
respondent is not at fault, the payment of such a large. sum would undoubtedly
work s•erious injustice td the appellant because it is likely to destroy the very
existence of the Institution. [1024 G-1025 BJ
Therefore, instead of' granting the relief to the respondent as prayed for, if
he is allowed to withdraw and keep the sum of about Rs. 21,000/- deposited by
the appellant by virtue of interlocutory orders towards the salary of the respondent, it will vindicate his stand and compensate him for any hardship caused
to him by terminating his services and will put a stamp of finality to any fu_rther
litigation between them. [I 025 C-F]
(Per Bhagwati, J.) :
T!>is Court has laid down three exceptions to the rule under the Common
Law that the Cour~ will not ordinarily force an employe•r to retain the services
of an employee whom he no longer wishes to employ : (I) In the case of a
public servant di9missed from service in contravention of Art. 311; (2) Under
the Industrial Law; and (3) When a statutory body has acted in breach of a
mandatory obligation imposed by a statute. [1030 B-C, F-G]
G
H
Dr. S. B. Dutta v. University, of Delhi A.T.R. 1958 S.C. 1050; Life f11Surance Corporation of lmf1a v. Sunil Kumar Mukherjee A.LR. 1964 S.C. 847;
Mafat/al Ba.rdt v. Divi.sional Control/er, State Transport, Mahsana AJ.R. 1966
S.C. 1364; B. N. Tewari v. District Board, Agre.\ A.l.R. 1964 S.C. 1680;
U.P. State Warehousing Corporation v. C. K. Tyagi [1970] 2 S.C.R. 250;
bzdian Airlines Corporation v. Sukhdeo Rai [1971] Supp. S.C.R. 510 and
Bank! o'f Baroda v. Jewan Lal Mehrotra [1970] 2 L.L.J. 54, referred to.
But, these 3 exceptions formulated in the statement. of law laid dO\~n ·by
this Court, are not intended to be and cannot be exhaus!Ive. The categories of
exceptions to the general rule should not be closed, because, ~ny attempt at
rigid and exhaustive formulation of legal rules is bound .to sttfle the gr~wth
of Jaw and cripple its capacity ta adapt itself ~o the changing needs of. society.
In fact, in the Sirsi Municipality v. Kom Francis [1973] 3 S.C.R. 348, this Court
+
VAISH COLLEGE V. LAKSHMI NARAIN
1009
A
pointed out !hat the third exception applied not only to employees in the service oi' "bodie9 created under statutes" but also to those in the employment of
'"mher public or local authorities". This exception is really intended to cover
cases where by reason of breach of mandatory obligation imposed by law, as
distinct from contract, the termination Qf service is null and void so that there
is in law no repudiation at all. [1031 C-FJ
. Where the relationship between the employer and his employee is gov·erned
by statute or statutory regulations the termination of the service of the employee
may, in a given situation, be null and void, and in that event, it would not have
the effect of putting an end to the contract .and the employee would be entitled
· to a declaration that his service is continuing. What the employee would be
claiming in such! a case is not enforcement of contract of personal service· but
declaration of statutory invalidity of an acr done by the employer. [1029 A-DJ
..
Jn the present case, it is not necessary to decide whether the appellant is or
io; not a statutory body or a publi<; authority or whether the Statutes of the University had the force or law conferring rights on the respondent as in the case
of P. R. Jodh v. A. L. Pande [1965] 2 S.C.R. 713, or that they only set out
the terms and condiiions which confe.rred no legal rights unless and until they
were embodied in a contract between the appellant and the respondent, as in
the case of V. R. Mishra v. Managing Co111111ittee, Slll'i Jai Narain College [1972]
3 SCR 320. n6, because, the termination of the respondent'9 services was
ineffective and inoperative as it was not approved by the Vice-ChancelloT as
required by the University Act. The· language of the section of the University Act is absolute and peremptory and provides in unambiguous te~ms that the
termination ~hall be ineffective and inoperative unless approved by the ViceChancellor; and this rule· of law, enacted by the Legislature, operates iTres.
pective of whether the management is or is not a statutory body. When the
Court refuses to recognise the termination as valid, it only enforces the Jaw
and there i~ no question of transgressing the principle that a contract of personal
service cannot be •~nforced. [1031 F-10320]
Therefore, the termination of the services of the respondent by the appellant
was ineffective and void and did not operative to put an end to the employment.
Hence, ordinarily the responderit, whose termination of service is thus null and
void or ineffective by reason of a statutory provision or subordinate legislation
which has the force of law, should be awarded a declaration that he continues
in service and the fact that he was in employment only for a short pe,riod of
two years should be no ground for refusing him the declaration. [1032 D-F
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But, in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances ot this case and since
!he grant of too relief is in the discretion of the Court, it must be he'id that this
1s not a proper case for the grant of such relief. If the relief of declaration
and i~junctiop_ is granted to the respondent, it wilJ involve the appellant in a
financ1_al ha~1hty o_f more than a lakh of rupees and that would wipe out the
educat.1on~I mshtuhon of the_ a~p7llant or in any event seriously cripple it and
that, m its turn, would preJud1c1aliy affect the interests or the student community. That· is an important consideration which the Court cannot fail to
take into account. in exercising its discretion. Mcy-eover, the aggregate amount
of about Rs. 21,000/- deposited by the appellant fo Court would be a fair and
just compensation to the respondent. [1032 F,-G, H-1033 BJ
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No 1543 of 1974 .
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G
Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the
30th July, 1974 of the Allahab,ad High Court in Second Appeal No.
2973 of 1972.
S. V. Gupte, .T. P. Goyal, P. C. Gupta and G. S. Chatterjee for the
Appellant.
·
·
M. K. Ramamurthi and 0. P. Rana for Respondent No. I.
D. P. Mukherjee for Respondents 3-5.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 2 S.C.R.
The Judgment of H. R. Khanna and S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, JJ. was
delivered by Fazal Ali, J., P. N. Bhagwati, J. gave a separate opinion.
FAZAL Au, J.-This appeal by special leave js directed against
the judgment of the Allahabad High Court affirming the deci:ee of the
First Additional Civil & Sessions Judge, Muzaffarnagar by which the
plaintiff/respondent's suitfor injunction was decreed.
The appeal arises in the follo..ying circumstances. The appellant ·
which is the Executive Committee of Yaish Degree College in the District of Muzaffarnagar was registered under the Registration of Cooperative Societies Act as an institution for imparting education. The
affairs of the College were managed by the Executive Committee of
the Yaish College which is the appellant in this case. In the year
1957 the Yaish Degree College was affiliated to the Agra University
and as a consequence thereof the College agreed to be governed by
the provisions of the Agra University Act and the satutes and ordinances made thereunder. With the establishment of the Meerut University some time in the year 1965 the Yaish Degree College got affiliated to the Meerut University. The plaintiff/respondent was appointed as Principal of the College on permanent basis with effect from
July 1, 1964 and his appointment as Principal was formally approved
by the Vice-Chancellor of the Agra University. 'iwo years later it
appears that differences arose between the Executive Committee of the
College and the plaintiff/respondent resulting in allegations and coun- ·
ter-allegations and culminating in a notice served by the Executive
Committee on October 24, 1966 on the plaintiff/respondent directing
him not to discharge the duties of the Principal and another letter was
sent to defendant No. 4 a member of the staff of the College to officiate as Principal in place of the plaintiff/respondent. This was followed up by a counter-notice by the plaintiff/respondent to the Executive Committee that the notice sent to him was illegal and the respondent also asked defendant No. 4 not to assume charge of the Principal.
On March 12, 1967, the Executive Committee by a resolution terminated the services of the plaintiff/ respondent with effect from October
24, 1966 and this resolution was amended by another resolution on
March 29, 1967. Even before the formal resolution terminating the
services of the plaintiff/respondent was passed it appears that the plaintiff had filed the present suit on October 28, 1966 before the Court of
the First Additional Civil & Sessions Judge, Muzaffarnagar which was
transferred for disposal to the Court of the Munsif, Kairana.
G
H
The plaintiff's case was that on being affiliated to the Agra. University and thereafter to the Meerut University and adopting the provisions of the Acts and the statutes of the said Universities the appellant
College became a statutory body and had no jurisdiction to terminate
the services of the plaintiff/respondent without seeking the previous
approval of the Vice-Chancellor. The plaintiff furth~r submitted t~at
after his appointment he entered into an agreement with the Executive
Committee in accordance with the statutes of the University and the
appellant was bound by the terms and provisions of the statutes under
•
YAISH COLLEGE v. LAKSHMI NARAIN
"·
(Fazal, Ali. J.)
10 11
which his services could not be terminated without the previous approval of the Vice-Chancellor. The plaintiff therefore contended that his
removal from service was without jurisdiction and he must be deemed
to have continued in service. He also made some allegations of bias
and mala fides against the Executive Committee and some other persons with which we are not concerned in this appeal. The plaintiff.
accordingly prayed for an injunction restraining the defendants from
interfering with his duties as the Principal of the College. It appears,
however, from the record that after the notice given to the plaintiff/
respondent by the Executive Committee the plaintiff was bereft of all
his powers and in spite of his attempts to get into the College and work
as Principal he was not allowed to do so which led to some criminal
proceedings also. It is, therefore, clear that at least after the resolution of the Executive Committee was passed tenninatin:i, the services
of the plaintiff he· has not been working as Principal of the College uptil now. This position is not disputed before us by counsel for the
parties.
A
B
c
The defence was that the Executive Committee was not a statutory_
body and therefore was not bound by the statutes and the provisions of
the University Acts although as a matter of convention it had agreed
to follow the same. The defendant/appellant also denied the allega- D
tions of the plaintiff/ respondent that the Executive Committee had
entered into any agreement or contract of service wiih the plaintiff/
respondent. The defendant further alleged that as the plaintiff/ respondent remained habitually and perpetually absent from his duties,
without the permission of the concerned authority the cleiendant/ appellant was compelled to dispense with the services of the plaintiff/respondent. In fact the plea taken by the defendant was that the plaintiff E
himself by his remaining perpetually absent from duties abandoned the
service and had put an end to the contract of service and therefore he
could riot be heard to say that the contract of service still subsisted.
'
The Trial Court of Munsif, Kairana, framed a number of issues
and after considering the evidence and the circumstances, found--(i)
that the plaintiff had failed to prove that he ever executed any agreement with the defendant/appellant; and (ii) that the defendant/appellant was not a statutory body and therefore was not bound by the provisions of the University Acts or the statutes made thereunder. The
learned Munsif therefore found that a case for declaration or injunction had npt been made out and he accordingly dismi:;sed the suit of
the plaintiff.
The plaintiff/respondent went up in appeal against the judgment
and decree of the Munsif and the appeal was heard by the First Additional Civil & Sessions Judge, Muzaffarnagar, who by his order dated
December 3, 1971, reversed the decision of the Munsif and decreed
the plaintiff's snit and granted the injunction prayed for. It may be
noticed that so far as the plea of the plaintiff/respondent that be had
executed an agreement with the Executive Committee of_ the College
which formed the basis of the terms of his ccntract of service was concerned the learned Additional Civil & Sessions Judge abo affirmed the
finding of the Munsif on this point and held that there was no such
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 S.C.R,
agreement. Even before us this finding was not disputed by the learn·
cd coun~el for the plaintiff/respondent who has proceeded on the
~ssumpt10n that there was no agreement executed between the plaintiff and the defendant as alleged by the plaintiff.
The defendant/appellant filed a second appeal in the High Court
of Allahabad against the decision of the First Additional Civil &
Sessions Judge decreeing the plaintiff's suit. The matter was heard
by a single Judge who, however, referred the case (<) a Full Bench framing the following issue :
f
"Can the Civil Court grant the relief of injunction in view
of the facts and circumstances. of the present case ?"
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Consequently the matter was placed before the Full Dench of _the
Allahabad High Court which after hearing the arguments decided the
following points 'in favour of the plaintiff/respondent :
( 1) That the defendant/ appellant being a stautory body
was· bound by the provisions of the University Acts
and the statutes made thereunder and therefore the
termination of the services of the plaintiff/ respondent
without obtaining the sanction of the Vice-Chancellor
was illegal & invalid; and
(2) That in the facts and circumstances of the case, the
plaintiff/respondent was entitled to the injunction as
/
prayed for.
The case then came back before the Single Judge who in view of
the decision of the Full Bench affirmed the decree of the First Additional Civil & Sessions Judge decreeing the plaintiff's suit with the
modification that the suit was decreed only against defendants 2, 4,
6 & 7 but dismissed as against defendants 1 & 5. Hence this appeal
by special leave before us.
Mr. Gupte learned counsel for the appellant submitted before us
that it was not necessary to go into the complicated facts of t}le case,
because he adumbrated three propositions of law before us, which in
his opinion were sufficient to decide the case. In the first place it was
contended that the finding of the Full Bench which formed the basis
of tile judgment of the High Court appealed against that the defendant/
appellant was a statutory body was legally erroneous; secondly the counsel submitted that even if the appell!i:nt was a statutory body as no
agreement was executed between the respondent and the appellant the
statutes passed by the University would not apply and the termination
of the services of the respondent would be governed by the usual master and servant relationship; and thirdly, it was contended that it is
well settled that the courts do not enforce a contract of personal service in the absence of special circumstances as laid by several decisions
of this Court, and the case in hand does not fall within any of the
exceptions laid down by this Court.
Mr. Ramamurthi learned counsel for the respo11dent rebutted the
arguments of Mr. Gupte and supported the judgment of .the Full Bench
of the Allahabad High Court that the appellant was a statutory body
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YAISH COLLEGE v. LAKSHMI NARAIN (Faza/, Ali. /.)
1013
,.
and therefore the termination of the servi-;es of the respondent was
A
legally invalid. It was further contende.d that in view of the decision
of this Court in Sirsi Municipality v. Kom Farncis( 1 ) the scope of the '
exception laid down by this Court in various cases has been extended
even to include within its fold non-statutory· bodies provided they are
public or local bodies which the appellant/defendant was undoubtedly
one. Lastly it was submitted that once it is established that the ter:S.
mination of thtt services of the respondent was legally invalid inasmuch
as the sanction of the Vice-Chancellor was not obtained, the declaration that the plaintiff/respondent continued in service and injunction
prayed for must be granted as a matter of law. In the course of the
arguments, however, the learned counsel for the appdlant also suggested that the relief of injunction or declaration being an equitable relief
and in the discretion of this Court this was not a li.t case in which
C
this discretion should be exercised in favour of the plaintiff/respondent.
We would first deal with the important question, which has been
the sheet-anchor of the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent as also the main basis of the judgment of tl\c Full Bench of
the Allahabad High Court, as to whether or not the appellant Executive Committee can be said to be a statutory body in the circumstances
of the present case. · It seems to us that before an institution can be a
statutory body it must be created by or under the statute and owe its
existence to a statute. This must be the primary thing which has got
to be established. 'Here a distinction must be made between an institution which is not created by or under a statute but is governed by
certain statutory provisions for the proper maintenance and administration of the institution. There have been a number of institutions
which though not created by or under any statute have adopted certain statutory provisions, but that by itself is not, in our opinion, sufficient to clothe the institution with a statutory character. In Sukhdev
Si11gh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raglzuvanshi & others('.!) this
Court clearly pointed out as to what constitutes a statutory body. In
this connection my Lord A. N. Ray, C. J., observed as follows :
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" A company incorporated under the Companies Act is
not created by the Companies Act but comes into existence in
accordance with the provisions of the Act. It is not a ~tatu
tory body because it is not created by the statute. It is a
body created in accordance with the provisions of the
statute."
F
It is, therefore, clear that there is a well marked Jistinction between
a body which is created by the statute and a body whid1 after having·
come into exist~nce is governed in accordance with the provisions of
the statute. In other words the position seems to be that the institution concerned must owe its very existence to a statute which would be
the fountain-head of its powers. The question in such cases to be asked
·is, if there is no statute would the institution have anv legal existence.
If the answer is in the negative, then undoubtedly it is a statutory body,
but if the institution has a separate existence of its own without any
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(I) [1973] 3 S.C.R. 348.
(2) fl 975] 3 S.C.R. 619.
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[1976] 2 S.C.R.
reference to the statute ceonccrned but is merely governed by the statutory provisions it cannot be said to be a statutory body. The High
Court, in our opinion, was in error in holding that merely because
the Executive Committee followed certain statutory provisions of the
University Act or the statutes made thereunder it must be deemed to
be a statutory body. In fact the Full Bench of the High Court relied
on three circumstances in order to hold that the Executive Committee
was a statutory body, viz., (i) that it was affiliated to the Agra University which was established by the statute; (ii) that there were certain
mandatory provisions in the Agra University Act which were binding
on the Executive Committee; and (iii) that the Executive Committee
was governed by the statutes framed by the Agra University. In .our
opinion, none of these factors would be sufficient to alter the character
and nature of the Executive Committee and conwrt it into a fullfiedged statutory body. To begin with the Executive Committee had
an independent status having been registered under the Registration of
Co-operative Societies Act and was a self-governed or an autonomous
body. It was affiliated fo the Agra University merely for the sake of
convenience and mainly for the purpose that the courses of studies
prevalent in t)'ie College may be recognised by the University.
Statute 14-A of the Agra University Hand-Book (1965-66) runs
thus:
"Each College, already affiliated or when afliliatcd, wbich
is not maintained exclusively by Government must be under
the Management of a regularly constituted Governing body
(which term includes Managing Committee) on which the
staff of the college shall be represented by the Principal of the
college and at least one representative of the teachers of the
.:ollege to be appointed by rotation in order of seniority
determined by length of service in the college, who shall hold
office for one academic year.''
All that the statute of the Agra University required was that the Managing Committee of the College must co-opt the Principal of the College
and one representative of the teachers of the college by rotation as
members of the Committee. It is manifest that by co-opting these
members the Managing Committee did not lose its independent status
but continued to remain a non-statutory and autonomous body. Similarly the mere fact that the statutes of the University were adopted by
the Managing Committee and it was as a matter of convention bound
to follow the statutory provisions of the Act wouid not clothe the
Managing Committee with a statutory status or character. ln fact the
adoption of the statutes was agreed to by the appellant Executive Comrnittee for the better governance, administration and extension of the
educational activities of the institution. In fact an identical argument
which forms the basis of the judgment of the Full Bench of the High
Court had been advanced before this Court and rejected outright. For
instance in Sabhajit Tewary v. Union of India & Ors.( 1 ) the question
was whether the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research which
(I) [1975] 3 S.C.R. 616.
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VAISH COLLEGE v. LAKSHMI NARAIN (Fazal Ali, J.)
1015
was a society registered under the Societies Regi~tration Act, as the
present appellant is, was a statutory body. It was urged that becaus.e
the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research had government nominees as the President of the body and derived guidance and 11nancial
aid from the Government, it was a statutory body A. N. Ray, C.J.,
rebutted these arguments and observed as follows :
A
"The Society does not have a statutory character like the
Oil and Natural Gas Commission, or the Life Insurance Corporation or Industrial Finance Corporation. It is a society
incorporated in accordance with the provisions of the Societies Registration Act. The fact that the Prime Minister is
the President or that the. Government appoints nominees to
the Governing Body or that the Government may terminate
the membership will not establish anything more than the
fact that the Government takes special care that the promotion, guidance and co-operation of scientific and industrial
research, the institution and financing of specific researches,
establishment or development and assistance to spec;ial institutions or departments of the existing institutions for scientific study of problems affecting particular industry in a trade,
the utilisation of the result of the researches conducted under
the auspices of the Council towards the development of industries in the country are carried out in a responsible manner."
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Similar view was taken by this Court in· Kumari Regina v. St. Aloysius
Higher Elementary School & Anr.(1) where this Court observed as
follows:
"But it cannot also be gainsaid that as the Government
has ·the power, to admit schools to recognition and grantsin-aid, it can, de hors the Act, lay down conditions under
which it would grant recognition and aid. To achieve
uniformity and certainty in the exercise of such executive
.power and to avoid discrimination, the Government would
have to frame rules which, however, would be in the form of
administrative instructions to its .officers, dealin<r with the
matters of .r~cognition and aid. If such rules ~ere to lay
down cond1t10ns, the Government can insist that satisfaction of such conditions would be condition precedent to
obtaining recognition and aid and that a breach or non-compliance of such conditions would entail either the denial or
withdrawal of recognition and aid. The management of a
school, therefore, would commit a breach or non-compliance
of the conditions laid down in the rules on pain of deprivation of recognition and aid. The rules thus govern the terms
on which the Government would grant recognition and aid
and the Government can enforce these rules upon the management. But the enforcement of such rules is a matter between the Government and the management, and a third party,
such as a teacher aggrieved by some order of the manage-
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(I) [1971] Supp, S. C.R. 6.
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ment, cannot derive from the rules any enforceable rlght
against the management on the ground of a breach or noncompliance of any of the rules."
This is a case which is almost on all fours with the facts of the present
case because there the case was whether the school after being recognised by the Government for the purpose of grant was bound to observe
the rules.
ln Indian Airlines Corporation v. Sukhdeo Rai( 1), it was observed
as follows :
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'The fact, therefore, that the appellant-Corporation was
one set up under and was regulated by Act XXVII of 1953
would not take away, without anything more, the relationship between it and its employees from the category of
purely master and servant relationship."
•
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The Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court, however, appears
to have placed great reliance on the decisions of this Court in Prabhakar Ramakrishna Jodh v. A. L. Pande & A11r.C) whe;:e this Court
held that the Governing Body of the College in that case was a statutory body. In this connection, this Court observed as follows :
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"On the other hand, we are of Opinion that the provisions
of Clause 8 of the Ordinance relating to security of the tenure
of teachers are part and parcel of the teachers' service conditions and, as we have already pointed out, the provisions of
the 'College Code' in this regard are validly made by the
University in exercise of the statutory power and have, therefore, the force and effect of Jaw. It follows, therefore, that
the 'College Code' creates legal rights in favour of teachers
of affiliated colleges and the view taken by the High Court
is erroneous."
This case, however, is clearly distinguishable from the facts of the present case. To begin with, in P. R. lodh's case, this Court was dealing
with the College Code which was itself a creature of the statute, namely,
the University of Saugar Act. Under Ordinance No. 20 Para 1 the
Governing body was created by an Ordinance pas3ed under the University of Saugar Act. It is, therefore, clear that the statutes are the
creature of the Act. Thus the distinction is that in P. R. Jodh's case
the Governing Body 'was the Council of Management established under
the Act while here the Managing Committee is not. It is obvious that
the Governing Body was created under a statutory provision because
the Ordinance had undoubtedly a statutory force having been passed
under the Act. Para 2(i) (c) of the College Code runs thus :
"2. (i) In this Ordinance, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context : -
H
( c) 'Governing Body' means the CouncH of Management established under this Ordinance for the control
and general management of the 'College'."
(I) [1971] Supp. S.C.R. 510, 514.
(2) [1965) 2 S.C.R. 713, 718.
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YAISH COLLEGE v. LAKSHMI NARAIN
(Fazal Ali, J.)
101 7
The Governing Body was, therefore, establi~hcd under the Ordinance A
itself and had no independent existence at all. Similarly under Para 3
of the Ordinance the constitution of the-Governing Body was laid down.
It is, therefore, clear that not only was the Governing Body of the
College established under the Ordinance but even the constitution of
the said Governing Body was laid down by the Ordinance itself' and
the functions of the Governing Body were clearly defined by Pam 4 of
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Ordinance No. 20. The Ordinance itself was called the "Colleg.:
Code" which came into legal existence by virtue of the Ordinance. · In
other words, the position is that before Ordinance No. 20 was passed
under the University Act, the Governing Body had no existence at all.
The same, however, could not be said of the present Managing Committee which had its independent existence long before it was affiliated.
to the Agra University and had also its own constitution, the only
exception being that two members had to be taken ex-officio in the
Managing Committee. There is, therefore, world of difference between the nature and manner of the establishment of the Governing
Body under the University of Saugar Act and the Managing Committee
in the instant case. Further more, this case was noticed and discussed
by a later judgment of this Court in Vidya Ram Mishra v. Managing
Committee, Shri Jai Narain Col/ege(1) and was distinguished. Speaking
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for the Court, Mathew, J., observed as folloyvs :
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"When once this Court came to the conclusion that the
'College Code' had the force of Jaw and conferred rights on
the teachers of affiliated colleges, the right to challenge the
order terminating the services of the appellant, passed in
violation of clause S(vi) (a) of the 'College Code' in a proceeding under Article 226 followed 'as the night the day' and
the fact that the appellant had entered into a contract was
considered as immaterial.
*
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On a plai.n reading of statute 151, it is clear that it only
provides that the terms and conditions mentioned therein
must be incorporated in the contract to be entered ii1to between the college and the teacher concerned. It does not say
that the terms and conditions have any legal force, until and
unless they are embodied in an agreement. To put it in
other words, the terms and conditions of service mentioned
in Statute 151 have proprio vigore no force of law. They .
become terms and conditions of service only by virtue of
their being incorporated in the contract. Without the contract, they have no vitality and can confer no legal rights.
Whereas in the case of Prabhakar Ramakrishna Jodh v.
A. L. Pande and another-[(1965) 2 S.C.R. 713], the terms
and conditions of service embodied in clause S(vi) (a) of the
'College Code' had the force of law apart from the contract
and conferred rights on the appellant there, here the terms
and conditions mentioned in Statute 15 l have no efficacy, unless they are incorporated in a contract."
(!) [1972) 3 S.C.R. 320, 326.
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It is, therefore, clear that in P. R. lodh's case the College Code was by
itself a statutory Code so that the provisions of the statute operated
proprio vigore and did not depend on the execution of the agreement
between the employer and the employee in accordance with the statutes
of the University. In the instant case, which is very much like the
case in Vidya Ram Mishra (supra) the statute merely enjoined that
the agreement between the employer and the employee should be incorporated according to the form and conditions prescribed by the
statute and until the said agreement is executed the provisions of the
Statute would not apply proprio vigore. The Allahabad High Court
no doubt tried to distinguish Vidya Ram Mishra's case, but with due
respect, we might observe that the distinction drawn by the High Court
is a distinction without any difference. The High Court has not considered the two basic facts which were present in P. R. Jodh's case but
which were not present in the instant case, viz., ( 1) that the Governing
Body in the case dealt with by this Court in P. R. Jodh's case was in
itself a creature of the statute; and (2) that in the instant case the
statute did not apply proP.rio vigore but only after an agreement was
executed between the employer and the employee in accordance with
the terms and conditions of the statute. The High Court also failed
to consider that there was a concurrent finding of fact by all the Courts
below that the plaintiff/respondent never executed any agreement with
the Executive Committee of the College in the form prescribed by the
statutes of the Agra University Act. ,
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Thus in view of the decisions of this Court regarding the circumstances under which the institution can be treated as a statutory body
we are unable to agree with the view taken by the Allahabad High
Court that the Executive Committee was a statutory body merely because it was affiliated to the University or was regulated by the provisions of the University Act or the statutes made thereunder. We
accordingly hold that the decision of the Full Bench of the Allahabad
High Court on this point is legally erroneous and must be overruled.
This brings us to the next point for consideration as to whether or
not the plaintiff/respondent's case fell within the exceptions laid down
by this Court to the general rule that the contract of personal service
is not specifically enforceable. In this connection as early as 1964, in
S. R. Tewari v. District Board, Agra and Anr.(I), this Court observed
as follows :
"Under the common law the Court will not ordinarily
force an employer to retain the services of an employee
whom he no longer wishes to employ. But this rule is subject to certain well recognized exceptions. It is open to the
Courts in an appropriate case to declare that a public servant who is dismissed from service in contravention of Art.
311 continues to remain in service, even though by so doing
the State is in effect forced to continue to employ the servant
whom it does not desire to employ. Shnilarly under , the
industrial law jurisdiction of the labour and industrial,
-------
tl I 1196~] l S.C.R. 55, 59.
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YAISH COLLEGE
v. LAKSHMI NARAIN (Fazal Ali, J.)
10 19
tribunals to compel the employer to employ a worker, whom
he does not desire to employ, is recognised. The Courts
are also invested with the [>OWer to declare invalid the act of
a statutory body, if by doing the act the body has acted in
breach of a mandatory obligation imposed by statute, even if
by making the declaration the body is compelled to do
something which it does not desire to do."
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To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Executive Committee
of U.P. State Warehousing Corporation Ltd. v. Chandra Kiran
Tyagi (1), where it was observed as follows :
"From the two decisions of this Court, referred to above,
the position in law is that no declaration to enforce a contract of personal service will be normally granted. But there
are certain well-recognized exceptions to this rule and they
are : To grant such a declaration in appropriate cases regarding ( 1) A public servant, who has been dismissed from
service in contravention of Art. 31 l. (2) Reinstatement of a
dismissed worker under Industrial Law by Labour or Industrial Tribunals. (3) A statutory body when it has acted in
breach of a mandatory obligation, imposed by statute."
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In Indian Airlines Corporation v. Sukhdeo Rai (supra) this Court
also observed as follows :
"It is a well settled principle that when there is a purported termination of a contract of service, a declaration, that
the contract of service still subsisted, would not be made in
the absence of special circumstances because of the principle
that courts do not ordinarily grant specific performance of
service. This is so, even in cases where the authority
appointing an employee was acting in exercise of statutory
authority. The. relationship between the person appointed
and the employer would in such cases be contractual, i.e.
as between a master and servant, and the termination of that
relationship would not entitle the servant to a declarntion
that his employment had not been validly determined."
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To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Bank of Baroda v.
Jewan Lal Mehrotra(1 1 ) where this Court observed as follows :
"The law as settled by this Court is that no declaration
to enforce a contract of personal service will be normally
·granted. The well recognised exceptions to this rule are (1)
where a public servant has been <;lismissed from service in
contravention of Art. 311; (2) where reinstatement is sought
of a dismissed worker under the industrial law by labour or
industrial tribunals; (3) where a statutory body has acted in
breach of a mandatory obligation imposed by statute;"
(1) [1970] 2 S.C.R. 250. 265.
(2) [1970] 2 LL.J. 54. 55.
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In the Sirsi Municipality's case the matter was exhaustively reviewed and Ray, J., (as he then was) observed as follows :
"The cases of dismissal of a servant fall under three
broad heads, purely by contract of employment. Any breach
of contract in such a case is enforced by a suit for wrongful
dismissal and damages. Just as a contract of employment is
not capable of specific performance similarly breach of contract of employment is not capable of founding a declaratory
judgment of subsistence of employment. A declaration of
unlawful termination and restoration to service in such a case
of contract of employment would be indirectly an instance of
specific performance of contract for personal service. Such
a declaration is not permissible' under the Law of Specific
Relief Act.
The second type of cases of master and servant arises
under Industrial Law. Under that branch of law a servant
who is wrongfully dismissed may be reinstated.' This is a
special provision under Industrial Law. This relief . is a
departure from the reliefs available under the Indian Contract Act and the Specific Relief Act which do not provide
for reinstatement of a servant.
The third category of cases of master and servant arises·
in regard to the servant in the employment of the State or
of other public or local authorities or bodies created under
statute."
On a consideration of the authorities mentioned above, it is, therefore, clear that a contract of personal service cannot ordinarily be specifically enforced and a Court normally would not give a declaration
that the contract subsists and the employee, even after having been
removed from service can be deemed to be in service against the will
and consent of the employer. This rule, however, is subject to three
well recognised exceptions-(i) where a public servant is sought to be
removed from service in contravention of the provisions of Art. 311
of the Constitution of India; (ii) where a worker is sought to be
reinstated on being dismissed under the Industrial Law; and (iii) where
a statutory body acts in breach or violation of the mandatory provisions of the statute.
In view of our finding that the Executive Committee of the College
in the instant case was not a statutory body, the present case does not
fall within any of the excepted categories mentioned above, and hence
prima facie, the plaintiff/respondent is not entitled to any declaration
or injunction. The learned counsel for the respondent, however,
placed great reliance on the decision of this Court in Sirsi Municipality's case (supra) in order to contend that this decision had included within the fold of its exceptions a fourth category, namely, an institution which even though was a non-statutory body, but was a local
'
VAISH COLLEGE v. LAJ<.SHMI NARAIN
(Fazal Ali, J.)
1021
or a public authority. Reliance was placed particularly on the following observations of Ray, J., as he then was, in that case :
'The third category of cases of master and servant arises
in regard to the servant in the employment of the State or
of other public or local authorities or bodies created under
statuti:.
In the case of servant of the State or of local authorities
or statutory bodies, courts have declared in appropriate cases
the dismissal to be invalid if the dismissal is contrary to rules
of natural justice or if the dismissal is in violation of the
provisions of the statute."
1'
Assuming for the sake of arguments, but not deciding that this
decision has extended the scope of the exceptions, so that the appellant Executive Committee though a non-statutory body will still be
bound by the statutory provisions of law, let us see what is th~ position. It would appear that under s. 25-C (2) of the Agra University
Act corresponding to similar provisions in Kanpur and Meerut Universities Act of 1965 which runs thus :
"Every decision by the Management of an affiliated
. college, other than a college maintained by Government, to
dismiss · or remove from service a teacher shall be reported
forthwith to the Vice-Chancellor and subject to provisions to
be made by the Statutes shall not take effect until it has been
approved by the Vice-Chancellor."
it was incumbent on the Executive Committee of the College to have
taken the previous approval of the Vice-Chancellor before terminating
the services of the plaintiff/respondent. Reliance was placed by the
learned counsel for the respondent on the words "shall not take effect
until it has been approved by the Vice-Chancellor". It was urged
that there has been an infraction of a mandatory provision of the Act
itself which is undoubtedly binding on the appellant Executive Committee and the resolution of the Executive Committee terminating the
services of the respondent is not only invalid but completely without
jurisdiction, and, therefore, the plaintiff/respondent is entitled tO' the
injunction sought for. It is common ground that the procedure enjoined in sub-s. (2) of s. 25-C of the Agra University Act was not at
all followed by the Executive Committee and there can be no doubt
that the Executive Committee has been guilty of this default. The
question remains whether even if there has been a violation of the
mandatory provisions of the statute, should we in the exercise of our
discretion grant a declaration or an injunction to the plaintiff/respondent in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case ? It
is well settled that a relief under the Specific Relief Act is purely discretionary and can be refused where the ends of justice do not require
the relief to be granted. Mr. Ramamurthi learned counsel for the
plaintiff/respondent submitted that the question of discretion would
arise only in case where the High Court or this Court is actihg in a writ
jurisdiction and not in a suit. We are, however, unable to agree with
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this argument because the exercise of discretion is spelt out from the
provisions of the Specific Relief Act and the common law and it
applies as much to the writ jurisdiction as to other action at law.
In Jerome Francis v. Municipal Councillors of Kuala Lampur(l).
Lord Morris observed as follows :
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"In their Lordships' view when there has been a purported termination of a contract of service a declaration to the
effect that the contract of service still subsists will rarely be
made. This is a consequence of the general principle of law
that the courts will not grant specific performance of contracts of service. Special circumstances will be reciuired
before such a declaration is made and its- making will normally be in the discretion of the Court. In their Lordships'
view there are no circumstances in the present case which
would make it either just or proper to make such a declaration."
Further more under similar circumstances though the dismissal of theemployee was by an authority which was not competent to dismiss him,
namely, the Municipal Council, their Lordships of the Privy Council
refused to grant the declaration in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case which caused hardship. The Privy Council in
A. Francis .v. Municipal Councillors of Kuala Lumpur( 1) observed as.
follows :
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"Accepting, however, the decision of the Court of Appeal,
which, as has been pointed out, has not been the subject of
any cross-appeal, the position on Oct. 1 was that the removal
of the appellant was a removal by the council and not by
the president. The council were his employers, but having
regard to the provisions of the ordinance their termination
of his service constituted wrongful dismissal. Their Lordships consider that it is beyond doubt that on Oct. 1, 1957,
there was de facto a dismissal of the appellant by his employers, the respondents. On that date he was excluded from
the council's premises. Since then he has not done any work
for the council. In all these circumstances it seems to their
Lordships that the appellant must be treated as having been
wrongly dismissed on Oct. 1, 1957, and that his remedy lies
in a claim for damages. It would be wholly unreal to accedeto the contention that since Oct. 1, 1957; he had continued
to be and that he still continues to be in the employment of
the respondents."
As against this position Mr. Ramamurthi counsel for the plaintiff/
respondent submitted that in Hill v. C. A. Parsons & Co. Ltd. ( 3 ) a
declaration that the termination was invalid was granted by the Court.
In that case, however, it was pointed out that the declaration was
(!) [1962] l W.L.R. 1411.
(2) [1962] 3 All. E. R. 633, 637.
(3) 1971] 3 All E. R. 1345.
VAISH COLLEGE
v. LAKSHMI NARAIN (Fazal Ali, !.)
10 23
granted under very special circumstances of that case where the employee was said to be removed from service almost at the fag end of his
career after serving for 35 years when he was due to retire only two
years later. In that case, however, Lord Denning laid down that in
the absence ofany special circumstances, a declaration should not be
granted. It is clear that in the instant case the respondent had worked
in the College for only two years. In these circumstances, therefore,
this case does not appear to be of any assistance to the respondent.
In R. T. Rangachari v. Secretary of State for India in Council(!)
the Privy Council observed as follows :
"But, although their Lordships differ in this important
matter from the reasoning and conclusions of the Courts
below, they are not on the whole prepared to direct that a
declaration on this point should be made. The questions of
fact and law are now decided, and a declaration could have
no greater effect than the decision itself. After this lapse of
time, and having regard to his health, no one suggests that
the appellant can now be restored to his office, and the matter
of pension and the responsibility of doing right in that regard
rests with the Government. Accordingly, their Lordships
agree in the view of the Courts below that no order or
declaration should be made in this action."
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A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Mahant llidra
Narain Das v. Mahant Ganga Ram Das & Anr.(2) observed as follows:
"The second thing to be noted is that the court is given
a discretion to make the declaration sought and the plaintiff
need not ask for any further relief. The relief being discretionary, no person can claim the declaration as of right."
Similarly in Bhairabendra Narayan Bhup v. State of Assam ( 3 ), a
Division Bench of the Assam High Court observed as follows :
"It must be remembered that the declaration claimed
under s. 42 lies entirely within the judicial discretion of the
Court and is to be exercised with caution according to the
exigencies of a particular case. A party cannot, as of right
claim such a declaration, because such a relief is more in the
nature of an equitable relief than a legal remedy. It has
been repeatedly held that a Court should be circumspect as
to the declaration it makes, and futile declarations should be
always avoided."
Apart from these decisions it would appear that s. 20 ( 1) of the
Specific Relief Act clearly codifies this principle and may be extracted
as follows :
"20. (1) The jurisdiction to decree specific performance
is discretionary, and the court is not bound to grant such
relief merely because it is lawful to do so; but the discretion
-(1) L. R. 64 I.-A.-40, 53-54.
(2) A.LR. 1965 All. 683, 684.
(3) A.LR. 1953 Assam 162, 165.
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of the court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided
by judicial principles and capable of correction by a court of
appeal."
Similarly s. 34 of the Specific Relief Act also gives a discretion to the
Court to give a declaration of the legal character. Section 34 runs
thus:
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"Any person entitled t~ any legal character, or to any
right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character
or right, and the court may in its discretion make therein a
declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in
such suit ask for any further relief :
Provided that no court shall make any such declaration
where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a
mere declaration of title, omits to do so.
Explanation.-A trustee of property is a "person
interested to deny" a'title adverse to the title of someone who
is not in existence, and for whom, if in existence, he would be
a trustee."
It seems to us that neither the First Additional Civil & Sessions
Judge nor the High Court, while decreeing the plaintiff's suit, considered this aspect of the matter whether this was a fit case in which the
discretion should have been exercised in favour of the respondent. It
is manifestly clear from the authorities discussed above that the relief
of declaration and injunction under the provisions of the Specific
Relief Act is purely discretionary and the plaintiff cannot claim it as
of right. The relief has to be granted by the Court according to sound
legal principles and ex debito justitiae. The Court has to administer
justice between the parties and cannot convert itself into an instrument
of injustice or an engine of oppression. In these circumstances, while
exercising its discretionary powers the Court must keep in mind the
well settled principles of justice and fairplay and should exercise the
discretion only if the ends of justice require it, for justice is not an
object which can be administered in vacuum.
The admitted facts in the present case, which will put the Court on
its guard, while exercising its discretion to grant a declaration or injunction are as follows :
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( 1) That the plaintiff/respondent served the institution for
a short period of two years only i.e. from 19M to
1966 and thereafter he was bereft of all his powers
and did not work in the College for a single day.
(2) That if the declaration sought for or the injunction is
granted to the plaintiff/respondent the result would be
that he would have to be paid his full salary with
interest and provident fund for full nine years i.e.
from 1966 to 1975, even though he had not worked in
the institution for a single day during th_is period.
YAISH COLLEGE v. LAKSHMI NARAIN
(Bhagwati, J.)
I 025
(3) That consequent upon the declaration the appellant
would have to pay a very huge amount running into
a lakh of rupees or perhaps more as a result of
which the appellant and the institution wou1d perhaps be completely wiped out and this would undoubtedly work serious injustice to the appellant
because it is likely to destroy its very existence.
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( 4) It is true that the plaintiff/respondent is not at fault,
but the stark realities, hard facts and extreme hardship of the case speak for themselves.
( 5) It appears that by virtue of the interlocutory orders
passed by this Court, the appellant has already deposited Rs. 9,000/- before the High Court which was to
be withdrawn by the respondent after giving security,
and a further sum of Rs. 9,100/- being the salary of
13 months has also been deposited by the appellant
before the Trial Court under the orders of this Court.
It is also stated by counsel for the appellant that the
appellant has deposited Rs. 3,000/- more. We feel
that in the circumstances the respondent may be permitted to keep these amounts with him and he will
not be required to refund the same to the appellant.
The amount of deposit in the High Court, if not withdrawn by the respondent may now be withdrawn by
him without any security and if he has already withdrawn the amount he will be discharged from the
security. This will vindicate the stand of the respondent and compensate him for any hardship that may
have been caused to him by the order terminating his
services, and will also put a stamp of finality to any
further litigation between the parties.
In view of these special and peculiar circumstances of this case, we feel
that it will not be a proper exercise of discretion to grant a decree for
declaration and injunction in favour of the respondent.
The appeal is accordingly allowed. We set aside the order passed
by the High Court and the First Additional Civil & Sessions Judge,
dismiss the plaintiff's suit and restore the judgment of the Trial Court.
In the circumstances of the case the parties will bear their own costs
throughout.
BHAGWATI, J. I agree with the final order proposed by my learned brother Fazal Ali, J., but I would like to state my own reasons for
reaching that conclusion. The facts giving rise to the appeal have
been fully set out in the judgment of my learned brother and it would
be a futile exercise to restate them. I will straight away proceed to
consider the question of law which arises for determination in the
appeal. The question is, ,whether the termination of the service of
the first respondent by the appellant was in violation of Statute 30 of
the Statutes of the Agra University which applied to the appellant at
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the material time, and in any event, the termination was ineffective and
inoperative as it was not approved by the Vice-Chancellor as required
bys. 28, sub-s. (3) of the Kanpµr and Meerut Universities Act, 1956,
and in either case, whether the first respondent was entitled to a declaration that the termination was null and void so as to warrant a declaration that he continued in the service of the appellant, or, his claim
merely lay in damages. It is a question of some importance.
I will first take up the first part of the question. On this part,
there was no dispute between the parties that the requirements of
Statute 30 were not complied with by the appellant in terminating the
service of the first respondent. The controversy merely centered round
the question whether the termination ofservice in !Jreach of the .requirec ments of Statute 30 rendered the termination null and void so as to
entitle the first respondent to a declaration that he continues in service
or it amounted merely to a breach of contract giving rise to a claim
for damages. Let me first examine this question on principle before
turning to the decided cases. There are two distinct classes of cases
which might arise when we are considering the relationship between
employer and employee. The relationship may be governed by conD tract or it may be governed by statute or statutory regulations. When
it is governed by contract, the question arises whether the general principles of the Law of Contract are applicable to the contract of employment or the law governing the contract of employment is a separate
and sui generis body of rules. The crucial question then is as to what
is the effect of repudiation of the contract of employment by the employer. If an employer repudiates the contract of employment by
E dismissing his employee, can the employee refuse to acce;:it the dismissal as terminating the contract and seek to treat the contract as still
subsisting ? The answer to this question given by general contract
principles would seem to be that the repudiation is of no effect unless
accepted, in other words, the contracting party faced with a wrongful
repudiation may opt to refuse to accept the repudiation and may hold
the repudiator to a continuance of his contractual obligation. But
F does this rule apply to wrongful repudiation of the contract of employment ? The trend of the decisions seems to be that it does not. It
seems to be generally recognized that wrongful repudiatien of the contract of employment by the employer effectively terminates the employment : the termination being wrongful, entitles the employee to claim
damages, but the employee cannot refuse to accept the repudiatim1 and
seek to treat the contract of employment as continuing. What is the
G principle behind this departure from the general rule of law of contract ? The reason seems to be that a contract of employment is not
ordinarily one which is specifically enforced. If it cannot be specifically enforced, it would be futile to contend that the unaccepted repudiation is of no effect and the contract continues to subsist between the
parties. The law in such a case, therefore, adopts a more realistic
posture and holds that the repudiation effectively terminates the conH
tract and the emplgyee can only claim damages for wrongful breach
of the contract. Now a contract of employment is not specifically
enforced because ordinarily it is a contract of penonal service and,
VAISH COLLEGE v. LAKSHMI NARAIN (Bhagwati,_ J.)
1027
as pointed out in the first illustration to clause (b). of s. 21 of the Sp~
cific Relief Act, 1877, a contract of personal service cannot be spec1fic2lly enforced. Of course this illustration has now been omitted in_
the new Specific Relief Act, 1963 and what would be the effect of
such omission may be a point which may require consideration some
day by this Court. But for the purpose of this case, l will proceed
on the assumption that even under the new Act, the law is the sa_me
and it frowns on specific enforcement of a contract of personal service.
Now what is the rationale behind this principle? That is found stated
in the locus classicus of Fry, L.J., in De Francesco v. Bamum( 1)
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"For my own part, I should be very unwilling to extend
decisions the effect of which is to compel persons who are
not desirous of maintaining continuous personal relations with
one another to continue those personal relations. [ have
a strong impression and a strong feeling that it is not in the
interest of making that the rule of specific performance should
be extended to such cases. I think the Courts are bound to
be jealous, lest· they should turn contracts of service into
contracts of slavery; and therefore, speaking for myself, I
should lean against the extension of the doctrine of specific
performance and injunction in such a manner."
This rationale obviously can have application only where the contract
of employment is a contract of personal :;ervicc involving personal
relations. It can have little relevance to conditions of employment in
modern large-scale industry and enterprise or statutory bodies or public
authorities where there is professional management of impersonal
nature. It is difficult to regard the contract of employment in such
cases as a contract of personal service save in exceptional cases. There
is no reason why .specific performance should be refused in cases of
this kind where the contract of employment does not involve relationship of personal character. It must be noted Lhat all these doctrines
of contract of service as personal, non-assignable, unenforceable, and
so on, grew up in an age when the contract of service was still frequently a "personal relation" between the owner of a small workhop
or trade or business and his servant. The conditions have now vastly
changed and these doctrines have to be adjusted and reformulated in
order to suit needs of a changing society. We cannot doggedly hold
fast to these doctrines which correspond to the social realities of an
earlier generation far removed from ours. We must rid the law of
these anachronistic doctrines and bring it in accord "with the felt necessities of the times". It is interesting to note that in Fry's classic work
on Specific Performance, contracts of service appear in a small group
under the sub-heading "Where enforced performance would be worse
than non-performance". We may ask ourselves the question : for
whom it would be worse and for whom it would he better. Where, in
a country like ours, large numbers of people are unemployed and it is
extremely difficult to find employment, an employee who is discharged
from service may have to remain without means of subsistence for a
long period of time. Damages equivalent to one or two months wages
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(!) [1890] 45 Ch. D. 430.
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would be po.or con~olation to .him. They would be wholly insufficient
t~ sustam lum durmg. t~e penod of unemployment following upon his
disc~arge. The prov1S1on .for damages for wrongful termination of
service was adequate a.t a time when an employee could without difficulty find other employment within the period of reasonable notice for
which damages were given to him. But in conditions prevailing in our
country, damages are a poor substitute for reinstatement : they fall far
short of the redress which the situation requires. To deny reinstateB ment to an employee by refusing specific performance in such a case·
would be to throw him to the mercy of the employer : it would enshrine
the power of wealth by recognising the right of the employer to fire an
employee by paying him damages which the employer cat1 afford to
thro"'. away but which would be no recompense to the employee. It is,.
therefore, necessary and I venture to suggest, quite possible, within the·
limits of the doctrine that a contract of personal service cannot be
c specifically
enforced, to take the view that in case of employment under
a statutory body or public authority, where there is ordinarily no
dement of personal relationship, the employee may refuse to accept
the repudiation of the contract of employment by the statutory body
or public authority and seek reinstatement on the basis that the repudiation is ineffective and the contract is continnin'!. That is in effect
of McClalland v. lVortiiern Ireland General
D what happened in the case
H ea/th Service Board (11) . The plaintiff's contract in this case was
really one of master and servant, the only special condition being that
her post had been advertised as "permanent and pensionable" and it
provided specific reasons, such as gross misconduct and inefficiency,
for which she might be dismissed. The defendant Board introduced a
rule after her appointment that women employees must resign on
E marriage and since the plaintiff got inarricd, the respondents terminated her service by giving what they thought was a reasonable notice. The·
plaintiff contended that the defendant Board was not entitled to terminate her service and claimed a declaration that the purported termination was null and void and she continued in service. The House of
Lords held that the contract was exhaustive as regards the reasons for
which the defendant-Board could terminate the service of the plaintiff
F and since none of those reasons admittedly ,,xisted, the termination
of service of the petitioner by the defendant-Boar<l was nullity
ancl the plaintiff continued in service of the defendant-Board.
This was a case of a pure contract of master and servant and yet ~he
House of Lords held that the termination of employment of the plamtiff by the defendant-Board which was 1'.ot accepted .by ~he plaintiff
was ineffective and the plaintiff was entitled to a deciarat1on that ?he
G continued in service. It should thus be possible to hold. that even if a
statutory body or public authority terminates the service of an e~
ployee in breach of a contractual. obligation'. the employe~ could d1~
regard the termination as ineffective and claim a declaration that. Ins
service is continuing. But this would be a somewhat no~e.1 and ui:orthodox ground which has not been recognised by any decision of this
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(I) [1957] ! W. l. R. 594: [1957].
(2) All E. R. 129.
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YAISH COLLEGE v. LAKSHMI NARAIN (Bhagwati, J.)
I 0 29
Court so far and moreover I do not think that, en facts, this is a proper case in which it would really be applicable and h1:nce I do not
propose to finally pronounce upon it.
The second category of cases are those where the relationship between the employer and the employee is governed by statute or subordinate legislation, and where such is the case, the termination, which
is. the same thing as repudiation, may, in a given situation, be null and
void and in that event, it would not have the effect of putting an end
to the contract and the employee would be entitled to a declaration that
his service is continuing. The doctrine that a ·contract of personal service cannot be specifically enforced would not stand in the way of the
employee, because the termination being null and void, there being no
repudiation at all in the eye of the law, there would be no question
of enforcing specific performance of the contract of employment.
What the employee would be claiming in such a case is not enforcement of a contract of personal service but declaration of statutory invalidity of an act done by the employer. The case would be of a kind
similar to that decided by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
in High Commissioner for India v. I. M. Lail(!) the essential feature
of which was aptly and succinctly described by this Court in Dr. S. B.
Dutt v. University of Delhi( 2 ) in these words :
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"'That was not a case based on a contract of per.sonal service. . . The declaration did not enforce a contract of per. sonal service but proceeded on the ba~is that the dismissal
could only be effected in terms of the statute and as that had
not been done, it was a nullity, from ·1"11ich the result followed that the respondent had continued in service. All that the
Judicial Committee did in this case was to make a declaration of a statutory invalidity of an act, which i~ a thing
entirely different from enforcing a contract of µersonal service."
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Where, for example, the termination is outside the powers of a 5tatutory body either because the statutory body has no power to terminate
the employment or because the termination is effected in breach of a
mandatory obligation imposed by law which prescribes that the termination shall be effected only in a particular manner and no other, it
would be a nullity and the employee would be entitled to ignore it and
ask for being treated as still in service. such was the case in Life
Insurn11ce Corporation of India v .. Sunil Kumar Mukherjee('.1) where
an order of termination of service of certain employee by the Life
Insurance Corporation in breach of clauses lO(a) and IO(b) of an
order passed by the Central Government under s. 11 (g) of the Life
Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, was held to be null and void on the
ground that it was not effected in terms of clauses lO(a) and lO(b)
pf the Statutory Order. So also in Mafatlal Barot v. Divisional Controller, State Transport, Mahsana( 4 ), this Court held that an order of
termination of service passed against the petitioner in contravention of
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(!) 75 Tnd. App. 225.
(3) A.LR. 1964 S.C. 847.
(2) A. I. R. l 958 S. C. 1050.
(4) A.LR. 1966 S.C. 1364.
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clause 4(b) of Schedule 'A' to the Regulations made by the State Road
Transport Corporation in exercise of powers conferred under s. 45
of the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950 was bad in law and it
was quashed by issuing a writ of certiorari. This principle was also
approved by this Court in B. N. Tewari v. District Board, Agra( 1 )
though it was held there, on facts that the dismissal of the employee
was proper and justified. Shah, J., speaking on behalf of this Court
in that case recognised this principle and treated it as a third exception
to the general rule in the following words :
"Under the common law the Court will not ordinarily
force an employer to retain the services of an employee whom
he no longer wishes to employ. But this rule is subject to
certain well-recognised exceptions. It is open to the Courts
in an appropriate case to declare that a public servant who is
dismissed from service in contravention of Article .~ 11 continues to remain in service, even though by so doing the State
is in effect forced to continue to employ the servant whom it
docs not desire to employ. Similarly under the industrial
law, jurisdiction of the labour and industrial tribunals to
compel the employer to employ a worker whom he does
not desire to employ, is recognised. The Courts are also invested with the power to declare invalid the act of a statutory
body, if by doing the act the body has acted in breach of a
mandatory obligation imposed by statute, even if by making
the declaration the body is compelled to do something which
it does not desire to do."
This position in law was reiterated by this Court in U.P. State Warehousing Corporation v. C. K. Tyagi(2) where, after referring to Dr.
Dutt's case and S. R. Tewari's case, Vaidialingam, J ., observed :
"From the two decisions of this Court referred to above,
the position in law is that no declaration to enforce a contract of personal service will be normally granted. But
there are certain well-recognised exceptions to this rule and
they are : To grant such a declaration in appropriate cases
regarding ( 1) a public servant, who has been dismissed from
service in contravention of Art. 311. (2) Reinstatement of a
dismissed worker under Industrial Law or Labour m Industrial Tribunals. ( 3) A statutory body when it has acted in
breach of a mandatory obligation, imposed by statute."
This statement of law was reaffirmed again by this Court in Indian Airlines Corporation v. Sukhdeo Rai ( 3 ) and Bank of Baroda v. Jewan
Lal Mehrotra( 4 ).
Now, two questions immediately arise for consideration on tbis
statement of law. The first is, what is the 'statutory body' contemplated in these decisions, and the second is, arc: the three exct;ptions formulated by this Court intended to be exhaus~ivc? W~en we are trt
iug to understand what is the 'statutory body which this Court had m
(I) A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1680.
(3) [19711 Supp. S.'C.R. 510.
(2) [1970] 2 S.C.R. 250.
(4) [1970] 2 L. L. J, 54.
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YAISH COLLEGE v. LAKSHMI NARAIN (Bhagwati, J.)
1031
mind when it laid down this statement o( Jaw, it must be remembered
that a statement of law enunciated by thi~ Court must be read in the
hgbt of tbe principle which it seeks to effectuate and it should not be
construed as if it were a section. The third exception is intended to
cover cases where by reason of breach of mandatory obligation imposed bv law, as distinct from contract, the termination of service is
null and void so that there is in law no repudiation at all. That is the
principle on which the thirc!. exception is based and it is in the light of
this principle that the expression 'statutory body' used by this Court
has to be understood. Now, obviously, a body or authority created
by statme would be a statutory body, but even a body or authority
which is created under a statute, as for example, the State Road Transport Corporation which is created by the State under the. Road Transport Cornoration Act, f950, would also be a statutory body. What
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other kinds of statutory bodies would be induded is a matter not free
trom difficulty. But in any event it docs appear to me that the three
exceptions formulated in the statement of law laid down by this Court
in the above decisions are not intended to be and cannot be exhaustive.
The categories of exceptions to the general rule should not be closed,
because any attempt at rigid and exhaustive formulation of legal rulesany attempt to put law in a strait jacket formula-is bound to stifle the
growth of law and seriously cripple its capacity to adapt itself to the
changing needs of society. In fact, Ray, J., as he then was, speaking
on behalf of this Court in Sirsi Municipality v. Kom Francis( 1) pointed
out that the third exception applied not only to employees in the service of "bodies created under statutes'', but also to those in the employment of "other public or local authorities". lt may be a possible
view-and some day this Court may have to consider it-that where
E
law, as distinct from contract, imposes a mandatory obligation prescribing the kind of contract which may be entered into by an employer
and the manner in which alone the service of an employee may be
terminated, any termination of service effected in breach of such statutory obligation would be invalid and ineffective and in such a case the
court may treat it as null and void. But I do not think it necessary
to pursue this iine of discussion any further and come to a positive
conclusion whether the appellant is or is not a statutory body or a public F.
authority nor do I consider it necessary w go into the question whether
the Statutes of the Agra University had the force of law and conferred
rights on the Principal and teachers of affiliated colleges, as in Prabhakar Ramakrishna Jodh v. A. L. Pande & Anr.e), or they only set out
'the terms and conditions which had no validity and conferred no legal
rights, unless and until they were embodied in the contract between
the principal or teacher on the one hand and the affiliated college on the &
other as in Vidya Ram Mishra v. Managing Committee, Shri Jai Narain
Coliege( 2 ). I take the view that on the second part of the question
the e::ase of the first respondent is well founded.
Jt was common ground between the parties that at the material time
the Statute which was applicable to the appellant was the Kanpur and
(1) [19?31 3 S.C.R .348.
(2) [1965] 2 S.C.R. 713.
(3) [1972] 3 S.C.R. 320.
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Meerut Universities Act, 1965. Section 28, sub-s. (3) of this Act
declares that every decision by the management of an affiliated college
to dismiss or remove from service a teacher shall be reported forthwith
to the Vice-Chancellor and subject to the provisions contained in the
Statutes shall not take effect unless it has been approved by the ViceChancellor. The language of this section is absolute and p.:remptory
and leaves no doubt as to its meaning and effect. It provides in terms
clear and unambiguous that the termination of service of a teacher
by the management shall not take effect, that is, it shall be ineffective
and inoperative unless the Vice-Chancellor on being informed has
approved of it. When this section, which is a law made by the Legislatures, has enacted that the termination of service shall be ineffective
or, in other words, it shall have. no validity or force unless it ha~ been
approved by the Vice-Chancellpr, it is difficult to see how it can be
regarded as effectively terminatin_g the service. To take such a view
would be to refuse to give effect to the law enacted by the Legislature.
The Jaw enacted in this section operates, irrespective whether the
management is or is not a statutory body. Such a consideration is
entirely irrelevant to the applicability of this section. \Vhen the section says that the termination of service shall not have any effect, the
Court must refuse to recognise the termination as valid and effective,
and when the Court does so, it merely enforces the law and there is
no question of transgressing the principle that a contract of personal
service cannot be enforced. There can, therefore, be no doubt that
the termination of service of the first respondent by the appellant was
ineffective and void and it did not operate to put an end to the empl-0yment, even wrongful, by reason of s. 28, sub-s. (3) of the Kanpur and
Meerut Universities Act, 1965.
The first respondent, on this view, would ordinarily be entitled to
the declaration and injunction prayed for by him, but the relief of
declaration and injunction being discretionary, I agree with the view
taken in the judgment of my learned brother Fazal Ali, J ., that having
regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances ot the present case as
set out in his judgment, this is not a proper case where such relief of
dcciaration or injunction should be granted to the first respondent :
instead, the aggregate amount of Rs. 21, 100/- deposited by the appellant in the Court would be fair and just compensation to the first respondent. However, I must hasten to make it clear that ordinarily an
employee whose termination of service is found to be null and void or
ineffective by reason of a statutory provision, and that would include
subordinate legislation which has the force of law, should be awarded
a declaration that he continues in service and it should be no ground
for refusing him such declaration that before his purported. termination of service, he was in employment only for a short penod. T~at
would be denying him security of tenure which the law seeks to give
him in clear and unambiguous terms. But, in the present case, the
circumstance which weighs most with me in refusing to exercise my
discretion in favour of the first respondent is that if the relief of declaration and injunction is granted to the first respondent, it will involve
the appellant in a financial liability of over Rs. one lakh an~ that
would wioe out the educational institution of the appellant or tn any
•
YAISH COLLEGE v. LAKSHMI NARAIN
(Bhagwati, J.)
103 3
event seriously cripple it and that, in its turn, would prejudicially
.aff,;ct the interests of the student community which is an important
.consideration which the Court cannot fail to take into account while
.determining what are the broad considerations of social justice which
must guide its exercise of discretion.
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I ac\'.Ordingly agree with the final order proposed by my learned
brother.
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V.P.S.
Appeal allowed.
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