SMT. INDIRA NEHRU GANDHI versus SHRI RAJ NARAIN
Supreme Court of India | Decided 7 November 1975 | [1976] 2 S.C.R. 347 | 1975 INSC 272
Key facts
- Decided
- 7 November 1975
- Bench
- A.N. RAY*, HANS RAJ KHANNA, KUTTYIL KURIEN MATHEW, M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG, Y.V. CHANDRACHUD
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 887/1975
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1976] 2 S.C.R. 347
- Neutral citation
- 1975 INSC 272
Text of the judgment
347
SMT. INDIRA NEHRU GANDHI
A
v.
SHRI RAJ NARAIN
(and Vice Versa)
•
November 7, 1975
(With Review Application dated December 19, 1975)
B
[A. N. RAY, C.J., H. R. l<HtANNA, K. K. MATHEW, M. H. BEG AND
Y. v. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.]
Constitutiou of India-Art. 329,A ( 4) and (5) as inserted by the Constitution (Thirty Ninth Amendment) Act, 1975-Validity of.
C
Election Laws (Amendment) Act, (Act 40) 1975 and the Constitution of
lndia (Thirty Ninth Amendment) Act, 1975-Validity of-Not open to challenge
on the score theot some members of Parliament were in preventive detelltio'nScope of Articles 79, 81, 85, 105(3) and 122 of the Constitution of lndia.
Preventive detention of the Members of Parliament-Challenge to-Not·
permissible collaterally while challenging the validity of the Statute.
(
D
Represemation of the People (Amendment Act 58) of 1974-Validity of.
•
Election Laws (Amendment Act 40) of 1'975-Ss. 7, 8 and 10. Validity ofConstittttion of India Art. 31-B, 245 and 246 intent.
Election £c,ws (Amendment Act 40) of 1975-S. 7 is only clarificatory of
the State of Law and not changing the ,law-Validity of the amendment is not
open ta cha/lenge wizen unamended S. 123(7) df the Representation of the People
A ct (Act 43) of 1951 was not assailed-Amendment is intra vi res, t/1e powers
of the Parliamellt to legislate-Constitution of lndiQ Art. 327.
Constitution of lndia-Art. 368-Constituent powers
S11premacy of.
of
E
Parliame11t-
F
Basic structure, theo1)' of-Applicability to "o,rdinary legislation" 1111der Arts.
245, 246 of the Constitution of India.
Representatio!l of the People Act (Act 43) of 1'951-S. 123(3) as amended
by Election Law Amendment Act 40 of 1975-Use of "Cow and Calf symbol"
-Neither a religious nor a national symbol.
,.
Eiection expenses-Expenditure "incurred" or "authorised"-Mea11illg and
tcsi of autlwrisation-S. 77, 83(1)(b) and 123(6) of the Representation of the
Prople Act 1951-Evidence and proof of allegations of exceeding the limit of
authorised expenditure-Candidate not required to disavow or denounce expcndi-
G
1life
Cor1·upt Practice-Proof of "Mens Rea" and "Actus Reus" is necessary u/s
123(7) of the Representation of the People Act.
Constitutidn of India An. 14-Amendment to Election Laws by Act 40
of 1975. special treatment to the Prime Minister and Speaker on account of
unique oflice-Placin~ the statutes in the protected Schedule under A rt. 31-11
dues not offend A rt: 14.
H
348
A
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 2 S.C.R.
Pl<'adi11g alld Eridc11ce in Election petitions-A//egatio11 of corrupt practice-
s. 8.3( I) (b) and 123 of the Representatio11 of the People Act-lllsufficie11t
pa111culars of corrupt practice-No amount of 1·ridencc b.e iooked into a case
11ot really set up.
Adverse inference, presumptio11 Of S. 114 illustration (g) of the Evidence Act
(Act !), 1872-Presumptio11 is always optional and one of fact and 1101 obliga•
tory.
B
Conclusive Proof-Gazette notificatio11 of appointment suspensio'n, retirement
or resignatio11 of Government employees-Cl. 8 of the Election Laws Amendmott Act 40 of 1975.
Interpretation df Statutes-Rule of construction of provisio11 widely worded.
c
Review Appl/cation--Order XXXVlll Supreme Court Rules 1966 read with
order XLV!l Rule 1 C.P.C.-Fai/ure to make a submission is not a ground 101·
•
~
reopening or review of a case.
D111y-Cou11se/'s duty while arguing a case, one of law and facts-What is.
D
Pursuant to the Notification dated January 27, 1971 u/s 14(2) of the Representation of the People Act. 1951, Smt. Indira :Nehru Gandhi, the appellant
filed her nomination papers on February 1. 1971 before February 3, 1971,
the last date therefor fixed by the Election Commission for Rae Barely constituency. The appellant was for a number of years before the election, Prime
Minister of Tndia and is since then continuing to hold that office. On his
resignation w.e.f. 14-1-1971 the notification of which was gazetted on 25-1-1971
from the post of officer on special duty in the . Prime Minister's Secretariat
Yashpal Kapur was appointed the election agent of the appellant. The signed
form about the appointment of Yashpal Kapur as an election agent was submitted
to the Returning Officer on February 4, 1971 the date of scrutiny. The r,ppellant, who was a candidate of the Indian National Congress (R) ""' allotted
the party symbol of "Cow and Calf".
E
F
G
H
As per the poll results declared on March 10, 1971, the appellant was elected to the House of the People by an overwhelming majority of 1,11,810 votes
over her close rival, Shri Raj Narain, a Samyukta Socialist Party Leader. Shri
Raj Narain filed an election petition on 24-4-1971 under s. 80 read with s. 100
of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 to challenge the election of the
successful returned candidate before the High Court of Allahabad. At the trial
of the petition, the petitioner limited. the challenge only to the following grounds
viz.,
(i) The successful candidate procured the assistance of' the Armed
Forces for ar.tanging her flights by Air Force aeroplanes and
helicopters.
(ii) Her election agent Shri Yashpal Kapoqr and others distributed
clothes and liquor to induce the voters to vote for her.
(iii) She and her election, agent made appeals to the religious symbol
of "cow and calf".
(iv) Her election agent and others proenred vehicles for the free
.
conveyance of voters to the polling station.
(v) She and her election agent incurred or authorised expenditure
in violation of s. 77(3) of the Rewesentation of the People Act
read with Rule 90 of the Conduct of Election Laws, 1961.
(vi) She obtained assistance of the Gazetted Officers of the ·Government of Uttar Pradesh for fnrlhering her election prospects by
rostrums and providing loudspeakers etc. and
(vii) She held herself out as a prospective candidate £rom the Rae
Barely Constituency immediately after the dit!solution of the
\
f
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
349
Lok Sabha on 27-12-1970 and for furtherance of her election
rrospects, she obtained the assistance of Shri Yashpal Kapoor
a Gazetted Officer in the Government of India holding the post
of' officer on special duty in the Prime Minister's Secretariat
for furthering the same purpose. The learned single Judge
of the High Court found the appellant guilty of having committed corrupt practices within the meaning of s. 123 (7) of the
Representation of the Peopl·e Act and held
( l) The appellant held herself out as a candidate from the
Rae Bareily Parliamentary Constituency on December 29, 1970.
~··
( 2) The appellant obtained the assistance of the officers of the
Government of U.P., particularly the Dist. Magistrate, superintendent of Police, the Executive Engineer (PWD) and the Engineer Hyde! Dept. for construction of rostrums and arrangement
of <;\Jpplv of power to loudspeakers in the meetings held on
l-2-197 l ,- and 25-2-1971 in f[irtherance of her election prospects
and
A
B
c
(3) The status of YashpaJ Kapur continued to be that of a
gazetted officer despite retrospective acceptance of the resignation and hence she obtained his services in furtherance oi' her
election prospect.
Acting under s. SA of the Act, the learned Judge also declared that the successful candidate would stand disqualified for a. period of six years from June 12,
1975 being the date of the judgment. Aggrieved by this part of the Judgment,
Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi filed an appeal No. 887 of 1975 and the defeated
candidate filed cross-appeal No. 909 of 1975.
f
D
During the pendency of the election petition in the: High Court, the President
of India on October 19, 1974 promulgated "The Representation oi' the People
!Amendment) Ordinance, 1974" which was replaced by Act 58 of 1974.
The Representation of the People (Amendment Act 58) of 1974 by way of
an explanation to s. 77 of the Act laid down that expenses incurred by a political party or supporte'rs would not be deemed to be election expenditure of a
candidate belonging to that party. lt expressly excepted from its operation
decision of the Supreme Court voiding an election before the commencement of
the Ordinance. Jt also excepted similar decisions of High Court provided they
had become final or unappealable.
•
The defeated candidate filed a Writ Petition No. 3761 of 1975 in the High
Court to challenge the constitutional validity of the Ordinance of 1974. ln
view of the finding in the election petition that the total amount of expendiure
incurred or authorised by the successful candidate Qr her election agent together
with the amount proved to have been incurred by the political party or the State
Government in connection with the election did not exceed the prescribed limit,
the learned judge though it unnecessary to inquire into the constitutionality
of the Ordinance and the Act of 1.974 and thus, dismissed the Writ Petition.
An appeal was filed to a Division Bench of the High Court from the aforesaid
order but by the consent of parties. the points _involved in the Writ Petition
and in the appeal before the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court were
permitted to be argued in this Court, in the appeal and cross-appeal.
During 1he pendency of these appeals the Parliament passed the Election
Laws (Amendment) Act 40 of 1975 which came into force on August 6, 1975.
It substitutes a new S. 8A in the Representation of the People Act, 1951 em·
powering the President to decide where a person found guilty of corrupt practice shall be disqualified and if so, for what pelriod. By s. 6 it amends s. 77
of the Act of 1951 making pre-nomination expenses, a matter of irrelevant
consideration. It declares that the expenditure incurred by a Government ser·
vant in the discharge of his official duty in connection with any arrangement or
I
E
F
G
II
350
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 2 S.C.R.
facilities and such arrangements or facilities shall not be deemed to be expenditum or assistance incurred or rendered for tbe furtherance of the election prospects of the candidate concerned. By s. 7 it redefines a candidate to mean a
person who has been or claims to have been duly nominated as a candidate in
any election. lly s. 8 it provides that no 9ymbol allotted to a candidate shall be
deemed to be a religious or national symbol and it says to extent relevant that
the publication in the official gazette of the resignation of the government servant shall be conclusive proof of the fact of resignation. lf the effective date,
of resignation is stated in the publication, it shall also be a conclus·ive proof
of- the fact that the Government servant ceases to be in service with effect
from the particular date. The amendments made by ss. 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the
Amending Act have retrospective effect and expressly govern election . appeals
pending in this Court among other proceedings.
l
·~
By the Constitution ( 39lh Amendment) which came into force on August
10, 1975 two new Articles in the Constitution, namely, Art. 71 and 329A were
introduced. This Act puts in the 9lh Schedule three Acts, namely, (1) The
Representation of the People Act (Act 43) of 195l.; (2) The Representation
of the People (Amending Act 58) of 1974 and (3) The Election Laws (Amendment Act) 4() of 1975. Article 71 which replaces its precursor empowers the
Parliament to pass law9 regulating the election of the President and the Vice
President including the making of a provision for the decision of disputes relating to these elections. Art. 329A has six clauses out of which the first three
d~al with the future election to the Parliament of persons holding the office of
Prime Minister or Speaker at the time of election or who are appointed to these
offices after the election to the Parliament.· These clauses aim at depriving the
courts of their jmisdiction to try election petitions in which the election of the
Prime Minister or tbe SP.eaker to the Parliament is challenged. Clause 4 frees
the disputed election of the Prime Minister and the Speaker to the Parliament
from the resu·aints of all election laws. It declares snch election ag valid notwithstanding any judgment and clause 5 ordains that any appeal dr cross-appeal
pending before the Supreme Court shall be disposed of on the assumption that
judgment under appeal is void, that the findings contained in the jud,gment
never had· any existence in the eye of law and tbe election declared void by
judgment shall continue to be valid in all respects. Clause 6 provides that Art.
329A shall have precedence over the rest of the Constitution.
This Court held by a majority of 7 to 6 in the case of His Holiness
Kcsavmvmda Bharati v. State of Kera/a, that the power of amendment under
Art. 368 does not enable Parliament to alter the basic structure or framework
of th·e Constitution.
As to what are the basic structLrres of the Constitution, illustrations have
been given by each of these. Judges. They include democratic republican form
of the Government, Secular character of the Constitution, separation of powers
among the legislature. executive and judiciary, the federal character of the O:mstitution; Rule of Law, Equality of status and of opportunity; Justice, Soda!,
Economic and political; Unity and integrity of the nation aud the dignity of the
individual secured by the various provisions of the Constitution. There was
consensus among these judges that democracy is a basic structure of the Constitution. This Court further was of the unanimous view in Bharati's case that
Art. 31-B is not open lo challenge. The view of the seven judge< in Bharati's
case is that Art. 31-B is a constitutional device to place the specified statutes in
ihe Schedule beyond any attack that these infringe Part HI of the Constitution.
Placiug reliance on the majority view in Bharati'9 case and on the ground
that some of the basic stmctures of the Constitutio1\ have been damaged by the
enactment and that they were beyond the amending power under Art. 368 the
respondent challenged the constitutional validity of the Constitution (39th
Amendment) Act, 1975 and tbe Election Laws (Amendment) Act 40 of 1975.
H
•
Accepting the appeal and dismissing the cross-appeal· the Court.
HELD : (By Court) Constitutional validity of the Acts cannot be challenged
on the score that a number of members of Parliament were in detention under
the Preventive detention laws. The legality of the detention orders c:timot be
canvassed collaterally. [355F, 461F, 5340-E; 587A-G, 670H, 671A]
•
i-
>
I
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
351
May's Parliamentary Practice 18th Edn.; Bradlaugh v. Gosett 12 9.B.D. 27
285-86; K. Ana11da11 Na.inbiar v. The Chief Secretary to Gdvt. of Madras
[1966} 2 S.C.R. 406.
Per Majority (Khanna, Mathew and Chandrachud. JJ.) Cl. 4 of Art.
329A as introduced by the Constitution (Thirty Ninth Amendment) Act, 1975
is unconstitution. [474D, 525E, 665B-E]
A
·@
Per C.J. Clause 4 of Art. 329A in the present case inv3:lida!ing the electi<?n
has passed a declaratory Judgment and not a law. The legislative Judgment .m
Cl. 4 is an exercise of judicial power. The conslituent power can exercise
judicial power, but it has to apply law. [418F]
f
Per Beg J. Undoubtedly Cl. (4) of Art. 329A could be said to have a
political objective in the context in which it was introduced and the comt CQltld
perhaps take judicial notice of this context. If the purpose of Clause 4 of Art.
329A was purely to meet the political needs of the country and was only partly
revealed by the policy underlying the Statement of object and reasons, it
seems possible to contend that it was not intended at all to oust the jurisdiction · of the court. Hence, Art. 329A Cl. 5 will not so understood, bar the
j llrisd iction of the Court to hear and decide the appeals. when it says that t'he
appeal shall be disposed of in conformity with the provisons of Cl. ( 4) [644H, 645A-B]
(Per C.J., Khanna a11d Beg, JJ.) (iii) The "Cow and Calf" symbol is not
a religious symbol. [443G-H, 480H, 578F-Gl
By Court (Unanimous) The Election Laws (Amendment Act 40) 1975 is
valid. [437E-G, 488E, 536C, 587A-G, 669GJ
(Per Khanna, Mathew &. Beg JJ.)
The corrupt practice defined in S. 123(7) could not be committed by any
person before there was a "candidate" for an election. [476F, 535E-F, 547E]
·Per C.J. Candidate is not required to disavow or denounce expenditure,
incurred by a political party. [433-A]
Per C.J. & Khanna J. Official duty will be a duty in law. [44IEF, 480ABJ
By Court : Retrospective legislation of election law is valid. [418E, 481CD, 482 A-B, 530 D-G]
Per C. J. There is no vice of delegation in the Statutes. [442AJ
Mathew J. (Contra) Cl. 8(b) of the Election Laws Amendment Act does
not suffer from the vice of excessive delegation and is not arbitrary. [536C]
Per Ray C.J.
Judicial Review in an electio'n petition is not a conipu/sion.
..
(i) Judicial Review in many mattern under statute may be excluded. In
many cases special jurisdiction is created to deal with matters assigned to
such authorities. A Special forum is even created to have election disputes.
A right of appeal may be conferred against such decision.
If Parliament acts
as •the forn111 for determination of election disputes, it may be a question of
Parliamentary privilege and the courts may not entertain any review from suchJ
decisions.. That is because the exercise of power by the Legislature in determining disputed elections may be called legislative power. A distinction arises
between what can be called the traditional judicial determination by courts
and tribunals on the one hand and the peculiar jurisdiction by the legislature in
determining .controverted election on the other. [410D-F]
American Constitution Art.1 Sec. 5(2); German Federal· Republic C6nstitu. lion; Australian Constitution; Grenvile Act 1868; English Representation of
People Act. 1949; Story on American Constitution: Corpus Juris Vo]. 16(1956)
& Vol 29(1965); Taylor v. Beckham'44 L, Ed. 547 p.585; Truman H. Newbery
v. U$.A. 65 L. Ed. 913; David S. Barry v. The U.S.A. Ex Rel Thomas W.
Cunningham 73 L. Ed. 867 Charles W. Baker v. Joe C. Carr 7 L.Ed. 663.
Julian Bond v. James Slopper Floyd 17 L. Ed. 2nd 235 Adam Clayton Powell
v. John W. McCormack 23 L. Ed. 491. (Considered)
B.
C
D
E
F
C.
U
352
.A
B
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976) 2 S.C.R.
. (ii) The legal order is a sysrem of genera\ and individual norms connected
with each other according to the principle that Jaw regulates its own creation.
Creatio1_1 of_ law is an application of law. The creation of a legal norm is normaJly
an apphcat101! of the h\gher norm, regulating its creation. The application of
~1g~~r norn~ .1s t~e creation of a'. !ower norm determined by the higher norm. A
JUd1crnl dec1s1on is an. act by which a general. norm, a statute, is applied but at
the same time an individual norm is created binding one or both parties to the
Taking it into a court is application
conflict. Legislation is creation of law.
of Jaw. The higher norm may determine the organ and the Procedure by
which a lower norrm and the contents of the lower norm are created. The
judicial function is like legislation both creation and application of law
and is ordinarily determined by the general norms both as to procedure and as
to the contents of the norm to be created. whereas Jegislation is
usually
determined by the constitution only in the former aspect. [4 IOF-H, 411-Cl
Judicial Review is not to be fotmded on any Article in our Constitution unlike
the American or the Australian Constitutions. [414F]
·C
D
Judicial review in the election disputes is not a compulsion. Judicial Review
of decisions in election disputes may be enlrusted by Jaw to a judicial tribunal.
If it. is to a Tribunal or to the High Court. the Judicial Review will be attracted
either under the relevant law providing for appeal to this court or Art. 136 of
the Constitution may be attracted. Under Art. 329(b) the contemplated Jaw
may vest thei, power to entertain election petitions in the House itself which may
determine the dispute by a resolution after receiving a report from a special
committee. Jn such cases Judicial review may be eliminated without involving
amendment of the Constitution. The Constitution permits by amendment exc.Jusion of judicial review of a matter if it is necessary to give effect to the
Directive Priniciples of Slate Policy. A similar power may be available in the
larger interest of the security of the State. In either case. the exc]usian of
judicial review does not mean that pi:incinles of equality are violated. It only
means that the appropriate body making the law satisfied itself and determines
conclusivelv that principles of equality have not been violated. Tf judicial
review is excluded the court is not in a position to conclude that the principles
of equality has heen violated. Art. 33 excludes judicial review in matter>
relating to the Armed Fo,rces. Art. 262(2) excludes. jurisdiction of court> in
water disputes. The Amending body has similarly excluded judicial review
in Articles 31A. 31B and 31C. [416BE. G]
"Audi A/teram Partem-Rule of-App/icabilit)' to le!?islative processes.
The
The legislature is entitled to obtain information from any source.
kgislature may can witnesses. The rule of Audi Alteram Partem is not applicable to a legislative process. [415H, 416A]
F
Exclusio11 of the operation of the equalitv principle from some fields is
co11.1tit11tio11ally possible.
G
Equality of status as well as equality of opportunity is a fundamental right
in Art. 14 and
16 of the Constitution, which means equality before law and
equal protection of the laws. Equality is spoken in the Preamble. There is
liberty to legislature to classify to establish equality. When Art. 3 IA and 31B
eliminated judicial review the meaning was not that the legislature would go
on discriminating. The task of classification can be left to the legislature. It
is the· very nature of legislation that cfassification must be in public interest.
Exclusion of the operation of the equality principle from some fields is
constitutionally possible. [416E-G]
There is 110 q11estio11 of c.ny separation of powers beillf? invo/l"ed i11 clcctio11
nu:.ilters.
H
In our constitution there is separatfon of powers in a broad sense.. The
doctrine of separation' of powers as recognised in America. is not app\icable
to our country. Hence, the larger question wh~ther there !S any doctrine of
separation of p0wers, when it comes to exercise of constituent power does
not arir1e. [414G-HI
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
I
In re. Del/ii Laws Act [1951] SCR 747 @ 965-66; Jayantilal Sodhan V,
R. N. Raina [1964} 5 SCR 294; Chatldra Mohan v. State of U.P. & Ors..
[1967] I SCR 77 @ 87 and Udai Ram Sharma and Ors. etc. v. U11io11 of J11di1J
and Ors. (1968J 3 SCR 41 & 67 (referred to).
Many powers which are strictly judicial have been excluded from the Purview of the courts. Under our constitution. Parliament has inherited all the
privileges, powers and immunities of the British HouSe of Comm0ns. In the
case of election disputes Parliament has defined the procedure by Jaw. It can
at any time change that procedure and take over itself the whole question. There
is, therefore, no question of_ any separation of powers being involved in matters
concerning elections and election petitions. [415B-C]
J11lia11 Bond v. John S/opper Floyd 17 L. Edn. Adam Clayton Powell v.
Jolin W. McCormack 23 L. Eda. 491 (referred to).
"Legislature is cvmpcle111 to validate matters. fo1111d to he i11w1Ud by cour/J
by c!1a11ging the law''
The power of the legislature to validate mailers which have been found by
judgment or orders of competent courts and Tribunals to be invalid or illegal
is a well known pattern. The legislature validates acts and things by which the
basis of judgments or order of competent courts and tribunals is changed and
the judgments and orders are made ineffective. The effect of validation is to
chan~ the law so as to alter the basis of any judgment which might have been
given on the basis of old law. The rendering of the judgment ineffective by
changing its basis by legislative enactment is not an encroachment on judicial
power, but a legislation within the competence of the Legislature rendering the
basis of the judgment non-est. Where invalid elections declared by reason of
corrupt practice have been validated by changing the definition Qf corrupt
practices in the Representation of the People Act. 1951. retrospectively, the
original judgment is rendered ineffective. [412D, E-F, 4 I 3A-B]
1
A
S
c
D
Kanta Kathuria v. Manak Chand Surmw, (1970] 2 S.C.R. 830 (relied on).
Abe)·a Sekma v. .layahilake [1932] A.C. 260, Basa11thc• Chandra Chose v.
The King Emperor [1944] F.C.R. 225, Piare D11sad/1 & Ors. v. King Emperor
[f944J F.C.R. 81, referred to.
E
Constit11e111 Power is "sui generis". It can exercise judicial power but it has
to apply law.
·
The constituent powers is "sui generis". It is different from legislative power
The position of unlimited Jaw making power is the criterion of legal sovereignty.
The .:onstituent power is sovereign because the Constitution flows from the
Constituent power. When the constituent nower exercises powers, the constituent
power comprises legislative, executive and ludicial powers. All powers flow from
the constituent power through the constitution, to the various departments or
heads. Jn the hands of the constituent authority there is no demarcation of
powers. The Constituent power is independent of the doctrine of separation of
powers and sovereign. Jt is the power which creates the organs and distributes
the powers.
There is no doubt, that the constituent power i9 not the same as
le-gislative. power and legislative power is always to be borne in mind because
!he constituent power is higher in norm. The constituent power is not the same
as ordinary law making power. The constituent power is sovereign. The
constituent power can exercise judicial power. but it has to apply law. [410E,
C-D. 416A, 4180, Fl
F
G
The concept of free and fair election is 1101 a basic structure.
The concep~ of free and fair election is worked out by the Representation
of the People Act. The Act provides a definition of "corrupt practice" for the
guidance of the court. In making !he law the legislature acts on the concept of free and fair election. In any legislation relating to the validity of election.
the \;"Oncept of free and fair elections is an important consideration. In the
process of election the concept of free and fair election is worked out
by
formulatinit the principles of franchise. and the free exercise of franchise.
In cases of disputes as to election the concept of free and fair elections means
1-1
354
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 'S.C.R.
\
A
B
that dispt~tes are fa!rlY and justly decided. Electoral offences are statutory
ones. . It 1s not possible to hold that the concept of free and fair election is
a basic structure. Some people may advocate universal franchise. Some
people. may adv.ocate proportional representation. Some people may advocate
edue.al!onal qua!Jficat10ns for voters. Some P.eople may advocate property qualifications for voters. Instances can be mult1phed on divergence of views in
regard to qualifications for voters, qualifications of members, forms of corrupt
practices. Th:lt is why there is law relating to and regulating elections. [416H,
417A-C]
Infirmities in Cl. (4) of Art. 329A-Rule of law is of]ended.
c
D
E
F
G
Cbuse 4 in Art. 329A has done four things, first it has wipe<.! out not
merely the judgment but also the election petition and the law relating ~hereto.
Secondly, it has deprived the right to raise a dispute about the validity of the
election by not having provided another forum. Third, there is no judgment
to deal with and no right or dispute to adjudicate upon. Fourth, the constituent
power of its own legislative judgment has validated the el~ction. [417C-D]
· Clause ( 4) suffers from these infirmities. First, the forum might be
chaaged but another forum has to be creared. If the constituent power became
itself the forum to decide the disputes the constituent power by repealing the
law in relation to election petitions and matters connected therewith did not
have any petition to seize upon to deal with- the same.
Secondly, any
decision is to be made in accordance with law. Parliament has power to
create law and apply the same. In the present case, the constituent power did
not have any law to apply to the case, because the previous law did not apply
and no other law was applied to clause (4). , The validation of the election in
the pre5'ent case is, therefore, not by applying any law and it, therefore offends
Rule of .Jaw. [417H, 418A-B]
It is true that no express mention is made in our constitution of vesting the
judiciary the judicial power as is to be found in the American constitution. But
a division of the three main functions of Government is recogni§cd in our
constitution; judicial power in the sense of the judicial power of the state i9
vested in the judiciary. Similarly, the Executive and the Legislature are vested
with powers in thei.r spheres. Judicial power bas lain in the hands of the
judiciary prior to the constitution and .. aJso since the constitution. It is not
the intention that the powers of the Judiciary should be passed to or be shared
by the Executive or the legislature or that the powers of the Legislature or the
Executive should pass to or be shared by the Judiciary. [418B-D]
Ref1·ospective Legislation not by itself discrimination
The constituent power is 90verei'gn. Law-making power is subject to the
constitution. Parliament mav create a forum to· bear or itself hear the election
disputes. Whichever body Will hear election disputes will have to apply norms.
Norms are legal standards. There is no discrimination, if classification on rational basis is made for determination of disputes relating to persons hold~g the
office of the Prime Minister or the Speaker. The changes effected by the
Amendment Acts 1974 and 1975 apply to all an<l there is no discrimination.
Retrospective legislation is not by itself discrimination. [4180-E]
Clause (4) of Art. 329A in the present case invalidating the election has
passed a declarat01y judgment and not a law. The legislative judgment in clause
4 is an exercise of judicial power. The constituent power can exercise judicial
power but it has to apply law. r418F]
H
'"
The validation of the election is not by applying legal norms. Nor can
it be said !'hat the validation of election in clause 4 is by norms set up by the
Constituent power. [418G]
Clause 5 in Art. 329A shows that an appeal against any order of any
court referred to in clause 4 pending, before the commencement of the Constitution (Thirty.ninth Amendment) Act, 1975, before the Supreme Court, shall
)
"
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
355
be disposed of in conformity with the provisions of clause 4. The appeal cannot be disposed of in conformity with the provisions of clause 4 inasmuch
at !he validation of lhe election cannot rest on clause 4. [4l8HJ
A
"The Election Lall"s (Amendment) Act 40, 1975 and Constillltion (Thirty11i11th Amendment) Act, 1975 cannot be challenged on the ground that there
was no valid session of 1/te House as a number of members of Parliament were
in detention and were prevenled from taking deliberations in tile Pai"liament."
· (1) When a member is excluded from participation in the proceedings of
B
the House, that is a nrntter concerning the Parliament and the grievances of
exclusion is in regarJ to proceedings within ~he walls of Parliament. In regard
to rights to be exercised within the walls of the House, the House itself is the
judge. (420 A-BJ
. May's Parliamentary Practice 18th Edn. pp. s2:s3 Draudlaugh v. Gossett 12
Q.B.D. 271 & 285-286. In re. Farrers (1543). In re. Shirley I Jiatsell 157,
English Act J: James I C 13' (Considered).
The composition of Pmliament is not dependent on inability of a member
to attend for whatsoever reason. The purpose of Art. 85. is to give effect to the
collective right of ~he House which represents the nation to be called as often
as the situation demands, and in any case the interval between two sessions must
not exceed six months. Assuming a conftic! were to arise between the privileges of a member under Art. 105(3) and the functions of the House to assemble
under Art. 85 the privilege .of the member .wi!J not prevail. The Constitution
provides for proclamation of emergen~y. the suspension of the remedy under
Art. 359 for enforcement of fundamental rights enabling even . detention of
members of Parliament, when necessary. Art. 85 is not suspended. The six
months rule is obligatory. It follows that the members' right under Art. 105 (3)
and the functions of the House to assemble under Art. 85 the privilege Of the
a
member will not prevail. The det>ention of members of Parliament is by
statutory authority in the exercise of his statutory powers.
It follows that
member~· right under Art. 105 are not availablelunder a detention in these circumstances. For the purposes of Art. 105(3) a conviction under Penal laws
or detention under Emergency laws must be deemed to be valid till it is set aside.
(421 B-C, E]
When under Art. 359, the Presiden' during the operation of a Proclamation
of Emergency by order declares that the right to move any court for the enforcement of rights conferred by Part III shall remain suspended and persons who
· are members of House of Parliament are in detention under orders made under
the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, the detention cannot be challenged
by collateral attack on the ground of deprivation of their participation in the
Parliamentary proceedings. The challenge will be questioning the detention on
the ground that the detention is in violation of Artid~s 19, 21 and 22.
·
[421F-Gl
Art. 85 is not a prov1Sion regarding the Constitution of Parliament, but of
holding session. The scope of Parliamentary privilege of freedom· from arrest
has been defined positively and negatively. The positive aspect of the privile11e
is expressed in the claim of the Commons to freedom from arrest in all civil
actions or suits during Parliament. and during tbe period when a member was
journeying or returning from Parliament. The privilege has been deprived
negatively in the claim of the Commons which specifically excepted treason,
fulony and breach or surety or the peace. The House will not allow even the
sanctuary of its walls to protect a member from the process of criminal Jaw
aHhough a service of a criminal process on a Member within the precincts of
Parliament, whilst the House is sitting without obtaining the leave of the Home,
would be a breach of privilege. [421H, 422B-C, F-GJ
Mays' Parliamentary Practice 18th E<ln. pp. 82-83 Braudlaugh v.
Gosset 12 Q.B.D. 271 @ 285-86. In re. Shirley's Halsell 157; English
Act I James I C 13; Constitntion of India A1is. 18. 21, 22. 79, 81, 85,
105(3) 122(1) and 359; Special Reference No. 1 of 1964, [1965] 1
c
D
E
F
G
H
356
A
B
c
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976) 2 S.C.R.
\
S.C.R. 413: In rP. Wilke., 19 State Tr. 981; Defence General Regulation 1939. Emergency (Defence) Act 1939 English; Defence of India
Rules 1962 Rule 30(1)(2) (referred to).
Arl>. 79, 81, 85, 86, I 00 cannot be construed to confer any right as such
on individual Members or impose any· obligation on them. It is not as if
a
Member of Parliament is bound to attend the session or is under an obligatio11
to be present in the House, when the President addresses it. The context in
which these Articles appear shows that the subject matter of these Articles is not
the individual righls of the Members of Parliament, but they refer to the right
of the President to· issue a summon' for the ensuring session of Parliament or
to address the House or Houses. The freedom of speech to which Article t05
refers would be available to a Member of Parliament, when he attends
the
Session of Parliament. If the order of detention validly prevents him from
attending a session of Parliament no occasion arises for the exercise of the right
of freedom of speech and no complaint can b~ made that the said right has
invalidly invaded. [424B-D]
-
'~
•
1\. A11a11dan Nambiar & Anr. v. The Chief Secretarv, r.01•er11111e11t of
Madras and Ors., rJ966l 2 S.C.R. 406 (relied on).
The challenge that there was no \'alid session of the House. cannot
be
accepted. It is not open to the respondents to challenge the orde1:s of detention
collaterally. The principle is that what is direclly forbidden cannot be indireC'ly
achieved. [424Dl
D
E
F
A cc.ndidate is 1101 required to diSa\'011' or denounce expenditure incurred or
authorised hy a po/it/m/ part:·.
Election expenses incurred by a political party in connection with the election of the candidate of the party is not a part of the election expenses of the
candidates. Similarly. participation in the programme of activity organised by
a political party will nol fall within the expenses of candidate of the party. A
candidate is not required to disavow or. denounce the expenditure incurred or
authorised by the political party because the expenditure is neither incurred nor
authorise by the candidate. One can disavow what would be a'cribcd to be
incurred or authorised by one. In the case of expenses of a political party, there
is no quo,.lion of disavowing expenditure incurred or authorised by the political
party. As per the changes in law affected by the Amendment Acts. 1974, 1975
to Section 77 of the t 961 Act the exnenditure incurred or authorised in connection with the election of a candidate by the political party shall not be deemed
to be &nd shall not ever be deemed to have been expenditure incurred O"
authorised by the candidate or his election agent. The ruling in Kanwar Lal
Gupta's case is no longer good law because of the legislative changes. [432H,
433A-B. 430H,. 431AB1
\,
Ka111rar Lal G11,.ta v. Amamath Chawla. A.LR. 1975 S.C. 308 (no longer
good law); flam Raj v. Pt., Tlari Ram and Ors. 40 ELR 1125; S/w/1 Ja.rnntilal
Ambalal \'. Kast11rilal Nagindas Doshi and Ors. 42. ELR 307; Rwrania)'a Singh
v. Baijnath Singh J: Ors. [19551 1 SCR, 671; Ram Dayal v. Briirai Singh and
Ors. [1970] 1 S.C.R. 530; Mag Raj Patadia v. R. K. Bir/a and On. f 19711 (2)
S.C.R. 118. (discussed).
G
H
"Authorisation in S.
77
of the Represe11rario11 of the l'cor>le Act
1951
r<:q11ires proof".
1\llegations that election expenses arc incurred or auihoriscd by a candidate
or bis agent will have to be proved. Authorisation means acceptance of the
responsibility. Authorisation must precede the expenditure. Authorisation
means reimbursement by the candidate or election agent of the person who has
been authorised by the candidate or by the elec!ion agent to spend m !ncur. In
onkr to constitute authorisation the effect must be that the authonty must
cany with it the right of reimbursement. [433F-G]
"Rosie Structure Theory"
The contentions that ordinary legislative measl!res are suhie.:;t like ~onstitu
tion mncnuments ta the restrictions of not damaging or t.lestroy111g ba"c struc-
'f
I
SMT. INDIRA GANDI-ll V. RAJ NARAIN
357
ture or basic features are utterly unsound. The contention that legislative measures are subject to restrictions of Nie ilieory of basic structures or basic features
is to equate legislative measures with constitution amendment. [436A,B]
Art. 245 and 246 give plenary powers to legislature to legislate. The power
of plenary body is not to be construed like the power to delegate. The only
prohibition is with reference to the provisions of the constituiion. The Constitution is the conclusive instrument by which powers are affirmatively created
or negatively restricted. The only relevant test for the validity of a statute
made under Art. 245 is whether the legislation is within the scope of the affirmative grant of power or is forbidden by some provisions of the constitution.
[436F-G]
B
· To accept the basic features or basic structures· theory with re~ard to ordinary
legislation would mean that there WOJJld. be two kinds of !imitations for legislative measures. One will pertain to legislative power under Art. 245 and 246
and the legislative en;ries and the provision in Art. 13. The other would be that
no legislation can be made as to damage or destroy basic features or basic
structures. ·This will mean rewriting the constitution and robbing the legislature
of acting wiihin the framework of the Constitution. No legislation can be free
from challenge on this ground even though the legislative measure is within the
plenary. powers of the legislative. [436G-H, 437AJ
C
There is no implied limitations on the power of amendment of the constitution. Our constitution has not adopted the due process clause of the American
Constitution. Reasonableness of legislative measures is unknown to our constitution. The crucial point is that unlike the American consiitqtion where rights
are couched in wide ~neral terms leaving it to the course to evolve necessary
I imitations our constitutioJl has denied due process as a test of invalidity of law,
Our constitution contemplates that consideration of jusiice or general welfare
might require restriction on enjoyment of fundamental rights. (437 A-CJ
.,
A
Kesavananda Bliarati's case [1973] Suppl. S.C.R.
State of Madras [1950] S.C.R. 88 (followed).
1;
A. K. Copa/an
D
v.
The theory of basic structures or basic features is an exercise in imponderables. Bade structures or basic features are indefinable. The legislative entries
are the fields of legislation. The pith and sub>tance doctrine has been applied
ou
in order to find ou• legislative competency, and eliminate encroachment
legislative entries. Jf the theory of basic structures or basic features will be
applied to legislative measures it will denude Parliament and State Legislatures
of tire power of legislation and deprive them of laying down legislative policies.
This will be encroachment on the separation of powers. [437C-DJ
E
F
"Electo1d Legislation and amendments thereto are intra vires the powers
of Parliament to legislate.
•
..• 'l
The Constitutional validity of a •latutc depends entirely on the exisl'ence of
the legislative power and the express provision ii1 Art. 13. Apart from the
limitation the legislature is not subject to any other prohibition. The amendments made to the 1951 Act by the Amendment Acts 1974 and 1975 are to give
elfect to ce1tain 'iews expressed by this Court in preference to certain views
dcparl!ed from or otherwise to clarify the original intention. It is within the
powers of Parliament to frame laws with regard to elections. Parliament has
power to enumerate and define election expenses. Parliament has power to
state whether certain expenses can be included or may be excluded from election expenses. Parliament has power to adopt conclusive proof with regard to
· matters of appointment, resignation or termination of service. Parliament has
power to state what can be considered to be office of profit. Parliament has
power to state as to what will and wh'.lt will not constitute co~rupt prac~ice.
Parliament has power to enact what will be the ground for d1squal1ficatlon.
Parliament has power to define "candidate". Parliament has power to state
what symbols will be allotted to candidates for election. These are all legislative
policies. [437E-GJ
• , .•.•.. '"'~· .
2-t~SCI/76
G
H
358
A
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 197 6] 2 s.c.rc
\
The conclusive evidence or conclusive proof clause is an accepted legislative
measure. Similarly giving retrospective effect to legislative amendment is accepted to be valid exercise of legislative power. [437H]
Kanta Kathuria v. Manak Chand ~urana, (1970] 2 S.C.R. 830 (affirmed).
The rendering of a judgment ineffective by changing the basis by legislative
enactment is not encroachment on judicial power because the legislation is within the competence of the legislature. [438Cl
B
M. P. V. Sundararamier & Co. v. The State of A. P. & Ors. [19581 S.C.R.
14'22 (relied on)
·
"Retro~pective
c
legis/aJion of election laws is valid".
It is well recognised that Parliament and State Legislature can make their
law5 operate retrospectively. Any law that can be made prospectiwly can be
made with retrospective operation (Vide Kanta Kathuria's case). Certain kinds
of laws cannot operate retrospectively and that i9 "expost facto" legislation.
The present case docs not fall within the category. [438E-F]
May's Parliamentary Practice 17th Edn. p. 546 and English
(referred to).
ca~cs
therein
Tl1e Fundamental Right< Chapter has no bearing on Election rights.
D
The Fundamental Rights chapter has no bearing on a right created by a
Statute relating to Election. The Right to stand as candidate and to contest
an election is not a common law right. It is a special right created by a
statute which can only be exercised on the conditions laid down by a statute.
£438HJ
Jamna Prasad Mukhariya and Ors., v. Lachhi Ram and Ors., (1955] 1 S.C.R.
608 (applied).
E
There is no basic structure or basic feature or basic framework with regard
to the time when under the Election Laws a person is a candidate at the election. The contention that the amendment of the definition of "candidate"
has damaged or destroyed basic structure is untenable. [439Al
Camlid<Me meaning of-It does not include "retumed candidate" within tlie
meanillR of Section !OO(l)(b)
F
The contention that the expression "returned . candidate" is descriptive of
the expression "candidate" will rob section 100 of its content.
The word
"candidate" in relation to various electoral offences shows that he must be
a candidate: at the time of the offence. [439A-B]
Electoral Offences under the Representation of the
and the Indian Panel Code Ss. 171-A No. l Distinctfon.
G
H
Peqple
Act,
1951
A significant distinction arises between the electoral offences under the 1951
Act and the offences under sections 171-A to 171-I of the Indian Penal Code.
namely, that the 1951 Act uses the word "cimdidate' or his election agent
with reference to various offences, whereas the Indian Penal Code does not use
the word "candidate" in relation to commission of any offence. Any person
may fall within the offences of bribery, undue influence, personation at elections
within the provisions of the Indian Penal Code or for false statement or
illegal payments in connection with any election or failure to keep election
accounts. Sections 171-A to 171-I of the Indian Penal Code and the provisions
contained in sections 125 to 136 of the Representation of the People Act 1951
follow the pattern of English Acts namely, Statutes 17 and 18 Victoria, Chap.
r.n (1853-54). Statutes 21 and 22 Victoria Chapter I (1882). In these sectiol!s
dealing with the acts of persons other than candidates and votees no time JS
mentioned, while the English Act does mention. [439B-C, 4400-EJ
Parker's conduct of Parliamentary Elections' 19'70 Edn. p. 52-53; In· re.
Youthal I O'M & H 295; In re. Bodin 50'M N 280; In re. Norwic/1 54 L T
•
1.
I •
/
r
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
359
'627; Siatute 17 and 18 Victoria, Ch. CII (1853-54); Statute 21 and 22 Viet.
Ch. LXXXVU (1858 l Statute 46 and 47 Viet. LI !882.
A
Holding out as a candidate~Meaning of.
\
The 1951 Act uses the expression "candidate" in relation to several offence
for the purpose of fixing liability with reference to a person being a candidate,
if no time be fixed with regard to a person being a candidate it can be said
that from the moment a person is elected he can be said to hold himself out
as a candidate for the next election. The definition of the English Act cannot
be of any aid to the construction of the 1951 Act. [441A-BJ
•
B
"Official dutv" will he duty in law.
Official duty will be a duty in law. Official duty will be duty under
administrative directions of the Executive. Official duty will be for security
law and order and matters in aid of public purpase. These dnties will be in
connection with election. Official. duties must have reasonable connection between the Act and the discharge of duty. [441E-F]
c
MataioR Dob~y v. fl. C. Bhari, [19551 2 S.C.R. 925 (applied).
"There is no vice of delegation in the statutes."
There is no vice of delegation in the statutes. "Delegation" is not the
complete handing over or transference of a power from one person or body of
persons to another. Delegation may be defined as the entrusting by a person
or body of persons of the exercise of power residing in that person or body of
persons to another person or body of persons with complete power of revocation or' amendment remaining in the grantor or dele,sator. Delegation often involves the granting of discretionary authority to another, but such authority is
purely derivative. The< ultimate power always remains in the delegator and is
never renounced. [442A-C]
1
Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturin.fi' (Weaving) Co. Ltd. v. The Assistant
Commissioner of Sales Tax and Ors. [19741 4 S.C.R. 98 & 116. (followed).
The contentions that the Amendment Acts of 1974 and 1975 are subject to
basic features or basic structures or basic frame work fails on two grounds.
First, legislative measures are not subject to the theory of basic features or
basic structure or basic frame work. Secondly the majority view in Kesavananda Blzarati's case is that the 39th Amendment which put the two statutes in
the Ninth Schedule and Art. 31-B is not open to challenge on the ground of
either damage to destruction of basic features., basic structures or basic framework or on the ground of violation of fundamental rights. [442H, 443A]
Kesavananda Bliarati's case, [1973] Supp. S.C.R. 1 (applied).
1
•
...- '"'\
:...
·~
••
D
E
F
Cow and Calf symbol validity allotted by the Election Commissioner under
the Election Rule is not a religious symbol within the mealling of s.123(3)
and the usage of the symbol will not co1Zslitute also a corrupt practice."
It is impossible to hold that because one party ha9 not been given the symbol
of "cow, calf and milk maid", therefore, the symbol of "cow, calf and milk
maid" becomes a religious symbol. No evidence was let to prove that "cow and
calf" is a religious symbol. [443G-HJ
G
Per Khanna,. l.
"Propriety of the impugned constitutional amendment is not_ the concern of
the Court.
This Court is n9t ~oncerned _with the wisdom behind or the propriety of
the impugned constitutional amendment. These are matters essentially for
those who are vested with the authority to make the constitutional amendments
All that this Court is concerned with is the constitutional validity of the impugn:
ed amendment. [457A-B]
H
360
A
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[l976j 2 S.C.R.
\
"Co11stit11tional validity of tlze Acts cannot be assailed on the ground tlzat
some of the members of Parliament where prevented because al tlzeir detention from attending and participating in the prodecdings of tlze House of Parlia-
mem.
B
c
The contention that the sitttings of the two Houses of Parliament in which,
the impugned Acts were passed essentially relates to the validity of the proceedings of the two Houses, are matters which are not justiciable and pertain to
the internal domain of the two Houses. Of course, the courts can go into the
question as to whether the measures passed by Parliament are constitutionally
valid. The court cannot, however, go into the question as to whether the sittings
of the Houses of Parliament were not constitutionally valid because some
members of those Houses were prevented, from attending and participating in
the discussion9 in these Houses. Art. 122(1) and Art. 100 would show that
the framers of the Constitution were anxious to ensure that the procedural
urcgularities and other grounds like those mentioned in clause (2) of Art. 100
should not vitiate the validity of proceedings of Parliament and that it would
not be permissible' to call in question those proceedings on such grounds. [458DE, 459B-C]
I
I
~
May's "Parliamentary Practice" 18th Edn. 100; K. Anc•ulan Nambiar &
A11r. v.' The Chief Secreta1'v Govemment of Madras and Ors. [1966] 2 S.C.R.
406 {relied on). Speo.tal Refel"ence No. 1 of 1964, [1965] 1 S.C.R. p. 413;
(Obiter) not applicable.
D
It is a right of each House of Parliament to be the sole judge of the
lawfulness of its own proceedings. It would, therefore. follow that the courts
cannot go into the lawfulness of the proceedings of the House of Parliament.
[460F·Gl
Bradla11gh v. Gossett 12 Q.B.D. 271 (1883-84) (quoted with approval).
E
The act of detaining a person is normally that of an outside agency and
not that of the House of\ Parliament. It would certainly look anomalous, if
the act of an outside agency which might ultimately turn out to be not leMl
could affect the validity of the proceedings of the House of Parliament or
could prevent that House from assembling and fnnctioning. [460Gl
"Gazette notification raises an assumptio'n tlzat tlze Acts were duly passed".
Jn the face of the pt1blication in the gazette of the Election Laws (Amendment Act 40) 1975 and the Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment Act) 1975
this court must assume that those two Acts were duly passed. [461Al
F
Marshall Field & Co. v. Jdh11 M. Clark 14 U.S. 649: Oscar Leser v. Merder
Garnett 66 L. Ed. 505 (di~cussed).
The constitutional validity of the Constitution Amendment Act and the 1975
Act amendini: the Representation or the People Act cannot be assailed on
the ground that some of the members of Parliament were prevented because
of their detention from attending and participating in the proceedings of the
House of Parliament. [461Fl
·
G
"Validity of preventive detention of Members of Par/icvnent cannot be
do/laterally raised in proceedings wherein the court is concemed with t/ie l'afidity of constitution a11u!nd111ent.1'
•
Question as: to whether a member of Parliament has been validly detained
under a law relating to p~·evention detention can be !lppropriately gone
into in proceedings for a y;nt o~ habeas corpus. Suc1!- question can!lot be collaterally raised in procee<lmgs ltke the present wherem the court 1s concerned
with the validity of a Constitution Amendment Aot and an Act to amend the
Representation of the People Act. [458B·Cl
H
It is plain that it would not be poosible. ~or the court in. such co!lateraT
proceedings to record a findinu about the. valld1ty of the. d;tent10n of mem~rs
because the full material having a beanng on the val1d1ty of the detention
J •
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
\
361
would normally be, apart from the authority passing the order for detention,
·Only with the person ordered to be detained or his friends and relatives. It
would plainly be hazardous to record a finding without such material and a
.court of law, should decline to record such a finding in collateral proceedings.
Till such time as a finding is recorded in appropriate proceedings, about the
validity of the detention pf the members of Parliament the court would have to
proceed upon the assumption that the detention has not been shown to be
invalid. [459E-G]
A
[Obiter : Jn deciding a case .before it. the co_urt should resist the atte~pt
<if a party to induce it to decide a matl'Cr which though canvassed durmg
arguments is only incide.ntal and collateral and can appropriately be dealt with
in separate proceedings.] [458C-Dl
B
"Clause 4 of Art. 329A is unconstitutional as it violates the principle of free
tN1d fair elections an essential postulate o'j democracy, which in its tum is a
part of the !Jc.<Sic structure of the Constitution."
Clause ( 4) of Art. 329A consists of four parts, viz; (i) No law made by
Parliament before the commencement of the Con~titution (Thirty-ninth Amend·
men!) Act, 1975 insofar as it relates to the election petitions and matters
connected therewith shall apply or shall be deemed ever to have applied to
or in relation to the election of any such person as is referred to in Cl. ( 1) to
either House of Parliament.
(ii) and such election could be declared to be
void or has, before such commencement, been declared to be void under any
such law. (iii) and notwithstanding an qrder made by any court before such
commencement declaring such election to be void, such election shall continue
to be valid in all respects; and (iv) any such order and any finding on whicbi
such order is based shall be and shall he deemed always to have been void
and of no effect. [461G-H, 462A-CJ
•
As far as part (i), it relates to a matter which can be the subject of
an ordinary legislation or a constitutional amendment. A Jaw in the above
terms can validly be made by a legislature as well as by constituent authority.
The fact that the above Jaw would have retrospective effect would not detract
tfrom the competence of legislature of competent authority to make such a law.
It is well-settled that it is permissible for a legislature to make a law with retrospective effect.
The power of a legislature to make a law with retrospective
effect is not curtailed or circumscribed by the fact that the subject matter of
such retrospective law is a matter relating to an election dispute. If a legislature
can pass legislation in respect of matters relating to an election dispute with
retrospective effect, the constituent autoority. which is a kind of super Jegisla·
ture would a fortiori be entitled to do so. (4620-G]
State of Orissm v. Bhupendra Kumar Bose, [1962] Supp. 2 SCR 38Q; Kanta
Kathuria v. Manak Chand Surana, (1970](2) SCR 835, applied.
Part (ii) of cl. ( 4) spells out the consequence which flows from part ( i) or
the clause. If the previous law insofar as it relates to the election petitions
and matters connected therewith was not to apply to the election of the Prime
Minister and Speaker, it wonld necessarily follow that election of the appellant
who was the P.rime Minister would not be deemed to be void or ever to have
become void on the ground on which such election could be declared to be
void or has before such commencement been declared to be void under any
such law. [462G-H]
If.
The same, to some extent, appears to be true of part (iv) of Cl.(4).
the previous law insofar as it relates to the election petitions and matters connected therewith was not to apply to the election of the appellant, the High
Court shall be deemed to have had no jurisdiction to decide the election peti~
ti<:>n challenging the election of the appellant. The resultant effect of the
amendment thus was that the order by which the election of the appellant
was declared to be void and the finding on which such order was based were
rnndered to be void and of no effect.· [463A-C]
A declaration that an order made by a court of Jaw is void is normally part
of the judicial function and is not a legislative function.
AlthOugh there
"' '
c
D
E-
F
G
H
l
362
A'
B
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 s.c.R.
J
is, in the Constitution of India, na rigid separation af powers, by and large,
the spheres of judicial functian and legislative functions have been demarcated
and it is not permissible for the legislature to encroach upon the judicial sphere.
A legislature while it is entitled to change with retrospective effect the law which
formed the basis of judicial decision, it is not permissible to the legislature
to declare the judgment of the court to be void or not binding. [463D-E]
Shri Prithvi Cotto11 Mills Ltd. & A11r. v. Broach Borough Municipality &
Ors., [1970](1) SCR 388 @ 392, Janpada Sc.b/ia, Ch/1indwara etc. v. The Central
Provinces Syndicate Ltd. & Anr. etc. [1970] (3) SCR 745 @751; Municipal
Cdrporat1'011 of the City of Alunedabtul etc. v. New Shorrock Spg. & Wvg. Co.
Ltd. etc. [1971] (1) SCR 287; State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. v. M. Rayappa
Gounder, AIR 1971 SC 231, (followed).
American Jurisprudence 2nd Edn. Vol. 46 p. 318-319 and Douglas Liyange
v. The Quee11, [1967] AC 259 (discussed).
c
D
E
F
G
H
By Part (iii) of Cl.(4), it is declared that the election of the appellant
shall continue to be valid in all respects. Such a declaration would not follow
from part (i) or part (ii) or part (iv) of the clause. The result is that so far
as the dispute relating to the election of the appellant is concerned, a legal
vacuum came into existence.
It was open to the Constituent Authority to
fill that vacuum by prescribing a law which was to govern the dispute arising
out of the petition filed by the respondent to challe_nge the election of the
appellant. The constituent authority, however, did not do so and straightaway
proceededi to declare the election of the appellant to be valid. There is nothing
ip clause ( 4) to indicate that the constituent authority applied any law in declaring the election of the appellant to be valid and if so what wn.s that Jaw.
[465H, 466F-Gl
"Democracy, which is a basic stmcture of t/1e Constitution and its postulates."
The power of amendment of the Constitution in A.rt. 368 does not Permit
altering the basic structnre of the Constitution.
Democratic set up is part of
the .basic structure of the Constitution. Democracy i:ostulates that there should
be pJ:riodic elections so that people may be in a position to select the old re•
presentatives or if they so choose, to change the representatives and elect in their
place other representative. Democracy fnrther contemplates that the elections
should be free and fair, so that the voters may be in a position to vote for
candidates of their choice.
Democracy can indeed function only upon the
faith that elections are free and fair and not rigged and manipulated, that they
are effective instruments of ascertaining popular will both in reality and form
and are not mere rituals calculated to generate illusion of deference to mass
opinion. Free and fair elections require that the candidates and their agents
should not resort to unfair means or malpractices as may impinge upon the
process of free and fair elections. Disputes do arise and to resolve the disputes, the different democratic countries of the world have made provisions prescribing the law and the forum for resolving of those disputes. [4670-H]
Kesavananda Bliarati's case [1973] Supp. SCR 1, (applied).
U. K. Representation of the People Act, 1949: U.S. Constit111ion, Art.
Section 5: Au.<tralian Constitution, s. 47; Japanese Constitution, Art. 55; Iceland
Constitution, Art. 46; Norwaigia11 Constitution Art. 64; French Constitution, Art.
59; German Federal Republic Co11stitutio11 Art. 41; Italian Cdnstiflltion Art. 66;
Tur/dsh Constitution Art. .75 and Malaysian Constitution, Art. 53, referred to.
"Rules ofi Electoral Morality affected' by cl. (4) of Art. 329A."
Election laws lay down a code of conduct in election matters and prescribe
what may be called. rules of electoral morality. The object of a provision for
resolving election disputes in the Election Laws i~ to enforce rules of eJectoral
morality and to punish deviance fr?i;n the prescribed code of con9uct Ill election matters.
But for such prov1S1on, there would be no sanct10n fo,r the
above code of conduct and rules of electoral morality. Nothing would bring
the code of conduct into greater contempt and make a greater mockery of it
than the absence of a provision to punish its vioiati<?~·
'f!le position would
become all the more glaring that even though a prov1s1on exists on the statut.e
book for punishing violation of the code of conduct in election matters a parti-
I "
>
' ..
I
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
363
cu!ar election is made immune and granted exemption from the operation
such a provision. [469A-C]
of
The vice of clause (4) of Art. 329A is not merely that it makes the previous law contained in the R.P. Act as amended by Acts 58 of 1974 and 40
of 19·75 inapplicable to the challenge to the election of the appellant, it also
makes n() other election Jaw applicable for resolving that dispute. The further
vice from wl,.ich the said clause suffers is that it not merely divests !]le previous
authority. namely the High Court of its jurisdiction to decide the dispute relating to the election of the appellant, it confers no jurisdiction on some other
authority to decide that dispute. Without even prescribing a law and providing
a forum for adjudicating upon the grounds advanced to challenge the election
of the appellant, the constituent authority has declared the election of the appellant to be valid. (4690-B] ·
.._.;
7
To confer an absolute validity upon the election ot one particular candidate
and to prescribe that· the validity of that election shalJ not be questioned before
any forum or under any law would necessarily have the effect cA sayin11. that
howsoever gross may be the improprieties which might have vitiated that election:
howsoever flagrant may be the malpractices which might have been committed
on behalf of the returned candidate during the course of election and howsoever
foul and violative of the principles of free and fair elections may be the means
which might haw been employed fm securing success in that election, the said
election would be none-the-Jess valid and it would not be permissible to complain of these impropdeties, malpractices and unfair means before any forum or
under any Jaw with a view to assail the validity of that election. Not much
argument is needed to show that any provision which brings about that result
is subv~ive of the principle of free and fair election in a democracy.
The
fact that the candidate concerned is the Prime Minister of the country or the
Speaker of the Lower House of Parliament would, if anything, add force to the
above conclusion because both these offices re_Present the acme of the democratic
process in a country. That ill fact the elections of the incumbents of the two
offices were not vitiated by any impropriety, malpractice or unfair means is
not relevant or germane to the question with which the Court is concerned,
namely, as to what is the effect of clause (4) of article 329A. [469F-H, 470AJ
The vice of declaration contained in part (iii) of clanse (4) regarding the
validity of the election of the appellant is aggravated by the fact that such a
declaration is made after the High Court which was then seized of juriSdiction
had found substance in some of the grounds advanced by the respondent and
had consequently declared the election of the appellant to be void. To put a
stamp of validity on the election of a candidate by saying that the chalJenge
to such an election would not be governed by any election law and that the
said election in any case would be valid and immune from any challenge runs
counter to accepted nonm of free and fair elections in all democratic countries.
[470B-CJ
A
B
C
D
E
F
Marabary v. Madison 1 Cr. 137, 163 (1803) United States v. Lee 106 U.S.
l96, 220 (quoted with approval).
'
Rule of Construction o1 widely worded provisions in the Statute."
If a clause of a Constitution or statutory provision is widely worded the
width of its ambit cannot be circumscribed by taking into account the facts of
an individual case to which it applies. [470F]
G
Although the provisions of constitutional amendment should be construed
in a fair and liberal spirit, such liberal spirit should not be carried by the
court to the extent of discovering the application of dormant and latent law in
the declarati'on of the validity of an election even though there is not even
a remote indication of such law in the impugned provi~ion. (471 BJ
H
"Rule of law, requirements of"
R.ule of Jaw postulates that the decisions should be made by the application
of known principles and rules and in general such decisions should be predictable
364
A
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
fl 97 6) 2 S.C.R.
\
and the ctt1zen should know where he is.
If a decision is taken without any
principle or any rule, it is not predictable and such a decision is the antithesis of
a decision taken in accordance with the rule of law. [471il-C]
Clause (4) of Art. 319A strikes at the basis of free and fair Eleclions.
B
c
The effect of impugned clause ( 4) is to take away both the right and the
remedy to challenge the election of the appellant.
Such extinguishment of the
right and remedy to challenite the validity of the election, is incompatible with
the process of free and fair elections.
Free and fair elections necessarily
postulate that if the, Sl!CCCSS of a candidate is secured in elections by means
which violate the principle of free and fair elections, the election should on
that account be liable to be set aside and be declared to be void.
To extinguish the right and the remedy to challenge the validity of an election would'
necessarily be tantamount to laying down that even if the election of a candidate
is vitiated by the fact that it was secured by flagrant violation of the principle
of free and fafr election, the same would still enjoy immunity from Cl:iallenge
and would be none-the-less valid.
Claiise ( 4) of Art. 32<}A can, therefOre, be
held to strike at the basis of free and fair elections. [417C-E]
Bryce : American Commonwealth 912 Edn. 47-50; United States Code 1970
Ed. Sections 5, 6, 15 and Roscse Pound, Jurisprudence Vol. III 106.
D
E
Clause (4) of Art. 329A of the Constitution is to be struck down on the
ground that it violates the principle of free and fair elections, which is an
essential postulate of democracy and which in its turn is a part of the basic
structure of the Constitution, inasmuch as it abolishes the forum without providing for another forum for going into the dispute relating to the validity of the
election of the appellant and further prescribes that the said dispute relating
to the validity of the election of the appellant shall not be governed by any
ele9(ion Jaw and that the validity of the said election shall be absolute and not
consequently he liable to be assailed and (2) it extinguishes both the rigl:!t
and the remedy 'to challenge the validity of the aforesaid election. [4740-E]
[His Lordship did not express any opinion about the validity of the other
cal uses of Art. 329A, since Cl. ( 4) alone was relevantl [461G]
"From when held out as
change in law.
F
candidate" has becdme academic in view of the
The question as to when the appellant held herself out as a candidate from
the Rae Bareli Constituency has become purely academic in view of he change
of the definition of the word "candidate" as given in clause (b) of s.79 of the
Representation of the People Act 40 of 1975. [475C-D]
"Candidate ddes not include "returned candidate" ins. lOO(l){b)."
G
Candidate in Clause (7) of Sec. 123 of the Representation of the People
Act would mean a person who has or who claims to have been duly nominated
au a candidate at the election. The word "candidate" has not been used merely
to identify the person who is duly nominated as a candidate at an election. The
word "candidate" would not include also a person who, after the commission of
corrupt practice specified in cl.(7) is subse14uent!y nominated as a candidate.
The amended definition shows that unless context otherwise requires candidate
means a person who has been or dailllll to have been duly nominated as a candidate at an election.
There is nothing to indicate that the word candidate in
cl.(7) of s.123 has been used merely tn identify the person who has been or
would be subsequently nominated as a candidate. A definition clause in a
statute is a legislative device with a view to avoid making different provisiom
of the statutes to be cumbersome. When a word is defined in the statute and
that word is used in a provision to which that definition is applicable the effect
is that wherever the word defined is used in that provision, the definition of the
Reading the word "candidate" i'n s.123(7) of the
word get~ substituted.
Representation of the People Act in the sense in which it has been defined as
...
SMT. INDIRA GANDIII V. :RAJ NARAIN
•
••
365
a r~sult of. the amendment made by Act 40 of 1975, tl?.e only reasonable inference is that the person referred to as a ca:i.diJate in that clause should be a
person who bas been or claims tQ have been duly nominated as a candidate at
1n1 election and not one \vho is yet to be nominated. [476F-ll, 477A-B] ·
· The contention that, if while dealing: with corrupt practice committed by a
.candidate before he became a returned candidate in the ccintext of s-.100\ 1)
(b) it is permissible to hold the \\'ords ureturned candidate'' are intended to
identify the person who subsequently becomes a returned candidate, the !ame
criterion should apply when construing the \\'Ord ..candidate'' in s. 123 of the Repr~entation of the People Act. is devoid of force.
The definition of the words
returned candidate and candidate given in s. 79 of the Representation of
the People Act are preceded by the words unless the context otherwise requires.'' .
The connotation of the above words is that normally it is the definition given
in the section w,hich should be applied and given effect to. This normal rule
may h0\1.'ever be departed from if there be· something in the context to show
that the definition should not be applied. So far .as clause (b) of s. 100 (1) is
conce;:,.ed, the context plainly requires that the corrupt practice referred to in·
that cl<u.1se should have been committed by the candidate before 00 became a
returned candidate, or by his agent or by any other person with his consent ~r
that of his election agent. The compulsion arising from the context which is
there in ct. (b) of s. 100(1) of the Representation of the People Act is singularly
absent 'in s. 123(7} of the Representation of the People Act. There is nothing
in the context of the later provision which requires that the full effect to the
new <lefinition of the word ''candidate" should not be given effect to. [474E·Hl
llahhury's Laws of England 3rd Edn. Vol. 14, 222-223 (not applicable).
A
ll
c
D
Official duty includes statutory and all those to be carried out as per o.dministratl'i·e instructions.
There is_ nothing in the proviSo to s.123(7) as inserted by the Election Law
Amendment (Act 40) of 1975 to confine the words "official duty" to duty imposed by the statute. Official duty would include not merely duties imposed by
statutes but also those /\\·hich have to be carried out in pursuance of administrative in<;tructions. [480A-Bl
E
"Co1v and. Calf is not a religious or a national synibor·.
.,
In view of the proviso to Cl. 3 of s. 123 inserted by Act 40 of 1975, the
symbol of cow and calf shall not be deemed to be a religious symbol or. a
natio:1al symbol for the purposes of s. 123(3) of the R"Cpresentation of the
People Act. [480H, 481Al
_
.
F
"Retorspective -legfs{atioli. is· intra vires the [)OY.'ers of the legislature".
,•
A legislature has, except in a matter for ,,.,hich there is prohibition tile one
contained in Art. 20(1) of the constitution, the power to make laws which are
prospective in operation as well as laws which have retrospective operation.
There is no limitation on the power of the legislature in this respect. Apart
f!om the field in which there is a constitutional prohibition fer giving retro~c
uve effect has now become a part of norm.al legislative process. Election laws
are a part of the normal legislative process and what is permitted in the matter
or .ordinary le&islation would also be permissible in the matter of. legblation relahn~ to elections unless there be rome provision in the constitution which
forbids such a course. 'The matter is no tonger "res jntegra". [481C-D G
482A-B]
.
. '
'
Statt of Orissa v. Bhupendra Kunwr Bose [1962) Supp. (2) SCR 380; "Kanta
Kathurl, v. Manak Chand Surana [1970] (2) SCR 835 (affirmed).
;lbeyusekera v. Jaya~Uake [1932) AC 26Q (discussed).
-J
G
H
366
A
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976) 2 S.C,R.
The provisions of Act 40 of 1975 are general in terms and would apply to
all election disputes which may be, pending either in the High Court or in appeal
before the Supreme Court or which may arise in future. It is no doubt true
that the retrospective operation of amending Act has tlie effect of placing one
of the parties to the dispute in a more advantageous position compared to
others; but tliat is inevitable in most of the amendments with retrospective
operation. The contention that the amendment in laws was void because it gave
advantage to a party is to be rejected. [486C-DJ
B
Harbhajan Singh v. Mohan Singh and Ors. [1974] 2 SCC 364 (discussed
and applied).
Kanta Kathurio v. Manak Chand Surana [1970] (2) SCR 835 (affirmed).
c
Whenever a legislature makes a law or amends a law it has to inoicatc the
time from which it would come into effect. This is essentially a matter for the
legislature and the court cannot substitute its own opinion, for that of the legislature. The fact that the change in law is made applicable to pending cases
and the classification treats the decided cases as belonging to one category and
pending cases as belonging to another category is not offensive to Art. 14.
Indeed the question of propriety is a matter which is entirely for the legislature
to think of and decide. It cannot aJfect the validity of Jaw. [486F-H]
Anam Mills v. State of Gujarat [1975] 2 SCC 175 (followed).
D
In case the provisions of the amended law are abused, this court would not
be helple~s in the matter. The proper course in such an event would be to
strike down the action taken under the amended law and not the law itself.
[4870]
Change in tlze definition of tlze word does not impinge upon the process of
"free and fair elections".
E
F
As a result of the change in the definition of candidate, the legislature has
fixed a definite date viz. that of nomination instead of the earlier time which
had an element of indefiniteness and uncertainty about it for finding as to..mhcn
a person became a candidate. Certainty is an essential desideratum in law and
any amendment of law to achieve that object is manifestly a permissible piece
of legislation. The choice of date was a matter for the legislature to decide
and the court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the legislature. In
this respect. more so when whatever be the choice of date, has aspects of both
pros and cons. [4888-C]
Union of India v. M/s. Parmaswaran Match Works AIR
·
followed.
1974 SC 2349,
Laying down rule of conclusive proof is not assumption of judicial power
by Le1dslaturr..
G
Laying down a rule of conclusive presumption in a statute with a view to
remove uncertainty with regard to the date of taking effect of appointment or
resignation of a Government employee cannot be characterised as an assump··
tion of judicial power by the legislature. [488G]
Nolle of the three objects o~ the change effected by Act 40 of 1975 has any
taint of 1111constitutionality.
H
One of the objects of the changes effected by Act 40 of 1975 is to remove
the uncertainty and set at rest the controversy as to what would be the precise
date of a person in the service of the Central Government ceasing to be in such
service in case he tenders his resigqation. Another object of the change effected
by the Act of 1975 is that a candidate who is bound in view of para 8 of the
Elections Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968 to use the party
symbol allotted by the Election Commission and who cannot use any other
symbol shall not suffer and be guilty of corrupt practice under s. 123 (3) of the
Representation of the People Act because of the use of that symbol. The third
t
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
\
l
367
object of the change effected by the Act 40 of 1976 is that a candidate should
not suffer or be held guilty of corrupt practice because of any act done by any
person in the service of the Government and belonging to any of the classes
mentioned in s. 123(7) of the Representa.tion of the People Act ii~ the discharge of his official duty. Non~ of the three objects has any tamt of unconstitutionality and that the impugned provisions do not infringe upon the principle of free and fair election. [488E, H, 489C-01
The act in the discharge or purported disch11rge of official duty of the
Government employees referred to in the newly added proviso to section 123(7)
of RP Act would have to be of a kind which is germane to their official duties.
Wha.t would be permissible under the above provision would be that which is
conceived to be done in public interest and not something conceived to be done
in the personal interest of a candidate. In spite of some difficulty which may
arise in borderline cases, this distinction must be borne in mind. If, however,
because of doing something conceived in public interest, e.g., as in the present
case the security arrangement for the person holding the office of the Prime
Minister, some advantage may also possibly accrue to a candidate, it will
have to be regarded as incidental and would not detract from action taken under
lhe above provision being in publ,ic interest. As against that, any action taken
with a view to further the personal interest of a candidate should not be allowed to be camouflaged as an action taken in public interest. Care must be taken
to ensure that public interest is not allowed to degenerate into a cloak for furtheranc" of the personal interests of a candidate in an election. The disch11rge
or purported discharge of official duty must necessarily have public interest and
not the personal interest of a candidate as its basis. The courts while dealinl?
with the newly a.dded proviso to section 123(7) should construe it, if reasonably possible, in such a manner as would sustain the validity of that proviso.
In case there is abuse of the above provision, the proper course, would be to
strike down the action taken under the proviso and not the proviso itself.
[4890-H, 490A-Bl
[His Lordship felt not necessary to deal with the argument that the theory
of basic structure of the Constitution operates upon an amendment or the Constitution under Art. 368 only, but it does not hold good when Parliament enacts
a statute in exercise of powers under Art. 245 of the Constitution in view of
his findings that the provisions of Act 40 of 1975 have not been shown to infringe upon the process of free. and fair election]. [490E-G]
B
c
E
·
"Lexa! evidence is necessary to show the extent of user of each vehicle in the
elections'.
It is n.o doubt true that by using a vehicle for the furtherance of the prospects of candidates in more tb~n one constitnency one should not be allowed
!O ci~cumvent the salutary provisions of the Representation of the People Act
tn this respect. To prevent such circumvention it is essential that evidence
should be led to show as to what was the extent of the mer of the vehicle in
the constituency. [4940-E]
v
"
Hans Raj v. Pt. Hari Ram and Ors., 40 E.L.R. 125 (applied).
As the election expenses of the· appellant have not been shown to exceed the
prescribed limit of Rs. 35,000/- the question of invoking a.nd going into the
validity of Act 58 of 1974 doe~ not arise. [497 A-BJ
[His Lordship thought it unnecessary to express an opinion abou.t the view
of Ka11wc•r Lal v. Amar Nath Chawla, AIR 1975 SC 308]. [497B]
"Whether Fundamental Rights are not a part of the basic structure of the
Constitution-O;bservations of Justice Khanna in Bharati's case clarified."
(1) What has been laid down by His Lordships in Bharati's case [1973]
Supp. SCR 1 is (i) that no article of the Constitution is immune from the
amendatory process because of the fact that it relates to a fundamental right
and is contafoed in Part Ill of the Constitution. The constitutional amendment under Art. 368 does not constitute "law" as mentioned in Art. 13. There
H
SUPRE,\fE COURT REPORTS
A
B
[1976] 2 5.C,R.
was no Iimita.tion on the power o~ Parliament to amend the provisions of Part III
of the ConstltutIO'! so a~ to. abndge or take away the fundamental rights. As
r~gards the SCOPe. of the power of amendment under Art. 368, and the connotati_on _of th<:: word "amendment" it is clear from the Bharati's case that no dist!nct1on was ma_de between a provision relating to fundamental rights and provis10ns _dealmg with matters other than funda:mental rights. The limitation inhen~nt m the word "amendment" according to which it is not permissible by
~niendment of the Constitution to change the basic structure of the Constitut10n was. to operate equally on articles pertaining to fundamental rights as on
o_the! articles not pertaining to these rights. The secular cha-meter of the Constltut10n and .the rights guaranteed by Art. 15 pertain to the basic structure. Right
to property 1s not a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. To contend
that according to. Khanna J ., in Bharati's case that fundamental rights are not
a part of the basic structure of the Constitution is not correct.
[4970-E, 4980-H, 499A, E-F)
Go/aknath'.s case [1967] 2 SCR 762, referred to; Bharati's case [1973] Supp.
S.C.R. 1, clanfied.
I
It hag been said that great cases like hard cases make bad Jaw. For great
cases are called great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping the
law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate overwhelming
i~terest, which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment. These immediate . interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure. It, therefore, became
essential to rid the case of all the embellishments resultiing from the political
overt?ne~ and to bring it to a level which is strictly judicial, so that the various
constlturnonal and legal aspects of the matter may be examined in a dispassionate atmosphere. [499G-H, 500AJ
,
·E
G
1I
National Securities Co. v. U.S .. 193 US 197 referred to.
Per Mathew I.
"Concept of democracy and its requisite"
The concept of democracy as visualised by the Constitution presupposes
the representation of the people in Parliament and State Legislatures by tbe
method of election. And before an election machinery can be brought into
operation, there are three requisites which require to be attended
to namely (1) there s!iould be a set of laws and rules making provisions with
respect to all matters relatin,g to, or in connection, elections and it should be
decided as to how these laws and rules are to be made (2) there should be an
execut<ive charged with the duty of securing the due conduct of elections; and
(3) there should be a judicial tribunal to deal with disputes arising out of or
in connection with elections. Articles 327 and 328 deal with the first of these
requisites Art. 324 with second and Art. 329 with the third requisite. [5040-F]
N. P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer Namnakal Constituency & Ors.
[1952] SCR 218 @ 219 (referred to).
As per Art. 329(b), a power must be lodged somewher~ to judge the
validity of the election, for otherwise there would be no certamiy as to who
were legitimately chosen as members, and any intruder or usurper might cl~m
a seat and thus trample upon the privileges and liberties of the people. In whichever au1'hority the power is lodged, the nature of the func!ion i~ such that. !t
requires a judicial apprc:ach. It cannot be resc:lve<l on. cc;ms.1d~rah~ms of polill-·
cal expediency. In whichever body or authority the 1unsd1ction JS rested, the
exercise of the jurisdiction must be judicial in cliaracter. [505C-D, 506B]
Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh and Ors. [1965] (I) SCR
267 (relied on).
Erskine May's Parliamentary Practice ]8th Edn. (19•71) 29 @ 31 and
Bcwry v. U.S. Ex. Rel. Cu1aningham 73 L. ed. 367 (referred to).
Vesting power~ to ad]'udicate election disputes in each ?f the Ho'!se of
Parliament by the Constitution would have bee!! on the basis ?f do_ctrme of
political question and this doctrine has no hosp1ta~le quarte.r .m this Court.
Judicial power is the exercise of a power on the basis of pre-existing Jaw.
[506C-D, 507-Bl
•
j
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
369
Madliav Rao Sci11dia v. Union AIR 1'971 SC 530 Wechsler : Tdward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law 73 Harv. Law Rev. 1 @ 1-9; United E11gi11eeri11g Workers' Union v. Devanayagam (1968} A.C. 365; Justice Holmes in
"Prentis v. At/antic Coast Line Co. 211 @ 216 (J;eferred to).
A
Constituem power is the vower to frame Constitution a11d make laws by
way of amending.
\
•
The Constituent power is the power to frame a Constitution. The people
of India in the exercise of that power framed the Constitution and ia enac.ts
basic norms. By that instrument, the people conferred on the amending body
the power to amend by way of addition, varia~ion or repeal any of its provisions.
"Legal sovereignty" is a capacity "to determine the actions of persons in certain
intended ways by means of law. The amending body which exercises the constituent power of the legal sovereign, though limited by virtue of the decision
in Bharati's case can express itself only by making Jaws. [507H, 508-E]
Kcsavananda Bharati's case [1973] Supp. SCR 1 (applied).
W. J. Rees: The theory of sovereignty Restored in "Mind". Vol. LIX 1950,
quoted at p. 68 of In defence of Sovereignly, ed. W. J. Stankiewicz (referred to).
c
Distinction between constitutional law a11d ordinary law.
The distinction between constitutional law and ordinary law in a rigid constitution like ours is that the validity of the Constitutional Law cannot be challenged whereas that of ordinary law can be challenged on the touchstone of
Constitution. A constitution cannot consist of a string of isolated dooms. A
judgment or sentence which is the result of the exercise of judicial power or
of despotic discretion is not a law as it has not got the generality which is an
essential characberistic of law. A despotic decision without ascertaining the
facts of a case and applying the law to them though dressed in the garb of law
is like a bill of attainder. It is a legislative judgment. The end-product of· the
exercise of judicial power. is a judgment or sentence and nob law. Since the enJ
of law is common good. the law should be framed not for private benefit but
for the common good of all citizens. A statute is a general law.
[508E-G, 509C-D, 510B]
D
E
The resolution of an election dispute by the amending body is not law. It
is either judicial sentence or a legislative judgment like a Bill of Attainder.
The pith and substance of the law enactments was a legislative plan ex-post
facto to secure the conviction, although legislation ad lwminem which is directed
to the course of particular proceedings may not always amount to an inter.
ferene<i with the functions of the judiciary. [51 lF-G, 513C-D]
Li)'anage v. The Queen [1971] 1 A.C. 259 @ 291 a11d Blackstone : Commentad,s Vol. I, 44; Ro1~<sea11 C<intract Social Bk. fl Ch. VI, S. V. Tlwma.1•
At1uinas Treatise on Law Gateway Edn. (1970) 87 (referred to).
Austill: Jurisprudence 2nd Ed. Vol. I. p. 18; Kelsen : General Theorv of
Law and Statute (1961) p. 38 John Chipman Grcry : Nature and Source of LGw p.
161 : Courtney Jlbert: Legislative Methods & Forms (Oxford) 1901 p. 208, J.C.
Carter: Laiv Its original, growth and fu11ctlo11 (New York cmd Londdn) 1907
fl· 116 : Walter Bar,elu;t; The English Cmrntilution (1967) World's Classics Edn.
(Oxford 1928) P. 119; Hayek : Law, Legislation a11d Liberty : Friedman "Legal
TTreory" 5th Edn. p. 1010; Len L, Fuller : "The Morality of Law" p. 49;
J. ~tory: Commentaries 0'11 the Constitution of the United States (Bostan 1833).
(discussed)
J
~
G
U.S. v. Brown 381 U.S. 437 : Cooley Co11stitwional Limitations pp. 536-537
Sth Ed. 1927 : M'Caulay; History of Eng/and p. 207 (1900)
Cfause 4 of Art. 329A is a legislation ad /1omi11em
' '
F
Clause 4 was legisl.ation ad hominem directed against the course of hearing
of f:be appeals on 11'.ents as the appeals and cross-appeah were to be disposed
of m accordance with that clause and not applying the law to the facts as
H
370
A
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 2 S.C,R.
ascertained by the court. This was a direct interference with the decision of
these appeals by the Supreme Court -on their merits by a h;gislative judgment.
[513F-GJ
Principles of Audi Alteram Partem violated.
If the amending body really exercised judicial power that power was exercised in violation of the principles of natural justice of "audi alteram partem".
Even if a power is given to a body without s111;cifying that the rules of natural
justice should be observed in exercising it, the nature of the power would caJl
for its observance. There is nothing on the face of the amendment to show that
the amending body ascertained the facts of the case or applied any norms for
determining the validity of the election. Under Art. 368, the amending body
cannot pass an ordinary law with retrospective effect to validate the election.
It can only amend the Constitution by passing a Jaw of the rank of which
the Constitution is made of. Adjudication facts of an election dispute cannot
be gathered by legislative process behind the back of the parties; they can be
gathered only by judicial process. The amending body in the instant case did .
not ascertain the facts by resorting to the judicial process.
[513G, 514E-F, 515A-B)
E
:H
Clause 4 of Art. 329A, damages the democratic structure of the Cdnstit11tio11,
ff clause ( 4) was an exercise in legislative validation without changing the
Jaw which made the election invalid, when there ought to have been an exercise of judicial power of ascertaining the adjudicative facts and applying the Jaw,
the clause would damage the democratic structure of the Constitution, as the
Constitution visualizes the resolution of an election dispute by a petition presented to an authority exercising judicial power. The contention that there was
no election dispute as clause (4) by repealing the law relating to election petition had rendered the petition filed by the respondent non-est, if allowed, will
toll the death knell of the democratic structure of the Constitution. If Art.
329(b) envisages the resolution of an election dispute by judicial process by a
petitiqn presented to an authority as the appropriate legislature may by Jaw
provide, a constitutional amendmen.t cannot dispense with that requirement without damaging an·essential feature of democracy, viz.; the rnech~J.ism for determining the real representative of the people in an election as contemplated
by the Constitution. [515B-D]
Our Constitution visuahzes the resolution of an election dispute on the basis
of a petition presented to such authority and in such manner as the appropriate
legislature may, by Jaw, provide. The nature of the dispute raised in an eleC"'
tion dispute is such that it cannot be resolved except by judicial
process, namely by ascertaining the facts relating to the election and
When the amending body held that
applying the pre-existing- Jaw.
the election of the appellant was valid, it could not have done to except by
ascertaining the facts by judicial process and by applying the law. The result
of this process would not be the enactment of constitutional Jaw but the passing
of a judgment or sentence. The amending body, though possessed of judicial
power had no competence to exercise unless it passed a constitutional law
enab1ing it to! do so. If, however, the decision of the amending body to hold
the election of the appellant val~ was the result of the exercise of an "irresponsible despotic discretion" governed solely by what it deemed political neces·sity or expediency, then like a bill of attainqer, it was a legislative amendment
disposing or a particular election dispute and not the enactment of a law resulting in an amendment of the Constitution. And, even if the latter process (the
exercise of, despotic discretion) could be regarded as an amendment of the
Constitution, the amendment would destroy an essential feature or democracy
as established by the Constitution, namely, the resolution of election dispute
by an authority by the exercise of judicial power by ascertaining the adjudicative
facts and applying the relevant Jaw for determining the real representative of
the people. The decision of amending body cannot be regarded as an exercise
in al•nstituent legislative validation of an election for these reasons. Firstly
there can be no legislative validation of an election when there is dispute between the parties -as regards the adjudicativ~ facts; the amending body cannot
gather these facts by employing legislative process; they can be gathered only
•
I
I
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NA~AIN
371
__..,
by judicial process. Secondly, !he amending body must change the law retrospectively so as to make the election valid, if the election was rendered invalid
by virtue of any provision of the law actually exi!'lting at the time of election.
Art. 368 does not confer on the amending body the competence to pass any
ordinary law whether with or without restrosP'ective effect. Clause ( 4) expressly
excluded the operation of all Jaws relating to election petition. to the election
in questi'on. Therefore, the election was held to be valid not by changing the
law which rendered it invalid. Thirdly, the cases cited for the appellant are
cases relating to legislative validation of invalid election~ or removal of disqualification with retrospective effect. Being cases of legislative validation or re~
moval of disqualifications by legislature, they are not liable to be tested on the
basis of the theory of basic structure, which is applicable only to constitution
amendment~. Fourthly there was no controversy in those cases with·regard to
adjudicative facts; if there was controversy with regard to these facts, ft is verY
doubtful whether there could be legislative validation of an election by a changing the law alone without ascertaining the adjudicative facts by judicial process.
[52lA-H]
I
\
Abcyasekhara v. Jayatilake [1932] A.C. 260; Piare Dusadh & Ors. v. King
Emperor [1944] F.C.R. 61, Kanta Kathuria v. Ma11ak Chand Surana [19701 2
SCR 835 and State of Orissa v. Bhupendra Kumar Bose (1962) Supp. 2 SCR
380. (Considered).
A
B
c
"Art. 14 is not a basic structure of the Constitution.''
The majority in Bharati's case did not hold that Art. 14 pertains to the basic
structure of the Constitution. The majority upheld the validity of the first pal"t
of Art. 31C. This would show that a constitutional amendment which takes
away or abridges the right to challenge the validity of an ordinary law for
violating the fundamental right under that Article would not destroy or damage
the basic structure. The only logical basis for supporting the validity of
Art. 31A-31B and the first part of 31C is that Art. 14 is not a basis structure.
[522B-Cl
Democracy proceeds on two basic assumptions (1) popular sovereignty in
the sense that the coontry should be governed by the representatives of the
people; that all power came from them; at their pleasure and under their watchful supervision it must be held and (2) that there should be equality among
the citiz.ens in arriving at the decisions affecting them. Today it is impossible
to conceive of a democratic republican form of government without equality
of ditizeDSI Our Constit:ution envisage~ the establishment of a democrat'ic
republican form of government based on adult suffrage. [5220-H, 523Al
Equality fs a multi-coloured concept incapable of division. It is a notion of
many shades and connotations. The Preamble of the Constitution guarantees
equality of status and of opportunity. They are nebulous concepts. It i9 not
sure whether they can provide a solid foundation to rear i basic structure. The
types of equality which democracy guarant'ees are all subsumed under specific
articles of the Constitution like articles 14, 15, 16, 17 etc. and there are no
other principles of equality which is an essential feature of democratic polity.
[523B-CJ
-
..
D
E
F
"Art. 329A of/ends Rule of Law which is a basic structure of the Co11slitution"
t
<
>
I
In the opini'on of some of the judges constituting the majority in Bharati's
case, rule of law is a basic structure of the Omstitution apart from democracy.
The rule of law postulates the pervasiveness of the spirit of law throughout
the whole range of government in the sense of excluding arbitrary official action
in any sphere. "Rule of law" is an expression to, give reality to something which
is not readily expressible. Rule of law is based upon the liberty of the indivi-,
dual and bar. as its object the harmonizing of the opposing notions of i'ndivi-<
dual liberty and public order. The notion of justice maintains the balance between the two, and justice has a variable content. [523C-D]
Dicey "Constitlllions''; Jermome Frank "If men were Angels" p. 203 (1942),
Friederich Hayek; "Road to Serfdom" "Constitution' of Liberty" Frank's Committee (1957) Report p, 6 (discussed).
G
H
372
A
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 S.C.R.
The rule of law from one point of view means ti1at decisions; should be
made by the application of known principles and rules, and in general, such,
decisions should be predictable and the citizen should know where he is. [524·C!
Jafainghani v. Union of India [1967] 2 S.C.R. p. 703 @ 718 (applied)
B
This exposition of the rule of law is only the aspiration for an ideal and it
is not based on any down-to-earth analysis of practical problems with which
a modem government is confronted. ' In the world of action, this ideal cannot
be worked ou< and that is the reason why this exposition has been rejected b)'
all .practical men. [524-C-D]
c
There is a genuine concept of rule of' law and that concept implies equalitr
before the law or equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law. But if rule
of law i9 to be a basic structure of the Constitution, Ol1'e must find specific provisions in the Constitution embodying the constituent elements of the concept.
It cannot be conceived of rule of law as a twinklin~ star up above the constitu"
tion. To be a basic structure, it must 1Je a terrestnal concept having its habitat
within the four-corners of the Constitution. The provisions of the Constitution
wero enacted with a view to ensure the rnle of law. The equality aspect of the
rule of law and of democratic republicanism is provided in Article 14. May
be, the other a1ticles referred to do the same duty. The concept of equality
which is basic to rule of law and that which is regarded as the most fundamental postubte of republicanism are both embodied in Ati. 14. [524G-H,
525-CJ
D
Basheswar Nath v. The Commission,er of Income Tax [1959] (!) SCR 528:
State of West Bengal v. Anwar A Ii Sarkar [1952] SCR 284, Ward v. Flood 17
Am. Rep. 405 (disi:ussed).
E
Qu(J.('re : If, according to the majority in Bharati's case Article 14 .toes
not pertain to basic structure of the Constitution, which is the other principle
of equality incorporated in the Constitution which can be a basic structure of
the Constitution or an. essential feature of democracy or rule of law ? [525-DT
"Cl. 4 of Art. 329A is bed and 1mco11stitwidi1al"
G
H
.
{
I
Clause ( 4) is bad and has to be struck. down, as unconstitutional, Clauses l
to 3 of Art. 329A are severable. [525-E]
(His Lordship did not express any opinion on validity of claru;es 1 to 3
Art. J29A as it was not necessary for deciding tbe case]. [525-E]
F
.
or
"T/1ere is 110 inldbition as suc/1 in Art. 368 to destroy or damage the basic
stmcture by an amendment so far as the powers of Parliamellt to pass laws are
cancerned."
•
T™' inhibition to destroy or damage the basic structure by an amendment of
the Constitution flows from the limitatic>n on the power of amendment unde1·
Art, 368 read into it by the majority in Bharati's case because of their assnmPtion that there are certain fundamental features in the constitution which i'ts
makers intended to remain there in perpetuity. There is no such inhibitiort so
far as the power of Parliament or State legisla.tures to pass laws is concerned.
Articles 245 and 246 give the power and also provide the limitation upon the·
power of Parliament and legislature to pass laws. It is only the specific p1<0visions enacted in the Constitution which could operate as limitation upon that
power. [525 G-H, 526-A]
"Preamble is 11eit/1er a source nor a limitation 11po11 tile power of lei:isfafio11.
l
It is. impossible to spin out any concrete concept of basic sfmctw·e out of tf1e
fiOSSlTlner conL'epts set out in the Prean1ble.''
/
;).
The Preamble, though a part of tbe Consti'tutioDJ is neither a source of power
nor a limitation upon that power. Tiie Preamble sets out the ideological aspiratiaos of the people. The essential features of the great roncepts set out in t11e
preamble are delineated in the various provisions of the Constitution. It is these
specific provisions in the body of the Constitution which determine the type of
•
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
..
373
democracy which the founders of that instrument established; the quality and
nature of justice political, social and economic which was their desideratum, the
content of liberty of thought and expression which they entrenched in that
document, the scope of equality of status and of opportunity which they enshrined in it. These specific provisions enacted in the Constitution alone can determine the basic structure of the Constitution as established. These specific provisions either separately or in combination determine the content of the great concepts set out in the preamble. It is impossible to spin out any concrete concept
of basic structure out of the gossamer concepts set out in the preamble. The
specific provisions of the ConstitutiO!li are the stuff from which the basic struc·
ture has to be, woven. [526A-D]
"Free and fair election in an ideal democracy is not a test to which law can
be subjected to" ..
\
•
The norms of election set out by parliament or state legislatures tested in
the light of the provisions of the Constitution or necessary implications therefrom
constitute the law of the land. That law cannot be subject to any other test,
like the test of free and fair election in an ideal democracy. An ordinary law
cannot be declared invalid for the reason that it goes against the vague concept of democracy; justice, political, economic· and social; liberty of thought
belief and expression; or equality of status and opportunity or some invisible
radiation from them. [526D-F]
(Finer : Comparative Government (1970) pp. 62-63 Giovanni Sartori :
Democratic Tlzeor)' Ch. I;)
"Law can be tested dnly on the principles of Democracy actually incorporated
in the Constitution."
..
The term democracy has not only a descriptive or denotative function, but
also a normative and persuasive function. A firm distinction should be made
between t!J.e is and the ought of democracy. The prescriptive and the descriptive definition of democracy must not be confused because the democraiic ideal
does not define the democratic reality and vice versa; the real democracy is not
and cannot be the same as the ideal one. One cannot test the validity of an
ordinary law with reference to the esSential elements of an ideal democracy. It
can be tested only with reference to the principles of democracy actually incor~
porated in the Constitution. Nor can democracy be tested on the touchstone of
justice. The concept of social justice is vague · and indefinite. Liberty of
thought, expression belief, faith and worship are not absolute concepts. They
are emotive words. They mean different things to different people. Equality of
status and of opportunity are concepts laden with emotional overtones. In their
absoluteness they are in~apable of actual realisation. The enacting provisions
in the body of the Constitution alone give concrete shape to these ideas and it
is on the basis of these provisions that the validity of ordinary law should be
tested. [527A-El
A
B
c
D
E
F
Giovanni Sartori; "Democratic Theory Ch. l, Hanskelsen; General Theory of
Law and State" (1946) p. 13 and G. K. Al/en "Aspects of Justice" p. 31 (referred to).
,.
I
""
.
\
"The doctrine of the spirit of the Constirutidn is a slipper slope".
;representation of the people in the law-making organs. The method by which
this representation has to be effectuated has been provided in part XV of the
Constitution. Under Article 329(a) the Constitution has entrusted the task: of
framing the law relating to election parliament, and subject to the Jaw made by
Parliament, to the State legislature. An important branch of the law which
sounds in the area of free and fair election, namely, delimitation of constituencies and allotment of seats to such constituencies is put by Art. 327 and 328
beyond the cognizance of court. When it is found that the task of writing the
legislation on the subject has been committed to Parliament ang State legi 0fatures
by the Constitution, it is incompetent for a court to test its validity on the basis
of some vague norms of free, and fair election. Like other Jaws made by par!ia-·
m'ent or state legislatures, the Jaws made under Articles 327 and 328 are liable
to be· tested by Part Ill of the Constituti'on or any other provision of the Constitution, but it is difficult to see how these Jaws could be challenged on the
3-126 Sup. Cf/76
G
.H
374
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 ·s.c.R.
ground that they do not conform to some ideal notions of free and fair election
to be evolved by the court from out of airy nothing. [527F-G. 528A-C]
"The doctrine of the spirits of the Constitution is a slippery slope".
The doctrine of the 'spirit' of the Constitution is a slippery slope. T!Je
courts are not at liberty ta declare an act void, because, in their opinion, It rs
opposed to the spirit of democracy or repu.blicanism supposed to pervade the
Constitution but not expressed in words. When the fundametttal law has not
~limited, either in terms or by necessary implication, the general powers conferred upon the legislature, the Court cannot declare a limitation under the
notion of having discovered some ideal norm : of free and fair election.
[528-D]
The principles of democratic republfcan government are not a set of inflexible
rules; and unless they are specifically incorporated in the Constitution, no law
can be· declared bad merely because the court thinks that it is opposed to some
implication drawn from the concept. [528-F]
Cooley: Constitutional /imitations, Stlz Ed. Vol. I (referred to).
"Bharati's case does not support either of the propositiom viz. (i) an ordi·
nm·y law, if it damages the basic structune should be held bad (ii) that a co11stit111ional omendme/lf putting an Act in the Ninth Schedule would make the pro1·isio11s of the Act \'11/nerable for the reasons that tiiey damage or destroy tlie
ha.1ic structure constituted not by the fundamellfal rights, bllf by some .other
basic structure".
.
Even though an Act is put in the Nin th Schedule by a constitution amendment, its provisions would. be open to attack on the ground that they destrey or
damage the basic structure if the fundamental right or rights tak~n away or
abrogated pertains or periain to: basic structure. But the Act cannot be attack-·
ed, for a collateral reason, namely, that the provisions of the Act have destroyed
or damaged some other basic structure, say for instance, democracy o ~ separation of powers. There is no support from the majority in Bbarati's case for
the proposition that an ordinary law, if it damages or destroys basic, structure
should be held bad or for the proposition that a constitutional amendment putting an Act in the Ninth Schedule would make the provisions of the Act vulnerable for the reasons that they damage or ilestroy the basic structure constituted
not by the fundamental rights taken. away or abridged but some other basic
htructure. And, in principle, .there is no reason for accepting the correctness
of the proposition. The Constitution makers eschewed to incorporate the "due
process" clause in that instrument apprehending that the vague contours of
that concept will make the court a third chamber. The concept of basic structure as brooding omnipresence in the sky apart from the specific provisions of
the Constitution constituting it is too vague and indefinite tu provide a yardstick. to determine the validity o~ an ordinary law. [529B-C, F-H]
"Election /c.ll's do not attain the stntus of constituliona/ law by virtue of
heing put in the Ninth Schedule".
It may be assumed that these election laws amendment Acts, even after
th"y were put in the Ninth Schedule by Constitutional amendmer.t remained
open to attack for contravent_ion, if any, of the fundamental rights, these Acts
would not be open to attack on the ground that their provisions destroyed or
damaged an essential feature of democracy, namely, free and fair election. The
Acts remain part of the ordinary Jaw of the land. They did not attain the, status
of constitutional Jaw merely because they were put in the Ninth Schedule. The
utmost that can be said is that even after putting them in the Ninth Schedule,
their provisions would be open to chalienge on the ground that they fook away
or abrogated all or any of the fundamental rights, and therefore damaged or
destroyed a basic structure if the fundamental rights or right taken away er
abrogated constitute or constitutes a basic structure. [530A-C]
"Retro.1pectil'e legislation is intra rires the powers of Par/irlmF!nt to legislate."
Retrospective operation of law in the field of election bas been upheld by
this Court in Kanta Katlwria v. Manak Chand Surana. Retrospective• operation
I
>
I
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
375
of any Jaw would cause hardship to some person or other. This is inevitable;
but that is no reason to deny to the legislature the power to enact retrospective
iaw. In the case of a Jaw which has retrospective effect, the theory is (l:lat
the Jaw was actually in operation in the past and if the provisions of the Acts
are general in their operation, there can be no challenge on the ground of discrimination or unfairness merely because of their retrospective effect. If an Act
cannot be challenged on the ground that its provisions are discriminatory or
unreasonable if it is prospective in operation, those provisions cannot be attacked on these grounds merely because the provisions were given retrospective effect
unless there are special circumstances and in the instant ca~e there are no such
special circumstances.
These Acts are not liable to be challenged on any of
the grounds. [5300-G]
A
B
Kanta Kathuria v. Manak Chand SurallC' [1970] 2 SCR 835 (affirmed).
"The Election Law (Amendment) Act 40, 1975--mid the Constitution
(Thirty-ninth Amendmellf) Act 1975 canndt be challenged on the score. that
ll 1111111ber of 1r1c111bcrs of Parlia111ent were in detention and prevented froni taking
deliberations in the Parliameni"
Jn Ananda Nambiar v. Chief Secretary Govt. of Madras [1966] 2 SCR p.
406 this Court held that the member of Parliament had no privilege which
obliged the court to release him from custody in order to enable him to attend
the sessions of the Parliament. Jn England a member of Parliament who is
convicted of a criminal offence. and is undergoing sentence in pursuance to his.
conviction has no right or privilege to be released from custody for attending
Parliament. The very same principle will apply in the case of detention under
an emergency regulation. [531C-D]
c
D
A. Nambiar v. Chief Secretary [1966] 2 SCR 406 (noti applicable).
May's Parliamentary Practice 18th Ed. p. 103, 372 (referred to).
Ever since the decision of Holt C.J. in Ashby v. White 'it has been settled
that privilege is part of the common law and cannot affect rights to be exercised
outside or independently of the House. Regularity of internal proceedings is one
rhing; the constitutional rights of the subject are another; and it is the latter
which are in issue in a case where the question is whether t4e document is a
statute. [533E-FJ
E
Bmdlaugh v. Gossett, 12 Q.B.D. 271, 285-286 and Ashby v. White, 1703
Heksten: Essays in Con'stitutionnl Law ended, p. 22 (applied).
(14 ), St. Tr. 695 and May's Parliamentary Practice.
>
Art. 85 (I) provides that the President shall from time to time summon
each House of Parliament to meet at such time and place as he thinks fit, but
six months shall not in'tervene between the last. sitting in one session alild 'he
date appointed for its first sitting in the next session. Art. 122 (1) provides that
the validity of any proceedings in Parliament shall not be called in question on
the ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure, so even if there is any
F
irregularitiy in the procedure in the passing of the statute, it is not open to a
court to question its validity.
[533G, BJ
The detention of the members of Parliament was by statutory authorities in
the purported exercise of rheir statutory power. It would be strange if a statutory authority, by an order which turns out to be illegal, could prevent the
Houses of Parliament from meeting as enjoined by Art. 85. If a statutory
authority passes an illegal order of detention and thus prevents a member of
Parliament from attending the House the proceedings of Parliament cannot
become illegal for that reason. It is the privilege of Parliament to secure the
attendance of persons illegally detained. But if the privilege is not exercised by
Parliament. the proceedings of Parliament would not become illegal for that
reason. [533H, •534A-B1
~
The President in performing his constitutional functions under Articles 352,
and 359 has not authorised the illegal detention of any person let alone any
members of Parliament or unconstitutionally prevented the release from custody
G
H
376
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
n
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 S.C.R.
of any member. He has only discharged his constitntional fnnctions. If this
be s~, it is difficnlt to hold that the Session in which the amendments were passed
was illegally convened. The challenge to the validity of the amendments on this
score mnst be over-ruled. [534D-EJ
·"Ca11didate, mea11i11g of-for purposes of corrupt practice."
There can be no doubt that s. 100(1) (b) when it speaks of commission of
corrupt practice by a returned candidate, it can only mean commission of corrupt
practice by a candidate before he became a returned candidate. Any other
reading of the sub section would be absurd. But there is no such compulsion
to read the words "candidate" in s.123(7) in the same manner. It is the content
that gives colour to a word. A word is not crystal clear S. 79 of the Act indicate3 that the definitions therein have to be read snbject to the context. The
Legislature must fix some point of time before which a person cannot be a
"candidate" in an election and, a wide latitude must be given to the legislature
in fixing that point. [53 5E-FJ
Halsbury's Laws of England 3rd Edn, Vol. IV p. 332 218 (referred to) :
U11io11 of I11dia and Anr. etc. v. M /s Parameswaran Match Works etc.
[1975] 2 SCR 573'@ 579•; Louisville Gas Co. v. Alabama Power Co. 240 US 30
@ 32 (relied dn).
There is no excessive delegatio11 i11, cl. 8(b) of EL Act 40 of 1975.
Clause 8 (b) of the Election Laws Amendment Act, 40 of 197 5 does not
suffer from the vice of excessive delegation and is not arbitrary. [536C]
Per Beg, J. The meaning of the Principle of the Supremacy of the Co11stitutio11 is tlzat neither of the three constitutionally separate organs of State, can
leap 01uside the boundaries of its own constitutionally assig11ed :
The assumption ·underlying the theory of Judicial review of all law making,
including fundamental law making is that courts, acting as interpreters of the
"Real Will" of the people embodied in their constitution and assumed to be
more lasting and just and rational and less liable to .err than their "General
Will', represented by the opinions of the majorities in Parliament and the State
Legislatures for the time being can discover the not always easily perceived purposes of their constitution for the people. The courts thus act as agents and
mouthpieces of the "Real Will" of the people themselves. Just as courts are
not constitutionally competent to Legislate under the guise of interpretation so
also neither our Parliament, nor any State Legislature, in the purported exercise
of any kind of law making power, perform an essentially judicial function by
virtually withdrawing a particular case, pending in any court, and taking upon
itself the duty to decide it by an application of law or its own standards to
the facts of that case. This power must a~ least be first constitutionally taken
awav from the court concerned and vested in another authority before it can
be lawfully exercised by that authority. lb is not a necessary or even a natural
incident of a "Constituent power". The logical and natural meaning of the
princ'iple of supremacy of the Constitution is that neither of the three constitutionally separate organs of State can, according to the basic scheme of our
Constitution to-day, leap outiside the boundaries of its own constitutionally
assigned sphere or orbit of authority into that of the other.
[538G-H, 539A-EJ
Bosanquet "Philosophical theory of the State etc. Ch. V. 96-115 Hanskelsen"
"General Theory of Law and the State" p. 143, referred to.
Legal effect and nature of the stay order. It was not a "co11ditio11al stay",
but a "co11ditio11ed stay order."
The legal effect of the stay order was that the trial Court's order, to use
the language of s.116(B)(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951,
"shall be deemed never to have taken effect". It did not matter if the stay
order, out of deference for existing precedents had been framed in the form of
a "conditioned" stay, that is to say, a stay in law and effect 'with certain conditions annexed. It was no- a conditional stay. Indeed, having regard to the
nature! of the order, the operation of which was to be stayed, there could be no
l
>
•
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. )1AJ NARAIN
377
·'conditional" stay in this case. As to the legal effect of such a stay order, there
is no doubt, that, considering the clear words of section 116(B)(3) of the 4ct,
it deprived the order of the High Court of any operative force whatsoever durmg
the pendency of these appeals. There could be really no binding precedent in
discretionary matters depending on the facts and circumstances of each case.
The operation of the judgment of the trial court and the consequential orders
are stayed only on "sufficient cause" shown on the facts of that case.
[540E·G]
,.,/'
B
Under section 123 (7) of the Repre~entation of the People Act the obtaining
or procuring or abetting or attempting to obtain or procure had to take place
either by a candidate or by his agent or by somebody with the consent of the
candidate or his election agent. The question of vicarious liability will a!ise only
from the date of appointment as such agent and only when a case of obtaining
indirect assistance is set up.
\
Un~il the candidate had appointed an election agent, the action of any other
parson could not constitute him automatically an agent so that he may, by
doing something voluntarily, succeed in making the candidate vicariously liable
for his own actions whether he was or was not a gazetted officer at the time
when he committed the act complained of. The question of obtaining assistance through an agent or other person could only arise where such a case of
obtaining assistance indirectly through others is set up but not otherwise.
[545A-B]
"Liability by implication, Nature of the Principle"
Whenever a case of a liability by implication, where there is such a species
of liability in law, comparable to a criminal Jia:bility, is to be fastened upon
an individual, the prosecutor is to be expected, as part of an elementary duty
to give fair notice and a fair opportunity to meet what the individual has rea-lly
to be made liable for, either because of some act or omission of the individual
concerned, or, even more so, for that of an agent, or another person fo1' which
there may be some sort of' vicarious liability from facts showing consent or
agency, to give full particulars of circumstances from which such implications
or vicarious liabilities may arise. [545G·H, 5461\]
"I
On the language of section 123(7) a liability in not created by merely not
rejecting voluntarily given aid. The candidate may not often be aware ·of
the voluntarily given assistance so as to be able to reject it. A case of consent
which can be legally set up is only one of consenting to active obtaining o~
procurement by an agent or by some other person who becomes, fo.r the purposes
of the specific aid given and consented to, ordinarily prior to obtaining it, as
good as an agent employed by the candidate. [546C·Dl
"Types .of cases of actual obtaining of assistance u/s. 123(7)
On the terms of Section 123(7) the following three types of cases of actual
obtaining of assistance, as distinguished from abetment or attempting to obtain
it can be legally set up either exclusively or alternatively against a candidate:
(il a direct obtaining of it by the act of th" candidate himself; (ii) an indirect
or vicarious procurement of it by the acts of a duly constituted agent, and (iii)
an indirect or vicarious procurement of it by the acts of a person who, though
not a duty constituted agent becomes constructively an agent for the purpose
of some particular aid obtained, because it was assented to by the candidate at
a time which, must, ordinarily, be before the aid is given, so that the person
through whom assistance is obtained is a constructive agent for this particular
aid at the time when it is given. The term procurement should, strictly speaking,
apply only in the last two types of cases. A reference to s. 100( 1) (b)
furtheir emphasises the position that a corrupt practice for which the High
Court fa to declare an election void must have been committed either by a
returned candidate or his election agent or by any other person with the consent
of the returned candidate or his election agent". A case falling u/s. 100(1) (d)
(ii) of a "Corrupt practice committed in the interest of a candidate by an
agent other than his election agent is very different and postulates ( 1) a, corrupt
practice which is committed only by an agent, and,; (ii) the existence of such
,
>
A
'
c
D
E
F
G
H
378
A
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976) 2 S.C.R.
'·
an agent, and then requires proof of the further fact that the result of the
election was materially affected by the corrupt practice. [5460-G]
Jt is the act of solicitation for the aid of the officials mentioned in S. 123(7),
wh.ether successful or not, and not the mere fact that certain advantage flow
qmte naturally and conventionally from the occupation of an office without any
solicitation, or the mere fact that some assistance is voluntarily given by some
one to an election campaign which is penalised by the provision. [547-D]
B
Voluntary rendering of help by a Government ser.vant without any attempt
by the candidate concerned to "obtain" or "procure" it does not constitute a
"Corrupt practice" of the candidate, whatever be the impropriety of it for the
Government servant himself._ [563E-F]
Hafiz Mohd. Ibrahim v. Elcctioll Tribullal 13 E.L.R. P. 262 and Rcmphal
v. Brahm Prakash 23 E.L.R. (Punjab) p. 92, (1968), applied.
c
Corrupt practice could not be committed by any person before there was . .a
''candidate"
The definition in section 123(7) meant, on a ordinary and natural interpretaticm of words used, that the corrupt practice defined there could not be
committed by any pElrson before he was a "candidate" for an election. [547-E]
D
In any case, if there was any uncertainty at all, in the law, it has been removed
by amendment of section 7 of the Act. 40 of 1975, so that Section 79(b) reads
as follows :
"Candidate means a person who has been on claims to have been duly nomi·
nated as a candidate at any election." [569C-D]
I
Prooj of "mens rea" fdr the act of actus reus is necessary to
allegations of corrupt prac.tice
substantiate
E
It is a . well settled rule that allegations of corrupt practice in the course
of an election must be judged by the same standards as a criminial charge. And,
no rule of evidence, in judging guilt on a criminal charge, is more firmly rooted
than that no charge, resting on circumstantial evidence, could be held to be
proved beyond reasonable doubt unless the chain of circumstances is so complete
and so connected with the charge that it leaves no other reasonable hypothesis
open for the court to adopt except that the offender had committed the offence
alleged. [550C-E]
F
Smt. Om Prab/w Jain v. Charan Das & Anr.
relied. on.
G
H
.
AIR 1975 S.C. 1417 @ 1426,
The logical conseCJ,uence of placing a charge of . corrupt practice on !he
same footing as a crimlflal charge is the obligation to mterpr~t the .words wh~ch
define it strictly and narrowly. Indeed, any natural and ord10.ary interpretation
on the words "obtaining or procuring or abettin& or attemptmg" mu~t carry
with it the imperative requirement that the candidate concerned or ht• ag~nt
must have intentionally done an act which has the effect contemplated by Section
123(7). In other words, a "mens rea" or a guilty mind as well as an "actus
reus" or a wrongful act must concur to pro~uc~ the r~sult contemp.lated by Jaw.
So far as election expenses are concerned, It ts possib!e to conceive. that .ev.en
an unintentional result (i.e. expenses "incurred" exceedmg the p1escnbed hmit)
may be enough: so that a duty to' prevent this result may be there in law. But,
S. 123(7) requires actual intended acts of "obtaining" or "procuring" or attempt.
ing or abetti.ng. For s. 123(7·) results are immaterial. S.123(7) does not create
an "absolute -statuto!'y liability". [548A-C]
Dr. Y. S. Parmar v. Hira Singh, AIR 1959 S.C. p. 244, dissented from.
Satyadel' Bushahiri v. Padam Dev and ors. 10 E.L.R. 103 (S.C.) 1954, 103
(SC) (1954); McJ1e11dra Kumar v. Vidyavati & Ors. 10 E.L.R. 214 (SC) 1954;
!
t
"'
379
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
Babubhai Va./lab!z Das Gandhi v. Pil/ao Homi Mody 36 E.LR. 108 @ 123-124;
Haji Abdul Wahid v. B. V. Keskar 21 ELR 409' @ 432, discussed.
A
Before a candidate can be held guilty of a corrupt practice a mens rea
as well as an actus reus must be shown on the. part of either the candidate
herself or her election agent; and, on the evidence on record mens rea was a
necessary ingredient of the corrupt practice and the doctrine of constructive
knowledge is not applicable. [573F-G]
v.
B
in the instant case, the election petition alleged a wrongfully obtained and
procured assistance due to acts of the respondent as well as her election agent
Shri Yashpal Kapoor. Proof of actual mens rea as well as actus reus was not
given. The allegation of "corrupt practice" was, therefore, liable to be rejected
on thi's ground alone since there could not possibly, on the facts of the case,
be any mens rea on the part of appellant. [573H-574A]
C
Moti/al v. Manglaprasad AIR 1958 794 @ 797 and
Ram Nath Sharma & Ors. 17 ELR 243 @ 253, referred to.
Biresh Mishra
Sheopath Singh v. Ram Pratap [1965] 1 SCR 1975, relied on.
Contractual iwtice on termination of Government serrice Oil either side is
not cdmpulso1y.
It is abundantly clear from Rule 5(b) of the. Central Civil Services (Tempo.rary Service) Rules, 1949, that the Government and the Government servant
could dispense with the period of notice if it was mutually agreed upon to do
that. [558-F]
D
Neither the Government nor the Government servant is in a worse position
than the ordinary master and servant governed by contract. In fact, Art. 310
makes it clear that in such. a case. the tenure of office of a Central Government
is "during the pleasure of the President" It is inconcievable that the law shonld
thrust the status of a Government servant upon one who does not want it,
jparticularly when the Government also does not in public interest, refuse to
relieve him, by making him stick to any terms to the contrary in his contract.
Our law on this point is not so monstrous as to foist the "statm" of a Government servant on anyone in such, circumstances. However, there was an amendment also in the law by s. 1 of Act 40/1975, which was made retrospective
by Sec. 10 of Act 40/1975, and that makes the legal position still clearer.
[558G-H, 559B,F]
E
Halsbury's Laws of England Vol. V (Simond's Edn.) p. 61 Edwards M.
Edwards v. United States ( 1800) 26 Lawyers Edn. p. 31. Raj Kumar v. Union
of India [1968] (3) SCR 857; Raj Narain v. Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi,
(1972], (3) SCR 841 (referred to).
F
Mere possibility of abuse of power does not invalidate the provisions of all
Act; right to complain begins after t.he event.
There is no foree in the contention that the power conferred by Election Law
Amendment Act upon the Government is bound to be abused by those who
hold the reins of Government. The presumption is that a bona fide use will
be made of this power lodged in such responsible hands. If such powers are
ever exercised in a mala fide manner, it is the particular exercise of the power
that can be questioned and struck down. The provisions do not become invalid
merely because it could be abused as practically any provision of law can
be by those who may want to do so. [559G-H]
Chailenge· on the ground that it conld be misused or likelihood of misuse, in future, cannot possibly succeed. The possibility of misuse of power
given by a statute cannot invalidate the provision conferring the power. The
occasion to complain can only arise where there is such alleged misuse. Even
the possibility of such misuse of the power by so responsible an official as the
Election Commissioner cannot be easily conceived of. [578C-D]
G
H
380
A
B
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 S.C.R.
\
Df. B. N. Khare v. State of Delhi [1952] SCR 519 @ p. 562, State of Wesz
Bengal v. A. A. Sarkar [1952] SCR 284 @ p. 301; R. K. Dalmia v. Justice
Tendolkar [1959] SCR 279 @ p. 306; T. K. Mudaliar v. Venkatachafam [1955]
(2) SCR 11% @ 1239; Chitralekha v. State of Mysore [1964] (6) SCR 368
@ p. 382-383; M. R. Dcka v. N. E. F. Rly. [1964] (5) SCR p. 683 (referred
to.)
Act 58/1974 could be justified as merely an attempt to restore the law
as understood prior to Amarnath Chawlds case.
·
·'
The amendment made by Act 58 of 1974, by adding the explanation (1) to
Sec. 77 ( 1) of the Act, could be justified as merely an attempt to restore the
law as it has been understood to be previous to decisions of this Court in
Kanwar/al Gupta's case. [582 D]
!
)
Kanwar/al Gupta v. Amarnath Chawla AIR 1975 SC p. 308 @ 315-316
(no longer good law).
c
D
E
"Allegations of corrupt practice u/s 123 in an election petition uls 83 ( l)(b)
require pleading with sufficient particulars of legal evidence and no amount of
evidence· can be looked into> onl a case not really setup".
The principle that no amount of evidence could be Jocked into on a case
not really set up was applicable in the instant case. It was quite unfair to
expect the original respondent to meet ~ case of a de facto agency which was
not set np at all. Furthermore, the case of de facto agency was, in the circumstances of the particular case, only pos'3ible to set up if the respondent had
made some request to an alleged agent to go and conduct the election campaign even before he was appointed her election agent on 1-2-1971. The Court
cannot, without proof of any specific request or solicitation or even knowledge
of or consent to the doing of any particular acts which the alleged agent may
have done, make the candidate vicariously liable for them. Of this, there was
not only no evidence whatsoever on record, but the evidence is to the contrary.
If this was not established by evidence on record, it could be said that the bottom
was knocked out of even such. a hypothetical case. Had a case of de facto
agency been argued, it is not conceivable that certain cases of Division Benches
of th~ Allahabad High Court would not have been cited to show on what kind
of evidence it could succeed. [562 E-F, A-Bl
Rustom 5atin v. Dr. Sampurnanand and Ors. XX ELR 221 @
J. P. Rc•wat v. K. D. Paliwal XX ELR (All) 443, 456, referred to.
F
G
H
243;
The principle that no amount of evidence can be looked into on a case not
set up i's sufficient to dispose of the evidence songht to be adduced a bout a
cheque of Rs. 70,000/_-· received by Shri D. B. Singh, who was not summoned
by either party to prove what it was spent upon if it was spent at all. Section
83 (1) (b) of the Act contains the mandatory provision that the petition 'shall
set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice that the petitioner alleges,
including as full a statement as possible of the names of the parties alleged to
have committed such corrupt practice and the date and place of the commission
of each such practice." [581 G-H, 582 A]
· Absence of proof of a desire to change the constituency is not proof of a
a. positive holding out as a candidate under the unamended s. 79(h) of rite
Representation of the People Act.
Absence of proof of a desire to change the constituency is not proof of a
positive "holding out". What is relevant is not what other people think or say
about what a possible candidate would do, but what the candidate cgncerned
himself' has said or done, so as to amount to a "holding out" as a candidate
by the candidate from a particular cons!lituency. Mere speculation of rumour
circulated by other persons interested in finding out the the Prime Minister's
constituency could only prove what their own expectations or beliefs were.
This type of evidence, strictly speaking, could not even be admissible unless '
it could be related to s-Omething actually said or done by the candidate. All
that such "evidence", consisting of speculation and rumours, could prove was
that people interested were speculating or indulging in guess work. [565 E-F]
•
r
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
38 I
In the instant case, the answer of the Prime Minister at tm:, Press conference
29-12-1970 or the contents of her speech in Coimbatore, in early January
1971, or even a declaration or announcement of the All India Congress Com~
mittee on 29-1-1971, assuming that there was such an announcement, could not
mean that the Prime Minister had held herself out as a .candidate for the
constituency. \fhis "holding out has to take place by the Prime Minister heFself
and not by the Congress Committee." [567 A-B]
In any case, if there was any uncertainty at all, in the Jaw, it has been
removed by an amendment by section 7 of Act No. 40/19,75, changing the
definition of "candidate" in S. 79'(b) of the Representation of the People Act.
[569-C]
Mwudswami Gounder v. S. Khader Sharif] 4 E.L.R. 283 @ 292; S. Khader
Sharif] v. Munniswami Gounder and Ors. [1955] (2) SCR 469 @ 473 lrelied
on).
J. P. Rawat v. Krishna Dutt Paliwal 20 ELR (Act) p. 443 @ 463; Haji
Abdul Wahid v. B. V. Keskar and Anr. 21 ELR (Act) 409. K. K. Mishra
V. Baramali Babu 38 ELR (Orissa) p. 451 453. (referred to).
"Punitive character df corrupt practice under the Indian Penal Code and
under the Peoples Representatidn Act, 1951.
A
'Oil
Corrupt practices of a candidate cannot go unpunished, whether they are
committed before or after he becomes a candidate, when they amount to acts
which come within the purvi~w of electoral offences dealt with by chapter 3,
Sections 125, 126, 127, 127(A) or chapter 9A of the Indian Penal Code.
Offences such as bribery, for purposes of either ind11cing persons to vote or not
to vote or to stand or not to stand as candidates, undue infiuence and persona~
tion etc. should be sufficient deterrents against perver~ion of the electoral
process by those prospective candidates, who want to adopt corrupt and
objectionable means for gaining success at the polls. [569 GH, 570 Al
The Amendment of the definition "ccmdidate" in s. 79(b) with retrospective .effect, is i11t1:a vires of the powers of the Parliament to legislate under
Art. 327 of the Constitution of India. Duty of the Court to interfere with and
when to interfere.
The amendment of Section 79(b) by section 7 r /w section 10 of the Election Laws (Amendment) Act 40 of 1975 is within the unquestionable powers
of Parliament to legislate, either prospectively or retrospectively, with regard
to election matters. It is incapable of being interpreted as an attack on free
and fair elections. Court cannot take upon themselves the task of laying down
what electoral laws should be. The law~makers, assembled in Parliament, are
presumed to know and understand their business of making laws for the welfare
and well being of the mass of people of this country, for the protection of democrncy, and of free and fair elections, in accordance with the needs of the
democratic process better than courts, know and understand these. It is only
where a piece of legislation clearly infringes a constitutional provision or
indubitably overrides a constitutional purpose or mandate or prohibition that
courts can interfere. There is no invalidity in this provision.
Even if the present definition of candidate is a new one, it cannot be said
to be arbitrary. The concept contained in it is found in the English defintion. [569 FJ
B
C
D
E
F
G
Halsbury's Laws of England 3rd Edn. Vol. 14 p. 162 (referred to).
"Faci/.ities to the Prime Minister in compliance with the official rules and
Instructions do not fall under corrupt practice within the meaning of s. 123(7)
of the Represellfation of the People Act."
The State Government had acted in compliance with the instructions issued
by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India in 1958 read with Rule 71 (6)
of what is known as the Blue Book.
The provisions of Section 123 (7) were
intended to prevent solicitation for aid and not sending of information to the
State Government in the course of ordinary official business even if the candi·
date concerned knows that the State Government is bound, under the rules,
H
382
A
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 'S.C.R.
'
to make the necessary arrangements dictated by the needs of the security of
the Prime Minister and convenience of the public. [570 G-H, 571 G]
The case, that by instructing the State Government, knowing that it will
make the necessary arrangements through its servants, the returned candidate
was employing the State Govt. as her agency in prbcurising the aid of' the
Officers concerned, was neither set up nor put in issue. [571 F]
B
c
D
E
G
The view taken by the High Court that the "persona" of a candidate during
the election must not only be different from that of the Prime Minister, but also
that when the two capacities are held by the same person, the secuoify arrangements are made to protect an artificial legal "Persona" and not the persona of
the Prime ~,Iinister is manifestly erroneous. The security <rrrangements are not
to be withdrnwn merely because the Prime Minister at some particular moment
of time, acts in another capacity. Even if the court were to recognise this distinction between the "Persona" of the Prime Minister and that of a candidate,
it is impossible to separate the special iurangements made for the security of
the person of the Prime Minister from these to which she may be entitled as a
candidate only. It is impossible to deny at any time the facilities and precautions meant for the person who holds the office of the Prime Minister to
the person just because she also figures as a candidate at an election. So Jong
as the person is the same, what is meant for the person must be attributed to> the
persona or capacity of the Prime Minister and not to that of a candidate only.
So long as the person was the same the distinction between the two capacities
or personae for the purposes for which facilities were given and the proteclion
provided, was both factually &S well as legaily impossible and quite
immaterial. Such a case could not be 'one of solicitation of official aid
and assistance. It is a case in which certain precautions are taken <rnd arrangements made almost "automatically" by officers of the State, as a m<rtter of duty
towards the office held by a candidate who undoubtedly enjoys certain advantages, which an ordinary candidate cannot have. The appurtenances of office
or distinctions achieved are comparable to those personal advantages which are
not enjoyed because they are "obtained" or "proce,red" by a candidate <rs any
official favour shewn, but as a matter of right under the rules. The officials
concerned only perform their duties under the law and are not giving aid
"procured" or "obtained".
If such a result in law is unfair, it is not for
courts to find a remedy by accepting the argument that those who enjoy the
benefits of office must be made to realise and suffer some of its handicaps. Thi~
clearly means that the benefit which law gives, without solicitation by the candidate, must be converted, by a jedicia,l fiat, into a disadvantage and a Jiandicap.
It is for Parliament to step in and change the Jaw if an alteration of it is considered necessary by it The only change that need be made in the law, if that
could be the legislative intent, is to provide that the holder of any office for
the time being would not be qmdified to stand at an election, .In that event,
holders of' all ministerial offices will have to resign before they offelf th.emselves
as candidates. But. such is not our law found in the 1951 Act or anywhere else.
rt would be extending the scope of section 123 (7) too wide to hold that the
facilities automatically provided by the State to the Prime Minister, by virtue
of his ·or her office. are also struck by a provision directed against solicit<rtion
of official aid and assistance by candidates, (571 H, 572 A-H, 573 A-Bl
Motilal v. Mang/a Prasad AJ.R, 19•58 Alt 794 & 797; Biresh Mishra v. Ram
Nath Sharma and ors, 17 ELR All 243 @ 253, referred to.
Amendment· with retrospective effect of the definition of the candidate in
s. 79(b) is only clari/icatory by the law and cannot be characterised as altering
the "rules of the 1::ame",
H
Parliament could certainly set right a defect in law which may have come
to its notice <rs a result of the interpretation of s, 123 (7). It is not, possible
to question the motives behind the legislation. when the defect due to a possible
ambiguity is removed, because a judicial interpretation focusses the attentio1t
of Parliament on the need for a clarification of the law which becomes evident.
This amendment with retrospective effect is merely a clarification of the state
of Ja,w as it really was even before the amendment, but was misunderstood.
•
I
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
383
There is no question here of altering the "rules of th_e gam~". to th~ disadvautage of the petitioner. The disadvantage for the elect10n petitioner, if any, was
there already, because of the consequences which legally and_ natura.lly flow frOJ!I
the occupation by the appelhmt of the high office of the Pnme Mm1ster of this
country. [574 A-B, G-H]
A
There is no attack on the validity of section 123(7) of the Act as it existed
before the amendment. Hence, there could be no challenge to the validity of
the amendment if it does not change the law but merely clarifies it. [574 H,
575 Al
B
Amendment by i11serti11g a provisio11 at the end of s. 123(7) of the Represe11tatio11 of the People Act by Act 40/1975 relating to certai11 facilities to the
Ptime Mi11ister by virtue of h,er .office by Government official-and placing the
Act 40 of 1975 under the protected Ninth S,chedule of the Constitutio11 read with
Art. 31B cannot be challenged on the grmtnd of validation of Art. 14 and JIB
of the Constitution of lndia.
Such an attack upon the validity of this amendment viz., that, as a candidate
at an election, the Prime Minister a:nd an ordinary candidate should enjoy equal
protection of Jaws, is possible only under the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution. But, as Act 40 of 1975, has been placed, by section 5 of the Thirty
Ninth Amendment, in the protected Ninth Schedule of the Constitution, it becomes immune from such an attack. A similar attack through the back door
. of a "basic structure" of the Constitution, cannot be made. This particular
amendment has nothing to do with damage to any part of the "basic sbructure"
of the Constitution. Even if an attack on the ground of violation of Art. 14
were open today, the occupation of such a high and important office as that of
the Prime Minister of this country, with all its great hazards and trials, would
provide a rationa:l basis for reasonable classification in respect of advantages
possessed by a Prime Minister as a candidate at an election due to arrangements made necessary by considerations of safety and protection of the life and
person of· the Prime Minister. There is no sustainable ground of a,ttack at all
on the validity of this provision. [57 5 B-E]
Kesavanada Bharati's case [1973] [Suppl.] SCR p. I, affirmed.
To treat unequally situated and circumstanced persons as though they 'were
equals in the eyes of law for all purposes is not really to satisfy the requirements of the equality contemplated by the Constitution. The court cannot
attempt to achieve, by means of judicial interpretation, an equalisation of conditic-ns under which, in its opinion, candidates should contest elections. It is
not the function of courts to embark on attempts to achieve what is only in the
power of Parlia:ment to accomplish, that is to say, to bring about equality of
conditions where the law permits j'ustifiable discrimination. [576 D-C]
.,.
c
D
E
F
Burden of Proof :
The burden of proof is heavy on one who assails the result of an .election.
[576 G]
Rahimkhan v. K/1urs/iid Ahmed 1974 (2) SCC 6601 666, 672, followed.
"Cow and Calf symbol, validity allotted by the Election Commissioner under'
the Rules, is not a religious symbol withi11 the meaning of the rules-the svmbol
will not constitute corrupt practice u/s 123(7) of the Represel!fation of the
People A ct. The amendment inserted by Act 40 of 1975 is valid.
· Quoting passa:ges from ancient text about the sacredness of the cow in
The use of pictures
of this excellent and useful ammal 1s so frequently made today for commercial
purposes or purposes other than religious that a picture of the cow and calf
cannot,_ excel?t ~n so~e special and purely religious contexts, be held to have
a rehg1~us s1gmfic~nce. The cow and calf symbol is not in itself a religious
symbol_ m an elecl!on so as to convert its. use into a: corrupt practice unqer secllon 123(3) of the Act. [578 F-G]
G
supp~rt of the use of cow as a relig_ious symbol is useless.
H
384
A
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 ·s.c.R.
Blzar~tandro Singh v. Ram Salzava Pandey & Ors. AIR 1972 M.P. 176 @
179; Sl11tal Prasad Misra v. Nitiraj Singh Chaudhary M.P. Gazette, 23-6-1971,
Pt. I P; 807 Paras 18 to 23. Sri Prasanna Das Damodar Das Pa/war v. /ndu Lal
Kanlzaiya 1;-al Yajnik, .Gujarat Gazette dt. 20-7-1972 Pt. 4 C p. 1042 & pp, 1355
to .~362: Sh~h Jaya_ntdal Ambalal v. Kasturilal Nagin Das Doshi 36 ELR 189;
Bai1anath Smgh Vzdya v. R. P. Singh 36 ELR 327; Bishambar Dayal v. Raj
Ra1esh.war and Ors. 39 ELR 363 & p. 376; Dinesh Dang v. Dau/at Ram 465 &
4?6; M1ym:nta/ v. Mansa Din & Ors. 37 ELR 67 & 89; B. P. Maurya v. Prakashv1r Shastri 37 ELR 137 & p, 147; Bahadar Rai v. Ram Singh Dlzanvar and Ors.
37 ELR 176 & 188, Vishw@iath Prasad v. Salamatullah and Ors. 27 ELR 145 &
f.;/86, Lachchi Ram v. J.P. Mukhalva and Ors., 9 ELR 149 & p. 157. (Referred
The test of authorisation u!s 77 of the Representation of the People Act
1vou/d be creation of a liability and the case of authorisation has lo be set up
and proved.
c
-0
F
G
H
t
'
The test of authorisation wou.ld naturally be the creation of a liability to
reimburse whoever spends the money and not necessarily the provision of
money before hand by the candidate on whose behalf it is spent. Nevertheless,
the authorisation has to be set up and proved. [583 BJ
Kanwar/al Gupta v. Amamath Chawla, AIR 1975 S.C. P.308 @ 315-316
(no longer good Jaw) Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh [1955] (1) SCR 671
Ramdayal v. Brijraj Singh [1970] (1) SCR 530, Magrai Patadia v. R. K. Bir/a
[1971] (1) SCR 118; B. Rajagopala Rao v. N. C. Ranga AIR 1971 SC 367.
"Election laws in our country require proof of circumstances from which
implied authorisation can be intended."
E
\
If some expenses are shown or admitted to have been incurred by the
candidate's party or third persons over the election of the successful candidate,
and are part of total expenditure on more than one constituency the
question of separation of such expenses by such process of estimation and
/apportionment can only arise if it is first proved that whatever expenditure was
incurred by candidate's party or by any other person, who may be a friend, a
relation, or a sympathiser, was incurred in circumstances from which it can
be inferred that the successful candidate would reimburse the party or person
who incurred it. It is only then that expenditure could be held to be authorised by the candidate. Voluntary expenditure by friends, r~li;tions or sympathisers and expenditure incurred by a candidate's, party, without any request
or authorisation by the candidate has never been deemed to be expenditure1
by the candidate himself. (583 D-G]
Rananjaya Singh v. Biaj11ath Singh and Ors. [1955] ( 1) SCR 671, Ram Dayal
v. Brijrai Singh [1970] (1) SCR 530; Magraj Patadia v. R. K. Bir/a [1971] (2)
SCR 118. Hans Raj v. Pt. Hari Ram and Ors., 40 ELR SC 125 @ 128-129;
Shah Jayantilal Ambalal v. Kasfllri Lal Nagindas & Ors. etc. 42 ELR SC 307
@ 311, Samant N. Balakrishna etc. v. George Fernandez & Ors. etc. [1969] (3)
SCR 603 @ 607 (relied on).
It is true that, when election~ of persons in the position of a Prime Minister
of even a minister, whether in the Central Government or a State Government,
takes place a number of people, come forward eit~er to give or th!Ust their
It may be impossible for the candidate to
supposed aid in the election.
;refuse it without offending them. But, i~ is also impossible for the courts
to make the candidate himself or herself responsible so as to impose an obligation upon the candidate not only to find out and pay them the expenses incurred
by them but to add them to1 his own expenses. That would. obviously be a most
unfair result. And, this is not what the Jaw requires in this country. The law
requires proof of circumstances from which at least implied authorisation can
be properly inferred. [585 H, 586 A-Bl
'
.
i
/
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
385
Presumption as to adverse inference under section 114, Evidence . Act, is
always optional and one of fact depending upon th;e whole set of facts and1
it is not obligatdry.
A presumption u/s 114, Evidence Act (Act I) 1872 is always ()ptional and
It is not obligatory. A'
one of fact depending upon the whole set of facts.
presumption could not arise from non-production of alleged evidence to m:et
a case not even set up and when the Court was not even requested to exercise
its discretionary powers under Order XVI Rule 14, C.P .C. [586 D·Fl
M. C/zenna Reddy v. Ramachandra Rao 40 ELR p. 390 @ 415.
(distinguished)
Vdidity of the Election Law (Amendment) Act 40 of 1975-And the Constitution (39th Amendment) Act 1975 cannot be challenged on the ground that
a number of Members of Parliament were in detention and prevented from
taking deliberations in the Parliament.
Article 122 of the Constitution prevents this t;.ourt from going into any
question relating to irregularity of Qroceedings "in Parliament." An objection
that, as a number of membe,-s of Parliament belonging to the opposition parties
in detention were kept .away due to orders under the Preventive Detention
laws, which could not even be questioned before courts of law, because of
~he declaration of the emergency by the President, so that some procedural
defect, in making the amendments of the Act of 1951 and the 39th Constitutional amendment, arose is directly covered by the terms of Art, 122 ·of the
Constitution which debars every court from examining the propriety of' Pro,
ceedings "in Parliament." H any privileges of Members of Parliament were
involved, it was open to them to have the question raised in Parliament. There
is no provision of the Constitution providing lfor any notice to each Member of
Parliament. That is also a matter completely covered by Art. 122 of the
Constitution,. Issuance of notice.s are internal matters of procedure· which the
;Houses of Parliament themselves regulate. Objections on such grounds cannot be. taken to the legislative procedure. [587 A-G]
Sharma v. Srikrishna AIR 1960 SC 1186 @ 1189 (followed).
Col/c.teral challenge to preventive detention by way of obiections td the.
validity of the Thirty Ninth Amendment and the Election Laws Amendment
cannot even be entertained.
As regards the validity of detentions of Members of Parliament, that cannot
be questioned automatically or on the bare statement by counsel that certain
Members of Parliament are illegally detained with some ulterior object. The
enforcement of fundamental rights is regulaied by Articles 32 and 226 of the
Constitution and the suspension of remedies under these Articles is also governed by appropriate constitutional provisio9s.
Their legality and regularity
cannot be collaterally assailed by mere assertions made by counsel. These'
objections to the validity of the amendments and the 39th Amendments cannot
even be entertained in this manner in these election proceedings.
[387 H,
388 A-BJ
.
"A certificate by the Speaker that a bill has been duly passed is a conclusive
evidence df the [egislt>tion."
All that this court can look into, in appropriate cases is whether the proCe·
dure which amounts to "legislation" or, in the case of a constitutional amendment, which is prescribed by Art. 368 of the Constitution, was gone through
at all.
As a proof of that, however, it will accept, as conclusive evidence,
a certificate of the Speaker, that a bill has been duly passed. [587 Fl
State of Bihar v. Kameshwar AIR 1952 SC 252 @ 266 (applied).
"Precise meaning of the term "constituent powers" under Art. 368 of the
Constitution;"
The theory that the constituent power is above the Constitution or lies
"outside" the Constitution is quite novel. It postulates an undifferentiated
or amorphous amalgam of bare power constituting the "constituent poWer"
which is independent and above the Constitution Itself because it operates on
A
B·
c
F·
G
3:l 6
A
B
SllPREJV!E COURT REPORTS
[ 197 6] 2 ·s.C.R.
the Constitution and can displace it with, so to say, one stroke of its exercise.
Such an extreme theory could not be supported by any of the earlier cases.
The majority view in Bharati's case seemed to be that both the supremacy of
the Constitution and separation of powers are parts of the ba5ic structure
of the Constitution.
To accept a theory that the constituent power Is outside
th'<! Constitution and operates independently and above the Constitution itself,
would make it unnecessary to have a Constitut1on beyond one consisting of
a single sentence laying down that every kind. of power is vested in the consti-·
tuent bodies, which may, by means of a single consolidated order or declaration
of law exercise any or all of them themselves whenever they pleased to do so
whether such powers be executive, legislative or judicial. • This cannot be the
Such a ·view will defeat
ambit of "constituent power" in our constitution.
the whole purpose of a cOn'.titution. [594 G-H, 59.S A-DJ
T. C. Golaknatlz v. State of Punjab [1967] (2) SCR 672 Kesm·ananda Bharti's
case [1973] Supp SCR p. 1 referred to.
c
If constituent power ·by itself is so transcendental and excepti.onal as to be
above· the provisions of the Constitution itself, it should not, logically speaking,
be- bound even by the procedure of amendment in Art. 386(2). [595 Fl
The words "sovereignty" and "sovereign power" to describe the constituent
power should for several good reasons be avoided, so far as possible by lawyers ~ho seek that clarity of thought for which precision in language is the
first requircmeni as these terms are "emotive" and vague in character. [596 D-EJ
D
E
Lord Bryce: Studies in History & Jurisprudence (1901) (503-504); Leonard
;Sclwrpio; Key concepts in Political Science Series @ p. 7; Drcd Scott v.
Sandford (1856) 19 How; 393 referred to.
The j'udicial and law-making func~ions, however broadly conceiv~d, could
not possibly have b~en m~an_t to. be mterchm;ga\Jle. They are not moopable
of distinction and d1fferentiahon 1n any constJtutionally prescnbed sphere of
operation of power including that of constituent power. [603 F J
Ju.dicial Review of all law-making, whether it appertains to the sphere of
fundamental law or of ordinary law, is tracable to the doctrine of judicial
control by reference to certain basic principles contained in our constituliqn
and considered too inviolable .to be easily alterable. One cannot refu&c to
recoonise it so long as the doctrine is found embodied in our constitution (606
H. 607 Al
F
There is no Article in the American Constitution like Art.l 3 of our constitution, which declared any kind of legislation abridging or taking_ myay fundamental rights to be "void". Nevertheless, even there, .the Con>tttut1on, as the
ba•sic or fundamental law of the land, was to operate as the touch-stone
of the validity of ordinary laws. [607 El
Marbury v. Madison 1803, Cranc/1 137 referred to.
G
H
Under our Constitution, by Article 141 of the Comtitution. power is vested
only in the Supreme Court and no other organ or authority of the Republic
to declare the law "which shall be binding on all Courts within the territory of
India." Articles 32, 136 and 143 of the Constitution of India do vest c·~rtain
powers on the Supreme Court of Jndia and Articles 226 and 227, similarly,
vest certain powers on the High Courts, including superintendenc-e of the functioning of all courts and Tribunals. It is true that there is no mention or
vesting of judicial power, as such, in the Supreme Court by any Article of
our Constitution, but, it c_annot be denied that what wsts in the Supreme Court
and High Courts is really judicial power. The Constitution undcuhtcdly sPecifically vests such power, that is to say, power which can properly he described as
''.judicial power", only in the Supreme Court and in the High Court9 and not
in other bodies or authorities, whether executive or legislati,·e, functionit;o
under the Constitution. Such a vesting of power in Parliament could not hav~
\
'
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
38 7
been omitted if it was the intention of Constitution makers to clothe it also
with any similar ju(iicial authority or functions in any capacity whatsoever, [607
E-H, 608 A-BJ
The claim therefore that an amalgam or some undifferentiated residue of
inherent pow~r, incapable of precise definition ~md including jt?dicial power,
vests in Parliament in its role as a constituent authority, cannot be substantiated
by a reference to any Article of the Constitution whatsoever, whether substantive or procedurai. Attempts are made to infer such a power from mere theory·
and speculation as to the nature of the Constituent power" itself. It does
not follow that because the constituent power necessarily carries with it the
power to constitute judicial authorities, it must also by implication. mean that
the Parliament, acting in its constituent capacity, can exercise the judicial power
itself directly without vesting it in itself first by an amendment of the Constitution.
As a matter of correct interpretation of the Constitution, and, even
more so, from the point of view of correct theory and principle, from which no
practice should depart without good reason, it is highly important. [608 C-E]
The term "so\'~reign" is only used in till! preamble of our Constitution".
The CoJllltitution was actually made by the people of India by virtue of their
political sovereignty which enabled them to create a legally sovereign Democratic Republic Jo which they consigned or entrusted, through the Constitution,
the use of sovereign power to be exercised, in its different forms, by the three
0rgans of Government, each acting on behalf of the whole people so as to
serve the object stated in the Preambk. This reference to the "people of Tndia"
is much more than a legal fiction. It is an asse,11ion, in the basic legal in~trument for the governance of this country of the f'act of. a new political power.
[609 A-BJ
It has been pointed out, in the Kesavananda Bharati's case that the preamble
of our Constitution did not, like that of the American Constitution, "Walk
before the Constitution", but was adopted after the rest of the Constitution
was passed so that it is really a part of the Constitution itself. Tt means that
the Constitution is a document recording an act of entrustment and conveyance
by the people of India:, the political sovereign, of legal authority to act on its
"This Constitution''
has a
behalf to a "Sovereign Democratic Republic".
basic structure comprising the three organs of the Republic : the Executive.
the Legislature, and the Judiciary. It is through each of these organs that
the Sovereign will of the People has to operare and manifest itself and not
through only one of them. Neither of these three separate organs of the
Republic can take owr the function assigned to the other. This is the1 basic
structure or scheme of the system of Government of the Republic laid down in
this Constitution whose identiy cannot, according to the majority view in
Kesavananda's case be changed even by resorting to Article 368. The Republic
is controlled and directed by the Constitution to proceed towards certain
destinations and for certa.in purposes only. The power to change even llhe direction and purposes is itself divided in the sense that a proposed change, if challenged must be shown to have the sanction of all the three organs of the Republic
each applying its own methods and principles and procedure for resting the
correctness or v_alidity of the' measure. This result necessarily follows from our
pre>ent Constitutional structure and scheme. If the judicial power operates here
like a brake, or a veto, it is not one which can be controlled by any advice or
direction to the judiciary as is the case in totalitarian regimes. In our system.
which is democratic its exercise is left to the judicial conscience of each individual
judge. This is also a basic and distinguishing feati1re of Democracy. [(\09 C-HJ
Pro~.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
Friedman: Law in a changing Society p. 61 (referred to).
Inasmuch as the Constitution is the imtrument which regulates the distribution between and the exercise of sovereign power by the three organs of the
State, and it is there constantly to govern and to be referred to and to be appealed
to in any and every case of doubt and difficulty, it could itself, con:eptua:lly,
be regarded as the true· or "ultimate" sovereign, that is to say, Sovereign as
H
3BS
A
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 ·s.C.R.
compared with "immediate" sovereignty of an organ of the Republic acting with·
in its own sphere and at its own level. [610 A-C]
.
.
Ernest Barker : Social & Political Theory. (referred to) ·
"Sovereignty is. limited bdth by its own nature as well as its mode of action"
B
c
A theory of a legal sovereignty must necessarily demarcate the sphere of its
"legal" or proper operation as opposed to mere use of power either capriciously
or divorced from human reason and natural justice. Sovereignty, as recognised
by law, is limited both by its own "nature" as well as its "mode of action".
There should be no difficulty in accepting such a theory if one can conceive of
an ordered system or "Government of laws" as opposed to "Government of men"
placed beyond limitations of this kind, which is implicit in the very idea of a
Constitution. Our constitution not only regulates the. operations of the organs
of State, but symbolises the unity of the Republic and contains the inspiring
hopes and aspirations and cherished goals of all the efforts of the nation. It
operntes not merely through law but also on the minds and feelings of the
people. [612 C-GJ
, ,~
!
"'
r
Bharati's case Supp, [1973] 1 SCR [applied]
D
Any satisfactory theory of sovereignty must account for the power of the
people to act in certain ways or to move in certain directions. The will of the
people is thus inseparable, from a constitution which enables it- to be expressed
and then to govern. The Constitution neither is nor can be sovereign in the
sense that ihe people whd made it cannot unmake it or change to. It only prescribes the correct mode of doing everything, including that of changing the
very system of Government. It is only in this sense that it ca~ be sovereign
or supreme and rule the life of a nation. [613 D-FJ
Willis; Constitution Law of the United States; Willioughby; Fundamental
concepts of Public Law (Tago~e Law Lectures) 1924 p. 77; Cooper v. Wendsworth Board of Works 1863 14CB (NS) 180.
E
F
"Placing some limitations on exercise of sovereign power is the esssence of a
constitution and the rationale of its existence."
No simple theory of sovereignty fits the complex facts of modern life. E·very
theory of today, ultimately, rests on concepts more refined than the physical
or spiritual might of some ruler, in whom executive, legislative and judicial
powers coalesce to take away all legal distinctions between them. Even if that
was over the concept of sovereignty anywhere, it was certainly not that of our
.constitution makers and it is not ours today. The value of constitutional government is that it prescribes definite ways in which this sovereign power shall be
exercised by the State. The Constitution does place some limitations on exercise
of sovereign power. That is the essence of a constitution and the rationable of
its existence. [614 C-F]
Willoughby : Nature of the State (1928) p. 302, Lester B. Orfield: The
Amending of the F!ederal Constitution p. 166.
G
H
As between the sovereignty of the amending Article and the sovereignty of
the Constitution there could be little doubt that lawyers should and would
prefer the sovereignty or supremacy of the whole constitution rather than of
any part of it. On the face of it, it appears more reasonable and respectable
to swear allegiance to the whole Constitut10n, rather to Art. 368 or to the amending power contained in it. If there is a part of our constitution which deserves
greater devotion than any other part of it is certainly the preamble of our Cons,
titution. [615 C-D]
Our Constitution, which has been described as the "Cornerstone of the
Nation", was devised as a means to serve needs of the people of the country. It
has not only the elevating preamble, deserving the allegiance of every rational
'
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
I
)
"\
\.
•
~·
38 9
human being, but Part IV of our Constitution, which contains Directive.Principles of State Policy'' to guide the future course of state action, Parlicularly
in the Jegil;lative field. It is true. that provisions· of Part IV are not enforceable
thr9ugh the Courts against the State, but they are declared to be fund~mental
in the governance of the country and are used to mterpret the Constttuuon and
to fix the meanings of its provisions. From this point of viey; also, the co~·
cept of supremacy of the Constitution is, undoubtedly, more sUited to the neeos
of <;>ur country. It not only places the goals towards which nations must march,
but it is meant to compel our Sovereign Republic, with its three organs of
Government, to proceed in certain directions. It assumes that each o~gan of
State will discharge' its tmst faithfully. We cannot deny to the Constttnuon that
supremacy which is the symbol and proof of the level of our civilisation.
[617 A-CJ
Ware v. Hylton (1876)3 Dall 199, Dred Scott v. Sandfo,rd (1856) 19 How
393; Gibbus v. Ogden (1824) (9 Wheat p. 1); White v. Heart (1871) 13 Wall
646; Keit/1 v. Clark (1878) 97 U.S. 454; National Prohibition cases (1920) 253
U.S. p. 350; American Constitution (Compared and discussed)
"Supremacy of the Constitution is part of the basic structure".
The doctrine of supremacy or sovereignty of the Constitution, adopted by
this Court in Special Reference No. l of 1964, was declared to be a. part of the
basic structure of the Constitution in Bharati's case. The minority, while not
specifically dissenting from this view, held that, even what was considered by
the majority to be a part of the basic structure, was alterable under Art. 368.
But, no judge of this Court has so far held that, without even attempting to
change what may be basic structure of the Constitution itself, by appropriate
amendments, judicial power could be exercised by Parliament under Art. 368 on
the assumption that it was already there. [617 D, G-HJ
The theory of the supremacy of the Constitution is inherent in the very
concept of the "auguster thing" which lies behind "Parliament or King" and is
sought to be embodied in the Constitution of a country. The most proper and
appropriate functions· of the amending power in a Constitution, which is also a
part 6f the Constitution, and, indeed, its most potent part, is that of making
basic changes so as to avert constitutional breakdowns and revolutions, if possible. The implied limitations of a "basic structure'', operating from even outside the language of Art. 368, as it stood before the 24th amendment restrict
its scope. These limitation~ must, however, be related to and found in the
provisions of the cC!nstitution and not outside. [619 D-G]
A
B
c
D
E
The words "Constituent power" ~re advisedly used in the 24th amendment
so as to clarify the position and not to put jn or to include anything beyond
constitution making power in Art. 368. (620 Cl
' The constituent power is still bound by the exclusively prescribed procedure
to "amend by way of addition, variation or repeal" any provision of' the Constitu,tion. It is entirely a law making procedure elaborately set out in clause (2)
of Art. 368. Jn fact, Art. 368 contains so much of the fundamental law making or legislative procedure that, in Golaknath's case, fiV"e learned Judges' held
that it was confined to procedure and did not contain at all the substantive
power to amend. Clause (1) of Art. 368 introduced by the 24th amendment.
was, meant to remove this objection among others, and to do no more. It could
not be intended to put some new amalgam of executive and judicial or quasijudicial substantive powers into it also by some implication so as to do away
with the very need for such an elaborate and carefully drawn up constitution
such as. ours. The absence of any quasi-judicial procedure, .from the comprehensively fram~d procedural provisions. of Art. 368, seems extremely significant. It indicates that it was the clear intention of constitution makers that no
judicial or quasi-judicial function could be performed by Parliament whilst
operating in the special constituent field of Constitutional law making. An
omission to provide any quasi-judicial procedure in Art. 368. which. apparently
furnishes a self-contained code, means that no 5ruch power wa~ meant to be
included here _at all. Prqper exercise of judicial power is inseparable from
hppropriate procedure. [620 C-F]
4-126 S.C.T./76
.•
F
G
.H
390
A
B
c
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 197 6] 2 s.c.it.
The political sovereignty of the people, recognised by the preamble of our
constitution, where the people are described as the constitution makers who gave
the constitution unto themselves, does not mean that the people retained unto
themselves any residue of legal sovereignty. They did not p~escribe, apart from
dividing the exercise of sovereign power roughly between the three organs of
the Republic, each with its own modus operandi any othe,r or direct method,
such as Initiative or Referendum, for exercising their politically sovereign power.
The people entrusted to the three. organs of the sovereign Democratic Republic.
They constituted the exericse of the three aspects of sovereign power on behalf
of the people. This is the only way of reconciling the idea of a sovereign people
in the political sense, and the sovereignty of the Republic represented by a
legally supreme constitntion, so that the sovereign powers of each of the' three
organs of the Republic had to be exercised in conformity with the mandates, both
positive and negative, express and implied of the constitution. It would be
preferable to describe this concept as one of the "Supremacy of the Constitution" instead of "Sovereignty" of the Constitution, because of the theoretical,
speculative, and emotive clouds which have gathered arou11d the term sovereignty.
[621 A-DJ
Tijkayat Sri Govinc:ic.lji Maharaj v. The State of Rajasthan [1964] (1) .SCR
p. 561 @ 591, Queen v. Burah 5 I.A. 178; (referred to).
'
,. (
•
I
'•
"Clause 4 of Art. 329A could not be said to be a valid piece; or Jaw
making.
·
D
It is true that, in the exercise of the law making constituent power, brought
in by s. 8 of the Indian Independenee Act, the legislatures could be armed ·with
judicial powers if appropriate Jaws w'ere made to that effect.
But, as no
law either constitutional or ordinary, was passed, preceding the 39th Amendment,
to repeal the Act of 1951 and then to vest a judicial powzr in Parlh\ment,
so as to enable it to take over and decide election disputes itself directly Cl.. (4)
of Art. 329A by virtue of containing certain provisions or the assumptio'Ql that
s_uch a judicial power was already there in Parliament, could not be said to be
valid as a piece of law making. [623 E-GJ
E
Art. 105 (3) of the Constitution does
presumed exercise of judicial power.
F
G
not
confer
on
Parliame•it
any
What was not conferred upon Parliament itself, in its constituent capacity,
could not be impliedly assumed to be there by virtue of certain "powers, ,privileges and immunities which belong separately to each House of Parliament.
Such a claim cannot be based upon what is to be derived from Art. 105. This
reasoning would, obviously, conflict with the provisions, of Art. 329(b) of the
Constitution which indicates that an election dispute can only be resolved by
an election petition before a forum provided by an ordinary enactment. [624 C-DJ
In exercise of its powers under Art. 329(b), our Parliament had enacted the
Act of 19,51. The procedure prescribed by the Act had the binding force of a
constitutionally. prescribed procedure. It could not be circumvented un1ess, with
reference to cases covered by Art. 329'A(4), it had been first repealed. Only
after such! a -repeal could any other forum or procedure be legally adopted. It
could not be assumed, by reason of Art. 105(3), that the prescribed forum
shifted to Parliament itself, and that Parliament. in exercise of its constituent
function, had both legislated and adjudicated. [624 E-F]
Australian Constitution Art. 47 (referred to)
Rule of Construction applies to interpretation of the Constitution G1! well.
H
The well recognised rule of construction of statutes, which must apply t~ .the
interpretation of the Constitution as well is "Expressio Unius Est Exclusio
Alterius". From this is derived the subsidiary rule that an expressly laid .down
mode of doing something necessarily prohibits the doing of that thing in .any
other manner. [624 G-H]
-
/
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
391
Crawford's "Statutory Constructions ( 1940) p. 334 (referred to).
A
Art. 329(b) excludes the provisions of Art. 105(3).
\
\
1
What is separately expressly, and especially provided for by Art. 329(b)
must necessarily fall outside the purview of Art. 105(3). Moreover Art. 105(3)
contained a temporary provision until o~her provision was made by Parliament
in that behalf. Appropriate provisions were enacted by the Act of 1951, in
compliance with Art. 329(b), the proper Article for it. It would be idle to
contend that these provisions suddenly lapsed or ceased to exist as soon as
Parliament took up consideration of the issues and the grounds of the decision
on them by the High Court to which reference is made in Art. 329(A)(4).
Again, a purported exercise of power, in enacting Art. 329(A)(4), cou_ld only
be a law making power and not any other power which could conceivably fall
under Art. 105(3). The required law making power is found in article 368.
[625 D-E]
Erskine May: Parliamentary Procedure (18th Edn.) 153-155; Special Reference No. 1 of 1964 [1965] 1 SCR 175; Kielly v. Cc;-son 4 Moore PC 63;
The exercise of the jurisdiction to determine an election dispute, vested in
the High Court by the Act of 1951, for al! elections to the House of the Peop]e,
in accordance with Art. 329(b), cannot be taken away by a constitutional
amendment, purporting to repeal retrospectively the provisions of the Act of
19'51, a piece of ordinary legislation, in their application to a particular class
of cases, and making a. simultaneous declaration of the rights of the parties
to a judgment, without first performing a judicial function also, which was not
included in the constituent or any other law making power. [629 D-E]
~
B
C
D
[His Lordship thought it nQ.t necessary to pursue the question whether there
are any legal !imitations upon the subject matter which may be considered fit
for inclusion or incorporation in a constitution, as it was left to the good sense
,
of. the Constitution makers]. [631 DJ
'
Parliament could not be deemed to have withdrawn the c.ase and decided if.
~gislative action can sometimes be made to serve as an unobjectionable
substitute for what could and should strictly and properly be done judicially.
The A~t of 1951, enacted under the provisions of article 329(b) of the Constitution, provided a procedure which could not be circumvented. Despite the
impression created by the terms of the declaration at the end or Cl, ( 4) of
Art. 329A, it cannot be assumed that Parliament took over a case intn its own
hands to decide it and to incorporate the result in the form of Art. 329(A)(4).
Parliament could not be deemed to be unaware of the bar created by Art. 329 (b)
and the 1951 Act. [631 D-GJ
t
E
F
East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council [1952] A.C. 109
(referred to.).
Art. 329(A) 4 is only a piece of purported /aw-making.
Art: 329 (A) (4) is part of. an amendment of the Constitution for _the purposes
found m the statement of ob1ects and Reasons. Only the declarat10n given at
the end of it suggests that, in the course of it, the effect upon the case before
this, court was considered and dealt .with. [633 F-GJ
}·
G
Retrospectivity of Art. 329(A) 4 is valid.
Retrospective legislation which does not impair vested or substantial rights
or const,itutional prohibitions is permissible. [636 Al
Willoughby : Constitution of the United States 2nd Edn. V.ol. 3: Cooley :
Constitutional Limitation; MPV. Sundaramier & Co. v. The State of A.P. &
Anr. [1958] SCR 1422; Sri Vinod Kumar and Ors. v. State of Himachal Pradesh
[,!259] Supp. (1) SCR 160; Jadah' Singh v. The State of Himachal Pradesh and
1l
392
A
B
c
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 S.C.R.
'
Ors. [1960] (3) SCR 755; Udai Ram Sharma and Ors. v. Union of India anti
Ors. [1968] 3 SCR 41; Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of. jndia and Ors.
[1970] (3) SCR 530; Jagannat/z etc. v. Authorised Officer L<tnd Reforms and
Ors. etc. [1972] (1) SCR 1055; Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. & Anr. v. T/1e State of
Assam, [1964] (5) SCR 975; Mis. Tirat'iz Ram Rajindranath Lucknow v. State
of U.P. & Anr. AIR 1973 SC 405; Krishna Chandra Gangopadhaya etc. v. Tile
Union of India and Ors. AIR 1975 SC 1389; Pandia Nad~w mu/ Ors. v. The
State of Tamil Nadu (1974] (2) SCC 539; State of Orissa v. B. K. Bose
[1962] (Supp.) 2 SCR 380; State of U.P. v. Roja Anand Brahma Shah [1967] (!)
SCR 362; Shri Pritlzvi Cotton Mills Ltd. & A nr. v. Broach Borough Municipality
& Ors. [1970] (1) SCR 382 @ 392; Jana.pada Sabha, Chindwara etc. v. The
Central Provinces Syndicate Ltd & A11r. etc. [1970] 3 SCR 745; Municipal
Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. New Shorock Spg. and Wvg. Co. Ltd.
etc. [1971] (1) SCR 288; State of Tami/ Nadu & Anr. v. M. R. Gounder Am".,.
AIR 1971 SC 231; A marjit Kaur and Ors. v. Pritam Singh and Ors. AIR 1974
SC 2068; Qudrat Ullah v. Municipal Board Bareill)'1 AIR 1974 SC 396; A. K.
Copa/an v. State .of Ta111il Nadtt [1950] SCR 88 @ 198; S. C. Chose v. King
Emperor [1944) FCR 295; John Clm'ke Geot'ge Esquil'e and Sir, Roll:111d Jennings, Knight 1955 Law Rep. States 4 Eliz~ 2 America~' Jurisprudence; 2nd·
Edn. Vol. 46@ 318; Kanta Katlzurla v. Ma11ak Chand Surano [1970] (2) SCR
835.
Constitutional validity of amendments in general and 39th Amendment in
particular.
D
E
If the constituent bodies taken separately or together, could be legally sovereign, the constitutional validity of no amendment could be called in question
before the Court. It is well established that it is the Constitution and not theconstituent power which is supreme here, in the sense that the constitutionalitY
of the Constitution cannot be c.alled in question but the exercise of the constituent power can be. The validity of exercise of constituent powers have to be
judged by testing it on anvil of Constitutional provisions. Courts have to test
the legality of Jaws, whether purporting to be ordinary or Constitutional, by the
no1'ms laid down in the Constitution. This follows from the supremacy of theConstitution. [640 D-E, GJ
,
\
J. C. Gray : Nature & Source of Law p. 96 Ke/sen "General Theory of law
and State" p. 150 (referred to).
"The basic structure of the Constitution tests validity of a constitutional law·
an1e11(/Jnent and c•!so ordinary laws :
F
G
The basic structure of the Con>titution tests both, viz. the validity of a.
constitutional amendment and ordinary laws, because ordinary law making itself
cannot go beyond the range of constituent power. [640 GJ
The issues whether a majority patty can virtually act as the judge, in an election dispute between itself and the minority parties and whether this amounts
to a denial of political justice can only be decided in accordance with the
objects of the Preamble, by the judiciary. It would be a dangerous precedent
to Jay down that they can be. and need be determined n9where at all. That is
·what acceptance of total validity of Art. 329A(4) may mean if it bars this
court's jurisdiction to hear and decide such a case on merits. There is no
reason why the issue should be termed as· one of "political justice" instead of
one olain and simple or elementary justice. [641 A, B, Fl
".l11risdz'ction cannot be barred by A rt. 329A"
Tt is true that the right in an ele,ction petition is a statutory right, created'
by the statute u/s 116A· .of the Act of 1951 and it can be taken away retrospectively. But, where this taking away also involves the taking away of the
~ight to be heard by this Court on a grievance, whether justifiable or not that
a minority is party is being oppressed by the majority. this court cannot' deny
the spokesman of the minority a right to lie heard on merits. Such an issue is
,:onsti*1.1tional and legal and not political. [642 C-D]
I
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN
393
The jurisdiction of this court to consider the different grounds of complaint
does not ordinarily arise at all under Section 1l6A of th~ A_ct of _1951. ~ut,
in view of the decision to hear the arguments on the constttut10nal issues raised
fo the writ petition in the High Court, the causes of action arising out of the
amenqments have become attached to the appeals u/s 116 A of the Act.
[643 B-D]
T]le effect of clauses (4) and (5) & (6) of Art. 329A would be,_ if ~his
<:ourt were to hold that its jurisdiction is barred preventing it from gmng int~
the merits of the appeals under section l 16A of the Act, the appeal also could
not be gone into, and, this; would mean denying an -opportunity also• to the ajlPe1lant Prime Minister of asserting her rights, under the 1951 Act and of vind1catfog her stand in the case bv showing that there was really no sustainable
:ground what·soever for the findings of the High Court against her. This court
would, therefore, be prevented from doing justice to. her case as well a9 if the
court were to accept the contention that the Thirty-ninth Amendment bars the
Court's jurisdiction to hear the appeals under S<:ction 116A of the Act on
merits. The total effect would be that justice would appear to be defeated
even if in fact, it is not so as a result of the a.lleged bar to this Court's jurisdiction if such a Bar be held to b<: there. It could not be the intention of Parliament that justice should appear to be defeated. [643 D-F]
"The doctrii1e of political q11csthm" of Art. 329A.
Undoubtedly, clause ( 4) of the Art. 329A, could be said to have a political
objective, in the context in which it was introduced and this court could perhaps
take judicial notice of this context. Even if it was possible to go beyond the
~tatement of objects and reasons and to hold that clause (4) of Art. 329A is
there essentially for demonstrating the strong position of the Government and of
the Prime Minister of this country so as to inspire the necessary confidence in
and give the necessary political a.nd legal strength to the Government to
enable it to go forward boldly to deal with internal economic and Jaw and order
problems and international question there is no reason why this -could make it
necessary to exclude the jurisdiction of this court so as to prevent it from consi•
dering a case which would have been over much sooner if the court bad not
been confronted with these difficulties. [644 H, 645 A-Bl
[His Lordship observed that he failed to see what danger to the countrY
could arise or how national interests could be jeopardised by a consideration and
a decision by this court of such a good case as the Prime Minister of this country had on facts and law.] [645 CJ
There may be and was som1:. useful political objective. to be served by demonstrating the strength and ability of the Government to face the difficulties
with which it had been conf'ronted. lf that be so, clause ( 4) of Art. 329A bad
a political objective and its purpose has been served. If that was the real
object behind its enactment, it could not be really to injure the interests of
political parties or groups. The context and the political consideratiOns placed
before the court could be relevant in understanding the real meaning of clause
( 4) of Article 329A of the Constitution. [645 C-Dl
Mai:bury v. Madison (1803) 1 Cr. 137, 163 (referred to).
kesavana11da Bharati's case [1973] Supp. SCR 1 (relied on).
Baker v. Carr 369 U.S. 186, H. H. Malwrajadhiraja Madhay Rao Jiwaji Rao
Scindia Bahadur & Ors. v. Union of India [1971] 3 SCR 9; Raisahib Ram
Jawa!'a Kap.ur and Ors. v. State df Punjab. [1955] (2) SCR 225; Jayantilal
Anmtlal Smdhan v. N. Rana [1965] 3 SCR 201; Halsbury's Laws English
3rd Edn. Vol. 7 Art. 409 p. 192 (discussed).
,
"Maxim" ut res magis valeat quam pereat-lts applicability.
It is. well-establishe~ _canon of in~erpretation that, out of two possible interpreta!Ions of a provisIOn. one which prevents it from becoming unconstitutional should be preferred if this is possible-Vt res magis valeat quam pereat.
[645 El
Jt. f~ t_rue that the de~ming provision seems to stand in the way of the court's
exam111at10n of the ments of the case even though there is no dire.ct provision
takin~ away !h:e co_urt's ju~isdiction to coi:sicler the merits of the appeals. A
deeming provision mtroduc111g a legal action must be confined to the context
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
394
A
B
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 2 'S.C.R.
of it and cannot be given a larger effect. A legal fiction is created for some
definite purposes and should not be extended beyond its legitimate field determined by its coil.text. [645 F-G]
Radha Kishan v. Durga Prasad AIR 1940 PC 167; Bengal Immunity Co.
Ltd. v. The State of Bihar and Anr. [1955] (2) SCR 603; C.I.T. Bombay v.
James Anderson [1964] (5) SCR 590; C.I.T. Madras v. Express Newspapers Ltd.
Madras, [1964] (8) SCR 189; Sri Jagadguru Kavi Basara Rajendraswami of
Gavimutt v. Commissio11er of Hindu Religious Charitable Endowments Hyderabad [1964] (8) SCR 252, Ex part Walto11 in Re. Levy (1881) 17 Ch. D. 746
(referred to).
\
"Clause (5) of Art. 329A does 11ot bar this Court's Jurisdiction"
c
D
E
If the purpose of clause ( 4) of Art. 329A was purely to meet the political
needs of the country and was only partly revealed by the policy underlying
the Statement of reasons and objects it seems possible to contend that it was
not intended at all to oust the jurisdiction o·f the Court. Hence Art, 329A;
clause (5) will not, so understood, bar the jurisdiction of the court to hear and
decide the appeals when it says that the appeal shall be disposed of in conformity
with the provisions of clause ( 4). [646 B-C]
In the circumstances of this case, it would seem that conformity with the
declaration embodied in Article 329A clause (4) is possible if it i~ confined to
the meaning and effect of the deeming provision to what was needed only for
the declaration to be given at the end of clause ( 4) by the constituent bodies,
with a political object, and not for the purposes of affecting this Court's jurisdiction which was meant to determine the legal effects of what was decided
in the Allahabad High Court. The more natural interpretation would appear
to be that the deeming provision should apply for "all purposes" including
those for consideration of the appeals before this Court. But, if it is not possible to decide those appeals without giving a different meaning to the deeming
provision, on which the final declaration in claU9e (4) rests and clause (5)
leaves this court free to decide bow this court could conform with clause ( 4),
this court's jurisdiction ro decide factual and legal issues judicially cannot be
said to be taken away absolutely. If the fiction was only a logical step in the
proces~ of the declaration to be made by constituent auJhorities for. political
purpo~s. but not of this court for legal purposes. The fiction will only attach
to the declaration contained at the end of clause ( 4) for political purposes
only. f646 C-EJ
"Doctrine of Readifzg down not applied"
F
G
Perhaps it could be argued, by applying the doctrine of reading down, that
clause (4) was 11ot intended to oust the jurisdiction of this court altogether to
try the case. No such attempts at reading it down have, however, been made
in support of the validity of Art. 329A (4). Clause (4) _of Article 329A(4)
does not so operate as to bar the jurisdiction of this court to go into and
determine the merits of the appeals before this Court by applying the Act of
1951. Even if this Court were to consider matters of expediency and national
interest, as it 9hould in appropriate· cases, it does not appear to be either eX"
pedient or in conformity with national interests to leave the question in doubt
whether the judgment under appeal before this Court could or could not legally
stand on its own legs under the unamended law. [646 E-Hl
Art. 329A(4) does not stand in the way of the consideration of the appeals
before this court on merits under the Act of 1951 or the validity of the amendments of the Act. [647 A]
On Review Application :
"Cou11sel's duty while arguing a case"
H
A court is not required, by any rule of natural justice, to intimate to learned counsel what particular route or reasoning will finally appeal to a judge or
be· adopted by him in reaching a particular cGnclusion in his judgment. If
a counsel raises an issue which, in the opinion of a Judge, can only be answered
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
395
by 'going into findings of fact, he should anticipate the possibility of such a
view. [673 C-D]
It may be difficult for learned counsel sometimes to anticipate and meet the
requirements of every learned judge of this court when there are live of them
hearing a cas~. It is, however, the duty of counsel, who raise issues which.
may necessitate consideration of questions of fact and law, to satisfy the require.
ments of any one of the judges, who may be of opinion that these issues could
not possibly by decided properly without considering findings of fact and the
applications of law to them. · [673 F-G]
After· holding that the Representation of People Act 1951 was not materially
altered, but only explained by most amendments of 1975, consideratidn of merits
wu:.voidable :
Learned counsel for the election petitioner having stated that he had no
further atgument to advance if his submissions on the validity and interpretation of amendments of Representation of the People Act, 1951, were not accept·
able to the Court, could not urge, on an application for review, that he did not
deal with merits because he did not anticipate the view of a learned Judge
that the law, as contained in the Representation of People Act, 1951, had not
been altered except on one matter. On such· a view, the appeal of the successful candidate coi.ild not be either fairly or legally disiposed of or allowed without any consideration of the merits of the case simply because of the election
petitioner's counsel's statement presumably in the interests of his client. A consideration of and decision on merits of the case became imperative in such a
situation. [674 E-Hl
"Failure to make a particular submis~~on is 1101 a ground for redpening or
review of a case."
When counsel had ample opportunity to make all his submissions and yet,
either due to some D)isapprehension or for some other reason he fails to make
any particular sybmission, the case cannot be reopened, particularly when
nothing which could possibly affect the result is indicated even in the review
application. ·It is high time that it was realized by everyone that courts are not
meant for political tactics or propaganda. [67 4 B, C-D]
Per. Chandrachud, J.
It is beyond Court's jurisdiction to consider whether, the election of a private
individual and the disvute concerning it cannot be a matter of constitutional
amendment under Art. 368.
The alleged objection to the 39th Amendment is that the election of a private
individual and the dispute concerning it cannot ever be a matter of Constitutional
amendment. Under Article 368 the question touches a totally new dimension of
the amending power : Can the Constituent Assembly, while amending the Cone•itution, prpnounce upon private disputes or must it only concern itself with what
may be termed orgap.isational matters concerning the country's governance ? The
question has the mefi.t of' novelty, but there is no substance in it. It requires to be
examined in isolation. that is, divorced from considerations arising from the
theory of separation of powers and the aspect whether the amendment constitutes
an encroachment on judicial functions and thereby damages one of the basic
structures of the Constitution. The reason why there is no wbstance in the
contention is that what the Constitution ought to contain is not for the Courts
to decide. The touchstone of the validity of a Constitutional amendment is firstly
whether the procedure prescribed by Articlei 368 is strictly complied with and
secondly whether the amendment destroys or damages the basic structure of
the Constitution. The subject-matter of constitutio.nal amendments is a question
,of high policy and Courts are concerned with the interpretation of laws, no~
with the wisdom of the policy underlying them. The Constitution can be
amended so as to provide that wagering contracts shall be void or that bigamous
marriages shall be unlawful or that economic offenders shall be visited with a
higher penalty. The Indian Constitution is not like the American Constitution
an instrument of few words. The range of topics it covers would bemuse anY
student of foreign Constitutions which do not even skirt the problems with which
our Constitution deals in copious details. In fact, there is hardly any important
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
396
A
B
c
D
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 ·s.c.R.
facet of national life which our Constitution does not touch. Along with matters
of high priority like citizenship, Fundamental Rights, Directive Principles of State
Policy and the relation between the Union and ~he States, it deals with matters not
normally considered constitutionally important like the salaries of high dignitaries,
the power of the Supreme Court to frame rules for regulating its practice and
procedure, official language for communication between one State and another
and last but not the least, elections to the Parliament and lhe S>tate Legislatures.
Those to whose wisdom and judgment the constituent power is confided, will
evoke scorn and derision if that power is used for granting~ er withdrawing building contracts, passing or failing students or granting and denying divorces.
But the electorate lives in the hope that a sacred power will not so flagrantly
be abused and the moving finger of history warns of the consequenceS: that inevitably flow when absolute power bas corrupted absolutely. The fear of perversion
is no test of power. [656 G-H, 657 A-Fl
Elections to legislatures were considered by Constitution makers to be a
matter of constitutonal importance. Though the powers of the Prime Minister
in a cabinet form of democracy are not as unrivalled as those of the President in
the American system it i~ undeniable that the Prime Minister occupies a unique
position. The choice of the subject for constitutional amendment cannot, therefore, be characterized as trifling, frivolous or outside the framework of a copious
Constitution. It is wrong to think that elections to the country's legislatures are
a private affair of the contestants. They are matters of public interest and of
national importance. Every citizen has a stake in legislative elections for, his
social and economic well-being depends upon the promises and performance of
the legislature. Such elections, and more so the election. of the Prime Minis~er
who is at least primqs inter pares, can legitimately form the subject-matter of a
constitutional provision. The validity of what is brought into the Constitution
has to be judged by different standards. [657 G-H, 658 A-CJ
Rottscliaefcr on Constitutional Law (Ed. 1939) page 397 (referred to).
"Ratio of the. majority decision in Bharati's case and the 1111amendc:•bl~
features."
E
F
G
H
The ratio of the majority decision in Bharati's case is not that ,some named
features of the constitution are a part of its basic structure but that the power
of amendment cannot be exercised so as to damage or destroy the essential elements or the basic structure of the Constitution. Supremacy of the constitution,
Republican Democratic form of the Government, Secular character of the Cons!itution, Separation of powers, federalism and dignity and freedom of the individual, the mandate to build a welfare state, unity and integrity of the Nation,
sovereignty of India. Sovereign Democratic Republic, Parliamentary Democracy.
the three organs of the· State and judicial Review are mere illustrations of what
constitutes the basic structure according to Bharati's case. [658 C-E]
If there be beyond the pale of reasonable controversy any unamendable
features of the constituti'on on the score that they form a part of the basic
structure of the Constitution, they are that (i) India is a sovereign Democratic
Republic (ii) Equality of Status and opportunity shall be secured to all its
citizens; (iii) The state shall have no religion of its own and all persons sha!l
be equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess,
practise and propagate religion and that (iv) The nation ~hall be governed
by a Government of Laws, not of men. These are the pillars of our const!tutional philosophy, the pillars therefore of the basic structure of the Constitution. "Basic Struc!ure" by the majority judgment, is not a part of the funda-·
mental rights nor indeed a provision of the constituti.on.. The theory of ha.sic
structure is woven out of the conspectus of the constitution and the amendmg
power is subjected to it because it is a constituent power. "The power to amend
the fnndamental instrument cannot carry with it the power to destroy its essen.
tial features". This brief is the arch of the theory of basic structure.
[659 B-C, 670 B-CJ
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kera/a, [1973] Supp. S.C.R. 1 (explained).
The Preamble of the co11stit11tion does not hold the key to its be.sic structure
and is neithe.r a source nor a /imitation df Power".
The view that the preamble of the Constitution holds the t.ey to its basic
structure or that the preamble is too holy to suffer a human touch is not correct
,
I
'
'
-
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
397
Preambles of the Constitution9 are metaphysical like slogans and are intended .
primarily to reflect the hopes and aspirations of !•he people; they resonate
the ideal which the' Nation seeks to achieve, the target and not the achievement.
Though our preamble was voted upon and is a part of the Constitution it is
really "a preliminary statement of the reasons" which made the )Jass.tog of the
Constitution neceS>Sary and desirable. The preamble of our conslltution cannot
therefore be regarded as a source of any prohibitions or inhibitions. [659 D·G}
A
H. M. Seervai Constitutional Law o'f India 2nd Edn. 19,75 p. 76:; Halsbury's
Laws of En!iland 3rd Edn., p. 370; Willoughby : Constitutional La>v; Attorney
GeneraA v. Prince Emest Augustus of Ilanorer [1957] A.C. 436, 463; Jn re:
Bembari Union & Exqhange of Enclaves (Referred to).
B
"Judicial Review cannot be considered ti} be a part of the basic structure so
.tar as le11islative elections are concerned".
The fundamental premise of the argument that judicial power is a part of
the basic structure and since the 39th Amendment by Arts. 329A(4) and (5)
deprives the courts including the Supreme Court of their power to adjudicate
upon the disputed election the amendment is unconstitutional, is too broadly
stated because the Constitution, as originally enacted, expressly <;xcluded Judi·
cial Review i'n a large variety of important matters. Each of the provisions of
Art. 31(4), 31(6), 136(2), 227(4), 262(2) and 329(a), shows that the Constitutio_n· did not regarg judicial review as an indispensable measure of. t~e legality
or propriety of every determination. Even in a vital matter perta1mng to the
election for membership of the Parliament the framers of the Constitution had
left .the decision to the judgment of the Executive through Art. 103 (I) and
103(2) and 329(b). Under Art. 329(b). it was open to the legislature to
·]eave. the adjudication of election disputes to authorities other than thes·2 in the
hierachy of our judicial system. The decisions of these tribunals could eventually be brought before the Supreme Court under Art. 136( 1) of the constitutidn, but it is at least, plausible that were. the legislatures to pass laws leaving
the decisions of election disputes to themselves, judicial review might have stood
excluded~ Since the Constitution, as originally enacted did not consider that
judicial power must intervene in the interest of purity of elections, judicial review cannot be considered to be a part of the basic structure in so far as Jegis·
lative elections are coricemed. The theory of Basic Structure has to be considered in each individual case, not in the abstract, but in the context of the
concrete problem. The problem here is whether under our constitution, judicial review was considered as an indispensable concomitant of elections to
country's legislatures. The answer,plainly is "no". [660 A-H, 661 A]
"I
-
•
The contention that Arts. 329(A)(4) and (5) are unconstitutional on the
ground that by these provisions the election of the Prime Minister is placed
beyond the purview of courts cannot be accepted. [661 Fl
D
E
F
Erskine May: Parliamentary Practice 18th Edn. p. 29,; Halsbury'> Laws of
England 3rd Edn. Vol. 14 p. 250, 324; American Cons~itution Art. 1 sec. V.
Clause ( !.) Leste~ Jayson "The Constitution of tl1e U.S.A." (referred to).
-· ,
-
c
\
. I
•
I
i
'
Constitution of India Art. 31(4), 31(6). 103(1), 103(2), 136(2), 227(4),
262(2), 327, 328, 329(a), (b). (considered).
G
"Clauses (4) mid (5) o1 Art. 329(A) i11trnd11ced by 39th Amendment are
not in total derogatio'n of Po/iticifll Justice ond hence Constitutional".
\
The concept of "Political Justice" of which the Preamble to the Constitution
of India speaks is too vague and nebulous to permit by its yardstick, the invali'
dati.on of a constitutional amendment.
There is no substance in the contention
1ba·: the relevant clauses of the 39th Amendment are in total derogation of "polL
tiC>tl justice" and are accordingly unconstitutional. [661 G.l
Clauses (4) and (5) of Art. 329(A) inserted hv the 39th Amendment do not
damage or destroy democratic structure of the Constitution.
H
398
A
B
c
D
E
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 ·s.c.R.
The contention that "Democracy" is an essential feature of the Constitution
is unassailable. If the democratic form of government is the corner-stone of
our constitution, the basic feature is the broad form of democracy that was
known to our Nation, when the constitution was enacted, with such adjustments
and modifications as exigencie~ ·may demand, but not so as to leave the mere
husk of a popular rule. Democracy is not a dogmatic: doctrine and no one can
suggest that a rule is authoritarian because some rights and safeguards. avail·
able to the people at the inception of its constitution have been abridged or ab·
rogated or because, as the result of a constitutional amendment, the form of
Government does not strictly comport with some classical defrnition of the
concept.
The needs of the Nati on may call for severe abne&ation, though
never the needs of the Rulers and evolutionary changes in the fundamental law
do not necessarily destroy the basic structure of its Government. What does
the law live for, if it is dead to living needs ? [661 H,. 662 A-DJ
An answer to the question whether the provisions contained in Articles 329A
( 4) and (5) are destructive of' the democratic form of government lies in the
comparison between the pre 39th Amendment period and the post 39th Amend~
ment period in the context of our constituti'on.
The substance of the matter
is the rule of the majority and the manner of ascertaining the will of the majority
is through the process of elections. The rule is still the rule of the majority
despite the 39th Amendment and no law or amendment of the fundamental
instrument has provided for the abrogation of the electoral process. In fact it
is through that process t.hat the electorate expressed its preference for the
appellant over the respondent. Articles 79, 80, 81, 100(1), 105 and 326 unimpaired as they remain even after the 39th amendment are enough assurance that
the Parliament is not leading the country to a totalitarian path. The impugned
provisions do not destroy the democratic structure of our government. [662 E,
663-B-C, D-El
Max Radin: "A restatement of Honfold" Harvard Law Review (1938)
Vol. 51, P. 1141, 1145; C.F. Storng; "Political Constitutions" E.L, B.S. (Ed. 2
Impression 1970) p. 172; Tennyson "Poems"; Sir Frederick Pollock "Essays in
Jurisprudence 'Essays & Morals' 303; Constitution of India Art. 79, 80, 81
100(1), 105 & 326 (considered).
"Provisidns of Art. 329(4) are outright negation of the right of equality conferred by Article 14".
F
G
The 39th Amendment is, however, open to grave objection on other grounds,
insofar as clause (4) and (5) of Article 329A are concerned. Generality
and equality are two indelible characteristics of justice administered according
India
to law.
The preamble to our constitution by .which the people of
resolved solemnly to secure to all its citizens equality of status and opportunity
finds its realization in an ampler· measure in Article 14 which guarantees equality
before the law and the equal protection Of laws to all persons, citizens and non.
citizens alike.
Equality is the faith and creed of our Democratic Republic and
without it, neither the constitution nor the laws made under it could reflect the
common conscience of those who owe allegiance to them. And if they did not,
they would fail to commandi. respect and obedience without which any constitution would be doomed to founder on the rocks of revolution. A constitution
which, without a true nexus, denies equality b.efore the law to its citizen may
in a form thinly disguised contain reprisals directed against private individuals in
matters of private rights and wrongs. [663 H, 664 A-Cl
Sir Frederick Pollock "Ethics and Morals (Essays in Jurisprudence) p. 303
Sir Frederick Pollock "Jurisprudence & Legal Essays" (1960) p. 195.
H
Article 329(a) (4) which makes the existing election laws retrospectively
inapplicable in a wry substantial measure, to the Parliamentary elections of
the Prime Minister and the Speaker, creates a legal vacuum.
The plaiD
intendment and meaning of Clause ( 4) is that the election of the tw~ .personages
will be beyond the reach of any Jaw, past or present. These prov!Sl:ins are .an
outright negation of the right of equality conferred by Art. 14, a nght which
'
.
•
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
399
me re than any other is a basic postulate of our constitution. It is true that
the right, though expressed in an absolute form, is hedged in by a judge .made
restriction that it is open to the Legi~lature to make a reasonable classification
so that the same law will not apply to all persons alike or different laws may
govern the rights and obligations of different persons falling within distinct
cla:ises. [664 D-E, G]
A
·,Plato's "Politicus" p. 294 quoted in Edmond Cahn "The sense of justice"
(19~) p. 161 (referr~d to).
B
"Clauses ( 4) & ( 5) of Art. 329A are arbitrary and are calculated to damage
or destroy the Rule of Law."
..
That the classification must be fo-unded on an intelligible differenth which
distinguishes those who are grouped together from those who are left c ~ot and
th<.t the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be
achieved by the particular law flows from the principle of equality.
The first
test may be assumed to be satisfied, since there i> no gainsaying that in our
system of Government, the Prime Minister occupies a unique position as a
"Primus inter pares."
But what is the nexus of the uniqueness with law
which provides that the election of the Prime Minister and the Speaker to the
Parliament will be above all laws, that the election will be governed by no
norms or standards applicable to all others who contest the efection and that
an election declared to be void by a High Court judgment shall be deemed to
h0 valid, the judgment and its finding;; being themselves required to be deemed to
be void ? Such is not the doctrine of classification and no facet of that doctrine
can support the favoured treatment accorded by the 39th Ame;idment to the
high personages. It is the common man's sense of justice which sustains
democracies and there is a fear that the 39th Ari1endment, by its impugned. part,
may outrage that sense of justice. Different rules may apply to different conditions and classes of men and even a single individual may, by his uniqueness,
form a class by himself. But in the absence of differentia reasonably related
to the object of the law, justice must be administered with an even hand to an.
[665 B-E]
State of Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, [1952] S.C.R. 284, (applied).
"The "Rule of law" means that the exercise of powers of government >hall
be conditioned by law and that suoject to the exceptions to the doctrine of
equality, no one shall be exposed to the arbitrary will of the Government. It
has been said in lighter vein, to show the supremacy of the Parliament, that
the charm of the English constitution is that"'it does not exist". But our constitution exists and must con!inue to exist. It guarantees equality before Jaw
and the equal protection of laws to everyone. The denial of such equality as
modified by the judicially evolwd theory of classification is the very negation
of rule of lii.w. It follows that clauses ( 4) and (5) of Article 329(A) are
arbitrary and are calculated to damage or destroy the Rule of Law. [665 G,
666 D-El
A. V. Dicey "Constitutional Law"; S. A. de Smith "Judicial of Administmtlve Action (1968) p. 5; Wade & Phillips; Constitutional Law (6th Edn.)
p. 70-73; (reforred to)
·C
D
E
F
G
Separation of Powers, principle of-Whether the 39th Amendment is invalid
on the ground that it abrogates the principle of "Separation of Powers".
The argument directed at showing the invalidation of the 39th Amendment
on the ground that it abrogates the principle of "separation of powers" is
replete with many possibilities since it has several side lights. Unlike the
American and Australian Constitutions which are rigid, ail Indian constitution
does not expressly vest the three kinds of power in three ditrerent organs of
the State. But the principle of "separation of powers" is not a magic· formula
for keeping the three organs of the State within the strict" confines of their
functions. [666 E, 667 C-Dl
Hi
400
A
SUPREME COURT REPORTS.
(1Q76) 2 S.C.R.
Granville Austin : The Indian Constitution : Corner-stones of
p. 186.
a
Nal.ion
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan 293 U.S. 388 @ 410; In re : Delhi La11•s Act
[1951] S.C.R. 747, 964. (Considered).
The existence and the limitations on the powers of three departments ot
governm~nt are due to the normal proces~ of specialisation in governmental busi-
:C
ness, which becomes more and more complex as civilisation advances. The legislature must make Jaws, the executive enforce them and tlie· judiciary interpret
them because they have in their respective field, acquired an expertise which
makes them competent to discharge their duly appointed J'unctions. The political usefulness of the doctrine of separation of powers is now widely recognised though a satisfactory definition of the three functions is difficult to evolve.
But the function of the Parliament is to make laws, not to decide cases. The
reason for this restraint is not that the Indian Constitution recognises any dgid
separation of powers. Plainly it does not. The reason is that the concentration of powers in any one organ may, by upsetting that fine balance between
th,e th~ee organs destroy the fundamental premises of a democratic government
to which we are pledged. [667 E-F, 668 A-CJ
Sir Carleton K. Allen "Law and Orders" 1965 Edn. p. 8 ·Madison: "The
Federalist"; Paton: Text Book of Jurisprudence (1964) p. 296. (referred to).
No constitution can survive without a conscious adherence to its fine check'
and balances. Just as courts ought not to enter into the problems entwined
in the "Political thicket", Parliament must also respect the preserve of the
.courts. Courts have, by and large, come to check their valourous propensities.
Jn the name of the constitution, the Parliament may not also turn· its attention from: th•e important task of legislation to deciding court cases for which
it lacks the expertise and the apparatus. If it gathers facts, it gathers tacts
of policy. If it records findings, it does so without a pleading and without
framing any issues. And worst of all if it decides a court case, it decides
without hearing the parties- and in defiance of the fundamental principles of
natural justice. [668 G-H, 669 A-Bl
Julius Stone: '"Social Dimensions of Law & Justice (1966) P. 668.
(referred to)
F
In the instant case, the Parliament by clause ( 4) of Art. 319A. has, decided
a matter of which the country's courts were lawfully seized. . Neither more nor
less. It is true, that retrospective validation is a well known legislative process
which has received the recognition of this Court in tax cases·, pre-emption cases.
tenancy cases and a variety of otlier matters including four election cases. But
in all these cases, what the legislature did was to change the Jaw retrospectively
so as to remove the reason of disqualification, leaving it to the couris to apply
the amended Jaw to the decision of the particular case. The exercise by the
legislature of what is purely and indubitably a judicial function is impossible to
sustain frt the context of our cooperafive federalism w.hich contains no rigid
distribution of powers but which provides a system of salutary checks and
balances. (669 B-El
•G
Harold Laski : "Grammar of Politics"; Kanta Kathuria v. Manak
Surc•na [1970] 2 SCR 835 (referred to).
Chand
It is contrary to the basic tenets of our constitution to hold that the Amending body is an amalgam of all powerS-legislative, executive and judicial.
"Whatsoever pleases the emperor has the force of law" is not an article of
democratic fai"th. The basis of our constitution is a well planned legal order,
the presuppositions Qf which are accepted by the people as determining the
methods; bv which the'.functions of the Government will be discharged and the
power of the State shall be used. [669 F-G]
.H
''Elertion Laws (Amendment Acts) are valid", Bharati's case is not an
authority that ordinary legislation must also answer to the same test as a constitutidnal cJ1swer. The tlzeorv of basic structure is wlwilv nut of place in
matre1'.~ relating 101 validities oi 01·dinary laws made under the constltutidn!'
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
I
40 1
( i) The argument regarding the invalidity of the Representation of the
People (Amendment) Act 58 of 1974 and of the Election Laws (Amendment
Act, 1.97 5) has, however no substance. [669 G]
\
)
A
(ii) The Constitutional Amendments may, on the ratio of the Fundamental
Rights case, be tested on the anvil of basic structure. But apart from !he pnncipl'e that a case is only an authority for what it decides it does not logically
follow from the majority judgment in Bharati's case, that ordinary legislation
must aho answer the same test as a constitutional amendment. Ordinary Jaws
have to answer two tests for their validity; ( 1) The law must be within the
legislative competence of' the legislatlire as defiRed in Chapter I Part XI of the
Constitution and ( 2) it must not offend against the provisions of Articles 13 ( 1l
and (2) of the Constitution. "Basic structure'', QY the majority Judgment is
not a part of the fundamental rights nor indeed a provision of the Cons!itution.
The theory of basic structure is wholly out of place iu matters relating to the
validity cf ordinary Jaws made under the Constitution. (669 G-H, 670 A-CJ
There is no paradox that the higher power should be subject to a limitation,
which will not operate upon a lower power. A constitutional amendment has
to be passed by a special majority and certain such amendments have to be
ratified by the legiSlature of not Jess than one, half of the States as provided
bv Art. 368(2). An ordinary legislation can be passed by a simple majority.
The two powers, though species of the same genus, operate in different fields
and are therefore subject to different limitations. [670 C-Dl
No objection can accordingly be taken to the constitutional validity of the
two imrugned Acts on the ground that they damage or destroy the basic
structure. The power to pass these Acts could be exercised retrospectively
~
. as n!uch as prospectively. [670 E]
c
D
"R(presentation of the People Amendment Act 58 of 1974, makes the issue
of expu:sl!s incurre(l by the political party ccaden1ic.''
The expenses incurred by the political party together with the expenses incurred by the appellant are not shown to exceed the prescribed ceiling. Apart
from that, Act 58 of 1974, makes that issue academic. (670 G]
E
"Vaiidity of Co11stit111io'11 (Thil'fyni/l/h Amendment) cannot be challenged
nn the ground that a number of members of Parliamelit were in detention and
were prcrented fron1 taking de/iQercl/ions in tile Parlia1nent."
Tk ·e is no' merit in the contention that the Constitutional amendment is
bad because it was passed when some members of the Parliament were in deten-·
tion. The legality of the detention orders cannot be canvassed in these appeals
collater21ll'. And from a practical point of view, the presence of 21 members
of the Lok Sabha and 10 members of the Rajya Sabha, who were in detention
could net have made a difference to the passing of the Amendment. (670 H,
671 Al
F
Argumems of Respondem No. 1 (Defeated Candidate)
(1) Th·~ :l9ih Amendment affects the basic structure or the framework of
the Con-titution adopted by the constitution and i9, therefore, beyond the
amend'nQ power conferred by Art. :168. It destroys the identity of the Constitutian.
G
(2) Separation of powers is a basic feature of the Constitution and, therefore, c,ery dispute involving the adjudication of legal rights must be left to the
decision of the judiciary. Clause four of Art. 329A iniroduced by the 39th
Amendr;-:ent takes away that .iurisdiction and is, therefore, void.
(3) The function of the legislature is to legislate and not decide private
dispute,. In the instant case the constituent assembly has transmitted its constitutional functions by adjudicating upon a private dispute.
( 4) Democracy is an essential feature of the Constitution. Free and fair
election' are indispen5able for the successful workin!I of any democratic Government by providi,ng that the election of the Prime Minister shall not be open to
H
402
A
B
c
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976) 2 S.C.R.
challenge and shall continue to be val.id despite the judgment of the Allahabad
High Court; holding that the election is vitiated by corrupt practices, the constituent assembly has destroyed the very core of democracy.
(5) Equality is an essential feature of a republican Constitution. The 39th
Amendment .puts the Prime Minister and the Speaker above the law and beyond
. the reach of the equality principle. The classification made by the· 39'i'h Amend.
ment bears no nexus with the sort of the immunity grahted to too high personages from the operation of election laws.
,
(6) The rule of law and judicial review are also basic features of the Constitution. To freeze certain persons from the constraints of law and to place their
conduct beyond the judicial review is to destroy the identity of the Constitution.
No freedom is secured without the court to protect it. The organic balance
between the three branches, the legislature, the executive and the judiciary is
upset by eroding the authority of the Supreme Court in the vital matteVi like
el('.9tions and the rule or law is abrogated by providing that the election of the
Prime Minister shall continue to be valid and will be open to no challenge
before any other authority whatsoever.
(7) The concept of political justice recognised by the preamble is Yiolated
by the 39th Amendment. The Constitution can always be subverted by revolutionary methods. The question is whether it is permissible to the Parliament
to use the legitimacy of the constitutional provisions for effecting revoluticnary
changes.
E'
F
(8) The .constituent power partakes of legislative power and can only be
exerciS't)d within the highest ambit of the latter power. Therefore, even With
a 2/3rd majority of the constituent body cannot exercise executive or judicial
power for example, the power to appoint or dismiss a Government servant or
the power to declare war which are executive powers cannot be exercised by the
constituent assembly. Similarly, it cannot be in the guise of amending the
Constitution provided that an accused arraigned before the criminal court shall
be acquittl;)d and shall be deemed to be innocent. The Constitution body can
make changes in the conditions of the exercise of judicial power but it cannot
usurp that power and lastly (9) The question in Fundamental Rights case was
whether Parliament can in the exercise of its powers of amendment abridge
or take away Fundamental Rights and whether there are any foherent or implied
limitations on the Parliament powers of amendment. Jn other words, the
· question was whether the power of amendment can be exercised so as to destroy
or mutilate the basic structure of the Constitution. The Fundamental Rights
case did not involve the consideration of the question as to what the power
of amendment comprehends. Promoting and demoting Gov~rnment servants
passing and failing students who have appeared in an examination granting or
withdrawing building contracts but not the least declaring whc ha~ won and
who has Jost an election are matters clearly outside the scope of the• amendi.,g
power under Article 368 which means and implies the power to alter the Fundamental instrument of country's governance.
Arguments for the constitutional validity of the 39th Amendmelll :
For the Appellants by A. K. Sen :
G
(1) The amendment follows well-known pattern of all validation Act3 bY
which the basi9 or judgments or orders of competent courts and tribunals is
changed and the judgments arid orders are made ineffective.
(2) The effect of validation i's to change the law so as to alter the basis of
any judgment. wbich might have been given on the basis of old law and, thus,
to make the judgment ineffective.
(3) A forn1al declaration that the judgment rendered under the old Act is
void is not necessary. If the matter is pending in appeal, the Appellate court
has to give effect to the altered law and reverse the judgment. If the matter
is not pending in appeal then the judgment ceases to be operative and binding
L 1
as res judicata.
~
I
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
403
(4) The rendering of a judgment ineffective by changing its basis b):' legis·
lative enactment is not an em;roachriient on judicial power but a legtsJation
within the competence of the Legislature rendering the basis of the judgment
non· est.
(5) The constituent power has retrospectively changed the law in so far
as it relates to election. The constituent authority could have left the applica~
tion of the changed law either to Parliament or to any other body. But, it has
chosen fr,, assume the duty of determination in thi~ particular case for itself.
•
r
A
B
(6) The determination of election disputes and the validity of elections is
not an exercise of judicial power. This function may be left either to courts
properly so called or to tribunals or to other bodies including the Legislature
itself.
(7) The rigid separa.ion of powers as it obtain in the United States of
America and in the lesser degree under the Australian, Constitution does not
apply to India. Many powers which are strictly judicial have been excluded
from the purview of the courts. Therefore, no question of any separation of
powers being involveJ in matters concerning elections and election petitions.
(8) There is no question of separatiOn of powers when the constituent
authority exercises either a power which is allocated to the legislature or to
the Executive or to the judiciary under the Constitntioh. In the hands of the
constituent authority there is no demarcation of powers. But, the demarcation
emerges only when it leaves the hands of the constituent authority through well.
defined channels into demarcated pools. The constituent power is independent
of the fetters or limitations imposed by separation of powers in the hands of
the organ~ of the Government amongst whom the supreme authority or the
State is allocated.
c
D
(9) The constituent power springs as the fountain head and partakes of
sovereignty and is the power which creates organs and distributes the power.
Therefore, in a sense, the, constituent power is all embracing and is at once
judicial, executive and legislative. It is in a sense a supreme power.
(I 0) Even if' the preamble Jays down as its objective, the 39th Constitution
amendment do~s not violate the said concept. of equality as the same is based
on a rational classification and has a reasonable nexus with the object of the
amendment.
(11 ). The preamble to the Constitution only refers to securing "equality of
status nnd opportunity". Equality of status and opportunity has· got manY
facets. Some of these facets are guaranteed as Fundamental Rights under Article
14 to l 8 of the Constitution. These facets alone can be considered to be
basic features of the Constitution assuming that equa!itv was a basic feature of
the Constitution.
·
(12) "Free and fair election" does not postulate that there must be a
constitutional provision for determining election disputes by a separate tribunal
or court.
(13) The 39th Amendment does not affect the structure of a republic demo·
cracy assuming that the sam~ is a basic feature of the Constitution. The validation of one election does not alter the character of the democrncy.
(14) A constitutional amendment need not necessarily be the structural erganisation of the .State.
Shri Jaganath Kaushal supported the argument of Shri Sen by citing pragmatic· Hlustrations. He gave interesting statistics showing that from very smaJl
percentage of election petitions succeed eventually which is evidenced with such
petitions are used by defeated candidates as an instrument against a successful
candidate. Parliament, therefore, wanted to save high personages from such
harass·mertt. A law may benefit a single individual and may still be valid.
The judgment of the A11ahabad High Court became a nullity by reason of that
Court ceasin!( retrospectively to have jurisdiction over the dispute and a judg·
men! which is a nullity need not be set aside. It can even challenged in a
collateral JJroceedings.
E
F
G
H
4 0-1
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 2 ·s.C.R.
(I) The majority decision in the fundamental Rights case is not an authority for the proposition ·that there could be no free or f'air elections without
judicial review. The Constitutions and laws of several countries leave the decision of election disputes to the judgment of the legislatures themselves. The
history of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 as also various articles
in our Constitution show that judicial review can be excluded in appropriate
cases as a matter of policy. (2) ·That validation of elections is a process wellknown to democratic forms of Government. ( 3) That a law may be constitutional even if it relates to a single individual if on account of special reasons,
the sirrgle individual could be treated as a class by himseli'. (4) That it is clear
from rn·ticles 326 and 327 of the Constitution that the Constitution-makers
thought that as a matter of high policy elections ought to be dealt with by the
Constitution itself and not by ordinary legislation passed within the framework
of the Constitution. How much of elections should be dealt with by the Constitution and how much should be relegated to ordinary legislation is not a matter
for the courts to decide. Jf the constituent body thought that the offices of the
Prime Minister and the Speaker are important eno\!.iUi to be dealt with by the
Constitution itself' in the matter of their elections to the Parliament, it cannot
be said that the dech;ion is frivolous or without jurisdiction; and that (5) The
contention tbat the 39th Amendment is not an exercise of cdnstituent power
should not be allowed to be taken up· because every possible aspect of the
matter was argued in Sankari Prasad's case, Sajjan Singh's case and the Fundamental Rights case. The basic question involved in these cases was as to what
is the meaning of the word 'amendment'. The argument now is that there is
a further limitation on the amendin_g power. If it is .the same question and. has
been de>ided, it cannot be reopened by saying that the question has a, new aspect
which was not considered then. Ti' the question is new, the principle of Fundamental Rights case cannot be extended any further. Therefore, the constituent
power must be held to be a plenary power on which the only limitation is as
regards the inviolability of the basi·c .structure.
.
f
Arguments of the Solicitor General:
( 1) Article 14 is founded on a sound public policy recognised and followed in all civilised States. The exclusion of judici'al review does not by itself'
mean !he negation of equality. Article 3 lB which on the face of it denied
equality to different sections of the community attained the ideal of economic
justice by bringing about economic ~quality. ~rticle 33 aJs.o shows that the
demands of public problems mav reqmre the ad1ustment of Fundamental Rights
for ensuring greater equality. (2) What a Constitution should contain depends
on what permanencv is intended to be accorded to a particular provision included in the Constitution (3) Exclusion of Judicial Review is at least permissible
in those fields where originally the Con.stitution did not provide for or contemplate judicial revfow. (4) Tf the election law does not apply. as it ceases to
applv ·by virtue of arti~le 329A(4l. it.is the £'unction of the legislature to declare
whether or not a narhcular elect19n 1s good or bad: and that the Rule of Law
is not " part of the basic structure of the Constitution and apart from article
J 4. our Constitution recognises neither the doctrine of equality nor the Rule
of Law.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 887 and 909
of 1975.
Appeals from the judgment a'.id order dated the 12th June, 1975
of the Allahabad High Court in Election Petition No. 5 of 1971.
H
'
Arguments of the Allomey General:
A.' K. Sen, .T. N. Kaushal. D. P. Singh, .T. B. Dadachanii. R. H.
Dhebar, Madun Gujadlwr, S.C. Agarwal, Yogeshwar Prasad, H.K. L.
Blwgat, Sudhir Bera, K. P. Bhandari and Mrs. Anjali K. Verma for
the Appellant (In C.A. No. 887175) and for Respondent No. 1 (In
CA No. 909 /75) .
,
.
I
I.
-
-
•
.I
....
.,.
r
.
. SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v~ RAJ NARAlN '(Ray,
C.J.)
405
Shanti Bhushan J. P. Goyal, R. C. Divivedi, R. C. Srivastava
Pranab Chatterji; s.'s. Khanduja, E. C. Agarwala, C. K. Ratnaparkhi,
M. C. Gupta, T. N. Parwal, U. N, R. Rao, C. K. Garg, B. Soloman,
K. C. Dua, Raghunath Singh and Sripal Singh for the Appelfant (In
CA No. 909175) ·and for Respondent N~. 1 (In C.A. No. 887175).
Niren De, Attorney General of India, Lal Narain Sinha, Solicitor
General for India and Dr. V. A. Said Mohammad, R. N. Sachthey,
P. P. Rao, Miss Sumitra Chakravarty and S. P. Nayar for the Attorney
General of India.
·
,
The following Judgments were delivered
RAY, C.J.-In Civil ·App~al No. 887 of 1975 the appellant is
Indira Nehru Gandhi and the respondent is Raj Narain. Civil
Appeal No. 909 of 1975 is the cross objection of the respondent .
0,1 14 Jnly, 1975 it was directed that both the appeals would be
heard together. The appeals arise out of the judgment of the High
Court of Allahabad dated 12 June, 1975. The High Court held that
the appellant held herself out as a candidate from 29 December, 1970
and was guilty of having committed corrupt practice by having obtained the assistance of Gazetted Officers in furtherance of her election prospects. The High Court further found the appellant guilty
of corrupt practice committed under section 123(7) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 hereinafter referred to as the· 1951
Act by havmg obtained the assistance of Yashpal Kapur a Gazetted
. Officer for the furtherance of her election prospects. T.he High Court
held the appellant to be disqualified for a period of six years from
the date of the order as provided in section 8(a) of the 1951 Act.
The High Court awarded costs of the election petition to the respondent.
·
It should be stated here that this ju_dgment disposes of both the
appeals. Under directions of this Court the original record of the
High Court was called for. The appeal filed by the respondent with
regard to Issues Nos. 2, 4, 6, 7 •and 9 formed the subject matter of
cross objections in Civil Appeal No. 909 of 1975. The cross objections are t® same which form grounds of appeal filed by the
respondent in the High Court at Allahabad, against an order of dismissal of Civil Misc. Writ No. 3761 of 1975 filed in the High
Court at Allahabad.
The Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment) Act, 1975 conl"ains
three principal features. First, Article 71 has been substituted by
a new Article 7L The new Article 71 states that subject to the provisioas of the Constitution, Parliament may by law regulate any
matter relating to or connected with the election of a President or
Vice-President including the grounds on which such election may be
·
questioned.
The second feature is insertion of Article 329A in the Constitution. Clause 4 of Article 329A is challenged in the present appeals.
There are six clauses in Article 329 A.
The first clause states that subject to the provisions of Chapter II
of Part V [except sub-clause (e) of clause (1) of Article 102] no
election to either House of Parliament of a person who holds the office
S-L126 SCI/76 '
A
B
c
D
G
H
406
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
{1976] 2 s.c.R.
of Prime Minister at the time of such election or is appointed as
Prime Minister after such election; and to the House of the People of
a person who holds the office of Speaker of that House at the time of
such election or who is chosen as the Speaker for that House after
such election, shall be called in question, except before such authority
(not being any such authority as is referred to in clause (b) of Article
329) or body and in such manner as may be provided for by or under
any law made by Parliament and any such law may provide for all
other matters relating to doubts and disputes in relation to such election including the grounds on which such election may be questioned.
Under the second clause the validity of any such law as is referred
to in clause ( 1) and the decision of any authority or body under such
law shall not be called in question in any court.
The third clause states that where any person is appointed as
Prime Minister or, as the case may be, chosen to the office of the
Speaker of the House of the People, while an election petition referred
to in Article 329 (b) in respect of his election to either House of
Parliament or, as the case may be, to the House of the People is pending, such election petition shall abate upon such person being appointed as Prime Minister or, as the case may be, being chosen to the office
of the Speaker of the House of the People, but such election may be
called in question under any such law as is referred to in dause ( 1).
The fourth clause which directly concerns the present appeals
states that no law made by Parliament before the commencement of
the Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment) Act, 1975, in so far as
it relates to election petitions and matters connected therewill1, shall
apply or shall be deemed ever to have applied to or in relation to the
ekction of any such person as is referred to in clause ( 1) to either
House of Parliament and such election shall not be deemed to be
void or ever to have become void on any ground on which such election could be declared to be void under any such law and notwithstanding any order made by any court, before such commencement,
declaring such election to be void, such election shall continue to be
valid in all respects and any such order and any finding on which such
order is based shall be and shall be deemed always to have been void
and of no effect.
The fifth clause states that any appeal or cross appeal against any
such order of any court as is referred to in clause ( 4) pending immediately before the commencement of the Constitution (Thirty-ninth
Amendment) Act, 1975, before the Supreme Court shall be disposed
of in conformity with the provisions of clause ( 4).
'
'
•
f
•
The sixth clause states that the provisions of this Article shall have
effect notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution.
H
The third feature in the Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment)
Act is that in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution after Entry 86
and before the Explanation several Entries No. 87 to 124 inclusive
are inserted. The Representation of the People Act, 1951, the Representation of the People (Amendment) Act, 1974 and the Election
Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975 are mentioned in Entry 87.
...
SMT. lll!DIRA GANDHI
1
t
v. RAJ NARAIN (Ray, C.J.)
407
The respondent contends that the Representation of the People A
(Aniendment) Act., 1974 and the Election Laws (Amendment) ~ct,
1975 referred to as the Amendment Acts, 1974 and 1975 do not enJ~Y
constitutional immunity because these Acts destroy or damage basic
.structure or basic features.
In view of the challenge by the respondent to the constitutional
validity of the Amendment Acts, 1974 and 1975 notice was given to B
the Attorney General.
The appeals were to be heard on 11 August, 1975. In view of the
Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment) Act, 1975 which came into
existence on 10 August, 1975 the hearing was adjourned till 25 August,
1975.
The constitutional validity of clause ( 4) of Article 329A falls for
.consideration. Clause ( 4) of Article 329A is challenged on two
c
grounds. First, it destroys or damages the basic features or basic
structure of the Constitution. Reliance is placed in support of the
contention on the majority view of 7 learned Judges in His Holiness
Kesavananda Bharati Sripadanagalavaru v. State of Kera/a and
Another( 1 ).
It should be stated here that the hearing has proceeded on the
assumption that it is not necessary to challenge the majority view in D
Kesavananda Bharati's(<1) case. The contentions of the respondent
.are these : First, under Article 368 only general principles governing
the organs of the State and the basic principles can be laid down. An
.amendment of the Constitution does not contemplate any decision in
ce&pect of individual cases. Clause ( 4) of Article 329A is said to be
exercise of a purely judicial power which is not included in the constiE
·tuent power conferred by Article 368.
. Second, the control over the result of the elections and on the question whether the election of any person is valid or invalid is vested
in the judiciary under the provisions of Article 329 and Article 136.
The jurisdiction of judicial determination is taken away, and, therefore, the democratic character of the Constitution is destroyed.
T~ird, th~ A~endment destroys and abrogates the principle of
F
equahty. It 1s said that there is no rational basis for differentiation
between persons holding high offices and other persons elected to
Parliament.
Fourth, the rule of law i& the basis for democracy and judicial
review. The fourth clause mak~s the provisions of Part VI of the
Representation of the People Act inapplicable to the election of the
Prime Minister and the Speaker.
Fifth, clause ( 4) destroys not only judicial review but also separation of power. The order of the High Court declaring the election to
be void is declared valid. The cancellation of the judgment is denial
of political justice which is the basic structure of the Constitution.
The second ground is that the constitution of the House which
passed the Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment) Act is illegal. It
is said that a number of members of Parliament of the two Houses
---(1) [1973] Supp. S.C.R.1.
G
H
.
408.
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
.
;
SUPREME
COURT REPORTS
J
.
- [19761 2 s.c.R.
were detained by executive order after 26 June, .1975.. These persons
were not supplied any grounds of detention or given any opportunity
of making a representation against their detention. Uniess the President convenes a session of the full Parliament by giving to all members
thereof an opportunity to attend the session and exercise their right
of speech and vote, the convening of the session will suffer from illegality and unconstitutionality and cannot be regarded as a session of
the two Houses of Parliament. The mere fact that a person may be
deprived of his dght to move any court to secure his release from such
illegal detention by means of a presidential order under Article 359
does not render the detention itself either legal or constitutional. The
important leaders of the House have been prevented from participation. Holding of the session and transacting business are unconstitu·
tional.
Under the first ground these are the contentions. The Constitution Amendment affects the basic structure of institutional pattern
adopted by the Constitution. The basic feature of separation of
powers with the role of independence of judiciary is changed by denying jurisdiction of this Court to test the validity of the election. The
essential feature of democracy will be destroyed if power is conceded
to Parliament to declare the elections void according to law under
which it has been held to valid. This is illustrated by saying that
Parliament can· by law declare the election of persons against predominant ruling party to be void. If the majority party controls the
legislature and the executive, the legislature could not have any say as
to whether t.he executive was properly elected. Free and fair elections
are part of democratic structure and an election which has been held
to be invalid for violation of the principles of free and fair elections
and by commfasion of corrupt practices is validated. The basic structure of equality is violated by providing that those who hold office of
Prime Minister and Speaker are above law although election laws were
there. The persons who will hold the office of Prime Minister and
Speaker have been free from those laws and they are not under rule of
law and there is no judicial review with regard to their elections.
The nature of the constituent power is legislative. The constituent
power cannot exercise judicial power. Exercise of judicial power or
of a purely executive power is n9t power of amendment of the Constitution. The Constitution may be amended to change constitutional
provisions but the constituent power cannot enact that a person is
declared to be elected. The consequence of change of law may be
that the decision given by a co_urt under the law as it stood will not
stan<l.
The respondent contends that judicial review is an essential feature
of basic structure because of the doctrine of separation of powers for
these reasons : Judicial review is basic structure in the matter of election to ensure free, fair and pure election. In the American and the
Australian Constitutions the judicial power of the State is located in
the judiciary. There is no such provision in our Constitution. The
Executive, tbe Legislature and the Judiciary are all treated under our
Constitution with respective spheres. The jurisdiction of this Court
and of High Courts under our Constitution .is dealt with by Articles
under th« Heads of the Union Judiciary and the State Judiciary. Under
'
•
t
I
&MI. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
----- ..
t •
.
(Ray, C.J.)
409
Article 136 any Tribunal or Court is amenable to the jurisdiction of A
this Court. The corollary drawn from this is that if under clause (4)
of article 329A of the Thirty-ninth Amendment the power of judicial
review is taken away it amounts to destruction of basic structure.
In England formerly Parliament used to hear election disputes. In
1870 Parliament found that because of political factions it would be
B
better to leave the task of deciding controverted elections to Judges.
Pariiament delegated its power of deciding controverted elections to
Courts. Under the English Law the Courts hear and make a report
to Parliament. In America each House shall be the judge of the
eleclions, returns and qualifications of its own Members. That is
Article 1 Section 5 of the American Constitution. In Australia any
question of a disputed election to either Horise, shall be determined by
the House in which the question arises. Under the German Federal C
Republic Constitution the legislature decides whether a person has
lost his seat. Against the decision of the Bundestag an appeal shall
lie to the Federal Constitutional Court.
The view of Story on the American Constitution is that the power
to judge elections, returns and qualifications of the members of each
House composing the legislature is to be lodged in the legislature.
Story says that no other body can be so perpetually watchful to guard D
its own rights and privileges from infringement (See Story page 585).
In Corpus Juris Vol. 16 (1956) it is said that the judiciary cannot exercise powers which are to be found in the other two departments of Government which are normally legislative or powers which
are generally executive in their nature. All ma.tters relating to or
affecting elections are political questions and, as such, are not questions for the judiciary. All matters relating to or affecting elections E
are, in the absence of controlling constitutional or statutory provisions
to the c0ntrary, political questions and, as such are, not questions for
the judiciary. So, subject to express constitutional restrictions, all
matters relating to the holding of elections and determining their
results, including contests are political questions (pp. 691, 692; 710).
In Corpus Juris Vol. 29 (1965) it is stated that under constitu- F
tional provision conferring on the "legislature the power to determine
by law, before what authority, and in what manner the trial of con- .
tested elections shall be conducted, the legislature is given broad power.
A constitutimial provision authorising the legislature to provide for
the mode of contesting elections in all cases not otherwise specifically
provided for in the Constitution itself confers on the legislature adequate authority to provide for all election contests and to determine G
where and by what means election contests shall be conducted. The
right to contest an election is not a common law right. . Elections
belong to the political branch of the Government, and, in the absence
of the special constitutional or statutory provisions, are beyond the
controi of the judicial power. (Sections 245, 246). A contested
election case is a proceeding in which the public is interested, since
it is for the public good. An election contest is not merely a proceedH
ing. for the adjudication and settlement of the private rights of rival
cla~mat~ts to an office. Tt is the public interest, not the parties' claims,
which 1s the paramount legislative concern (Section 24 7).
410
A
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 'S.C.R.
In America disputed elections are decided by the Legislature.
In
Taylor v. Beckham(<!) the American Supreme Court held that a deter-
mination of an election contest for the office of the Governor is a
political question and is not justiciable. In Truman H. Newberry v.
United States of America(2) the American Supreme Court held that
the manner of elections can be controlled. In David S. Barry v.
United States of America Ex. Rel. Thomas W. Cunninggham( 3 ) the
B decision of the American Supreme Court in Charles W. Baker v. Joe
C. Carr( 4 ) was referred to in order to find out as to what aspects of
elections would be justiciable and not a political question. In Baker
v. Carr (supra) the delimitation of constituencies was held to be a
justiciable issue. In Julian Bond v. James 'Sloppy' Floyd( 5 ) the
exclusion of an elected representative because of his statement attacking the Vietnam policy was held to be justiciable on the ground that
c it was not within the jurisdiction of the Legislature to find out whether
a member was sincere in regard to his oath of the legislature. Jn
Adam Clayton Powell v. John w:- McCormack(6) the disqualificatioll'
by the House of a Congressman on the basis of qualification on the
ground which was not in the Constitution was held to be justiciable.
The Federal District Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter
of controversies arising under the Constitution. The conferment of
D power on each House in Americ<t to be a judge of elections is an exclu. sive ground of power and constitutes the House to be the sole and ultimate Tribunal.
E
G
H
'
•
-
The American decisions show that if the House claims additionaI
power to disqualify a member on the ground other than those stated
in the Constitution _judicial review against disqualification would be
available. In Bond's case (supra) disqualification was on an unconstitutional ground that his statement on Vietnam policy was a matter of free speech and expression. The court did not decide an
election dispute but as a custodian of judicial power judged whether
the House was acting within its power.
Parliam~nt itself can also hear election disputes.
That was the
English practice until the Grenville Act, 1868 when Parliament conferred power on courts. Before 1770, controverted elections were
tried by the whole House of Commons as party questfons., The House
found that the exercise of its privilege could be submitted to a Tribunal
constituted by law to secure impartiality in the administration of justice
according to the laws of the lan,d. Jn !868 the jurisdiction of the
House in the trial of controverted elections was transferred by statute
to the courts of law. The present procedure is contained in the
English Representation of the People Act, 1949. The trial is confided to judges selected from the judiciary. ProviSfon iS made in eaclr
case for constituting a rota from whom these judges are selected. The
House has no cognizance of these proceedings until their determination when the judges certify their determination, ill writing, to the
Speaker, which is final to all intents and purposes. Trial is not a proceeding of the House. The judges are to make a report in any case
--------
(!) 44 L. Ed. 547.
(3) 73 L. Ed. 867.
(5) 17 L. Ed. 2d 235.
(2) 65 L. Ed. 913.
(4) 7 L. Ed. 2d, 663,
(6) 2J L. Ed~ Zd 491.
•
I
-
I
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
•
(Ray, C.J.)
411
Where charge has been made in the petition of corrupt and illegal
practice. Provision is also made for the trial of a special case. All
certificates and reports of the election court are entered in the Journals
of the House. Under section 124 (5) of the English Representation
of the People Act, 1949, it is the duty of the House to make orders
for carying the determination of the judges into execution.
Judicial review in many matters under statute may be excluded.
In rnauy cases special jurisdiction is created to deal with matt(lrs
assigned to such authorities. A special forum is even created to hear
election disputes. A right of appeal may be conferred against such
decision. If Parliament acts as the forum for determination of election disputes it may be a question of parliamentary privilege and the
courts may not entertain any review from such dec~sions. That is
because the exercise of power by the Legislature in determining disputed elections may be called legislative power. A distinctidn arises
between what can be called the traditional judicial determination by·
·courts and tribunals on the one hand and the peculiar jurisdiction by
the legislature in determining controverted elections on the other.
The legal order is a system of general •and individual norms connected with each other according to the principle that law regulates its
own creation. Each norm of this order is created according to the
provisions of another norm and ultimately according to the provisions
of the basic norm constituting the unity of this system, the legal order.
A norm belongs to a certain legal order, because it is created by an
organ of the legal community constituted by this order. Creation of law
is application of law. The creation of a legal norm is normally an
application of the higher norm, regulating its creation. The application of higher norm is the creation of a lower norm determined by the
higher norm. A judicial decision is an act by which a general norm, a
statute, is applied but at the same time an individual norm is created
binding one or both parties to the conflict. Legislation is creation of
law. Taking it into account is application of law. The higher norm
may determine the organ and. the procedure by which a lower norm
and the contents of the lower norm are created. For a norm the creation of which is not determined at all by another norm cannot belong
to another legal order. The individual creating a norm cannot be
considered the organ of the legal community, his norm-creating function cannot be imputed to the community, unless in performing the
function he applies a norm of the legal order constituting the community. Every law-creating act must be a law applying act. It must
apply a nnrm preceding the act in order to be an act of the legal 0rder
or the community constituted by it. When settling a dispute between
two parties a court applies a general norm or statutory or customary law. Simultaneously, the court creates an individual norm pro·
viding that a definite sanction shall be executed against a definite individual. The individual norm is related to the general norm as the
statute is related to the constitution. The judicial function is thus like
legislation. both creation and application of law. The iudicial function is ordinarily determined by the general norms both as to procedure and as to the contents of the norm to be created, whereas legis·
lation is usuallv determined by the constitution only in the former
respect.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
412
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
,H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 s.c.R.
The general norm which attaches abstractly determined consequences, has to be applied to concrete cases in order that the sanction
determined in abstract may be ordered and executed in concrete. The
two es5cntial elements of judicial functions are to apply a pre-existing
general norm in which a certain consequence is attached to certain
conditions. The existence of the concrete conditions in connection
with the concrete consequence arc what may be called individualization
of the general and abstract norm to the individual norm of the judicial
decision.
The contention is that the constituent power is . an exercise in
legislative process. The constituent power, it is said, can exercise
legislative as well as judicial and executive powers. It is said that
if a legislation can validate a matter declared invalid by a judgment
the constituent power may equally do so. Special emphasis is laid
on Article 102 ( 1) (a) of the Constitutiot,1 which is amended by the
Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment) Act. Article 102(1) (e)
speaks of disqualification by certain laws. The constitutional amendment seeks to amend Article 102 and remove the disqualificutidn. in
the case of the Prime Minister a111d the Speaker. Reliance was placed
on the decisions in Abeyesekera v. Jayabilake(1) and Piare Dusadh
& Ors. v. The King Emperor(') tllat an ameindment is supportable to
invalidate a judgment.
Abeyesekera's case (supra) is an authority for the proposition
that the legal infirmity can be removed and active indemnity can be
passt:d to relieve from penalties incurred.
In Piare Dusadh's case (supra) the Special Criminal Courts (Repeal) Ordinance, 1943 which conferred validity and full effectiveness
on sentences passed by special courts which functioned under the
Special Criminal Courts Ordinance, 1942 was challenged. It \v>as
argued in Piare Dusadh's case (supra) that the 1943 Ordina'ace attempted to exercise judicial power. The Federal. Court did not accept
the contenti0n on the ground that in India the legislature has enacted
laws providing that suits which had -been dismissed on a particular
view of. the law must be restored and retried. Our Federal Court
said that Parliament simply takes up· certain determinations which
exist in fact, though made witllout autllority, and prescribes not that
they shall be acts done by a Board of Review, but that tlley shall be
treated as they would be treated if tlley were such acts. The sections
do not constitute an exercise of the judicial power. The legislature
had not attempted to decide the question of the guilt or innocence
of any of the accused. The question had as a matter of fact been
decided ·by tribunals which were directed to follow a certain judicial
procedure. · Our Federal Court held that once the decisions of the
special courts were held void for want of jurisdiction the legislature
created those special courts a•ad authorised them to try cases and
pass sentences. The legis1'ature gave jurisdiction to the courts to pass
the sentences. The Ordinance did not exercise any judicial power
because the sentences in due course were subject to an appeal and
review by the regular courts of the land.
or [1932] A. c. 260.
(2) [1944) F.C.R. 61.
'
•
'
_.
•
•
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
':\ J
)
I
(Ray, C.J.)
413
The power of the legislature to validate matters which have been
found by judgments or orders oLcompetent courts and Tribunals to be
invalid or illegal is a well-known pattern. The legislature validates
acts and things done by which the basis of judgments or onlers of
competent courts and Tribunals is changed and the judgments and
orders are made ineffective. All the Sales Tax Validatiua cases, the
election validation cases ure illustrations of that proposition. The
present appeals are not of the type of providing indemnity against
penalties or determining existing facts to be treated in accordance
with change of law.
The effect of validation is to cha1age the law so oas to alter the
basis of any judgment, which might have been given on the basis of
old law and thus make the judgment ineffective. A formal declaration that the judgment rendered under the old Act is void, is not
necessary. If the matter is pending in appeal, the •appellate court
has to give effect to the altered law and reverse the judgment. The
rendering of a judgment ineffective by changing its basis by legisiative
enactment is not an encroachment on judicial power but a legislation
within the competence of the Legislature rendering the b•asis of the
judgme'at non-est. If a competent court has found that a particular
tax or levy has been imposed by a law, which is. void because the
legislature passing the law was not competent to pass the law, then
the competent legislature hoas validated the tax or levy by a validation
Act involving a reenactment of the invalid law. Where the competent
legislature has passed a law which is contrary to any of the Fundamental Rights in Part III of the Constitutio1,1 and the law has been
declared void by 'a competent court, the appropriate legislature has
passed a retrospective law validating the actions taken under the old
invalid law by curing the defects in the old law so as to make the
new law consistent with Part III of the Constitution.
Where invalid elections declared by reason of corrupt practices
hoave .beea validated by changing the definition of corrupt practices
in the Representation of the People Act, 1951 retrospectively the
(See Kanta Kqthuria v.
original judgment is rendered ineffective.
Manak Chand Surana(l)
Our Federal Court in Basanta Chandra Ghose v. The King Emperor(2) dealt with the validity -and effect of Ordinance No. 3 of
1944. One of the objects of that Ordinance was to enact a presumption in the Ordinance itself in favour of detention orders to preclude
their being questioned in courts of law and to take away or limit the ·
power of the High Court to make orders under section 491 of the
Criminal Procedure Code. . The third object of the Ordinance was
challenged on the grou',1d thoat section 10(2) of the Ordinance which
provided that if at the commencement there is pending fa. any Court
a~y proceeding by which the validity of an order having effect by
VIItue of section 6 as if it had been made under .this Ordinance is
called in question, that proceedrag is hereby discharged. Section
10(2) of the Ordinance was challenged on the ground that this woas
in abrogation of judicial power by legislative authority. It was said
(1) [1970) 2 S.C.K 830.
(2) [1944] F.C.R. 295
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
•
414
A
B
c
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 2 ·s.C,R.
that the. legislative authority on.ly passed t~e law and the disposal of
the particular case could remam the funct10n of the court. Section
10(2) of the Ordinance w~s. said not to leave it tq the court to apply
the rule. of law lo the dec1s10n of cases but to discharge all pendin§
proceedmgs. Our Federal Court noticed the distinction between a
legislative act and the judicial act, and said "a directio\1 such a proceeding is discharged is clearly a judicial act and not an enactment
of l~w". In Piare Dusadh's case (supra) the latter Ordinance
~rov1ded that .t~e decisions of the earli~r Tribunals which were negatived by a dec1s10n of the Federal Court should be treated as decisions
of duly constituted Tribunals. That was held not to constitute a
judicial power by the Ordinance making authority. In Basanta
Chandra Ghose's case (supra) the Federal Court held section 10(2)
?f the Ordinance to be a direct disposal .of cases by the legislature
itself. Basanta Chandra Ghose's case (supra)· was decided on the
ground that the section in the Ordinance discharged the proceedings.
There was nothing left to the Court.
•
•
Counsel on behalf of the resoondent contended that the constituent power could deal with amendments of the Constitution, but could
not exercise constituent power in relation to validating an election.
0
Judic:·al Review is one of the distinctive features of the American
Constitutional Law. In America equal protection of the laws is
based on the concept of due process of law. These features are not
in our Constitution.
In Bond's case (supra) the House claimed additional power to
disqualify a member on grounds other than those stated in the ConstiE tution. It was conceded there as it will appear at page 244 of the
Report that judicial review against the disqualification decreed by the
House would be available if a member was excluded on racial ground
or other unconstitutional grounds. The House claimed that the
ground on which Bond was disqualified was 111ot an unconstitutional
ground. The court held that there was no distinction between a
disqualification decreed by the House on racial grounds and one alF leged to violate the right of free speech. The court concluded that
Bond was deprived of his constitutional rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment by the disqualification decreed by the House. This was
not a case of deciding an election dispute by the House and the Courtsitting on appeal on the decision of the House. This is a case where
a disqualification was imposed on unconstitutional grounds, thereby
·affecting the fundamental rights of Boi1d. This is not an authority
G for the proposition that the decision of the House on an election dispute would be open to judicial review.
H
The case of Powell v. McCormack (supra) is also one of disqualification by the House of a Congressman on the basis of qualification
which the House added to those specified in the ConstitutiO'n. In
other words, the House purported to unseat a member by disqualifying him on a ground not given in the Constitution. This was net a
case of deciding an election dispute. Under_ the statute in question
the Federa[ District Court had jurisdiction over all civil action where
controversy arises uader the Constitution. This was a case entertain-
•
,.
'
I
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN (Ray; C.J..)
41 5
ed on the ground that exclusion of a member of the House was uncomtitutional. This case is an authority for the proposition that if
a power is committed to a particular organ, the court cannot adjudicate upon it. Where a power is exercised by one organ, which is
not committed to that particular orga!1 of the State and such exercise
of power is violative of a constitutional provision the matter becomes
cognizable by courts. The Court held that a question of unconstitutional exclusion of a member is not barred from judicial review as a
political question.
)
Judicial review is not to be founded on any Article simifar to the
American Constitution. Jn the Australian Constitution also the jµdicial power is located in the court. The doctrine of separation of
_powers is carried into effect in countries like America, Australia. In
our Constitution there is separation of powers in a broad sense. But
the larger question is whether there is any doctrine of separation of
powers when it comes to exercise of constituent power. The doctrine of separation of powers as recognised in America is not applicable to our country. (See Delhi Laws Act( 1 ), Jayantilal Sodhan v.
F. N. Rana('), Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.( 3 )
•and Udai Ram Sharma and Ors. etc. v. Union of India & Ors(4)
The rigid separation of powers as under the American Constitution
or under the Australian Constitution does not apply to our country.
Many powers which are strictly judicial have been excluded from the
purview of the courts. The whole subject of election has been left
to cc;urts · traditionally under the Common Law and election disputes
and matters are governed by the Legislature. The questioln of the
determination of election disputes has particularly been regarded as a
~pecial pri:-rilege of Parliament in England. It is a political question
m the U\11ted States. Under our Constitution Parliament has inherited all the privileges, powers and immunities of the British House
of Commons. In the case of election disputes Parliament has defined
the proced~re by law. It can at any time change that procedure and
take_ over 1tsel~ the whole question. There is, therefore, no questio·n
of a~y separation of powers being involved in matters concerning
elect10ns and election petitions.
When the constituent power exercises powers the constituent
power comprises legislative, executive and judicial powers. All
powers flow from the constituent power through the Constitution to
the various departm_ents or heads. In the hands of the constitueiat
authority there is no demarcation of powers. It is only when the
constituent authority defines the uuthorities or demarcates the areas
that separation of power is discussed. The constituent power is independent of the doctrine of separation of powers. The co~1stituent
power is sovereign. It is the power which creates the organs and
distributes the powers.
(1) [1951] S.C.R. 747 at 965-66.
(2) [1964] 5, S.C.R. 294.
(3) [1967] 1 S.C.R. 77 at 87.
(4) [1968] 3 S.C.R. 41 at 67.
B.
c
D
E
G
H
416
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 2 S.C.R.
\
A
The constituent power is sui generis. It is different from legislative power. The position of un-limited law making power is the
criterion of legal sovereignty. The constituent power is sovereign
because the Constitution flows from the constituent power.
Ja Article 329A an exercise of judicial power is the question for
determination. In legislative processes there may be judicial process.
B If the legislature has to fix the amount or lay down the principle for
fixation of amount the question will arise as to whether this is exercise of judicial power. The determination of the amount will involve
judicral procedure. When the legislature determines the amount the
fixation of amount is purely by legislative process. But in doffig so
the legislature takes into account factors relevant to individual properties.
Every organ of the State has to ascertain facts ·which make the
c
foundation of its own decision. The executive usually collects its
materi•als through its departments. The judiciary acts in a field where
there are two or more parties before it and upon evidence placed
before it, pro1aounces its verdict according to principles of natural
justice. The legislature is entitled to obtain information from any
. source. The legislature may call witnesses. The rule of Audi
U Alteram Partem is not applicable in a legislative process. Legislation is usually general. It may sometimes be for special reasons an
individual case. There is no doubt that the constituent power is not
the same as legislative power. The distinctlo<a between constituent
power and legislative power is always to be borne in mind because
the constituent power is higher in norm.
Judicial review in election disputes is not a compulsion. Judicial
review of decisions in election disputes may be entrusted by law to
a Judicial Tribunal. If it is to a Tribunal or to the High Court the
judicial review will be attracted either under the relevant law providing for appe•al to this Court or Article 136 may be attracted. Under
Article 329(b) the contemplated law may vest the power to entertain
election petitions in the House itself which may determine the dispute by a resolution after receiving a report from a special Committee.
In such cases judicial review may be eliminated without involving
amel11dment of the Constitution. The Constitution permits by amendment exclusion of judicial review of a matter if ii is necessary to give
effect to the Directive Principles of State Policy. A similar power
may be available when such exclusionis needed in the larger interest
of the security of the State. In either case the exclusion of judicial
review
does not mean that principles of equality are violated. It only
G
means that the appropri'ate body making t_he law satisfied itself and
determi'iles conclusively that principles of equality have not _been
violated. That body conclusiveJy makes classification for the purpose
of applying the principles of equaHty. It is said that in this class of
cases the answer to the question of the validity of the cl>assification
rests on factors to which the court has no access and the materials
may be of highly confidential nature and the decision has to be on
H
a matter of political necessity. If judicial review is excluded the court
is not in a position to conclude that principles of equality have been
violated.
•
J
'
'
SM'r. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAlN (Ray, C.J.)
417
Equality of status as ·well as equ:ility _of opportunity is a fund~
mental rightin Artieles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It also means
equality before law and equal protection of the laws. Equality is
spoken in the ~re-amble. The:e is liberty to legislat~re. to cl~sify .to
establish equality. When Articles 31A and 31B elmunated JUd1c1al
review the meaning was not that the legislature would go 0'11 discriminating. The task of classification can be· left to the legislature. It
is the very nature of legislation. that classification must be in public
interest. The amending body has excluded judicial review in Articles
31A, 31B and 31C.
Exclusion · of the operation of the equality pdaciple from some
fields is constitutionally possible. Article 33 excludes judicial review
in matters relating t<;> the Armed Forces. ~rticle 262(2) excludes
jurisdiction of courts in water disputes.
Decisions in election disputes may be made by the legislature
itself or may be made by courts or tribunals on behalf of the legislature or may be made by courts and tribunals on thei: own_ exercising
judicial functions. The concept of free and fair election is worked
out by the Representation of the People Act. The Act provides a
definifam of "corrupt practice" for the guidance of the cotirt. In
making tlle law the legislature acts on the concept of free and fair
election. In any legislation relating to the validity of elections the
concept of free and fair elections is an important consideration. In
the process of election the consept of free .and fair election is worked
out by formulating the principles_ of franchise, and the free exercise
of fraachise. In cases of disputes as to election, the concept of free
and fair election means that disputes are fairly and justly decided.
Electoral offences are statutory ones. It is not possible to hold that
the concept of free and fair election is a basic structure, as contended for by the respondent. Some people may advocate universal
franchise. Some people may advocate proportional representation.
Some people may advocate educational qualfiication for voters. Some
people may advocate property qualifications for voters. Instances
can be multipled on divergence of views in regard to qualifications for
voters, qualifications of members, forms of corrupt practices. That is
why there is law relating to and regulating elections.
Clause ( 4) in Article 329A has done four things. First, it has
wiped out n~t merely the judgment but also the election petition and
the law relatmg thereto. Secondly, it has deprived the right to raise
a dispute about the. validity o_f the .election by not having provided
another forum. Thtrd, there is no Judgment to deal with and no
rig~t or dispu~e t<? adjudicate upon. ~ourth, the constituent power
of 1.ts own legislative 1udgment has validated the election.
At the outset it has to be noticed that constituent power is not
!he san1~ as ordinary law-ma~ing power. On behalf of the appellant
tt was nghtly contended that 1f any amendment of Article 102(1) (a)
of the Constitution had to be made, it had to be made by amendment
of the Constitution. The matter does not rest there.
If no law prior to the Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment) Act
will apnly to election petitions or matters connected therewith the
result is that there is not only no forum for adjudication of election
\
c
D
E
F
G
H
418
B
·C
0
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 'S.C,R.
disputes but that there is also no election petition in the eye of law.
The insurmountable difficult is in regard to the process and result of
validating the election by clause ( 4). Two answers were given on behalf of the appellant. One was that the validation of the election is itself
the law. The other was that the constituent power applied its own norms
to the election petition. Both the answers are unacceptable. The
election petition itself did not have any existence in law there was no
petition which could be looked into by the constituent power. If
there was no petition to look into it is difficult to comprehend &S to
what norms were applied to the election dispute. The dispute has
to be seen. The dispute has to be adjudicated upon.
Clause ( 4) suffers from these infirmities. First, the forum might
be changed but another forum has to be created. If the constituent
power became itself the forum to decide the disputes the constituent
power by repealing the law in relation to election petitions and
matters connected therewith did not have any petition to seize upon
to deal with the same. Secondly, any decision is to be made in
accordance with law. Parliament has power to create law and apply
the same. In the present case, the constituent powers did not have
any law Lo apply to the case, because the previous law did not apply
and no other law was applied by clause ( 4). The validation of the
election in the present case is, therefore, not by applying any law and
it, therefore, offends Rule of Law.
lt is true that no express mention is made in our Constitution of
vesting the judiciary the Judicial power as is to be found in the
American Constitution. But a division of the three main functions
of Government is recognised in our Constitution. Judicial power in
the sense of the judicial power of the State is vested in Lhe Judic;iary.
Similarly, the Executive and the Legislature a:re vested with powers
in their spheres. Judicial power has lain in the hands of the Judiciary
prior to the Constitution and also since the Constitution. It is not
the intention that the powers of the Judiciary should be passed to- or
be shared by the Executive or the Legislature or that the powers of
the Legislature or the Executive should pass to or be shared by the
Judiciary.
The constituent power is sovereign. Law making power is subject to the Constitution. Parliament may create forum to hear
election disputes. Parliament may itself hear election disputes.
Whichever body will hear election disputes will have to apply norms.
Norms ar~ legal standards. There is no discrimination if classification on rational basis is made for determination of disputes relating
to perso:1s holding the office of Prime Minister or the Speaker. The
changes effected by the Amendment Acts, 1974 and 1975 apply to
all and there is no discrimination. Retrospective legislation is 110t
by itself discrimination. The changes introduced to the 1951 Act
apply to all.
Clause 4 of Article 329A in the present case in validating the
election has passed a declaratory judgment and not a law. The
legislative judgment in clause 4 is an exercise of judicial power. The
constituent power can exercise judicial power but it has to apply
law.
\
•
i
'
SMT. INDIRA GANPHI v. RAJ NARAIN (Ray, C.J.)
419
I
•
I
1
The validation of the election is not by applying legal norms. A
Nor can it be said that the validation of election in clause 4 is by
norms set up by the constituent power.
Clause 5 in Article 329A states that an appeal against any order
of any court referred to in clause 4 pending, before the comrnence.ment of the Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment) Act, 1975,
before the Supreme Court,· shall be disposed of in conformity with
the provisions of clause 4. The appeal cannot be disposed of in B
conformity with the provisions of clause 4 inasmuch as the validation of the election cannot rest on clause 4 .
Jn view of the conclusion tjlat the appeal cannot be disposed of
in conformity with clause 4, it is necessary to hear the appeals on
other grounds in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 Act and
Amendment Acts, 1974 and 1975.
c
The second contention of the respondent is that the session of the
Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha is invalid for these reasons. If the
Executive illegally and unconstitutionally detains any person the
detention affects the validity of the proceedings. A number of
members of Parliament of the two Houses, namely, the Lok Sabha
and the Rajya Sabha were detained by executive orders after 26 June,
1975 and before the summoning of a session of the two Houses of D
Parliament. Parliament commenced the session on 21 July, 1975.
None of the members of Parliament were either supplied any grounds
of detention or given any opportunity to make any representation
. against their detention. The President who was the authority to
summon a session of Parliament issued the Presidential Order under
Article 359 of the Constitution on 27 June, 1975. The right of the
detained members of Parliament to move any court for the enforce- E
ment of their fundamental right under Article 22 of the Constitution
was taken away by the executive order of the President who became .a
party to the unconstitutional and illegal detention of the members of
Parliament by preventing them from securing their release.
The constitutional position of the two Houses of Parliament is
governed by the provisions of Articles 79 and 81 of the Constitution. F
The respondent contends that unless the President convenes a session
of the Full Parliament by giving to all members thereof an opportunity to attend the session and e_)(ercise their right of speech and vote,
the convening of the session will suffer from illegality and unconstitutionality and cannot be regarded as a session of the two Houses of
Parliament. Any business transacted in a session of such truncated
House cannot, therefore, be regarded in law as a session of a House. G
The mere fact that a person who is under unconstitutional and
illegal detention may be deprived of his right to move a court to
secure his release from such illegal detention by means of a Presidential Order under Article 359 is said by the respondent not to render
the detention of a person either legal or .constitutional, and, therefore,
such a detenm must be provided an opportunity to participate in the
proceedings of the House. It is emphasised by the respondent that 11
when important leaders of different parties are unconstitutionallv
prevented from participating in the session of the House, a sessio~
420
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
.SUPREME COURT REPORTS·
~1976]
2 ·s.c.R .
cannot be held for deliberations in which different members influence
the views of others by their own participation. If in the holding of
a session and in transacting business therein, the provisions of the
Constitution are not complied with, this is said to amount to illegality
or unconstitutionality and not a mere procedural irregularity within
the meaning of Article 122(1) of the Constitution.
The essence of the respondent's contention is that the right of
participation of some members of the House of Parliament in the
proceedings of Parliament under Article 105(3) of the Constitution
has been interfered with. When a member is excluded from participating in the proceedings of the House, that is a matter concerning
Parliament and the grievance of exclusion is in regard to proceedings
within the walls of Parliament. In regard to rights to be exercised
within the walls of the House the House itself is the judge. (See
May's Parliamentary Practice 18th Ed. pp. 82-83, 12 Q.B.D. 271 at
285-286).
In Bradlaugh v. Gossett(!) Bradlaugh claimed to make affirmation instead of taking the oath. He was permitted to make tlie affirmation "subject to any liability by statute'', and took his .seat. Upon
an action for penalties it was decided, finally by the House ot Lords, '
that Bradiaugh had not qualified himself to sit by making the atfirma-·
tion. On re-election, he attempted to take the oath, but was prevented by order of the House which eventually directed the Serjeant
to exclude him from the House until he undertook to creale no further disturbance. Bradlaugh then brought an action against the
Serjeant in order to obtain a "declaration that the order of the House
was beyond the power and jurisdiction of the House and void, and
an order restraining the Serjeant at Arms from preventing Bradlaugh
by force from entering the House". It was held that the Court had
no power to restrain the executive officer of the House from carrying
out the order of the House. The reason is that the House is not
subject to the control of the Courts in the administration of the internal proceedings of the House.
If an outside agency illegally prevents a member's participation the
House has the power to secure his presence. In 1543 Ferrers a member was arrested in London. The House, on hearing of his arrest,
ordered the Serjeant to go to the Compter and demand his delivery.
The Serjeant was resisted by the city officers, who were protected by
the sheriffs. The Commons laid their case before the Lords. They
ordered the Serjeant to repair to the sheriffs, and to require the delivery of Ferrers without any writ or warrant. The Lord Chancellor
had offered them a writ of privilege but they refused it. The sheriffs
in the meantime had surrendered the prisoner. This practice of releasing Members by a writ of Privilege continued but no writ was to be
obtained.
The present. mode of releasing arrested members goes back to
Shirley's(2) case. In 1603 Shirley was imprisoned in the Fleet, in
execution, before the meeting of Parliament. The Commons first
tried to bring him into the House by habeas corpus, and then sent the
(1) 12 Q.B.D. 271.
(2) 1 Hatselt, 157.
\
'
•
•
••
I
I
~
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN (Ray, C.J.)
I
421
A
Serjeant to demand his release. The warden refused to give up his
prisoner. At length the warden delivered up the prisoner.
·An Act 1 James l, c, 13 was passed, which while it recognised the
privilege of freedom from arrest, the right of either House of. Parliament to set a privileged person at liberty, and the right to pumsh those
who make or procure arrests, enacted that after such time as the
privilege of that session in which privilege is granted shall cease,
parties may sue and execute a new writ. In 1700 an f\.ct was pass.e.d
which while it maintained the privilege of freedom from arrest with
•
more distinctness than the Act 1 James 1 c. 13, made the goods of
privileged persons liable to distress infinite and sequestration, between
a dissolution or prorogation and the next meeting of Parliament, and
during adjournments for more than fourteen days.
The composition of Parliament is not dependent on inability of a
c
merhber to. attend for whatsoever reason. The purpose of Article 85
is to give effect to the collective right of the House which represents
the nation to be called as often as the situation demands, and in any
case the interval between two sessions must not exceed six months.
Assuming a conflict were to arise between the privileges of a member
under Article 105 (3) and the functions of the House to assemble
f}
under Article 85 the privilege of the member will not prevail. The
detention of members of Parliament is by a statutory authority in the
exercise of his statutory powers.
The suspension under Article 359 of the remedy for the enforcement
of fundamental rights is dependent on a Proclamation of Emer•
gency under Article 352. Parliament. has the power not to approve of tlw Proclamation, and, thereafter the emergency shall cease to operate.
The contention of the respondent means that Parliament cannot meet
E
even so as lo withhold approval of the emergency and thus terminate
the suspension of the member's right of moving the court. The Constitution provides for proclamation of emergency, the suspension of
the remedy under Article 359 for enforcement of fundamental rights
enabling even detention of members of Parliament when necessary.
Article 85 is not suspended. The six months rule is obligatory. It
follows that the members' right under Article 105 are not available
F
under a detention in these circumstances. For the purposes of Article
105 (3) a conviction under Penal laws or detention under Emergency
Jaws must be deemed to be valid till it is set aside .
When under Article 359 the President during the operation of a
Proclamation of Emergency by order declares that the right to move
any court for the enforcement of rights conferred by Part III shall
G
remain suspended and persons who are members of House of Parliament are in detention under orders made under the Maintenance of
Internal Security Act, the detention cannot be challenged by collateral
·~
. attack on the ground of deprivation of their participation_in the Parlia4
· mentary proceedings. The challenge will be questioning the detention
on the ground that the detention is in violation of Articles 19, 21 and
22.
H
Article 85 provides that not more than six months shall intervene
between the two Sessions of Parliament. Article 85 is not a provision
regarding the constitution of'Parliament but of holding of Sessions.
•
.
l
6-Ll26SCI/76
422
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 197 6] 2 'S.C,R.
The powers, privileges and immunities of Parliament and its members
as provided in Article 105 are that they shall be such as may be
defined by Parliament by Jaw, until so defined, shall be tho>e of {he
House of Commons of the Parliament of the United Kingdom.
In Special Reference No. 1 of 1964(') it was held that the court
could entertain a petition under Article 226 on the ground that the
impcisition of penalty by the legislature on a person who is not a member of the legislature or issuing process against such person for its
contempt committed outside the four walls of the House.
The scope of the parliamentary privilege of freedom from arrest
has been defined positively and negatively. The positive aspect of the
privilege 1s expressed in the claim of the Commons to freedom from
arrest in all civil actions or suits during the time of Parliament and
during the period when a member was journeying or returning from
Parliament. The privilege has been defined negatively in the claim
of the Commons which specifically excepted treason, felony and breach
or surety of the peace.
The privilege of freedom from arrest is limited to civil causes, and
has not been allowed to interfere with the administration of criminal
justice or emergency legislation. (See May's Parliamentary Practice
18th Ed. at p. I 00). In early times the distinction between ''civil"
and "criminal" was not clearly expressed. The development of the
privilege has shown a tendency to confine it more narrowly to cases of
a civil character and to exclude not only every kind of criminal case,
but also cases which, while not strictly criminal, partake more of a
criminal than of a civil character. This development is in conformity
with the principle laid down by the Commons in a conference with the
Lords in 1641 : "Privilege of Parliament is granted in regard of service
of the Commonwealth and is not to be used to the danger of the
Commonwealth".
Jn Wilkes casee) it was resolved by both Houses on 29 November, 1763 that the privilege of Parliament does not extend to the case
of writing and publishing seditious libels, nor ought to be allowed to
obstruct the ordinary course of the laws in the speedy and effectual
prosecution of so heinous and dangerous an offence. "Since that
time" the Committee of Privileges said in 1831 "it has been considered
as established generally, that privilege is not claimable for any indictable offence".
These being the general declarations of the law of Parliament, the
House will not allow even the sanctuary of its walls to protect a Member from the process of criminal law, although a service of a criminal
process on a Member within the precincts of Parliament, whilst the
Home is sittinl! without obtaining the leave of the House, would be a
breach of privilege.
The committal of a Member in England for high treason or any
criminal offence is brought before the House by a letter addressed to
the Sneaker by the committing judge or magistrate. Where a Member i< convicted but released on bail pending an apoeal, the duty of
the Ma!!istrate to communicate with the Speaker does not arise. No
duty of informing the Speaker arises in the case of a person who
{ll [1%5] I S.C.R. 41:1.
(2) 19 State Tr .• 981.
'
I
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
(Ray, C.J.)
423
while in prison under sentence of a court is elected as a Member of
Parliament. In the case of detention of Members under Regulation
14B of the Defence of Realm Regulations in England, the communi.cation was made to the Speaker by a letter from the Chief Secretary
to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland which was read to the House by the
Speaker. The detention of a Member under Regulation 18B of the
Defence (General) Regulations, 1939, made under the Emergency
Powers (Defence) Acts, 1939 and 1940, led to the Committee of Privileges being directed to consider whether such detention constituted
a breach of the privileges of the House; the· Committee reported that
there was no breach of privilege involved. In the case of a member
<ieported from Northern Rhodesia for non-compliance with an order
declaring him to be a prohibited immigrant, the Speaker held there
was no prima facie case of breach of privilege. <See May's Parliamentary Practice 18th Ed. p. 103).
In K. Anandan Nambiar and Anr. v.
Chief
Secretary
A
B
c
Govern-
meni of Madras & Ors. (' 1) the petitioners who were members of Par-
liament and detained by orders passed by the State Government under
Ruic 30 ( l) (b) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962 challenged the
validity of the orders of detention on the ground that Rule 30 (1) (b)
was not valid because "a legislator cannot be detained so as to prevent
him from exercising his constitutional rights as such legislator while
the legislative chamber to which he belongs is in session". The State
raised a preliminary objection that the petitions were incompetent in
view of the order issued by the President under Article 359 (1) suspending the rights of any person to move any court for the enforcement
of rights conferred by Articles 14, 21 and 22. This Court held that
the validity of the Act, Rule or order made under the Presidential
·Order could not be questioned on the ground that they contravene
Articles 14, 21 and 22.
The petitioners also contended in Nambiar's case (supra) that
Rule 300) (b) under which the orders of detention had been passed
was invalid on grounds other than those based on Articles 14, 19, 21
and 22. This Court held that if that plea was well-founded, the last
clause of the Presidential Order was not satisfied, and, therefore, the
bar. created by. it suspending the citizens' fundamental rights under
Articles 1.f, 21 and 22 could not be pressed into service by the
.respondent.
Articles 79, 85, 86, 100(1) and 105(3) were considered in Nam(supra) in relation to rights of Members of Parliament,
and It was held that the totality of rights cannot claim the status of
fundamental rights and freedom of speech on which reliance was
placed is a part of the privileges falling under Article 105. The
reason is that freedom from arrest under a detention order is not recognised as a privilege which can be claimed by Members of House
of Commons in England. This Court then posed the question that if
a claim for freedom from arrest by a detention order could not be sustained under the privileges of the Members of Parliament whether it
biar'~ case
'
(I) [ 1966] 2 S.C.R. ;405.
0
E
F
G
424
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(197 6] '2 S.C.R.
could be sustained on the ground that it is a constitutional right which
could not be contravened. The statement in May's Parliamentary
Practice 7th Ed. at p. 78 which is to be found in the 18th Edition at
p. 100 that the privilege of freedom from arrest is limited to . civil
causes, and has not been allowed to interfere with the administration
of criminal justice or emergency legislation was accepted as the basis
of two propositions laid down in Nambiar's case {supra). First,
Articles 79, 85, 86, 100 and 105 cannot be construed to confer any
right as such on individual Members or impose any obligation on
them. It is not as if a Member of Parliament is bound-to attend the
session, or is under an obligation to be present in the House when the
President addresses it. The context in which these Articles appear
shows that the subject-matter of these Articles is not the individual
rights of the Members of Parliament, but they refer to the right of the
President to issue a summons for the ensuing session of Parliament or
to address the House or Houses. Second, the freedom of speech to
which Article 105 refers would be available to a Member of Parliament when he attends the session of the Parliament. If the order o~
detention validly prevents him from attending a session of Parliament,
no occasion arises for the exercise of the right of freedom of speech
and no complaint can be made that the said right has been invalidly
invaded.
The second ground of challenge that there was no valid session of
the House cannot be accepted for the reasons given above. It has also
to be stated that it is not open to the respondent to challenge the orders
of detention collaterally. The principle is that what is directly forbidden cannot be indirectly achieved.
The High Court found first that the appellant has to be regarded
as a candidate from 29 December, 1970 as she held herself out on
that date as a candidate. The second finding is that the appellant obtained and procured the assistance of Yashpal Kapur for the furtherance of her election prospects when Yashpal Kapur was serving as a
Gazetted Officer with the Government of India. The High Court
found that Yashpal Kapur's resignation from his serviee though submitted on 13 January, 1971 did not become effective until 25 January,
1971 when it was notified. The further finding by the High Court is
that Yashpal Kapur under the instructions of the appellant delivered
election speech on 7 January, 1971 at Munshi Ganj and another
speech at Kalan on 19 January, 1971. The third finding by the High
Court is that the appellant and her election agent Yashpal Kapur
procured and obtained the assistance of the officers of the State Government, particularly, the District Magistrate, the Superintendent of
Police, the Executive Engineer, P.W.D. and the Engineer to Hydel
Department for the construction of rostrums and arrangement for
supply of power for loudspeakers at meetings addressed by the appellant on 1 February, 1971 and 25 February, 1971 and further that the
said assistance was for furtherance of the prospects of election of the
appellant. The High Court found the appellant guilty of corrupt
practice under section 123(7) of the 1951 Act. The High Court
declared the election of the appellant to be void. The High Court
also held the appellant to be disqualified for a period of six years from
the date of the order.
\
•
•
I
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN (Ray, C.J.)
425
The definition of "candidate" in section 79(b) of the 1951 Act
until the amendment thereof by the Election Laws (Amendment) Act,
1975 was as follows : " 'Candidate' means a person who has been or claims
·to have been duly nominated as a candidate at any election
and any such person shall be deemed to have been a candidate as from the time when, with the election in prospect,
he began to hold himself out as a prospective candidate".
'
This definition has now been substituted by section
Amendment Act, 1975, as follows:-
7 of
B
the
" 'Candidate' means a person who bas been or claims
to have been duly nominated as a candidate at any election".
Section 10 of the Amendment Act, 1975 further enacted that the
amendments shall have retrospective operation so as to apply to and
in relation to any election held before the commencement of the
Amendment Act, 1975 on 6 August, 1975 to either House of Parliament or to either House or the House of the Legislature of a State,
inter atia, (iv) in respect of which appeal from any order of any high
Court made in any election petition under section 98 or section 99 of
the 1951 Act is pending before the Supreme Court immediately before
such commencement.
>
,
A
Section 9 of the Amendment Act, 1975 has substituted clause (a)
in section 171-A of the fadian Penal Code and a "candidate" means
for the purpose of section 171-A of the Indian Penal Code a person
who has been nominated as a candidate at any election. Previously
the definition of "candidate" in section 171-A of the Indian Penal
Code was the same as in section 79 (b) of the 1951 Act prior to the
amendment thereof by the Amendment Act, 1975. In section 171-A
, of the Indian Penal Code there was a proviso to the effect that candidate would mean a person who holds himself out as a prospective
candidate provided he is subsequently nominated as a candidate.
Relying on the provisions introduced by the Amendment Act,
1975, it is contended on behalf of the appellant that she will be
regarded as a candidate only from 1 February, 1971, namely, the
date when she has been duly nominated as a candidate at her election,
and, therefore, the finding of the High Court cannot be sustained. It
is also contended by the appellant that the finding of the High Court
that Yashpal Kapur delivered election speeches on 7 January, 1971
and 19 January, 197f under instructions of the appellant cannot be
supported because the appellant was not a candidate either on 7
January, 1971 or on 19 January, 1971.
The second finding by the High Court with regard to the resignation
of Yashpal Kapur n9t to be effective until 25 January, 1971 is contended to be d.i&piu~d by legislative change by the Amendment Act,
1975. Section 8{b) of the Amendment Act, 1975 has introduced
Explanation (3) at the e11d of section 123(7) of the 1951 Act. This
Amendment has n:t;ro&pective operation.
c
D
E
F
G
H
426
A
B
c
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 197 6] 2 5.C.R.
The Explanation is as follows : " (3) For the purposes of clause (7), notwithstanding
anything contained in any other law, the publication in the
Official Gazette of the appointment, resignation, termination
of service, dismissal or removal from service of a. person in
the service of the Central Government (including a person
serving in connection with the administration of a Union
territory) or of a State Government shall be conclusive
proof-
D
E
The effect of Explanation (3) at the end of section 123(7) of the
1951 Act incorporated by the notification dated 25 January, 1971 in
the Gazette dated 6 February, 1971 makes the fact of the resignation
of Yashpal Kapur from his service fully effective from 14 January,
1971. It is, therefore, contended that from 14 January, 1971 Yashpal
Kapur was not a Government servant.
G
H
•
(i) of such appointment, resignation, termination of
service, dismissal or removal from service, as the case may
be, and
(ii) where the date of taking effect of such appointment,
resignation, termination of service, dismissal or removal
from service, as the case may be, is stated in such publication, also of the fact that such person was appointed with effect
from the said date, or in the case of resignation, termination
of service, dismissal or removal. from service, such person
ceased to be in such service with effect from the said date".
F
'
To constitute a corrupt practice within the meaning of section
123 (7) of the 1951 Act the act complained of must be an act of obtaining or procuring of assistance of the categories of Government
servants mentioned therein by the candidate or his election agent or
by any other person .with the consent of the candidate or his election
agent. Section 100(1) (b) of the 1951 Act enacts that if the High
Court is of opinion that any corrupt practice has been committed by
a returned candidate or his election agent or by any other person with
the consent of a returned candidate or his election agent, the High
Court shall declare the election of the returned candidate to be void.
A returned candidate is defined in section 79 (f) of the 1951 Act to
mean a candidate whose name has been published under section 67
of the 1951 Act as duly elected. A returned rnndidate in order to be
guilty of a corrupt practice within the meaning of section 123 (7) of
the 1951 Act must be guilty of any of the acts mentioned in the different sub-sections of section 123 as a candidate. The appellant contends that the appellant was not a candidate on 7 January, 1971 or
19 January, 1971 and there could not be any procuring or obtaini1ng
of any assistance by the appellant as a candidate or by anybody else
with the consent of the appellant. All the sub-sections of section 123
of the 1951 Act refer to the acts of a candidate or his election agent
or any other person with the consent of the candidate or his election
,
I
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
(Ray, C.J.)
427
agent. The prese~t definition of "candidate" which has retrospective
effect is contended to exclude completely acts by candidate prior to
the date he is nominated as a candidate.
...
The third finding by the High Court that the appellant and her
election agent Yashpal Kapur procured and obtained the assistance
of the officers of the State Government. particularly, the District
Magistrate, the Superintendent of Police, the Executive Engineer,
P.W.D. and the Engineer to Hyde! Department for construction of
rostrums and arrangement for supply of power for loudspeakers and
for their assistance for furtherance of the prospects of the election of
the appellant has to be tested in the light of the provisions contained
in section 123 (7) of the 1951 Act. Under the said provision obtaining or procuring by candidate or his agent any assistance for' the furtherance of the prospect of that candidate from Gazetted Officers is
corrupt practice. The Amendment Act, 1975 by section 8 thereof
has added a proviso to section 123(7) of the 1951 Act. The proviso
is as follows : "Provided that where any person, in the service of the
Government and belonging to any of the classes aforesaid,
in the discharge or purported discharge of his official duty,
makes any arrangements or provides any facilities or does
any other act or thing, for, to, or in relation to any candidate
or his agent or any other person acting with the consent of
the candidate or his election agent, (whether by reason of
the office held by the candidate or for any other reason),
such arrangements, facilities or act or thing shall not be
deemed to be assistance for the furtherance of the prospects
of that candidate's election".
The proviso aforesaid shows that where persons in the service of
the Government in the discharge of official duty make any arrangement or provide any facility or. do any act or thing in relation to a
candidate, such arrangements and facilities shall not be deemed to be
assistance for furtherance of the prospect of the candidate's election.
Therefore, the service rendered bv Government servants for co•,1struction of rostrums and arrangements"for supply of power for loudspeakers
according to the contention of the appellant could not be considered
as assistance for the furtherance of the prospects of the election of the
appellant.
The contentions of the appellant can succeed if the Amendment
Acts of 1974 and 1975 are valid. The respondent has challenged the
constitutional validity of these Acts. Therefore, that question has to
be examined before the appellant's contentions can be answered.
The respondent in cross-appeal challenged the findings of the
High Court on issue No. 9 and contended that the High Court should
have held that the election expenses of the appellant exceeded the
limit. The respondent also challenged the finding of the High Court
with regard to issue No. 6 and contended that the High Court should
have held that the symbol of cow and calf was a religious symbol and
A
B
c
D
E
·F
G
H
428
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 S.C.R.
A
the appellant committed corrupt practice as defined in section 123(3)
of the 1951 Act. The respondent did not press Issues No. 4 ~nd 5
which related to distribution of quilts, blankets, dhoties and liquor.
The respondent also abandoned Issue No. 7 which related to voters
being conveyed to the polling stations free of charge on vehicles hired
and procured by Yashpal Kapur.
8
The issue pressed by the respondent was that the appellant and her
election agent Y ashpal Kapur incurred or authorised expenditure in
excess of the amount prescribed by section 77 of the 1951 Act read
with Rule 90. The respondent alleged that the election expenses of
the appellant, inter alia, were Rs. 1,28,700/- on account of hiring
charges of vehicles, Rs. 43 ,230 /- on account of cost of petrol and
diesel; Rs. 9,900/- on account of payments made to the drivers of the
vehicles. The respondent further alleged that the appellant spent
Rs. 1,32,000 /- on account of construction o( rostrums for public
meetings on 1 February, 1971 and 25 February, 1971. The respondent contended that the findings of the High Court should be reversed.
c
D
E
F
G
H
\
The High Court found that the election expenses furnished by the
appellant were Rs. 12,892.97. The High Court added another sum
of Rs. 18,183.50. The three items which were added by the High
Court were cost of erection of rostrums amounting to Rs. 16,000t-,
cost incurred in installation of loudspeakers amounting to Rs. 195 i /and cost for providing car transport to respondent No. 1 amountino
to Rs. 232.50. The total election expenses found by the High Court
came to Rs. 31,976.47 which was below the prescribed limit of
Rs. 35,000/-.
With regard to hiring charges of vehicles the High Court found
that the respondent did not examine any witness to indicate as to
whether the vehicles were used only for party propaganda or they
were used in connection with the election of the appellant. The High
Court further found that the documents which were relied on by the
respondent did not establish that the vehicles had been engaged or
used in connection with the election work of the appellant.
The respondent repeated the following contentions which had
been advanced before the High Court. Dal Bahadur Singh, President,
District Congress Committee wrote a letter to the District Election
Officer intimating that 23 vehicles had been engaged by the District
Congress Committee for election work in Rae Bareli, Amethi and Ram
Sanehi Ghat constituencies, and, therefore, the vehicles should be derequisitioned. Dal Bahadur Singh thereafter wrote a note to Yashpal
Kapur and requested that the Jetter be sent to the District Election
Officer to that effect. Yashpal Kapur wrote a letter to the District
Election Officer and repeated the prayer contained in Dal Babadur
Singh's letter. It was, therefore, contended that because Yashpal
Kapur was the election agent of tbe appellant and he moved for the derequisition of the vehicles it should be inferred that the vehicles were
engaged for the election of the appellant. Yashpal Kapur said that
the vehicles were used in the three Parliamentary constituencies. The
'
.,_
'
I
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
(Ray, C.J.)
429
High Court rightly held that the evidence did not establish that the
vehicles had been used for the election work of the appellant. The
_High- Court also correctly found that there was no evide~ce t~ show
that Yashpal Kapur made any propaganda from the vehicles Ill any
manner for the purpose of the election.
"
.
· With regard to the expenses for the erection of rostrums the respondent contended that the appellant's election expenses should include Rs. 1,32,000/- as the costs for erection of rostrums for the
meetings on 1 February, 1971 and the meeting on 25 February, 1971.
The High Court held that Rs. 16,000/- could only be added to the
election expenses of the appellant consisting of Rs, 6,400/- for four
xostrums and Rs. 9,600/- for six rostrums .
The amount or Rs. 16,000/- which was added by the High Court
on account of cost of erection of rostrums cannot be included in the
.election expenses of the appellant by reason of amendment to ~ection
77 of· the 1951 Act by the Amendment Act, 1975. Explanat10n 3
has been added as follows : "For the removal of doubt, it is hereby declared that any
expenditure incurred in respect of any arrangements made,
facilities provided or any other act or thing done by any
person in the service of the Government and belongio.g to any
of the classes mentioned in clause (7) of section 123 in the
discharge or pmported discharge of his official duty as mentioned in the proviso to that clause shall not be deemed to
be expenditure in connection with the election incurred or
authorised by a candidate or by his election agent for the
purposes of this sub-section."
By the Amendment Act, 1975 a proviso has been added to section
123(7) of the 1951 Act to the effect that arrangements made or facilities provided or any act clone by a Government servant belonging to
the class mentioned there in the discharge of official duty shall not be
deemed to be assistance for furtherance of the prospects of that candidate's electioi1. All thes·e amendmen~s have retrospective operation.
Therefore, the cost of rostrums cannot be added to the election expenses of the appellant. Services rendered by Government servants
for the erection of rostrums and for supply of power for lo~dspeakcrs
cannot be deemed to be assistance for the furtherance of the prospects
-of that candidate's election.
'
The respondent contended that Exhibit 118 which was the Bank
account of the District Congress Committee showed on the one hand
1hat there was deposit of Rs. 69,930/- on 4 March, 1971 and on the
-other there was a withdrawal of Rs. 40,000/- on 4 March, 1971 and
of Rs. 25,000/- on 6 March, 1971, and, therefore, the sum of
Rs. 65,000/- should be added to the election expenses of the appellant. When it was put to Yashpal Kapur that the sums of Rs. 40,000/·
and Rs. 25,000/- were withdrawn by Dal Bahadur Singh, Yashpal
Kapur said that he was not aware of it. There is no pleading in the
election petition that the appellant authorised incurring expenditure
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
430
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 2 S.C.R.
A
by a.political party. There is no pleading that any amount ha5 been
paid by the political party.
There is no complaint in the petition
about the sum of Rs. 65,000/- or the sum of Rs. 69,930/-. Yashpal
Kapur denied knowledge of Rs. 70,000/-. The appellant was not.
asked a single question. There is no evidence to identify any of
these payments with the election of the appellant.
B
It is appwpriate at this stage to refer to the amendment which
was introduced by the Amendment Act, 1974. The appellant relies
Gn the provision to show that expenses incurred or authorised by a
political party cannot be included in election expenses. Explanation I
which was inserted at the end of section 77 of the 1951 Act by
Amendment Act, 1974 is that any expenditure incurred or authorised
in connection with the election of a candidate by a political party or
by any other association or body of persons or by an individual other
ihan the candidate or his election agent shall not be deemed to be and
shall not ever be deemed to have been expenditure in connection with
the election incurred or authorised by the candidate or by his election
agent.
A proviso was also added to the aforesaid Explanati·::m I by the
Amendment Act, 1974. The proviso stated that nothing contained
in the Expianation shall affect (a) any judgment, order or decision
or the Supreme Court whereby the election of a candidat.: to the
House of the People or to the Legislative Assembly of a State has
been dcclai·ed void or set aside before the commencement of the
Represeniation of the People (Amendment) Ordinance, 1974; (b)
any judgment, order or decision of a High Court whereby ti1e election
of any such candidate has been decll~red void or set aside before the·
commencement of the said Ordinance if no appeal has been preferred
to the Supreme Court against such judgment, order or deci:-.ion of the
High Co~irt before such commencement and the period o[ limitation
for filing such appeal has expired before such commencement.
c
D
E
F
G
H
\
..
Explanation 2 which was added to section 77 of the 1951 Act by
the amendment Act, 1974 is as follows:'·For the purposes of Explanation · I "political party"
shali have the same meaning as in the Election Symbols
(Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968, as for the time
being in force".
Counsd for the respondent relied on the recent decision of this
Court in Kanwar Lal Gupta v. A rnarnath Chawla & Ors. (1) in support of tlie proposition that there has been no change in law and if
expenses incurred by a political party can be identified wiLh the election of a candidate then that expenditure is to be added to the eieetion expenses of a candidate as being authorised by him. There are·
no find in.l(S by the High Court in the present appeals that any
expenses bv a political party were authorised by the appellant. There
is also no finding in the present appeals that any expenses incurred by
a political party can be identified with the election of the appellant.
The changes in law affected by the Amendment Acts, 1974 and 1975
(I) A.l.R. 1975 S.C. 308.
,
I
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN (Ray, C.J.)
431
totally repd the submissions on behalf of the resp?ndenL Exp~nses
incurred or authorised in connection with the election of a candidate
by a policical party shall not be deemed to be and shall not ever. be
deemed to have been expenditure in co11nection with the elect~on
incurred or authorised by the candidate. Furthermore, the rulmg
in Kanwur Lal Gupta's case (supra) is no longer good law because
of the legislative changes.
'!"
J
•
~
-'
•
('
,
Counsel for the respondent contended that the judgment of the
High Com t should be reversed with regard to election expenses of
the appellant on three counts. First, Exhibit 118 shows that . the
sum m Rs. 65,000/- which was drawn by the Congress Committee
should have been held by the High Court on a reasonable inference
to have been spent by the District Congress Committee as having
been autf;oriscd by the election agent of the appellant. Se.:ond, the
High Coun has not taken into account expenses of the election agent
at 12 rn1;etings other than the meetings addressed by the appellant
and has also not taken into account the telephone expenses of the
election agent. The telephone expenses amounted to Rs. 836.85
between 11 January, 1971 and 10 February, 1971 and a (urtha sum
of Rs. 2,514/- for the period 11 February, 1971 to 15 March, 1971.
Third, it is said that there were 5000 polling booths and if 20
workers were required per booth then 10,000 workers would be
required and the only inference is that an amount in excess was
spent for workers with the authority of the election agent.
In Issue No. 9 there was no amount alleged with r,~gard lo telephone bills or election meetings under the heading of alleged election
expenses. There was no allegation to that effect in the petition.
With regard to expenses for the alleged 12 meetings addr.::ssed by
the election agent the evidence of Yashpal Kapur is that he addressed
about a dozen meetings and he did not include in the election return
the expense~ incurred for installation of loudspeakers because the
expenditure was not incurred by him. He also said that he did not
include in the election return the expenses incurred over the construction ot platforms because the meetings were arranged by the District
Congress Committee. No allegations were made in the petition with
regard to any alleged sum of money on account of election meetings
where the election agent spoke. The High Court rightly said that
the telephone expenses and expenses for meetings could not be taken
into consideration because no suggestion of the case was made until
the stage of arguments.
The respondent's submission is that the appellant was the Prime
Minbter at the time of the election, and, therefore, there was a big
campaign and the expenses were enormous. That will mean little.
Expenses incurred or authorised by a political party are under th'
Amendment Act, 197 4 not to be deemed to be expenditure m connection with the election incurred or authorised by the candidate or
by his election agent for the purposes of section 77 of the 1951 Act.
c
E
F
G
H
.&..-··-
432
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 S.C.R.
The part piayed by a political party in connection witi1 candidates
of the party at the election particularly in relation to expenditure
incurred by the political party with regard to candidates 9f the party
has been the subject of some decisions of this Court. This Court
has observed that expenditure must be by the candidate himself and
any expcnd1mre in his interest by others (not his agent within the
meaning or the term of the Election Laws) is not to be take1i note
of. Where vehicles were engaged by the Congress Committee and
used by the candidate, the amount spent by the Congress Committee
could not be taken to be included in the expenditure of the candidate's
election expenses (See Hans Raj v. Pt. Hari Ram & Ors.(1)).
iE
F
...
Ex penscs incurred by a political party in support of its candidates
have beeJ. held by this Court not to fall within the mischief of section
123(6) of the 1951 Act (See Shah Jayanti/al Ambalal v. Kasturilaf
Nagindas Doshi & Ors. (2)). In Rananjaye Singh v. Baijnath Singh
& Ors. ( 11 ) this Court pointed out that expenses must be incurred ·or
authorised by the candidate or his agent. In that case lhc Manager,
the Assistaat Manager, 20 Ziladars and their peons were :::Ueged to
have worked for the election of the appellant. This Court held that
the employment of extra persons and the incurring or authorising of
extra expenditure was not by the candidate or his election agent. The
extra men employed and paid were in the employment 01 the father
of the appeliant. This Court said that the position in Jaw could 11ot
be at all different if the father had given those employees a holiday
on full pay and they voluntarily worked in connection with the election of the appellant. Persons who volunteer to work cannot be
said to be employed or paid by the candidate or by his eie.:tion agent.
In Ram Dayal v. Brijraj Singh & Ors. ( 4 ) the appellant challenged the election of the respondent on the ground that the Maharaja
and the Rajmata of Gwalior had helped the respondent's election in
a number of ways and acted m• his agents and the respondent incurred
considerable expenditure which exceeded the limit. This court found
that assum:ng the expenditure was incurred by the Maharaja and the
Rajmata of Gwalior for the purpose of ca~vassing votes, _in the absence
of any evidence to show that the Mahara1a and the Ra1mata acted as
election agents or that the expenditure was authorised by the respondent, it was not liable to be included in the election expcnscs .
. On behalf of the respondent it was said relying on !he decisio;i
of this Court in Kanwar Lal Gupta's case (supra) that rf the c~ind1date takes advantage of expenditure incurred by the political party
in connection with -the election of the candidate or participates in the
programme of activity or fails to disavow the expenditure the candidate cannot escape the rigour of the ceiling by saying that he has not
incurred the expenditure but his political party has clone so. Exp~n
diture incurred- by a political party in connection with the election
H
\
(I) 40 F. L. R. 125.
(2) 42 F.L.R. 307.
13) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 671.
(4) [1970] l S.C.R. 530.
,
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN (Ray, C.J.)
I
433
of the candidates of the party is not a part of the election expense.s
of the candidate. Similarly, participation in the pr~gramme of a~t1vity organised by a political party will not fall 'Y1thm. the elec~1on
expenses of the candidate of the party. A candidate 1s not reqmred
to disavow or denounce the expenditure incurred or authorised 'by
the political party because the expenditure is neither incurred nor
authorised by the candidate. One can disavow what would be
ascribed to be incurred or authorised by one. In the case of
expenses of a political party there is no question ot disavowing
expenditur~ incurred or authorised by the political party.
..
The decision in Kanwar Lal Gupta's case (supra) was based on
an obscrv<ttion extracted from the decision of this Court in Megh
Raj Patadia v. R. K. Bir/a & Ors. (1:). In Megh Raj Patodia's case
(supra) the allegations were that the respondent had been put up by
one of the· wealthiest business houses in the country which owned or
controlled a large number of companies and during the election campaign vast material and human resources of these companies were
drawn upon by the respondent. This Court dismissed the appeal on
the ground that the appellant had failed to establish that expenditure
in excess of the prescribed limit was incurred by the respondent. In
Megh Raj Patodia's case (supra) there is an observation that expenses
incurred by a political party to advance the prospects of the candidates
put up by it without more do not fall within section 77 of the 1951 Act.
The words "something more" were construed by counsel for the respondent to mean that if a candidate takes advantage of expenditure
incurred or authorised by a political party such expenses could be
attributed to a candidate. The Amendment Act, 1974 has added'
Explanation 1 to section 77 of the 1951 Act which shows that expenditure incurred or authorised in connection with the election. of a
candidate by the political party shall not be deemed to be expenditure
incurred or authorised by the candidate or his election agent.
•
,
C
])
E
Allegations that election expenses are incurred or authorised by a
candidate or his agent will have to be proved. Authorisation means \ F
acceptance of the re~ponsibility. Authorisation must precede the expenditure. Authorisation means reimbursement by the candidate or
election agent of the person who has been authorised by the candidate
or by the election agent of the candidate to spend or incur. In order
to constitutr authorisation the effect must be that the authority must
carry with it the right of re-imbursement.
G
For the foregoing reasons the contentions of the respondent that the
appellant exceeded the limit of election expenses fail.
The respondent contended that the amendments by the Amendment
Acts of 1974 and 1975 are constitutionally invalid. It may be stated
here that the Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment) Act, 1975 in section 5 thereof enacts that in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution
(1) [1971] 2 S.C.R.118.
I
H
434
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
after entry 86, inter alia, the following
namr.ly : -
A
Entries
[1976) 2 S.C.R.
shall be
'
inserted,
"'87. The Representation of the People Act, 1951 (Central
Act 43 of 1951); The Representation of the People (Amendment) Act, 1974 (Central Act '58 of 1974); and the Eleclion
Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975 (Central Act 40 of 1975)".
"'
18 .
c
The contention of the respondent is that when the power of amending the Constitution cannot be exercised to damage or destroy the basic
features of the Const.itution or the essential elements of the basic structure or framework thereof the limitations on the exercise of legislative
power will arise not only from the express limitations contained in the
Constitutiqn, but also from necessary implication either under Articles
or even in the Preamble of the Constitution. This contention on behalf
of the respondent is expanded to mean that if the democratic way of
life through parliamentary institutions based on free and fair elections
is a basic fl':alure which cannot be destroyed or damaged by amendment
of the Constitution, it cannot similarly be destroyed or damaged by
any legislative measure.
These reasons were submitted by the respondent. First, the power
to resolve doubts about the validity of elections of Parliament ;incl
State Legislatures has been vested by the Constitution in the jpdicial
organ competent to decide election, petitions and, therefore, it is not
open to the Legislature to take away and interfere with these exclusive
functions of the judiciary by any legislation amending the law governing the electirm adjudicated by the judiciary. Second, the insertion
iE of these Acts in the Ninth Schedule will not confer any irr.munity on the legislative measure if basic features of the Constitution are damaged or destroyed on the ground that the provisions
contravene Part Ill of the Constitution. Third, any provision
in the legislative measures which has the effect of bringing about
unfairness between different rival candidates in the matter of election
i& discriminatory and it not only contravenes Articles 14 but also v.ioF Iates the implied limitation on legislative power relating to free and fair
elections. Fourth, any amendment of the law with retrospective operation governing an election which has already been held necessarily introduces an element of unfairness and brings about a denial of equality
among rival candidates. : Fifth, the deeming clause introduced in the
1951 Act by sections 6(b) and 8(a) and (b) of the Amendment Act,
1975 and the device of conclusive proof adopted by section 8 ( c) in the
Amendment Act, 1975 are unconstitutio:ial encroachments on judicial
G
power. Sixth, power conferred by an enactment including a constitutional enactment has to be so exen;ised as to give effect to the guiding
principles of the basic norms of that legislation and not so as to militate
against those guiding principle~ or basic norms.
-
D
H
The definition of "candidate" is amended by the Amendment Act,
1975. The contentions of the respondent on the amendment of the
definition of "candidate" are these. The expression "returned candidate" is descriptive of the person and the corrupt practices mentioned
in section 123 of the 1951 Act in relation to a candidate will not be
-~
,,
.
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN
(Ray, C.J.)
435
<Confined to c?rrupt practices com~itted with. referen_ce to the ~efi?i
tion of •·candidate". Corrupt practices alleged m relat10n to cand1daces
will be relatable to any period and will not be confined to corrupt practices alleged between the date of nominat:ion and the date of election.
If corrupt practices are committed by ca~d1dat~s who eventuall)'. b~come
returned candidates such corrupt practices will be, offence~ w1th111 .th~
meaning of section 123 of 1951 Act without any reference to the time
of commission.
Counsel on behalf of the respondent also contended as follows. The
basis of fair and free elections is that the election of a candidate will be
.avoided if any corrupt practice has been committed by the candidate
by or with the knowledge and con~ent of that candidate. The acts of
a candidate may be eithi;:r anterior to the date of nomination or it may
be subsequent to the date of nomination. Therefore, the Amendment
Act, 1975 destroys and damages free and fair election by allowing
candidates to commit corrupt practices prior to the date of nomination.
'
The Amendment Act, 1975 is also challenged as falling within the
vice of delegated legislation by the amendments inserted as Explanation
3 to section 77 of the 1951 Act and the insertion of the proviso to section 123 (7) of the 1951 Act. These provisions have already been noticed. Broadly stated expenditure incurred by persons in Government
service will not be deemed to be for furtherance of the candidate's election. The contentions are these. No guidelines have been laid down
as to what expenditure can be .incurred or what facilities can be made.
what acts or things can be done. Delegation cannot include the change
of policy. Policy must be clearly laid down in the Act for carrvi'l!!
into effect the objectives of the legislation. The legislature must declare
the policy. Any duty can be assigned, any facility in connection with
the election can be asked for by the party in power to be done for the
candidate. The official duty opens a wide power of instructions to
Government servants who may be asked to assist candidates by canvas;sing, influencing which will damage fair elections.
The device of conclusive proof which is .introduced to add Explanation 3 to section 123(7) of the 1951 Act. with regard to the date with
effect fr.om which the person ceased to be in service is said to be an
encroachment on judicial power.
A
B
C
D
E
F
Section 8(a) of the Amendment Act. 1975 which adds a proviso
to section 123 of-the 1951 Act to the effect that no symbol allotted
under this Act to a candidate shall be deemed to be a religious symbol·
or a national symbol for the purposes of this clause is attacked as
legalising religious symbols and thus offending securalism.
G
Section 10 of the Amendment Act, 1975 which enacts that the
amendment shall have retrospective effect is challenged as retrospectively Jegalisin!! a void election. These submissions are made. Ti! this
power i~ upheld there can be a legislative measure to avoid valid elections. The distinction between law abidinQ: persons and lawless nerson~
.is eliminated. One person has not been given the opportunitv of ~pend
ing money at the time of election but the other is retrospectively given
H
436
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 S.C.R.
the advantage of spending in excess and thereafter of avoiding the effect
of excess expenses by validation.
The contentions on behalf of the respondent that ordinary legislative
measures are subject like Constitution amendments to the restr.ictions
of not damaging or destroying basic structure, or basic features are
utterly unsound. It has to be appreciated at the threshold that the
contention that legislative measures are subject to restrictions of the
theory of basic structures or basic features is to equate legislative measures with Constitution amendment. The hierarchical structure of the
legal order of a State is that the Constitution is the highest levd within
national law. The Constitution in the formal sense is a solemn document containing a set of legal norms which may be changed only when
special prescriptions are observed. The purpose of special prescriptions is to render the change of these norms more difficult by regulating
the manner and form of these amendments. The Constitution consists
of those rules which regulate the creation of the general legal norms, in
particular, the creation of statutes. It is because of the material Constitution that there .is a special form for constitutional law. If there is
a constitutional form then constitution laws must be distinguished from
ordinary laws. The material Constitution may determine not only the
organs and procedure of legislation, but also, to some degree, the contents of future laws. The Constitution can negatively determine that
the laws must not have a certain content e.g. that the Parliament may
not pass any statute which restricts religious freedom. In this negative way not only contents of statutes but of the other norms of legal
order, judicial and administrative decisions likewise, may be determined
by the Constitution. The Constitution can also positively pr~cribe
certain contents of future statutes. This may be illustrated with reference to the prov.isions in Article 22 that no person who is atTested
shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may
be, of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied the right to
consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice.
Articles 245 and ~46. give pl~nary powers to legislatures to legis!ate: The only questwn is whether any pro~ision of the Const.itution
1s v10lated. The power of plenary body is not to be construed like the
pOlyer of a delegate. The largest kind of power will be attributed to
legislature. ' !h~ only prohibiti~n ~s Wfth reference to the provisions
of ~e Const1tut10n. The ConstJtut10n Is the conclusive instrument by
which powers are affirmat1v~IY'. created or negatively restricted. The
only relevant test for the vahd1ty of a statute made under Article 245
is whether. tl1c lel?islation is within the scope of the affirmative grant of
power or is forbidden by some provision of the Constitution.
To. accept t~e ~asic features or basic structures theory with regard
t? ?rd!nary leg1sla.t10n. would mean that there would be two kinds: of
H
hm1tatlons for le~1slatlve, measures. One will pertain to legislative
pow~r. un~er A~tJcles 245 and 246 and the legislative entries and the
prov1s10n m ~rt1cle 13. The other would be that no legislation can be
m~de as to oamage or destroy basic features or basic structures. · This
~Ill ~ea!1 rewriting the Constitution and robbing the legislature of actmg w1thm the framework of the Constitution. No legislation can be
...
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI ~· RAJ NARAIN (Ray, C.J.)
437
free from challenge on this ground even though th~ legislative measure
.is within the plenary powers of the legislature,
"
The theory of implied limitations on the power of amendment of
the Constitut10n has been rejected by seven Judges in Kesavananda
Bharati's case (supra). Our Constitution has not adopted the due
process clause of the American Constitution. Reasonableness of legislative measures is unknown to our Constitution. The cruc:ial point is
that unlike the American Constitution where rights are couched in wide
general terms leaving it to the Courts to evolve necessary limitations
our Constitution has denied due process as a test of invalidity of law.
In A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras(1) due process was rejected by
clearly limiting the rights acquired and by eliminating the indefinite
due process. Our Constitution contemplates that considerations of
justice or general welfare might requ:ire restriction on enjoyment of
fundamental rights.
The theory of basic structures or basic foalu!.'es is an exercise in imponderables. Basic structures or basic features are indefinable. The
legi3lativc entries are the fields of legislation. The pith and substance
doctrine has been appl.led in order to find out legislative competency,
and eliminate encroachment on legislative entries. If the theory off basic
structures or basic features will be applied to legislative measures it will
denude Parliament and State· Legislatures of the power of legislation
and deprive them of lay.ing down legislative policies. This will be encroachment on the separation of powers.
..
A
B
C
D
The constitutional validity of a statute depends entirely on the existence of the legislative power and the express provision in Article 13.
E
Apart from the limita,ti9n the legislature is .pot :subject to any other
prohibition. The amendments made to the 1951 Act by the Amendment Acts, 1974 and 1975 are to give effect to certain views expressed
by this Court in preference to certain views departed from or otherwise
to clarify the original intt'.,ntion. It is within the powers of Parliament
to frame laws with regard to elections. Parliament has power to enutnerate and define election expenses. Parliament has power to lay down F
limits on election expenses. Parliament has power to state whether
certain expenses can be included or may be excluded from election
expenses. Parliament has power to adopt conclusive proof with regard
to matters of appointment, resignation or termination of service.
Parliament has power to state what can be considered to be office of
profit. Parliament has power to state as to what will and what will ·
not constitute corrupt practice. Parliament has power to enact what G
will be the ground for disqualification. Parliament has power to define
"candidate". Parliament has power to state what symbols will be
allotted to candidates at election.
These are all legislative policies.
The conclusive evidence or conclusive proof clause is an accepted
legislative measure. Similarly, giving retrospective effect to legislative
amendment is accepted to be valid exercise of legislative power. The
H
---- - - - (1) [1950]S.C.R. 88.)
7-126SCT /7 6
438
A
SUPREME COURT REPOR'fS
[1976] 2 S.C.R.
·,
well-known pattern of all Validation Acts by which the basis of judgments or orders ofl competent Courts and Tribunals is changed and the
judgments and orders are made ineffective is to be found in M. P. V.
Sundararamier & Co. v. The State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr(1).
The powc1 of the legislature to pass a law includes a power to
pass it retro,pectively. An important illustration with reference to
retrospective legislation in regard to election is the decision of this
Court, in Kanta Kathuria's case (supra). Kanta Kathuria was disqualified by reason of holding an office of profit. First the Ordinance
and later the Act was passed to nullify the decision of the High
Court. The Ordinance as well as the Act stated that notwithstanding any judgment or order of any court or Tribunal, the ollicer shall
not be dis4ualified or shall be deemed never to have disqualified the
c holders
thereof as a member of the Legislative Assembly. The rendering of a judgment ineffective by changing the basis by legislative
enactment is not encroachment on judicial power because the legislation is witnin the competence of the legislature.
A contention was advanced that the legislative measure could
not remove the disqualification retrospectively, because the Constitution contemplate disqualification existing at certain time in accor0
dance with iaw existing at that time. One of the views expressed
in that case is that Article 191 recognises the power of the Legislature
of the Stale to declare by law that the holder of the office shall not
be disqualified for being chosen as a Member. Power is reserved to
the Legislature. of the State to make the declaration. There is
nothing in the Article to indicate that this declaration cannot be
E made with r~trospective effect. The Act was held not to be ineffective in its retrospective operation on the ground that it is well recogniseu that Parliament and State Legislatures can make their laws
operate retrospectively. Any law that can be made prospectively
. can be made with retrospective operation. It is said that certain
, kinds of laws cannot operate retrospectively. That is ex-post facto
legislation. ihe present case does not fall within that category.
F Reference may be made to May's Parliamentary Practice 17th Ed.
p. 515 where instances are given of validation of election by the
British Parliament.
This Court in Jumuna Prasad Mukhariya & Ors. v. Lachi Ram
& Ors. (2) rejected the contention advanced there that sections
123(5) and 124(5) of the 1951 Act interfered with a citizen's fundamental right to freedom of speech. This Court said that these laws
G do not stop a man from speaking. They merely prescribe conditions which must be observed if one wants to enter Parliament. The
right to stand as a candidate and to contest an election is not a common law right. It is a special right created by statute which can only
The Funbe exercised on the conditions laid down by the statute,
Jamcntal Rights Chapter has no bearing on a right like this created
by a statute relating to Election.
H
(1) [1958] S.C.R. 1422
(2) [1955) I S.C.R. 608,
•.
-
'
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
•
(Ray, C.J.)
439
The coutention on behalf of the respondent that the amcndmei;it
of the definition of "candidate" has damaged or destroy~d basic
srructurc is untenable. There is no basic structure or basic fcat~rc
or basic framework with regard to the time when under th~ Ele~t10n
Laws a person is a candidate at the election. . The,, c?ntent10:i of th~
resppndent that the expression "returned candidate . 1s descnpt1ve of
the expression "candidate" will rob section 100 of its content. The
word ··candidate" in relation to various electoral offences shows that
he must be a candidate at the time of the offence. Time is necessary
for fixing the offences. A significant distinction arises between. the
electoral o!Icnces under the 19 51 Act and the offences under scct10ns
171-A to 1/1-1 of the Indian Penal Code, namely, that the 1951
Act uses the word "candidate" or his election agent with reference
to various oill:nces, whereas the Indian Penal Code does not use the
word "ca11didate" in relation to commission of any offence. Any
person may fall within the offences of bribery, undue influence,
personation at elections within the provisions of the Indian Penal
Code or for false statement or illegal payments in connection with
:any election or failure to keep election accounts.
The English Representation of -the People Act, 1949 called the
English Acr. was relied on by the respondent to show that the word
•'candidate" in the 1951 Act should have the same meaning as in the
English Act and there should be no limitation as to time in relation
to a candida:c. "Candidate" is defined in section 103 of the English
Act in relation to parliamentary election to mean a person who 1s
elected to serv.: in Parliament or a person who is nominated as a candidate at the election or is declared by himself or by others to be a
camlidate on or after the day of the issue of the writ for the election,
or after the dissolution or vacancy in consequence of which the writ
was issued. The electoral offences under the English Act speak of
a person to be guilty of corrupt practices of bribery as· mentioned
in section 99, of treating as mentioned in section 100 anJ of undue
influence as mentioned in section 101 of the English Acr. These
sections in the English Act speak of a person and do not use the
expression "candidate".
Where a candidate is elected the English definition gives no commencing date as from which his candidature has ccmmenced;
whereas, if he be not elected, he is not a candidate until he has been
nominated, or is declared to be a candidate on or after the di:;solution or vacancy. A candidate who is elected is accordincrly a
"candidate" as . soon as he has ~ntered upon his election ca~paign,
and has made 1t known that he mtends to present himself as a candidate at the ensuing election, he may thus become a candidate
before the dissolution of Parliament, and may be unseated for bribery or_ treating committed months or even years before the vacancy
or _elcct10n, fo~ such a~ts are offences at common law. With respect
to 1llegal practices, which ~re pu.rely statutory offences, it would seem
that a narrower construction will .prevail, and that a candidate wilt
not be held responsible for payments etc., made before he is a can-
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
440
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 2 S.C,R.
A
didate in point of fact, and which payments only become illegal practices by reasun of his subsequently becoming a candidate l Sec
Parker's Conduct of Parliamentary Elections 1970 Ed. pages 52-53).
It has been held in England that a candidate may be unseated for
l:>ribery or treating committed months or even years before the
B vacancy or election [Youghal('l) and Bodwin(")]. The present position under th;;; English Act is stated in Parker's Conduct of Parliamentary Elc.:tions 1970 Ed. at p. 330 to be that since the corrupt
practicc under consideration is purely a statutory offence, which only
becomes a corrupt practice by reason of the person in whose support
the prohibited expenses were incurred subsequently becoming a
candidate, the candidate may not be held responsible. In Norwich(3)
c the question' was considered in relation to the responsibility of a
candidate for payments which only become illegal practices by reason
of his subsequently becoming a "candidate" as defined by statute,
and it was hdd that he was not liable. The liability of a candidate
under the English Act, particularly, with regard to election expenses
as laid down in section 63 of the English Act is regarded as open to
doubt until the point is settled by the decision of an election court.
D
Sections 171-A to 171-1 of the Indian Penal Code and the provisions contained in sections 125 to 136 of the 1951 Act foilow the
pattern of English Acts, namely, Statutes 17 & 18 Victoria, Chapter
Cll (1853-54); Statutes 21 & 22 Victoria, Chaptcr LXXXVII
( 1858) and Statutes 46 & 47 Victoria, Chapter LI (1802). These
English Statutes make certain acts punishable as corrupt practice
E when they relate to persons other than candidates or voters. Section
11 of 17 & 18 Victoria, Chapter CU ena,cts that the persons mentioned therein shall be deemed guilty of bribery and punishable in
accordance with the provisions of the Act. The words used there
are "every person'" who shall do the acts mentioned therein shall be
punishable. In these sections dealing with the acts of persons other
than candidates and voters no time is mentioned. On the other
F hand, section IV of Statutes 17 & 18 V'.ctoria, Chapter CII makes
certain acts of voters and candidates corrupt practice. Section IV
of the aforesaid English Statute enacts that every candidate at an
election who shall corruptly by himself, or by or with any person or
by any other ways or means on his behalf, at any time, either before,
during, or after any election, directly or indirectly give or provide, or
cause to be given or provided any expenses incurred for any meat,
drinlc, entertainment, etc. shall be deemed guilty of an offence of
G
treating. In these sections when the acts of voters am! candidates
are made punishable the words used are "before or during any election, directly or indirectly or at any time either before, durinP' or
after any election" in Section IV of the Act. These words ':nake
acts of voters or candidates committed before or during an election
also corrupt practice. Without these words acts of the candidate
made punishable under the English Statutes would only be the acts
H
committed by the candidate after he becomes a candidate.
(1) 1 O'M. & H. 295.
(3) 54 L.T. 627!
/
(2) 5 O'M. & H. 230.
'•
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN (Ray, C.J.)
441
The 1951 Act uses the expression "candidate" in relation to
several offences for the purpose of affixing liability .with reference to
a person being a candidate. If no time be fixed with regard to a
person being a candidate it can be said th!1t from the rnomen.t a
person is elected he can be said to hold himself out as a candidate
for the next election. The definition in the English Act cannot be
of any aid to the construction of the 1951 Act.
>
·· The contention of the respondent is that if a candidate is free to
spend as much as a candidate likes before the date of nomination and
a great premium would be placed on free use of mone!' before the
date of nomination. The 1951 Act specifies what elect10n expenses
arc of a candidate. The statute specifies time in regard to a candidate. That time cannot be enlarged or reduced. The holding out
by a person if candidature was a flexible and elastic idea. The date
of nomination is definite and doubtless. Different views may he
taken as to the time of holding out. The legislature has now set the
matter at rest.
The word "incur" according to the dictionary meaning means to
become liable to. The word "incur" means undertake the liability
even if the actual payment may not be made immediately. The
undertaking of the responsibility for the expenditure concerned may
be either by the candidate or his election agent. Again, a candidate
is also to be deemed responsible for the expenditure if he has authorised a particular expenditure to be made by someone else on his
behalf.
The contention on behalf of the respondent is that the Amendment Acts of 1974 and 1975 fall within the vice of delegated legislation because there are no guidingi principles with regard to official
duty or 11aturc of expenditure in Explanation 3 to section 77 of the
1951 Act and in the proviso to section 123(7) of the 1951 Act.
Official duty will be a duty in law. Official duty will be duty under
administrative directions of the Executive. Official duty will be for
security, law and order, and matters in aid of public purpose. These
duties will be in connection with election. To illustrate, section 197
of the Criminal Procedure Code speaks of official duty.
This Court in Mata jog Dobey v. H. C. Bhari(1) interpreted the
words "official duty" to have reasonable connection between the act
and the discharge of duty. The act must bear such relation to the
duty that the person could lay a reasonable claim, but not a pretended
fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his
duty. Where a power is conferred or a duty imposed by statute or
otherwise, and there is nothing said expressly inhibiting the exercise of
the power or the performance of the duty by any limitations or restrictions, it is reasonable to hold that it carries with it the power of doing
all such acts or employing such means as are reasonably necessary for
1'uc11 execution, because it is a rule that when the law commands a
(I) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 925.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
442
A
B
c
DJ
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 2 S.C.R.
thing to be done, it authorises the performance of whatever may be
necessary for executing its command.
There is no vice of delegation in the Statutes. "Delegation is
not the complete handing over of transference of a power from one
person or body of persons to another. Delegation may be defined
as the entrusting, by a person or body of persons, of the exercise of
a power residing in that person or body of persons to another person
or body of persons, with complete power of revocation or amendment
remaining in the grantor or delegator. It is important to grasp the
implications of this, for, much confusion of thought has unfortunately resulted from assuming that delegation involves or may involve,
the complete abdication or abrogation of a power. This is precluded by the definition. Delegation often involves the granting of
discretionary authority to another, but such authority is purely derivative. The ultimate power always remains in the delegator and is
never renounced". [See Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd.
v. The Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax and Other.;(,' )l.
The Constitution 29th Amendment Act was considered by this
Court in Kesavananda Bharatis case (supra). The 29th Amendment Act inserted in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution Entries
65 and 66 being the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1969 and the Kerala
Land Reforms Act, 1971. This Court unanimously upheld the
validity of the 29th Amendment Act. The unanimous view of this
Court in Kesavananda Bharati's case (supra) is that Article 3 lB
is not open to challenge. Six Judges held that the 29th Amendment
Act would be ineffective to protect the impugned Act if they took
away the fundamental rights. Six Judges took the view that the
29th Amendment Act is valid and further that Article 3 lil has been
held by this Court to be independent of Article 31A and that Article
3 lB protects Scheduled Acts and Regulations and none of the Scheduled Acts and Regulations is deemed to be void or ever to liave
become void on the ground of contravention of any fundamental
rights. Article 3 lB gives a mandate and complete prote.:fa>n from
the challenge of fundamental rights to the Scheduled Acts and Regulations. The view of seven Judges in Kesavananda Bharati's case
(supra) is that Article 31B is a constitutional device to place the specified statutes in the Schedule beyond any attack that these infringe Part
III of the Constitution. The 29th Amendment is allirmed in
Kesavananda Bharati's case (supra) by majority of seven against
six Judges.
The contentions of the respondent that the Amendment Acts of
1974 and 1975 are subject to basic features or basic structure or
basic framework fails on two grounds. First, legislative measures
are not subject to the theory of basic features or basic structure or
basic framework. Second, the majority view in Kesavananda Bharati's
case (supra) is that the 29th Amendment which put the two statutes
in the Ninth Schedule and Article 31B is not open to challenge on the
(1) [1974] 4 S.C.R. 98 at 116.
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
(Ray, C.J.)
443
ground of either damage to or destruction of basic. fe~tures, basic
structure or basic framework or on the ground of v1olat10n of fundamental rights.
•
.
The symbol allotted to the party of the appellant was: characterised by the respondent as a religious symbol. ~Jnder Articl~ 324 t~e
superintendence, direction and control of elections to Parliament, is
vested in the Election Commission. Rule 5 of t~e. Conduct of Ele~
tions Rules, 1961 states that the Election Com~1ss1on shall, by J?.Ot1fication in the Gazette of India and in the Official Gazette of · each
State, specify the smybols that may be c~osen .by cand~datcs a~ ~lections in Parliamentary or Assembly constituencies and tne restnctions
to which their choice shall be subject. Rule 10 ( 4) of the - 1961
Rules aforesaid states that at an election in a Parliamentary or
Assembly constituency, where a poll becomes necessary, the returning
officer shall consider the choice of symbols, expressed by the contesting candidates in their nomination papers and shall, subject to any
general or special direction issued in this behalf by the Election Commission allo( a different symbol to each contesting candidate in conformity, as far as practicable with his choice. It is, therefore,
apparent that the power to specify permissible symbols is vested by
Rule 5 in the Election Commission. The choice of candidates is
limited to the symbol specified by the Election Commission. The
Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968 was
made in exercise of the power conferred by Article 32B of the Constitution read with Rule 5 and Rule 10 of the Conduct of Election
Rules and all other powers enabling in this behalf.
Clause 17 of the Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment)
Order, 1968 provides that the Commission shall by notification in the
Gazette of India publish lists specifying national parties and the symbols respectively reserved for them etc. There can, therefore, be no
doubt that the power of evolving permissible symbols is exclusively
vested in the Election Commission. · It is under their direction that
the Returning Officer has to make allotments and allotments are made
in term§ of Clauses 5, 6 and 8. Therefore, in the matter of evolving
of the permissible symbols, the jurisdiction is vested in the Election
Commhsion. If a candidate displays in addition to the allotted symbol an additional symbol which may have a special appeal on grounds
of religion to a particular community, then the Court will be entitled
to go into this question.
·
With regard to the symbol of cow and calf being a religious symbol it was said on behalf of the respondent that the Akhil Bhartiya
Ram Rajya Parishad asked for cow, calf and milkmaid symbol and
were refused. They were given the symbol of a "Rising Sun". It
is impossible to hold that because one party has not been given the
symbol of cow, calf and milkmaid, therefore, the symbol of cow and
calf bc;;omes a religious symbol. The High Court on the evidence
adduced by the respondent rightly came to the conclusion that there
was no evidence to prove that the cow and calf is a religious symbol.
The High Court rightly held that cow and calf is not a religious
symbol.
A
B
c
•
D
E
F
G
H
444
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 s.c.R.
The finding of the High Court that the appellant held herself out
to be a candidate from 29 December, 1970 is set aside because the
Jaw is tilat the appellant became a candidate only with effect from the
da.te oi nomination which was 1 February, 1971. The finding of the
High Cpurt that the resignation of Yashpal Kapur did not become
effective until it was notified in the Gazette is also set aside because
under ti;e Jaw the resignation became effective from 14 January, 1971.
The finding of the High Court that the appellant committed corrupt
practice in breach of section 123 (7) of the 19 51 Act is also repelled
by the legislative changes and is, therefore, set aside. The order of
disqualif.cation of the appellant is also set aside.
For t11e foregoing reasons the contentions of the appellant succeed
and the contentions of the respondent fail. The appeal is accepted.
The judgment of the High Court appealed against is set aside. The
· cross objection of the respondent is dismissed. There will be no
order as to costs.
KHANNA, J. Civil Appeal No. 887 of 1975 has been filed by
Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi (hereinafter referred to as the appellant)
against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court whereby election
petition filed by Shri Raj Narain respondent No. 1 (hereinafter referred
to as the respondent) to question the election of the appellant to the
Lok Sabha from Rae Bareli Parliamentary constituency was allowed
and the election of the appellant was declared void. The appellant was
found guilty of having committed corrupt practices under section 123(7)
of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to
as the RP Act) and as such was stated to be disqualified for a period
of six years in accordance with section 8A of the RP Act. Cross appeal
No. 909 of 1975 has been filed by Shri Raj Narain against the judgment of the High Court in so far as it decided certain issues against the
rcspomlent.
The President of India called upon different constituencies in the
country to elect members to the Lok Sabha by notification dated
January 27, 1971 under section 14(2) of the RP Act. Last date for
filing nomination papers was fixed as February 3, 1971 for Rae Bareli
conc,tituency by the Election Commission. The appellant filed her
nomination paper on February 1, 1971. The appellant was for a number of }ears before the election Prime Minister of India and is since
then continuing to hold that office. Yashpal Kapur who was previously a
gazetted officer in the Government of India holding the post of Officer
on Special Duty in the Prime Minister's Secretariat and who subsequently submitted his resignation, was appointed the election agent of the
appellant. The signed form about the appointment of Yashpal Kapur
as election agent was submitted to the Returning Officer on February
4, 1971, the date of scrutiny. The date on which Yashpal Kapur
submitted his resignation and the same became effective is, however, a
matter of controversy between the parties. The appellant, who was a
candidate of the Indian National Congress (R), was allotted the party
symbol of cow and calf. Polling took place in the first week of March
on March 1, March 3 and March 5, 1971. The appellant and the
SMT. lNDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAlN
1
(Khanna, !.)
445
respondent were the principal contestants. There were two other A
candidates but we are not concerned with them. The result of the
election was declared on March 10, 1971. ·The appellant got
1,83,309 votes, while the respondent secured 71,499 votes and the
former was declared elected. The respondent thereafter filed election
petition on April 24, 1971 to challenge the election of the appellant.
Apart from some grounds which were not pressed, the election of the
B
appellant was assailed on the following grounds :
( 1) The appellant held herself out as a prospective candidate
from the Rae Bareli constituency immediately after the
dissolution of the Lok Sabha on December 27, 1970, and
for furtherance of her election prospects, she, obtained and
procured the assistance of Yashpal Kapur who was at
that time holding the post of Officer on Special Duty. The
appellant thus committed corrupt practice under section c
123(7) of the RP Act.
(2) The appellant and her election agent procured the assistance of members of armed forces of the Union for furtherance of her election prospects inasmuch as the members of the armed forces arranged planes and helicopters
of the Air Force at her instance for her flights to enable. D
her to address meetings in her constituency. The appel-·
lant thereby committed corrupt practice under section
123 (7) of the RP Act.
(3) The appellant and her election agent obtained the assistance of a number of gazetted officers and members of the
police force for the furtherance of her election prospects
E
inasmuch as the services of the District Magistrate, Superintendent of Police, Rae Bardi and the Home Secretary.
Uttar Pradesh Government were utilised for the purposes
of the construction of rostrums and installation of loudspeakers at various places within the constituency where
the appellant addressed her election meetings as also for
the _purpose ~f making arrangements of barricading and
postmg of police personnel on the routes by which the appel- F
lant was to trnvel in her constituency and at the places
~~ere she wa~ _to address meetings, in order to give publicity to her v1s1ts and thus attract lame crowds. The
appellant was thereby stated to have committed corrupt
practice under section 123(7) of the RP Act.
(4) Yashpal Kapur: election agent of the appellant and her
G
o!he~ agents ~1th the consent of Yashpal Kapur, freely
d1stnbute~ quilts, blankets, dhotis and liquor among the
voters to mduce. them to vote for her and thereby the
app~llant committed corrupt practice of briberv under
sect10n 123 (1) of the RP Act.
'
(5) The appellant an~ )ler
election agent made extensive
appeals t? the religious symbol of cow and calf and thereby committed corrupt practice under section 123(~) of
the RP Act.
-
H
446
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 s.c.R.
(6) Yashpal Kapur and some other persons with his consent
hired and procured a number of vehicles for the free
conveyance of electors to the polling stations and thereby
committed corrupt practice under section i23(5) of the
RP Act.
(7) The appellant and her election agent incurred or authorised
expenditure in contravention of section 77 of the RP Act
and thereby committed corrupt practice under section
123(6) of the RP Act.
The appellant in her written statement denied the various allegations levelled against her and pleaded that Yashpal Kapur resigned
from his post on January 13, 1971 and his resignation was accepred
with effect from January 14, 1971. Notification dated January 25,
1971 was issued by the Prime Minister's Secretariat in that connection
It was added that P. N. Haksar, then Secretary to the Prime Minister,
told Yashpal Kapur on the same day on which the resignation was
tendered that it was accepted and that formal orders would follow.
Yashpal Kapur became the election agent of the appellant on February 4, 1971. During the period he was a gazetted officer in the Government of India, he did not do any work in furtherance of the appel··
!ant's election prospects. Regarding the use of planes and helicopters
of the Air Force, the appellant admitted that on February 1, 1971
she went by an Indian Air Force plane from Delhi to Lucknow from
where she went by car to Rae Bareli, addressing meetings enroute. It
was further admitted that on February 24, 1971 the aprellant went
by helicopter of the Indian Air Force to Gonda on regular party work
and that from there she went by car to Lucknow, Unnao and Rae Bareli
addressing public meetings in several constituencies besides her own.
The appellant referred to the Pillai Committee Report and the Office
Memoranda issued by the Government of lndia aqd asserted that thl.l
aforesaid flights were made by her in accordance with them. It was
added that under the rules, bills for those flights were to he paid by
the All India Congress Committee and most of them had already been
paid.
According to the appellant, neither she nor did her election
agent solicit, reqmre or order the use of Air Force planes and the Government of India provided the planes as part of their normal duty.
The appellant denied having obtained the assistance of the District
Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police, Rae Barcli as also that of
the Home Secretary, UP Government for any of the puq.1oses mentioned in the petition. The appellant in this context referred to the
instructions issued by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India.
She pleaded that arrangements for posting of police on the routes
which she followed and the arrangements of rostrums were made by
the State Government itself in compliance with those instructions. In
regard to the loudspeakers, she pleaded that those were arranged by
the District Congress Committee and not by the officers of the State
Government. It was denied that any directions or instructions in that
regard were issued by the appellant or her election agent. The allegations regarding the distribution of blankets, dhotis and liquor were
stated to be absolutely false. As regards the symbol of cow and calf,
the appellant stated that it was not a religious symbol and that it was
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI
>·
"
•
v. RAJ NARAIN (Khanna, /.)
447
wrong that extensive appeals were made by her or her election agent
to that symbol. The appellant added that she and her election agent
merely informed the voters that the symbol of the Indian National
Congress (R) was cow and calf and that the voting mark should be
put against that symbol. The decision of the Election Commission
allotting the symbol of cow and calf to her party was final and the
same could not, according to the appellant, be made a ground of
attack nor could the court go into that question. The allegation regarding hiring and procuring of vehicles and the use thereof for conveyance of the voters to the polling stations was described by the ap. pellant as false. Likewise, she denied the allegation that she or her
election agent incurred expenditure in excess of the prescribed limit.
Following issues were framed in the case :
"(1) Whether respondent No. 1 obtained and procured the
assistance of Yashpal Kapur in furtherance ·ot the prospects of her election while he was still a Gazetted Officer
in the service of Government of India ? If so, from what
date?
\
'
..
B'
c
(2) Whether at the instance of respondent No. 1 members of
the Armed Forces of the Union arranged Air Force
planes and helicopters for her, flown by members of the
Armed Forces, to enable her to address election meetings
on 1-2-1971 and 25-2-1971, and if so, whether this constituted a co'rrupt practice under section 123 (7) of the
Representation of the People Act ?
])
( 3) Whether at the instance of respondent No. 1 and her election agent Yash pal Kapur, the District Magistrntc of Rae
Bareli, the Superintendent of Police of Rae Bareli and
the Home Secretary of U.P. Government arranged for
~ostrums, loudspeakers and barricades to be set up and
for members of the Police Force to be posted in connection
with her election tour on 1"2-197f and 25-2-1971 · and
if so, whether this amounts to a corrupt practice ~nder
section 123(7) of the Representation of the People Act?
E
(4) Whether quilts, blankets, dhotis and liquor were distributed by agents and workers of respondent No. 1, with
the consent of her election agent Yashpal Kapur, at the
places and on the dates mentioned in Schedule A of the
Petition in order to induce electors to vote for her ?
(5) Whether the particulars given in paragraph 10 and
Schedule A of the Petition are too vague and general to
afford a basis for allegations of bribery under section
123 ( 1) of the Representation of the People Act ?
'
A.
(6) Whether by using the symbol cow and calf, which had
been allotted to her party by the Election Commission in
her election campaign the respondent No. 1 was guilty of
making an appeal to a religious symbol and committed a
F
G·
448
SUPREME COURT REPORT'S
[1976] 2 S.C.R.
corrupt practice as defined in section 123 ( 3) of the Representation of the People Act ?
(7) Whether on the dates fixed for the poll voters were conveyed to the polling stations free of charge on vehicles
hired and procured for the purpose by respondent No. 1's
election agent Yashpal Kapur, or other persons with his
consent, as detailed in Schedule B to the Petition ?
(8) Whether the particulars given in paragraph 12 and Schedule B of the Petition are too vague and general to form
a basis for allegations regarding a corrupt practice under
section 123 (5) of the Representation of the People Act?
•
(9) Whether respondent No. 1 and her election agent Yashpal
Kapur incurred or authorised expenditure in excess of
the amount prescribed by section 77 of the .Representation
of the People Act, read with rule 90, as detailed in para
13 of the Petition ?
D
(10) Whether the petitioner had made a security deposit in accordance with the rules of the High Court as required by
section 117 of the Representation of the People Act ?
(11) To what relief, if any, is the petitioner entitled?"·
Subsequent to the framing of the above issues, the following three
additional issues were framed in pursuance of the judgment of this
Court in an appeal against an interlocutory order of the High Court :
·-
"(1) Whether respondent No. 1 obtained
and procured the
assistance of Yashpal Kapur in furtherance of the prospects of her election while he was still a Gazetted Officer
in the service of the Government of India '? If so, from
what date?
(2) Whether respondent No. 1 held herself out as a candidate
from any date prior to 1-2-1971 and, if so, from what
date?
(3) Whether Yashpal Kapur continued to be in the service of
Government of India from and after 14-1-1971 or till
which date ?"
During the pend ency of the election petition in .the ·High. Court,
:section 77 of the RP Act was amended by an Ordmancc which was
subsequently replaced by Act 58 of 1974 (hereinaft~r referre~ to as
the 1974 amending Act or Act 58 of 1974). The said amendmg Act
inserted two explanations at the end of sub-section ( 1) of section 77
of the RP Act. The material part of the explanations reads as under :
H
"Explanation 1.-Notwithstanding any judgmen!, or.der or
decision of any court to the contrary, any expenditure ~ncurred
or authorized in connection with the election o[ a candidate by
a political party or by any other association or body of persons
•
..
'
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN
•
•
•
•
(Khanna, !.)
449
or by any individual (other than the candidate or his election agent) shall not be deemed to be, and shall not ever be
deemed to have been, expenditure in connection with the election incurred or authorized by the candidate or by his election
agent for the purposes of this sub-section :
Provided .................... .
Explanation 2.-For the purposes of Explanation 1,
'political party' shall have the same meaning as in the Election
Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968, as for the
time being in force."
The above amendment in section 77 had a bearing on the allegation
which was the subject-matter of issue No. 9. The respondent filed
writ petition challenging the validity of the amending Act.
The High Court decided issues 2, 4, 6 and 7 in favour of the appellant and against the respondent. Issues 5, 8 and 10 were found in
favour of the respondent and against the appeHant. On issue No. 9
the finding of the High Court was that the total amount of expenditure
incurred or authorized by the appellant or her election agent, together
with the expenditure proved to have been incurred by the party or by
the Srate Government in connection with the appellant's election
amounted to Rs. 31,976.47 which was sufficienily below the prescribed limit of Rs. 35,000. The appellant as such \vas held not guilty
of any corrupt practice under section 123 ( 6) of the RP Act. As the
respondent was found to have failed to prove that the expenses of the
appellant or her election agent, together with the expenses found to
have been incurred by the political party and the State Government in
connection with the appellant's election exceeded the prescribed
limit, the High Court held that no ground had been made out for inquiring into the validity of the 1974 amending Act. The writ petition filed by the respondent was accordingly dismissed.
•
c
D
E
On additional issue No. 2, the finding of the High Court was that
the appellant held herself out as a candidate from the Rae Barcli
F
Parliamentary constituency on December 29. 1970. Issue No. 3 was
decided by· the High Court against the appellaut. It was held that the
appellant obtained the assistance of the officers of the UP Government,
particularly the District Magistrate, Superintend<:nt of Police, the Executive Engineer PWD and the Engineer Hydei Department for construction of rostrums and arrangement of supply of power for loudspeakers in the meetings addressed by her on February 1, 1971 and
February 25., 1971 in furtherance of her election prospects. The G
appellant, as such, was found guilty of corrupt practice under section
123(7) of the RP Act. On additional issue No. 3, the High Court
found that Yashpal Kapur continued to be in the service of the Government of India till January 25, 1971, which was the date of the notification regarding the acceptance of Yashpat Kapur's resignation. The
High Court referred to the fact that according to the notification resig- H
nation of Yashpal Kapur had been accepted with effect from January_
14, 1971 and observed that the order accepting the resignation was
passed on January 25, 1971 and till that order was P<issed, the status of
450
A
B
c
D
E
.F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 2 S.C.R.
Yashpal Kapur continued to remain that uf a Government servant
despite the fact that when that order was passed it was given retrospective effect so as to be valid from January 14, 1971. As regards
issue No. 1 and additional issue No. 1, the High Court held that the
appellant obtained and procured the assistance of Yashpal Kapur during the period from January 7 to 24, 1971 wh:;n Yashpal Kapur was
still a gazetted officer in the service of the Government of India in the
furtherance of her election prospects.
As a result of its findings on issues No. \ issue No. 1 read with
additional issue No. 1, additional issue No. 2 and additional issue
No. 3, the High Court allowed the petition and declared the election
of the appellant to the Lok Sabha to be void. The appellant was
found guilty of having committed corrupt practice under section 123(7)
of the RP Act by having obtained the assistance of gazetted officers of
the uP Government, viz., the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police Rae Bareli, the Executive Engineer PWD Rae Bareli
and Engineer Hyde! Department Rae Bareli in furtherance of her election prospects. The appellant was further found guilty of having committed another corrupt practice under section 123 ( 7) of the RP Act
by having obtained the assistance of Yashpal Kapur, a gazetted olliccr
in· the Government of India holding the post of Officer on Special Duty
in Prime Minister's Secretariat, for the furtherance of her election
prospects. The appellant, it was accordingly observed, stands disqualified for a period of six years from the date of the order in accordance with section SA of the RP Act. The writ petition, as mentioned
earlier, was ,dismissed.
•
An appeal against the judgment of the learneJ single Judge of the
High Court dismissing the writ petition is pendin~ before the High
·
Court.
During the pcndency of these appeals, Parliament passed the Election Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975 (Act 4G of 1975) (hereinafter
referred to as 1975 amending Act or (Act 40 of 1975) and the same
was published in the Gazette of India Extraordinary dated August 6,
1975. Section 2 of the 1975 amending Act substituted a new section
tor section 8A in the Act. According to the: new section, the case of
every person found guilty of a corrupt practic<: by an order under
secuon 99 shall be' submitted as soon as may be, after such order takes
effect to the President for determination of the question as to whether
such person shall be disqualified and if so, for wi1at period. not exceeding six years. It is also provided that the person who stands disqualified may before the expiry of the period of disqualification submit
a petition to the President for the removal or such disqualification for
the unexpired portion of the said period. The President shall then
give his decision on such petition after obtaining tl1e opinion of the
Election Commission and in accordance with such opinion. Sections
3, 4 and 5 of the 1975 amending Act deal with other consequential
matters relating to disqualification, and it is not necessary for the
purpose of the present case to go into them. Secdons 6 and 7 amended
sections 77 and 79 of the RP Act and we shall refer to ihem presently.
•
•
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI
v. RAJ N.\RA\N (Khanna, J.)
451
A
Same is the position of section 8 of the amending Act which intro.duced changes in section 123 of the RP Ac~. Secti<'.n 9 amended s~c
tion 171A of the Indian Penal Code. Sect10n 10 gives retrospective
·effect to sections 6, 7 and 8. Sections 6, 7, 3, 9 and I 0 of Act 40 of
1975 rt>ad as under:
"6. In section 77 of the principal Act, in sub-sectiJn
B
(1),-
•
(a) for the words 'the date of publication of the notifica-
tion calling the election', the words '!he date on
which he has been nominated' shall be substituted;
( b) after Explanation 2, the following Explanation shall
be inserted, namely : -
c
'Explanation 3.-For the removal of doubt, it is hereby
declared that any expenditure in respect of any
arrangements made, facilities provickd or any other
act or thing done by any person in the service of the
Government and belonging to any of the classes
mentioned in clause ( 7) of section 123 in the
discharge or purported discharge of his official duty
as mentioned in the proviso to that clause shall not
be deemed to be expenditure in connection with the
~lection incurred or authorized by a candidate or by
his election agent for the purposes of this sub-section.'
D
7. In section 79 of the principal Act, for clause (b), the following clause shall be substituted, namely:-
E
'(b) 'candidate' means a person who has been or claims
· to have been duly nominated as a candidate at any
election.'
8. In section 123 of the principal Act.(a) in clause .(3), the following proviso shall be inserted
at the end, namely : )
F
'Provided that no symbol allotted under this Act to a
candidate shall be deemed to be a religious symbol or a
national symbol for the purposes of this clause.'
(b) in clause (7), the following proviso shal lbe inserted
<tt the end, namely : 'Provided that where any person, in the service of the
Government and belonging to any of the classes aforesaid
in the discharge or purported discharge of his official duty;
makes any arrangements or provides any facilities or does
any othe~ act ·or thing, for, to, or in relation to, any candidate or his agent or any other person acting with the consent
of the candidate or his election agent, (whether by reason of
the office held by the candidate or for any other reason), such
G
H
452
A
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 s.c.R.
arrangements, facilities or act or thing shall nut be deemed
to be assistance for the furtherance of the prospects of that
candidate's election.'
·
(c) in the explanation at the end, the foHowing shall be added,
namely:
4
'(3) For the purposes of clause (7), notwithstanding
anything contained in any other law, the publication in the
Official Gazette of the appointment, resignation, termination
of service, dismissal or removal from service of a pers'On
in the service of the Central Government (including a person
serving in connection with the administration of a Union
Territory) or of a State Government shall · be conclusive
proof-
•
B
c
(i) of such appointment, resignation, termination of
service, dismissal or removal from service, as the case may
be, and
D
E
(ii) where the date· of taking effect of such appointment, resignation, termination of service, as the case may
be, is stated in such publication, also of the fact that such
person was appointed with effect from the said date, or
in the case of resignation, termination of service, dismis~al or removal from service, such person ceased to be in
such service with effect from the said date.'
9. In the Indian Penal Code, in section 171A, for clause (a), the
following clause shall be substituted, namely :'(a) 'candidate' means a person who has been numinated as a candidate at any election.'
10. The amendments made by sections 6, 7 and 8 of this Act in
the
principal Act shall also have retrospective operation so as to
F
apply to and in relation to any election held before the commence, ment of this Act to either House of Parliament or to either House or
the House of the Legislature of a State-
G
H
( i) in respect of which any election petition may be
presented after the commencement of this Act; or
(ii) in respect of which any election petition is pending in any High Court immediately before such commencement; or
(iii) in respect of which any election petition has been
decided by any High Court before such commencement
but no appeal has been preferred to the Supreme Court
against the decision of the High Court before such commencement and the period 'Of limitation for filing such
appeal has not expired before such commencement; or
I
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v, RAJ NARAIN
(Khanna, J.)
453
(iv) in respect of which appeal from any order of any
High Court made in any e~ec~ion petit~on und.er section
98 or section 99 of the prmc1pal Act 1s pendmg before
the Supreme Court immediately before such com_mencement."
It is submitted by Mr. Shanti Bhushan on behal( of the respondent that the amendments made in the RP Act have an impact upon
five out of the seven grounds which were set up by the respondent to
assail the election of the appellant.
On August 10, 1975 the Constitution (Thir.ty-J?-inth Amendment)
Act, 1975 was published. A number of const1tut1onal change were
made by the Constitution Amendment Act. We are, however, c~n
cerned with section 4 of the Constitutional Amendment Act which
inserted article 329A in the Constitution after article 329. Article
329A reads as under:
"329A 'Special provision as to elections to Parliament
in the case of Prime Minister and Speaker.-(1) Subject to
the provisions of Chapter II of Part V [Except sub-clause (e)
of clause (1) of article 102], no election-
A
B
c
D
(a) to either House of Parliament of a person who,
holds the office of Prime Minister at the time of such .
election or is appointed as Prime Minister after such
election;
'
(b) to the House of the People of a person who holds
the office of Speaker of that House at the time of
such election or who is chosen as the Spe·aker for
that House after such election;
E
shall be called in question, except before such authority (not
bei.ng any such authority as is referred to in clause (b) of
article 329) or body and in such manner as may be provided for by or under any law made by Parliament and any
such law may provide for all other matters relati'ng to doubts
and disputes in relation to such election including the
grounds on which such election .may be questioned.
F
(2) The validity of any such law as is referred to in
clause ( 1) and the decision of any authority or body under
such law shall not be called in question in any court.
(3) Where any person is appointed as Prime Minister
or, as the case may be, chosen to the office of the Speaker
of the House of the People, while a•a election petition
referred to in clause (b) of article 329 in respect of his
election to either House of Parliame•at or, as the case may
be, to the House of the People is pending, such election petition shall abate upon such person being appointed
as Prime Minister or, as the case may be, being chosen to
8-L126SCI/76
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
A
B
c
(1976] 2 S.C.R.
the office of the Speaker of the House of the People, but
such election may be cnlled in question under a'ay such law
as is referred to in clause ( 1) .
( 4) No law made by Parliament before the commencement of the Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment) Act,
1975, in so far as it relates to election petitions and matters
connected therewith, shall apply or shall be deemed ever to
have applied to or in relation to the election of any such
person as is referred to in clause ( 1) to either House of
Parliament and such election shall not be deemed to be void
or ever to have become void on any ground on which such
election could be declared to be void or has, before such
commencement, been declared to be void u111der any such
law and notwithstanding any order made by any court, before such commencement, declaring such election to be void,
such election shall continue to be valid in all respects and
any such order and any finding on which such order is
based shall be and shall be deemed always to have been
void and of ,no effect.
D
(5) Any appeal or cross appeal against any such order
of any court as is referred to in clause ( 4) pending immediately before the commencement of the Constitution
(Thirty-ninth Amendment) Act, 1975,' before the Supreme
Court shall be disposed of in conformity with the provisions
of clause ( 4).
E
( 6) The provisions of this article shall have effect notwithstanding anything cont~ined in this Constitution."
Section 5 of the above Constitution· Amendment Act inserted in
the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution a number of enactments including the RP Act as also Acts 58 of 1974 and 40 of 1975.
F
G
H
At the hearing of the appeal Mr. Sen on behalf of the appellant
has relied upon clause (4) of the new article 329A and has conte•1ded that that clause clearly applies to the present C"ase. It is urged
that in view of that clause no law made by Parliament before the
coming into force of the Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment)
Act, 1975 i.e., before August 10, 1975, in so far as it relates to the
election petitions and matters connected therewith shall apply
or shall be deemed ever to have applied to or in relation
to the election to the Lok Sabha of the appellant who being Prime
Minister is one of the persons referred to in clause (1) of that article.
It is further submitted that in view of that clause, the election of the
appellant shall not be deemed to be void or ever to have become void
on any ground on which such election could be declared to be void
or has before such commencement been declared to be void under
any such law. Mr. Sen also adds that notwithstandin!! the order
made by the High Court before such commencement declaring the
election of the appellant to be void, her election shall continue to be
valid in all respects and any such order and anv finding on which
such order is based_ shall be and shall be deemed always to have been
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN
(Khanna, J.)
45 5
void and of no effect. Submission is consequently made tliat in view
of the mandate contained in clause ( 5) of the article, the appeal filed
by the appellant and the cross appeal filed by the respondent should
be disposed of in conformity with the provisions of clause ( 4).
•
•
In reply Mr. Shanti Bhushan on behalf of the respondent has not
c;ontroverted, and in our opinion rightly, the stand taken by Mr. Sen
that clause ( 4) of the article applies to the facts of the present case .
He, however, contends that section 4 of the Constitution Amendment
Act which has inserted article 329A in the Constitution is invalid.
The validity of the above constitutional amendment has been challenged by Mr. Shanti Bhushan on the following two grounds :
( 1) The above constitutional amendment affects the basic structure or framework of the Constitution and is, therefore, beyond the
amending power under article 368.
•
•
(2) The Constitution Amendment Act was passed in a session of
Parliament after some members of Parliament had been unconstitutionally detained and thus illegally prevented from influencing the views
of other members present at the time. the above Act was passed. This
groun<l, it is urged, also affects the validity of the amending Act .40
of 1975.
Article 329A deals with election to either House of Parliament of
a person who holds the office of Prime Minister at the time of such
election or is appointed as Prime Minister after such election and to
the House of the People of a person who holds the office of Speaker
of that House at the time of such election or who is chosen as the
Speaker for that House after such electio.n. According to clause (1)
of article 329A, no election of persons mentioned above shall be
called in question, except before such authority or body and in such
manner as may be provided for by or under any law made by Parliament. It is made clear that the authority before which such election
shall be called in question would not be the one as referred to in clause
(b) of article 329. The law to be made by Parliament under clause
( 1) may provide for all other matters relating to doubts and
disputes in relation to such election including the grounds on
which such election may be questioned. The above law shall be
subject to the provisions of clause ( 1) of article 102 except
sub-clause ( e). The law made under clause ( 1) cannot, therefore,
remove the disqualification for being chosen a member of either House
of Parliament because of that person holding an office of profit or
because of his unsoundness of mind or because of his being an undischarged insolvent or because of his being not a citizen of India, or
because of his having voluntarily acquired the citizenship of a foreign
State, or because of his being under any acknowledgment of allegiance or adherence to a foreign State, as contemplated by sub-clauses
(a) to ( d) of clause ( 1 ) of article 102 of the Constitution. The
law made under clause (1) of article 329A would not, however, be
subject to clause ( e) of chuse ( 1) of article 102, according to which
a person shall be disqualified for being chosen as and for being, a
member of either House of Parliament if he is so disqualified by or
A
B
c
D
F
G
H
456
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 S.C,R.
under any law made by Parliament. According to clause (2) ot
article 329A, the validity of a law referred to in clause ( 1) and the
decision of any authority or body under such law shall not be called
in question in any court. Clause (3) provides for the abatement of
an election petition which is pending in respect of the election of any
person who is appointed as Prime Minister or chosen as Speaker of
the House of the People during the pendency of the petition. It is
further provided that the election of such person can be called in
question under any such law as is referred to in clause ( 1) of
article 329A. Clause ( 4) is the crucial clause for the present
case .. According to this clause, no law made by Parliament before the commencement of the Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment) Act in so far as it relates to election petitions and matters
connected therewith, shall apply or shall be deemed ever to have applied to or in relation to the election of any of the persons mentioned
above to either House of Parliament. The remaining part of the
clause deals with some_ further matters. It is provided in clause ( 4)
that the election of the aforesaid persons shall not be deemed to be
void or ever to have become void on any ground on which such
election could be declared to be void or has, before such commencement, been declared to be void under any such law. It is further
provided that notwithstanding any order made by any court before
the commencement of the Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment)
Act declaring such election to be void, such election shall continue
to be valid in all respects and any such order and any finding on
which such order is based shall be and shall be deemed always to have
been void and of no effect. According to clause ( 5) , any appeal or
cross appeal against any such order as is referred to in clause ( 4)
pending immediately .before the commencement of the Constitution
(Thirty-ninth Amendment) Act, before the Supreme Court shall be
disposed of in conformity with the provisions of clause ( 4) . Clause
(6) states that the provisions of article 329A shall take effect notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution.
The proposition that ·the power of amendment under article 368
does not enable Parliament to alter the basic structure or framework
of the Constitution was laid down by this Court by a majority of 7
to 6 in the case of His Holiness Kesavananda Bharathi v. State of
Kera/a (1). Apart from other reasons which were given in some of
the judgments of the learned Judges who constituted the majority, the
majority dealt with the connotation of the word "amendment". It
was held that the words "amendment of the Constitution" in article
368 could not have the effect of destroying or abrogating the basic
structure of the Constitution. Some of us who were parties to that
case took a different view and came to the conclusion that the words
"amendment of the Constitution" in article 368 could not have the
effect of destroying or abrogating the basic structure of the Constitution. Some of us who were parties to that case took a different
view and came to the conclusion that the words "amendment of the
Constitution in article 368 did not admit of any limitation. Those
(!) [1973] Sup. S.C.R. 1.
•
•
•
SMT. INDIRA ,GANDill v. RAJ NARAIN (Khanna, J.)
457
!rt Kesavana_nda's case (supra) may .A
still hold the same view as was given expression to in that case. For
the purpose of the present case, we shall have to proceed in accordance with the law as laid down by the majority in that case .
o~ us who were in ~e minority
•
Before dealing with the question as to whether the impugned
amendment affects the basic structure of the Constitution, I may make
it clear that this Court is not concerned with the wisdom behind or
· the propriety of the impugned constitutional amendment. These
. are matters essentially for. those who are vested with the authority to
make the constitutional amendment. All that this Court is concerned with is the constitutional validity of the impugned amendment.
•
•••
.
•
•
I may first deal with the second contention advanced by Mr.
Shanti Bhushan. According to him, the impugned constitutional
amendment and the amending Act of 1975 were passed in sessions
of Parliament. wherein some members, including the respondent, could
not be present because they had been illegally detained. The fact
that those measures were passed by the requisite majority has not
been questioned by the learned counsel but he submits that if the
abovementioned members had not been detailed and had not
been prevented from attending the sittings of. Parliament, they could
have influenced the other members and as such it is possible that t.he
impugned Constitution Amendment Act and the 1975 RP amending Act might not have been passed. Mr. Shanti Bhnshan accordingly asserts tjlat the sittings of the House of Parliament in which the
above mentioned two measures were passed were not legal sittings.
Any measure passed in such sittings, according to the learned counsel, ·
cannot be considered to be a valid piece of constitutional amendment
or statutory amendment.
There is, in my opinion, no force in the above submission. The
proposition that a member of Parliament cannot claim immunity
from being detailed under a law relating to preventive detention does
not now admit of much donbt. The privileges, powers and the immunities of the members of the two Houses of Indian Parliament as
well as of the Indian legislatures are the same as those of the members of the House of Co=ons as they existed at the time of the commencement of the Constitution; · The position about the privileges of
the members of the House of Commons as h obtained in the United
Kingdom at the relevapt time has been stated in Erskine May's Parliamentary Practice, 18th Ed. (p. 100) as under : '
"The privilege of freedom from arrest is limited to civil
causes, and has not been allowed to interfere with the administratio1,1 of criminal justice or emergency legislation."
The above observations were relied. upon by this Court in the case
of K .. Anandan Nambiar & Anr. v. Chief Secretary, Government of
Madras & Ors.(>). The petitioners in that case were members of
Parliament. They were detained by orders passed by the State
Government under rnle 30(1 )(b) of the Defence of India Rules,
(1) [1965] 2 S.C.R. 406.
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
458
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 s.c.n.
1962. They challenged the validity of the orders of detention, inter
alia, on the ground that rule 30(1) (b) was invalid because a legislator cannot be detained so as to prevent him from exercising his
c0nstitutional rights as legislator while the legislative chamber to which
he belongs is in session. This Court rejected that contention and
held that the true constitutional position is that so far as a valid order
of detention is concerned, a member of Parliament can claim no
special status higher than that of an ordinary citizen and that he is as
much liable to be arrested and detained under it as any other citizen.
It was also held that if an order of detention validly prevents a member from attending a session of Parliament, no occasion would arise
for the exercise by him of the right of freedom of speech.
Question as to whether a member of Parliament has been validly
detained under _a law relating to preventive detention can, in my opinion, be appropriately gone into in proceedings for a writ of habeas
corpus. Such question cannot be collaterally raised in proceedings
like the present wherejn the cou_rt is concerned with the validity of a
Constitution Amendment Act and an Act to amend the Representation
of the People Act. In deciding a case before it the court should decide matters which arise directly in the case. A court should resist
the attempt of a party to induce it to decide a matter which
though canvassed during arguments is only incidental and collateral
and can appropriately be dealt with in separate proceedings.
The contention advance_d by Mr. Shanti Bhushan that the .sittings
of the two Houses of Parliament in which the impugned Acts were
passed were not valid essentially relates to the validity of the proceedings of the two Houses of Parliament. These are matters which are
not _justiciable and pertain to the internal domain of the two Houses.
Of course, the courts can go into the question as to whether the measures passed by Parliament are constitutionally valid. The court
cannot, however, go into the question as to whether the sittings of the
Houses of Parliament were not constitutionally valid because some
members. of those Houses were prevented from attending and participating in the discussions in those Houses. It has not been disputed
before us, as already mentioned, that the impugned Constitution
Amendment Act and the statutory amendment Act were passed by
the requisite majority. It is not the case of the respondent that the
number of the detained members of Parliament was so large, that if
they had voted against the impugned measures, the measures would
not have been passed. Indeed, according to the affidavit filed during
the course of arguments, the number of members of the Lok Sabha
who were detained was 21 and of the Rajya Sabha the number was
10. An amendment of the Constitution under article 368, it is noteworthy, has apart from the requirement in certain cases o[ ratification by the State legislatures, to be passed in each House of Parliament by majority of the total membership of that House and bv a
majority of two-thirds of the members of that House present - and
voting. According to cllluse ( 1) of article 100 of the Constitution,
save as otherwise provided in this Constitution, all questions at any
sitting of either House or joint sitting of the Houses shall be deter-
~·
·•
•
.
.. .....
"
•
.
-
••
..
-
•
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN (Khanna, !.)
mined by a majority of votes of the members present and voting,
other than the Speaker or person acting as Chairman or Speaker.
The Chairman or Speaker, or person acting as such, shall not vote
in the first instance, but shall have and exercise a casting vote in the
case of an equality of votes. Clause (2) of that article provides that
either House of Parliament shall have power to act notwithstanding
any vacancy in the membership thereof, and any proceedings in
Parliament ~hail be valid notwithstanding that it is discovered subse- B
quently that some person who was not entitled so to do sat or voted
or otherwise took part in the proceedings. Further, it is provided
in clause ( 1) of article 122 that the validity of any proceedings in
Parliament shall not be called in question on the ground of any alleg.::d
irregularity of procedure. All this would show that the framers of
the Constitution were anxious to ensure that the procedural irregularities and other grounds like those mentioned in clause (2) of c
article 100 should not vitiate the validity of proceedings of Parliament and that it would not be permissible to call in question those
proceedings on such grounds. The observations on page 456 in the
case of Speciai Reference No. 1 of 1964(i1) that if the impugned
proceedings of a legislature are illegal and unconstitutional and not
merely irregular the same can be scrutinised in a court of law do not,
D
in my opinion, warrant the inference that a court can hold the proceedings of a legislature to be not valid and constitutionai by going
into the question as to whether the detention of any member who
was prevented from being present in the sitting of the legislature on
account of hi~ detention was or was not in accordance with Jaw.
The acceptance of the above submission of Mr. Shanti Bhushan
would necessarily result in a situation that whenever a law is made E
by Parliament, it would be open to a person affected by that law to
question the validity of that law by asking the court to examine the
validity of detention of each of the members of Parliament who were
under detention at the time the said law was passed even though
those members do not themselves assail the validity of theit· detention. It is plain that it would not be possible for the court in such
collateral proceedings to record a finding about the validity of the F
detention of the members beqmse the full material having a bearing
on the validity of the detention would normally be, apart from the
authority passing the order for detention, only with the person ordered to be detained or his friends and relatives. It would plainly be
hazardous to record a finding without such material and a court of
Jaw, in my opinion, should decline to record such a finding in collateral proceedings. Till such time as a finding is recorded in appro- G
priate proceedings about the validity of the detention of the members
of Parliament, the court would have to proceed upon the assumption
that the detention has not been shown to be invalid.
· According to clause (3) of article 105 of the
'
.
459
Constitution
to
whic~ a sh<;'r.t reference has been made earlier, the powers, privlleges
and 1mmu111t1es of each House 0£ Parliament, and of the members
and the committees of each House, shall be such as may from time
(1) [1965} 1 S.C.R. 413.
H
460
A
B
c
D
E
F
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 s.c.R.
lo lime be defined by Parliament by law, and, until so defined, shall
be those of the House of Commons of the Parliament of the United
Kingdom, and of its members and committees, at the commencement of this Constitution. No law contemplated by clause l3) has
been made by the Parliament in India and as such we have to find
out the powers, privileges and immunities of the House of Commons
in the lrnited Kingdom at the relevant time. In the case of Bradlaugh v. Gossett (l) the plainttiff, having been returned as member
for the borough of Northampton, required the Speaker of the House
of Commons to call him to the table for the purpose of taking oath.
In consequence of something which had transpired on a former occasion the Speaker declined to do so. The House of Commons then
upon motion resolved "that the Serjeant-at-Arms do exclude Mr.
Bradlaugh (the plaintiff) from the House until he shall engage not
further to disturb the proceedings of the House." In an action
against the Serjeant-at-Arms praying for an injunction to restrain
him from carrying out the resolution, the court held that this being
a matter relating to the internal management .of the procedure of the
House of Commons, the court had no power to interfere. Dealing
with tht rights to be exercised within the walls of the House, Stephen
J. observed that those rights must be dependent upon the resolutions
of the House. He also added that there was no appeal from the
decision of the House of Commons. Stephen J. in the course of the
judgment also observed :
'•
"
-
" .... for the purpose of determining on a right to be
exercised within the House itself, and in particular the
right of sitting and voting, the House and the House alone
could interpret the statute but .... as regarded rights to be
exercised out of and independently of the House, such as
the right of suing for a penalty for having sat and voted, the
statute must be interpreted by this Court independently cf
the House."
The above passage has been cited on page 83 in Erskine May's
Parliamentary Practice, 18th Ed. with a view to show that it is a
right of each House of Parliament to be the sole judge of the lawfulness of its own proceedings. It would follow from the above that the
courts cannot go into the lawfulness of the proceedings of the Houses
of Parliament.
G
The Act of detaining a person is ,normally that of an outside
agency and not that of the House of Parliament. It would 'certaiulv
look anomalous if the act of an outside agency which might ultimately
turn out to be not legal could affect the validity of the proceedings
of the House of Parliament or could prevent that House from assembling and functioning.
H
The matter can also be looked at from another angle. Gazette
copies of the Election Laws Amendment Act, 1975 (Act 40 of 1975)
(1) 12 Q.B.D. 271 (1883-84).
•
\o
••
~ ~4
•
-
"
A
,,
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN
(Khanna, J.)
4 61
and the Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment) Act, 1975 have
been preduced oefore us. In the face of the publication in the
Gazette of the above mentioned two Acts this Court must assume
that those two Acts were duly passed. It may be pertinent in this
context to refer to the position in the United States where it was laid
down in the case of Marshall Field & Co. v. John M. Clark(1) as
1mdei:
;'The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and by the President of the Senate, in open session, of
an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses
that such bill has passed Congress; and when the bill, thus
attested receives the approval of the President, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that
has passed Congress is complete and unimpeachable. An
enrolled Act thus authenticated is sufficient evidence of itself
that it passed Congress."
In the case of a constitutional amendment which requires ratification
by the States, the position was stated by Brandeis J. in the case of
Oscar Leser v. J. Mercer Garnett(2) as follows :
"The proclamation by the Secretary certified that, from
official documents on file in the Department of State, it appeared that the proposed Amendment was ratified by the
legislatures of thirty-six states, and that it 'has. become valid
to all intents and purposes as a part of the Constitution of
the United States.' As the legislatures of Tennessee and of
West Virginia had power to adoPt the resolutions of ratification, official notice to the Secretary, duly authenticated, that
they had done so, was conclusive upon him, and, being certified to by his proclamation, is conclusive upon the courts."
•
)
•
I am, therefore, of the view that the constitntional validity of the
Constitution Amendment Act and the 1975 -Act amending the Representation of the People Act canpot be assailed on the ground that
some members of Parliament were prevented because of their detention
from attending and participating in the proceedings of the respective
Houses of Parliament.
We may now deal with clause ( 4) of article 329A which has
been added by the Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment) Act, 1975.
It is necessary to clarify at the outset that we are concerned in the
present case only with the constitutional validity of clause ( 4) and not
with that of the other clauses of that article. I, therefore, express no
opinion about the validity of the other clauses of article 329A. Clause
( 4) consists of four p_arts :
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
(i) No law made by Parliament before the commence-
ment of the Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment)
Act. 1975 in so far as it relates to the election
J
)
(1) 143 U.S. 649.
(2) 66 L. Ed. 505.
H
•162
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976) 2 S.C.R.
petitions and matters connected therewith shall
~pply o~ shall be deemed ever to have applied to or
m relat10n to the election of any such person as is
referred to in clause ( 1) to either House of
Parliament:
(ii) and such election shall not be deemed to be void or
ever to .have become void on any ground on which
such election could be declared to be void or has
before such commencement been declared to be void
under any such law;
(iii) i:\nd notwithstanding any order made by any court
before such commencement declaring such election to
be void, such election shall continue to be valid in all
respects;
(iv) and any such order and any finding on which such
order is based shall be and shall be deemed always to
have been void and of no effect.
In so far as part (i) is concerned, I find that it relates to a matter
which can be the subject of an ordinary legislation or a constitutional
amendment. According to this part, no law made by Parliament before
the commencement of the Constitution (Thirty..ninth Amendment)
Act, 1975 in so far as it relates to the election petitions and matters
connected therewith shall apply and shall be deemed ever to have
applied to or in relation to the election of any such person as is referred to in clause (1) to either House of Parliament. A law in the
above terms can validly be made by a legislature as well as by a cons~ituent authority. The fact that the above law would have retrospective
effect would not detract from the competence of the legislature or
constituent authority to make such a law. It is well-settled that it is
permissible for a legislature to make a law with retrospective effect.
The power of a: legislature to make a law with retrospective effect is
not curtailed or circumscribed by the fact that the subject matter of
such retrospective law is a matter relating to an election dispute [5ee
State of Orissa v. Bhupendra Kumar Bose(1) and Kanta Kathuria v.
Manak Chand Surana(2)]. Detailed reference to these cases would
be made at the appropriate stage subsequently. If a legislature can
pass legislation in respect of matters relating to an election dispute
with a retrospective effect, the constituent authority, which is a kind
of super-legislature, would a fortiori be entitled to do so.
Part (ii) of clause ( 4) spells out the consequence \vhich flows from
part (i) of the clause. If the previous law in so far as it relates to
the election petitions and matters connected therewith was not to apply
to the election of the Prime M.i,nister and the Speaker. it would necessarily follow that the election of the appellant who was the Prime
Minister would not be deemed to be void or ever to have become
void on the ground on which such election could be declared to be
void or has before such commencement been declared 'to be void under
any such law.
(1) [1962] Sup. 2 S.C.R. 38n.
(2) [1970] 2 S.C.R. 835,
'•
•
•
•
•
*.
-
-
••
1
)
!
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN (Khanna, J.)
463
The same, to some extent, appears to be true of part (iv) . of
clause ( 4). If the previous law in so far as it relates to the election
petitions and matters connected therewith was not to apply to the
election of the appellant, the High Court shall be deemed to have had
no jurisdiction to decide the election petition rhallenging the election
of the appellant. The effect of part (i) .of clause ( 4) is that the H!gh
Court was divested of the jurisdictio.n to decide the dispute relatmg
to the election of the appellant with a retrospective effect. The law
under which the election of the appellant was declared to be void as a
resul.t of the amendment was also made inapplicable with retrospec.;tive
effect to the dispute relating to the election of the appellant. The
resultant effect of the amendment thus was "tbat the order by which
the election of the appell<1nt was declared to be void and the finding
on which such order was based were rendered to be void and of no
effect.
Another aspect of part (iv) of clause ( 4) relates to the question
as to whether it is open to the constituent authority to declare an order
and a finding of the High Court to be void and of no effect or whether
such a declaration can be made only either in separate judicial· pro,ceedings or in proceedings before a higher court.
A declaration that an order made by a court of law is void is normally part of the judicial function and is not a legislative function.
Although there is in the Constitution of India no rigid separation of
powers, by and large the spheres of judicial function and legislatiw
function have been demarcated and it .is not permissible for the legislature to encroach upon the judicial sphere. It has accordingly been
held that a legislature while it is entitled to change with retrospective
effect the law which formed the basis of the judicial decision, it is not
permissible to the legislature to declare the judgment of the court to
be void or not bind [see Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. & Ors. v.
Broach Borough Municipality & Ors. (1), Janapada Sabha, Chhindwara etc. v. The Central Provinces Syndicate Ltd. & Anr. etc.e),
Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad etc. v. New Shorock
Spg. & Wvg. Co. Ltd. etc.( 3 ) and State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. v. M.
Rayappa Gounder(4) ].
A
8
c
D
E
F
<
The position as it prevails in the United States, where guarantee
of due process of law is in operation, is given Olli pages 318-19 of Vol.
46 of the American Jurisprudence 2d as .under :
"The general rule is that the legislature may not destroy,
annul, set aside, vacate, reverse, modify or impair the final
judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, so as to take
away private rights which have become vested by the judgment. A statute attempting to do so has been held unconstitutional as an attempt on the part of the legislature to exercise judicial power, and as a violation of the constitutional
guarantee of due process of law. The_ legislature is not only
prohibited from reopening cases previously decided by the
(1) [1970] 1 S.C.R. 388 (at 392).
(3) [1971] 1 S.C.R. 288.
(2) [1970] 3 S.C.R. 745 (at 751).
(4) A.LR. 1971 S.C. 231.
G
H
-
464
A
SUPR_EME COURT REPORTS
--
--- _____.m:=a;__
[1976] 2 S.C.R.
...
courts, but is also forbidden to affect the inherent attributes
of a judgment. That the statute is under the cruise of an
is worthy
act att:ecting remedies does not alter the rule.
of notice, however, that there are cases in which judgments
requiring acts to be done in the future may validly be affected
by subsequent legislation making illegal that which the .iudgment found to be legal, or making legal that which the judgment found to be illegal.
It
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
10.--- - - Judgment as to public right.
•
With respect to legislative interference with a judgment,
a distinction has been made between public and private rights
under which distinction a statute may be valid even though
it renders ineffective a judgmellll: concerning a public right.
Even after a public right has been established by the judgment of the court, it may be annulled by subsequent legislation."
....
Question arises whether the above limitation imposed upon the
legislature about its competence to decfare a judgment of the court
to be void would also operate upon the •:omtitncnt authority?
View has been canvassed before us that the answer to the above
question should be in the negativ~. Although normally a declaration
that the judgment of a court is void can be made either in separate
proceedings or in proceedings before the higher court, there is, according to this view, no bar to _!he constituent authority making a declaration in the constitutional law that such an order would be void especially when it relates to a matter of public importance like the dispute
relating to the electiol11 of a person holding the office of Prime Minister.
The declaration of the voidness of the High Court judgment is something which can ultimately be traced to part (i). _ Whether such a
declaration should be made by the court or by the constituent authority
is more, it is urged, a matter of the mechanics of making the declaration and would not ultimately affect the substance of the matter that
the judgment is declared void. According to article 31B, without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in article 3 lA, none
of the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule nor any
of the provisions thereof shall be deemed to be· void, or ever to have
become void, on the ground that such Act, Regulation or provision
is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions of this Part, and notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of allly court or tribunal to the< contrary, each
of the said Acts and Regulations shall, subject to the power of any
competent Legislature to repeal or amend it, continue in force. The
·effect of the above article, it is pointed out, is that even if a statute
has been declared to be void on the ground of contravention of fundamental rights by a court of law, the moment that statute is specified
by the constituent authority in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution,
it shall be deemed to have got rid of that voidness and the order of
the court declaring that statute to be void is rendered to be of no effect.
It is not necessary in such an event to make even the slightest change
i
..
\,
-
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN (Khanna, J.)
465
in the statute to rid it of its voidness. The stigma of voidness attach· A
ing to the statute because of contravention of fundamental rights foun~
by the court is deemed to be washed away as soon as the statute 1s
specified by the constituent authority in the Ninth Schedule and the
judgment of the court in this respect is rendered to be in_operative and
of no effect. Iru the case of Don John Douglas L1yange v. The
Queen( i) the Judicial Committee struck down as ultra vires and void
the provisions of the Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Act, 1962 on 8
the ground that they involved the usurpation and infringement by the
legislature of the. judicial powers inconsistent with the written constitution of Ceylon. Their Lordships, however, expressly referred on
page 287 to the fact that the impugned legislation had not been passed
by two-thirds majority in the manner required for an amendment of
rhe Constitution contained in section 29(4) of the Constitution. It
c
was observed :
. "There was speculation during the argument as to what
the position would be if Parliament sought to procure such a
result by first amending the Constitution by a two-thirds
majority. But such a situation does not arise here. Jn, so
far as any Act passed without recourse to section 29 ( 4) of
the Constitution purports to usurp or infringe the judicial
power it is ultra vires."
D·
The above observations, it is urged, show that the restriction upon the
· legislature in encroaching upon judicial sphere may not necessarily
hold good in the case of constituent authority.
'r
-
<
. The above contention has been controverted by Mr. Shanti Bhushan
and he submits that the limitation on the power of the legislature that
it cannot declare void a judgment of the court equally operates upon
the constituent authority. It is urged that the constituent authority
can only enact a law in general terms, even though it be a constitutional law. The constituent authority may also, if it so deems proper
change the law which is the basis of a decision and make such change
with retrospective effect, but it cannot, according to the learned counsel,
declare void the judgment of the court. Declaration of voidness of a
judgment, it is stated, is a judicial act and cannot be taken over by the
constituent authority. Although legislatures or the constituent authority can make laws, including those for creation of courts, they cannot,
according to the submissio.n, _exercise judicial functions by assuming
the powers of a sqper court in the same way as the courts cannot act
as a super legislature. It is, in my opinion, not necessary to dilate
upon this aspect and express a final opinion upon the rival contentions, because of the view I am taking of part (iii) of clause (4).
We may now come to part (iii) of clause ( 4). By part (iii) it is
declared that the election of the appellant sha!J continue to be valid
in all respects. Such a declaration would not follow from part (i) of
the clause. It would not also follow from part (ii) and part (iv) of
(!) [1967] A.C. 259.
E
F
G
H
466
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
•
[1976] 2 S.C.R.
A
the clause which, as mentioned earlier, in effect represented the consequcnces flowing from part (i). The election to the Lok Sabha of the
appellant, who was the Prime Minister, was challenged on the ground
that she or her election agents had been guilty of some malpractices.
The declaration that her election was to be valid in all respects necessarily involved the process of going in\to the grounds on which her
election had been assailed and holding those grounds to be either facB tually incorrect or to be of such a nature as in law did not warrant
the declaration of her election w be void. The case_ of the appellant
is that some of the grounds mentioned against her were factually incorrect and in respect of those grounds the findings of the High O:mrt
is against the respondent a.nd in her favour. In respect of some 0ther
grounds, except in one or two matters there is not much divergence
between the appellant and the respondent on the question of facts.
c The
point of COJitroversy between the parties mainly is that, according
to the respondent, those facts constituted corrupt practice as defined
in section 123 of the RP Act, while according to the appellant· those
facts did not constitute corrupt practice. In any case, according to
the appellant, in view of the ameJidment made in the RP Act by amending Acts 58 of 1974 and 40 of 1975, these facts did not constitute
corrupt practice. The declaration made in part (iii) of clause ( 4) that
D the election of the appellant was to be valid in all respects was tantamount in the very nature of things to the repelling of the grounds
advanced by the respondent to challenge the election of the appellant.
Question therefore arises as to what, if any, was the law which was
applied in repelling the grounds advanced by the respondent to challenge the election of the appellant. So far as the existing law relating
to election disputes was concerned, part (i) of clause ( 4) expressly
E stated that such a law would not apply to the petition filed by the
respondent to challe.nge the election of the appellant. This means that
the provisions of the Representation of the People Act were not to apply
to the petition filed by the respondent against the appellant. This also
means that the amending Acts 58 of 1974 and 40 of 1975 were not
to apply to the dispute relating to election of the appellant.
F
G
The dispute relating to the election of the appellant is also not
to be governed by law which is to be enacted under clause (1) of
article 329A. Such a law would apply only to future elections. The
result is that so far as the dispute relating to the election of the appellant is concerned, a legal vacuum came into existence. It was open
to the constituent authority to fill that vacuum by prescribing a law
which was to govern the dispute arising out of the petition filed by the
respondent to challenge the election of the appellant. The constituent
authority, however, did not do so and straightaway proceeded to
declare the election of the appellant to be valid. There is nothing in
clause ( 4) to indicate that the constituent authority applied any law
in declaring the election of the appellant to be valid and if so, what
was that law.
H
I am unable to accede to the argument that the constituent authority
kept in view the provisions of the RP Act as amended by Acts 58 of
1<-'
•
~
i 1111
•.
~
~
•
.
"
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RA.J NARAIN (Khanna, 1.)
467
1974 and 40 of 1975 and their impact on the challenge to the efoction A
of the appellant in· declaring the election· of the appellant to be valid.
The difficulty in accepting this argument is that in part (i) of clausc(4)
the constituent authority expressly stated that the previous Jaw, namely,
the R !' Act as amended in so far as it related to election petitions and.
matters connected therewith was not to apply. so far as the challenge
to the election of the appellant was concerned. It is also difficult to
agree that the constituent authority took into account some ether un- B
specified Jaw or norm in declaring the election of the appellant to be
valid. As mentioned earlier, there is nothing in clause (4) to indicate
that the constituent. authority took into account some other law or
norm and if so, what that law or norm was. The position which
thus emerges is that according to clause (4) no Jaw was to apply for
·adjudicating upon the challenge to the· election of the appdlant and
the same was in terms of part (iii) to be valid in all respects. The C
question with which we a~e concerned is whether the pro,·isions of
clause ( 4) of article 329A by which the constituent authority in
effect prescribed that no election law was to govern the chaHo::ge
to the election of the appellant and that the same in any case was
to be valid in . aH respects is a permissible piece ·of constitutional
amendment or whether it is void on the ground that it affects the
basic structure of the Constitution.
D
•
•
..
•
•
•
This Court in the case of Kesavananda Bharati (supra) held bv
majority that tlie power .of amendment of the Constitution contained
· in article 368 does not permit altering the ·basic structure of the __..
Constitntion. All the seven Judges who constituted· the majority
were also agreed· that democratic set up was part of the bas;c E
structure of the Constitution. Democracy postulates that there
should · be periodical elections, so that people may bo in a
position either to re-elect the old representatives or, if they so
choose, to change the representatives and elect in their place other
representatives. Democracy further contemplates that the elections
should be free and fair, so that the voters may be in a position to
vote for candidates of their choice. Democracy can indeed function F
only upo!1 the faith ·that elections ar~ fre_e and fair and not rigged
and mampulated, . that they· are effecllve mstruments of ascertainin"
popular will both in reality and form and are not mere rituals cai:
culated to generate illusion of deference to. mass opinion: Free and
fair elections require that the candidates and their agents should not
.resort to unfair means or malpractices as may impinge upon the process Of free and fair elections. Even in the absence of unfair means G
and malpractices, sometimes the result of ari election is . materiallv
affected because of the improper rejection of ballot papers. Likewise.
the result of an election may be materially affected on account t>f the
improper rejection of a nomination paper. Disputes, therefore, arise .
with regard to the validity of elections. For the resolving of those
disputes. the different democratic countries of the world have made
provisions prescribing the law and the forum for the resolving of H
those disputes. To eive a few examoles. we mav re(er to the United
Kim.'dom where a parliamentary: election vetition h tried bv two iudges
on the rota for the trial of parliamentary election petitions in
468
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976) 2 S.C.R.
accordance with the Representation of the People Act, 1949. Section 5
of article 1 of the US Constitution provides that each House (Senate
and the House of Representatives) shall be the judge of the elections,
returns and qualifications of its own members. Section 47 of the
Australian Constitution provides that until the Parliament otherwise
provides, any qucst10n respecting the qualification of a senator or
of a member of the House of Representative, or respecting a vacancy
B in either House of Parliament, and any question of a disputed election
to either House, shall be determined by the Honse in which the question arises. Article 55 of the Japanese Constitution states that each
House shall judge disputes related to qualifications of its members.
However, in order to deny a seat to any member, it is necessary to
pass a resolution by a majority of two-thirds or more of the mem. bers present. Article 46 of the Iceland Constitution provides that
C
the Althing itself decides whether its members are legally elected
and also whether a member i~ disqualified. Article 64 of the
Norwegian Constitution states that the representatives elected
shall be furnished with certificates, the validity of which shall be submitted to the judgment of the Starting. Article 59 of the French
Constitution provides that the Constitutional Council shall rule, in
the case of disagreement, on the regularity of the election of deputies
D and senators. Article 41 of the German Federal Republic Constitution states that the scrutiny of election shall be the responsibility of the
Bundestag. It shall also decide whether a deputy has lost his seat
in the Bundestag. Against the decision of the Bundestag an appeal
shall lie to the Federal Constitutional Court. Details shall be regulated by a federal law. According to article 66 of the Italian Constitution, each Chamber decides as to the validity of the admission
E of its own Members and as to cases subsequently arising concerning
ineligibility .and incompatibility. In Turkey article 75 provides inter
alia that it shall be the function of Supreme Election Board to review
and pass final judgment on all irregularities, complaints and objections
regarding election matters during and after elections. The function·
and powers of the Supreme Election Board shall be regulated by law.
Article 53 of the Malaysian Constitution provides that if any quesF
tion arises whether a member of a House of Parliament has become
disqualified for membership. the decision of that House shall be taken
and shall be final.
A
G
H
Not much argument is needed to show that unless there be a
machinery for resolving an election dispute and for going into the
allegations that elections were not free and fair being vitiated by
malpractices, the provision that a candidate should not resort to malpractices would be in the nature of a mere pious wish without any
legal sanction. It is further plain that if the validi~v of t~e election
of a candidate is challenged on some grounds, the said elect10n can be
declared to be valid only. if we provide a forum for going into those
grounds and prescribe a law for adjudicating upon those grounds. If
the said forum finds that the grounds advanced to challenge the election are not wel1 founded or are not sufficient to invalidate the
election in accordance with the prescribed law or dismisses the petition
•
-
f
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN (Khanna, J.)
469
to challenge the election on some other ground, in such an event it
,can be said that the election of the returned candidate is valid.
•
· · · Besides other things, election laws Jay· down a code of conduct
in election matters and prescribe, what may be called, rules of electoral morality. Election laws also contain a provision for r.esolving
disputes and determination of controversies which must inevitably arise
in election matters as they arise in other spheres of human activity.
The object of such a provision is to enforce rules of electoral morality
and to punish deviance from the prescribed code of conduct in election matters. It is manifest that but for such a provision, there would
be no sanction for the above code of conduct and rules of electoral
morality. It is also plain that nothing would bring the code of conduct into greater contempt and make a greater mockery of it than the
absence of a provision to punish its violation. The position would
become all the more glaring that even though a provision exists on the
statute book for punishing violation of the code of conduct in election
matters, a particular election is made immune and granted exemption
from the operation of such a provision;
A
B
c
The vice of clause ( 4) of article 329 is not merely that it makes
the previous law contained in the RP Act as amended by Acts 58 of
1974 and 40 of 1975 inapplicable to the challenge to the election
of the
appellant, it also makes no other
election
law
applicable for resolving that dispute. The further vice from which
the said clause suffers is that it not merely divests the previous authority, namely, the High Court of its jurisdiction to decide the dispute
relating to the election of the appellant, it confers no jurisdiction on
some other authority to decide that dispute. Without even prescribing
a law and providing a forum for adjudicating upon the grounds advanced by the respondent to chaJ!enge the election of the appellant,
the constituent authority has declared the election of the appellant to
be valid.
D
To confer an absolute validity upon the election of one particular
candidate and to prescribe that the validity of that election shall not be
questioned before any forum or under any law would necessarily have
the effect of saying that howsoever gross may be the improprieties
which might have vitiated that election, howsoever flagrant may be the
malpractices which might have been committed on behalf of the returned candidate during the course of the election and howsoever foul
and violative of the principles of free and fair elections may be the
means which might have been employed for securing success in that election, the said election would be none-the-less valid and it would not be
permissible to complain of those improprieties, malpractices and unfair
means before any forum or under any law with a view to assail the
validity of that election.
Not much argument is needed to show
that any provision which brings about that result is subversive of the
principle of free and fair election in a democracy. The fact that the
candidate concerned is the Prime Minister of the country or the
Speaker of the lower House of Parliament would, if anytlling, add force
to the above conclusion because both these offices represent t11e acme
F
9-126 SCT/76
E
G
H
470
A
B
c
D
E
F
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 2 S.C.R.
of the democratic process in a country. That in fact the elections of
the incumbents of the two offices were not vitiated by any impropriety,
malpractice or unfair means is not relevant or germane to the question
with which we are concerned, namely as to what is the effect of clause
( 4) of article 329A.
The vice of declaration contained in part (iii) of clause ( 4) regarding the validity of the election of the appellant is aggravated by the fact
that such a declaration is made after the High Court which was then
seized of jurisdiction had .found substance in some of the grounds advanced by the respondent and had consequently declared the election of
the appellant to be void. To put a stamp of validity on the election of
a candidate by saying that the challenge to such an election would not
be governed by any elect\on law and that the said election in any case
would be valid and immuqc from any challenge runs counter to accepted
norms of free and fair elections in all democratic countries. In the case
of Marbury v. Madison(') Marshall CJ. said that "the government of
the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws
and not of men." In United States v. Lee(') Samuel Miller J. observed
that "no man is so high that he is above the law. . . . All. . . . officers
are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it." Although the above
observations were made in the context of the US Constitution, they, in
my opinion, hold equally good in the context of our Constitution.
It has been argued on behalf of the appellant that the grounds on
account of which the election of the appellant had been held to be void
by the High Court were of a technical nature. I need not express any
opinion about this aspect of the matter at this stage but, assuming it to
be so, I find that clause ( 4) of article 329A is so worded that however
serious may be the malpractices vitiating the election of the Speaker or
the Prime Minister, the effect of clause (4) is that the said election
would have to be trea,ted as valid. I cannot accede to the submission
that in construing clause ( 4) we should take into account the facts of
the appellant's case. This is contrary to all accepted norms of construction. If a clause of a Constitution or statutory provision is widely
worded, the width of its ambit cannot be circumscribed by taking into
account the facts of an individual case to which it applies. As already
mentioned, clause ( 4.) deals with the past election not merely of the
Prime Minister but also of the Speaker. So far as the election of the
Speaker is concerned, we do not know as to whether the same was ever
challenged and, if so, on what grounds, and whether such a dispute is
still pending.,
G
H
Another argument advanced in support of the validity of the amendment is that we should take it that the constituent authority constituted
itself to be the forum for deciding the dispute relating to the validity of
the election of the appellant, and after considering the facts of the case,
declared the election of the appellant to be valid. There is, however,
nothing before us as to indicate that the constituent authority went into
the material which had been adduced before the High Court relating to
the validity of the election of the appellant and after considering that
(1) t Cr. 137, 163 (1803).
(2) 106 U.S. 196, 220.
J
•
•
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN
-
,
'..J
(Khanna, !.)
4 71
material held the election of the appellant to be valid. Indeed, the statement of Objects and R,easons appended to the Constitution (Thirtyninth Amendment) Bill makes no mention of this thing. In any case,
the vice of clause ( 4) would still l~e in the fact that the election of the
appellant was declared to be valid on the basis that it was not to be
governed by any law for settlement of election disputes. Alth~ugh t~e
provisions of a constitutional amendment should be construed m a fair
and liberal spirit, such liberal spirit should not be carried by the court
to the extent of discovering the application of a dormant and latent law
in the declaration of the validity of an election even though there is not
even a remote indication of such a law in the impugned provision. Rule
of law postulates that the decisions should be made by the application
of known principles and rules and in general such decisions should be
predictable and the citizen should know where he is. If a decision is
taken without any prindple or without any rule, it is not prcdicta~le
and such decision is the antithesis of a decision taken in accordance with
the rule of law.
·
The matter can also be looked at from another angle. The effect of
impugned clause ( 4) is to take away both the right and the remedy to
challenge the election of the appellant. Such extinguishment of the
right and remedy to challenge the validity of the electfon, in my opinion,
is incompatiablc with the process of free and fair elections. Free and
fair elections necessarily postulate that if the success of a candidate is
secured in elections by means which violate the principle of free and
fair elections, the election should on that account be liable to be set
aside and be declared to be void. To extinguish the right and the remedy
to challenge the validity of an election would necessarily be tantamount
to laying down that even if the election of a candidate is vitiated by the
fact that it was secured by flagrant violation· of the principles· of free and
fair election, the same would still enjoy inmrnnity from challenge and
would be none-the-less valid. Clause ( 4) of article 329A can, therefore, be held to strike at the basis of free ·and fair elections.
1
I agree that it is not necessary in a democratic set up that disputes
relating to the validity of the elections must be settled by courts of law.
There are many countries like France, Japan and the United States of
America where consistently with the democratic set up the determination
of such controversies is by legislatures or by authorities other than the
courts. The question with which we are concerned, however, is whether
it is permissible in a democratic set up that a dispute with regard to the
validity of a particular election shall not be raised before any forum and
shall.not be governed by law and whether such an election can be declared, despite the existence of a dispute relating to its validity, to be
valid by making the existing Jaw relating to election disputes not applicable to it and also by not applying any other election law to such a
dispute. The answer to such a question, for the reasons given earlier by
me, should be in the negative.
Reference to the election of the US President made bv Mr. Sen is
also not helpful to him. It is clear from observations on pages 47-50 of
the American Commonwealth by Bryce 1912 Ed. and sections 5, 6 and
A
c
D
E
F
G
H
4 72
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 2 S.r.R.
15 of the United States Code (1970 Ed.) that there is ample provision
for the determination of such disp~es after the poll. The fact that such
determination of the dispute is before the declaration of the result would
not detract from the proposition that it is essential for free and fair
elections that there should be a forum and law for the settlement of
such disputes relating to the validity of the election.
Argument has· also been advanced that the offices of the Prime
M_inister and Speaker arc of great importance and as such they constitute a class by themselves. This argument, in my opinion, would
have relevance if instead of the law governing disputes refating to
the election of other persons, another law had been prescribed to
govern the dispute relating to the election of a person who holds
che office of the Prime Minister or Speaker. As it is, what we find
is that so far as the disputes relating to the election of the appellant is
concerned, neither the previous law governing the election of persons holding the office of the Prime Minister is to apply to it nor the
future law to be framed under clause ( 1) of article 329A governing
the election of persons _holding the office of Prime Minister is to apply
to this duspute. Likewise, the previous forum for adjudicating upon
the election dispute which went into the matter, has· been divested
of its jurisdiction with retrospective effect and, at the same time, no
jurisdiction has been vested in any other forum to go into the matters.
The present is not a case of change of forum. It is, on the contrary,
one of the abolition of forum. As such, the question as to whether
the office of Prime Minister constitutes a class by itself loses much
of its significance in the context of the controversy with which we are
concerned.
It has been argued in support of the constitutional validity of clause
( 4) that as a result of this· amendment, the validity of one election
has been preserved. Since the basic structure of the Constitution,
according to the submission, continues to be the same, clause ( 4)
cannot be said to be an impermissible piece of constitutional amend~
ment. · The argument has a seeming plausibility about it, but a deeper
reflection would show that it is vitiated by ·a basic fallacy. Law
normally connotes a rule or norm which is of general application. It
may apply to all the .persons or class of .persons or even ind!vi~uals
of a particular descnption. Law prescnbes the abstract pnnc1ples
by the application of which individual cases are decided. Law, however is not what Blackstone called "a sentence". According to
Ros~oe Pound, law, as distinguished from laws, is the system of authoritative materials for grounding or guiding judicial and administrative
action recognized or established in a politically organized society (see
page 106, Jurisprudence, Vol. III). Law is not the same as judgment. Law lays down the norm in abstract terms with a coercive
power and sanction against those guilty of violating the norm, · while
judgment represents the decision arrived at l1y the application of law
to the concrete facts of a case. Constitution!ll law relates to the various
organs of a state· it deals with the structure of the government, the
extent of distributlon of its powers and the modes and principles of its
operation. The Constitution of India is so detailed that some of the
matters which in a brief constitution like t"'1at of the United States of
...
(
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN (Khanna, J.)
. "i
'
.....
-
I
·~
,•
473
A
America are dealt with by statutes from the subject matter of various
articles of our Constitution. There is, however, in a constitutional
law, as there is in the very idea of law, some e1ement of generality
or general application. It also carries with it a concept of its applt:
.:ability in future to situations which may arise in that context. lf
there is amendme.o,t of some provision of the Constitution and the ·
amendment deals with matters which constitute constitutional law in
B
Lhe normally accepted sense, the court while deciding the question of
the validity of the amendment would have to find out, in view of Lhe
majority opinion in Keshavananda Bharati's case (supra), as to whether the amendment affects the basic structure of the Constitution.
The constitutional amendment contained in clause ( 4) with which we
are concerned in the present case is, however, of an altogether different nature. Its avowed object is to confer validity on the election of
c
the appellant to the Lok Sabha in 1971 after that election had been
declared to be void by the High Court and an appeal against the judgment of the High Court was pending in this Court. Inspite of our
query, we were not referred to any precedent of a similar amendment
of any Constitution of the world. The uniqueness of the impugned
constitutional amendment would not, however, affect its validity.
If the constituent authority in its wisdom has chosen the valiD
dity of a disputed election as the subject-matter of a constitutional
amendment, this Court cannot go behind that wisdom. All that this
Court is concerned with is the validity of the amendment. I ueed not
go into the question as to whether such a matter, in view of the
normal concept of constitutional law, can strictly be the subject of
a constitutional amendment. I shall for the purpose of this case
assume that such a matter can validly be the subject-matter of a conE
stitutional amendment. The question to be decided is that if the im~
pugned amendment of the Constitution violates a principle which is
part of the basic structure of the Constitutfon, can it enjoy immunity
from an attack on its validity because of the fact that for the future,
the basic structure of the Constitution remains unaffected. The
answer to the above question, in my opinion, should be in the negative.
Wliat has to be seen in such a matter is whether the amendment conF
travenes or runs counter to an imperative rule or postulate which is
an integral part of the basic structure of the Constitution. If so, it
would be an impermissible amendment and it would make no difference
whether it relates to one case or a large number of cases. If an.
amendment striking at the basic structure of the Constitution is not
permissible, it would not acquire validity by being related only to one
·case. To accede to the argument advanced in support of the validity
G
of the amendment would be tantamount to holding that even though
it is not permissible to change the basic structure of the Constitution,
whenever the authority concerned deems it proper to make ·
such an amendment, it· can do so and circumvent the bar to the
making of such an amendment by confining it to one case. What is
prohibited· cannot become permissible because of its being confined
to one matter.
H
Lastly, question arises whether we should strike down clau~e ( 4)
in its entirety or in part. So far as this aspect is concerned, I am
'
474
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
II
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1976) 2 S.C.R.
of the view t~at the ~ifferent parts of clause ( 4) arc so integrally connected and lmked with each other that it is not possible to sever
them and uphold the validity of part of it after strikin<T down the rest
of it. It would indeed be unfair to the appellant if we"were to uphold
t~~ first part of clause ( 4) and strike down other parts or even part
(m). As would be apparent from what follows hereaft·~r the election
of the appellant is being upheld by applying the provisio~s of the RP
Act as amended by Act 40 of 1975. Such a course would not be
permissible if we were to uphold the validity of th~ first part of clause
( 4) and strike down the other parts. We would also in that event be
creating a vacuum which is the very vice for which we are striking
down clause ( 4). I am, therefore, of the view that clause ( 4) should
be struck down in its entirety.
...
r'
t
\.
-
In view of my finding that clause ( 4) strikes at the basic structure
of· the Constitution, it is not necessary to go into the question as to
whether, assuming that the constituent authority took it upon itself to
decide the dispute relating to the validity of the election of the appellant, it was necessary for the constituent authority to hear the parties
concerned before it declared the election of the appellant to be valid
and thus in effect repelled the challenge of the respondent to the validity of the appellant's election.
As a result of the above, I strike down clause ( 4) of article 329A
on the ground that it violates the principle of free and fair elections
which is an essential postulat·e of democracy and which in its turn is
a part of the b:;isie structure of the Constitution inasmuch as ( 1). it
abolishes the forum without providing for another forum for going into
the dispute relating to the validity of the election of the appellant and
further prescribes that the said dispute shall not be governed by any
election law and that the validity of the said ·election shall be absolute
and not consequently be liable to be assailed, and ( 2) it extinguishes
both the right and the remedy to challenge the validity of th·e aforesaid
election.
We may now deal with appeal No. 887 of 1975 filed by the appellant. So far as this appeal is concerned, it has been argued by Mr.
Sen on behalf of the appellant that the grounds on which the election
of the appellant has been declared by the High Court to l>e void no
longer hold good in view of the amendment in the RP Act by Act
40 of 1975. As again that, Mr. Shanti Bhushan on behalf of the
respondent has assailed the validity of Act 40 of 1975. In the alternative, Mr. Shanti Bhushan contends that even if the validity of Act
40 of 1975 were to be upheld, the grounds on which the election of
the appellant has be~n declared to be void would still hold good.
The question as to whether Act 40 of 1~75 is not vitiated by any
constitutional infirmity would be dealt with by me subsequently. For
the time being I would proceed upon the bas.is that . t~e statuto.ry
amendment in the RP Act by Act 40 of 1975 1s constitutionally valtd.
Section 10 of Act 40 of 1975, which has been reproduced earlier,
makes it clear, inter alia, that the provisions of sections 6, 7 and 8
\
I
~-
.•
"'
"'
•
,
_,.
--- ...
SMT. JNDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN (Khanna, 1.)
475
Qf that Act shall have retrospective operation, so as to apply to or in
relation to any election held before the commencement of this Act, to
either House of Parliament in respect of which appeal from any order
of any High Court made in any election petition under the RP Act is
pending before the Supreme Court immediately before such commencement. It is, therefore, obvious that the provisions of sections 6,, 7 and
8 of Act 40 of 197 5 would be attracted to this case. One of the
questions. which actually arose for determination before the High Court
was as to what was the date on which the appellant held herself out
as a candidate. According to the written statement filed on behalf of
the appellant, she held herself out as a candidate from the Rae Bareli
constituency on February 1, 1971 when she filed her nomination paper.
As against that, the case of the respondent was that the appellant held
herself out as a candidate from that constituency on December 27,
1970 when the Lok Sabha was dissolved. The finding of the High
Court i's that the appellant held herself out as a candidate from the Rae.
Bareli constituency on December 29, 1970 when she addressed a Press
conference. The question as to when the appellant held herself out
as a candidate from the Rae Bareli constituency has now become purely academic in view of the change in the definition of the word "candidate" as given in clause (b) of section 79 of the RP Act by Act 40
of 197 5. According to the original definition, "unless the context otherwise requires, 'candidate' means a person who has been or claims to
have been duly nominated as a candidate at any election and any such
person shall be deemed to have been a candidate as from the time
when,, with the election in prospect, he began to hold himself out as
a prospective candidate''. The new definition states that "unless the
context otherwise requires, 'candidate' means a person who has been
or claims to have been duly nominated as a candidate at any election".
The question as to when a person holds himself out as candidate,
therefore, .loses its importance in the context of the· new definiti_on.
One of the grounds which weighed with the High Court in declaring the election of the appellant to be void was that the appellant committed corrupt practice under section 123(7) of the RP Act inasmuch
as she obtained and procured the assistance for the furtherance of her
election prospects of Yashpal Kapur during the period from January 7
to 24, 1971 when Yashpal Kapur was still a gazetted officer in the
service of the Government of India.
A
B
C
D
E
F
According to clause (7) of section 123 of the RP Act, the following Act shall constitute corrupt practice under that clause :
"The obtaining or procuring or abetting or attempting
to obtain or procure by a candidate or his agent or, by any
other person with the consent of a candidate or his election
agent, any assistance (other than the giving of vote) for the
furtherance of the prospects of that candidate's election,
from any person in the seNice of the Government and belonging to any of the following classes, namely;(a) gazetted officers;
(b) stipendiary judges and magistrates;
G
H
476
A
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 2 S.C,R.
.
~
(c) members of the armed forces of the Union;
(d) members of the police forces;
(e) excise officers;
?'
(f) revenue officers other than village
B
c
revenue officers.
known as lambardars,, malguzars, deshmukhs or by
any other name,. whose duty is to colkct land revenue
and who are remunerated by a share of, or commission on, the mnount of land revf:nuc collected by them
but who do not discharge any police func.tion; and
(g) such other class of persons iin the service of the
Government as may be prescribed.
Explanatio11.-(1) In this section the expression 'agent'
includes an election agent, or polling a§ent and any person.
who is held to have acted as an agent in connection with the
consent of the candidate.
D
E
F
G
H
(2) For the purposes of clause (7), a person shall be
deemed to assist in the furtherance of the prospects of a candidate's election if he acts as an election agent."
Perusal of the above clause shows that what constitutes corrupt practice under the above clause is the obtaining or procuring or abetting
or attempting to obtain or procure by a candidate or his agent or by
any person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent any
assistance (other than the giving of vote) for the furtherance of the
prospects of the candidate's election from any person in the service
of the Government and belonging to any of the classes specified therein. It is, in my opinion, essential that at the time the impugned act,,
namely, the obtaining or procuring or abetting or attempting to obtain
or procure the assistance of a Government ~:ervant is done, the person
doing the act must be a candidate or his agent or any other person
with the consent of a candidate or his election agent. Candidate in
this clause would mean a person who has bi~en or who claims to hav·'.:
been duly nominated as a candidate at the election. I am unable to
accede to the submission of Mr. Shanti Bhushan that the word "camlidate" has been us-ed merely to identify the person who is duly nominated as a candidate at an election and that the word ''candidate". as
mentioned in clause (7), would also include a person who after
the commission of the corrupt practice specified in that clause, is subsequently nominated as a candidate. The amended definition reproduced above shows that unless context otherwise requires, candidate
means a person who has been or claims to have been duly nominated
as a candidate at an election. To accede to the submission of Mr.
Shanti Bhushan would be tantamount to reading in the definition of the
word "candidate" in addition to the words "who has been or claims
to have been duly nominated" also the words "who is subsequently
nominated as a candidate". There is nothing to indicate that the
word "candidate! in clause (7) of sectfon 123 has been used merely
•
.•
~
•
"- .-.
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN (Khanna, J.)
477
.to identify the person who has been or would be subsequen.tly J?-Omina~ed
as a candidate. A definition clause in a statute is .a legislative device
with a view to avoid making different provisions of the statute to be
cumbersome. Where a word is defined in the statute and that word
is used in a provision to which that definition is applicable,, the,effect
is that wherever the word defined is used in that provision, the definition of the word gets substituted. Reading the word "candidate" in
section 123(7) of the RP Act in the sense in which it has been defined
as a result of the amendment made by Act 40 of 1975. I find that
the_ only reasonable inference is that the person referred to as ~ candidate in that clause should be a person who has been or drums to
have been duly nominated as a candidate at an election and not one
who as yet to be nominated.
'
Mr. Shanti Bhushan has invited our attention to clause (b) of
section 100(1) of the RP Act wherein it is stated that subject to the
provisions of sub-section (2) of the section if the High Court is of
the opinio11 that any corrupt practice has been committed by a returned
candidate or his election agent or by any other person with the consent
of a returned candidate or his election agent, the High Court shall
declare the election of th~ returned candidate to be void. ''Returned
candidate" has been defined in clause (f) of section 79 to mean, unless
the context otherwise requires; a candidate whose name has been published under ·section 67 as duly elected. It is urged that as the corrupt
practice referred to in clause ( b) of ,section 100 ( 1) of the RP Act
would in the very nature of things have to be committed by the returned
candidate before his name was published under section 67 as duly
elected, the words "returned candidate" in clause (b) of section lGO(l )'
must be taken to have been used with a view to identify the person
who subsequently beclplle a returned candidate. It is urged that if
while dealing with corrupt practice committed by a candidate before
he became a returned candidate in the context of section lOO(U(b),
it is permissible to hold that the words "returned candidate" are intended to identify the person who subsequently became a returned candidate,
the same criterion should apply when construing the word "candidate"
in section 123 of the RP Act. This contention, ·in my opinion, is devoid of force. The definition of the words "returned candidate" and
"candidate" given in section 79 of the RP Act are preceded by the
words "unless the context otherwfa.~ requires'. The connotation of the
above words is that normally it is the definition given in the section
which should be applied and given effect to. This normal .rule may,.
however, be departed from if there be some thing in the context to
show that the definition should not be applied. So far as clause (b)
of section 100 (1) is concerned, the context plainly requires t.hat the
corrupt practice referred to in that clause should have been committed
by the <:andidate before he became a returned candidate, or by his
agent or by any other person with his consent or that of his election
agent. The compulsion arising from the context which is there in
clause (b) of section 100 ( 1) of the RP Act is singularily absent in
section 123(7) of the RP Act. There is nothing in the context of the
latter provision which requires that we should not give full effect to
the new definition of the word "candidate".
A
B
c
IJl
E
F
G
H
478
A
.B
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 2 S.C.R.
. Reference has also been made by Mr. Shanti Bhushan to observations on pages 222-3 of Vol. 14 of Halsbury's Laws of Enofand Third
Ed.ition, accor9ing to which a candidate at a general election 1~my be
gmlty of treatmg even though the training took place before the dissolution of the Parliament and consquently before he came within the
statutory definition of a candidate. These observations have been made
in th~ .context of the statutory provisions in the United Kingdom. Those
prov1s10ns were couched in a language substantially different from that
in which the provisions of the RP Act in India an: couched and as such
in my opiriion, not much assistance can be derived from those observa~
tions.
.
•
E
F
G
H
As the appellant filed her nomination paper on February 1, 1971,
in view of the amended definition of the word "candidate", it would
have to be taken that the appellant became a candidate only on February 1, 1971. The result is that even if the finding of the High Court
that the appellant obtained _and procured the assistance of Yashpal
Kapur during the period from January 7 to 24, 1971 were assumed to
be correct, the appellant shall not be deemed to have committed corrupt
practice under section 123 (7) of the RP Act. As regards the assistance of Yashpal Kapur which the appellant is alleged to have obtained
and procured after January 14, 1971, the controversy stands resolved
also by another amcndm~nt. According to the case of the appellant.
Yashpal Kapur tendered his resignation by letter dated January 13, 1971
with effect from January 14, 1971. The High Court found that Yashpal
Kapur continued to be in the service of the Government of India till
January 25, 1971 which was the date of the notification regarding the
acceptance of Yashpal Kapur's resignation. According to the said
notification,, the President was pleased "to accept the resignation of
Shri Y. P. R. Kapoor, Officer on Special Duty in the Prime Minister's
Secretariat, with effect from the forenoon of the 14th January, 1971".
The explanation which has been added to section 123 of the RP Act
makes it clear, inter alia, that for the purpose of clause (7), notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, the publication in the
official gazette of the resignation and termination of service of a person
in the service of the Central Government shall be conclusive proof of
his resignation and termination of service and where the date of taking
effect of his resignation or termination of service is stated in such publication, also of the fact that such person ceased to be in such service
with effect from the said date. Yashpal Kapur in view of the newly
added explanation, shall be taken to have ceased to be in Government
service with effect from January 14, 1971. Any assi>tance of Yashpal
Kapur which the appellant was alleged to have obtained or procured
on or after January 14, 1971 would not, therefore, make her guilty
of corrupt practice under section 123(7) of the RP Act.
Another irround on which the Hi!!h Court declared the election of
the appellant "'to be void was. that she committed corr_upt pn1ctice. under
section 123 ( 7) of the RP Act inasmuch as she ob tamed the assistance
of the officers of the UP Government, particu1arly the District Magistrate, Superintendent of Police, the Executive Engineer PWD and the
Engineer Hyde! Department for construction of rostrums and arrangement nf supply of power for loudspeakers in the meetings addressed
.
.
'(
SMT. lNDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAlN
(Khanna, J.)
479
by her on February 1, 1971 and February 25, 1971 in furtherance of
her election prospects. It is not disputed that what was d_one by t~e
.above mentioned officers was in pursuance of official directions and m
the discharge or purported discharge of the offi,cial duties. This is indeed clear from letter dated November 19, 1969 from the Government
of India,, Ministry of Home Affi!irs to all State Governm~nts wherein
there is reference to rule ( 6) of tfie Rules and Ins truct10ns for the
Protection of the Prime Minister and it is stated :
•
"As the sccuri~y of th·e Prime Minister is the concern
-0f the State all arrangements for putting up the rostrum,
the barricades etc. at the meeting place, incl~ding that of an
.election meeting will have to be made by the State Government concerned ................... .
In the case of election meetings, all expenditure on police,
setting up of barricades and taking lighting arrangements
will be borne by the State Government while expenditure on
the public address system and any decorative arrangements
will be the responsibility of the political party concerned.
(The expenditure on all these items, may in the first instance
be borne by the State Government and then recovered from
the political parties concerned). Jn regard to the· rostrum
only 25% of the cost of the rostrum or Rs. 2500.00 whichever is less, shall be contributed by the party as the rostrum
has to be of certain specifications because of security considerations."
Assuming that the finding of fact recorded by the High Court in this
respect is correct, the appellant can still be not guilty. of the commission of corrupt practice under section 12.3 (7) of the RP Act in view
of the new proviso which has been inserted at (he ·end of clause (7)
of section 123 and which reads as under :
•
·1
•
"Provided that where any person, in the service of the
Government and· belonging to any of the classes aforesaid,
in the discharge or purported discharge of his official duty,,
makes any arrangements or provides any facilities or does
any other act or thing, for, to or in relation to any candidate
or his agent or any other person acting with the consent of
the candidate or his agent or any other person acting with
the consent of the candidate or his election agent, ( whcth.:r
by reason of the office held by the candidate or for any
other reason). such arrangements, facilities or act or thing
shall not be deemed to be assistance for the furtherance of
the prospects of that candidate's election."
The above proviso has also a direct bearing on the allegation of the
respondent that the appellant committed corrupt practice under section
123(7) 0£ the RP Act inasmuch as she or her election agent procured
the assistance of members of armed forces of the Union for furtherance
of her election prospects because of the fact that the members of the
armed forces arranged planes and helicopters of the Air Force for
her flights to enable her to address meetings in her constituency.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
480
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 S.C.R.
It has been argued by Mr. Shanti Bhushan that the words "in the
discharge of purported discharge of his official duty" in the above
mentioned proviso have reference orily to statutory duty and not to
other duty performance Of which takes plac" in pursuance of administrative instructions. I find it difficult to accede to the above submis-sion as there is nothing in the above proviso to ·confine the words. t'
"official duty" to duty imposed by statute. Official duty would include
not merely duties imposed by statutes but also those which have to•
be carried out in pursuance of administrative instructions.
Mr. Shanti Bhushan during the course of arguments made it plain ~
that apart from his .submission with regard to the validity of Act 40 .__
of 1975, his objection relaing to the applicability of Act 40 of 1975
was confined to two matters, namely, the connotation of the word
"candid ale" and the meaning to be attached to "official duty". Both
these objections have found by me to be not tenable. I - would,
therefore, hold that subject to the question n to whether the provisions of Act 40 of 1975 are valid, the grounds on which the High
Court has declared the election of the appellant to be void no longer
hol.d good for declaring the said election to be void.
We may also before dealing with the validity of Act 40 of 1975
refer to one other change brought about by that Act which has a
bearing upon the present case. It was the case of the respondent
that the appellant and her election agent made extensive appeals to
the religious symbol of cow and calf and thereby committed corrupt
practice under 1'Cction 123 (3) of the RP Act. Corrupt practice has.
been defined in that provision as under :
"(3) The appeal by a candidate or his agent or by
any other person with the consent of a candidate or his
election agent to vote or refrain from voting for any person on the grourn;I of his religion, race, caste, community or
language or the use of, or appeal to rdigious symbols or
th.; use of, or appeal to, national symbols, such as the
mitional fla;; or the national emblem, for the furtherance of
the pro>p~cts of the election of that candidate or for prejudicially affecting the election of any candidate."
It is the common case of the parties that the symbol of cow and
calf was allotted to the Congress party by the Election Commission.
The learned counsel for the respondent stated during the course of
arguments in the High Court that he confined his case only tci the
use of the symbol of cow and calf. The learned counsel gave uo
that part of the case of the respondent wherein it had been alleged
thai appeals were made to the religious symbol of cow and calf by
the appellant. The following proviso has now: been inserted in
clause (3) of section 123 by section 8 of Act 40 of 1975 :
"Provided that ho symbol allotted under this Act to a
candidate shall be deemed to be a religious symbol or a
national ~ymbol for the purposes of this clause."
It is; therefore, apparent in view of the above proviso that the symbol of cow and calf which was allotted to the appellant shall not be
sMT. INDIRA GANDHi
v. R.AJ NARA.iN (Khanna, J.)
481
deellled to be a religious symbol or a national symbol for tlie purpose
The appellant as such cannot l:>e
deemed to have committed a corrupt practice under secnon 123(3)
.of the RP Act by use of the symbol of cow and calf.
.of section 123(3) or the l<.P Act.
Jn assailing the validity of Act 40 of 1975 Mr. Shanti Blmshan
Ji.as referred to section 10 of that Act, according to which the amend.meats made by sections 6, 7 and 8 of the Act in the RP Act shall
• have retrospective operation, so as to apply to any election held
111 .before the commencement of the Act in respect of which an election
,petition is pending or in respect of which appeal from any order of
-" the High Court is pci1ding immediately before the commencement of
.Act 40 of 1975. It is urged that a change in the election law with
retrospective effect strikes at the principle of free and fair elections.
Retrospective operation of the amending Act, according to the
learned counsel, has the effect of condoning what was at the time it
·was committed a corrupt practice.
A
•
I have given the matter my earnest consideration, a.nd am of t?e
opinion that there is no substance in ~~e above. conten~1'?".-· A lcg1sJature has, except in a matter for wh1cn there. 1s prolnb;tton like the
one contained in article 20 ( 1) of llhe Constitut10n, the power to make
Jaws which are prospective in operation as well as laws which have
·->- retrospective operation. There is no limitation on the power of the
legislature in this respect. Essentially it is a matter relating to the
-capacity and competence of the legislature. Although most of the
Jaws made by the legislature have a prospective operation, occasions
.arise quite often when necessity is felt of giving retrospective effect to
a law. This holds good both in respect of a principal Act as well
.as in respect of an amending Act. If the provisions of an Act passed
.by the legislature are not violative of the provisions of the Constitu.tion, those provisions shall have to be given effect to and the fact that
<the operation of the Act is prospective or retrospective would make
\ no difference. It is also permissible to amend a law which is basis
of t~e. decision of a court with retrospective effect and rely upon the
• ·prov1s1ons. of the amended law in appeal against the above decision
·Of the court. The court of appeal in wllich an event gives full effect
to the amended law even though such amendment has been made
after the decision of the original court. The one field in which it is
~ot permissible to J1!ake a law with retrospective effect is contained
m cl~use (1) of article 20, according to which no person shall be
conv;cted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the
!ime of, the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be sub1ected to a pen~lly greater than that which might have been inflicted
·under the law m for~e at ~he time of the commission of the offence.
· A:P~rt from the ~eld m which there is a constitutfonal prohibition for
g1vmg. retrospective. effect to a law, power of making amendment in
la~ with retrospective. effect has ~ow become a part of normal legislative process. Question then arises as to whether in spite of the
~eneral con~petence ~f the legislature to make a law with retorspect1;ie effect, 1s t?c Jeg1s1a11!re ren~ered incompetent to make a law
, ..1.
-with retrospective effect m election matters ? The answer to tliis
B
c
D
E
F
G
')f
H
482
A
H
c
D
E
•
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 S.C.R.
question, in my opinion, should plainly be in the negative. Election
laws arc a part of the normal legislative process and what is permitted in the matter of ordinary legislation would also be permissi,.
ble in the matter of legislation relating to elections unless there be
some provision in the Constitution which forbids such a course. We .,,,
have not been refrrred to any provision in the Constitution which has
the effect of creating a bar in the way of the legislature making a law
relating to elections with retrospective operation. If a party seeks to
•
carve out an exception to the normal rule, it can do so only on the
basis of some cogent ground. No such ground has been brought to '9'
our notice. The matter indeed is not res integra because there have
been two cases wherein this Court has upheld the validity of the law
making amendments in election laws with retrospective cliect.
Th.: first rnch case was State of Orissa v. Bhupendra Kumar
Bose (supra). It arose out of elections to the Cuttack Municipality
held in December 1957 to March 1958 as a result of which 27 appellants were declared elected as Councillors. The respondent, who
was defeated at the elections, filed a writ petition before the High
Court challenging the elections. The High Court held that the
electoral rolls had not been prepared in accordance with the provisions of the Orissa Municipalities Act, 1950, as the age qualification
had ·been published too late thereby curtailing the period of claims
and objections to the preliminary roll to 2 days from 21 days as
prescribed. The High Court consequently set aside the elections.
The State took the view that the judgment affected not merely the
Cuttack Municipality but other municipalities also. Accordingly,
the Governor promulgated an Ordinance validating the elections to
the Cuttack Municipality and validating the electoral rolls prepared
in respect of rnrious municipalities. The respondent thereupon filed
a writ. petition before the High Court contending that the Ordinance
was uncomtitutional. The High Court struck down the Ordinance.
One of the grourn.ls which weighed with the High Court in striking
down the Ordinance was that it contravened article 14 of the Constitution. . The State and the Councillors came up in appeal to this
Court. It was held by this Court that the Ordinance was valid and
that it successfully cured the invalidity of the electoral rolls and of
elections to the Cuttack Municipality. The Ordinance was further
held not to offend article 14 of the Constitution as its object was not
only to save the elections to the Cuttack Municipality but also to
other municipalities whose validity might be challenged on similar
grounds. The Ordinance, in the opinion of the Court, did not sinirle
out the respondent for discriminatory treatment. Gaiendragadkar ~ J.
(as he then was) speaking for the Constitution Bench of this Court
obsen'ed:
"The Cuttack Municipal Elections had been set aside
by the High ,Court and if the Governor thought that in the
public interest, having regard to the factors enumerated in
the preamble to the Ordinance, it was necessarv to validate
thL~ said elections, it would not necessarily follow that the
Ordinance suffers from the vice of contravening Art. 14."
....
SMT. lNDlRA GANDHl v. RAJ NARAIN (Khanna, J.)
483
A
It was fu rtiler observed :
,.
,J
"Therdore, if the infirmity in the electoral rolls on··
which the ckcision of the High Court in the earlier writ
petition was based, had not been applicable to the electoral
rolls in regard to other Municipalities in the State c;>f Orissa,
then it may have been open to the Governor to issue an
Ordinance oniy in respect of the Cuttack Municipal Elections, and if, on account of special circumstances or reasons
applicable to the Cuttack Municipal Elections, a taw was
·passed in respect of the said elections alone, it could not
have been challenged as unconstitutional under Art. 14.
Similarly, if Mr. Bose was the only litigant. affectc~ by the
decision and as such formed a class by himself, it would
have been open to the Legislature to make a law only in
respect of his case. But as we have already pointed uut,
the Ordinance does not purport to limit its operation only
to the Cuttack Municipality; it purports to validate the
Cuttack Municipal Elections and the electoral rolls in respect of other Municipalities as well. Therefore, we arc
satisfied that the High Court was in error in coming to the
conclusion that section 4 contravenes Art. 14 of the Constitution."
In Kanta Kathuria v. Manak Chand Surana (supra) the dispute
relat.ed to the election .of the appellant to the Rajasthan Legislative
Assembly. The appellant in that case had been appointed as a
Special Government Pleader to represent the State of Ra jasthan in·
an arbitration case. The appellant then stood for election to the State
Legislative Assembly and was declared elected. The election of the
appellant was challenged inter alia on the ground that the appellant
~ held an office of profit within the meaning of article 191 (1) of the
Constitution. The High Court set aside the election of the appellant.
The appellant then came up in appeal to this Court. During the
pendency of the appeal, Rajasthan Act 5 of 1969 was passed declaring among others that the holder of the office of 'Special Government
Pleader was not disqualified from being chosen or for being a member
of the State Legislative Assembly. The :\ct waj made retrospective
and removed the appellant's disqualification retrospectively. On the
ques.tion as to whether the appellant was holding an office of profit
and hence was disqualified, Sikri, Ray and Reddy JJ. held that the
appellant was not holding an office of profit. Hidayatullah CJ. and
right in holding
Mitter J., however, held that the High Court
that the appellant held an office of profit. All the five Judges constituting the Constitution Bench were, however, unanimous on the
point that the Act of 1969 had removed the disqualification of the
appellant retrospectively. Hidayatullah CJ. speaking for himself and
Mitter, J. observed :
was
"It is also well-recognised that Parliament and Legisla.r
tures of the States can make their laws operate rctrosncc•ively. Any law that can be made prospectively may he
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
484
A
ll976] 2 5.C.R.
made wili1 retrospective operation except that certain kinds
of laws cannot operate retrospectively. This is not one of
them
c
D
This position being firmly grounded we have to look
for limitations, if any, in the Constitution. Article 191
(which has been quoted earlier) itself recognises the power
of the Legislature of the State to declare by law that the
holder of an office shall not be disqualified for being chosrn
as a rntmbcr. The Article says that a person shall be disqualifkd ii he holds an otfice of profit under the Government of lndia or the Government of any State unless that
citfice is di;;clared by the Legislature not to disqualify the
holder. Power is thus reserved to the Legislature of the
State to make the declaration. There is nothing in the
word<, o[ the a1 ticle to indicate that this declaration cannot
be made with retrospective effect."
•
It was further observed :
"Regard being had to the legislative practice in this
country and in the absence of a clear prohibition either
express or implied we are satisfied that the Act cannot be
declared ineffective in its retrospective operation."
Sikri, J. (as he then was) speaking for himself, Ray J. (as he then
was) and Reddy J. dealt with the matter in the following words :
·F
:H
"Mr. Chagla, learned counsel for the respondent, contends that t11e Rajasthan State Legislature was not competent 'to declare retrospectively' under Art. 191 (l)(a) of
the Constitution. It seems to us that there is no force in
this contention. It has been held in numerous cases by
this Court that the State Legislatures and Parliament can
legislate retrospectively subject to the provisions of the
Constitution. Apart from the question of fundamental
rights, no express restriction has been placed on the power
of the Legi&lature of the State, and we are unable to imply,
in the context, any restriction. Practice of the British
Parliament does not oblige us to place any implied restriction. We notice that the British Parliament in one case
validated the election : (Erskine May's Treatise on the
Law, Privileges Proceedings & Usage of ParliamcntSeventeenth (1964) Edition)'Aftcr the general election of 1945 it was found that
the persons elected for the Coatbridge Division of Lanark
and the Springhbourn Division of Glassgow were disqualified at the time of their election because they were
member" of tribunals appointed by the Minister under
the Rent of Furnished Houses Control (Scotland) Act.
1943, wbich entitled them to a small fee in respect of
attendance at a Tribunal. A Select Committee reported
that the disqualification was incurred inadvertently, and
•
..
·~
'
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN
(Khanna, J.)
485
in an:onlance with their recomm~nd~tion th.e Coat~ridge
and Springbourn Elections (Vahdat.10n) Bill was mtro. duced to validate the irregular elect10ns [H. C. Deb .
.;.. (1945-46) 414, c. 564-6]. See also H.C. 3 ,(1945-46);
·ibid. 71 (1945-46) and ibid. 92 (1945-46).
~e 'have also noticed two earlier instance~ retr~spec;tive
•
-
legislation, e.g., the House of Commons (P1squah~cat10n)
Act, 1813 (Halsbury Statutes of England p. 4~,) .ai.1d
Sec. 2 of the Re-election of Ministers Act, 1919 ( 1b1d.
p. 515)'
Great stress was laid on the word ·'declare' in Art.
191 (1) (a), but we are unable to impl_Y any limitation on
the powers of the Legislature from this . word. ,,Declaration can be made effective as from an earlier date.
The above t\Vo authorities .of this Court clearly lend support. for
the view tl1at it is permissible to amend a law relating to elect1011s
with rctrospcctivc operation. Mr. Shanti Bhushan has critici~cd the
observations of Sikri J. reproduced above on the score that m the
United Kingdom amendments in election law have not been made to
affect pending proceedings in courts. This is essentially a matter
for the legislature to decide, this does not affect the competence of
the legislature to make a change in election law with retrospective
effect. In any cam, the proposition of law laid down in the case of
Kanta Katlwria is binding upon us and I do not find any reason to.
detract either from the soundness of the view expressed therein or its
binding effect.
-,
- •.
I .
r
The Privy Cour;cil also upheld in the case of Ariyesekera v.
Jayalilake(1) an Order in Council giving retrospective effect to an
election law in Ceylon. This question arose in the following circumstances. An Order in Council of 1923 made provision as to the
Legislative Council in Ceylon, but reserved to His Majesty power to
revoke. alter or amend the Order. The appellant, as common informer, brought an action to recover penalties under the Order from the
respondent, who he alleged had sat and voted after his seat had become vacant under its provisions by reason of his having a pecuniary
interest in a contract with the Government. In 1928, after the
action had been brought, but before its trial, an amendin" Order in
Council was made providing that the actiort should be d~mis,ed: it
alw amended the Order of 1923 so as to except the office held by the
respondent from its operation. It was held that the Order of ·1928
was valid. having regard to the power reserved by the Order of 1923.
and wa~ an effective defence to the action, although it was retrospective in its operation. Lord Darling in the above context observed :
"It was argued that the Order in Council of November
1. 192~. w~s ultra vires as. affecting to take away right
already m existence, thus
--, .
(1) [1932] .A.C. 260,
10-126 Sur. CT/76
havmg
a retrospective
action
c
E
F
G
H
486
A
8
c
D
E
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS .
(1976] 2 S.C.R.
The effect, however, of the Order of 1928, as expressed on
the iace of it, was no more than an act of indemnity and
relief in respect of penalties incurred. It may be true that
'not Jove himself upon the past hath power'; but legislators
have certain the right to prevent, alter or reverse the conseq uenccs of their own decrees. There is no necessity tQ
give instances to prove that they have frequently done w;
even going so far as to restore the heritable quality to
blood which had been deprived of its virtue by Acts of
attainder."
I am not impressed by the argument that retrospective operation
of the relevant provisions of Act 40 of 197 5 affects free and fair
elections. The said provisions of Act 40 of 1975 are general in
terms and would apply to all election disputes which may be pending either in the High Court or in appeal before the Supreme Court
or which may arise in future. It is no doubt true that the retrospectiv~ operation of an amending Act has the effect of placing one of
the parties to the dispute in a more advantageous position compared
to others but that is inevitable in most of ·the amendments with
retrospective operation. This Court in the case of Harbhajan Singh
v. Mohan Singh & Ors.(1) dealt with the provisions of section 3 of
Punjab Pre-emption (Repeal) Act, 1973, according to which on and
from the date of commencement of that A::t, no court shall pass a .
decree in any suit for pre-emption. This Court held that the above
provision was also applicable to appeals which were pending at the
commencement of that Act as an appeal was in the nature of a rehearing, and as such even if the suit had been decreed by the trial
court, the suit was liable to be dismissed because of the coming into
force of the Punjab Pre-emption (Repeal) Act during the pendency
of the appeal. It is plain that only those vendees obtained the benefit of the ahove Act who had filed appeals against the decree awarded
against them in pre-emption suit. Vendees in other cases who did
not file appeal against the decrees awarded against them in view of
the then existig law had to Jose the purchased property and thus be
at a disadvantage. That fact, however, did not prevent this Court
from giving effect to the amendment. Whenever a legislature makes
a Jaw or amends a law, it has to indicate the time from which it
would come into effect. This is essentially a matter for the legislature and the court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the
legislature. The fact that the change in law is made applicahle to
pending cases and the classification treats the decided cases as belonging to one category and pending cases as belonging to another category is not offensive to article 14 [see. Anant Mills v. State of
Gujarat(2)]. Nor can the court interfere on the score of the propriety of givin)! retrospective effect to an amendment mad~ in an
election law. Indeed, the question of oropriety is a matter which
i~ cntirelv for t11e legislature to think of and decide. It cannot affect
the validity of the law. This Court in the case of Kanta Kathuria
(supra) expressly rejected the contention that amendment in election
(I) [1974] 2 S.C.C. 364.
(2) (1975] 2
~.c.c.
11s.
-
•
•
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN (Khanna, J.)
law was void because it gave advantage to
C.J. observed in this context :
..
..;
•
•
-
~
•
a
party.
487
Hidayatullah
"It is true that it gave an advantage to those who stand
when the disqualification was not so removed as against
those who may have kept themselves back because the disability was not removed. That might raise questions of the
propriety of such retrospective legislation but not of the
capacity to make such laws."
)-
The above observations also provide an answer to the contention
o[ Mr. Shanti l3lmshan that the provisions of the amendment made
by Act 40 of 1975 can be abused. I may state that in case the provisions of the amended law are abused, and some of the instances of
abuse were visualized by Mr. Shanti Birnshan during the course of
arguments, this Court would not 'be helpless in the matter. The
proper course in such an event would be to strike down ~he action
taken under the amended law and not the law itself.
Reference was ·also made by Mr. Shanti Bhushan to the effect of
retrospective amendment in cases which may arise unckr section
123 (l) of the RP Act. We are in the present case n0t concerned
with section 123{1) of the RP Act and consequently it is not necessary to express any opinion with regard to the impact of the amendment upon section 123 ( 1) of the RP Act. Nor is it necessary to
express opinion on the point as to whether it is permissible to make
a law which has the effect of creating a corrupt practice or disqualification retrospectively and thus unseating a returned candidate as
such a question docs not arise in this case.
•.l
B
Likewise, Sikri J. expressly rejected the contention that retrospective
amendment in election law was bad because it was not a healthy
practice and because such a course was liable to be abused in the
following words :
'The apprehension that it may not be a healthy practice
and this power might be abused in a particular case are
again no grounds for limiting the powers of the State
Legislature."
>
A
The change in the definition of the word "candidate" to which
our attention has been invited by Mr. Shanti Bhushan does not
impinge upon the process of free and fair elections. The fact that
as a result of the above change, we have to take into account onlv the
prejudicial activity of the candidate or his election agent fron~ the
date of the nomination of the candidate and not from the Jate he
holds himself out as a candidate does not affect the process of free
<l:nd fair .elections. It is necessary while dealing with corrupt practice relatmg to elections to specify the period within which the
impugned act, alleged to constitute corrupt practice should have been
done. As a result .of the amendment, the legislature has fixed the
sa'd period to be a5 from the date of nomination instead of the period
as from the elate on which the candidate with the election in prospect
c
D
E
G
H
488
A
B
c
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 S.C.R.
began to hold himself out as a prospective candidate. It is common experience that the date from which a candidate holds himself
out as a prospective candidate is often a matter of controversy between
the parties. The result is that an element of indefiniteness and uncertainty creeps in infi.nding the date from which a person can be
said to be candidate. As a result of the change in the definition of
candidate, the legislature has fixed a definite date, viz., that of nomination, instead of earlier time which had an element of indefiniteness
and uncertainty about it for finding as to when a person became a
candidate. Certainty is an essential desideratum in law and any
amendment of law to achieve that object is manifestly a permissible
piece of legislation. The choice of date was a matter for the legislature to decide and the court cannot substitute its own opinion for
that of the legislature in this respect, more so, when whatever be the
choice of date, has aspects of both pros and cons. The date of
nomination is normally, as in the present case, about a month before
the date of polling and it is plain that most of the acts of corrupt
practice are committed during this period. In any case, as mentioned above, the court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of
the legislature in the choice of date. The choice of date, as observed
in the case of Union of India v. M/s Parameswaran Match Works(,!)
as a basis for classification cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary
even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice unless it is
shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. When it
is seen that a line or a point there must be and there is no rr,athematical or logical way of finding it precisely, the decision of the legislature or its delegate must be accepted unless we can say that it is very
wide of any reasonable mark.
One of the objects of the change effected by Act 40 of 1975 is to
remove the uncertainty and set at rest the controversy as to what
would be the precise date of a person in the service of the Central
Government ceasing to be in such service in case he tenders his
resignation. The amended law makes it clear that where the date
of taking effect ot the resignation is stated in the publication in the
Official Gazette, it shall be that date. Similarly, in the case of
appointment of a person, the date of taking effect of such appointment shall be the date mentioned in the publication in the Official
Gazette in case such a date is stated in such publication. The fact
that the new provision creates a conclusive presumption with regard
to the date of taking effect of appointment or resignation docs not
mean, as is sought to be argued on behalf of the respondent, that
there has been an encroachl):l.ent by the legislature upon the judicial
sphere. Laying down a rule of conclusive presumption in a statute
with a view to remove uncertainty with regard to the date of tlictaking effect of appointment or resignation of a Government employee
cannot be characterised as an assumption of judicial power by the
legislature. Another object of the change effected by Act 40 of
1975 is that a candidate who is bound, in view of para 8 of the
Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968 to use
(1, AIR 1974 SC 2349
,
•
\
-·'
.
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN (Khanna, J.)
.
•
,. f
-.
..\
489
the party symbol allotted by the Election Commission: and who cannot use any other symbol, shall not suffer and be guilty of corrupt
practice under section 123 (3) of the RP Act. because o~ ~he use. of
that symbol. It is to be assumed that Election Comm1ss1on which
is an independent body, would act fairly and properly and woul~ not
allot a symbol, which is a religious symbol, to a party or a candidate.
The fact that the allotted symbol was one of those suggested by the
party concerned would not relieve the Election Commission of its
duty to see that it does not allot a religious symbol to that party .
Assuming that the Election Commission makes an error of judgment
in this respect and allots a symbol which, in fact, is a religious symbol, the object of the new provision is that a candidate should not be
penalised because of such an error on the part of the Election Commission. Th<: third object of the change effected by Act 40 of 1975
is that a candidate should not suffer or be held guilty of corrupt
practice because of any act done by any person in the service of the
Government and belonging to any of the classes mentioned in section
123 ( 7) of the RP Act in the discharge or purported discharge of his
official duty. None of the three objects mentioned above has any
t!lint of unconstitutionality and I find it difficult to hold that the
imp~gned provisions impinge upon the principle of free and fair
e).ect10ns.
So far as the newly added proviso to section 123 (7) is concerned, it may be stated that the act in the discharge or purported discharge of official duty of the Government employees referred to
above would in the very nature of things have to be of a kind which
is germane to their official duties. It may include steps taken by
the Government employees for maintenance of law and order or in
connection with the security of a 'candidate or other persons. It
would not, however, include canvassing or doing such acts which may
properly be considered to be part of the election propaganda for
furtherance of the prospects of a candidate's election. In taking
action under the above provision, it must be borne in mind as stated
on page 152 of Free Elections by W. J. M. Mackenzie that in the
last resort "the system of free elections depends on a certain separation of powers between administrators (or policemen) and politicians : there must be some public sense that police and administration
serve the public, not the party leaders". What would be permissible
under the above provision would be that which is conceived to be
<lone in public interest and not something conceived to be done in
the personal interest of a candidate. In spite of some difficulty which
may arise in borderline cases, this distinction must be borne in mind .
If, however, because of doing something conceived in public interest,
e.g., as in the present case the security arrangement for the person
. holding the office of the Prime Minister, some advanta<>e may also
possibly accrue to a candidate, it will have to be regard~d as inci<l~r;ital an? wc;ulcl no~ d~tract from action taken under the above prov1~1on b~mg 111 pubhc mterest. As against that, any action taken
with a view to fortlier the personal interest of a candidate should not
be allowed to be camouflaged as an action taken in public interest.
Care must be taken to ensure that public interest is not allowed to
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
490
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976j 2 S.C.R.
decrencrate into a cloak for furtherance of the personal interests of a
ca~didate in an election. The· discharge or purported disc!)argc of
ollicial duty must necessarily have public interest and not tlic personal interest of a candidate as its basis. The courts while dealing
with the newly added proviso to section 123 (7) should com.true it.
if reasonably possible, in such a manner as would sustain the validity
oi that proviso. In case there is abuse of the above provision, the
proper course, as already mentioned, would be to strike down the
action taken under the proviso and not the proviso itself.
One other change brought about by Act 40 of 1975 is th~ addition of an explanation in section 77 of the RP Act. According to.
the new explanation, any expenditure incurred in respect of any
arrangements made, facilities provided or any other act or ~hing done
by any person in the ~ervice of the Government and belongtng to any
of the ('.lasses mentioned in clause (7) of section 123 in the discharge
or purported discharge of his official duty as mentioned in the provisa
to that clause shall not be deemed to be expenditure in connection
with the election incurred or authorized by a candidate or by his
election agent for the purposes of section 77 ( 1). The validity of
the above l'Xplanation in a great measure is linked with the validity
of the new proviso to section 123(7) of the RP Act, and for the
reasons stated for upholding the proviso to section 123 (7), the new
explanation to section 77, it seems, may have also to be upheld. It
is not neceGsary to dilate upon this aspect because even without
invoking the aid of the new explanation to section 77, the · tligh
Court has found, and I see no reason to disturb that finding, that the
total expenses incurred by the appellant were less than the prescribed'
limit.
Argument has also been advanced that validity of Act 40 of 1975
cannot be assailed on the ground that it strikes at the basic structureof the Constitution. Such a limitation, it is submitted, operates upon
an amendment of the Constitution under article 368 but it does not
hold good when Parliament enacts a statute in exercise of powers
under article 245 of the Constitution. In view of my finding that
the provisions of Act 40 of 1975 with which we are concerned hav"'
not been shown to impinge upon the process of free and fair elections
and thereby to strike at the basic structure of the Constitution, it is
not necessary to deal with the above argument. I would, therefore,
hold that the provisions of Act 40 of 1975 with which we are concerned are valid and do not suffer from any constitutional infirmity.
We may now deal with cross appeal No. 909 of 1975. Mr.
Shanti Bhushan has not pressed the challenge to the findings of the
High Court on issues 4 and 7. He has, however, assailed the finding
of the High Court on issue No. 9 whereby the High Court held that
the appellant incurred an expenditure of Rs. 31,976.47 on lier election as against the prescribed limit of Rs. 35,000. In Ex. 5,
Return of her election expenses, the appellant showed her total
election expenses to be Rs. 12,892.97. The respondent in para 13
of the election petition alleged that the appellant and her election
agent had incurred expenditure much beyond the prescribed limit of
a.
I'
•
•
...
•
-
..,
'
SMT. INDJRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN (Khanna, /.)
.•
49i
Rs. 35,000 and thereby committed corrupt practice ~ndcr section
123 ( 6) of the RP Acl. The respondent gav~ some items o~ the
expenditure which were alleged to have been mc?rred by the ai:pellant and her elcctiuu agent but were not shown m the return of the
election expenses. The material items with which we are now concerned were as under :
(i) The hiring charges of the vehicles specified in para
13(1)-mer Rs. 1,28,700.
A
B
(ii) Cost of petrol and diesel for the vehicles
...,;
A...
...
, )
specified
in para 13(1)-over Rs. 43,230.
(iii) Payments made to the drivers c•f vehicles specified in para 13(1)-over Rs. 9,900~
(iv) Repairing and servicing charges of vehicles specified in para 13(1)-0ver Rs. 5,000.
(v) Payment; made to the workers engaged for the
purpose of. election propaganda-over Rs. 6,600.
(vi) Expenses on the erection of rostrums for the public
meetings addressed by the appellant in the constituency on · February 1 and 25, 1971--ovcr
Rs. 1,32,000.
(vii) Expenses on arrangement of loudspeakers for the
various election me~tings of the appellant addressed
on February 1 and 25, 1971-over· Rs. 7,000.
(viii) Expenses on motor transport for the conveyance of
the appellant and her party to the place of her election meetings on February 1 and 25, 1971-over
Rs. 2,000.
\
The High Court held that the respondent had failed to prove the
first five items. As regards the expenses for the ~rection of rostrums
for the public meetings addressed by the appellant on February 1 and
25,, 1971, the High Court found that four meetings were addressed
by the appellant in the constituency on February 1 and six meetings
on February 25, 1971. The cost of a rostrum in each meeting came
to Rs. 1,600. The total expenses of the ten rostrums thus came to
Rs. 16,000 and the same, it was held, was liable to be added to the
amount shown in the return of election expenses of th~ appellant. The
amount of Rs. 16,000 included the money paid by the District Congress
Committee as its share of the cost of rostrums. Regarding the expenses
of loudspeakers, the High Court found that the total expense of Rs.
800 had been incurred on the installation of !omhpeakers in the
meetings addressed by the appellant on February 1 and 25, 1971.
In addition to that, the High Court added Rs. 1, 151 as cost of energy
supplied for the functioning of the loudspeakers. The total amount
which was added to the election expenses of the appellant on account
of the loudspeakers thus came to Rs. 1,951. An amount of Rs. 232.50
was found by the High COurt to have be.;:n incurred by the appellant
for her transport on February 1 and 25, 1971. Adding the
c
D
E
F
G
H
492
A
E
G
H
(1976] 2. S.C.R.
aggregate of Rs. 16,000, Rs. 1,951 and Rs. 232.50 in all Rs. 18,183.50,
'.O the figure of Rs. 12,892.97 which had been shown by the appellant
1~ her return, the total expense incurred by the appellant on her electwn was found by the High Court to be Rs. 31,976.47.
In appeal before us Mr Shanti Bhushan has assailed the finding of
the High Court in so far as the High Court has not accepted the case
of t~~ respondent that the appellant in~urred expenses on the cost
of hmn&, petrol and the salary of the drivers for 23 vehicles. It may
be mentioned that the respondent in para 13 of the election petition
referred to 32 vehicles which were alleged to have been hired by the
appellant, but both before the High Court and in appeal before us,
lear.ned counsel for the respondent has confined his argument to 23
vehicles.
<;
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
•
.
-
;.._
·
To appreciate. the point of controversy between the parties! it may
be necessary to set out some material facts. Section 160 of the RP
Act provides inter alia that if it appears to the State Government that
in connection with an election held within the State, any vehicle is
needed or is likely to be needed for the,, purpose of transport of ballot
boxes to or from any polling station, or transport of members of the
police force for maintaining order during the conduct of such election
or transport of any officer or other person for performance of any
duties in connection with such election, the Government may by order
in writing requisition such vehicle, provided that no vehicle which is
being /awfully nsed by a cmulidate or his agent for any puroose connected with the election of such candidate shall be requisitioned until
the completion of the poll at such election. It appears that 23 vehicles,
described at some places as cars and at other places as jeeps,. were requisitioned by the district authorities Rae Bareli for election purposes
under the above provision. On February 23, 1971 Dal Bahadur Singh,
who was the President of the District Congress Committee Rae Bareli,
addressed a letter to the District Officer Rae Bareli praying that the
above mentioned 23 v·~hicles, of which the numbers were given, had
been taken by the District Congress Committee Rae Bareli . for the
Parliamentary constituencies of Rae Bareli, Amethi and Ram Sanehi
Ghat. There are, it may be stated, seven Assembly constituencies in
Rae Bareli district. Out of them, five Assembly constituenc;ie~ constitute Rae Bareli Parliamentary constituency. One of the As.sembly
constituencies in Rae Bareli district in part of Ram Sanehi G~.t Parliamentary constituency, while the seventh Assembly constituency is
part of Amethi Parliamentary constituency. On February 24, 1971
a reply was sent on behalf of the District Election Officer of Dal .Bahadur Singh regarding the latter's request for release of 23 vehicles. It
was pointed out in the reply that it was not possible to release the
vehicles in favour of any party for election purposes. At the same
time, it was mentioned that the question of releasing of the vehicles
could be considered at the request of a candidate or his election agent.
On receipt of the above reply. Dal Bahadur Singh sent the same to
Yashpal Kapur on February 24, 1971 along with note A43, the material part of which reads as under :
"You are requested tn kindly write a Jetter with your
recommendation to the Election Officer so that t11e cars
t
'•
..
-
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN
•
-..
......
.
'\
(Khanna, J.)
493
taken by the District Congres~ C?mmittee may be release~t
I have tried to find out Shn V1dyadhar Vaipayee who is
contesting the election from Amethi Parliamentary Constituency and Shd Baiznath. Kure~l who is con.testing the
election from Ram Saneh1 Parhamentary Constituency, but
they are not available. You are, therefore, requested to
write the above letter to the District Election Officer positively so that the election work of all the three Parliamentary Constituencies which is going on, on behalf of District
Congress Committee, may not suffer."
On February 25, 1971 Yashpal Kapur addressed a letter to the District Officer Rae Bareli stating that the 23 vehicles in question had
· been taken by the District Congress Committee Rae Bareli for the
three Parliamentary constituencies of Rae Bareli, Amethi and Ram
Sanehi Ghat. The District Officer was requested to release the 23
vehicles without t'ielay. Yashpal Kapur also enclosed with that
letter the note of Dal Bahadur Singh. The 23 vehicles, it would
appear, were thereafter released by the District' Election Officer. The
appellant in para 17 (b) of her written statement, admitted that those
23 vehicles were used by the District Congress Committee Rae Bareli
for election work in the three Parliamentary constituencies of Rae
Bareli. Amcthi and Ram Sanehi Ghat. The High Court, in not
accepting the case of the respondent in respect of the 23 vehicles,
observed that there was nothing to show that the above mentioned
vehicles had been obtained on hire or were obtained gratis. There
was also, according to the High Court, no cogent material to show
that the said vehicles had been engaged and used in connection with
election work of the appellant.
Mr. Shanti Hhusl;an, while assailing the finding of the High
Court. has submitted that, as five out of the seven Assembly constituencies in Rae Bareli district were in Rae Bareli Parliamentary
constituency, five-seventh of the expenses incurred on the said 23
vehicles should be added to the election expenses of the appellant .
I find it difficult to accede to the above submission because of the
paucity of the material on record. There is no cogent evidence to
show that the 23 vehicles in question were used for the election of
the appellant. It is no doubt true that the said 23 vehicles were
used by the District Congress Committee Rae Bareli for election work
in the three Parliamentary constituencies, viz., Rae Bareli, Amethi
and Ram Sanehi Ghat. The record is, however. silent on the point
as to what extent they were used in Rae Bareli Parliamentary constituency. One can in the above context visualise three possibilities·:
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
(i) As the appellant, who was the Prime Minister of the
country, was contesting from Rae Bareli consti~
tucncv. the District Congress Committee concentrated its attention on that constituency and used the
23 vehicles mostly for the election work in that
constituency.
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
494
A
B
c
D
E
F
c·
H
[ 197 6] 2 S.C.R •.
(ii) As the appellant bad a mass appeal
the District
Congress Committee office bearers thought that the
Rae Bareli constituency was very safe and, therefore, concentrated attention on the other two Parliamtntary constituencies and used the 23 vc:1ich:s
mostly for those two constituencies.
(iii) Equal attention was paid to all the three constituencies and there was proportionate use of the
vehicles for the three constituencies.
Mr. Shanti Bhushan would have us to accept the first or the third
possibility and would rule out the second. If so, it was, in my
opinion, essential for the respondent to lead some evidence regarding
the use of the 23 vehicles. He did nothing of the kind. Neither the
owners nor the drivers of those vehicles were examined as witnesses.
There was also, as mentioned earlier, no other cogent evidence to
show that those vehicles or any of them were used.Jor the appellant's·
election in the Rae Bareli constituency, and if so, to what extent. The
respondent himself did not come into the witness box to substantiate
the charge against the appellant regarding the use of the 23 vehicles.
The fact that Dal Bahadur Singh was not examined as a witness on
behalf of the appellant would not warrant the filling in of the
gaps and lacunae in the evidence adduced by the respondent by a
process akin to guess work. It is no doubt true that by using a
vehicle for the furtherance of the prospects of candidates in more
than one constituency one should not be allowed to circumvent the
salutary provisions of the RP Act in this respect. To prevent such
circumvention, it is essential that evidence should be led to show as
to what was the extent of the user of the vehicle in the constituency
concerned. In Hans Raj v. Pt. Hari Ram & Ors. ( 1) a jeep hired
by the Congress Committee during elections was used in more than
one constituency, including that of the returned candidate who was
a Congress nominee. Question arose as to whether the expense incurred in connection with that ieep could be included in the election
expenses of the returned candidate. While answering the question
in the negative, Hidayatullah C.J. observed :
'·The bill stands in the name of the Congress Committee
and was presumably paid by the Congress Committee also.
The evidence, however, is that this jeep was used on behalf
of the returned candidate and to that extent we subscribe to
the finding given by the learned judge. Even if it be held
that the candidate was at bottom the hirer of the jeep and
the expenditure on it must be included in his account, the
difficulty "is that this jeep was used also for the general
Congress propaganda in other constituencies. As we
stated, the jeep remained in Chalet and at Mubarakpur. No
doubt Chalet is the home town of the returned candidate and
his oflJcc was situated at Mubarakpur but that does not indicate that the jeep was used exclusively on his account. The
petrol chart shows that petrol was bought at several pumps,
---------
------- ~
~
~---
(1) 40 E.L.R. 125 ..
-
SMT. JNDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN
-...
(Khanna, J.)
495
both inside the constituency and outside. This shows, as
docs the evidence, that the jeep was used not only in this
constituency but also in the other constituencies. lf this be
true, then, it is almost impossible on th~ evidence as it
exists in this case to decide how much of the use went for
the benefit of the returned candidate and how much for the
use of candidates in the other constituencies also put up by
the Congress Committee. In this situation it is difficult to
say that the whole of the benefit of the jeep went to the
returned candidate and once we hold that the entire benefit
did not go to him, we are not in a position to allocate the
expenses between him and the other candidates in the other
constituencies."
Reference has also been made during the course of arguments by
Mr. Shanti Bhushan to some entries in a register of the Congress
Committee. The High Court declined to place any reliance on those
entries as those entries had not been proved. I see no cogent ground
to take a different view. Our attention has been invited by Mr.
Shanti Bhushan to a report in issue dated January 22, 1971 of
Swantantra Bharat wherein there was a reference to the Personal
Secretary of the Prime Minister having reached Rae Bareli with a
caravan of 70 motor vehicles. No reliance can be placed upon that
report as the correspondent who sent that report was not examined
as a witness.
The other difficulty which I find in accepting the submission of
Mr. Shanti Bhushan in respect of 23 vehicles is that there is no evidence to show that any payment was made for the use of the above
mentioned vehicles. There is also nothing to show that those vehicles
were engaged on hire. As mentioned earlier, the owners and drivers of
those vehicles were not examined as witnesses. I, therefore, find no
sufficient ground to interfere with the finding of the High Court in
respect of the above mentioned 23 vehicles.
.
I
;
B
c
D
E
F
Mr. Shanti Bhushan has next assailed the finding of the High Court
in so far as it has held that the respondent has failed to prove that
the appellant incurred an expense of Rs. 6,600 on workers engaged
for the purposes of election propaganda. I, however; find no infirmity in the finding of the High Court in this respect as there is no
cogent evidence whatsoever that any expense was incurred for engaging workers for the election work of the appellant. Thecase of the
appellant is that her workers did not work voluntarily and without
·
receipt of any remuneration.
Apart from challenging the findings of the High Court in respect
of 23 vehicles and the alleged payment to workers, Mr. Shanti
Bhushan has also referred to some other circumstances with a view
to. show that the election expenses of the appellant exceeded the prescribed amount of Rs. 35,000. It has been pointed out that a cheque
for Rs. 70,000 was sent by the Provincial Congress Committee to
. G
H
496
A
B
c
D
E
F
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 S.C,R.
Dal Bahadur Singh, President of the District Congress Committee
Rae Bareli, and the same was er.edited in Dal Bahadur Singh's account
after deducting of the bank charges on March 4, 1971. Dal Bahadur
Singh withdrew out of that amount Rs. 40,000 and Rs. 25,000 on
March 4 and 6, 1971 respectively nearabout the days of poJling.
It is urged that the said amount must have been spent for the purpose of the elections. There was no reference to the said amount
of Rs. 70,000 in the petition. There is also no reference to the
amount of Rs. 70,000 in the judgment of the High Court or in the
grounds of appeal. As such, I am of the view that the respondent
should not be allowed to set up a case against the appellant on the
basis of the bank entries in the account of Dal Bahadur Singh.
Reference has further been made by Mr. Shanti Bhushan to the
expenses which were alleged to have been incurred on the telephone
charges and the meetings addressed by Yashpal Kapur. The High
Court rejected the submission in this respect on behalf of the respondent in the following words :
'·Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that from the
evidence on record, it transpires that expenditure was also
incurred on the telephone connection and telephone
charges; on the meetings addressed by Shri Yashpal Kapur
within the Constituency during the period of election; on
the election material viz., pamphlets, posters, etc. and oa
the lighting arrangements made for some meeting~
addressed by the respondent No. 1. According to learned
counsel, these expenses are also liable to be added to the
election expenses of the respondent No. 1. None of these
expenses were, however, pleaded in the petition. In fact,
till the commencement of the arguments in the case, the
respondent No. 1 could not even anticipate that the petitioner shall rely on these expenses for the purpose of his
case. It will, therefore, be prejudicial to the interest of respondent No. 1 if the aforesaid expenses are taken into
consideration. The submission made by learned counsel
for the petitioner is accordingly negatived."
.
(
t
I am in full agreement with the above observations of the High Court
and find no cogent ground to take a different view.
G
H
It may be stated that in view of the new explanation added to
section 77 of the RP Act by Act 40 of 1975, the amount of
Rs. 12,000 which represented 75 per cent of the expenditure incurred
on the construction of 10 rostrums borne by the Government, cannot
be included in the total election expenses of the appellant. The
High Court was also inclined to hold that the said amount of
Rs. 12,000 could not be included in the appellant's expenses. The
High Court, however, included the total amount of Rs .. 16,000 in the
election expenses of the appellant upon the assumption that the
appellant had not disavowed that expenditure. Be that as it may,
the fact remains that the High Court has found on issue No. 9 that
the total expenses incurred by the appellant on her election have not
•
.,
I
\
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAlN
(Khanna. J.)
497
been shown to exceed the prescribed limit. · I find no cogent reason
to interfere with that finding.
I also agree with the High Court that as the election expenses of
the appellant have not been shown to exce~d
prescribed_ li~it of
Rs. 35,000, the question of invoking a1~d flOHlg mto the vahd1ty . of
Act 58 of 1974 does not arise~ Nor 1s it necessary to express an
opinion about the view taken in Kanwa~lal v. Amarna~h Chawla('~)
in view of the fact that even after applymg the rule laid down m
that case, the total election expense of the appellant has not been
shown to exceed the prescribed limit.
A
t?e
So far as the finding of the High Court on issue No. 6 regarding
the u$e of the symbol of cow arid calf is concerned, the matter, ~s
already discussed earlier, is now covered by the amendment made m
section 123(3) of the RP Act by section 8 of Act 40 of 1975.
•. '
-'.
•
There was .a controversy during the course of arguments on the
point as to whether I have laid down in my judgment in Kesavananda
Bharati's case (supra) that fundamental rights are not a part of the
basic structure of the Constitution. As this controversy cropped up
a number of times, it seems apposite that before l conclude I should
de:il with the contention advanced by learned Solicitor General that
according to my judgment in that case no fundamental right is part
of the basic structure of the Constitution. I find it difficult to read
anything in that judgment to justify such a conclusion. What has
been laid down in that judgment is that no article of the Constitution
is immune from the amendatory process because of the fact that it
relates to a fundamental right and is contained in Part III of the
Constitution. It was also held that a constitutional amendment under
article 368. does not constitute "law" as mentioned in article 13. I
also did not agree with the view taken in the case of Golaknath(2)
that there was a limitation on the power of Parliament to amend the
provisions of Part III of the Constitution so as to abridge or take
away the fundamental rights. I thereafter dealt with the scope of
the power of amendment under article 368 and the connotation of
the word "amendment" and said in this context :
"I am further of the opinion that amendment of the
constitution necessarily contemplates that the constitution
has not to be abrogated but only changes have to be made
in it. The word 'amendment' postulates that the old constitution survives without loss of identity despite the change
and continues even though it has been subjected to alterations. As a result of the amendment, the old cefnstitution
cannot be destroyed and done away with; it is retained
though in the amended form. What then is meant by the
retention of the old constitution ? It means the retention
of the basic structure or framework of the old constitution.
A mere retention of some provisions of the old constitution
(1) A.LR. 1975 S.C. 308.
(2) [1967] 2 S.C.R. 762.
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
498
A
ll
c
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[I 976] 2 S.C.R.
even though the basic structure or framework of the constitution has been destroyed would not amount to the retention of the old constitution. Although it is permissible
under the power of amendment to effect changes, howsoever important, and to adapt the system to the requirements
of changing conditions, it is not permissible to touch the
foundation or to alter the basic institutional pattern. The
words 'amendment of the constitution' with all their wide
sweep and amplitude cannot have the effect of ·destroying
or abrogating the basic structure or framework of the constitution. It would not be competent under the garb of
amendment, for instance, to change the democratic government into dictatorship or hereditary monarchy nor would
it be permissible to abolish the Lok Sabha and the Rajya
Sabha. The secular character of the state according to
which the state shall not discriminate against any citizen on
the ground of religion only cannot likewise be done away
with. Provision regarding the amendment of the constitution does not furnish a pretence for subverting the structure of the constitution nor can article 368 be so construed
as to embody the death wish of the Constitution or provides
sanction for what may perhaps be called its lawful harakiri.
Such subversion or destruction cannot be described to be
amendment of the Constitution as contemplated lly article
368."
•
It was further observed by me :
E
F
G
"The word 'amendment' in article 368 must carry the
same meaning whether the amendment relates to taking
away or abridging fundamental rights in Part III of the
constitution or whether it pertains to some other provision
outside Part III of the Constitution. No serious objection
is taken to repeal, addition or alteration of provisions of t-he
Constitution other than those in Part III under the power of
· amendment conferred by article 368. The same approach,
in my opinion, should hold good when we deal with amendment relating to fundamental rights contained in Part III
of. the Constitution. It would be impermissible to diffe··
rentiate between scope and width of power of amendment
when it deals with fundamental rights and the scope and
width of that power when it deals with provisions not concerned with fundamental rights."
... -·
It would appear from the above that no distinction was made by me
H
so far as the ambit and scope of the power of amendment is concerned between a provision relating to fundamental rights and provisions dealing with matters other than fundamental rights. The
limitation inherent in the word "amendment" according to which it
is not permissible by amendment of the Constitution to change the
basic structure of the Constitution was to operate equally on articles
pertaining to fundamental rights as on other articles not pertaining
\
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI
v. RAJ NARAIN (Khanna, J.)
499
·do those rights. This was further made clear by the following obser-vations on page 688 :
"Subject to the retention of the basic structure or framework of the Constitution, I have no doubt that. t~e P?wer
o[ amendment is plenary and would include w1thm itself
the power to add, alter or repeal t~e various articles includ"
ing those relating to fundamental nghts."
.
..Proposition (vii) of the summary of my conclusions on page 758 of
.the judgment also bears it out and the same reads as under :
"(~ii) The power of amendment und~r ~rticle 368 do~s
not include power to abrogate the Const1tut10n nor docs 1t
include the power to alter the basic structure or framework
of the Constitution. Subject to the retention of the basic
structure or framework of the Constitution, the power of
amendment is plenary and includes within itself the power
to amend the various artfoles of the Constitution, including
those relating to fundamental rights as well as. those which
may be said to relate to essential features. No part of a
fundamental right can claim immunity from amendatory
process by being described as the essence or core of that
right. The power of amendment would also include within
itself the power to add, alter or repeal the various articles."
It has been stated by me on page 685 of the judgment (already
:.;reproduced above) that the secular character of the State, according
to which the State shall not discriminate against any citizen on the
__ground of religion only cannot likewise be done away with. The
. above observations show that the secular character of the Constitution and the rights guaranteed by article 15 pertain to the basic structure of the Constitution. The above observations clearly militate
.against the contention that according to my judgment fundamental
Tights are not a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. I
also dealt with the matter at length to show that the right to property
·was not a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. This would
have been wholly unnecessary if none of the fundamental rights was
.a part of the basic structure of the Constitution .
Before parting with this case I must acknowledge the assistance
·we received from the learned counsel for the parties as also from
learned Attorney General and Solicitor General in resolving the
·points of controversy. In spite of the political overtones, the case
· was argued forcefully yet without generating any heat and in an at. mosphere of befitting calmness. It has been said by Holines J. that
·great cases like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are called
: great, not by reason of their real importance iil shaping the law of the
future, but because of some accident of immediate overwhelmino. interest, whic~ api;ieals to the fe_elings and distorts the judgment'.
, Thes~ 1mmediat~. mterests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure
[Nattonal Secuntzes Co. v. U.S. Q1 ) ]. It, therefore, became essential
~to rid the case of all the embellishments resulting from the political
(l) 193 U.S. 197 (at 400-1) [1904].
A
B
c
0
G
H
500
A
B
c
D
E
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 S.C.R.
overtones and to bring it to a level which is strictly judicial, so th~t
the various constitutional and legal aspects of the matter may I?\:
examined in a dispassionate atmosphere. Learned counsel for the
parties made a significant contribution towards the attainment of this
objective. It may not be inappropriate in the above context to reproduce what was said by one of us (Khanna J.) in Kesavananda
Bharati's case (supra) at page 755 :
"That all constitutional interpretations have political
consequences should not obliterate the fact that the decision
has to be arrived at in thi< calm and dispassionate atmosphere
of the court room, that judges in order to give legitimacy lo
their decision have to keep aloof from the din and controversy of politics and that the fluctuating fortunes of rival
political parties can have for them only academic interest.
Their primary duty is to uphold the constitution and the
laws without fear or favour ancl in doing so, they cannot
allow any political ideology or economic theory, which may
have caught their fancy, to colour the decision."
·;
-
As a result of the above, I accept appeal No. SS7 of 1975 filed
by Shrimati Indira Nehru Gandhi, set aside the judgment of the
High Court in so far as it has found the appellant guilty of corrupt
practice under section 123 (7) of the RP Act and has declared her
election to the Lok Sabha to be void. The order that the appella11t
shall accordingly stand disqualified for a period of six years as pro'vided in section SA would also consequently be set aside. The clec~
tion petition filed by the respondent shall stand dismissed. Appeal
No. 909 of 1975 filed by Shri Raj Narain is dismissed. Looking to
all the circumstances, more particularly the fact that the election
petition filed by the respondent is being dismissed because of changd
made in law during the pendency of the appeal, the parties are
directed to bear their own costs throughout.
F
G
MATHEW, J. In the election petition filed by the respondent in
Civil Appeal No. SS7 of 1975 (hereinafter referred to as 'rc&pondcnt') , seven charges of corrupt practice were made against the
appellant therein (hereinafter called the 'appellant') and it was prayed that the election of the appellant be set aside. The learned judge
who tried the petition found that two of the charges had been made
out but that the rest of the charges were not substantiated. He set
aside the election of the appellant with the result that the appellant
incurred the disqualification for a period of six: years as visualized in
section SA of the Representation of the People Act. 1951. It is
against this judgment that Civil Appeal No. 8S7 of 1975 has been
filed.
H
The respondent has filed a cross appeal (Civil Appeal No. 909
of. 1975) challenging the findings of the High Court in respect of the
other charges of corrupt practice.
"
)
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN
(Mathew, J.)
50l
During the pendency of these appeals, the parliament pa~s.:d the
Election Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975 on 6-8-1975 by which certain amendments were made in the provisions of the Representation
of the Poople Act, 1951, and the Indian Penal Code.
•
I
J
I
On 10-8-1975, the parliament, in the exercise of its constituent
power, passed the Constitution (Thirty-Ninth Amendment) Act, 1975
(hereinafter referred to as the 'Amendment'). By the Amendment,
Article 71 of the Constitution was substituted by a new Article and
that Article provided by caluse (1) that, subject to the provisions of
the Constitution, parliament may, by law, regulate any matter relating to or connected with the election of a President or Vice-President,
including tl\.C grouncls on which such election may be questioned. By
clause (2) of the Article it was provided that all doubts and disputes arising out of 01: in connection with the election of a President
or Vice President shall,be inquired into and decided by such authority or body in such manner as may be provided for by or under any
law referred to in clause (1). Clause (3) stated that the validity
of any such law referred to in clause · ( 1) and ·the decision of any
authority or body under such law shall not be called iif question in
any court.
'-._'
•
A
B
c
D
Uy clause. 4 of the Amendment, Article 329-A was inserted 1:eading as fellows :
"329-A. Special provision as to elections
to
Pi:11'lta-
n:ent in the case of Prime Minister and Speaker :
( 1) subject to the provisions of Chapter II of Part V
(cxcc~t sub-clause (e) of clause (1) o.f article 102], no
E
clcctim1-( a) to either House of Parliament of a person who holds
the office of the Prime Minister at the time of such
election or is appointed as Prime Minister after such
election;
F
(b) to the House o.E the People of a person who holds
the office of a Speaker of that House at the time of
such election or who is chosen as the Speaker for
that House after such election :
shall be called in question except before such authority
[not being any such authority as is referred to in clause
(b) of Article 329] or body and in such manner as may
be provided for by or under any law made by Parliament
and any such Jaw may provide for all other matters relating
to doubts and disputes in relation to such election including
the grounds on which such election may be questioned. (2) The validity of any such law as is referred to in
dausc ( 1) and the <lecisiol). of any authority or body under
s;_ich Jaw shall not be called in question in any court.
,.
11-(26 S.C.L/76
G
H
502
A
B
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976) 2 S.C.R.
· (3) Where any person is appointed as Prime Minister _
or, as the case may be, chosen to the office of the Speaker
of th() House of the People, while an election petition referred to in clause (b) of Article 329 in respect of his election
to either House of Parliament or, as the case may be, to
the House of the People is pending, such election petition .
shall abate upon such person being appointed as Prime
Minister or, as the case may be, being chosen to the o~ce
of the Speaker of the House of the People, but such elect10n
may be called in question under any such law as is referred
to in clause (1).
E
(4) No law made by Parliament before the commencement of the Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment)
Act, 1975, in so far as it relates to election petitions and
matters connected therewith shall apply or shall be deemed
ever to have applied to or in relation to the election of any
such person as is referred to in clause (1) to either House
of Parliament and such election shall not be deemed to be
void or ever to have become void on any ground on which
such election could be declared to be void, or has, before
such commencement, been declared to be void under any
such law and notwithstanding any order made by any court,
before such commencement, declaring such election to be
void, such election shall continue to be valid in all respects
and any such order and any finding on which such order is
based shall be and shall be deemed- always to have been
void and of no effect.
F
(5) Any appeal or cross appeal against any such order
of any court as is referred to in clause ( 4) pending immediately before the commencement of the Constitution
(Thirty-Ninth Amendment) Act, 1975 before the Supreme
Court shall be disposed of in conformity with the provisions
of clause ( 4).
.
c
D
-
( 6) The provisions of this article shall have effect
notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution."
G
H
The respondent contended that clause ( 4) of Art. 329-A [hereinafter referred to as 'clause ( 4) '] is invalid for the reason that some
of the basic structures of the Constitution have been damaged by its
enactment.
The argument was that although the amending body could
declare that the election of the appellant shall not be deemed to be
void and the judgment of the High Court to be void on the basis that
no law relating to election petition and matters connected therewith
would apply to the election, yet the amending body could not have
held the election to be valid as it did not ascertain the facts relatin"
"'
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN
...
50 3
10 the election and apply the relevant l~w to. them .. Counsel
•
t
su~mitted that by its very nature, an election dispute m a democratic
system of government raises questions which can ?e decided ~nly by
the exercise of judicial power; that by retrospectiyely rende~mg the
forum for investigation into the complaints regardmg· the validity .of
the election of the appellant coram non judice, and by the amendmg
.body judging its validity without ascertaining the facts and applying
the relevant law the .Amendment has fundamentally damaged an
.essential feature 'of the democratic structure of the Constitution,
namely, free and fair election.
Counsel also submitted that equality and rule of law are essential
features of democracy; that clause ( 4) by dispensing with the application of the law relating to election petition and matters connected
therewith to the appellant, made an unreasonable classification among
persons similarly situated with reference to the purpose of the law.
.
...
(Mathew, !.)
The further submission was, that separation of powers is a basic
structure oE the Constitution and that if it be supposed that the
amending body ascertained the facts regarding the election of the
appellant and applied the relevant law, the exercise of that power by
the amending body would offend the doctrine of separation of powers
and that, at any rate, this process would not result in an amendment
of the Constitution by enacting a law, but oily in the passing of a
judgment or sentence which can never be characteriz.ecl as a law, let
alone a law relating to the Constitution of India.
1
Iii His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sirpadagalavaru v. State of
Kera/a and Another, etc. (1 1) (hereinafter referred to as 'Bharati's
case'), a majority of seven judges held that the power conferred under
Article 368 of the Constitntion was not absolute. They took the
view that, by an amendment, the basic structure of the Constitution
cannot be damaged or destroyed. And, as to what are the basic
structures of the Constitution,__ illnstrations have been given by each
of these judges._ They include supremacy of the Constitution, democratic republican form of government, secular character of the Constitution, separation of powers among the legislature, executive and
judiciary, the federal character of the Constitution, Rule of Law,
equality of status and of opportunity; justice, social, economic and
political; unity and integrity of the nation and the dignity of the
individual secured by the various provisions of the Constitution.
There was consensus ~m?ng these judges that democracy is a basic
structure of the Constltut10n. I proceed on the assumption that the
l~w as laid down by th~ majority in· that case should govern the decision here, although I did not share the view of the majority.
Therefor~,
B
C
D
E
F
G
~
if by clause ( 4) any essential feature of the
cr<l;ttc republican structure of our polity as visualized by the Constitution bas. be~n damaged or destroyed, the clause would be ultra vires
the Constitut1011.
(!) [1973] Supp. S.C.R. 1.
A
H
50..J
A
B
C
D
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976J 2 S.C.R.
One way of looking at the first part of clause ( 4) is that the
amending body bas, with retrospective effect, repealed the law
relating to election petition in respect o[ the persons specified in
clause ( 1) and hence the judgment rendered on the basis of the previous law relating to election petition became automatically void,
and the amending body was merely stating the consequence of · the
retrospective repeal of the law and therefore the declaration that the
judgment was void was not an exercise of judicial function. On the
other hand, it might be possible to view the first part of clause ( 4)
as an exercise of judicial power for the reason that, even assuming
that by virtue of the retrospective repeal of the law relating to election petition, there was no jurisdiction in the High Court to entertain
or try the election petition and pass the judgment, a repeal simpliciter
did not render the judgmeµt ipso facto void and therefore, in making
the declaration that the judgment was void, the amending body was
performing a function which has traditionally been in the province
of court.
Be that as it may, I feel no doubt that the amending body, when
it declared the election of the appellant to be valid, had to ascertain
the adjudicative facts(!) and apply the relevant norm for adjudging
its validity. If however, the amending body did not ascertain the facts
relating to the election and apply the relevant norm, the declaration
of the validity of the election was a fiat of a sui ge11eris character of
the amending body.
The concept of democracy as visualized by the Constitution presupposes the representation of the people in parliament and state
E legislatures by the method of election. And, before an election
machinery can be brought into operation, there are three requisites
which require to be attended to, namely, (1) there should be a set
o[ laws and rules making provisions with respect to all matters relating to, or in connection with, elections, and it should be decided as
to how these laws and rules are to be made; (2) there should be an
executive charged with the duty of securing the due conduct of clccF 1tions; a~d. (3) there sho~ld be a i.udicia! tribun3:1 to deal with disf putcs ansmg out of or m connect10n with elect10ns. Articles 327
and 328 deal with the first of these requisites, article 324 with the
second and article 329 with the third requisite [sec N. P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency and Othcrs(2) 1.
--
G
H
•
(1) "Adjudicative facts are facts about the parties or their activities businesses
and properties usually answering the auestions of who did what. where.' when. how
why, with what motive or intent; adjudicative facts are roughly the kind of fact~
that go to a jury in a jury case. Legislative facts do not usually concern the immediate parties but are general facts which help the tribunal decide questions of law'
policy and discretion."
"Facts pertaining to the parties and their activities that is, adiudicative facts
are intrinsically the kind of facts that ordinarily ought not to he determined with'.
out giving the parties a chance to know and to meet any evidence that mav be
unfavourable to them. that is, without providing the parties an onportunity for trial."
(see K.C. Davis : "The Requirement of a Trial-type Hearing", 70 Har\', L. Rev.
193 at 199).
(2) [1952] S.C.R. 218 at 229.
.
..
S!'.1T. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN
•
'
fl.\Jatlzetv, J.}
505
A
Article 329(b) envisages the c~allenge,to a~ election by a petition to be presented to such author~ty as the parlian:cnt may,.by ~a:"',
prescribe. A law relating to election should con.tam the . r_equ1S1te
qualifications· for candidates, the method of ~otmg, . defimt10n of
corrupt practices by the candidates and their election agents, the
forum for adjudication of election disputes _and other cognate matters.
It is on the basis of this law that the.question whether there has been
B
a valid election has to be determined by the authority to which the
petition is presented. _And, when a dispute is raised as regards the
validity of the election of a particular candidate, the authority
entrusted with the task of resolving the dispute must necessarily
exercise a judicial function, for, the process consists of ascertaining
the facts relating to the election and applying the law to the facts so
ascertained·. In other words, it is obvious that a power must be
c
lodged somewhere to judge the validity of tl1e election, for, otherwise,
there would be no certainty as to who were legitimately chosen as
members, and any intruder or usurper might claim a seat and thus
trample upon the privileges and liberties of the people. Indeed, elec- ·
tions .\vould become, under such circumstances, a mockery. In
whichever authority the power is lodged, the nature· of the function
is such that it requires a judicial approach. It cannot be resolved
D
on considerations of.political expediency.
• House wasof Commons
contended for the appellant that, in England, it was the
which originally decided election disputes conIt
..,
•
cerning its members, that it was only in 1770 that the function was
delegated to committees and, therefore, parliament is the proper
forum for deciding election disputes of its members as it is one of its
privileges. I think, at the time our Constitution was framed, the decision of an election dispute had ceased to be a privilege of the House
of Commons in England and therefore, under Article 105 (3), it
could not be a privilege of parliament in this country.
E
Before the ·year 1770, controverted elections were tried and determind by the whole House of Commons as mere party questions upon F
which the strength of contending factions might be tested. "In order
to prevent so notorious a perversion of justice, the House consented
to submit the exercise of its privilege to a tribunal constituted by
law; which, though composed of its own members, should be appointed so as to secure impartiality and the administration of justice
according to the Jaws of the land under the sanction of oaths". The
- principle of the Grenville Act, and of others which were passed at
G
different times since 1770, was the selection by lot of committees for
the trial of. election petitions. And, at present, by Part III ·of the Representation of the People Act, 1949, the trial of -controverted
cl~ctions is confided to judges selected from the judiciary in the appropriate part of the United Kingdom. ·Provision is made in each case
for constituting a rota from whom these judges are selected. The
J!ouse has no cognizance of these proceedings until their determina- H
!Ion, when the judges certify their determination. The Judges are
to ~.ake a report in any case where a charge !ms been made in the
petition of corrupt and illegal practice l1aving been committed at an
506
A
SUPRE1fE COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 'S.C.R.
election; and they may also make a special report on any matter
arising which they think should be submitted to the House(!).
Article 1, Section 5 ( 1) of the Constitution of the United States
of America provides that each House shall be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own members.
B
In whichever body or authority, the jurisdiction is vested, the
exercise of the jurisdiction must be judicial in character. This Court
•
has held that in adjudicating an election dispute an authority is performing a judicial function and a petition for leave to appeal under
Article 136 of the Constitution would lie to this Court r.gainst the
decision notwithstanding the provisions of Article 329(b) [sec Durga
Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh and others(")].
c
In Barry v. United States Ex. Rel. Cunning/Jame), it was held
that in exercising the power to judge of the election returns and qualifications of members, the senate acts as a judicial tribunal.
E
It might be that if the adjudication of election disputes in respect
of its members had been vested in each of the Houses of Parliament
by the Constitution, the decision of the House would have been final.
That would have been on the basis of the doctrine of the political
question, namely, that the function has been exclusively committed
textually to another agency. I am aware that the doctrine of political
question has no hospitable quarter in this Court since the decision in
Madhav Rao Scindia v. Union( 4 ). 1 But I venture to think that the
doctrine alone can explain why the courts abstain from interfering
with a verdict on an impeachment of the President for violation of
the Constitution, a function essentially judicial(") .
F
An election dispute has a public aspect in that it is concerned
more with the right of a constituency to be represented by a particular candidate. But it does not follow from the public character of
the controversy that there is no lis between the parties to the election
contest, and that the lis can be resolved otherwise than by ascertaining
the facts relating to the election, and applying the relevant law :
D
G
H
"A judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces
liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under
laws supposed already to exist. This is its purpose and
end. Legislation, on the other hand, looks to the future
and changes existing conditions by making a new rule, to be
applied thereafter to all or some part of those subject to its
power." ( 6)
(1) See Erskine May's Parliamentary Practice, 18th edition (1971), pp. 29-31.
(2) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 267.
(3) 73 L. Ed. 867.
(4) A.LR. 1971 S.C. 530.
(5) See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv.
L. Rev. 1, at pp. 7-9.
(6) Justice Holmes in Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, at 226
..
'
'
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN (Mathew, !.)
507
The Privy Council had occasion to consider this question :in
United Engineering Workers' Union v. Devanay~gam(1). The
judgment of the majority was delivered by 1:-ord. D1lhorne. Lord
Guest and Lord Devlin dissented. The question m the case was
whether the President of a labour tribunal in Ceylon was the hold~r
of a judicial office. If so, as the man in question had n?t been
appointed in the way the Constitution of Cerlon reqmre~ for
appointments of judicial officers, .whether the ,tn?unal wa~ without
jurisdiction. It is clear from the iudgme.nt of tneir · Lordships of t~c
minority that judicial power is the exerc1s~ of a po:-ver oi;i the basis
of pre-existing law. At pp. 384-385, therr Lordships said :
"Another characteristic of the judicial power is that it
is concerned with existing rights, that is, those which the
parties actually have at the inception of the suit and not
those which it may be thought they ought to have; it is concerned with the past and the present and not with the
future."
•'
According to the historic analysis, the essence of the distinction
between legislative power and judicial power is that the legislature
makes new law which becomes b.inding on all persons over whom the
legislature exercises legislative power : the judicature applies alrea¢ly
existing law in the resolution of disputes between particular parties :
and judges may not deviate from this duty. This view of the distfu,ction between the obligation to apply and enforce rules and a discretion
to modify rules or make new rules was at one time applied uncompromisingly in describing functions as legislative or judicial. Thus De
Lolme said that courts of equity as then existing in England had a
legislative function. They are, he said, a kind of inferior experimental legislature, continually employed in finding out and providing law
remedies for those new species of cases for which neither the cou~ts
of common law, nor th,e legislature have asi yet found it convenient or
practicable to establish any( 2 ). Though this would show that neither
for logic nor in language has the boundary between legislation and
adjudication ever been rigidly and clearly drawn, the distincti<;m
between the two is well established.
I
If, therefore, the decision of the amending body that the election
of the appellant was valid was the result of the exercise of judicial
power or of despotic discretion governed solely by considerations pf
potitical expediency, the question is, whether that decision, though
couched in the form of an enactment, can be characterized as ~
amendment ofl the Constitution.
The constituent power is the power to frame a constitution. The
f)'.:ople of India, in the exercise of that power, framed the Constitution
and it enacts the basic norms. By that instrument, the people conferred on the amending body the power to amend by way of addition,
variation or repeal any of its provisions (Article 368). It is 1'0t
(1) [1968] A.C. 356.
(2) see the Constitution of England, New Ed. (1800) p. 149.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
508
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 2 S.C.R.
A. necessary to. go in detail. into the question whcihcr the power to amend
is co-extensive with the constituent power
constitution. In Bharati's case, I said (1) :
". . . . under
oe the people to frame a
the Indian Constitution,
the
origi;nal
sovereign~the people-created, by the amending clause of
B
c
D
the Constitution, a lesser sovereign, almost co-extensive in
power with itself. This sovereign, the one established by the
revolutionary act of the full or complete sovereign has been
called by Max Rad:in, the "pro-sovereign'', the holder of the
amending power under the Constitution."
I fully appreciate that 'sovereign', if conceived of as an omnipotent
being, has no existence in the real world. Several thoughtful writers
have deprecated the use of the expression in legal discussion as it has
theological and religious overtones. Nevertheless, as the practice has
become inveterate, it will only create confusion if any departure is
made in this case flrom the practice. If it i51 made clear that sovereign
is not a 'mortal God' and can express himself or itself only in the
manner and form prescribed by law and can be sovereign only when
he or it acts in a certain way also prescribed by law, then perhaps the
use of the expression will have no harliuul consequence.
" 'Legal sovereignty' is a capacity to determine the actions of
persons in certain intended ways by means of a law . . . . where the
actions of those who exercise the authority, in those respects in which
they do exercise it, are not subject to any exercise by other persons of
the kind of authority which they are exercising" ( 2 ).
E
F
G
The point to be kept in mind is that the amending body which
exercisres the const:ituent power of the legal sovereign, though limited
by virtue of the decision in Bharati's case, can express itseff only by
making laws.
The distinction between constitution law and ordinary law in a
rigid constitution like ours :is that the validity of the constitutional law
cannot be challenged whereas that of ordinary law can be challenged
on the touch-stone of constitution. But constitutional law is as much
law as ordinary law. A constitution cannot consist of a string of
isolated dooms. A judgment or sentence which is the result of the
exercise of judicial power or of despotic discretion is not a law as it
has not got the generality which is an essential characteristic of law. A
despotic decision without ascertaining the facts of a case and applying
the law to them, though dressed in the garb of law, is like a bill of
attainder. It is a legislative judgment.
According to Blackstone, a law and a particular command are distinguished in the following manner : a law obliges generally the members of a given community, or a law obliges generally persons of a
given class. A particular command obliges a single person or pcr-
H
(l) [1973J Supp. S.C.R. 1 at 794.
(2) see W.J. Rees : "The Theory of Sovereignty Re-stated" in Mi11d, Vol. !ix
(1950) quoted at p. 68 of 'In Defense of Sovereignty', ed. W.J. Stankie11icz.
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN
(Mathew, J.)
509
sons whom it determines individually. Most of the laws eslablished
by political superiors, are therefore general in a two-fold rnann~r : . as
enjoining or forbidding generally acts of kinds or sorts; and as bmdm~
the whole community, or, at least, whole classes of its members. He
then said (L) :
-"Therefore, a particular act of the legislature to confiscate the goods of Titus, or to attaint him of high treason,
does not enter into the idea of a municipal law : for the operation of this act fs spent upon Titus only and has no relation to the community in general : it is rather a sentence than
a law."
This passage was cited with approval by the Privy Council in Liyanage
v. The Queen(") to show that the end product of the exercise of judi~
cial power is a judgment or sentence and not a law.
i -
..
A
B
c
sJ.
St. Thomas Aquinas (after considering the views of Aristotle;
Augustine and the opinions of jurists in pandects) has saad that since
the end of law is common good the law should be framed not for pr~
vate benefit but for the common good of all dtizcns( 3 ).
Rousseau wrote( 4 ) :
D
"When I say that the object of laws is always general, I
mean that the law considers subjects collectively and actions
as abstract; never a man as an individual, nor an action as
particular. . . . neither is what the sovereign himself orders
about a particular object a law but a decree; not an act of
sovereignty, ':but of magistracy?'
-
E
Austin draws an explicit distinction between 'Jaws' and 'particular
commands'. Where a command, he says, obliges generally to acts
or forbearances of a class, a command is a law or rule. But where
it obliges to a specific act or forbearance, a command is occasional
or particular(5).
'
•
'
.
Kelsen, after noting the distinction made by Austin has observed :
"We c~n of course recognize a~ law only general norms.
But. there 1s no doubt that Jaw does not consisit of general
norms only. Law includes individual norms, i.e., norms
which determine the behaviour of one individual in one
non-recurrin~ situation and which therefore are valid only
for one particular case and may be obeyed or applied only
once."
F
G
According to him, such norms are valid law because they are parts
of the legal order as a whole in exactly the same sense as those
general norms on the basis of which they have been created. He
(J) see Blackstone: Commentaries, Vol. J, p. 44.
(2) [1967] 1 A.C. 259, at 291.
(3) see "The Treatise on Law", Gateway Edition (1970), P- 87.
(4) Contract Social, Bk. II, Chap. VT.
(5) see Austin's Jurisprudence, 2nd ed., Vol. I, p. l 8.
H
510
A
B
c
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 2 S.C.R.
said that particular norms are the decisions of courts as far as their
binding force is limited to the particular case at hand and that a
judge who orders a debtor A to return $ 1000 to his creditor B was
passing a law(I).
It may be noted that Kelscn made no distinction, between lawcreation and law-application. According to him, every act of applying the law involved the creation of norms. In his view, there was
no distinction between creation and application of law, a view I
find difficult to accept in the light of clear distinction made by the
decisions of this Court between legislative and judicial functions.
A statute is a general rule. A resolution by the legislature that
a town shall pay one hundred dollars to Timothy Coggan is not a
·
statute( 2 ).
The mere fact that an Act to indemnify A or an Act sanctioning
a pension to th~ speaker is passed by the House of Commons in
England should not lead us to conclude that it is law. "The English
Legislature was originally constituted, not for legislative, but for
financial purposes. Its primary function was, not to make laws, but
to grant supplies" (3).
'
•
~
'
D
E
J. C. Carter has said that statute books contain vast masses of
matter which, though in the form of laws, are. not laws in the proper sense, that these consist in the making of provisions for the
maintenance of public works of the State, for the building of asylums, hospitals, school buses, and a great variety of similar matters, and that this is but the record of actions of the State in relation to the buslness in which it is engaged. According to him, the
State is a great public corporation which conducts a vast mass of
business, and the written provisions for this, though in the form of
laws, are not essentially. different from the minutes of ordinary corporate bodies recording their actio!1s ( 4 ).
Walter Bagehot has said :
F
G
....
H
"An immense mass, indeed of the legislation is not, in the proper language of jurisprudence, legislation at all. A law is a generaa
command applicable to many cases. The 'speical acts' which crowd
the statute book and weary parliamentary committees are applicable
to one case only. They do not Jay down rules according to which
railways shall be made, but enact that such and such a railway shall
be made from this place to that place, and they have no bearing on
any other transaction". (6)
(1) Kelsen : General Theory of Law and State, (1961), p. 38.
(2) John Chipman Gray : Nature and Source of Law, p. 161.
(3) Courtenay Ilbert, Legislative Methods and Form~, (Oxford, 1901), p. 208 .
(4) "Law, Its Origin, Growth and Function" (New York and London, 1907),
p. 116.
(5) "The English Constitution" (1967), World's Classics Edition (Oxford,
1928), p. 119.
...
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN
(Mathew, I.)
511
"When the authors of books on jurisprudence write about' law,
when professional lawyers talk about law, the ~ind of . law ~~out
which they are mainly thinking is that whic~ 1s found 111 ~u~t1man's
Institutes, or in the Napoleonic Codes, or 111 the New. Civil Code
of the German Empire, that is to say, the li~gal ~·11les wh1c'.1 rel~te to
contracts a11cl torts, to property, to family re/atwns and mherztance,
A
or else to law of crimes as is to be found in a Penal Code"(1).
..
.o1
•
t
j
John Locke was of the view that 'legislative authority is to act
in a particular way .... (and) those who wield this authority should
make only general rules. They arc to govern by promulgated established laws not to be varied in particular cases' (2) .
Perhaps the most exhaustive treatment of the question of the
necessity for generality in law is to be found in "Jurisprudence, !>;1en
and Ideas of the Law" by Patterson. (sec Chapter V). Accordmg c
to him, the generality of a ·law depends upon its being applicable
to an indefinite number of human beings and that is the most significant aspect of law. He said that an ordinary judgment of a Court is
not law as a judgment applies only to a limited number of individuals,
the parties to the case. He disagreed with Dr. Kelsen's statement that
the judicial decision is an individual legal norm as the expression
'individual legal norm' is a self-contradiction.
D
To Friedmann, the most essential element in the concept of law
is a degree of generality :
"The first deBideratum of a system for subjecting human
conduct to the governance of rules is an obvious one : there
must be rules. This may be stated as a requirement of
generality. Here as in so many other fields, John Austin's
E
distinction was basically right, but too rigidly drawn."
Friedmann was of the view that a community which had no general
prescription at all, but only an infinite multitude of individual commands, would not be regarded as having a legal order. It would dissolve into millions of individual relationships(3).
For the purpose of this case I accept as correct the statement F
of Blackstone already quoted and approved by the Privy Council in
Liyanage v. The Queen (supra). I cannot regard the resolution of
an election dispute by the amending body as law : It is either' a
judicial sentence or a legislative judgment like a Bill of Attainder.
It is no doubt tm:: that the House of Commons in England used to
pass bills of attainder. But the practice has fallen into desuetude, since
the year 1696. A bill of attainder is a special act of the legislature, as
inflict capital punishments upon persom ·supposed to be guilty of high
offences, such as treason and felony, without any conviction in the
ordinary course of judicial proceedings. The legislature assumes judicial magistracy, pronouncing upon the guilt of the party without any
(1) see Courtenay Ilbert, Legislative Methods and Forms, (Oxford, 1901), p. 209.
(2) see the passage quoted at p. 129 of Hayek : Law, Legislation and Liberty.
(3) Friedmann : "Legal Theory" 5th ed., pp. I 5-16. See also : Lon L. Fuller :
"The Morality of Law'', pp. 46-49.
G
H
512
A
B
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 s.c.R.
of the common forms and guards of trial, and satisfying itself with
proofs,, when such proofs arc with.in its reach, whether they are conformable to the rules of evidence or not. In short, in all such cases,
the legislature exercises the highest power of sovereignty, and what may
be properly deemed an irresponsible despotic discretio_n, being governed solely by what it deems political necessity or expediency, and too
often under the influence of unreasonable fears, or unfounded
suspicions ( 1).
In U.S. v. Brown(") the Supreme Court of United States of America
stated that the main reason: why the power to pass bill of attainder was
taken away from the Congress was :
c
D
E
F
G
H
"Everyone must concede that a legislative body, from its
numbers and organisation, and from the very intimate dependence of its members upon the people, which renders them
liable to be peculiarly susceptible to popular clamour, is not
properly constituted to try with coolness caution, and impartiality a criminal charge, especially in those cases in which
the popular feeling is strongly excited-the very class of cases
most likely to be prosecuted by t11is mode" (H).
Much the same reason will apply to the resolution of an dcction dispute by an amending body as it consists. in all democratic countries,
of an assembly of persons like parliament.
Jn Liyanage v. The Queen (supra) the appellants had been charged with offences arising out of an abortiv·~ cou:J d'etat on January 27.
1962. The story of the coup d'etat was set out in a White Paper issued
by the Ceylon Government. On March 16, 1962 the Criminal Law
(Special Provisions) Act was passed and it was given retrospective
effect from January 1, 1962. The Act was limited in operation to
those who were accused of offences against the State in or about
January 27, 1962. The Act legalised the imprisonment of the appellants while they were awaiting trial, and modified a section of tllc
Penal Code so as to enact ex post facto a new offence to meet the
circumstances of the abortive coup. The Act empow-~red the Minister
of Justice to nominate the three judges to try the appellants without a
(!) see 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States
(Boston, 1833), s. 1338.
(2) 381 U.S. 437.
(3) see Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, pp. 536-537, 8th ed., (1927)**
**Macaulay's account of the attainder of Sir John Fenwick in 1696, the last in the
History of the House of Commons, is particularly vivid :
"Some hundreds of gentlemen, every one of whom had much more than half
made up his min I before the case was open, performed the office both of judge and
jury. They wer: not restrained, as a judge is restrained, by the sense of responsibility .... They were not selected, as a j\lry is selected, in a manner which enables
a culprit to exc.ude his personal and political enemies. The arbiters of the prisoner's fate came in and went out as they chose. They heard a fragment here and
there of what was said against him, and a fra·gment here and there of
what was said in his favour. During the progress of the bill they were
exposed to every species of influence. One member might be threatened by t!re
electors of his borough with the Joss of his seat. . . Tn the debates arts were practised and passions excited which are unknown to well constituted tribunals. but from
which no great popular assembly divided into parties ever was or ever will be free".
[fX MecaµJay, History of England, p. 207 (l 900)].
'
~
Si\IT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN
j
-,
4
•
...
)
"
" r
j
(
>
(Mathew, J.)
513
jw·y. The validity of the Act was challenged as well as the nomination
which had been made by the Minister of Justice of the three judges. The
Ceylon Supreme Court upheld the objection about the vires of some
of the provisions of the Act as well as the nomination of the judges
Subsequently, the Act was amended and the power of nmnination of the
judges was conferred on the Chief Justice. The appellants having been
convicted at the trial before a court of three judges nominated under
the amended Act,_ went up in appeal before the Judicial Committee.
It was contended that the Acts of 1962 offended against the Constitution in that they amounted to a direction to convict the appellants or to
a Jcgislativc plan to secure the conviction and severe punishment of the
appellants and thus constituted an unjustifiable assumption of judicial
power by the legislature, or an interference with judicial power which
was outside the legislature's competence .
Tlic Privy Council said in the course of their judgment that the pith
and substance of the Jaw enactments was a legislative plan ex post facto
to secure the conviction, that although legislation ad lwmi11e111 which
is directed to the course of particular proceedings may not always
amount to an interference with the functions of the judiciary, but in the
present case they had no doubt that there was such interference; that
it was not only the likely but the intended effect of the impugned enactments and that it was fatal to their validity. TlK~y further said that the
true nature and purpose of these enactments were revealed by their
conjoint impact on the specific proceedings in respect of which they
were designed, and they took their colour. in particular from the alterations they purported to make as to their ultimate objective--the punishment of those convicted-and that these alterations constituted a grave
and deliberate incursion into the judicial sphere and then, they quoted
with approval the observations of Blackstone already referred to(1).
These observations have gr·:::at relevance to the case in hand. True it
is that their Lordships did not decide the question whether by a constitutional ~mendment the result could have been achieved or not.
At th~ time when the Amendment was passed, the appeal filed by
the appellant and the cross appeal of the respondent were pending before the Supreme Court. Clause ( 4) was legislation ad homine111
directed against tk course of the hearin!! of the appeals on merits as
the appeal and the cross appeal were to be disposed of in accordance
with t11at clause and not by applying the law to the facts as ascertained
by the court. This was a direct inteiierencc with the decision of these
appeals by the Supreme Court on their merits by a legislative judgment.
If the amending body really exercised judicial power,, that power
was exercised in violation of the principles of natural justice of audi
alterdm partem. Even if a power is given to a body without spccifyi-ng:
that the rules of natural justice should be observed in exercising it, the
nature of the power would call for its observance.
The Solicitor General contended that the amending body, in declaring that the election was valid was exercising its constituent legislative
power; that legislative power does not adjudicate but only creates val!dity, even retrospectively, by enacting a Jaw with that effect; that valtdation is law-making; that it alters the legal position by making new law
(l) see Black stone : Commentaries, vol. 1, !'. 44.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
514
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 197 6] 2 S.C.R.
and that validation may take place before or after a judgment. He said
that by the repeal of the provisions of the Representation of the People
Act, 1951, the amending body had wiped out not only the election
petition but also the judgment of the High Court and has deprived the
respondent of the right to raise any dispute as regards the validity of
the election of the appellant and, therefore, there was no dispute to be
adiudicated upon by the amending body. He also said-I think,, in th::
alternative-that although the Jaw relating to election petitions and
other matters connected therewith was dispensed with in respect of the
appellant, the amending body had the ideal norms of fair and free elcc"·
tion in its view for adjudging the validity of the election. He submitted that it was open to the amending body to, gather facts from any
source and as the facts collected qy the High Court were there factually,
the amending body looked into them and applied the ideal norms of
election for adjudging its validity.
It is difficult to understand, when the amending body expressly
excluded the operation of all laws relating to electi.on petition and
matt·~rs connected th~rewith by the first part of clause ( 4), what ideal
norms of free and fair election it had in view in adjudging the validity
of the election of the appellant. I cannot conceive of any pre-existing
ideal norms of election apart from the Jaw enacted by the appropriate
legislatures. If the amending body evolved new norms for adjudging
the validity of the particular election, it was the exercise of a d.~spotic
power and that would damage the democratic structure of the Constitution.
Quite apart from it, ther~ is n:Othjng on the face of the amendment
to show that the. amending body ascertained the facts of the case or
applied any norms for determining the validity of the election. I do
not think that under Article 368 the amending body was competent
to pass an ordinary law with retrospective effect to validate the election.
It can only amend the Constitution by passing a law of the rank of
which the Constitution is made of.
There is also nothing to show that the amending body validated •
the election with reference to any change of the law which formed the
foundation of the judgment. The cases cited by the Solicitor General
to show that a competent legislature has power to validate an invalid
election do not indicate that there can be a validation without changing
the Jaw which i.nvalidated the election. Nor do I think that a contested
election can be validated without an authority applying the new law
to the facts as ascertained by judicial process. If the court which
ascertained the facts and applied the law was rendered coram non
judice, the facts ascertained by it have ceased to be facts. There are
no absolute or immediately evident facts. Only by being first ascertained through legal procedure are facts brought into the sphere of law er,
we may say, though it may sound paradoxical, that the competent
C1rgan legally creates facts.. 'fhe courts perform a constitutive function
in ascertaining facts. There is no fact 'in itself' that A has killed B.
There is only somebody's belief or knowledge, They are all private
opinfons without relevance. Only establishment by a competent
I
'
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN
(Mathew, J.)
515
organ has legal relevance('). And, when that. organ was rendered A
coram non judice, and its judgment declared V?Id,_ th~ facts created
by it perished. They ceased to be facts. ~dJu~catrve fact~ of _an
election dispute cannot be gathered by legislative process behmd
the back of the parties; they can be gathered only by judicial process.
The amending body did not ascertain the facts by resorting to judicial
process.
B
If clause ( 4) was an exercise in legislative validation without
changing the law which made the election invalid, when there ought
to have been an exercise of judicial power of ascertaining the adjudicative facts and applying the law, the clause would damage the democratic structure of the Constitution, as the Constitution visualizes the
resolution of an election dispute by a petition presented to an authority
exercising judicial power. The contention that there was no election c
dispute as clause ( 4) by repealing the law relating to election petition
had rendered the petition filed by the respondent non-est, if allowed,
will toll the death knell of the democratic structure of the Constitution.
If Article 329 (b) envisages the resolution of an election dispute by
judicial process by a petition presented to an authority as the appropriate legislature may by law provide, a constitutional amendment
cannot dispense with that requirement without damaging an essential D
feature of democracy, viz., the mechanism for determining the real
representative of the people in an election as contemplated by the
Constitutio.n.
•
All the cases cited by the Solicitor General pertain either to legislative validation of a void election by applying a new law to undisputed facts or to the removal of an admitted disqualification by a law
with retrospective effect.
>
•
E
In Abeyesekera v. Jayatilake(2), the facts were : All order in
council of 1923 made provision as to the Legislative Council in Ceylon,
but reserved to His Majesty power to revoke, alter or amend the order.
The appellant, as common informer, brought an action to recover
penalties under the Order from the respondent, who he alleged had sat F
and voted after his seat had become vacant under its provisions by
reason of his having a pecuniary interest in a contract with the Govemment. In 1928, after the action had been brought but before its trial,
an amending Order in Council was made which provided: "if any
such action or legal proceeding has been or shall be instituted, it shall
be dismissed and made void, subject to such order as to costs as the
Court may think fit to make". It also amended the Order of 1923 so G
as to except the office held by the respondent from its operation. The
Privy Council held that. the Order of 1928 was valid, having regard
to the power reserved by the Order of 1923, and was an effective
defence t-0 the action, although it was retrospective in its operation and
that this was no exercise of judicial power. The direction to dismiss
must be understood in the light of an earlier provision in the same
Order in Council which amended the law on which the proceedin~ H
(1) see Kelson : General Theory of Law and State, p. 136.
(2) [!932] A.c. 260.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
516
A.
(1976] 2 S.C.R.
was founded; the dismissal was thus the result of the change in the
law and all that the later clause showed was that the change was to
have retrospective effect and govern the rights of parties even in pending proceedings. The decision would be helpful here only if and in so
far as the provision in clause ( 4) had followed from a change in any
rule of law.
ll
c
D
E
F
G
H
The decision in Piare Dusadh and Others v. King Emperor( 1)
concerned the validation of a sentence imposed by a special criminal
court which was held. to have no jurisdiction to try the case by an
order of a court. By a validation Act, the jurisdiction was conferred
with retrospective effect on the special criminal court and the sentence
imposed by it Vias made lawful. It was held that there was no exercise of any judicial power by the legislating authority,
-
Ini Kanta Kathuria v. Manak Chand Surana( 2 ), the appellant, a
government advocate stood for election to the State Legislative Assembly
of Rajasthan and was declared elected. The election was challenged
and the ground of challenge was that the appellant held an office of
profit within the meaning of Article 191 of the Constitution. The High
Court set aside the election for that reason. While the appeal was
pending in this Court, Rajasthan Act 5 of 1969 was passed declaring
among others that the holder of the office of a Special Government
Pleader was not disqualified from being chosen or for being a member
of the State Legislative Assembly; and, by s. 2(2), the Act was made
retrospectively removing the appellant's disqualification retrospectively.
It was held that Act 5 of 1969 had removed the disqualification retrospectively, that Parliament and the State legislatures can legislate retrospectively subject to the provisions of the Constitution, that no limitatiolli on the powers of the legislature to make a declaration validating
an election could be put, and that, by enacting the impugned Act, the,
disqualification if any which existed in the 1951 Act had been removed.
In State of Orissa v. Bhupendra Kumar Bose(8), the facts were as
follows : Elections were held for the Cuttack municipality and 27
persons were declared elected as councillors. One B, who was defeated
at the elections, filed a writ petition before the High Court challenging
the elections. The High Court held that the electoral rolls had not
been prepared in accordance with the provisions of the Orissa Municipalities Act, 1950, as the age qualification had been published too
late thereby curtailing the period of claims and objections to the preliminary roll to 2 days from 21 days as prescribed; consequently, the
High Court set aside the elections. The State took the view that the
Judgment affected not merely the Cuttack municipality but other municipalities also. Accordingly, the Governor promulgated an Ordinance
validating the elections to the Cuttack municipality and validating the
electoral rolls prepared in respect of other municipalities. Thereupon.
B filed a writ petition before the High Court contending that the Ordinance was unconstitutional. The High Court found that the Ordinance
contravened Article 14 of the Constitution, that it did not suceessfu11y
(1) [19+4] F.C.R. 61.
(2) (1970] 2 S.C.R. 835.
(3) [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 380.
•
.'
"!
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN
(Mathew, J.)
517
cure the invalidity and that it offended Art. 254\ 1) o~ the Constitution
as it was inconsistent with many Central Acts fa1hng m the concurrent
list and was unconstitutional. The State and the Councillors appealed
anid challenged the findings of the High Court.
This Court held that s. 3(1) of the Ordinance effectively removed
the defects ~n the electoral rolls found by the High Court by its judgment and that it successfully cured the invalidity of the electoral roll
and of the elections to the Cuttack Municipality.
i
~
~
The Solicitor General also cited other decisions to show that a
legislature can validate proceedings rendered invalid by judgment of
court. As I said, they all involved substitution of new law with retrospective effect for the old one a,nd the basic facts were all taken to
· have been admitted or not controverted. If the facts are not admitted,
the legislature cannot determine them except by employing judicial
process. Besides, those cases being cases of legislative validation, need
not pass the test of the theory of basic structure which, I think, will
apply only to constitutional ame~dment.
A
B
c
Counsel for the appellant also brought to the notice of the court
certain election validation Acts passed by the House of Commons in I>
England. These Acts removed with retrospective effect disqualilica- ·
tions of members of parliament. In none of these cases was an election which was being contested validated by parliament. Nor can
these instances of legislative removal of disqualification furnish any
assistance to this Court for the reason that in England there is no .
theory of basic structure operating as a fetter on the power of parlia- /
ment.
E
It was argued for the respondent that if the amending body exercised judicial power and held the election of the appellant valid, its
act was unconstitutional also qn the ground it damaged another basic
structure of the Constitution, namely, the doctrine of separation of
powers.
..
":_
•
The major problem of human society is to combine that degree of
liberty without which law is tyranny with that degree of law without
which liberty becomes licence; and, the difficulty has been to discover
the practical means of achieving this grand objective and to find the
OJ'portunity for applying _these means in the ever-shifting tangle of
·human affairs. A large part of the effort of man over' centuries ha~
been expended in seeking a solution of this great problem. A reign
pf law, in contrast to the tyranny of power can be achieved only through
separating appropriately the several powers of government. If the lawmakers should also be the constant administrators and dispensers of
law and justice, then, the people would be left without a remedy in
case of injustice since no appeal can lie under the fiat against such a
supremacy. And, in this age-old search of political philosophers for
the secret of ~ound government, combined with individual liberty, it
wa~ :t"fontes9meu who first saw the light. He was the first amonir the
pobtic:al ph1losophers who saw the necessity of separating judicial
power from the executive and legislative branches of ~,uvernment.
12-L126SCI/76
F
Q
H
518
A
. B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 S.C.R.
Montcsqu ieu was the first to conceive of the thr<:e functions of government as exercised by three organs, each juxtaposed against others.
He realised that the efficient operation of government involved a certain degree of overlapping and that the theory of checks and balances
required each organ to impede too great an aggrandizement of authority
by the other two powers. As Holdsworth says, Montesquieu convinced the world that he had discovered a new constitutional principle
which was universally valid. The doctr~ne of separation of governmental powers is not a mere theoretical, philosophical concept. It is
a practical, work-a-day principle. The division of government into
three branches does not imply, as its critices would have us think, three
water-tight compartments. Thus, legislative impeachment of executive
officers or judges, executive veto over legislation, judicial review of
administrative or legislative actio.ns are treated as partial exceptions
which need explanation(l).
There can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers
are united in the same person or body of magistrates, or, if the power
of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.
Jefferson said : All powers of government-legislative, executive and
judicial-result in the legislative body. The concentration of these
powers in the same hands is precisely the definition of despotic government. It will be no alleviation that these powers will be exercised by
a plurality @f hands and not by a single person. One hundred and
seventy three despots would surely be as oppressive as onee). And,
Montesquieu's own words would show that where the whole power
of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the
whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a
free constitution are subverted. In Federalist No. 47, James Madison
suggests that Montesquieu's doctrine did not mean that separate
departments might have "no partial agency in or no control over the
acts of each other". His meaning was, according to Madison, no more
than that one department should not possess the whole power of
another.
·
The Judiciary said the Federalist, is beyond comparison the weakest
of the three departments of power. It has no influence over either
the sword or the purse; no directio).l either of the strength or of the
wealth of the society and can take no active resolution whatever. It
may truly be said to have neither force nor will, but merely judgment.
Of the three powers Montesquieu said, the judiciary is in some measure next to nothing. If he realised the relative weakness of the
(1) see generally : "The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and its present-day
significance" by T. Vanderbilt.
(2) see Jefferson : Works : 3 : 223.
'
-
"
J.
,.
)
--
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN
..
-
.
/(
(Mathew, J.)
519
A
judiciary at the time he wrote, it is evidence of his vision that he
appreciated the supreme importa.nce of its independence. There is no
liberty, he said, if th~ judicial power be not separated from the legisla·tive and executive.
But this doctrine which is directed against the concentration of these
,po~ers in the same hand has no application as such when the question B
rl.s .whether an amending body ca,n exercise judicial power. In other
words, the doctrine is directed against the concentration of these sovereign powers in one or other organ of government. It was not designed
to limit the power of a co.nstituent body.
Whereas in the United States of America and in Australia, the
judicial power is vested exclusively in courts, there is no such exclusive c
vesting of judicial power in the Supreme Court of India and the courts
-subordinate to it. And if the amending body exercised judicial power
in adjudging the validity of the election, it cannot be said that by that
act, it has damaged a basic structure of the Constitution embodied in
the doctrine of separation of powers. Even: so, the question will remain
whether it could exercise judicial power without passing a law enabling D
it to do so. As I said, the exercise of iudicial power can result only
in a judgment or sentence. The constituent power, no doubt, is all
embracing, comprising within its ambit the judicial, executive and legislative powers. But if the constituent power is a power to irame or
.amend a constitution, it can be exercised only by making laws of a
E
particular kind.
The possession of pO\ver is distinct from its exercise(1). The
pos5ession of legislative power by the amending body would not entitle
it to pass an ordinary law, unless the Constitution is first amended by
passing a constitutional law authorizing it to do so. In the same
way, the possession of judicial power by the amending body would F
not warrant the exercise of .the power, unless a constitutional law
is passed by the amending body enabling it to do so. Until that is
done, its potential judicial power would not become actual. Nobody
can deny that by passing a law within its competence, pariiament can
vest judicial power in any authority for deciding a dispute or vest a
,part of that power in itself for resolving a controversy, as there is no G
.exclusive vesting of judicial power in courts by the Constitution. The
doctrine of separation of powers which is directed against the concentration of the whole or substantial part of the judicial power in the
fogislature or the executive would rtot be a bar to the vesting of such
:a power in itself. But, until a law is passed enabling it to do so, its
H
potential judicial power would not become actual.
(1) see Jacques Maritain : "Man and State", pp. 101·102; also the judgment
.of Hidayatullah J. in Golaknath v. Punjab, [19671 2 S-C.R. 762.
520
A
B
c
D
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 S.C.R.
Lord Coke objected to the exercise of judicial power by Jamcs I
for pragmatic reasons. Much of what Lord Coke said(!) can be
applied to parliament when it seeks to exercise that power in its constituent capacity.
A sovereign in any system of civilized jurisprudence is not like
an oriental despot who oan do anything he likes, in any manner he
likes and at any time he likes. That the Nizam of Hyderabad had
legislative, judicial and executive powers ai1d could exercise any one
of them by a firman has no relevance when we are considering how
a pro-sovereign-the holder of the amending power-in a country
governed by a constitution should function. Such a sovereign can
express 'himself' only by passing a particular kind of law; and not
through sporadic acts. 'He' cannot pick and choose cases according
to his whim and dispose them of by ad_ministering 'cadi-justice'; nor
can the amending body, as already noticed, pass an ordinary law,
as Article 368 speaks of the constituent power of amending by way
of addition, variation or repeal, any provision of the Constitution in
accordance with the procedure laid down in that Article. An ordinary law can be passed by it only after amending the provisions of
the Constitution authorizing it to do so.
1
-
If the basic postulate that a sovereign can act only by enacting
laws is correct, theln that is limitation upon his power to do anything he likes. If I may re-phrase the classical statement of Sir Owen
Dixon : the law that a sovereign can act only by law is supreme but
as to what may be done by a; law so made, the sovereign is supreme
over that law( 2 ). Of course, this is subject to the theory of basic
structure. In other words, even though a sovereign can act only by
making law, the law he so makes may vest the authority to exercise
judicial power in himself; without such law he cannot exercise judicial
power.
a
E
F
G
H
(1) On Sunday morning, November 10, 1607, there was a remarkable interview
in Whitehall between Sir Edward Coke, Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, and
James I. We have only Coke's account of the interview and not the King·s. but
there is no reason lei doubt its essential authenticity. The q_uestion between them
was whether the King, in his own person might take what causes he pleased from
the determination of the judges and determine them himself. This is what Coke
says happened: "Then the King said that he thought the law was founded upon
reason and that he and others had reason as well as the Judges; to which it was
answered by me, that true it was that God had endowed His Majesty with excellent
science and great endowments of nature, but His Majesty was not learned in the
Jaws of his realm of England, and causes which concern the life, or inheritance,
or goods, or fortunes of his subjects, are not to be decided by natural reason but
by the artificial reason and judgment of law, which law is an act which requires
Jong study and experience before that a man can attain to the cognisance of it;
and that the law was the golden metwand and measure to try the causes of the subjects· and which protected His Majesty in safety and peace : with which the King
was 'greatly offended, and said, that then he should be under the Jaw, which was
treason to affirm, as he said : to which I said that Bracton saith, quad Rex non debet
esse sub-homine sed sub Deo et lege." It would be hard to find a single paragraph
in which more of the essence of English constitutional law and history could be found.
The King ought not to be under a man, non debet esse sub homi,1e, but under
God and the !aw, sed sub Deo et lege.
(see R.F.V. Heuston : Essays in Constitutional Law, second edition, pp, 32-33).
(2). see "Law and the Ccnstituticn", 50 I.aw Quarterly Rev., 590, 604.
>.
-<'.ii.
1
t
..I
•
'SMT. INDIRA GANDHI
,•
'
~·
-
~
)
~
v. RAJ NARAIN (Mathew, J.)
521
The :result of the discussion ca111 be summed up as follows : Our
Constitution, by Article 329 (b) visualizes the resolution of a~ elec,tion dispute on the basis of a petition presented to such authority ~nd
in such manner as the appropriate legislature may, by law, provide.
The nature of the dispute raised in an election petition is such that
it canllot be resolved except by judicial process, namely, by ascertaining the facts relating to the election and ·applying the pre-existing law;
when the amending body held that the election of the appellant was
"Valid, it could not have done so except by ascertaining the facts by
judicial process and by applying the law. The result of this process
would not be the enactment /of constitutional law but the
passing of .a judgment or se'11tence. The amending body though
;possessed of judicial power had no competence to exercise it, unless
it passed a constitutional law enabling it to do so. If, however, the
decision of the amending body to hold the election of the appellant
valid w.as the result of the exercise of an 'irresponsible despotic discretion' governed solely by what it deemed political necessity or expediency, the~1, like a bill of attainder, it was a legislative judgment
disposing_ o'f a particular election dispute and not the enactment of
a law resulting in an amendment of the Constitution. And, even if
the latter process· (the exercise of despotic discretion) could be regarded as an amendme'at of the Constitution, the amendment would
damage or destroy an essential feature of democracy as established
by the Constitution, namely, the resolution of election dis·pute by an authority by the exercise of judicial power by
ascertaining the •adjudicative facts and applying the relevant law for
determining the real represe>11tative of the people. The decision of
the amending body cannot be regarded as an exercise in constituent
1egislative validation of an election for these reasons : firstly, there
· can be no legislative validation of an electid11 when there 'is dispute
between the parties as regards the adjudicative facts; the amendin~
body cannot gather these facts by employing le.gislative process; they
can be gathered only by judicial process. Secondly, the amending
body must change the law retrospectively so as to make the election
valid, if the election was re111dered invalid by virtue of any provision
of the law actually existing at the time of election; Article 368 does
not confer on the amending body the competence to pass any ordinary law whether with or without retrospective effect. Clause ( 4)
expressly excluded the operation of all laws relating to election pe1i·tion to the election in question. Therefore, the election was held to be
valid not by changing the law which rendered it invalid. Thirdly, the
·cases cited for the appellant are cases relating to legislative validation
of _invalid elections or removal of disqualification with retrospective
effect Being cases of legislative validatio\1, or removal of disqualifications by legislature, they are 1,1ot liable to be tested on the basis of
the theory of basic structure, which, I think, is applicable only to
constitutional amendments. Fourthly, there was no controversy iri
·those cases with regard to adjudicative facts : if there was controversy
with regard to these facts, it is very doubtful whether there could be
legislative validation of an election by changing the law alone without
ascertaining the adjudicative facts by judicial process.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
522
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 S.C.R.
The•n ·I come to the argument of counsel that equality is a basicstructure of the Constitution and that that has been damaged or des·
troyed by clause ( 4) .
The Solicitor General submitted that the majority in Bharati's
case (supra) did not hold that Article 14 pertains to the basic structure, that apart from Article 14, there is no principle of equality
which is a basic structure of the Constitution and that it is not a
chameleon-like concept which cha1ages its colour with the nature of
the subject matter to which it is applied.
f
-
The majority in Bharati's case did not hold that Article 14 pertains to the basic structure of the Constitution. The majority upheld
the validity of the first part of Article 31 C; this would show that a
constitutional amendment which takes away or abridges the right to
challenge the validity of an ordinary law for violating the fundamental
right under that Article would. not destroy or damage the basic structure. The o'11ly logical basis for supporting the validity of Article
31A, 31B and the first part of 31C is that Article 14 is not a basic
structure.
Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that even. if Article 14 does not_pertain to basic structure, equality is an essential feature of democracy and rule of law and that clause ( 4), by dispensing
with the application of the law relating to election petition and matters
connected therewith to the appellant and another has made an unreasonable distinction between persons similarly situated and has thereby
damaged or destroyed that essential feature, and therefore, the clause
is bad. He said that in so far as laws are general instructions to act
or refrain from acting in certain ways in specified circumstances en·
joi"1ed upon persons of a specified kind, they enjoin uniform behaviour
in identical cases; that to fall under a law is pro-tanto to be assimilated to a single pattern; and that a plea for rule of law in this sense
is, in essence, a plea for life in accordance with laws as opposed to
other standards, namely, the ad hoc dispensation from its operation.
He argued that if some persons, for ino stated reason, and in accor'
dance with no rule, obtain exemption from the operation of law, while
persons who are sufficiently similar in relevant characteristics are
governed by it, that is manifestly unfair, for, to allow some persons to
do that which is forbidden to all others is irrational.
Democracy proceeds on two basic assuU?-ptions : ( 1) popular
sovereignty Fn the sense that the country should be governed by the
representatives of the people; that all power came from them; at their
pleasure and under their watchful supervision it must be held; and
(2) that there should be equality among the citizens in arrivi'ng at the
decisions affecting them(i1).
Today, it is impossible to conceive of a democratic republican
form of government without equality of citizens. It is true that in
(l) see Robert ·A. Dahl: "A Preface to Democratic Theory'', pp. 4-33; and
Bryce: Modern Democracies, Vol. II, p. 9.
•
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN
(Mathew, J.)
. 523
the republics of Athens a>,1d Rome there were slaves who were regarded as chattels. And. even in the United States of America, there was
a republic even before the Negroes were enfranchised. Our Constitution envisages the establishment of a democractic republican form of
government based on adult suffrage.
•
Equality is a multi-coloured concept incapable of a single defi'nition. It is a notion of many shades and connotations. The preamble of the Constitution guarantees . equality of status and of
opportunity. They are nebulous concepts. And I am ~1ot sure whether they can provide a solid foundation to rear a basic structure. I
think the types of equality which our democratic republic guarantees
are all subsumed under specific articles of the Constitution like Articles 14, 15, 16, 17, 25, etc., and there is no other principle of equality
which is an essential feature of our democratic policy.
A.
B
c
In the opinio•a of some of the judges constituting the majority in
Bharati's case (supra). Rule of Law is a basic structure of the
Constitution apart from democracy.
'
-
The rule of law postulates the pervasiveness of the spirit of
law throughout the whole range of government in the sense of excludD
ing arbitrary official action in a'.1y sphere. 'Rule of law' is an expression to give reality to something which is not readiiy t:xpressible.
That is why Sir Ivor Jennings S'aid that it is an unruly horse. Rule
of law is based upon the liberty of the individual and has as its object,
the harmonizing of the opposing notions o.f i11dividual liberty and
public order. The notion of justice maintains the balance between
the two; and justice has a variable content. Dicey's formu1'ation of
E
the rule of law, namely, "the absolute supremacy or predominance of
1
regular law, as opposed to the influe11ce of arbitrary power, excluding
the existence of arbitrariness, of prerogative, even of wide discretionary
authority on the part of the government" has been discarded in the later
editions of his book. That is because it was realized that it is not
necessary that where law ends, tyranny should begin. A.s Culp Davis
said, where the law ends, discretion begins and. the exercise of discre- .
tion may mean either beneficence or tyran'11y, either justice or injustice, F
either reasonableness or arbitrariness. There has b~e~ no government
or legal system in world history which did not involve both rules and
discretion. It is impossible to find a government of laws alone and
not of men in the sense of eliminating all discretionary powers. All
governments are governments of laws and of men. Jerome Frank
has soaid :
G
"This much we qn surely say : For Aristotle, from
whom Harrington derived the notion of a government of
laws and not of men, that notion was not expressive of
hostility to what today we call administrative discretion. Nor
did it have such a meaning for Harrington."(')
Another definition of rule of law has been given by Friedrich A.
Hayek in his books : "Road to Serfdom" and "Constitution of
{1) see "If Men were Angels" (1942), p. 203.
H
524
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 2 S.C.R.
Liberty". It is much the same as that propounded by the
Committee in England('') :
·
Franks
'The rule of law stands for the view that decisions
should be made by the application of !mown principles or
laws. In general such decisions will be predictable, and the
citizen will know where he is. On the other hand there is
what is arbitrary. A decision may be made without principle, without any rules. It is therefore unpredictable, the antithesis of a decision taken in accordance with the rule of
law."
This Court said in Jaisinghani v. Union of lndia( 2 ) that the rule
of law from one point of view means that decisions should .be made
by the application of known principles and rules, and in general, such
decisions should be predictable and the citizen should know where
he is.
This exposition of the rule of law is a,lly the aspiration for an
idE"al and it is not based on any down-to-earth analysis of practical
problems with which a modern government is confronted. In the
world of action, this ideal cannot be worked out and that is the reason why this exposition has been rejected by all practical men.
If it is cO'atrary to the rule of law that discretionary authority
should be given to government departments or public offkcrs, then
there is no rule. of law in any modern state. A judge who passes a
sentence has no other guid•ance except a statute which says that the
person may be sentenced - to imprisonment for a term which may
extend to, say, a period of te'a years. He must exercise considerable
discretion. The High Courts and the Supreme Court overrule their
precedents. What previously announced rules guide them in laying
down the new precedents ? A court of law decides a case of first impression; no statute governs, no precedent is applicable. It is precisely because a judge cannot find a previously announced rule that
he becomes a legislator to a limited extent. All these would show
that it is impossible to enunciate the rule of law which has at its
basis that no decision can be made unless there is a certain rule to
govern the decision ( 3 ).
Leaving aside these extravagant versions of rule of law, there is a
genuine concept of rule of law and that concept implies equality before the law or equal subjection of all dasses to the ordinary law.
But, if rule of law is to be a basic structure of the_ Constitution, one
must find specific provis,ions in the Constitution embodyrng the coasti-_
tuent elements of the concept. I cannot conceive of rule of law as
a twinkling star up above the Constitution. To be a basic structure,
it must be a terrestrial CO'acept having its habitate within the four
corners of the Constitution. The provisions of the Constitution were
enacted with a view to ensure the rule of law. Even if I assume that
(I) Report
(1957) p. 6.
(2) [1967] 2 S.C.R. 703, at 718.
(3) see "Discretionary Justice" by K.C. Davis.
,. ~
•
'
>
" ....
fl
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN
525
.rule of law is a basic structure, it sems to me that the meaning and
the constitue'11t elements of the concept must be gathered from
the enacting provisions of the Constitution. The equality aspect of
the rule of 1'aw and of democratic republicanism is provided in Article
14. May be, the other articles referred to do the same duty.
·"
A
'I
~·
'
•
~
.....
.
,
(Mathew, J.)
.
I
~:
'
Das, C.J. said that Article 14 combines the English doctrine of
the rule of law and the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment to the American Federal Constitution('). In State of Bengal
v. Anwar Ali Sarkar( 2 ), Patanj•ali Sastri, C.J. observed that the first
:Part of the Article which has been adopted from the Irish Constitution, is a declaratio11 of equality of the civil rights of all persons within
the territories of India and thus enshrines what American judges
regard as the "basic principle of republicanism" ( 3 ) and that the second
part which is a corollary of the first is based on the last clause of the
:first section of the Fourteenth Amendment of the_ American Constitution. So, the concept of equality which is basic to rule of law a>nd
that which is regarded as the most fundamental postulate of repub-1icanism are both embodied in -Article 14. If, according to the
)najority in Bharati's case (supra), Article 14 does not pertain to
basic structure of the Constitution, which is th_e other principle of
equality incorporated in the Constituti<)l,1 which can be a basic structure of the Constitution or an essential feature of democracy or rule
of law ? However, it is unnecessary to pursue this aspect of the question as I have already given reasons to show clause { 4) to be bad.
I think clause ( 4) is bad for the reasons which I have already
summarised. Clauses (1) to (3) of Article 329-A are severable but
I expres_s no opinion on their validity as it is not necessary for deciding
this case.
Then the question is, whether the Representation of the People
'(Amendment) Act, 1974, and the Election Laws (Amendment) Act,
1975, are liable to be challenged for the reason tlrat they damage or
destroy a basic structure of the Constitution. Cou1,1sel for the respondent submitted that, if, by a constitutional amendment, the basic structure of the Constitution cannot be destroyed or_ damaged, it would
be illogical to assume that an ordinary law passed under a power
conferred by that instrument can do so and si1,1ce these Acts damage
the concept of free and fair election, the Acts were bad.
I think the inhibition to destroy or damage the basic structure by
an amendment of the Constitution flows from the 'limitation on the
power of amendment under Article 368 read into it by the majority
in Bharati's case because of their assumption that there are certain
fundamental features in the Constitution which its makers intended to
remain there in perpetuity. But I do not find any such inhibition
so far as the power of parliament or state legislatrues to pass laws is
concerned. Articles 245 and 246 give the power and also provide
(I) Basheshar Nath v. The Commissioner of lwome Ta<, [l959] I S.CR. 528,
at 550-551.
(2) [1952] S.CR. 284 at 293.
(3) cf. Ward v, Flood, 17 Am. Rep. 405.
B
c
D
E
F
G
a
526
A
B
c
D
£
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 S.C.R.
the limitation upon the power of these organs to pass laws. It is only
the specific provisions enacted in the Constitution which could operate
as limitation upon that power. The preamble, thougll a poart of the
Constitution, is neither a source of p_ower nor a limitation upon that
power. The preamble sets out the ideological aspirations of the people. The essential features of the gre"!t co~1cepts set out in the preamble are delineated in the various provisions of the Constitution.
It is these specific provisions in the body· of the C_onstitution which
determine the type of democracy which the founders of that instrument established; the quality and nature of justice, political, social
and economic which was their desideratum, the content of liberty·
·of thought and expre$sion which they entrenched in that
document, the scope-of equality of status and of opportunity which
they enshrined in it. These specific provisions en'~cted in the Constitution alone can determine the basic structure of the Constitution as
est'ablished. These specific provisions, either separately or in combination determi1ae the content of the great concepts set out in the preamble. It is impossible to spin out any concrete concept of basic.
structure out of the gos~mer concepts set out in the preamble. The
specific provisions of the Constitution are the stu©' from which the
basic structure has to be woven. The argument of counsel for the
respondent proceeded on the assumption that there are certain ·norms
for free and fair election in an ideal democracy and the law laid down
by parliamen.t or state legislatures must be tested on those norms and,
if found wanting, must be struck down. The »1orms of election set
out by parliament or state legislatures tested in the light of the provisions of the Constitution or necessary implications therefrom constitute the law of the land. That l'aw cannot be subject to any other
test, like the test of free and fair elecion in a'11 ideal cjemocracy.
....
•
...
I do not think that an ordinary law can be declared invalid for the
reason that it goes against the vague concepts of democracy; justice
political, economic and social; liberty of thought, belief and expression; or equality of status and opportunity, or some invisible radiatidit
from them.
". __ (No) political terms have been so subjected to contradictory definitions as 'democracy' and 'democratic' since
it has become fashionable and profitable for every and any
state to style itself in this way. The Soviet Union and communist states of Eastern Europe, -the Chinese Peoplo's
Republic, North Korea and North Vietnam all call them·
selves democracies. So does Nasser's Egypt; so does Gene.
ral Stoessner's Paraguay; so did Sukarno's Indonesia. Yet,
if anything is clear, it is that these states do not all meet
the same definition of democracy" (11) •
"
•
- i1•
'T
~:
_1:
Definitions are important, for _ they are responsible in ~he
last analysis
for our
image of democracy. The quest10n
is not only what does the word 'democracy' mean but also what is
the thi11g. And, when we try to answer this latter query, we discover
(1) See Finer : Compartive Government (1970) PP 62--63,
-
,,
-
•
,
•
.J
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI
v. RAJ NARAIN (Mathew, J.)
527
that the thing does not correspond to the word. Sci, although 'democracy' has a precise literal meaning, that does not really help us to
understand what •an: actual democracy is. In the real world, R. A.
Dahl bas pointed out that, democracies are 'polyarchies'. The term
_}> . democracy has Iiot only a descriptive or denotative function but also
'°' a normative and persuasive functio•,1. Therefore, the problem of
definin<> democracy is two-fold, requiring both a descriptive •and pres• criptiv; function. To avoid pitfalls, it is necessary to keep in mind
• two things-first, that a firm distinction should be made between the
is and the ought of democracy, and second, that the prescriptive and the
~descriptive definitions of democracy must not be confused, because the
"democratic ideal does not define the democratic reality •and vice versa;
the real democracy is not and cannot be the same as the ideal one (1·) .
.,.., One cannot test the validity of an ordi1aary law with reference to the
essential elements of an ideal democmcy. It can be tested only with
reference to the principles of democracy actually incorporated in the
Constitution.
-
-
Nor can it be tested on the touchstone of justice. The modern
pilate asks : What is justice? aad stays not for an . answer. To
Hans Kelsen, justice is an irrational ideal, and regarded from the
point of rational cognition, he thinks there are only interests and hence
conflict of interest. Their solution, according to him, can be brought
, about by aa Order that satisfies one interest at the expense of the
other or seeks to achieve a compromise betwen opposing interests ( 2 ).
Mr. Allen has said that the concept of social justice is vague and in"
definite ( 3 ). Liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship
are not absolute concepts. They are emotive words. They mean
different things to different people. Equality of status and of opportunity are concepts laden with emotional overtones. In their absoluteness they are incapable of actu•al realisation. The enacting provisions in the body of the Constitution alone give concrete shape to
these ideas and it is on the nasis of these provisions that the validity
of ordinary law should be tested.
,._
The democracy which our Constitution-makers established is based
o'a the representation of the people in the law-making organs. The
method by which this 'representation has to be effectuated has been
provided in the Constitution. Part XV of the Constitution deals with
t the topic of elections.
Article 326 provides that elections to the
House of the people and to the legislative assemblies of States should
be on the basis of adult suffrage. Articles 327 and 328 provide for
~i making of laws with respect to all matters relating to, or in connection
with, elections to either House of Parliament or to the House or either
·-. House of the Legislature of a State including the preparation of elec'oral rolls, the dclimiration of constituencies and all other matters
constitution of such House or
necessary for securing the due
~ouse~. The validity of any law rel(!ting to the delimitation of constttuenc1es or the allotment of seats to the constituencies, made or
(1) see "Democratic Theory" by Giovanni Sartori, Chapter J.
~
(2) "General Theory of Law and State" (1946) p. 13.
(3) "Aspects of Justice'', p. 31.
G
H
528
A
B
·C
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 s.c.R.
purporting to be made under Article 327 or Article 328
not be called in question in any court [see Article 329(a)].
shall
•
This would indicate that the Constitution has entrusted the task
of framing the law relating to election to parliament, and; subject to
the law made by parliament, to the state legislatures. An important ,.
branch of the law which sounds in the area of free and fair election, "'
namely, delimitation of constituencies and allotment of seats to such
constituencies is put beyond the cognizance of .:court. When it is
found that the task of writing t!1'e legislatiau cin the subject has been
committed to parliament and state legislatures by the Constitution, is '"- •
it comp~tent for a court to test its validity on the basis of some vague
norms of free and fair election? I think not. As I said, like other
laws made by parliament. or state legislatures, the laws made under
Articles 327 and 328 ·are liable to be tested by Part III of the ConstitutiO!J or any other provisio'ii of the Constitution; but it is difficult to
see how these laws could be challenged on the ground that they do
not conform to some ideal notions of free and fair election to be evolved by the court from out of airy nothing.
The doctrine of the 'spirit' of the Constitution iJ? a slippery slope.
The courts are not at liberty to declare an act void, because, in their
opinion, it is opposed to the spirit of democracy or repubiicanism
supposed to pervade the Constitution but not eipressed in words. •
When the fundamental law has not limited, either in terms or by
necessary implication, the general powers conferred upon the legislature, we cannot declare a limitation under the notiaa of having discovered some id.ea! norms,: of free and fair election. ·
'F
·G
n
Cooley has observed that courts are not at liberty to declare
statutes void because they appear to the minds of the judges to violate
fundamental principles. of republican government, unless it shall be
found that those principles are phced beya.id legislative encroachment ~
by the Constitution. The principles of democratic republican govern- "
ment are not a set of inf!exil;ile rules; and unless they are specifically
incorporated in the Constitution, no law can be declared bad merely
because the Court thinks that it is opposed to some implicatio'.1 drawn
·
'
·
from the concept(').
Counsel for the respondent relied upon the observations of Sikri,
C.J. at p. 216, Shelat and Grover JJ. at p. 292, Hegde and Mukher_iea, JJ. at p. 355 and Reddy, J. at p. 556 in thefr judrments in
Bharati's case (supra) in support of his contention that when these ~
Acts were put in the Ninth Schedule by the constitutional amendment,
their provisions became vulnerable to attack if they or any one of them
damaged or destroyed the · basic features of democracy or repub--,_
licanism.
Sikri, C.J. has said that the Constitution 29th Amendment Act,
1971, is ineffective to protect the impuQned Acts there if thev abrogate or take away fu\1damental rights. 'f!Iis would not >how that tlie
(1) see Constitutional L.irnitatioas 8th ed., Vol. l, pp. 349-352.
1
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN
(Mathew, J.)
529
learned Chief Justice countenanced any challenge to an Act on the
ground that the basic structure of the Constitution has been damaged
or destroyed by its provisions not constituted by the fundamental
rights abrogated or taken away. In other words, if by taking
away or abridging the fundamental rights, the basic structure of the
'I Constitution is damaged or destroyed, then, according to th(f learned
Chief Justice, the legislation would be vulnerable on that score, even
' though it is put in the Ninth Schedule by a constitutional amendment.
, But it would not follow that an Act so put can be challenged for a
reaso>a not resulting from the taking away or abrogation of the funda~ mental right. To put it differently, even though an Act is put in
~the Ninth Schedule by a constitutional amendment, its provisions
would be open to attack on the ground that they destroy or damage
the basic structure if the fundamental right or rights taken away or
•abrogated pertains or pertain to basic structure. But the Act ca!nnot be attacked, if I may say so, for a collateral reason, namely, that
the provisions of the Act have destroyed or damaged some other basic
structure, say, for instance, democracy or separation of powers.
It
c
Shelat and Grover, JJ. have s_:,iid in their judgment that the 29th
Amendment is valid, but the question whether the Acts included ju
the Ninth Schedule by that Amenclme'11t or any provision of those
Acts abrogates any of the basic elements of th13 con:;titutional structure or denudes them of their identity will have to be examined when
• the validity of those Acts comes up for consideration. Similar observations have been made by Hegde and Mukherjea, JJ. and by
Reddy, J. Khanna, J. only said that the 29th Amel11dment was valid.
It is rather strange that an Act which is put in the Ninth Schedule
with a view to obtain immunity from attack on the ground that the
provisions thereof violate the fundamental rights should suddenly become vulnerable on the score that they damage or destroy a basic
structure of the Constitution res1,11ti1ag not from the takfug away or
abridgement of the fundamental rights but for some other reason.
E
There is no support from the majority in Bharati's case (supra)
for the proposition advanced by counsel that an ordinary law, if it
damages or destroys basic structure should be held bad or for the
proposition that a constitutional amendment putting ata Act in the
• Ninth Schedule would make the provisions of the Act vulnerable for
the reason that they damage or destroy a basic structure constituted
not by the fundamental rights taken away or abridged but some other
~ basic structure. And, in principle, I see no reaso111 for accepting the
correctness of the proposition.
F
"f'
Yltf
The Constitution-makers eschewed to incorporate the 'due process'
clause in that instrument apprehending that the vague contours of that
concept will make the court a third chamber. The concept of a basic
structure as brooding omniprese1ace in the sky apart from the specific
provisions of the Constitution constituting it is too vague and indefinite to provide a yardstick to determine the validity of an orqinary
Jaw.
G
H
530
A
'B
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 2 S.C.R.
So if it be assumed that these election Jaws amendment Acts, even
after they were put in the Ninth Schedule by cmstit:itional amendment
remained open to attack for contravention, if any, of the fundamental rights, these Acts would not be open to attack on the ground that
,,
their provisions destroyed or damaged an essential feature of democracy, namely, free and fair electio~1. The Acts remain part of the r
ordinary raw of the land. They did not attain the status of CO'.iIBtitutional law merely because they were put in the Ninth Schedule. '
The utmost that can be said is, as I indicated, tlrat even after putting •
them in the Ninth Schedule, their provisions would be open to challenge O'a the ground that they took away or abrogated all or any of"
the fundamental rights and therefore damaged or destroyed a basic'
structure if the fundamental rights or right taken away or abrogated
constitute or constitutes a basic structure.
r
"'I
D
E
·G
Counsel for the respondent then contended that retrospective operation has been given to the provisions of these Acts and that that would
destroy or damage an essential feature of democracy viz., free and
fair elections. The argument was that if one set of laws existed when
an election was held and the result announced, you can'11ot thereafter
substitute another set of laws and say that those laws ·must be deemed
to have been in operaticm at the time when the election was. held and
the result announced, as that would lead to inequality, injustice and
unfairness.
,.
Retrospective operation of law in the field of election has been
upheld by this Court [see Kanta Kathuria v. Manak Chand (supra)].
Retrospective operation of any law would C'ause hardship ta some
persons or other. This is inevitable; but that is no reason to deny to
the legislature the power to enact retrospective law. fa the case of a
law which has retrospective effect, the theory is that the law was actually in operation in the past and if the provisions of the Acts are
general in their operation, there can be no challenge to them
on the ground of disctimination or unfairness merely because of their
retrospective effect. In other words, if an Act cannot be challeJJged
on the ground that its provisions are discriminatory or unreasonable \ •
if it is prospective in operation, those provisions cannot be attacked
on these groui,1ds merely because the provisiqns were given retros- •
-pective effect, unless there are special circumstances. I see no such
special circumstances here.
•
I therefore hold that these Acts are not liable to be challenged
on any of the grounds argued by counsel.
f
Counsel for the respondent _submitted that the session of parliament- in which the Election Laws Amendment Act, 1975 and the 39th ./
Amendment to the Constitution were passed was not properly 1:onvened and therefore the amendments were inv.alid.
:H
The argument was that a number of members of the two Houses
of Parliament were illegally detained by executive orders before the
summo•ning of the two Houses and that was made possible by the
President-the authority to summon the two Houses--making an
I
-1
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI
v. RAJ NARAIN (Mathew, J.)
531
order under Article 359 of the Constitution on 27-6-1975, which
precluded·thesc members from moving the :ourt and obtaining release
from illegal detention and attending the session. In effect, the contention ot counsel was that the authority to summon parliament effectually prevented by its order made under Article 359, those members
who were illegally demined from attending the session and, as the
composition of the session was unconstitutional, any measure passed in
the session would be bad. Reliance was placed by counsel upon the
decision in A. Nambiar v. Chief Secretary(') in support of this
proposition.
"
"
A
B
The questioia which fell for consideration in that case was whether,
when a member of parliament was convicted for a criminal offence
and was undergoing a sentence in pursl!'ance .thereof, he has an unconditional right to attend a session of parliament. This Court held
that he had no privilege which obliged the court to release him from
custody in order to enable him to attend the session. This decision
has no relevance to the point in controversy here.
c
In England, a member of parliament who is convicted of a criminal ailence and is undergoi•ag sentence in pursuance to his conviction
has no right or privilege to be releiised from custody for attending
parliament. The very same principle will apply in the case of a detention under an emergency regulation(") .
D
-
•
-,
In England, it was taket,1 as settled that parliamentary roll is conclusive of the question _!hat a bill has been passed by both houses of
parliament and has received royal assent and no court can look behind the roll as such an inquiry would be an interference with the
privilege of parliament. Lord Campbell said in Edinburgh & Dalkeith
Ry. v. Wauchope(3) :
"'
..
I\
"
~
"I think it right. to say a word or two upon the point
that has been raised. with regard to an Act of Parliament
being held inoperative by a court of iustice because the
forms prescribed by the two Houses to be observed in the
passing of a Bill have not been ex-actly followed .... I cannot but express my surprise that such a notion should have
prevailed. There is no foU'adation for it. All that a i:ourt
of justice can do is t~ look to the Parliamentary Roll; If
from that it should . appear that a Bill has passed both
Houses and received the Royal Assent, no court of justice
can inquire into the mode in which it was introduced ]n
Parliament, nor into what was ~one previous to its introductio•.1, or what pas~t_d in P~rliament during its progress in its
various stages through both Houses."
It has since been said that Parliamentary Roll is not conclusive, that
when the jurisdiction of a c;ourt is invoked, it has power to determine
whether everything necessary has been done for the production of a
(1) [1966] 2 S.C.R. 406.
(2) see May's Parliamentary Practice, 18th ed., p. 103.
(3) [l 842] 8 Cl. & F. 710 at p. 724.
E
F
G
H
532
A
B
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 197 6] 2 S.C,R.
valid s~atute, that rule of law requires that the court should determine
legal questions raised before it and if its jurisdiction is properly invoked, it has to •a>aswer the question whether the document is a statute
duly enacted by a parliament. The view as propounded has been
summarized as follows :
" ( 1 ) Sovereignty is a legal concept : the rules which
identify the sovereign and prescribe its composition and
functions are logically prior to it.
,
(2) There is a distinction between rules which govern,
on the one hand, (a) the compositio'a, and (b) the pro'Cedure, and on the other hand (c) the area of power, of a
sovereign legislature.
c
D
E
F
The reasons for the view are these : When the purported sovereign
is anyone but a single actual person, the designation of him must in·
elude the statement of rules for the ascertainment of his will, ll.Ild
these rules, since their observance is a condition of the validity of his
legislation, are rules of law logically prior to him( 2 ). The extract~on
of a precise expression of will from a multiplicity of human beings
is, despite all the realists say, an artificial process and one which cannot be accomplished without arbitrary rules. It is therefore an incomplete statement to. say that in a state such and such an assembly
of human beings is sovereign. It can only be sovereign when aCting
in a certain way prescribed by law. At least some rudimentary ·manner and form is demanded of it : the simultaneous incoherent cry of
a rabble, small or large, cannot be law, for it is unintelligible(3).
Sir Frederick Pollock has said that supreme legal power is in one
sense limited by the rules which prescribe how it shall be exercised.
Even if no constitutional rule places a limit or boundary to what can
be done by sovereign legal authority, the organs which are to exercise
it must be delimited and defined by rules ( 4 ) •
·
So, the questions to be asked are : how is parliament composed ?
How does parliament express its will ?
G
The rules which identify the sovereign are as important as the
institution so identified. If this is so, it is open to the court to see
whether a parliament has been properly summoned in oi:der to decide
the question whether a measure passed by it answers the description
of a statute or a'n Act and that parliamentary roll, if such a thing
exists, is not conclusive.
(!) see R.F.V. Heuston : Essays in Constitutional Law, Second edition, pp. 6· 7.
H
fl
( 3) The courts have jurisdiction to question the validity
of an alleged Act of Parliament on grounds 2(a) and 2(b),
but not on ground 2( c) "(1).
(2) see Latham : "The Law and the Commonwealth'' (O.U.P. 1949), p. 523
(3) see Latham : "What is an Act of Parliament?" (1939) King's Counsel, p. 152.
(4) see Geoffrey Marshall : Constitutional Theory, pp. 40-41.
..
•
./
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI
As to
•
v. RAJ ·NARAIN
(Mathew~ J.)
533
Parliamenrary Roll, Heuston has said :
"The 'Parliamentary Roll', whatever exactly it may
have been, disappeared in England a century ago, though
even good authors sometimes write as if it still exists. Since
1849 there· has been no 'Roll', simply two prints of the Bill
on durable vellum by Her Majesty's St,ationery Office, which
are signed by the Clerk of the Parliaments and regarded as
the final official copies. Ove is preserved in the Public
Record Office and one in the library of the House of
Lords( 1).
·
A
B
Article 122( 1) provides that the validity of any proceedings in
Parliament shall not be called in question on the ground of any alleged
irregularity of procedure. · So, ev~n if there is any irregularity in the C
procedure in the passing of the statute, it is not open to a court to
qt1estion its validity. But this is distinct from the question whether ·
the two Houses have been properly summoned and the composition
. of the Session was proper.
The Solicitor General said that if a member is excluded from participating in the proceedings of a House, that is a matter-· concerning)
the privilege of that House as the grievance is one of exclusion from
the proceedings within the walls cif the House. And, in regard to
the right to be exercised within the walls of the House, the House
itself is the judge. He referred to May's Parliamentary Practice (18th
ed. pp. 82-83) and also to Bradlaugh v. Gossett( 2 ) in this connection.
He further said that if an outside agency illegally prevents a member from participating in the proceedings of the Hou.se, the House has
power to secure his presence in the House and cited May's Parliamentary Practice (18th ed. pp. 92-95) to support the prqposition.
- ..
_
..
,.
-·
These passages throw no light on the question in issue here. Ever
since the decision of Holt C.J. in Ashby v. White( 3 ) it has been
settled that privilege is part of the common law and cannot affect
rights to be exercised outside or indep_endently of the House. Regularity of internal proceedings is one thing; the constitutional rights of
the subject are another; and it is the latter which are in issue in a
case where the question is whether the document is a statute('1).
Article 85 ( 1) provides that the President _shall from time to time
summon each House of Parliament to meet at such time and place
as he thrnks fit, but six months shall not intervene between its last
sitting in one session and the date appointed for i!_s first sitting in the
next session.
[)
·E
F
G
The detention of these members of parliament was by statutory
authorities in the purported exercise of their statutory power. It would
be strange if a statutory authority, by an order which turns out to be
(l) Essays in Constitutional Law, p. 18 (2nd ed.).
(2) 12 Q.B.D. 271, 285-286.
(3) [1703] 14 St. Tr. 695.
(4) see Heuston : Essays in Constitutional Law, 2nd ed., p. 22.
13-Ll26SCf/76
H
534
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
/
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 2 5.C.R.
illegal, could prevent the Houses of Parliament from meeting as enjoined by Article 85. If a statutory authority passes an illegal order
.of detention and thus prevents a member of parliament from attending
the House, how can the proceedings of parliament become illegal for
that reason? It is the privilege of parliament to secure the attendance of persons illegally detained. But what would happen if the
privilege is not exercised by parliament ? I do not think that the
proceedings of parliament would become illegal for that reason.
The suspension of the remedy for the enforcement of fundamental
rights by the order of the President under Article 359 is dependent
upon a valid proclamation of emergency under Article 352. If a situation arose which authorized the President to issue a proclamation
under Article 352, he could also suspend, under Article 359, the remedy to move the court to enforce the fundamental rights. These are
the constitutional functions of the President and unless it is established
that the proclamation made by the President under Article 352 or the
suspension under Article 359 of the remedy for enforcement of fundamental rights is unconstitutional, it is impossible to hold that the
President has, in any way, illegally prevented the release of these members from the. supposed illegal detention so as to make a session of
parliament unconstitutional, in consequence of the inability of those
members to attend the session. In other words, the President, in
performing his constitutional function under these articles has not
authorized the illegal detention of any person let alone any member of
parliament or unconstitutionally prevented the release from custody of
any member. He has only discharged his constitutional functions.
If this be so, it is difficult to hold that the session in which the amendments were passed was illegally convened. The challenge to the validity of the amendments on this score must be overruled.
Counsel for the respondent submitted that it is immaterial when
a candidate committed a corrupt practice-whether it was before or
after he became a candidate-and that an election would be set aside
even if a person committed the corrupt practice before he became a
candidate. Section 79 (b) of the Representation of the People Act,
1951, defined the word 'candidate' as follows:
" 'candidate' moons a person who has been or claims t@
have been duly nominated as a candidate at any election, and
any such person shall be deemed to have been candidate as
from the time when, with the election in prospect, he began
to hold himself out as a prospective candidate".
Clause 7 of the Election Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975, substituted
the present definition in s. 79 (b) which reads :
" 'candidate' means a person who has been or claims
to have been duly nominated as a candidate at an election."
•
,G
•
-
4
I
I
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN
(Mathew, J.)
535
In support of the proposition that an election can be set aside
even if a persop has committed corrupt practice of bribery before he
became a candidate, cou_nsel cited Halsbury's Laws of England,_ 3rd
ed., Volume 14, pages 222 (paragraph 386) and 218 (paragraph
380).
These p•aragraphs state that in order to constitute the offence of
bribery, it does not matter how long before an electiori a bribe is
given, provided that t_he bribe is operative at the time of the ele"ction,
and that, time is material only when considering the question of evidence.
Counsel further said that under s. 100 of the Representation of
the People Act, 1951, an election is liable to be set aside if it is
found under clause (b) of sub-section ( 1) of that section that a
returned candidate has committed corrupt practice; that ex hypothesi,
a returned candidate cannot commit a corrupt practice, and therefore, it is not the description of a person as a returned candidate that is material. He argued that if in s. 100 ( 1) (b) the
word 'returned candidate' is used not with the idea of indicating that
a person should have committed corrupt practice after he became a
returned candidate, there is no reason to think that the word 'candidate'
in s. 123(7) has been used to show that the corrupt practice therein
mentioned should have been committed after a person has become a
'candidate' in order that the election of the candidate might be set
aside.
There can be no doubt that s. 100(1) (b), when it speaks of
commission of corrupt practice by a returned candidate, it can: only
mean commission of co~{,upt practice by a candidate before he became a_ returned candidate. Any other reading of the sub-section
would be absurd. But there i~ no such compulsion to read the word
'candidate' in s. 123 (7) in the smne manner. It is the context that
gives colour to a word. A word is not cry.stal clear. Section 79 of
the Act indicates that the definitions therein have to be read subject
to the context.
,,_
t
The legislature must fix some point of time before which a person cannot be a :candidate' in an election, and, a wide latitude must
be given to the legislature in fixing that point. In Union of India and
Another, etc. v. Mis. Parameswaran Match Works, etc.(1) this Court
observed:
"The choice of a date as a basis for classification cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular
reason is forthcoming for the choice unless it is shown
to be capricious or whimsical _ in the circumstances.
When it is seen that a line or point there must be, and there
is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the
decision of the legislature or its delegate must be accepted
unless we can say that it is very wide of the reasonable
(!) [1975] (2) S.C.R. 573 at 579.
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
536
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 ·s.c.R.
mark. See Louisville Gas Co. v. Alabama Power Co.(1)
per Justice Holmes.';
The learned Chief Justice has, in his judgment, referred to the
relevant English sratutes and the decisions of the English Courts
bearing on this point and has pointed out the difference between the
English Law and the Indian Law. I do not consider it necessary to
cover the same grou~1d. I agree w_ith his conclusion on the point.
I would therefore hold that even if it be assumed that the fuiding
of the High Court that the appellant obtained or procured the assist'ance of Shri Yashpal Kapur during the period from January 7 to
24, 1971, is correct, the appellant shall nqt be deemed to have committed corrupt practice under s. 123(7) of the Representation of the
People Act, 1951, as she became a candidate only on February 1,
1971. The learned Chief Justice has also dealt with the contentid11
urged by counsel for respondent that clause 8 (b) of the Election Laws
Amendment Act, 1975 suffers from the vice of excessive delegation
and is arbitrary. I agree with his r_easoning for repelling the same.
'
There can be no _dispute that if the Election Laws Amendment
Act, 1975, is valid, the appeal has to be allowed. I would, therefore,
set aside the findings of the High Court against the appellant and
allow the appeal without any order as to costs. In the cross appeal,
the· only question raised was about the correctness of the finding of the
High Court that the appellant has not exceeded the prescribed limit
of election expense. For the reasons given by Khanna, J. in his
judgment, I hold that the finding of the High Court on this issue was
correct. In this view, I have ifiO occasion to reach the other ql!estions
argued. I would dismiss the cross appeal without any order as to
costs.
·
BEG, J.-There are two Election Appeals Nos. 887 and 909 of
1975, before us under Section 116A of the Representation of the
People Act of 1951 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). They are
directed against decisions on different issues contained in the same
judgment of a learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court allowing
an election petition filed by Shri Raj Narain (hereinafter referred to
as the 'Election-Petitioner'), a defeated candidate at the election
held in February, 1971, for the membership of the Lok Sabha or
the House of the People, against Shrimati Indira Nehru Gandhi, the
Prime Minister of India (hereinafter referred to as 'the Original Respondent'). The election-petitioner is the respondent in Appeal No.
887 of 1975 filed by the original respondent. He is the appellant in
Appeal No. 909 of 1975 where the original respondent is the contesting respondent.
Before the election case, instituted on 24-4-1971, could be
decided by the Trial Court, an explanation was added to Section
77 ( 1) of the. Act. It had som~ .bearing on qu~stions .relating to
the expenses mcurred on the ongmal respondent s election, sought
(1) 240 U.S. 30, at 32.
·.
'
f
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN (Beg, J.)
•
537
to be raised by the election-petitioner, but, on findings of fact A
recorded by the Trial Court, it became immaterial for the merits of
the case and would continue to be that so long as the election-petitioner is unable to dislodge the Trial Court's findings on election
expenses. Other amendments were made by the Election Laws
(Amendment) Act No. 40 of 1975, (hereinafter referred to as the
'Act of 1975'), notified on 6-8-1975, after the decision of the case
by the learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court on 12-6-1975 and B
after the filing of the appeals before us. These amendments deal
directly with -several questions decided by the Allahabad High Court
which were pending consideration before this Court. Finally, came
the Constitution (Thirty-Ninth) Amendment Act of 1975, (hereinafter referred· to as the '39th Amendment'), gazetted on 10-8-1975,
just before the commencement of the hearing of the appeals by this
Court.
C
It was submitted by the learned. Counsel for the original res- ·
pondent, in his· opening address, that Section 4 of the 39th Amendment, adding clause ( 4) to Article 329A of the Constitution, meant
that Parliament itself, acting in its constituent capacity,. had taken
the case in hand and had, after applying its own standards, decided
it in favour of the original respondent so that the jurisdiction of this
Court to go into the merits of the case was ousted by clause ( 4) ~ D
read with clauses (5) and (6), sought to be added to Article 329A
of the Constitiition. It was submitted by him that each one of the
amendments of the. Act was aimed at removing genuine uncertainties
or doubts about what the law was so that it may be brought into the
line with what it had been previously understood to be as declared
by this Court, or, in any case, with what Parliament, correctly
exercising its unquestionable law making powers, thought that it E
should be.
.• •
•
~
"'
'.
\
The constantly recurring and vehemently pressed theme, of the
arguments of the learned Counsel for the election-petitioner was that
the context and the contents of the Acts of 1974 and 1975, and,
after that, . of Section 4 of the 39th Amendment, clearly indicated
that the whole object of th~ Acts of 1974 and 1975 and of the F
· Constitutional amendment was an oblique one : to deprive the election-petitioner of the remedies he had under the law against an election vitiated by corrupt practices, and of the benefits of a decision
of the High Court in his favour by taking away its grounds and then
the jurisdiction of Courts, which existed at the time of the 39th
Amendment, to deal with the case so that this case may not, in any
event, terminate in ·favour of the election-petitioner. It was repea- G
tedly suggested by the learned Counsel ,for the election-petitioner,
throughout his arguments, that the law making powers had been
really abused by a majority in Parliament for the purposes of serving
majority party and personal ends which were constitutionally unauthorised. It was even alleged that the President of India had also
become a party to the misuse of Constitutional powers by passing an
ordinance depriving Courts of jurisdiction to entertain Habeas Corpus H
petitions so that members of Parliament belonging to opposition parties, detained under preventive detention laws, may not secure release and oppose proposals which became embodied in the 1975 Act
538
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 2 S.C.R.
arrd the 39th Amendment. H is when the country is faced with
issues of this nature that the constitutionally vital role of the judicature, as a coordinate and independent organ of a democratic system
of governm~nt, comes into prominence and has to be performed without fear or favour, affection or illwill, as the custodian of constitutionality.
.
In the circumstances indicated above, it seemed to me to be
absolutely essential for us to call upon the parties defending or assailing the 39th Amendment and the Acts of 1974 and 1975, to
take us, inter alia, into the merits of the cases of the two sides
and the findings given by the trying Judge so as to enable us to see
how far these findings were justifiable under the law as it stood even
before the amendments by the Acts of 1974 and 1975, ( how they
were affected by these amendments, and how they were related to
the validity of Section 4 of the 39th Amendment. Speaking for myself, I clearly indicated to learned Counsel for the parties that I
regard the nature and merits of the case decided to be of crucial
importance not only in considering the validity of the 39th Amendment and of the Acts of 1974 and 1975, but also in the wider interests of justice which are bound to be served by the vindication of
the case of the party which should, on merits, win. Elementary
considerations of justice required that the party with a better case
should not be deprived of an opportunity of justifying its position,
on facts and law touching thei merits of the case, in the highest Court
of the land, · particularly' when the original respondent, who happens to be the Prime Minister of this country, was accused of corrupt practices to secure her election and then of abuse of constitutional
power and position to shield them. The high office of the original
respondent, far from disabling this Court from investigating such allegations, ought to provide a good ground for this Court to go into
the merits of the case if we are not really deprived of our jurisdiction to do that by Section 4 of the 39th Amendment. This follows
from the Rule of law, as I understand it, embodied in our Constitution. National interests cannot, or, at least, should not, I believe,
suffer if _justice and right, as determined by the highest Court in the
country, prevail.
Citizens of our country take considerable pride in being able to
challenge before superior Courts even an exercise of constituent power, resting on the combined strength and authority of Parliament
and the State legislatures. This Court, when properly called upon
by the humblest citizen, in a proceeding before it, to test the Constitutional validity of either an ordinary statute or of a Constitutional
amendment, has to do so by applying the criteria of basic constitutional
purpose and constitutionally prescribed procedure. The assumption
underlying the theory of judicial review of all law making, including
fundamental law making is that Courts, acting as interpreters of
what has been described by some political philosophers (See :
Bosanquet's "Philosophical Theory of the State" Chap. V, p. 96115) as the "Real Will" of the people, embodied in their Constitution and assumed to .be more lasting and iust and rational and Jess
liable to err than their "General Will", reflected by the opinions ol!
the majorities in Parliament and the State Legislatures for the time
being, can discover for the people the not always easily perceived
•
«
•
•
~
I
I
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
,
•
j
..
•
\
•
(Beg, J.)
539
purposes of their Constitution. The Courts thus act as agents and
mouthpieees of the "Real Will" of the People themselves. Although,
judges, in discharging their onerous constitutional duties, cannot afford to ignore the limitations of the judicial technique and their own
possibly greater liability to err than legislators could on socio-economic issues and matters of either social philosophy, or practical policy,
or political opinion only, yet, they cannot, without violating their
oaths of office, fail to elucidate and uphold a basic constitutional
principle or norm unless compelled by the law of the Constitution
to abstain from doing so. One of these basic principles seems to
me to be that, just as Courts are not constitutionally competent to
legislate under the guise of interpretation, so also neither our Parliament nor any State Legislature, in the purported exercise
of any kind of law-making power, perform an essentially
judicial function by virtually withdrawing a particular case, pending
in any Court, and taking upon itself the duty to decide it by an
application of law or its own standards to the facts of that case.
This power must at least be first constitutionally taken away from
the Court concerned and vested in another authority before it can be
lawfully exercised by that other authority. It is not a necessary or
even a natural incident of a "Constituent power". As Hans Kelsen
points out, in his "General Theory of Law and the State", (See :
p. 143 ), while creation and annulment of all general norms, whether
basic or not so basic, :is essentially a legislative function, their interpretation and application to findings reached, after a correct asceytainment of facts involved in an individual case, by employing the
judicial technique, is really a judicial function. Neither of the three
constitutionally separate organs of State can, according to the basic
scheme of our Constitution today, leap outside the boundaries o~
its own constitutionally assigned sphere or orbit of authority into
that of the other. This is the logical and natural meaning of the
principle of Supremacy of the Constitution.
Issues raised before us relating to the validity of the 39th Amend"
ment and the Acts of 1974 and 1975 were: What are the Constitutional purposes and ambit of the "Constituent power" found in
Article 368 of our Constitution? Were they, in any way, exceeded by the constituent authorities in making the 39th Amendment in
an unauthorised manner, or, for objects which, however, laudable,
were outside the scope of Article 368? Was there any procedural
irregularity in the composition of Parliament which could enable this
Court to hold that there was a basic defect in the enactment of either
the 1975 Act or of the 39th Amendment ? Whether provisions of the
Acts of 1974 and 1975 are immune from attack even on the ground
that they resulted in a departure from the "basic structure" of our
Constitution as explained by this Court in His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalavaru v. State of Kerala( 1 ), by having been
included in the 9th Schedule of our Constitution, which does protect
them from a challenge on the ground of any contravention of Part
III guaranteeing fundamental rights to citizens and other persons,
or, in other words, were the limits of the basic structure only operative against Constitutional amendments or apply to ordinary
(1) [1973] (1) Suppl. S.C.R.J).1.
A
c
D
E
F
G
H
540
A
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 ·s.C.R.
statutes as well? Are any of the provisions of the Acts of 1974 and
1975 void for departures from or damage to any part of· the "basic
structure"· of our Constitution or for any other excess or misuse of
law making powers ?
·
•
•
. We do not, when such a case comes up before us, concern our-
selves with the · validity. of provisions other than those which affect
the case before us .. Nor do we consider the objects of any provi- .
ll
siOil, · ill vacuo, divorced from the facts of the cas.e· to be· decided.
Therefore, ·parties had to and 'did address us on _the broad features
of the findings given by the learned Trial Judge and the nature of
the evidence given to support them so that we may be able to decide,
inter alia, whether any "validation" of the original respondent's
election, which was the evident purpose of clause ( 4) of Article 329,
sought to be added by Section 4 of the 39th Amendment, was at all
c necessary. If that election was not really void ·and· had been wrongly
held, by the Trial Court to be vitiated, it did not need to be validated
·at;:in:. In'. that· event, a purported validation would. be an exercise
in futility before this Court had decided these appeals. · Could it not
· be said that the intended validation was premature inasmuch as it
proceeded on a basically erroneous premise that the original respondent's election was invalid when the question of its validity was subD
judice in this Court? How could such a premise be assumed to be
correct before this Court had gone into merits and decided the
appeals pending before it ? Such an inquiry is not irrelevant if the
very nature and purpose of the exercise of a power are put in issue
by both sides.
If the existence of the judgment of the Allahabad High. Court .
E created the impression that it must be assumed to be correct even
before this Court had pronounced upon the . correctness of the judgment, the stay order given by this Court should have · removed it.
The legal effect of that stay order was that the Trial ·court's order,
to use the language of Section 116B (3) of the Act, ·"shall be deem. ed never to have taken effect". It did not matter if the. stay order,
out. of deference for existing precedents, had been fiamed in the form· ·
of
a "conditioned" stay, that is to say, a stay in law and effect ·with
F
certain conditions annexed. · It was not a '_'conditional" stay. · Indeed,
having regard to the nature of the •order the operation of which
was to be stayed,-·there could be no "conditional" stay here. As .
.. to the· legal· effect of such a stay order, there is no doubt in my mind
that, considering the clear words of Section 116A ( 4) of the Act,
it deprived the order of the High Court of any operative force whatG soever dnring the pendency of these appeals. There could be really
no binding precedent in discretionary matters depending on the facts
and circumstances of· each case. The operation of the judgment of
the ·Trial Conrt and the consequential orders are stayed only on
"sufficient cause" shown on the facts of that case. In the case before US, the sufficient cause seems to me to be apparent from a bare
perusal of th<; judgment of the Trial Court. . As I have pointed out
"H .below; 'the judgment under· appeal contains "glaringl_y erroneous ·conclusions, reached by ignoring· what has been repeatedly laid down
in e!ection cases by this Court, even if one \Vere to ·assume, for
the sake of argument, that all the findings of fact recorded by the
0
•...
•
••
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v, RAJ NARAIN (Beg, J.)
541
Trial Court, including some very questionable ones, on which its
conclusions rest, were correct.
•
•
••
..
A
In a case where the bonafides of legislation and even of a Constitutional. amendment, is questioned on the ground of a suggested fright- '
fuln~ss m the facts of the case which Parliament and the ra~ifying State
Legislatures ai:e to be supposed, if we are to accept the suggestion, to
hav~ b~en actmg i_n concert to prevent this Court from examining on B
me!1ts! It was, I th~nk, the duty of Counsel making any such suggestion
to mv1te our attent10n to any fact not fully disclosed or discussed in the
judgment under appeal atleast when he was asked, as I repeatedly
asked him in the course of his arguments extending over a period of
about fifteen days out of a total period of hearing of the case for thirtytwo days, how the Trial Court's conclusions on the two matters, forming the subject matter of appeal No. 887 of 1975 of the original respon- C
dent, could possibly be justified. However, I have also satisfied myself,
by going through the whole evidence on re.cord on these two matters,
which I shall presently deal with, that learned Counsel for the electionpetitioner could not possibly usefully add anything to the replies he
actually gave on the questions put to him on these matters and to the
discussion of the whole evidence on these questions by the Trial Court.
I have taken pains to clarify this position as the learned Counsel for D
the election petitioner, at the end of arguments of both sides, extending
over thirty two days of actual hearing stated that he bad argued on the
assumption that we will be concerned only with the validity of the 39th
Amendment and the validity and correct interpretation of the Acts of
1974 and 1975. I think that it was made clear to him that we will
have to enter into the1 merits if that was necessary, as I think it is, for
judging whether amendments in law were either necessary or justified. E
Learned Counsel for the election,petitioner was not prevented from
dealing with any question, whether of fact or law, which he may have
wanted to raise. Learned Counsel for both sides had fully argued atleast the election petitioner's appeal No. 909 of 1975 on facts1 and law.
'TI1ey had taken us sufficiently into facts and findings- involved in the
original respondent's appeal No. 887 of 1975 to justify our dealing with
all questions necessary to decide this appeal on merits also. Indeed, F
it is not necessary for us to go beyond findings of fact recorded .by the
learned Judge, as distinct from conclusions based upon them which are
questions of Jaw, to demonstrate the very palpable errors committed by
the learned Judge on the two questions which are the sub_ject matter
of appeal No. 887 of 1975.
Shrimati Indira Nehru Gandhi was elected to the House of the
People from the Rae Bareli constituency in Uttar Pradesh by an overwhelming majority of 1,11,80q votes against Sh~i Raj ~.arain. As is
not unusual, the defeated candidate filed an election petition under the
Act making all kinds of allegations, including some quite extra".agant
ones which formed the subject matter of the first set of eleven issues
fram'ed on 19-8-1971. Thereafter, three additional issues were framed
on 27-4-1973 when the question whether an amendment of the petition,
sought after the period of limitation for filing a petition to chall~nge
the election had expired, should be permitted, had been finally decided
by this Court in favour of Shri Raj Narain.
G
H
542
A
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 2 ·s.C,R.
The issues framed give an idea of the cases set up on behalf of the
two sides. They were :
ISSUES
"1. Whether respondent No. 1 obtained and procured the assisB
c
D
E
F
G
H
tance of. Yashp_al Kapur in furtherance of the prospects of
her election while he was still a Gazetted Officer in the service of Government of India. If so, from what date ?
2. Whether at the instance of respondent No. 1 members of the
Armed Forces of the Union arranged Air Force Planes and
helicopters for her, flown by members of the Armed Forces,
to enable her to address election meetings on 1-2-1971 and
25-2-1971, & if so, whether this c_onstituted a corrupt practice under section 123 (7) of the Representation of the
People Act ?
. ijl
3. Whether at the instance of respondent No. 1 and her election
agent Yashpal Kapur, the District Magistrate of Rae Bareli,
the Superintendent of Police of Rae Bareli and the Home
Secretary of U.P. Government arranged for rostrums, loudspeakers and barricades to be set up and for members of the
Police Force to be posted in connection with her election
tour on 1-2-1971 and 25-2-1971; and, if so, whether this
amounts to a corrupt practice under Section 123 (7) of the
Representation of the People Act ?
•
4. Whether quilts, blankets, dhoties and 'liquor were distributed
by agents and workers of respondent No. 1 with the consent
of her election agent Yashpal Kapur, at the places and on
the dates mentioned in Schedule A of the petition in order
to induce electors to vote for her ?
5. Whether the particulars given in paragraph 10 and Schedule
A of the petition are too vague and general to afford a basis
for allegations of bribery under Section 123 ( 1) of the
Representation of the People Act ?
6. Whether by using the symbol cow and calf, which had been
allotted to her party by the Election Commis~ion in J:ier
election campaign the respondent No. 1 was gmlty of makmg
an appeal to a religious symbol and committed a corr~pt
practice as defined in section 123(3) of the Representation
of the People Act ?
7. Whether on the dates1 fixed for the poll voters were conveyed
to the polling stations free of. charge on vehicles hired ~nd
procured for the purpose by respondent No. l's election
agent Yashpal Kapur, or other P.e~sons with his consent, as
detailed in Schedu!e B to the petition ?
8. Whether the particulars given in paragraph 12 and schebdu~e
B of the petition are too vague and gener'.11 to form a ~s1s
for allegations regarding a corrupt practice under Section
123(5) of the Representation of the People Act?
+
,.
,I
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN
(Beg, J.)
5 43
9. Whether respondent No. 1 and her election agent Yashpal
Kapur incurred or authorised expenditure in excess of the
amount prescribed by Section 77 of the Representation of
the People Act, read with rule 90, as detailed in para 13 of
the petition ?
Hl. Whether the petitioner had made a security deposit in accordance with the rules of the High Court as required by Section
117 of the Representation of the People Act ?
•
)
ADDITIONAL ISSUES
The High Court trying the case had, in the course of a lengthy jµdgment, rejected the election petitioner's case on issues Nos. 2, 4, 6, 7 and
9 of the first set of issues, after minutely and meticulously scrutinizing
every material allegation of the election-petitioner and the evidence
given in support of it on each of these issues. Out of these, the electionpetitioner, in his cross appeal No. 909 of 1975, has questioned the findings of th;e High Court only on issues Nos. 2, 4, 6, 7 and 9 set out
above. Issues Nos. 5 & 8 and 10, decided in favour of the election~
petitioner, were technical and are immaterial now. It will be noticed
that the additional issue No: 1, due to some error or oversight, is an
exact and unnecessary repetition of the initial issue No. 1. Additional
issues numbered 2 & 3 are connected with and subsidiaries of the initially framed issues numbered 1 and 3.
\
B
11. To what relief, if any, is the petitioner entitled?
1. Whether respondent No. 1, obtained and procured the assistance of Yashpal Kapur in furtherance of the prospects of
her election while he was still a Gazetted Officer in the service of the Government of India. If so, from what date ?
2. Whether respondent No. 1 held herself out as a candidate
from any date prior to 1-2-1971 and if so, from what date?
3. Whether Yashpal Kapur continued to be in the service of
Government of India from and after 14-1-1971 or till which
date ?"
\
A
The learned Trial Judge had accepted the election-petitioner's case
on the material issues numbered 1 and 3 of the initially framed issues,
and on the overlapping and subsidiary additional issues 1, 2 and 3.
He was of opinion that Shri Yashpal Kapur, a Central Government
servant and a Gazetted Officer of the rank of an Under Secretary, deputed to serve in the Prime Minister's Secretariat as an Officer on
Special Duty, had held his post until 25-1-1971, when his resignation,
tendered on 13-1-1971, was accepted by the President of India with
effect fram 14-1-1971, by means of a notification published on
6-2-1971. Consequently, the learned Judge set aside the election of
the original respondent after ·holding that she was guilty of a "corrupt
practice", as defined by Section 123(7) of the Act, on each of two
grounds : firstly, that she must be deemed to have obtained the help
of Shri Yashpal Kapur, in the furtherance of her election, before he had
ceased to be a gazetted officer in Government service, and after the
c
0
E
F
G
H
544
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 ·s.c.R.
A
original respondent had first held herself out, on 29-12-1970, as a
candidate at the forthcoming election from the Rae Bareli constituency
by answering inthe negative a question put to her at a Press Conference
in New Delhi inquiring whether she had decided to change her constituency from Rae Bareli in U.P. to Gurgaon in Haryana; and, secondly,
that she must be deemed to have obtained the help of officials of the
State of U.P. who got rostrums constructed for her election speeches
B and electricity provided and arrangements made for loudspeaker!\. The
learned Judge declared her to be disqualified under Section 8A of the
Act from holding her office for a period of six years from the date of
his order dated 12-6-1976. I deliberately employ the word "deemed"
to describe the nature of the findings of the Trial Judge on both those
questions because the learned Judge had himself indicated that they
were inferences based entirely on circumstantial and not on any direct
C evidence whatsoever of any instructions issued either by the original
respondent or by her election agent during the period following
29-12-1970. Election Appeal No. 887 of 1975 was filed against decisions on these two questions and consequential orders of the learned
Trial Judge.
It
•
\
~
The law, as found in the Act of 1951 did not, unlike the English
Act bf 1949, make a distinction between corrupt practices and illegal
practices. Section 123 (7), as it has stood unamended, enumerates, as
the last of the 7 classes of corrupt practice, as follows :
·
D
E
F
G
H
"S. 123(7) The obtaining or procuri~g or abe!ting or
attempting to obtain or JJrocure by a candidate or his agent
or, by any other person.with the consent of a ca~d!date or his
election agent, any assistance other than the g1vmg of vote
for the furtherance of the prospects of that candidate's election, from any person in the service of the Government and
belonging to any of the followmg classes, namely : (a) gazetted officers;
( b) stipendiary judges and magistrates;
(c) members of the armed forces of the Union;
(d) members of the police forces;
( e) excise officers;
(f) (g) xxx
xxx
xxx
Explanation.-( 1) In this sec~ion the expression . 'agent'
includes an election agent, a pollmg agent and . any person
who is held to have acted as an agent .in connection with the
election with the consent of the candidate.
(2) For the purposes of clause (7), a person shall be
deemed to assist in the furtherance of .the prospects of. a
candidate's election if he acts as an election agent of that
candidate".
It is clear that "the obtaining or procu.ring or abettin~ or attemptin.g
· or rocure" had to take place either by a candidate. or by ):us
to obtamb p b d "with the consent of the candidate or his election
agent or y some o y
•.
'
I
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN (Beg, J.)
545
agent". Until the candidate had appointed an election agent, the action
of any other person could not constitute him automatically an agent so
that he may, by doing something voluntarily succeed in makini:; the
candidate vicariously liable for his own actions whether he was or was
not a gazetted officer at the time when he committed the act complained
of. The question of obtaining assistance through "an agent" or "other
person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent" could only
arise where such a case of obtaining assistance indirectly through others
is set up but not otherwise,
•
B
On issue No. 1, the case set up in paragraph 5 of the petition is :
-
"Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi obtained and procured the
assistance of the said Shr.i Yashpal Kapur for the furtherance
of prospects of her election from the constituency aforesaid
inasmuch as the said Shri Yashpal Kapur was a Gazetted
Officer in the service of Government of India when his assis. tance was o~tained. and procured ..... The said Shri Yashpal
Kapur on the direction of Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi orga_nized the electioneering work for her in the constituency during
the period commencing from 27-12-1970 ...... "
.... ..
'1
•
~
\
\
-1
;
A
c
It is a case of liability resulting from an alleged "direction" given by D
Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi herself to Shri Kapur. No case of procurement of assistance of Shri Kapur through a. third person is set up although the word "procured" is mechanically lifted from Section 123 (7)
and used. On issue No. 3, the case set up in para 9 of the petition is
that both Smt. Indira Gandhi and her election agent, Shri Kapur,
"obtained and procured" the assistance of Govt. officers, but no directions or orders given by anyone are mentioned there. Issue No. 1 E
shows that the case which was put in issue and went on trial was
whether the original respondent had herself issued some direction to
Shri Kapur. Is~ue No. 3 shows that what was in issue here was
whether the Government officers mentioned there rendered the assis-'
tance indicated there "at the ·instance" of the original respondent or
her election agent. The discussion of evidence and findings of the
learned Judge, particularly on issue No. 1, show that the learned Judge
had almost made out a new case for the election petitioner and accepted it. This was, on issue No. 1, whether Shri Kapur had done some
acts in circumstances which justify the inference that he was constituted
a de facto agent of_the Prime Minister even before he was appointed
her election agent on 1-2-1971, and, on issue No. 3, whether sending
round of certain tour programmes with the approval of the Prime G
Minister, in the background of certain long standing instructions of the
Comptroller & Auditor General, read with letters sent by the Govt. of
India, as long ago as 12-1-1959, and .19-11-1969, amounted to "implied" directions by the Prime Minister or her election agent to the State
Government to provide the facilities the Govt. officials gave. Now,
whenever a case of a liability by "implication", where there is such a
species of liability in Jaw, comparable to a criminal liability, is to be
fastened upon an individual, the prosecutor is to be expected, as a part R
of an elementary duty to give fair notice and. a fair Op))?rtunity to meet
what the individual has really to be made liable for, either because of
54 6
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 S.C.R.
some act or omission of the individual concerned, or, even more so,
for t_hat _of an_ ag~~t or another person for which there mav be some sort
of v~canous ha~1hty, from facts showing consent or agency, to give full
~art_1~~lars of c1~cumstances from which such implications or vicarious
habiht1es may anse. I do not find that this was done here .
. The law must lay down a duty to _Prevent,. by taking some steps
which are ~ot ta~en, before a person 1s held hable for an omission.
And, t~ere 1s a difference between omission to prevent the doing of
somethmg and actual consent to the doing of it. l do not find in the
peti~ion, any case of a liability from omissions to do something'set up,
obviously becau~e.the law does not i~pose upon the candidate the duty
to prevent the givmg of voluntary assistance by others whether officials
or not. Nor is there anywhere in the petition a case of procurement by
consenting to aid obtained through others. It has to be remembered
that, on the langaage of Section 123(7), a liability is not created by
merely not rejecting voluntarily given aid. The candidate may not
often be aware of the voluntarily given assistance so as to be able to
reject it. A case of consent which can be legally set up is only one of
consenting to active obtaining or procurement by an agent or by some
other person who becomes, for the purposes of the specific aid given
and consented to, ordinarily prior to obtaining it, as good as an agent
employed by the candidate.
On the terms of Section 123 (7) the following three types of cases
of actual obtaining of assistance, as distinguished from abetment or attempting to obtain it, can be legally set up either exclusively, or, alte1~
natively, against a candidate : firstly, a direct obtaining of it by the act
of the candidate himself; secondly, an indirect or vicarious procurement
of it by the acts of a duly constituted agent; and, thirdly, an indirect or
vicarious procurement of it by the acts of a person who, though not a
duly constituted agent, becomes constructively an agent, for the purpose
of some particular aid obtained, because it was assented to by the
candidate at a time which must, ordinarily, be before the aid is given,
so that the person through whom assistance is obtained is a constructive
agent for this particular aid at the time when it is given. The term
procurement should, strictly speaking, apply only in the last ffi'.O types
of cases. A reference to Section 100(1) (b) further emphasises the
position that a corrupt practice for wh_ich th~ Hi~ Court is to declar_c
an election void must have been comil1!tted either by a returned candidate or his election agent or by any other person with t~e consent of ~he
returned candidate or his election agent". A case fallmg under Sectian
100(1) (d) (ii) of "a corrupt practi~e co~itted in,,t~e interes~s of a
candidate by an agent other than his ~lectlo~ ag~nt 1s ~ery different
and postulates : firstly, a corrupt practice which 1s committed only _by
an agent; and, secondly, the existence of such an agent. A case falhn,g
under Section 100 (1) ( d) requires also proof of the further fact t_hat
the result of the election was materially affected by the corm pt practice.
As I read the petition, I find on~y the fu~t of the three types OE
cases mentioned above set up exclusively on issue No. 1 because theft:
are no particulars there which could apply to .the other two t}'.Pes, of
cases. Obviously, the case set up was not of a corrupt practice oy
•
-
•
f'
I
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN (Beg, J.)
•
•
..
)
,
547
some act of a person to which the candidate became a party by merely
giving consent in which case the circumstances from which the consent
was to be inferred had to be indicated. It was a case of a direction
given by the Prime Minister herself to Shri Kapur who, it had to be
presumed for the purposes of such a case, would not have given the aid
if the direction or order was not there. This deliberately given "direction" had to be proved on the case set up. On issue No. 3, the petition
mentions only what was obtained, that is to say, the aid of particular
officers and the form it took; but, what caused that aid to be given or
the means adopted to get it were not set up there. I think these distinctions should have been borne in mind. I shall indicate below how the
learned Judge, in dealing with a case of the first type only falling under
Section 100(1) (b) of the Act, found in issue No. 1, mixed up facts
which could, strictly speaking, be relevant only in considering a case
of one of tbe other two types. And, in deciding issue No. 3, what really
and quite naturally flowed from and was the well understood appurtenant of the office of a Prime Minister, and, indeed, absolutely necessary
for the due protection of the life and freedom of movement of the
holder of that high office, was mistaken by the learned Judgl'. to be the
result of some kind of assumed solicitation for aid. What the learned
Judge entirely missed was that it is the act of solicitation for the aid of
the officials mentioned in Section 123 (7), whether successful or not,
and not the mere fact that certain advantages flow quite naturally and
conventionally from the occupation of an office, without any solicitation, or the mere fact that some assistance is voluntarily given by someone to an election campaign which is penalised by the provis-ion.
A
The definition given above in Section 123 (7) meant, on an ordinary and natural interpretation of words used, that the corrupt practice
defined there could not be committed by any person before there was a
"candidate" for an election. Hence, it became necessary to examine the
definition of a "candidate" found in Section 79 (b) which laid down :
E
"79. In this part and in parts VII and VIII, unless the
context otherwise requires,-
**
**
Section 123, defining corrupt practices, is found in Part VII of the
Act. Therefore, the definition of candigate in Section 79, as it originally stood, was sought to be applied by the Trial Court to determine
whether the original respondent could have committed a corrupt practice at the time of the alleged commission of it. Before, however, I
deal with that question, it is necessary to examine what "obtaining, or
procuring or abetting or attempting" meant in the light of the la.w laid
down repeatedly by this Court in cases of alleged corrupt practices.
'
C
D
F
**
(b) 'candidate' means a person who has been or claims
to have been duly nominated as a candidate at any election,
and any such person shall be deemed to have been a candidate as from the time when, with the election in prospect, he
began to hold himself out as a prospective candidate;"
7
B
G
H
548
A
B
c
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 2 ·s.C.R.
The logical consequence of placing a charge of corrupt practice on
the same footing as a criminal charge is obligation to interpret the words
which define it strictly and narrowly. Indeed, any natural and ordinary
interpretation on the words "obtaining or procuring or abetting or .
attempting" must carry with it the imperative requirement that the
candidate concerned or his agent must have intentionally done an act
which has the effect contemplated by Section 123(7). In other words,
a "mens rea" or a guilty mind as well as an "actus reus" or a wrongful
act must concur to prod_uce the result contemplated bv law. So far as
election expenses are concerned, it is possible to conceive that even an
unintentional result (i.e. expenses "incurred" exceeding the prescribed
limit) may be enough so that a duty to prevent this result may be there
in law. But, Section 123 (7) requires actual intended acts of "obtaining" or "procuring" or attempting or abetting. For Section 123 07)
results are immaterial.
In the case before us, the petition contains, as I have indicated
above, the necessary averment of a deliberate direction by the original
respondent herself, so far as issue No. 1 is concerned, and of "obtaining" and "procuring" as regards issue No. 3. These are enough
to denote the ingredients of a mens rea. But, one will search the
evidence in vain for any indication of a mens rea or guilty intent on
the part of the original respondent or of her election agent when she
had appointed one.. As regards both issues 1 and 3, the learned
Judge seemed to think that Section 123 (7) creates what is called
an "absolute statutory liability", which does not require a mens rea,
although, in dealing with issue No. 2, he had himself, after citing
the
necessary authorities, taken the view that a mens rea was also
E
essential. He had himself, in dealing with issue No. 2, distinguished
Dr. Y. S. Parmar v. Hira Singh(1'), a decision with whose ratio decidendi I have never, with due respect, felt happy in so far as it meant
that a charge of corrupt practice under Section 123(7) does not
require proof of mens rea. It was decided on the strength of a statu.~
tory presumption. There were other decisions of the Supreme Court
F under earlier law showing that mere appointment of a Government
servant as a polling agent could not be corrupt practice (See :
Satya Dev Pushahri v. Padam Dev & Ors.( 2 ), Mahendra Kumar v.
. Vidyavati & Ors.( 3 ). Dr. Parmar's case (supra) had necessitated an
amendment in clause (2) of Explanation 1 of Section 123(7) of the
Act so that a Government servant, by merely acting as a polling
agent, could not be "deemed" to have so acted as to further .the _pro~
pects of a candidate's election. The ~earned Judge had_ re~ted I~ his
G
findings on issue No. 2, on Babu Bhai Vallabh Das Gandhi v. P!lloo
Homi Mody( 4 ), and Haji Abdul Wahid v. B. V. Keskar( 5 ). B~t,
when he came to issue No. 3, and, right at the end of h1~
judgment, to issue No. 1, he appears to have overlooked the basic
H
(1) A. I. R. 1959 S. C. p. 244.
(2) 10 E. L. R. 103 (S. C.) [1954].
(3) 10 E. L. R. 214 (S. C.) (1954].
(4) 36 E. L. R. 108 @ 123-124.
(5) 21 E. L. R. 409 @ 432.
'
..
'
'
.
..
I
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN (Beg, J.)
\
.. .
•
,
•
549
requirements of a mens rea and an actus reus, or, in any case, if
he had these requirements in view, he erred in assuming that they
existed here. 1 think he gravely erred in holding that some "acms
reus" of the original respondent lay buried beneath circumstances
·which seem to me to really point in the opposite direction. Sometimes,
even if direct evidence is lacking, circumstantial evidence, which inescapably points to a particular conclusion, may be even better. But,
where is that evidence here ? I fail to see it and none was pointed
out to us .
Let me here quote the exact language used by the Trial Judge
himself in giving his findings on the first part (relating to 27-12-1970
to 13-1-1971) of issue No. 1 of the "fiirst set" of issues combined
with the issue No. 1 of the additional issues, both issues, for some inexplicable reason, being identically worded. The learned Judge
said :
"Learned Counsel for the respondent then urged that
even accepting that Shri Yashpal Kapur delivered a speech
at Munshiganj on 7th January, 1971 and that he canvassed
support for the respondent in that speech, he was not an
election agent on that date, and there is no evidence of the
fact that he had been instructed to do so by the respondent
No. 1. Learned Counsel stressed that, consequently, it should
not be held on that basis that the respondent No. 1 obtained
or procured the assistance of Shri Yashpal Kapur for the
furtherance of her election prospects.
I have given my careful consideration to this argument
as well, but I regret my inability to accept the same. As also
stated earlier, Shri Yashpal Kapur was occupying a position
of trust and confidence with the respondent No. l since
quite a long time. During the period in question he was
Officer on Special Duty in the respondent No. l's Secretariat. In 1967 he had resigned from his post for the sake
of respondent No. 1 to be able to do her election work in
the constituency. After that was done, he was taken back
in the respondent's Secretariat as Officer on Special Duty.
Respondent No. 1 held herself out as a candidate on 29th
December, 1970. On 5th of January, 1971 Raja Dincsh
Singh was sent to the constituency. On 7th of January,
1971 Shri Yashpal Kapur visited Rae Bareli, and on the
own admission of respondent No. 1, he did so with previous
notice to the respondent No. 1. The subsequent events
al~o appear to be material, for, according to Shri Yashpal
Kapur, immediately on return from Rae Bareli he held a
talk with the respondent No. 1 on 9th or 10th of January,
1971, on 13th January he again resigned from the post anrl
the same day set out once again for the constitu~ncy of_ the
respondent No. 1. It was again he who was ultimately appointed election agent for the respondent No. 1. It may
be added that it was not possible to adduce any direct evi14-126SCI/16
A.
B
c
I>
E
F
G
H
550
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 197 6] 2 S.C.R.
dence on the point whether the respondent No. 1 instructed Shri Yashpal Kapur to go to Rae Bareli on 7th Ja11uary,
1971 for any election work. That ca11 be inferred 011ly on
the basis of the surrou11di11g circumstances. I have already
mentioned those circumstances above and to my mind the
only inference that can be drawn on the basis of those circumstances is that the respondent No. 1 we11t to Rae Bareli
011 the aforesaid date under instruction of the respondent
No. l for doing preliminary Work pertaining to her election.
To sum, therefore, it is satisfactorily proved that the respondent No. 1 during the period ending on 13th January,
1971, obtained/procured the assistance of Shri Yashpa/
Kapur, a Gazetted Officer in the Government of India for
the furtherance of her election prospects, inasmuch as Shri
Yashpal Kapur was made to go to Rae Bareli 011 7-1-1971
and deliver a speech at Shaheed Mela in Munshiganj canvassing support for her candidature".
•
..•
\
Now, it is a well settled rule, repeatedly laid down by this Court,
that allegations of corrupt practice in the course of an election must
be judged by the same standards as a criminal charge. And, no rule
of evidence, in judging guilt on a criminal charge, is more firmly
rooted than that no charge, resting on circumstancial evidence, could
be held to be proved beyond reason,able doubt unless the chain
of circumstances is so complete and so connected with the charge
that it leaves no other reasonable hypothesis open for the Court to
adopt except that the offender had committed the offence alleged
(See : e.g. Smt. .Om Prabha Jain v. Charan Das & Anr.)( 1).
The learned Judge dealt with evidence on issue No. 1 relating to
the activities of Shri Yashpal Kapur by dividing it into three periods ·:
Cl) from 27-1:0.1970 to 13-1-1971, when Shri Kapur had not resigned
from Government service; (2) from 14-1-1971 to 25-1-1971, the
period after Shri Kapur's resignation upto its acceptance by the President of India evidenced by a notification dated 25-1-197.1 ; (3) from
26-1-1971 to 6-2-1971, the period after the acceptance of Shri Kapur's
resignation and upto the date of the publication of it in the official
Gazette. The learned Judge considered only the first two periods
material as he held the activities in the third period to be above board
because Shri Kapur was free to do what he liked in this period. Hence,
the fact that the original respondent appointed Shri Kapur her election
agent on 1-2-1971 made no difference to the result in the third period.
But we will find that a verv !!larino- feature of the findin!!s relating
to the first tw~ periods is that the original respondent is held vicariously responsible without anything bevond the activities of Shri Yashpal
Kapur and his position as an Officer on Special Duty in the Prime
Minister'~ Ser:retariat to justifv the inference that he had an express
or imolied authorisation on direction from the Prime Minister to do
anything in general or in particular on her behalf for her election.
(1)
A.LR. 1975 S. C. 1417@1426.
•
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN (Beg, J.)
5 51
Let us take the first period. What was required to be approved,
beyond all reasona!Jle doubt from the evidence on record on this part
of the case, was that Shri Yashpal Kapur had been instructed or directed by the original respondent to render the help, if any, that he did
give by the speech he was alleged to have made at a fair at Shaheed
Mela (Martyrs' fair) at Munshiganj in Rae Bareli on 7-1-1971, canvassing support for the original respondent's election-an allegation
which Shri Yashpal Kapur had denied in so far as any mention of the
original respondent's candidature is concerned. Shri Kapur admitted
that he had gone there with Shri Gulzarilal Nanda, a former Minister
of the Central Government, but said that he had only, when called
upon to do so, paid his tribute to the memory of the martyrs.
•
The learned Judg~ held that the recollection of Shri Yashpal Kapur
about what he said at the Shaheed Mela on 7-1-1971 was less reliable
than the statement of Shri Vidya Sankar Yadav (P.W. 43), an Advocate belonging to an opposition- party, supported by his political coworker, Nankau Yadav G'P.W. 28)-a witness who, in his transparent
anxiety to appear truthful, went so far as to make the absurd assertion th'at he had not told anyone, before he appeared in the witness
box, that he had attended the Shaheed Mela on 7-1-1971, and who
could not remember either the date of his marriage or the dates ofl
births of his children but asserted that he had noted 7-1-1971 without
even having ever talked on any previous occasion to anyone about this
date if he is to be believed-and, by Shri R. K. Dixit (P.W. 31), a
joint editor of a newspaper, who claimed to be present on the occasion,
and who, while reporting other facts 'll'nd reasons in his newspaper for
believing that the original respondent will stand from the Rae Barely
co1astituency, had not mentioned what he claimed, in the witness box, to
have heard Shri Yashpal Kapur himself say at the Mela. Obviously,
both these witnesses, if they were not committing perjury, did not have
good memories on their own admissions. But, the learned Judge had
believed them quite unhesitatingly although the meeting at Shaheed
Mefa, addressed by Shri Yashpal Kapur, had not even been given any
prominence in the pleadi1,1gs by being atleast specifically mentioned in
the petition.
'
The learned Judge disbelieved the evidence of the original respondent's witness Shri Sarju Prasad (R.W. 12), the fieadmaster of a
School, who had denied that he ever accompanied Shri Nankau (P.W .
28) to the Shaheed Mela as claimed by Nankau. The ground for
holding that Shri Sarju Prasad must be deposing falsely appears to me
to be very unfair both to Shri Sarju Prasad and Shri Gaya Prasad
Shukla, a Co1agressman, who was suspected, without the slightest foundation in evidence, of having induced Shri Sarju Prasad to give perjured
evidence simply because Shri Gaya Prasad, who did not even appear
as a witness, was a member of the Congress (R) party 'and was once
connected with the School in which Shri Sarju Prasad served. The
learned Judge said :
"It is quite likely that once N ankau had conceded in
cross-examination that Sarju Prasad had accompanied him
to the Shaheed Mela, pressure was brought to bear on Sarju
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
552
A
8
c
D
E
F
G
Prasad (R.W.12) by Gaya Prasad Shukla in order_ to make
him appear as a witness in the case and give evidence to contradict the testimony of N ankau.
It is true that in his reexamination Sarju Prasad (RW 12) admitted that on the
date O'a which he was examined as a witness -in the case the
school w•as being run by the Government under the control of
the District Basic Education Officer. However, the association that Gaya Prasad Shukla had with the Pathshala in his
capacity as Adhyaksha, and consequently with Sarju Prasad,
who was a teacher in that Pathshala, could not have been
wiped off overnight merely because the school was taken
over by the Government to be run under its own officers."
The reasons given by the learned Judge for holding that it was
"abundantly clear" that Shri Ram Pal (R. W. 13), another witness of
Smt. Gandhi, was "also not a truthful witness", were :
"Now, since Ramesh Chand Shukla Advocate is a resident of the same village where Ram Pal resided, and since he
was an important worker for the respondent No. 1 during the
election and was also _her Pairokar at some stage, the possibility of Ram Pal having been pressurised by Shri Ramesh
Chand Shukla cannot be excluded. Together with it there
is also the fact that Shri Gaya Prasad Shukla, another important worker of the respondent No. 1, happened to be the
Adhyaksha of the Zila Parishad during the period the witness was examined in the case. It is a matter of common
knowledge that the Adhyaksha of the Zila Parishad always
wields influence in the rural areas. It will not be out of
place to add that when it was put to Ram Pal in crossexamination as to which party did Sri Ramesh Chand
Shukla belong, he pleaded ignorance about it. It cannot be
accepted for any moment that even though Shri Shukla resided in the village in which this witness resided, and even
though Shri Shukla was such a prominent worker of the
Congress party, Ram Pal would not have know abont it."
I do not know how, when workers of the Congress party were
divided into two camps and had been changing sides, from time to
time, ignorance of a worker's precise party loyalties meant that Ram
Pal was untruthful. If mere possibilities of being "pressurised" or
biased were enough to tar a witness as untruthful, it is difficult to see
how or why the witnesses of the election petitio aer, on whom lay the
primary burden of proof, could escape similar treatment.
V. S.
Yadav, was, no doubt, an Advocate.
But, he was not i<Ven paying
Incometax.
He felt free, on a working day in Courts, to go to the
Mela.
He was enthusiastic enough as a member of an opposition
party to object, according to himself, to Shri Yashpal Kapur bringing
in the candidature of the original respondent even at a meeting which,
according to him, consisted mostly of Congress (R) sympathisers.
Shri Yashpal Kapur was not so ignorant or inexperienced in election
1
H
,
(1976] 2 'S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
I
'
•
SMT. INDIAA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN (Beg, J.)
5 53
. - ---
matters imd could not be assumed,. without any evidence to support
the assumption, to be so imprudent as to make a speech when he would
know that, as he was still a Government servant, this would be
misinterpreted.
·
Let us, for the sake of argument, assume that Shri Yashpal Kapur
had been over-powered by such a desire to exhibit an excessive zeal,
which got the better of his prudence that he, believing that a publicly
made gesture of his loyalty w•as needed on this particular occasion,
cast all caution to the winds and, while payL1g the tribute he was called
upon to pay to the memory of the martyrs, suddenly decided to jump
into the electoral fray by making an appeal at the martyrs' mela to
support Smt. Indira Gandhi, as- though the speeches of all those
local leaders who, in addition to Shri Gulzarilal Nanda, a former Minister, are said to have spoken there to the same effect, were not enough.
What follows ? It is here that we find the weakest link la the misty
and fanciful chain of the learned Judge's logic.
Where was the
evidence that, whatever else Shri Yashpal Kapur may or may not have
been supposed to do on his visit to Rae Bareli, this particular piece of
"frolic," a term used by faw relating to scope of authority, carried
the "direction., of Smt. Indira Gandhi herself behind it ? Indeed, there
is not only not a jot of evide.ice to suggest that Shri Yashpal Kapur
was actually asked by Smt. Gandhi to go to Rae Bareli to do anything
for her election on this visit, but. there is ample absolutely unshaken
evidence of Shri Yashpal Kapur to the contrary, _supported by the
evidence of the Prime Minister herself, which the learned .trial Judge
had, for some reason entiiely ignored.
In a'ny case, it is utterly unthinkable that the Prime Minister herself could have conceivably
authorised Shri Kapur to go to Munshiganj and make a public speech,
while he was still a. Government servant, to support her candidature.
And, if he had no authority from her either to act generally or to do
any particular act on her behalf, how could each and every action of
Shri Kapur possibly make the Prime Minister legally liable vicariously
for it?
y
•
A
B
c
D
E
The learned Judge, as is evident, from his summary of evidence F
and conclusions, relied on circumstantial evidence only. But, in order ..
that the circumstances should have a conclusive effect, so as to exclude
any reasonable hypothesis except that of quilt, they had to point in o>.ie
direction only and in no other.
What is the position that emerges
from a consideration of the circumstances found and detailed by the
learned Judge himself '! It was held that Shri Yashpal Kapur was
occupying a position of trust and ccJ.1fidence with the original-respon- G
dent for quite a long time. Indeed, his evidence shows that he was
so attached to the family of the original respondent and the {'Olitical
and national causes its members had represented that he was 1ust the
type of person who could, even without the slightest suggestion on the
pa_rt of the origi11al respondent, have voluntarily taken npon himself
the duty to do whatever he could do in his private capacity to help H
her return. at the election. Indeed, his private capacity, as· a person
attached to the family of the original respondent and to the causes
espoused by its members, could very well be considered more important
554
A
B
c
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 2 ·s.C.R.
by him than his gove=ent service. And, this is exactly what the
findings given by the leamed Judge relating to services rendered by
Shri Yashpal Kapur at the previous elections of the original respondent,
showing how he had resigned his post on a previous occasion, to help
in her election, indicated.
In the passage from the Judgment, quoted above, the learned
Judge draws an filference of a previous instruction, frQJn the Prime
Minister to Shri Kapur; to say what he is alleged to have said in a
speech, because, inter alia, Shri Kapur met the Prime Minister on his
return from Rae Bareli. Again, the necessary inference of a previous
intimation by Shri Kapur to the Prime Minister of his intention to visit
Rae Bareli, could not be that there was m:iy authority or direction given
by the Prime Minister to Shri Kapur to do or to say anything on her
behalf. All this would lie in the realm of pure conjecture and suspicion, . It left other possible and more reasonable infer_ences wide
open.
The learned Judge had himself held, so far as use of rostrums is
concerned, that the Prime Minister sheds her persc1ilality, as the holder
D of her office, and assumes the role of a mere candidate as soon as she
ascends a platform to make un election speech. Bnt, w)len the learned
Judge deals with the action of Shri Kapur, in making a speech from
a platform at a martyrs' mela, because Shri Kapur is called upon to pay
his tribute to the martyrs, he holds that not only must the capacity of
a Govt. Servant ullshakably stick to hin:i, but that Shri Kapur must have
been authorised by the Prime Minister herself knowing, as she did,
E · that he was a Govt. Servant, to go and make a pablic speech· at the
Mela and canvass for votes for her. I do not think that we can indulge in a flight of fancy which could be des::ribed 'as "flamboyant". ·
The nncontroverted evidence of Shri Kapur which had been ignored
by the Trial Jndge was that it was the special business of this witness, .
as an officer on Special Duty in the Prime Minister's Secretariat, in
F his own words, "to· deal with the representations received from public
and other works of semi-political nature." It is difficult to understand
how the occupant of such a difficult and responsible office as tbat of
_.,- the Prime Minister of the numerically largest democracy in the world
· can possibly discharge his or her duties towards the public satisfactorily without the aid of such officers. Naturally, as the Prime
G Minister was contemplating standing for electio>n from the Rae Bareli
constituency, it would not be outside the scope of the duties of such
an· officer to attend especially to the complaints and representations
from Rae Bareli. He stated that Shri Gulzarilal Nanda, who was
then the Railway Minister, had received some represen!'ations from
Rae Bareli. He also said that he bad; from time to time, forwarded
some representations to Shri Gulzarilal Nanda, who had asked -him
H to accompany hin:i to Rae Bareli. Therefore, apparently withoet
being asked bY the Prime Minister, bnt, after informing her of his
intention to go with Shri Gulzarilal Nanda, the witness had, in the
conrse of the performance of dnties especially assigned to him since
•
SMT. INDIRA (JANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN
(Beg, J.)
555
his appointment, visited Rae Bareli in the company of Shri Guizarilal
Nanda. This could not be outside the scope of his duties.
~
~
\
~
.,
1
",
Again, without any contradiction from any evidence whatsoever,
his.,.'>tatement, unquestioned also in cross examination, was that the
Prime Minister did not, at any time, ask him, in his own words,
"either directly or indirectly to do anything pertaining to her election". The Prime Minister's replies to interrogatories served upon
her show that she had no personal knowledge of what Kapur did
at Rae Bareli before he was appointed her election agent. It is also
apparent from the evidence of this witness and of the Prime
Minister herself that, when he expressed his desire on 9th or 10th
January, 1971, to the Prime Minister to resign from his post as Oflicer on Special Duty, she asked him to think over the matter as ;:his
would mean that he could not return to his post. He had earlier
said that this decision was taken with a view to do work for the
public in general and the Congress party in particular as he wanted
to enter public life. It is clear that the Prime Minister had left the
decision entirely to the free will and option of Shri Kapur who had
been asked to ponder over it carefully. When Shri Kapur had informed the Prime Minister again on 13-1-1971 that he had reached
his final decision after due consideration, to resign from his post so as
to be able to do public work, as he had political ambitions, she had
agreed to it and had asked him to see Shri P. N. Haksar, who was Incharge of the Prime Minister's Secretariat. He informed Shri P. N.
Haksar about this decision on the telephone and then met him an hour
later on 13-1-1971 to submit his letter of resignation. Shri Haksar,
relying upon Rule 3 of the Govt. of India Transaction of Business
Rules, had orally accepted this resignation, as the head of the Prime
Minister's Secretariat. He told Shri Kapur that he was a free man.
Naturally, the necessary notification, showing that Shri Kapur was
relieved of his office with effect from 14-1-1971, was to follow.
The statement of Shri Kapur, supported by those of the Prime
Minister and Shri P. N. Haksar, had been accepted by the Trial
S:ourt as correct so far as te nder of this resignation and its acceptance,
m all the stages, followed by the notification in the Gazette, went.
The learned Judge held that the President gave his assent on 25.1.1971.
Shri Kapur's letter of .resignation must ha_ve been duly forwarded and
was acted upon. This was the learned Judge's finding. Shri Kapur
did not work in the Prime Mi1nister's Secretariat after 13;1.1971 and
he drew no salary as a Govt. servant after that date.
The notification in the Gazette could not, according to rules, take place until
Shri Kapur had handed over charge. ·He signed and completed the
necessary papers relating to relinquishment of the charge of his office
on 13.1.1971, but he put the date 14.1.1971 under his signature on
the document evidencing a formal handing over of charge as it was
t? take effect from that date. The Trial Court held that the resignation of Shri Kapur would be effective from 25-1-1971 notwithstanding
the fact that his request to be relieved from office, with effect from
A
B
c
D
E
F
1
I\
.G
H
556
A
B
c
D
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 ·s.c;R.
14.1.1971, had been accepted and acted upon immediately by Shri
P. N. Haksar as the official head of the Prime Minister's Secretariat.
The papers were sent to the Secretariat of the President of India for
completion of formalities. The formal Presidential sanction having
been obtained, the notification dated 25.1.1971, declaring the resignation of Shri Kapur to be effective from 14.1.1971, was published
on 6.2.1971.
On the ·facts stated above, there could be no doubt whatsoever
that Shri Kapur was not asked to do anything at all in connection with
her election by the Prime Minister herself, but he had decided to
take interest in it voluntarily as he had some political ambitions; and,
therefore, he had asked the Prime Minister to be relieved of his office
in her Secretariat with effect from 14-1-1971. It is unfortunate that
the learned Judge thought that there was something almost sinister
in Shri Kapur taking such interest in the election or in hoping to enter
political life through absolutely legitimate means.
There is not the
slightest reason for· any0«1e who fairly examines the evidence of Shri
Kapur, supported by that of the Prime Minister and Shri P. N. Haksar,
to doubt the motives or the veracity of Shri Kapur on this point. He
frankly stated that his ambition was to enter political life. In any
case, the motives of Shri Kapur were not on trial. If such assistance
as he may have rendered was entirely voluntary, without any request
or solicitation from the Prime Mi1aister, I do not see how, on the
view of the correct legal position stated above, it made any difference
to the result even if Shri Kapur had continued to be a Government
servant upto 25.1.1971.
'
E
F
G
H
Shri P. N. Haksar was aware of and cited the applicable rule
for a resignation by a temporary Government servant, as Shri Kapur
was, and stated also the practice followed, in his experience, in such
cases.
He, presumably thought that the resignation was effective
~rom 14.1.1971.
Shri Kapur also acted upon that assumption and
in that belief.
The Prime Minister, who could not be expected to
examine suo moto the question whether Shri P. N. Haksar and Shri
Kapur were right in their beliefs about the effectiveness of the resignation, assumed that everything was alright.
fo any case, there could
not possibly, on these facts, be any mens rea on her part.
The learned Judge having accepted, on the unimpeachable evidence
of the date of notification of 25.1.1971, published in the official
Gazette on 6.2.1971, that Shri Kapur must have handed ia his resignation in a letter of 13.1.1971, it is very difficult to see how one
could possibly doubt the correctness of the statement of Shri P. N.
Haksar that, as the Head of the Prime Minister's Secretariat, he had
accepted the resignation orally and forwarded it on for necessary action.
The resignation had take'a place with the consent of the Prime
Minister. It is inconceivable, in the circumstances, that Shri P. N.
Haksar would not have, as the Head of the Department in which Shri
Kapur was working, agreed to relieve him of his duties by telling him
that he was a free man, and, thereby, accepted his resignation. He,
/
I
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NA!<AIN (Beg, J.)
•
)
+
557
very honestly, stated that he does not remember whether he wrote
2!11ything on the margin of that letter. He must have made so many
indorsements on so many letters and documents that it was expecting
the impossible to hold that he must remember what he wrote on every
·one of them.
The only other ground given by the learned Judge for
doubting the correctness of this version, which completely accords
with the natural and ordinary course of official busi•ness, was that the
additional written statement, filed a year after the original written
statement, mentions this fact for the first time. It seems to me that
the learned Judge was carrying his suspicions to excessive lengths.
The real question involved was the legal effect of the facts accepted
by the learned Judge to be correct. These were : firstly, that such a
letter of resignation was handed in on 13-1-1971 by Shri Kapur to
Shri Haksar asking to be allowed to resign with effect from 14-1-1971;
and, secondly, this very request was accepted by the President of
India and incorporated in a notification dated 25-1-1971.
The learned Judge had found Shri P. N. Haksar's stateme'ilt, that
such an oral acceptance, followed by the necessary notification afterwards, was "rather interesting," and, that the resignation could not
be effective until 25.1.1971, the date of drafting the notification. But,
what the learned Judge completely overlooked was that the 11otification itself made the resignation effective from 14.1.1971, the date
from which Shri Kapur hud neither worked in the Prime Minister's
Secretariat nor drawn any salary. There was no plea anywhere, and
there is no express finding on it, that the President's 1,1otification itself,
which made the resignation effective from 14.1.1971, was invalid to
the extent that it purported to give any retrospective effect to the
resigmtion, in the sense that it made it effective from a date prior
to its actual acceptance. The fact that it is made effective from
14.1.1971 shows that the letter must have reached the President's
Secretariat with the request that this should be done.
And, i'n the
ordinary course of business, the head of the office concerned makes
his indorsement on such letters.
A
B
c
D
E
F
The learned Judge had relied on Rule 5 of the Central Civil
Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949, which runs as follows
'•
"5 (a) The service of a temporary Government servant
who is not in quasi-perma•nent service shall be liable to
termination at any time by notice in writing given either by
the Government Servant to the appointing authority, or
by the appointing authority to the Government serva!nt.
(b) The period of such notice shall be one month,
unless otherwise agreed to by the Government •and by the
Government servant :
Provided that the service of any such Government servant may be termraated forthwith by payment to him of a
sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances
G
H
558
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 S.C.R.
for the period of the notice or as the case may be, for the
period by which such notice falls short of one month or
any ·agreed longer period."
The learned Judge had referred to Halsbury's Laws of England,
Vol. V (Simond's Edn.), p. 61, where it was laid down that in a
"corporation created by Statute for the discharge of public functions
a member may not have an absolute right to resign at will, because
the law may cast a duty upon the persons elected to a public office
to act in that office in public interest." He also referred to an American case, Edwards M. Edwards v. United States('), to the effect that
only the appointing authority could have accepted the resignation of
a1a occupant of a public office, and that, under the special provisions ·
of the law, the holder of such an office could be· subjected to a penalty
The
for a wrongful refusoal to perform the duties of his ·office.
desire or wish of the holder of the office had to give place to public
It is clear that the cases cited could
interest in such special cases.
have no relevance whatsoever for an interpretation of Rule 5 set out
above.
The learned Judge had then relied upon Raj Kumar v. Union of
lndia(2), where this Court held that "normally, and, in the absence
of any law or rule governing the conditions of his service to the
contrary, it will not be open to the public servant to withdraw his
resignation after it is accepted by the appropriate authority." In that
case, there was a dispute between the Govt. servant and the Union of
India on the question whether the Govt. servant concerned could withdraw his resignation after it was accepted. It was held that he could
not. It was not a case of an agreement between the parties at all as
to the date from which the resignation could effectively terminate service. It is true that, in Raj Narain v. Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi( 3 ),
when this very matter came up to this Court, to decide whether an
issue should ]?e struck on it, this Court had sent back the matter
to the High Court after holding that an issue should be framed to
decide when Shri Kapur's resignation became effective and that this
question "will have to be examined with reference to his conditions of
service." Now, it is clear, from the rule itself, that a condition of Shri
Kapur's service was that the Govt. and the Govt. servant could dispe'.lse with the period of notice if it was mutually agreed upon to do
that. Rule 5 (b) makes that abundantly clear. The learned Judge,
for some· reason, completely overlooked this aspect.
Neither the Govt. nor the Govt. servant is in a worse position
than an ordinary master or servant on a matter governed by contract.
In fact, Article 310 makes it clear that, in such a case, the tenure
of office of a Central Govt. serva11t is "during the pleasure of the
President." In the instant case, the President's pleasure was contained
in the notification dated 25.1.1971 showing that the President had
accepted the resignation of Shri Kapur with effect from the forenoon
of 14.1.1971. And, this is what Shri Kapur himself wanted. Hence,
[1880] 26 L. Ed. 31.
(2) A.LR. [1969] S.C. 180 : [1968] 3 S.C.R. 857.
(3) A.LR. 1972 S.C. 1302 : [1972] 3 S.C.R. 841.
(!)
/
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN (Beg, J.)
559
· there is no difficulty at all in accepting the correctness of a resignation
effective from the date which both parties to the contract, on p~tent
facts, had agreed to. No rights of an innocent 3rd par~y w~re either
involved or affected by such an acceptance of the res1gnatJO'n from
the date immediately after the date on which Shri Kapur had tendered
his resignation. That, as already point~d out, was als<;i t~e date. after
which he had ceased to work or draw his salary. It 1s mconce1vable
that the law should thrust the status .of a Govt. servant upon one who
does not want it, particularly when the Govt. also does not, in public
i•aterest, refuse to relieve· him by making him stick to any terms to
the contrary in his contract. Our law, on this point, is not so m,onstrous.
The position accepted by the learned Judge appears to me
to be quite indefensible. · However, there was an amendment also
in the Jaw by Sec. 7 of Act 40 of 1975, adding the following at the
end of the Explanatio•a to Sec. 123 (7) of the Act :
"(3) For the purposes of clause (7), notwithstanding
•anything contained in any other law, the publication in the
Official Gazette of the appointment, resignation, termination
0f service, dismissal or removal from service of a person in
the service of the Central Government (including a person
serving in connection with the administration of a Union
territory) or of a State Government shall be conclusive
proof- (i) of such appointme1at, resignation, termination of service, dismissal or removal from service, as the case may be,
and
·
(ii) where the date of taking effect of such appointment, resignation! termination of service, dismissal or- remov~l !!om service, •as the case may be, is stated in such
Pt;bhcat1on, also of the. fact that such person was appointed
with .eff~ct from the said date, or i11 the case of resignation, .
termmat10n of service, dismissal or removal from service,
such person ceased to be in such service with effect from
the said date."
I find that this amendment, which was made retrospective, by Sec.
10 of Act 40 of 1975, ~makes the legal position stiil clearer. The
learn~d Counsel for the election-petitioll_er had assailed the validity
of this amendment on the ground that powers conferred by it upon
the Govt. are bound to be abused by those who hold the reins of
Govt. I am afraid I am unable to see any force in this contention.
The pr~sumption is th!lt a bonafide use will be ma.de of this power
~odged m such responsible hands. If such powers are ever exercised
m a malafid~ manner, it ·is the particular exercise of the power that
.Cilll _be questioned and struck down.
The provisio<a does not become
invalici ~tely because it could be abused as practicallv any provision
·
of law can be .h_v those who may want to do so.
B·
c
D·
E.
F
G.
H
560
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 s.c.R.
A
I will next take up the period from 14.1.1971 upto 25.1.1971,
when Shri Kapur is said to have gone and voluntarily worked at Rae
Bareli, and to have done whatever he could to organise the conduct
of the Prime Minister's electia11 after his talks with the Prime Minister.
The position with regard to allegations in this period is summarised
as follows :
B
1. He is said to have either led or to have .ioined a procession of
cars taken out on 14.1.971 in the town of Rae Bareli as a part of
the election campaign for t_lie original respondent although Shri U. S.
Yadav (PW 41),. An Advocate, who was a staunch S.S.P. worker,
produced on behalf of the electio111-petitioner, clearly stated that he had
not seen Shri Kapur in that procession which he watched but he
h'ad seen him only on 15.1.1971.
The learned Judge, however,
not only relied on the evidence of Shri R. K. Singh (PW 42) but
also on that of Shri U. S. Yadav to hold that Shri Kapur must liave
been "associated with" the procession of people seen i'.t1 cars and peeps
taken out on 14.1.1971 shouting Congress (R) party slogans to start
off the election C'ampaign.
c
D
E
F
G
H
2. On 17.1.1971, Shri Kapur is said to have participated in an
electio111 meeting held ;:tt the Clock Tower. On this allegation, the
learned Judge accepted the evidence of Shri R. K. Dixit (PW 31),
and Shri R. K. Singh, (PW 42), although both these witnesses only
stated that some confusion took place at the meeting and Shri R. K.
Dixit did not even remember whether •any speech was made at all by
Shri Kapur. Shri R. K. Singh also did not state that Shri Kapur
actually made a speech but had said that "a disturbance took place
when Shri Kapur wa•ated to deliver a speech ........ as a result of
which he could not do so". The learned Judge rejected the evidence
of Shri V. C. Dwivedi (RW 18) supported by Shri Kapur (RW 32)
himself, that Shri Kapur was not present at all at this meeting. However, on the evidence of the election petitioner's witnesses themselves,
Shri Kapur could do nothing whatsoever in furtherance ·of the election
of the original respondent at this meeting.
3. On 19-1-1971, Shri Kapur is said to have address.od a meeting
at village Nihasta where he is said to have gone in the company of
Prof. Sher Singh, a Minister of State in the Government of India.
Although, the tour programme of the Minister concerned showed that
the Minister went to that village to inaugurate a Telephone Exchange
on 18-1-1971, supported by the evidence of Jagannath Prasad (RW
16), a resident of village Nihasta and K. D. Pandey (RW 17) Post
Master, Sub Post Office, yet, the learned Judge preferred the evidence
of Shri R. K. Singh (RW 42) for the election-petitioner despite the
infirmity in this evidence that it was neither consistent with the tour
programme of the Central Government. Minister sent in, advance. for
this function nor with the unshaken evidence of those wno orgamsed
the function.
4. It was alleged that Shri Kapur on 19-1-1971, a~a}nst in the .company of Prof. Sher Singh, the Ce~tral Gov~rnment Mm1ste~, men?oned
above, attended a meeting held m Lal~an1. ~CJ f::ir 1.\1\ this particular
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN_ (Beg. J.)
561
allegation is concerned, the learned Judge thoug~t that it ~ould ~ot be
accepted becaµse it was supporttld only by op.e highly partisan witness,
Shri G. N. Pandey, against 4 faultless witnesses : Abdul Jabbar (RW
25, Fatesh Bahadur Singh (RW 26) lshwar Chand (RW 27), and
Ranjit Singh (RW 28).
)
5. On 19-1-1971, Shri Kapur was said to be present at the inaugural
function of the Telephone Exchange at Behta Kalan a,nd is said to
have delivered a speech there. The learned Trial Judge accepted the
evidance of Pt. Shashank Misra, (PW 32), admittedly a highly partisan
witness, who was believed because of a question put to him in cross
examination suggesting that there was uproar when Shri Kapur started
speaking so that p.obody could hear what he said. The learned judge
held that this amounted to an admission of Shri Kapur's presence and
participation in this meeting.
A
B
C
6. Shri Kapur was alleged to have delivered a speech on 18-1-1971
at the foundation laying ceremony of a new Post Office building at
Rae Bareli in the compa,ny of Prof. Sher Singh, the Central Government
Minister, mentioned above. This allegation was not accepted on the
ground that it was not supported by any evidence whatsoever.
All that the witnesses could remember of Shri Kapur's speech, on
each occasion, was that he supported the original respondent's candidature. Out of allegations of acts said to have been committed on
6 occasions by Shri Kapur in this period, the learned Judge found only
4 instances proved. Out of these, it was clear that Shri Kapur could
not have done anything in furtherance of the original respondent's
election 17-1-1971, when, according to the election-petitioner's witnesses, he was not even allowed to ·speak. Even if al! the election
petitioner's witnesses accepted by the learned Judge are to be implicitly believed for this period the position is :
(a) O.n three occasions in this period, from 14-1-1971 to
25-1-1971, Shri Kapur is shown to have made a speech supporting
the original respondent's candidature.
D
E
F
(b) There is no evidence whatsoever from any source that Shri
Kapur did so on any of these three occasions either after having been
requested by the original respondent to do so or with her knowledge
or consent or approval.
•'
"•
(c) The only evidence in the case, on the decisive question, coming
from the side of the original respondent, is that Shri Kapur did, whatever he did, entirelv on his own in!itiative and in his private and individual capacity, without the slightest solicitation, request, or suggestion
from the original respondent who did not even k:now what he was
doing at Rae Bareli. And, this evidence, being uncontroverted, could
not be rejected. In fact, it was not rejected by the Trial Court. It
was ignored by it presumably under an erroneous belief that it was
not material.
There is no evidence whatsoever that Shri Kapur was constituted
a sort of general de-~acto agent of the Prime Minister even before he
G
H
562
A
rC
E
F
G
ff
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976) 2 'S.C.R.
became her election agent on 1-2-71. In deed, such a case, that Shri
Kapur was constituted a de-facto ag~lllt of the Prime M:inister an?i if
so what was the scope of his authority, was not set up m the petitJon
a~d was not put in issue. Therefore, there is no findmg on it by the
learned Judge. Could the Court then, without any proof of any
specific request or solicitation or even koowledge of or consent to the
doing of any particular acts Shri Kapur may have done in this period
make the Minister liable for them in any way ? I think not. The
election petitioner had to be confined to the case he had set up. This,
as already pointed out, could only be, onl a fair reading of the petition
on issue No. 1, one of specific authorisation of particular individual
acts of Shri Kapur. Of this, there is not only no evidence whatsoever
on record but the evidence is to the contrary.
t
•
Issue No. 1, as framed, and the form of findings given on it indicate
that the learned judge realized that the election petitioner's case must
be confined to proof of specific acts or statements of the original respondent herself which induced Shri Kapur, as a Government servant,
to give some assistance in furtherance of her election, but the discussion of evidence and the inferences which the learned Judge reached
upon the circumstances found, indicated that the learned Judge thought
that Shri Kapur was constituted a sort of de-facto agent everi before
Shri Kapur was clothed with legal authority on 1-2-71. This appears
to me to be ~he underlying current of thought and reasoning of the
learned Judge. Thus, the result was that what was really decided
was the case of a de-facto agency which was neither set up nor was the
subject matter of an issue. I, therefore, think that the principle that
no amounlt of evidence could be looked into on a case not reallv set
up was applicable here. It was quite unfair to except the original
respondent to meet a case not set up at all. Furthermore, the case of
de-facto agency was, in the circumstances of the particular case, only
possible to set up if the Prime Minister had made some request to
Shri Kapur to go and conduct the election campaign even before he
was appointed her election agent as 1-2-1971. If this was not established by evidence on record, it could be said that the bottom was knocked
out of .even such a hypothetical case. Had a case of de-facto agency
heen even argued, it is not conceivable that certain cases of Division
Benches of the Allahabad High Court itself would not have "been
cited to show on what kind of evidence it could succeed.
In Rustom Satin v. Dr. Sampoornanand & Ors.(1) it had been
held by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court (V. Bhargava
and J. N. Takru JJ.), inter alia (at 243) :
"So far as the election law in this country is concerned it
is a creation of statute and as such has to be interoreted in
accordance with the provisions of that statute. Section 100
of the Act clearly refers to corrupt practices committed by
folll· classes of persons only, viz., the candidate, his election
agent, persons acting with the consent of the candidate or
his election agent, and those acting without such consent.
(I) 20 E. L.R. 221 @ 243.
/"
,
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
(Beg, J.)
5 63
The corrupt practices committed by the first three classes
of persons are covered by section 100 ( 1) (b), while t~ose
committed by persons falling in the fourth class are provided
against in section lOO(l)(d) (ii)."
The same Bench of the Allahabad High Court in J. P. Rawat v.
K. D. Paliwal,( 2 ) had held (at p. 456) :
•
" ...... even in the case of admitted workers in whose
case also general consent to work for t]e candidate may be
implied, the consent of the returned candidate to corrupt
practice or practices complained against have to be separately
proved, and reliance upon general consent, express or implied
to work legitimately for the candidate is not deemed sufficient:"
After 14-1-71, the Prime Minister, like everyone else concerned,
obviously believed that Shri· Kapur was no longer a Government servant. As I have already pointed out this was the legally correct assumption. Even if one were to assume, for the sake of argument, that this
was not so and that the learned Judge had correctly held that Shri
Kapiir's resignation became effective from 25-1-1971, there could be
no liability for a corrupt practice by merely permitting Shri Kapur to
resign. The uncontroverted evidence is that, after resigning, Shri
Kapur went to Rae Bareli voluntarily, without any request or suggestion
made to him by !he original respondent or by anybody else to go to
Rae Bareli and work for her election. Even his appointment as the
original respondent's election agent on 1-2-71, according to Shri
Kapur's eviderke, was the result of a suggestion of Shri Dal Bah:idur
Singh at Rae Bareli, apparently during the Prime Minister's visit to
her constituency.
A
B
c
D
E
Cases in which help rendered voluntarily by a Government servant
without any attempt by the candidate concerned to "obtain" or
"procure" it were held not to constitute a "corrupt practice" of the
candidate, whatever be the impropriety of it for the Government servant himself, were completely overlooked by the learned Judge. In
Hafiz Mohd. Ibrahim v. Election Tribunale) a Division Bench of
Allahabad (Mootham C. J. and Mukerji, J.) had pointed out that a
Government servant has a "private personality" to. Similar observations of Dua J. are found in a Division Bench decision of the Punjab
High Court (See: Ram Phal v. Brahm Prakash( 3 ).
"
I
On the conclusions reached by the learn:ed Judge himself, the acts
of Shri Kapur between the period 25-1-71 and 6-2-71, the date of the
publication of the notification, could not be taken into account as no
corrupt practice could possibly exist in that period, due to the participation' of Shri Kaour in any election work. And, with regard to the
two earlier periods, beginning with 7-1-71, I am unable to see, for the
reasons given above, how any corrupt practice could be committed by
XX E. L. R. 443 @ 456.
(2) 13 E. L. R. 262.
(3) 23 E. L. R. 92 (1968).
(1)
G
H
564
A
B
c
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 ·s.c.R.
the original respondent vicariously due to anything done by Shri Kapur,
even if one were to apply the law as it existed before the amendments
of the Act.
Another question, which I may now briefly consider, is the date
from which the original respondent could be said to have held herself
out as a candidate. If she was not a "candidate", upto 25-1-1971,
as defined by law, that would, in itself, be a sufficient ground for wiping
out the effect of findings of the learned Judge on the two periods dealt
with .above.
•
•
The learned Judge had inferred that the Prime Minister was a
"candidate" from 29-12-70 as she had held herself out as a candidate
when she answered a question out to her on 29-12-70 at a Press
Conference at New Delhi. The question and answer were as follows :
"Q. A short while ago there was a meeting of the opposition leaders and there they said that the Prime Minister is
changing her constituency from Rae Bareli to Gurgaon ?
P.M. No. I am not."
D
E
F
G
H
Jn the witness box, the Prime Minister disclosed that what she meant
by the answer was that she would not contest from the. Gurgaon constituency. On further cross-examination, she stated :
"It is wrong to assume that while giving the reply marked
'B' in j:he transcript (Ext. 132) I conveyed that I was not
changing my constituency from Rae Bareli at all and emphatically held out that I would contest electionl again from Rae
Bareli. In my opinion there is no basis for this assumption."
The learned Judge had, in preference to the statement of the Prime
Minister herself as to what she meant, together with the evidence given
by her Secretariat that there ~ere entreaties or offers to her from other
constituencies that she should be their representative, relied on Press
reports and what members of other parties thought and did as a result
of the above-mentioned statement of the Prime Minister on 29-12-1970.
The learned Judge also referred to paragraph 1 (A) of the additional
written statement which runs as follows :
"That in fact, there were offers, from other Parliamentary
Constituencies in India, requesting this respondent to stand
as a candidate for the Lok Sabha from those Constituencies
an!d a final decision in regard to the Constituency was announced by the All India Congress Committee only on
January 29, 1971, and she only held herself out as a caridi-.
date on filing her nomination at Rae Bareli on 1st of February, 1971 (underlining is by me.)" ·
He had also referred to the visits made by Congress (R) leaders to
Rae Bareli, particularly, Shri Dinesh Singh and Shri Gulzarilal Nanda
and by Prof. Sher Singh. He had not accepted the explanation that
they had gone there of their own accord.
,.
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN (Beg, J.)
••
•
-,.,
i
•·
~
"
~
.i
·:
-'
565
Tue learned Judge had also considered several English authorities
but had noted that the law here was not the same as in England. It
had been laid in Munniswami Gounder v. Khader Sheriff & Ors. C1)
where it was said :
"In this respect the law in this country makes a significant departure and t?at depa~ture, in our ?Pini?n•. agai? emphasises the application of VItal democratic pnnc1ple,. m the
light of differing conditions. We may here note, b~1efiy, a
feature of the political practice in the United Kmgdom,
which repeatedly colours and influences the English Cases,
viz., the fact that there a person is often adopted as a candidate, by a political association, without any move on his
behalf, until a particular stage when the adoption is formalised
by his consent."
I am unable to see what bearing. the activities of opposition leaders
and statements issued by them or Press Reports, with regard to the
candidature of the original respondent No. 1 from the Rae Bareli
constituency, had upon either an interpretation of her own statement
of 29-12-1970, or the date on which she made a final decision to stand
as a candidate from the Rae Bareli constituency or the communication of that decision by her to her constituency. The material relied
upon by the learned judge consisted of speculation and hearsay corning
from persons who were certainly interested in finding out which constituency the Prime Minister, who had a choice of Gurgaon, a constituency much nearer to New Delhi, and, possibly of other constituencies
as well if she only wanted to change it. Absence of proof of a desire
to change the constituency is not proof of a positive "holding out".
It has been repeatedly laid down in decided cases on the point that
what is relevant is not what other people think or say about what a
possible candidate would do, but what the candidate concerned himself
has said or done, so as to amount to "a holding out" as a candidate
by th~ candidate from a particular constituency. Mere speculation
or rumour circulated by other persons interested in finding out the
Prime Minister's constituency could only prove what their own expectations or beliefs were. This type of "evidence'', strictly speaking,
could not even be admissible unless it could be related to something
actually said or done by the candidate. All that such "evidence"
· ~ould prove was that people interested were speculating or indulging
m guess-work. It seems to me that the learned Judge did not take
into consideration the tactics in the political game which, to some
extent, every party participating in such a game adopts. Some of these
tactics are quite legitimate and honourable, but other are not.
Th~ learn~~ Judge ref~rred to t?e contents of a speech made by
the Pnmc Mm1ster a~ .Ci;)Jmbatore m South India, ii] the early part
of January, 1971, castigatmg one of the. tactics of the opposition oarties
!~ choo~in~ S~ri Raj Narain to oppos~ her, for purposes of maximum
mud slmgmg . The learned Judge pomted out that the Prime Minister
(1) 4 E. L. R. 283 @ 292.
l 5-126SCI '76
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
:i66
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 S.C.R.
ad~itted in her evidence, that she could have said this in her speech at
C01m'?'atorc. She was. not asked whether this amounted to holding
hcrseH out as a candidate from Rae Bareli constituency. If such a
.question had been asked, there is little doubt that she could have explained the statement by the context in which it was made, just
as she had given the precise meaning of her statement of 29-12-1970
in the context in which it was made. Apparently, the context of th~
statement made in early January in Coimbatore was that the opposition
parties had chosen a candidate,, who, in the opinion of Prime Minister,
possessed certain capacity for "mud slinging" which others did not have.
The apparent object of what she mentioned in the speech was to expose
.tactics of opposition parties in choosing such a candidate from a constituency from which they thought the Prime Minister must be standing.
1t was obviously meant to disparage such tactics and not to disclose
her own intentions or future course of action. A healthy democratic
practiec or con_vcntion certainly is that the election of some candidates,
of certain stature and standing or position in public life, is not contested.
To point out that the opposition parties, far from intending to adoPt
such an attitude towards her, were busy devising methods of maligning
her, could not reasonably be constmed as a holding out of herself as a
candidate from a particular constituency unless one was predisposed to
put such a construction on every ambiguous statement of the Prime
Minister, made anywhere after the dissolution of Parliament in Decemb~r. 1970, until the election in the first week of March, 1971. Similarly,, the context of the question of 29-12-1970, put to the Prime
Minister at a conference at New Delhi. was that members of the opposit;rm parties thought that she may be contesting from Gurgaon. In
th, !i!lht of the opposition tactics, which the Prime Minister herself had
referred to in her speech at Coimbatore, it was not unlikely that the
Prime Minister would have preferred to keep her own intentions about
the constituency, from which she would ultimately stand, either a closely
!luarded secret, or, at least, in a fluid State. In any case, it was not
likely that she would announce her own intention very clearly to stand
from any particular constituency until it was considered by her or by
her nolitical advisers to be politically expedient to do so. Aiiain., it may
be that the prospect of such a leader standing from a particu Jar constituency was likely to have a politically exhilarating effect upon the
workers or on party activities in that constituency. From such a point
of view also. the Congress Party (R) of the Prime Minister may also
have preferred that the Prime Minister should not announce her decision until the last moment. A disouted question of fact on such a matter
could not possiblv be determined.by a Court on evidence of guess-work
or speculations of others which are, strictly speaking, not relevant. I
have indicated here that if some guess-work were permissible, as it is
'o give its benefit to the nerson a!lainst whom circumstantial evidence
is to he used. other nossible exn!anations and internretations were not
excluded. The question had to be decided on proof of the actual statemmts and actions of the candidate herself which could amount to clear
and unequivocal expressions of intention. showin!! a decision to stand
from a narticular constituency, meant nrimarilv for the benefit of the
voters of the particular constituency so- chosen- by a candidate. Where
.
was that evidence here?
..
•
I •
j
"
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN (Beg, J.)
•
5 67
11 seems to me that the learned Judge had given an exaggerated
importance to what were either not strictly relevant or insignificant
matters in preference to what could be and was decisive and unequivocal. I do not think that the answer of the Prime Minister at the l>ress
Conference on 29-12-1970 or the contents of her speech in Coimbatore, in early January, 1971,. or even a declaration or announcement of
the All India Congress Committee on 29-1-1971, assuming that there
was such an announcement, could mean that the Prime Minister had
herself finally decided to contest from the Rae Bareli constituency and
had held herself out as a candidate for thjs constituency. This holding
out had to take place by the Prime Minister herself and not by the
Congress Committee. Even if the fact o~ a declaration made by the
Congress Committee, on 29-1-1971, which is all that the written statement admits, proves that the Prime Minister was chosen by her party
for this particular constituency qn this date, her own decision on the
matter could only come and was proved by her to have actually come
later than that. This admission was, in my opinion,, misconstrued by
the learned Judge as a contradiction. In the absence of any evidence
whatsoever which could conflict with the Prime Minister's statement
:about the actual date of her final decision to stand from this Constitu"
ency, it seems to me that the learned Judge had no option reasonably
open to him except to accept the correctness of the only and the best
evidence on this question availab~e in the case. The learned Judge in
observing, quite unnecessarily, that his finding on this question was not
going to be affected by the importance of the office held by the Prime
Minister, seems, subconsciously, to have been so affected by it that he
did not act on the normal rule that the best evidence of a person's state
of mind is his or her own statements and actions and not of others.
He seems to have felt that judicial independence consists in inverting
this rule and judging the matter primarily from the evidence of the states
of mind and opinions and actions of other individuals in the case of a
Prime Minister of this country. I do not consider this to be a judicially correct approach.
·'
The fact that the tour programmes were circulated in advance for
the Rae Bareli District, in which the Prime Minister made electioneering speeches, could also not determine what the final declaration of
intention by the Prime Minister was going to be in regard to the Rae
Bareli constituency. It is not enough that the candidate should have
by then formed an intention to stand from a particular constituency.
There is a gap between intent and action which has to be fill~d by
proof of either statements or of conduct which amount to uneqmvocal
declarations made to voters in the constituency in order to amount to
a "holding out" to them. This seems to me to be the clear position in
the law as laid clown by Courts in this country on th:! meaning of Section
79(bl of the Art.
It is significant that despite the large number of speeches and statements the ·Prime Minister must have made throughout the country. in
this neriod. not a single statement made by her could even be cited in
which she had said before 1-2-1971, that she was standing: as a candidate from the Rae Bareli constituency. It is possible, as I lrnve indicated above, that this may be a part of the political gamz or permissible
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
568
A
B
c
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
party tactics so as to keep opposition parties guessing. It seems t()
me that the learned Judge was overlooking the context, the probabilities.
the natural course of events in &.uch case, the legal and logical relevance and effect of what he thought was decisive, and, finally, the importance of the statement of the Prime Minister hers~lf on this question,
supported by complete absence of any evidence to show that she had
herself made any clear and decisive statement in any speech or conversation which could shake her stand, that her final decision and unequivocal act was the filing of a nomination paper as a candidate on
1-2-1971 at Rae Bareli. I may mention here that, according to the
findings of the learned Judge himself, the question of the Prime Minister
holding herself out as a candidate for the Rae Bareli corutituency
became quite immaterial after 25-1-1971, and, on the findings I have
reached above, the whole question becomes unimportant. However, I
will indicate some authorities which the learned Judge himself had
noticed.
In S. Khader Sheriff v. Munniswami Gounder
Court said (at p. 4 73) :
D
E
[1976] 2 S.C.R.
&
Ors.(1),
•
this.
"When, therefore, a question arises under section 79(b)
whether a person had become a candidate at a given point of
time, what has to be seen is whether at that time he had clearly
and unambiguously declared his intention to stand as a candidate, so that it could be said of him that he held himself out
as a prospective candidate. That he. has merely formed an,
intention to stand for election is not sufficient to make him
a prospective candidate, because it is of the essence of the
matter that he should hold himself out as a prospective candidate".
In J. P. Rawat v. Krishna Dutt Paliwal( 2 ) a Division Bench of the
Allahabad High Court (V. Bhargava and J. M. Takru, JJ), iollowing
the decision of this Court in S. Khader Sheriff's case (supra) said (at
p. 463) : F
"The determining factor, therefore, is the decision of the
candidate himself, not the act of other persons or bodies adopting him as their candidate".
In Haji Abdul Wahid v. B. V. Keskar & Anr.( 3 ), it was held by a
Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court (R. N. Gurtu & S. N.
Dwivedi, JJ) :
G
H
"(i) that the purchase of the nomination forms and voters
lists, could not amount to holding out as a candidate : (ii) the
arranging of public meetings by the officials and the respondent's moving about in the constituency on the 15th and
16th could not by themselves amount to a holding out by
the respondent as a prospective candidate on those days in
(1) 1955 (2) SCR 469 @ 473.
(2) 20 E. L. R. 443 @ 463.
(3) 21 E. L. R. 4-09.
,•
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
(Beg, J.)
569
the absence of evidence to show that the respondent had utilised those meetings and tours for the purpose of making utterances of an electioneering character".
..
In K. K. Mishra v. Banamali Babu('), the Orissa High Court,
;relying upon the following observations of this Court in S. K_hader
Sheri/j's case (supra),, held that a holding out within the meantng of
Section 79(b) must be by declaration of the candidate to an elector or
to the electorate in a particular constituency and not to others :
"It may be that the holding out which is contemplated by
that section is to the Constituency; but if it is the Central
Committee that has to decide who shall be adopted for election from the concerned constituency, any declaration made
to the Committee is, in effect, addressed to the constituency
through its accredited representative".
A
B
c
The view of the learned Judge' appears to me to run counter to the
weight of authorities cited above. In any case, if there was any uncertainty at all, in the Jaw, it has been removed by an amendment by
Section 7 of Act No. 40 of 1975 so that Section 79(b) reads as follows:
" 'Candidate' means a person who has been or claims to
have been duly nominated as a candidate at any election";
Learned Counsel for the election petitioner contended that this
amendment, read with Section 10 of the Act 40 of 1975, would retrospectively alter the "rules of the game" and would be destructive of the
concept of free andi fair elections, if it means that a person is only a
candidate after he has been duly nominated and that he can indulge
in any amount of corrupt practices until the day previous to his nomination.
Even if the present definition is a new one,, it cannot be said to be
arbitrary. The concept contained in it is found in the English definition
which lays down : (See : Halsbury's Laws of England-3rd Edn. Vol.
'14 p. 162) :
" ...... a candidate in relation to a parliamentary election
means a person who is elected to serve in Parliament at the
election or a person who is nominated as a candidate at the
election, or is declared by himself or by others to be a candidate on or after the day of the issue of the writ for the
election ...... ".
•~
D
E
F
G
The English definition is wider but contains, as its first part, the very
-concept found in our new definition of a "candidate".
Corrupt practices of a candidate cannot go unpunished, whether
they are committed before or after he becomes a candidate, when they
amount to acts which come within the purview of electoral offences
dealt with by Chapter 3, Section 125, 126, 127, 127(a) or Chapter
9A of the Indian Penal Code. Offences,, such as bribery, for purposes
of either inducing persons to vote or not to vote or to stand or not to
(I)
38 E. L. R. 451 @ 475.
H
570
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 ·s.c.R.
stand as candidates, undue influence, and personation, are all dealt
with here. These should be sufficient deterrents against perversion of
the electrical process by a prosp~ctive candidate, who wants to adopt
corrupt anq objectionable means for gaining s.ucccss at the polis.
The amendment appears to me to be within the unquestionable
powers of Parliament to legislate, either prospectively or retrospecth·.o.y,
with regard to election matters. I am unable to see how it is capable
of being int·~rpreted as an. attack on free and fair elections, which,
according to the learned Counsel for the Election-petitioner, is part of
the basic structure of the Constitution. I think it is important to bear
in mind that Courts cannot take upon themselves the task of laying down
what ekctoral laws should be. The law makers,. assembled in Parliament, are presumed to know and understand their business of making
laws for the welfare and well being of the mass people of this country,
for the protection of, democracy and fr.;~e and fair election, in accordance
with the needs of the democratic process, better than Courts know and
understand these. It is only where a piece of legislation clearly infringes
a constitutional provision or indubitably over-rides a constitutional
purposes or mandate or prohibition that Courts can interfere. After
having listened to the lengthy and vehement arguments of the election
petitioner, I fail to any invalidity in this provision.
I will now take up issue No. 3 of the 1st set of issue on which.
after rejecting the contention that the erection of barricades and the
provision of the police force for security purposes by the Government
of U.P., during the election tours of the Prime Minister on 1-2-1'71
,and 25-2-1971 in the Rae Bareli constituency, c0'11travened. Section
123 (7), the learned 'Judge held that, nevertheless, the arrangements
made by the District Magistrate of Rae Bareli, the Superintendent of
Police, Rae Bareli, the Executive Engineer, P.W.D. and the Engineer
Hyde! Department, for constructing rostrums and the supply of
power for loud speakers, on the instructions givei,1 by the State Go·
vernment, was a corrupt practice struck by the provisions of Section
123(7) of the Act. As I have already indicated, the only evidence
relied upon by the learned Judge for this extraordinary finding, after
having rejected a similar allegation of a corrupt practice under issue
No. 2, on accoU'at of provision of the Air Force planes and helicopters flown by members of the Force, on necessary official instructions,
to enable the Prime Minister to go to places where she could address
election meetings on 1-2-1971 and 25-2-1971, was that the visits
of the Prime Minister to her constituency on these occasions were
preceded by the issue from the Prime Minister's office of the tour
programmes to the officials of the District through the State Government with the knowledge and consent of the Prime Minister. The
State Government had acted in compliance with the instructions
issued by the Comptroller & Auditor General of India in 1958 read
with Rule 71 (6) of what is known as the Blue Book. The relevant
part of this rule reads as follows :
"It has been noticed that the rostrum arrangements
are not always properly made because the hosts are some·
times unable to bear the cost. As the security of the
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN (Beg, .f.)
5 71
Prime Minister is the concern of the State, all arrangements
for putting up the rostrum, the barricades etc. at the meeting
place, including that of an election meeting, will have to be
made by the State Governme'at concerned".
The Goverament of India had also issued a letter (Ex. A21)
dared 19-11-1969 inviting the attention of the State Governments to
Rule 71 ( 6), mentioned above, and directing them to ensure that,
whenever rostrums are constructed on such occasions, they should
conform to certain specificatio'as laid down with due regard to security considerations. The letter also directed the State Governments to bill t.hc political party concerned with expenses upto 25 %
of the ·cost of the rostrums or Rs. 25,000, whichever is less. The
letter also directed that extravagance in expenditure should be
avoided.
It was proved. by the evidence of Shri R. K. Kaul (P.W. 58)
the Home Secretary in the Governme'at of U.P., that rostrums and
arrangements for barricading are made by the local officials employing contractors for the purpose, under instructions issued by the
State Government. The reasoning adopted by the learned Judge,
however, was that, as the Prime Minister's office had issued her tour
programmes, with the approval of the Prime Minister, the result must
be in the language of the learned Judge himself..:
". . . . . the tour programmes carried an implied direction that the State Government should also get constructed
rostrums and arrange for public address system for the
election meetings to be addressed by her on 1st of February, 1971 and 25th of February, 1971. It should be presumed that the respondent No. 1, as Prime Minister, of this
country, and with five years experience of that office behi'nd
her in 1971, also knew that the said work was to be done
by the officers of the State Government".
'•
This meant that the learned Judge was holding the Prime Minister herself responsible for instructing the State Government knowing
that it will make the necessary arrangements through its servants.
The case thus accepted, that the Prime Minister was employing the
State Government as her agency in procuring the aid of the officers
concemed, was neither set up nor put in issue. Apart from this
objection. the learned Judge overlooked that the provisions of Section 123 ( 7) were intended to prevent solicitation for aid and not
sending of information to the State Government in the course of
ordinary official business even if the candidate concerned knows that
the State Government is bound, under the rules, to make the necessary arrangements dictated by the needs of security of the Prime
Minister and convenience of the public.
The view of the learned Judge involves holding that the "persona"
(a term derived from the concept of the mask worn by Greek actors
on the stage in a drama) of a candidate during an election mnst not
only be different from that of the Prime Minister, but also that, when
the two capacities are held by the same person, what is due to the
A
.B
C
D
E
F
G
H
572
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 S.C.R.
occupant of the office of the Prime Minister must be withdrawn when
the same person acts as a candidate. 0,1 a similar argument, with
regard to use of helicopters and aeroplanes, the learned Judge himself had refused to acknowledge what amounts to a separable legal
personality of a candidate in the eyes of Jaw. The ground given
for this difference between the use of aeroplanes and helicopters by
the Prime Minister and the use of rostrums by her was that the former
was more con•aected with the office or capacity of the Prime Minister and that the latter was exclusively meant for her use in the capacity of a candidate. Even if we were to recognise this distinction
between the "persona" of the Prime Minister and that of a candidate,
it is impossible to separate the special arrangements made for the
security of the person of the Prime Minister from those to which
she may be entitled as a ca·adidate only. It is impossible to deny
at any time the facilities and precautions meant for the person who
holds the office of the Prime Minister to the person just because
she also figures as a candidate at an election. So long as the person
is the same what is meant for the person must be attributed to the
persona or capacity of the Prime Minister and not to that of a
candidate only. The learned Judge, however, thought that a candidate who happens to hold the office of the Prime Minister of
the country, is not entitled to the facilities or precautionary measures
taken to protect the person of the holder of the office when electioneering as though the Prime Minister and the candidate were two
different persons. He was unable to see that, so !mg as the person
was the same, the distinction between the two capacities or personae,
for the purposes for which facilities were given and protection provided, was both factually as well as legally impossible and quite
immaterial.
I also think that the learned Judge erred in holding that such a
case could be one of solicitation of official aid and assistance at all.
It is a case h1 which certain precautions are taken and arrangements
made almost "automatically", if one may- use this word here, by
officers of the State as a matter of duty towards the office held by
a candidat€ who undoubtedly enjoys certain advantages which an
ordinary candidate cannot have. It is as futile to complain of such
a distinction made as it is to complain that a candidate possesses certain advanrages at an electio•a because of the personal services rendered to the country or distinctions achieved by the candidate.
Again, there are advantages which attach themselves to a candidate
because of that candidate's personal qualities, qualifications, capa·
cities or background. The appurtenances of office or distinctions
achieved are, in my opinion, comparable to such personal advantages
in so far as they are not en_ioyed because they are "obtained" or
"procured". If such a result in Jaw is unfair, it is not for Courts
to frad a remedy by accepting the argument advanced before us
also : that those who enjoy the benefits of office must be made to
realize and suffer some of its handiC'aps. This clearly means that
the benefit which Jaw gives, without solicitation by the ca•ndidate,
must be converted, by a judicial fiat, into a disadvantage and a
handicap. It is for parJioament to step in and change the Taw if an
•
•
,·•
l
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN (Beg, J.)
573
alteration of it is considered necessary by it. The only change that
need be made in the law, if that could be the legislative i'iltent, is
to provide that the holder of any office for the time being would
not be qualified to stand at an election. In that event, holders of
•all Ministerial offices will have to resign before they offer themselves
as candidates. But, such is not our law found in the 1951 Act or
anywhere else. I think that it would be extendh1g the scope of
Sec. 123(7) too wide to hold that the facilities· automatically provided by the State to the Prime Minister, by virtue of his or her
office, are also &truck by a provision directed against solicitation of
official •aid and assistance by candidates.
The learned Judge had m_entioned a Division Bench decision of
the Allahabad High Court in Motilal v. Mang/a Prasad('), where
it was laid down :
"We think that the word 'obtain' in section 123 (7)
has been used in the essence of the meaning which connotes purpose behind the action of the candidate. The
word has not been used in the sub-section in the se,1se
of a mere passive receipt of assistance without the candidate even being conscious of the fact that the assistance has
been rendered. In order to bring the case under subsection (7), it must be shown that the candidate did make
some effort or perform some purposeful act in order to get
the assistance."
He had also cited another Divisio"1 Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Biresh Mishra v. Ram Nath Sharma & ors.( 2 ),
that:
"The words 'obtain' or 'procure' or 'abetting or
attempting to obtain or procure' any assistance necessary
imply some effort on the part of candidate or his agent.
Mere passive receipt of assistance is not contemplated by
the Section."
.
'
I think tlrat the import of such observations was clearly what
has been laid down repeatedly by this Court and emphasized by me
already-that a mens rea as well as an actus reus must be shown,
on the evidence on record, before a candidate can be held guilty of
a corrupt practice. In Sheopat Singh v. Ram Pratap (3), this Court
held, in dealing with the allegation of corrupt practice under Sec.
123 ( 4) of the Act, that mens rea was a necessary ingredient of the
corrupt practice a ad that the doctrine of constructive knowledge was
not applicable here.
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
1
In the case before us, the election petitioner alleged a wrongfully "obtained and procured" assistance due to acts of the original
respondent as well as her election agent Shri Yashpal Kapur. Hence,
(1)
(2)
(3)
AIR 1958 All. 794 @ 797.
17 E. L. R. 243 @ 253.
[1965] l SCR. 175.
H
\,
574
A
B
C
D
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
'
(1976) 2 S.C.R
proof of actual mens rea as well as actus reus ou the part of either
the candidate herself or her election agent had to be given. This
was not done. The election-petitioner was, therefore, liable to be
rejected on this ground alone.
If, however, there was any doubt or uncertainty on the matter,
the view taken by the learned Judge had, at any rate, directed the
attention of Parliameat to the need for a clarification of the law
which became necessary. It is not possible to object to the motives
behind the legislation on this ground. Parliament could certainly
set right a defect in law which may have come to its notice as a
result of the learned Judge's interpretation of Sec. 123 (7). The
defect may be due to a possible ambiguity. In order to clarify the
Jaw, Sec. 7 of the Act 40 of 1975 inserted a proviso at the end of
Sec. 123(7), which runs as follows:
•
•
"Provided that where. a'ay person, in the service of the
Government and bdonging to any of the classes aforesaid,
in the discharge or purported discharge of his official duty,
makes any arrangements or provides any facilities or does
any other act or th ng, for, to, or in relation to, any candidate or his agent or any other persO'a acting with the consent of the candid;1te or his election agent, (whether by
reason of the office held by the candidate or for any other
reason), such arrangements, facilities or act or thing shall
not be deemed to be assistance for the furtherance of the
prospects of that c;mdidate's election."
The learned Couose for the election-petitioner has, very fairly,
conceded that, if this amendment, which is retrospective by reason
of the operation of Sec. 10 of Act 40 of 1975, is valid, the decision
of the learned Judge on the above mentioned issue No. 3 would not
be sustainable. Such a concession, i·acidentally, means that whatever facilities were give i to the Prime Minister by the construction
of rostrums or provision of power for the loud-speakers, for which the
party was also billed, at least to the extent of Hh of the expenses of
the rostrums and wholly as regards the expenses of loud-speakers, were
given by the officers concerned in the performance of their official
duties. This is not the same thing as "obtaining" or "procuring'' by
solicitation.
Learned Counsel for the election-petitioner has, however, put
forward the same objection to this retrospective amendment as the
one against a change in the definition of "candidate". It appears
to me that this amendment is merely clarificatory of the state of
Jaw as it really was eve'n before the amendment. On the view I take,
there is no question he :e of altering the "rules of the game" to the
disadV'antage of the election petitioner. The disadvantage, if any,
was there already because of the consequences which, I think, legally
and naturally flow from the occupation of the high office of the
Prime Minister of this ~ountry:
1
E
F
G
H
There is no attack on the validity of Sec. 123 (7) of the Act
as it existed before the ame'.1dment. Hence, there could be no chat-
.•"
...
\
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
•
;.
(Beg, J.)
575
lengc to the validity of the amendment if it does not, as I think it
does not, ch•ange the law but merely clarifies it.
Learned Counsel for the election-petitioner contended that, as a
candidate at an election, the Prime Minister and a'a ordinary candidate should enjoy equal protection of the laws and should be afforded equal facilities irrespective of the office occupied by one or two
or more candidates. Such an attack upon the validity of this amendment seems to me to be possible only under the provisions of Art .
14 of the Constitutio•,1. But, as Act 40 of 1975, has been placed
by Sec. 5 of tht> 39th Amendment in the protected 9th Schedule of
the Constitution, it becomes immune from such an attack.. After
the practically unanimous opinion of this Court in Kesvananda
Bharati's case (Supra), that such an immunisation of an enactment
from an attack based upqn an alleged violation of the chapter on
fundamental rights is constitutionally valid, I do not think, that a
similar attack can be brought in through the back door of a "basic
structure" of the Constitution. Moreover, I am u•nable to see how
this particular amendment has anything to do with damage to any
part of the "basic structure" of the Constitution. Even if an attack
on the ground of a violation of Art. 14 .were open today, I think
that the occupation of such a high and importa'nt office as that of
the Prime Minister of this country, with all its great hazards and
trials, would ·provide a rational basis for reasonable classification in
respect of advantages possessed by a Prime Minis_ter as a candidate
at an election due to arrangements made pecessary by consideratio'ns .
of safety and protection of the life and person of the Prime Minister.
Hence, I am unable to see any sustainable ground of attack at all on
the validity of this provision.
Before I proceed further, I may me'ation that I have dealt with
the findings of the learned Judge, assailed by the original respondent's appeal No. 887 of 1975, perhaps in greater length and depths,
after going through the evidence in the case, than I had set out to
do. I have done so for several reasons. Firstly, l think that the
oature of the attack upon the bo•aafides of the amendments made,
although ordinarily not even entertainable, having been permitted
due, to the constitutional importance and gravity of the allegations
made, this question could not, in my opinio'n, be satisfactorily dealt
with without considering the nature of the :findings and the evidence
at some length so as to satisfy myself that no such question could
possibly •arise here. Secondly, if the amendments were made necessaty for reas0',1s brought out fully only by dealing with facts and
findings in this case, they could not give rise to any grounds to suggest that there was anything· wrong in making amendments to remove such reasons. Therefore, I think, it was necessary to go into
these for determining whether the amendments are good. Thirdly,
even if the amendments are valid, we had to be satisfied that the
tests of corrupt practices alleged are not fulfilled despite the concession of the election-petitioner's learned counsel that this would be
the position. Fourthly, find that the learned Judge has made certain manifest errors in appraising the evide'ace and interpreting the
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
576
A
B
D
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976) 2 S.C.H.
law which call for rectification by this Court as no other authority
can properly do this.
It appears to me, as already indicated by me, that the learned
Judge was perhaps unduly conscious of the fact that he was dealing
with the case of the Prime Minister of this country. He, therefore,
oas he indicated in his judgment, seemed anxious 'UOt to allow this
fact to affect his judgment. Nevertheless, when it came to appraising evidence, it seems to me that, as I have already pointed out,
he applied unequal standards in assessing its worth so as to largely
relieve the election-petitioner of the very heavy onus of proof that
lies on a party which challenges the verdict of the electors by allegations of cqrrupt practices. He also appeared to be attempting to
achieve, by means of judicial interpretation, an equalisation of conditions under which, in his opinion, candidates should contest elections.
I think, that it is not the function of Courts to embark o•a attempts
to achieve what is only in the power of Parliament to accomplish,
that is to say, to bring about equality of conditions .where the law
permits justifiable discrimination. As this Court has repeatedly
pointed out, to treat unequally situated and circumstanced persons
as though they were equals in the eyes of law for all purposes is 'Clot
really to satisfy the requirements of the equality contemplated by the
Constitution.
•
•
•
As regards appraisal of evidence in such a case, I may point out
that, in Rahim Khan v. Khurshid Ahmed('), Krishna Iyer, J., speaking for this Court, said :
E
F
G
"An election once held is not to be treated in a lighthearted man'i1er and defeated candidates or disgruntled electors should not get away with it by filing election petitions
on unsubstantial grounds and irresponsible evidence, thereby
introducing a serious element of u>acertainty in the verdict
already rendered by the electorate. An election is a politically sacred public act, not of one person or of one official,
but of the collective will of the whole constituency. Courts
naturally must respect this public expression secretly written
oand show extreme reluctance to set aside or declare void
an election which has already been held unless clear and
cogent testimony compelli'ng the Court to uphold the corrupt practice alleged against the returned candidate is adduced. Indeed, election petitions where corrupt practices
are imputed must be regarded as proceedings of a quasicriminal nature wherein strict proof is necessary. The burden is therefore heavy on him who assails an election which
has been concluded."
This Court also said there (at p. 672) :
H
"We regard it as extremely u11safe, in the present climate
of kilkenny-cat election competitior.1s and partisan witnesse.~
1
(1)
[19741 (2l sec 660, 666, 672.
';
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
•
\
(Beg, J.)
5 77
wearing robes of veracity, to upturn a hard won electoral
victory merely because lip service to a corrupt practice has
been rendered by some sanctimonious witnesses. The Court
must look for serious assurance, unlying circumstances or
unimpeachable documents to uphold grave charges of corrupt practices which might not merely cancel the election
result, but extinguish many a man's public life."
I will now take up the election petitioner's cross appeal No. 9091
75. Learned Counsel for the election petitioner, very properly and
frankly. conceded that he could not successfully assail the findmgs
of the learned Judge on issues Nos. 4 & 7 relating to alleged distribution of quilts, blankets, dhotis, and liquor by workers of the· original respondent or the alleged provision of free conveyance by vehicles
said to have been hired by Shri Kapur. The evidence on thes.e questi<Yas given by the election petitioner was too flimsy and e~travagant
and was met by over-whelming evidence to the contrary given by
respectable residents of localities in which the alleged corrupt practices ar~ said to have taken place. No driver of any conveyance
was produced. Nor was any person produced who had actually received any alleged gift or had consumed anything provided on behalf of the successful candidate.
As regards issue No. 2, relati'ag to the use of aeroplanes and
helicopters by the original respondent, which was not separately
pressed evidently because it was covered by the amendment which
was assailed by the election petitioner, the reasons I have given on
issue No. 3 for upholding the validity of the amendment relating to
the services rendered by Government officials a'ad members of
defence forces in due discharge of their duties are enough to cover
the points raised.
As regards issue No. 6, relating to the adoption of the drawing of
a cow and a calf as the symbol of the Congress (R) Party of the
original respondent, the finding of the Trial Court, based on a large
number of authorities, was that this is 1aot a religious symbol. This
question was directly decided in Bhartendra Singh v. Ram Sahai
Pandey & Ors. (1), Shital Prasad Misra v. Nitiraj Singh Chaudharyf2)
decided by M.P. High Court on 21-7-71; and Sri Prasanna Das
Damodar Das Palwar v. lndu Lal Kanhaiya Lal Yajnik (3), decided
on 27-8-71 by the High Court of Gujarat. The learned Judge also
cited the following cases where it was decided that a cow is not a
religious symbol :
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
Shah Jayanthi Lal, Amba Lal v. Kasturi Lal Nagin Das Doshi
(36 ELR 189); Baijnath Singh Vaidya v. R. P .. Singh (36 ELR
327); Bishambhar Dayal v. Raj Rajeshwar & Ors. (39 ELR 363'
at p. 376); Dinesh Dang v. Daulat Ram (39 ELR 465 at p. 476);
Shyamlal v. Mausa Din & Ors. (37 ELR 67 at p. 89); B. P. Maurya . H
(1)
(2)
(3)
AIR 1972 M. P. 176@ 179.
M. P. Gazette, 23-6-1971, Pt. Ip. 809 paras 18 to 23.
Gujarat Gazette dt. 20-7-1972, Pt. 4C, p. 1042 at pp. 1355 to 1362.
5 78
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPOR1S
[1976] 2 s.c.R.
v. Prakashvir Shastri (37 ELR 137 at p. 147); Sohadar Rai v. Ram
Singh Aharwar & Ors. (37 ELR 176 at p. 188); Vishwanath Pd. v.
Sa/amat Ullah & Ors. (27 ELR 145 at p. 186) & Lachchi Ram v.
J. P. Mukhariya & Ors. (9 ELR 14~ at p. 157).
In. addi.tion, Sec. 8 of the Act 40 of 1975 has made the position
on t?1s pomt also very clear by providing. th_at, in Sec. 123 of the
Act m clause (.3), the following proviso shall be inserted at the e'.1d :
"Provided that no symbol allotted under this Act to a
can.dictate shall be deemed to be a religious symbol or a
national symbol for the purposes of this _clause."
,,
As in the case of other amendments, this amendment was also
challenged on behalf of the election petitioner on the ground that it
could ~e misuse?. _I am afraid that attacks made on such sweeping.
suggest10ns of likelihood of misuse, in future, cannot possibly succ~~d. It h~s been repeatedly laid down by this Court that the possil!:nhty of misuse of a power given by a statute cannot invalidate the
provision conferring the power. (See Dr. B. N. Khare vs. State of
Delhi [1952) SCR 519 at p. 562; State of W.B. vs. A. A. Sarkar
[1952] SCR 284 at p. 301; R. K. Dalmia vs. Justice Tendolka~
[1959] SCR 279 at p. 306; T. K. Mudaliar vs. Venkatachalam
[1955] 2 SCR 1196 at p. 1239; Chitralekha vs. State of Mysore
[1964] 6 SCR 368 at p. 382-383; M. R. Deka vs. N.E.F. Rty.
[1964] 5 SCR 683. The occasion to complain can only arise when
th~re is such alleged misuse. Even the possibility of such misuse of
this power by so responsible an official as the Election Commissioner
cannot be easily conceived of.
·
It was submitted that the Election Commissioner's decision on
this question was unreasonable. The best class of evidence as to what
is and what is not to be reasonably regarded as a religious symbol,
according to the customs, mores, traditions, and outlook of the people of a country at a certain time consists of contemporaneous decisions of Courts. It is useless to quote passages from ancient texts
about the sacredness of the cow in support of the use of the cow as
a religious symbol today. The use of pictures of this excelle',1t and
useful animal is so frequently made today for commercial purposes
or purposes other than religious that the representation of a cow and
a calf cannot, except in some special and purely religious contexts,
be held to have a religious significance. I, therefore, see no force
at all in this submission of the election petitioner.
The only questio~1 argued with some seriousness in the election
petitioner's appeal was that the election expenses. which form the
subject matter of issue No. 9, had exceeded the limit of authorised
expenditure imposed by S. 77 of the Act read with Rule 90. On this
issue, the learned Judge had considered every allegedly omitted item
of expense very thoroughly and had reached the conclusion that the
following 3 items, totalling upto Rs. 18,183.50 had to be added to
the return of election expenses of the original respondent which mentioned items totalling upto Rs. 12,892.97. These were : (1) Cost of
rostrums Rs. 16,0001-; (2) Cost of installation of loud-speakers
I
I ,
,
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
•
(Beg, J.)
579
Rs. 1,951/-; (3) Cost of providing transport for one journey by car
Rs. 232.50.
On this issue, the learned Judge's appreci•ation of evidence was
not only very thorough a•ad correct, but the application o_f the
governing law on the subject also appears to me to be faultless. Ordinarily, we do not, sitting even in first appeals on questions of law
as well as of fact in election cases, go into findings of fact arrived
at without misapplication of law or i;:rrors of appro"!_ch to evidence.
la the case before us, two main questions and one subsidiary question, each of which is a mixed question of fact and Joaw, which deserve
consideration by this Court on this issue, have been raise@ before us.
I will deal with these questions briefly seriatum.
The first question is : If the party, which a candidate represents,
spends or others also spend some money on h_is or her election, is
this expenditqre one which can be or should be properly i'i1cluded in
the statement of election expenses submitted by the candidate ?
Arguments before us have proceeded on the assumption made by
both sides that some expenditure was incurred by the Congress (R)
Party and some expenditure must also have been incurred by those
who either voluntarily helped or even thrust their supposed assistance,
whether it was helpful or not, upon those managing the original respondent's election, which was not shown as part of her election expenses. Is the successful candidate bound, under the !'aw, to show
this also as part of election expenses ?
This question assumed special importance after the decision of this
Court in Kanwar/al Gupta v. Amarnath Chawla(''), where a Division
Bench of this Court observed :
"Now, if a C'andidate were to be subject to the limitation of the ceiling, but the political party sponsoring him or
his friends and supporters were to be free to spend as much
as they like in con•aection with his election, the object of
imposing the ceiling would be completely frustrated and _the
beneficient provision enacted in ·the interest of purity and
genuineness of the democratjc process would be wholly
emasculated. The mischief sought to be remedied and the
evil sought to be suppressed would enter the political arena
with redoubled force and vitiate the political life of the
cou\1try. The great democratic ideal of social, economic
and political justice and equality of status and opportunity
enshrined in the Preamble of our Constitution would remain merely a distant dream eluding our grasp. The legislators could never have intended that what the individual
candidate cannot do, the political party spO'asoring him or
his friends and supporters should be free to do. Tliat is
why the legislators wisely interdicted not only the incurring
but also the authorising of excessive expenditure by a candidate. When _the political party sponsoring a candidate incurs expenditure in connection with his election as distinguished from expenditure on general party prop~ganda and
(l)
AIR 1975 S.C. 308 315-316.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
sso
A
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
i
(1976] l, S.C.R.
I
the candidate knowingly takes advantage of it 0r participates in the programme or activity or fails to disavow the
expenditure or consents to it or acquieses in it, it would be
reasonable to infer, s•ave in special circumstances, that he
impliedly authorised the political party to incur such expenditure and he can11ot escape the rigour of the ceiling by
saying that he has not incurred the expenditure, but his
political party has done so. A party candidate does not
stand apart from his political party and if the political
party does not want the candidate to incur the disqualification, it must exercise, control over the expenditure which
may be incurred by it directly to promote the poll prospects
of the candidate. The same proposition must also hold
good in case of expenditure incurred by friends and supporters di~ectly in connection with the election of the candidate."
After making the above-m~ntioned obser_voations, the apparently
broad sw~p of the observations was limited as follows :
•
"It may be cantended that this would considerably inhibit the electoral campaign of political parties but we do
not think so. In the first place, a political party is free to
incur any expenditure it likes on its general party propar
ganda though, of course, in this area also some !imitative
ceiling is eminently desirable coupled with filing of return
of expenses and an tadependent machinery to investigate
and take action. It is only where expenditure is incurred
which can be identified with the election of a given candidate that it would be liable to be added to the expenditure
of that candidate as being impliedly authorised by him.
Secondly, if there is continuoµs commuaity involvement in
political administration punctuated by activated pha~es of
well-discussed choice of candidates by popular participation
in the process of nomination, much of unnecessary expenditure which is incurred today could be avoided."
It is not necessary to quote further from the judgment which suggests taking of steps for reform of electoral machinery so as to ensure·
"choice of candidates by popular participation in the process of nmnination", because that would take us into a territory beyond mere in"
terpretation of the law as it exists. It is clear from the passages cited
and later parts of the judgment that the earlier decisions of this Court,
requiring proof of authorisation by the candidate of the election expenditure for which he could be held responsible, and in particular.
Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh('), which I shall refer to again a
little later, are considered. It is enough to observe that the passages
quoted above rest on the assumption that, where there are special circumstances in a case which constitute a political party an implied agent
of the candidate himself, the candidate will be responsible. It was also
suggested there that a political party itself must exercise so!Ile control
{I) [1955] I S.C.R. 671.
t
,
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN (Beg, ./.)
58 !
over the expenses of the candidate it sets up. The objection was to a
canpidate merely using the political party as a channel or cover for expenses incurred by the candidate himself. This explains the exclusion
of expenses for "general party propaganda" from those for which the
candidate is accountable and liable. Such expenses could be, it was
held, properly incurred by the party itself, irrespective of the source
from which· the party obtained funds for carrying it on. What is de,-,
clared to be expense incurred by the candidate is that expense which
his party may incur either as an express or implied agent of the candidate and that only.
·'
A
B
The difficulty which faces the election-petitioner at the out set in
taking up a case of implied authorisation, on the strength of anything
observed or decided by this Court in Kanwar/al Gupta's case (supra),
is that no such case was set up here. The petition does not say that c
the local Congress (R) Party was really an express or implied agent of
the original respondent or that it had acted in a manner from which it
could be inferred that the funds were really being supplied by lhe
original respondent and were merely being. spent by the party or its
workers for the election under consideration. No facts or cifcumstances were at all indicated either in the petition or in evidence from
which such inferences were possible. On the other ham], what is cought D
to be pointed out now in the case before us is that a sum of Rs. 70,000/was shown to have been received from some undisclosed sources by
Shri Dal Bahadur Singh, the President of the District Congress Committee at Rae Bareily, and that a large part of it was shown, from entries in the bank account of the President of this Committee, to have
been disbursed during or soon after the election. The responsibility of
the District Congress Committee was, however, to carry on propaganda E
and supply information in 3 parliamentary constituencies. Neither party
summoned Shri Dal Bahadur Singh to give evidence.so_ that it could
not be proved what proportion of any of this sum of Rs. 70,000/- was
spent and in what work and for which of the 3 Parliamentary constituencies. All that was alleged, in paragraph 13 of the petition, is that
the '~expenditure incurred by the respondent No. 1, Smt. Indira Nehru
Gandhi and/or her election agent Shri Yashpal Kapur was much more F
than Rs. 25,000/- which was the permissible amount". After that,
particulars of 11 items were given, out of which the first was hiring of
32 vehicles whose numbers are mentioned. There is no mention whatsoever in this list of any sum paid either by the original respondent or
by anyone else on her behalf to Shri Dal Bahadur Singh or of any ex"
pense incurred on behalf of the original respondent by this gentleman.
;The principle that no amount cf evidence can be looked into on a G
case not set up is sufficient to dispose of this evidence of a cheque of
Rs. 70,000/- received by Shri Dal Bahadur Singh.
It is true that the case set up is that tl1e prescribed limit of expenditure was exceeded and the case is so stated that items beyond the list
could conceivably be added. Nevertheless, unless and until. there is a
plea that something was spent by th~ Congress (R) Pa~ty, either as an
express or implied agent of the oritnnal respondent, this loop-hole l_eft
in the petition would not suffice, Sec. 83 ( 1) (b) of the Act cont ams
16-126 SCJ/76
H
582
A
B
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 S.C.R.
the mandatory provisions ~at the petition "shall set forth full particulars of any corrupt ~ractlce that the petitioner alleges, including as
full a ~tatement as possible of the names of the parties alleged to have
c~m~mtted such corrupt practice and the date and place of the COITum1ss10n of each such practic_e".
. The judgment of this Court, in Kanwar/al Gupta's case (supra)
discusses a number of cases decided by this Court which show that it is
n?t enough to prove expenditure of money by a candidate's party or
friends or relations. It must be also proved that this was expenditure
authorised by the candidate and incurred as the candidate's express
or implied agent. These cases were :
v. Brijraj Singh ( 1970) 1 SCR 530, Megraj Patadia v. R. K. Bir/a
D
After examining this catena of cases, I think, with great respect,
that the decision of this Court in Kanwar/al Gupta's case (supra) could
be understood to point in a direction contrary to that in which the
previous cases were decided. Hence, it appears to me that the amendment made by Act 58 of 1974, by adding the explanation (1) to Sec.
77 ( 1) of the Act, could be justified as merely an attempt to restore the
law as it had been understood to be previous to decision of this Court
in Kanwar/al Gupta's case (supra) :
F
G
H
•
•
Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh (1955) 1 SCR 671, Ram Dayal
c
E
I
(1971) 2 SCR 118 and B. Rajagopala Rao v. N. G. Ranga
1971 s.c. 267).
(AIR
"Explanation 1.-Notwithstanding any judgement, order
or decision of any court to the contrary, any expenditure incurred or authorised in connection with the election of a
candidate by_ a political party or by any other association or
body of persons or by any individual (other than the candidate or his election agent) shall not be deemed to be, and
shall not ever be deemed to have been, expenditure in connection with the election incurred or authorized by the candidate or by his election agent for the purposes of this subsection :
Provided that nothing contained in this Explanation shall
affect( a) any judgment, order or decision of the Supreme
Court whereby the election of a candidate to the House of
the People or to the Legislative Assembly of a State has been
declared void or set aside before the commencement of the
Representation of the People (Amendment) Ordin~nce, 1974,
(b) any judgment, order or decision of a High Court
whereby the election of any such candidate has been ?eclare~
void or set aside before the commencement of the said Ordinance if no appeal has been preferre.d. to the Supr~me Court
against such judgment, order or declSlon of the. H!gh. Court
before such commencement and the period of hm1tat1on for
filing such appeal has expired before such commencement."
•
/
.,
.
..
T
".
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN (Beg, J.)
583
It appears to me that both parties to the case now before us were
under the impression that the expenses incurred by a political party over
its candi~ate's electi?n was outside. the pr~scribed limit which operated
O!JIY agamst expenditure by a candidate himself. Hence, the petitioner
had not pleaded expenses incurred by the party of the original respondent as expenses authorised by the original respondent. The test of
authorisation would naturally be the creation of a liability to reimburse
wh0ever spends the money and not necessarily' the provision of money
before-hand by the candidate on whose behalf it is spent. Nevertheless, the authorisation has to be set up and proved. In the written
statement filed on behalf of the original respondent, it was very frankly
admitted that some expenditure, incurred by the local Congress Party
itself, had not been shown a5 election expenses of the candidate herself,
This was the position because, on the side of the original respondent
also, the law was understood to be as it is found now clarified by the
addition of an explanation to Sec. 77 (I) of the Act.
The second question which arises for consideration is : if some expenses are shown or admitted to have been incurred by the candidate's
party or third persons over the election of the successful candidate, is it
possible to separate it from a total expenditure on more than one con~
stituency by some process of estimation and apportionment? Of course,
this question can only arise if it is first proved that whatever expenditure was incurred by candidate's party or by some other person, who
may be a friend, a relation. or a sympathiser, was incurred in circumstances from which it can be inferred that the successful candidate
would re-imburse the party or person who incurred it. As I have already held, it is only then that expenditure could be held to be authorised by the candidate. It is not enough that some advantage accrued or
expenditure was incurred within the knowledge of the candidate. This
was very clearly brought out i!l Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh and
·Ors.('). In this case, the Manager, Assistant Manager, 20 Ziladars,
and peons of. the proprietor of an estate in Uttar Pradesh had carried
on election,•.work, after.having been given a holiday on full pay by the
proprietor of the estate who was the father of the successful candidate.
It was contended that inasmuch as these persons were virtually emc
ployees of the candidate himself, their salary for the dav must be added
to the list of election expenses. This Court repelled this contention on
the ground that this extra expenditure had not been authorised by the
candidate or his agent. Hence, it need not be shown as an item of
election expense. Voluntary expenditure by friends, relations, or
sympathisers and expenditure incurred by a candidate's party, without
any reques~ or authorisation by the candidate, has never been deemed
to be expenditure by the candidate himself.
(See : Ram Dayal v.
llriiraj Singh [1970] 1 SCR 530); Megraj Patadia v. R. K. Birla
• [1971] 2 SCR 118). An attempt was then made to pass the responsibility on to the original respondent for the expenses of atleast 23 vehicles whose number~
are mentioned in a letter dated 25th February, 1971, written by Shn
(0
[1~51 (!)
s::: R 671.
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
58 4
A
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 2 S.C.R •.
Kapur, who was then the original respondent's election agent and sent
to the District Officer, Rae Bareily, stating as follows :
'
"Sir, ~ beg to say that the District Congress Committee,
~ae Bare1ly has taken the followmg cars for dcction purposes
111 the three Parli~mentary Constituencies, Rae Bareily, Amethi
B
and Ram Saneh1 Ghat.
them."
You may, therefore, kindly release
After giving numbers of the vehicles the letter proceeds ;
. "It is therefore r.cquested that the abovesaid cars may
kmdly be released without delay. The letter of the President
of District Congress Committee about the abovesaid cars i~
enclosed herewith."
c
D
The letter of the President of the Committee, mentioned by Shri Kapur,
was a rather urgent request made to him by Shri Dal Bahadur Singh,.
on 24-2-1971 (Ex. A-43), after informing him that he is in difficulties
as he had tried to find out unsuccessfully the whereabouts of Shri V.
Vajpayee, who was contesting election from Amethi Parliamentary
Constituency, and of Shri Baiznath Kurecl, who was contesting the
election from Ram Sanchi Parliamentary Constituency. He, therefore,
asked Shri Kapur, the election agent of the original respondent, to seml
a letter to the District Officer, who had refused to release the vehicles.
without the endorsement of the candidate concerned or his or her election agent.
It is clear from the above-mentioned correspondence
that
Shri
Kapu~ was not speaking on behalf of the other two candidates of ad-
E
F
G
H
joining Parliamentary Constituencies. He was not even undertaking to
pay anything for the use of the vehicles on behalf of the original respondent. Shri Kapur also did not state that these vehicles were needed
for work in the original respondent's constituency. He merely forwarded the letter with a request for compliance with what Shri D. B. Singh
wanted. Shri Dal Bahadur Siniih was concerned and entrusted with
conducting electioneering work in three adjoining Parliamentary Constituencies successfully. He had, therefore, made a frantic appeal to Shri
Kapur to come to his help. Shri Kapur, without concealing any fact,
had sent this very letter with a request for the release of the vehicles to
the District Officer concerned. On this evidence, the learned Judge
came to the conclusion that it was not possible to say which vehicles,
said to be Jeeps, had been utilized for election work and in which constituency. The learned Judge after considering the evide~ce r_ecorded
the finding that it was not possible to hold that the 23 veh1cl~s 111 question had been used exclusively for the purposes of the elect10n of the
oriiiinal respondent and not for "general party propaganda purvoses"
fat which the original respondent was not liable to pay.
In Hans Raj v. Pt. Hari Ram and Ors(1'), this Court in a similar
situation said :
"Whichever way one looks at the matter it is quite clear in
view of the decision of this Court reported in Rananjaya
(1) 40 E. L. R. 12s:& 128-129.
'.
r'-
SMT .. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
'/
"'
(Beg, J.)
58 5
Singh ".· Baijnath Singh & Others [1955] 1 SCR 671 that the
·e~pend!ture. ~ust be by the candidate himself and any expenditure. m his mterest by others (not his agents within the
meanmg of the term m the election law) is not to be taken
not.e of. Here the hiring was by the Congress Committee
which was not such an agent and therefore the amount spent
by the Congress Committee cannot be taken as an amount
which m_ust compulsori.ly be included in the expenditure over
the ele?tion by a can~1date. If this be the position, we have
to decide whether th1.s amount spent on the jeeps must be
. taken to b~ an expenditure made by the candidate himself. Of
that there 1s no evidence. The bill stands in the name of the
Congress Committee and was presumably paid by the Congress Committee also. The evidence, however, is that this
jeep was used on behalf of the returned candidate and to that
extent we subscribe to the finding given by the learned judge.
Even if it be held that the candidate was at bottom the hirer
of the jeep and the expenditure on it must be included in his
account, the difficulty is that this jeep was used also for the
general Congress propaganda in other constituencies."
I .
-\
A
B
, c
In Shah Jayantilal Ambalai v. Kasturilal Nagindas Doshi and Ors.(1')
this Court held :
., !
"It is now well settled that expenses incurred by a political
party in support of its candidates do not come within the
mischief of s. 123 ( 6) read with s. 77 of the Act."
0
In Samant N. Balakr.ishna Etc.
etc. ( 2 ) this Court pointed out :
E
v.
George Fernandez and Ors.
"In India all corrupt practices stand on the same footing.
The only difference made is that when consent is proved on
the part of the candidate or his election agent to the commission of corrupt practice, that itself is sufficient. When a
corrupt practice is committed by an agent and there is no
such consent then the petitioner must go further and prove
that the result of the election in so far as the returned candidate is concerned was materially affect~d."
However as I have already held, there is no case or evidence before us that' the Congress Party was the agent, express or im~lied, of
the original respondent or a~ting as the channel through which. ~ny
money whatsoever was spent by the original responde1.1t. The J?etitio~
could not possibly succeed on the ground of exceedmg election expenses. On the other hand, on the findings given by me above, the
expenses on the construction of. rostrums were also err~neously, ad.ded
by the learned Judge. In fact, 1t seems that other two items n,icnt10ned there were also wrongly added. Expenses of the installat10n and
use of loud-speakers and- the power supplied were certainly shown to
have been borne by the Congress Party itself. It is true that when
(1)
42 E. L. R .. 307 @ 311.
(2)
fl %9] 3 SCR 603 @ 637.
F
G
H
586
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREl\fE COURT REPORTS
[!976] 2 S.C.R.
el~c~ions of person~ in .the position of the Prime Minister or even of
Mm1sters, whether m the Central Government or a State Government,
take place, a number of people come forward to either oive or thrust
their supposed aid in the election. It may be impossible for the candidate to refuse it without offending them. But it is also impossible for
the. Courts to ma.ke ~he candidate himself or herself responsible so as
~o impose an obhgat1on upon the candidate to find out what expenses
mcurred by them were and then to add these on to the candidate's
account of expenses. That would be, obviously, a most unfair result.
And, this is not what the law requires in this Country, The law reql]ires proof of circumstances from which atlcast implied authorisation
can be inferred.
The third and the last and a subsidiary submission on behalf of the
election petitioner, on election expenses, was that, Shri Dal Bahadur
Singh not having been produced by the original respondent, some sort
of presumption arises against the original respondent. I do not think
that it is possible to shift a burden of the petitioner on to the original
respondent whose case never was that Shri Dal Bahadur Singh spent
any money on her behalf. The case of M. Chenna Reddy v. Ramchandra Rao(l') was relied upon to submit that a presumption may
arise against a successful candidate from the non-production of available evidence to support his version. Such a presumption, under Section 114 Evidence Act, it has to be remembered, is always optionaf
and one of fact, depending upon the whole set 0±1 facts. It is (ot
obligatory.
In Chenna Reddy's case (supra), the evidence seemed to have
resulted in a prima facie case whose effect the respondent had to get
rid of. In the case before us, the election petitioner had su111111oned
Shri M. L. Tripathi QPW-59), the Secretary of the District Congress
Committee, who appeared with account books of the Party at Rae
Bareily. The election petitioner could get nothing useful out of his
evidence. Even if the election petitioner did not, for some reason,
desire to summon Shri Dal Bahadur Singh similarly, his counsel could
have requested the Court to exercise its discretionary powers under
Order XVI Rule 14 C.P.C., but this was never done. A pre~umption
could not ~rise on the facts and circumstances of a case in which it
could not be said that Shri Dal Bahadur Singh's evidence was necessary to discharge some burden of the original respondent. The origi_nal
respondent had discharged whatever onus lay upon her by producmg
her own election agent Shri Kapur, who had kept her accounts. A;nd,
she had herself appeared in the witness box and faced a cross-exa~111a
tion which could not be held up as an example of compl~te fairness
and propriety. I do not quite understand what presumpt10n ~ould
possibly arise, due to non-production of Shri · Dal Bahadur S1~gh,
against what part of her case, and to what effect. It could certamly
not be suggested that there was any duty on her part to repel some
case never set up against her. It was nobody's case that the local
Congress Party was her agent.
m-4o£:-L:·R-:J;:-39o-@41 s.
{
/-
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN (Beg, J.)
58 7
I may now very. shortly deal ~ith the objection that, as a number
of Me1:11bers of Parliament belongmg to the opposition parties were in
deten.tion, under the preventive detention laws, which could not be
questioned before Courts of law, because of the declaration of the
emergency by the President, there was a procedural defect in making
the amendments of the Act of 1951 and the 39th Constitutional
amendment.
Articl~ 122 of. the Constitution prevents this Court from going into
any question relatmg to irregularity of proceedings "in Parliament". It
reads as follows :
"122. (1) The validity of any proceedings in Parliament
shall not be called in question on the ground of any alleged
irregularity of procedure.
A
B
c
(2) No officer or member of Parliament in whom powers
are vested by or under this Constitution for regulating procedure or the conduct of busines's, or for maintaining order,
in Parliament shall be subject to the jurisdiction of any Court
in respect of the exercise by him of those powers."
What is alleged by the election petitioner is that the opposition
Members of Parliament, who had been detained under the preventive
detention laws, were entitled to get notice of the proposed enactments
and the 39th amendment, so as to be present "in Parliament", to
oppose these changes in the law. I am afraid, such an objection is
directly covered by the terms of Article 122 which debars every Court
from examining the propriety of proceedings "in Parliament". If any
privileges of Members of Parliament were involved, it was open to
them to have the question raised "in Parliament". There is no provision of the Constitution which has been pointed out to us providing
for any notice to each Member of Parliament. That, I think, is also
a matter completely covered by Article 122 of the Constitution. All
that this Court can look into, in appropriate cases, is whether the procedure which amounts to legislation or, in the case of a Constitutional
amendment which is Prescribed by Article 368 of the Constitution,
was gone through at all, As a proof of that, however, it ~ill accept,
as conclusive evidence, a certificate of the Speaker that a Bill has been
duly passed. (JSee : State of Bihar v. Kameshwar) (1)
.. '
Again, this Court has held, in Sharma v. Sri Krish11a( 2 ), t~at '.l
notice issued by the Speaker of a Legislature for the breach of its pnvilege cannot be questioned on the gro1:'n.d that the rules of procedure
relating to proceedings for breach of pnvilege .have not been observ~d.
All these are internal matters of procedure which the Houses of Parliament themselves regulate.
As regards the validity o~ the detention~ of the Members of P~rlia~
ment, that cannot be questioned automatically. or on the. bare 'tatement by counsel that cert~n Members of Parliament are illegally detained with some ulterior object. The enforcement of fundamental
-{i)-AIR 1952 SC 252 @ 266.
(2)
AIR 1960 SC 1186 @ 1189.
D
E
F
G
H
58 8
A
B
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 S.C'oR.
rights is regulated by Articles 3 2 and 226 of the Constitution and the
suspension of remedies under these articles is also governed by appropriate constitutional provisions. Their legality and regularity cannot
be collaterally assailed by mere assertions made by Counsel before us.
I, therefore, over-rule these objections to the validity of the amendments and the 39th amendment as we cannot even entertain them in
this manner in these proceedings.
l will now turn to the validity of clause ( 4) of Article 329A sought
..
to be added by Section 4 of the 39th Amendment. I will quote the
whole of Section 4 as some argument was acjvanced on the context in
which clause ( 4) of Article 329A occurs. Section 4 reads as follows :
c
•
"4. In part XV of the Constitution, after article 329, the
following article shall be inserted, namely : "329A. (1) Subject to the provisions of Chapter II of
part V (except sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of article 102),
no election-
D
E
F
(a) to either House of Parliament of a person who holds
the office of Prime Minister at the time of such election or is
appointed as Prime Minister after such election;
(b) to the House of the People of a person who holds the
office of Speaker of that House at the time of such electi9n or
who is chosen as the Speaker for that House after such
election;
shall be called in question, except before such authority
(not being any such authority as is referred to in clause (b)
of Article 329) or body and in such manner as may be provided for by or under any law made by Parliament and any
such law may provide for all other "matters relating to doubts
and disputes in re,lation to such election including the grounds
on which such election may be questioned.
(2) The validity of any such law as is referred to in
clause ( 1) and the decision of any authority or body under
such law shall no~ be called in question in any court.
G
H
(3) Where any person is appointed as Prime Minister
or, as the case may. be, chosen to the office of the Speaker of
the House of the People, while an election petition referred
to in clause (b) of article 329 in respect of his election to
either House of Parliament or, as the case may be, to the
House of the People is pending, such election petition shall
abate upon such person being appointed as Prime Minister or,
as the case may be, being chosen to the office of the Speaker
of the House of the People, but such eloction may be called
in question under any such law as is referred to in clause
(1).
'
I •
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
•
J
(Beg, J.)
58 9
( 4) No law made by Parliament before the commencement of the Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment) Act,
1975, in so far as it relates to election petitions and matters
connected therewith, shall apply or shall be deemed ever to
have applied to or in relation to the election of any such
person as is referred to in clause (1) to either House of. Parliament and such election shall not be deemed to be v01d or
ever to have become void on any ground on which such election could be declared to be void or has, before such commencement, been declared to be void under any such law and
notwithstanding any order made by any Court, before such
commencement, declaring such election to be void, such election shall continue to be valid in all respects and any such
order and any finding on which such order is based shall be
and shall be deemed always to have been void and of no
.effect.
(5) Any appeal or cross appeal against any such order of
any court as is referred to in clause ( 4) pending immediately
before the commencement of the Constitution (Thirty-ninth
Amendment) Act, 1975, before the Supreme Court shall be
disposed of in conformity with the provisions of clause ( 4) .
A
B
c
D
( 6) The provisions of this article shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution".
Counsel for both sides are agreed that, for the purposes of the case
-.before us, we need not consider the Constitutional validity of clauses 1
to 3 of the newly introduced Article 329A of the Constitution. I will,
therefore, concern myself only with the constitutional validity of clause
(4) of Article 329A of the Constitution.
Learned Counsel for the election-petitioner contended that the constituent or amending power contained in Article 368 of our Constitution
had been misused to achieve some purpose which was either outside
the Article or which struck at the roots of the "basic structure" or "the
essential features" of our Constitution. It was submitted that the amendment is invalid on an application of the tests laid down by a majority
of the 13 Judges who indicated certain basic and inviolable principles
of our Constitution in Kesvananda Bharati's case (supra). It was contended thafthe newly added Article 329A (4) of the Constitution, far
from constituting a Constitutional law, which alone could be made under
Article 368, did not even satisfy the tests of a law, inasmuch as it did
not lay down any general rule applicable to all cases of a particular class
but was really designed to decide one particular election case, which is
now before us for hearing, in a particular way. According to learned
Counsel, the amending bodies had, under the guise of an exercise of
constituent power, really decided a particular election dispute arbitrarily
without following the elementary principles of juilicial procedure or
.applying any intelligible norms or principles of justice either as a Court
of law would have done or as any body of persons entrusted with the
duty to decide a matter justify or quasi-judicially could possibly have
·done. The assumption underlying this argument was that setting aside
E
F
G
H
590
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976]' 2 S.C,R.
the results of a judicially recorded judgment and order by declaring it
void and the validation of an election held by a Courf of law to be invalid necessarily involves the adoption of a judicial or a quasi-judicial
procedure if the results are to appear just and not violative of the basic
principles of natural justice which must be held to be parts of the Rule
of law .envisaged by our Constitution. What had been done by clause 4,
accordmg to the learned Counsel for the election petitioner, was nothing short of lifting and placing the elections of the first four dignitaries
of State outside the range of questionability. before ·any authority whatsoever either in the past, present, or future. As the only election out of
those of these dignitaries still in dispute at the time of the passing of
the 39th Amendment was the election of the Prime Minister to the
House of the People, now, under consideration in the appeals before us,
it was suggested that all this was done, wholly and solely, though indirectly, with the object of validating the Prime Minister's election as
a Member of the House of Representatives in 1971. It sought to place
the Prime Minister and the Speaker in a separate class by themselves as
candidates at a general election for the membership of the House of Representatives. It was urged that there could be no reasonable or logical
nexus between the alleged objects of such a classification and the results
of the amendment made. It was urged that, inasmuch as a Prime
Minister holds the pivotal position in the governance of the country,
there could not be a less and not more need to ensure that the election
of the holder of such a high office to a Parliamentary seat had been free
from any corrupt practice. It was urged that the test and the procedure for determining whether the holder of such an exalted, responsible,
and important office was duly elected as a Me11_1.ber of Parliament could
not, logically or reasonably, be different from that which ordinary Members of the Parliament had to go through. It was pointed out that, in a
case covered by this clause, there could be no consideration at all, if the
amendment is upheld, of th,e validity of a past election by any authority
in the future as all elections in this very special and exceptional class
had been validated without any qualification and quite unconditionally.
The effect was, it was urged, that the present Prime Minister was placed
in a very privileged and exalted position which was not enjoyed by a
past Prime Minister and which was not meant to be occupied by any
future Prime Minister. Such a procedure and such a result, it was contended, made a mockery of the concept of free and fair elections under
a democratic system. Furthermore, it was urged that it was destructive
of the concepts of rule of law, of equality before law, and of just determination of judicially triable dispute. Taking away of even the supervisory jurisdiction of superior Courts in elections of a certain class of
dignitaries was characterised as a gross violation of a basic principle of
oii'r Constitution. It was also submitted that, if what was intended to
be conveyed by the amendment was that Parliament had withdrawn the
case before us from the sphere of judicial scrutiny and determination
and had decided if itself, as was stated in his opening address by the
learned Counsel for the original respondent, not merely was the basic
constitutional principle of separation of powers set at naught but the
primordial rule of natural justice, that no one should be a Judge in his
own came, had been i,nfringed inasmuch as the dispute was really between a majority party and the numerically minority groups or parties in
the Houses of Parliament. No hearing could be given to leaders of the
f
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
(Beg, J.)
591
numerically minority groups, of parties in Parliament because they were,
it was submitted, illegally detained under Preventive Detention laws
after a declaration of emergency by the President of India, with the
result that members of Parliament who did not support the ruling party
were denied access to Courts so as to secure their release from detention
and could not take part in proceedings which produced the Acts
amending the Act of 1951, and, the 39th Amendment. I have already
dealt with and rejected the objection to the proceedings of the Houses
of Parliament, on the collateral ground of allegedly iller:1l detentions of
opposition leaders.
;
J
All the contentions of learned Counsel for the election-petitioners,
apart from the aileged procedural defect in amending the Act of 1951
and the Constitution when a number of opposition Members of Parliament are detained under the Preventive Detention laws, already dealt
with by me, seemed directed towards producing two results either simultaneously or alternatively : firstly, to pursuade us to hold that the
constituent power had been exceeded or sought to be utilised for extraneous purposes falling outside the purview of Article 368 of the. Constitution altogether; and, secondly, to convince us that the effects of the 4th
clause of Article 329A must be such that, if this purported addition to
our Constitution was upheld, the "basic structure" or the "basic
features" or "the underlying principles" of our Constitution will be
irreparably damaged so that it could not any longer be looked upon as
the same Constitution. It was submitted that the majority view in
Kesvananda Bharati's case (supra), which was binding upon us, will
compel us to invalidate clause ( 4) of Art. 329A. There was, in the
course of arguments, considerable overlapping between tests and considerations appertaining to the purposes and those involving the effects,
consequences, or implications of clause ( 4) if it was upheld. It was
proposed that purposes should be ascertained and their validity determined, inter-alia, in the light of the consequences and implications of
upholding the validity of the impugned clause. Both sets of contentions involved a definition of the scope of Article 368 and a determination of the exact nature of the function actually performed by the constituent authorities in passing the impugned clause ( 4) of Article
329A.
We have heard the learned Attorney General and the learned Solicitor General of India, in defence of the 4th clause of Article 329A sought
to be added by the 39th Amendment, as well as Mr. A. K. Sen and Mr.
Jaganoath Kaushal, learned Counsel for the original respondent, who
also supported the validity of the impugned clause. The 1st contention
of the learned Counsel seemed directed towards inducing us not to 109k
beyond the language to c;liseover the purposes or the nature of the furn:tion performed in passing clause ( 4) of Article 329 or its effects. This
contention had necessarily to rest upon the assumption that provisions
of clauses (4) and (5) and (6) of Article 329A. sought to be introduced by the 39th Amendment, were valid and had the effect of depriving this Court of jurisdiction to determine the validity of clause ( 4)
by ex:Ploring the purposes and objects which may lie behind the plain
rneanmg of clause ( 4). Our difficulty, however, is that even an attempt
to give its natural and literal meaning to every word used in Clause ( 4),
B
c
E
F'
G-
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
5 92
A
.B
·C
E
1I
[J '.)76] 2 S.C.R.
after llearing the statements made by learned Counsel supporting the
39th Amendment, to the effect that Parliament had itself examined the
validity of whatever order and findings on question of fact or law arc
referred to there, and had reached the conclusion that the order and
each of the findings of fact on which it was based must be adjudged to
be void and of no effect, baffles us very much. This could only mean
that Parliament, in its constituent capacity, had functioned as though
it w11s a direct Court of Appeal from a judgment of the High Court
while an appeal in the last Court is pending -a procedure which has
not been shown to have been followed so far in any case brought to our
notice either decided in this country or anywhere else in the world, all
the cases cited to support such a view being distinguishable on facts and
law applicable.
In, the circumstances of tbis case, set out above, the findings on
contested questions of fact and law and the order indicated by cla·use
( 4) could only be those contained in the judgment under appeal by
both sides before us. The language of clause ( 4) was, according to the
submissions of learned Counsel supporting the aIQendment, itself meant
to convey that, after going into the disputed questions of fact, the constituent bodies had reached the conclusion that the order and the findings must have no legal effect. Indeed, the Solicitor-General went so
far as to submit that Parliament must be deemed to be aware of . the
contents of the whole record of the proceedings in the High Court, induding the pleadings, the evidence, and the findings in the judgment of
, the High Court, as these were all available to it. In other words, we
must imagine and suppose that, whatever may be the actual position,
Parliament had sat in judgment over the whole case as a Court of appeal
would have done. But, the impugned clause (4), if valid, would compel us to make a contrary assumption inasmuch as it declares that all
Jaws prior to the 39th Amendment, relating to election petitions aml
"matters connected therewith'', which must include the grounds given
in Section lOO of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, were
neither to be applied nor ever deemed to have applied to such a case as
the one before us. This surely meant that they must be "deemed" not
to have been applied by Parliament itself, according to the well known
rule of construction that a legal fiction, introduced by a deeming provision, must be carried Jo its logical conclusion and we must not allow
our imagination to boggle at the consequences of carrying the fiction to
its logical conclusions (See : East and Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury
Borough Council(!).
At the same time, it was contcnded, and, this was especially emphasised by Mr. Jagannath Kaushal, that Parliament and the ratifying
legislatures of the States-participating in the constitution making process-had not applied any pre-eidsting norms but had merely declared
and registered, almost automatically, without any need to consider anything further or to apply any law whatsoever to any facts, what followed
from the abrogation of all pre-existing law, with its' procedure and
norms, so far as the election-petition against the original respondent was
concerned. This meant that the constituent bodies, proceeding on the
--··
(!)
·--
[1952] A. C. p. 109.
t
..
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN (Beg,
J.)
593
assumption that the High Court had rightly held the original respondent's election to be invalid by applying the provisions of the 1951 Act,
nad considered it i:.ecessary to validate what really was invalid according to the l 951 Act. In view of what I have already held on meirts,
such an as& ~mption, if it was there at all, could only be based on a misconception.
J
The conflicting points of view, advanced in support of the amendment, enabied the election-petitioner's counsel to find support for his
contention that the impugned clause ( 4) obviously meant that a considered judgment on, inter-alia, disputed questions of fact, however,
erroneous, had been swept aside, quite unceremoniously, mechanically,
and, without a semblance of a quasi-judicial procedure, by a purported
exercise of wnstituent power by the constituent bodies, consisting of the
two Houses of Parliament and the ratifying legislature-s of the various
States. H:: urged that the alternative contentions of Mr. Kaushal constituted an admission that no procedure whatsoever, which could be considerer! eith,~r reasonable or appropriate for a judicial or quasi-judicial
cic1cr111;!iau0n of any question of fact or law was followed. He contended tha~ whichever of the two alternative contentions of counsel supporting the 39th Amendment was accepted by us, his submission, that
the amendment was ultra-vires, arbitrary, and improperly motivated was
made out.
The essence of judicial or quasi-judicial function is the application
of a law which is already given by the law making authority to the judicial or quasi-judicial authority to apply. This law has to be applied to
certain findings after determining the disputed questions of fact in a
manner which inust conform to the canons of natural justice. Learned
Counsel for the election-petitioner contended that it was not necessary
to go beyond clause ( 4) to reach the conclusion that what was being
done to decide a dispute which could, under the law as it existed till
then, only be judicially determined iu the mode prescribed by Article
329(b) read with the Act of 1951 which could not be circumvented
even before Article 329A engrafted exceptions on it and the Act of
I 951 had been repealed retrospectively in its application to the Prime
Minister. The result of a sort of consolidated legislative-cum-adjudicatory functi011 was sought to be embodied in Article 329A ( 4) by purported Constitutional amendment. He contended that we were bound
to co'lsidc• and decide whether the "constituent power" contained in
Article 368 of the Constitution was meant to be used in this manner..
Such use would, he submitted, fall outside Article 368. Hence, he
subll!-itted,_ there was no need to resort to principles emerging from a
cons1derat1on of what may be spoken of as the basic structure or essential features of the Constitution. It was enough if we held that "constituent power" did not cover such a use made of it. Learned Counsel for
the election-petitioner had thus advanced an alternative contention
based upon the meaning of the term "constituent power" introduced by
the 24th amendment; and, in my opinion, we are duty bound to interpret
Article 368 and determine the precise meaning of "constituent power"
when properly called upon by a party before us to do so. Indeed,
the very contention that we should so construe "constituent power" as
to deny ourselves the ji:risdiction to decide the validity of what was
·.
A
G
D
E
F
G
H
594
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976) 2 S.C.R.
done under a purported exercise of such a power involves a determination of its meaning. I fail to see how our jurisdiction to do this
could be barred by the provisions of the very amendment whose constitutional validity is challenged before us.
Learned Counsel supporting the 39th Amendment, had, in defence
of the· Amendment, advanced arguments which go beyond the position
which was adopted to suppoft the amendments considered by us in
Kesvananda Bharati's case (Supra). The new argument now advanced,
to use the language of the Solicitor General in his last written submissions, is that "the power of amendment under Article 368 is "the very
original power of the people which is unbroken into the legislative and
the executive and the judicial". He submitted that the implied limitations, to which the majority decision in Kesva.nanda Bharati's case
(supra) has committed this Court for the time being, are no longer
available when considering this "unbroken" power. Mr. A. K. Sen
learned Counsel for the original-respondent, puts this very argument
in the following words in his written submissions :
"In the hands of the constituent authority there is no
demarcation of powers. But the demarcation emerges only
when it leaves the hands of the constituent authority through
well defined channels into demarcated pools. The constituent power is independent of the fetters or limitations imposed by separation of powers in the hands of the organs of
the Govt., amongst whom the supreme authority of the State
is allocated.
'
~'
The constituent power is independent of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
Separation of powers is when the
constitution is framed laying down the distribution of the
powers in the diffei:ent organs such as the legislative, executive
and the judicial power. The constituent power springs as the
fountain head and partakes of sovereignty and is the power
which creates the organ and distributes the powers. Therefore, in a sense the constituent power is all embracing and is
at once judicial, executive and legislative, or in a sense super
power. The constituent power can also change the system of
checks and balances upon which the separation of power is
based".
The theory advanced before us may have been designed to escape
the logical consequences of the majority view in Kesvananda Bharati's
case (supra) which we cannot, sitting as a Bench of five judges in this
Court, overrule. The theory is, however, quite novel and has to be, I
think, dealt with by us. It postulates an undifferentiated or amorphous
amalgam of bare power constituting the "constituent power". According to this theory, the power which constitutes does not need to be
either constituted or prevented from exercising a power assigned by it
already to a constituted authority. Hence, it is a power of a kind which
is above the constitution itself. If I am not mistaken, the learned Solicitor General did say that the constituent power !~es "outside" the
,•
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
(Beg, J.)
595
Constitution. In other words, it is independent and above the Constitu- A
tion itself because it operates on the Constitution and can displace. it
with so to· say, one stroke of its exercise. I do not think that such an
extr~me theory could be supported by the citation of either the majority or minority views of Judges, barring stray rcmar.ks ,made in oth~r
contexts, either in the I. C. Golaknath v. State of Pun1ab s(<1) case or m
the Kesvananda Bharati's case (supra). In fact, in neither of these two
cases was the question raised or considered at all by this Court whether B
the amending power or the "Constituent power" itself constituted such
an amalgamated concentration of power, said to be distributed by the
Constitution between the three different organs of State at a "subsequent
stage" whatever this may mean. The distribution of power of different
kinds between the three organs was compared to delegation of au~ority
to agents which could be withdrawn at any time by the constituent
c
bodies.
If we were to accept the theory indicated above, it would make it
unnecessary to have a constitution beyond one consisting of a single
· sentence laying down that very kind of power is vested in the
constituent bodies which may, by means of a single consolidated
order or declaration of law, exercise any or all of them themselves
whenever they please whether such powers be executive, legislative, or
judicial. Could .this be the ambit of "constituent power" in our Constitution ?
Would such a view not defeoat the whole purpose of a
Constitution ? Does the whole constitution so crumble and melt i•n
the crucible of constituent power that its parts cannot be made out ?
Before we could accept a view which carries such drastic implications
with it we will have to over-rule the majority view in Kesvananda
Bharati's case (supra). The majority view in that case, which is
binding upon us, seemed to be that both the supremacy of the Constitution a1ud separation of powers are parts of the basic structure of the
Constitution.
If "constituent power", by itself, is so transcendental and exceptional as to be above the provisions of the Constitution itself, it should
not, logically speaking, be bound even by the procedure of amendment
prescribed by Article 368 (2). I have not found any opinion expressed
so far by any learned Judge of this Court to show that the constituent power is not bound by the need to follow the procedure faid
down in Article 368(2) of the Constitution.
Indeed, rather inconsistently with the theory of an absolute and u'uquestionable power
in some undifferentiated or raw and unfettered form, operating from
above and outside the Constitution, learned Counsel, supporting the
impugned 4th clause i'.1 Article 329A, concede that the constituent
power is bound by the appropriate procedure laid down in Article
368 for the amendment of the Constitution.
What they urge is
that, subject to this procedure, which has been followed here, the
constit1i1ent power cannot be questioned because it is a "sovereign
power."
The logical cO'i1sequence of such an argument also is that
the majority view in Kesvananda Bharati's case (supra) was erroneous.
---~----~·
(1) [1967] 2 SCR 672.
(2) [1973] Supp. ro SCR Pl
D
E
F
G
H
596
A
B
c
D
E
F
SllPRE~IE
COURT REPORTS
It also overlooks that judicial review of laws made by Parliament is·
always a review of an exercise of "sovereign power".
It may be
that the object of the learned Consel in advancing this
extraordinary tbeory was to induce us to refer this case to a much larger bench
so that the majority view in Kesvananda Bharati's case (supra) may,
I, however, doubt whether puttrng forif necessary, be overruled.
ward such extreme and untenable propositions is the best method of
securing such a result.
I think that the possibly theoretical question indicated above,
whatever may be the object of raising it, does deserve Lo be seriously
considered and answered by us because it discloses a basic misconception.
Therefore, I propose to consider it at a length which seems
to me to be justified by our need to clarify 0ur thinh1g on a basic or
"key" concept without a final commitment to a particular view on it.
Clearer thinking, by examining a basic theoretical question from every
conceivable angle, leads, I believe, to that open mindedness which is
needed by lawyers no less than by any other class today so that we
may, contrary to our reputation, be responsive to the inevitable challenges of change.
Justice Holmes once said : "Theory is the most
important part of the dogma of law, as the architect is the most important man who takes part in the building of a house" (Holmes,
Collected papers (1921 ) 200) .
It seems to me that the words "sovereignty" and "sovereign power",
used repeatedly by learned Counsel defending the 39th Amendment to
describe the constituent power, should, for several good reasons, be
avoid~d, so far as possible, by lawyers who seek that clarity of thought
for which precision in language is the first requirement.
One of
these reasons was given by Lord Bryce (Studies in "History and Jurisprudence") (1901) (503-504). "The frontier districts, if one may
call them so, of Ethics, of Law, and of political science have been
thus fafested by a number of vague or ambiguous terms which have
produced many barren discussions and caused much needless trouble
to students. No offender of this kind has given more trouble than
the so-called 'Doctrine of Sovereignty' ". Prof. Mellwain, however,
opined : "But this very fact is proof of its vital importance in our
modern world, and the wide variety of the views held concerning its
essence, as well as the conflicting conclusions to which these views
still lead, may furnish sufficient excuse
another attempt to clarify
some of our ideas touching this central formula under which we try
to rationalize the complicated facts of our modern political life".
Another reason for eschewing such expressio'as, so far as possible,
is that they are "emotive" or of a kind about which Mr. Leonard
Schapiro, (writing on "Key concepts in Political Science" Series, at
p. 7) rightly observed; "Emotive words such as 'equality,' 'dictatorship,'
'elite'
or
even
'power'
can
often,
by
the
very passiom
which
they raise, obscure , a proper understanding of the sense in which they are~ or should
be,
or should not be, or have been used. Confucius regarded the rectification of names' as the first t•ask of government.
'If names are not
correct, language will not be in accordance with the truth of things',
for
G
H
[1976) 2 S.C.R.
'
1
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN (Beg, J.)
597
and this in time would lead to the end of justice, to anarchy and to
war".
At any rate, in America, the concept of State Sovereignty,
ranged against· that of riational sovereignty, did produce a civil war
which is said to have been precipitated by the decision of the American Supreme Court in Dred Scott v. Sandford (1).
I must preface my observations here about the concepts of
"sovereig,1ty" and exercise of "sovereign power", between which I
make a distinction, with two kinds of explanation.
The first kind
involves an exposition of a functional or sociological point of view.
I believe that very social, political, economic, or legal concept or
doctrine must answer the needs of the people of a country at a particular time. I see the development of co·acep~s, doctrines, and institutions as responses to the changing needs of society in every country.
They have a function to fulfil in relation to nutional needs.
The
second type of explanation may be called historical or meant merely
to i'adicate and 'illustrate notions or concepts put forward by thinkers
at various times in various countries so as to appropriately
relate them to what we may find today under our Constitution. We
have to appreciate the chronology or stages of their development if
we are to avoid. trying to fit into our Constitution something which
has no real relevance to it or bearing upon its con~e'ats or which conflicts with these. It must not. if I mav so put it, be constitutionally
..Indigestible" by a constitution such as ours. Of course, it is not a
secret tll'llt we have taken some of the basic concepts of our Constitution from British a'nd American Constitutions in their most developed
stages. That too must put us on our guard against attempts to foist
upon our Constitution something simply because it happens to be
either a British or American concept of some particular period which
could not possibly be found in it today.
Therefore, both types of
explanation appear to be necesmry to a'11 exposition of what may or
may not be found in our Constitution.
·
•
...
I certainly do not think that Judges of this Court have or should
think 'that they have the power to consciously alter, under the guise
of judicial interpretation, what the Constitution declares or necessarily
implies ewa though our pronouncements, interpreting the Constitution, n.iay have the effect of contributing something to the growth or
even change of Constitutioml law by clearing doubts, removing uncertainties, or filling up of gaps to a limited extent. If the law embodied fo our Constitution, as declared by this Court, is not satisfactory, I do not thi'nk that we can or should even attempt to stand in
the way of a change of any kind sought through appropriate constitutional means by the constitutionally appointed organs and agencies
of the State. If, however, this Court is asked to declare as valid what
seems to it to fall clearly outside the ambit of the Constitution, and,
indeed, what is even claimed to be operatrag from outside the Constitution and described as a supra-Constitutional power, there may be
no alternative left to it except to declare sucn a claim to be really outside the Constitution. If we were to do that we would only be .accepting the professed basis of the claim without conceding its consti(1)
(1856) 19 How. 393.
17-12GSCT/76
i;
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
598
Sl.'l'REME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 S.C.R.
A
tutional validity.
After all, we are really concerned with the questims of constitutional validity which can only be resolved by references to what the Constitution contains, either expressly or by a necessary implication, and not with what is beyond its range except in so
far as this also may be necessary to explain what is or what is deemed
to be a part of our Constitution.
B
The term "sovereign" is derived from the Latin word "Superanus"
which was taking "Suzerian" suggesting a hierarchy of classes which
In its origin, it is an
characterised ancient and medieval societies.
attribute assigned to the highest living human superiors in the political
hierarchy and not some abstract quality of a principle or of a law contained in a document-a meanrag, as will be shown here, which emerges clearly later.
In times of anarchic disorder or oppression, by
local satraps or chieftains or barons or even bullies and criminals,
ordinary mortals have sought the protection of those who could give
No book or document
it because of their superior physical might.
could provide them with the kind of help they needed. They looked
upto their "Sovereign liege a•ad Lord", as the medieval monarch was
addressed by his subjects, for protection against every kind of tyranny
and oppression.
c
D
E
F
G
H
The Greeks and Romans were not troubled by theqries of "SoveThe principle that Might was Right was recogreignty" in a State.
nised as the unquestioned legally operative' principle at least in the field
of their Constitutional laws.
Greek 1ihilosophers had, however,
formulated a theory of a Law of Nature which was, morally, above
the laws actually enforced.
In later stages of Roman Law, Roman
jurists also, saturated with Greek notions of an ethically superior law
of Nature, said that the institution of salvery, which gave the owner
of a slave theoretically absolute powers of life and death over the
slave, just like the powers of a pater-familias over his children, was
CO'atrary to jus naturale although it was recognised by jus gentium,
the· laws of then civilised world.
Aristotle, in his analysis of forms
of government, had emphasized the importance of the Constitution of
a State as a test or determinant of sovereign power in the State. And,
Roman jurists, had, indirectly, cleared the path for the rise of modern
legalism and constitutid,1alism by rescuing law itself from the clutches
of a superstitious reverance for customs, surrounded with ceremonial
and ritualistic observances and cumbersome justice defeating formalism, through fiction and equity, and forged a secular and scientific
weapon of socio-economic transformation.
All this was very useful
i11 preparing for an age in which secular law could displace religion
as the "control of controls" (See : Julius Stone's "Province & Function of Law", 1961 End. p. 754, 767).
Romans not only clarified basic notions but developed a whole
armoury of new forms in which law could be declared or made; Lex
Plebiscitum; Magistratuum Edicta: Senatusconsulta; Responsa Pru.dentium; Principum Placita.
The last mentioned consisted of orders
of Roman Emperors which were of various kinds, some of general
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN (Beg, J.)
•
-
599
.application to cases of particular kinds and others for particular individual cases : Edicta; Decreta, Mandata, Rescripta. They had the
"force of law" or "Lex" which could be roughly equated with our
"Decreta" were issued as decisions on individual
statutory law.
disputes, in exercise of the Emperor's power "under" the authority of
"Lex de Imperio", although "in the classiC'al period it was firmly
established that what the Emperor ordained had the force of law"
(See: R. W. Leage on Roman Law, Edn. 1961 p. 32) The point
to note is that, even in the embryonic 5tages of government through
legislation Jaw-maktag and decision of individual cases are found distinctly separate.
After the break-up of the Roman Empire, there were attempts in
medieval Europe, both by the Church and the Kings, to develop spiritual a»1d temporal means for checking wrong and oppression. Quests
for the superior or a sovereign power and its theoretical justifications
by both ecclesiastical and Jay thinkers were parts of an attempt to.
meet this need. The claims of those who, as vicars of God on earth.
sought to meddle with mundane and temporal affairs and acquire even
political power and influence were, after a struggle for power, which
took differe11t forms in different countires, finally defeated by European Kings with the aid of their subjects.
Indeed, these Kings tried
to snatch, and, not without success, to wear spiritual crowns which
the roles of "defenders of the faith" carried with them so as to
surround themselves with auras of divinity.
•
A \
The theory . of a legally sovereign unquestionable authority of
the King, based on physical might and victory in battle, appears to
have been developed i11 an.cient India as well, by Kautiliya, although
the concept of a Dharma, based on the •authority of the assemblies
of those who were learned in the dharmashastras, also competed for
control over exercise of royal secular power.
High philosophy and
religion, however, often seem to have influenced and affected the actual exercise of sovereign power and such slight law-making as the
King may have attempted.
The ideal King, in ancie,1t India, was
conceived of primarily as a Judge de.ciding cases or giving orders to
meet specific situ<itions in acco~dance with the Dharma Shastras. It
also appears. that the actual exercise of the power to administer justice
was often delegated by the King to his judges in ancient India. Indeed,
according to some, the theory of seP'arat,io1,1 o.f powers appears to have
been carried so far. (See : K. P. Jayaswal in "Manu and Yajnavalkya"
-A basic History of Hindu Law-1930 Edn. p. 82) that the King
could only execute the legal sente1we passed by the Judges.
We know that Semetic prophets, as messengers of God, also became rulers wieldiug both spiritual and political .temporal power and
authoritv although to Jesus Christ, who never sought temporal power,
is ascr:ibed the saying : "re'ader unto Caesar the things that are
Caesar's and onto God things that are God's". According to the
theory embodied in this saying, spiritual arid temporal powers and
authorities had to operate in d,ifferent orbits of power altogether.
Another theory, however. was that the messenger of God had given
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
600
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORT'S
[1976] 2 S.C.R.
the sovereign will of God Almighty which governed all matters and
this could not be departed from by any humfil1 authority or ruler. In
the practical administration of justice, we are informed, Muslim caliphs.
acknowledged and upheld the jurisdiction of their Kazis to give judgment against them personally.
There is an account of how the
Caliph Omar, being a defendant in a claim brought by a jew for some
money borrowed by him for purposes of State, appeared in person
in the Court of his own Kazi to answer the claim. The Kazi rose
from his seat out of respect for the Caliph who was so displeased with
this unbecoming conduct that he dismissed him from office. [See :
Sir A. Rahim's "Muhammadan Jurisprudence" (1958) p. 21].
1
-
The theory, therefore, that there should be a separation of functions between the making of laws, the execution of laws, and the
application of laws, after ascertaini'ng facts satisfactorily, is not new.
It is embedded in our own best traditions. It is dictated, if by
nothing else, by common sernse and the principle of division labour,
without an application of which efficient performance of any duties cannot be expected.
We may now look back at the theory a1ad practice of sovereignty
in Europe.
There, wise Kings, in the Middle ages, sought the support of their subjects in gatherings or "colloquia", which, in the words
of Mr. De Jouvenel (See : "Sovereignty an Inquiry into the Political
Good" p. 177), "had the triple character of a session of justice, a·
council of State and the timid beginnings of a legislative assembly
were the means by which the affairs of the realm came more and more
into the hands of t)J.e King". He goes on to observe : "The council
of the King and the Courts of justice progressively developed an
independent life, the assembly remaining under the name of Pariiament in Englaind and States-General in France."
Bodin, writing in the reign of Henry the III of France (1551 to
1589), viewed sovereignty as an absolute unlimited power which,
though established by law, was not controlled by it.
According to
him, under an ideal system, sovereignty was vested in the Ki>ng by
divine right.
The King's word was law.
But, even according to
Bodin, alth~ugh the Sovereign was free from the trammels of positive
law, as he was above it, yet, he was "bound by divine law and the
law of nature as well as by the common law of nations which embodies
principles distinct from these" (See : Du•ming's "History of Political
Theories : Ancient & Medieval" p. 28). Hobbes, a century later
continued this line of thinking on an entirely secular and non-moral
pla•ne. He opined : "Unlimited power and unfettered discretion as
to ways and means are possessed by the sovereign for the end with
a view to which civil society is constituted, namely, peace and escape
from the evils of the State of nature". in which the life of individuals
was "nasty, brutish, and short."
Although, Hobbes visualised the
existence of a social compact as the source of the authority of the
sovereign, yet, he looked upon the compact only as a mode of surrender by the subjects of all their individual rights and powers to tbe
sovereign who could be either an individual or a body of persons.
•
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN (Beg, J.)
601
Subjects, according to him, had no right to rely upon the compact as
a means of protection against the sovereign. He provided the fullest
theoretical foundations of a Machiavellian view of sovereignty.
As we know, in the 17th and 18th centuries, European monarchs
came in sharp conflict with the represe'u.tatives of their subjects assembled in "Parliament" in England and in the "States-General" in France.
And, theories were put forward setting up, as against the claims of
Kings to rule as absolute sovereigns by indefeasible divine right, no
lesser claims to inviolability· and even divinity of the rights of the
people. But, theories apart, practice of the art of Government proves that the effective power to govern by the very nature of conditions
needed for its efficient exercise, has had to be generally lodged in
one or few especially m times of crisis, but not in all those who represent the people even under democratic forms of Government.
Direct democracy, except in small city States such as those of ancient
Greece, is not practically feasible.
Theories of popular sovereignty put forward by
Locke and
Rousseau came to the fore-front in the 17th and 18th centuriesan era of revolutionary changes a!,1d upheavels.
The theory of.
certain immutable individual natural rights, as the basis of a set of
positive legal rights, essential and necessary to th.e fulfilment of the
needs of human beings as individuals, was advanced by Locke. He
visualised a social con.tract as a means of achieving the welfare of
individuals composi',1g Society.
He also advocated separation of
powers of government in a Constitution as a method of securing rights
of individual citizens against even their own Governments. Montesquieu elaborated this theory. The ideas of Rousseau were amongst
those which contributed to produce that great confiageration, the
Fre~1ch Revolution, which was. described by Carlyle as the "bonfire
of feudalism". Government, according to Rousseau, in all its
Departments, was the agent of the General will of the Sovereign
people whose walfare must always be its aim and object. But, the
General will for the time being was also liable to err about the particular means chosen to nchieve the ends of good Government. There
:was, according to Rousseau, also another part of the "General Will"
which was mort perma'aent and stable and unerring and decisive. He
·hinted that there was what Bosanquet (See : The Philosophical
Theory of the State-Chap. V) called the "Real Will", the basis of
which was found in Rousseau's philosophy. As p_qinted out by T. H.
Green, in his Lectures on "Principles of Political Obligation" (1931
Edn. p. 82) Rousseau's theory of sovereignty was designed to bring
·
out that :
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
"there's on earth a yet auguster thing,
Veiled though it be, than Parliament and King."
T. H. Green said : ''It is to this 'auguster thing', not to such supreme
power as Er1glish lawyers held to be vested in Parliament and king',
that Rousseau's account of the sovereign is really applicable."
H
602
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
( 197 6) 2 S.C.R.
A
The ideas of Rousseau were subsequently used by Hegelian and
Idealist politi'<al philosophers to deify the State as the repository of
the "Real Will" of the people and by Marxists tci build tht:ir theory
of a dictatorship of the proletariat.
But, the views of Lockt: and
Montesquieu were sought to be givea a practical form by American..
Constitution makers, who imbued with them, devised a macilinery for
·the control of sovereign power of the people placed in the hands of
Suspicion
B the three organs of State so tha~ it may not be misused.
of Governmental power and fear of its misuse, which characterised
liberal democratic thinking, underlay the doctrine of separation of
powers embodied in the American Constitution.
c
D
E
F
G
H
•
...
'The merits of democracy'', according to Bertrand Russel (See :
"Power : A new Social Analysis" p. 187) "are negative : it docs not
insure good government, but it prevents certain evils". He pointed out
(at p. 188) : "It is possible, in a democracy, for the majority t°'
exercise a brutal and wholly unnecessary tyranny over a minority ....
The safeguarding of mi•aorities, so far as is compatible with orderly
Government, is an essential part of the taming of power'".
He alse
said (at p.192) : "Where democracy exists, there is still need to
safeguard individuals and minorities •against tyranny, both because
tyranny is undesirable in itself, and because it is likely to lead to
breaches of order.
Montesquieu's advocacy of the separation of
legislative, executive, and judiciary, the traditional English belief in:
checks and balances, Bentham's political doctrines and the whole of
nineteenth century liberalism, were designed to prevent tlle arbitnry
exercise of power. But such methods have come to be c0nsidered
incompatible with efficiency."
Some quite honest, upright, and intelligent people think that the:
inefficiency, the corruption, the expense, the waste of tim<: and effort,
and the delay in accomplishing what they regard as much too urgently
needed socio-economic and cultural transformations of backward:
peoples today, involved in treading the democratic path, are so great
that they would readily sacrifice at least some of the democratic processes a'11d such safeguards against their misuse as separation of
powers and judicial review are meant to provide.
They would not
mind taking the risk of falling into the fire to escape from what they
believe to be a frying pan. Some may even agree with Bernard Shaw,
who lik,r,d to look at everything turned upside down m attempts tO'
understand them, that Democracy, with all its expensive and timeco',1suming accompaniments, is, even in the most advanced countries,.
only a method of deluding the mass of the people into believing that
they are the rulers whilst the real power is •always enjoyed by the few
who must be· judged by the results they produce and not by their professions.
Others regard democracy as the only means of achieving
the highest good and the greatest happiness of the greatest number.
They consider its maintenance to be inextricably bound up with the
preservation of the basic individual freedoms and a supporting mechanism or structure of checks and balances, separation of powers, and
judicial review.
What some believe to be obstacles to any real progress are looked upon by others as almost sacred institut10ns essential
•
<
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN (Beg, J.)
603
for the protectia11 of their lives and liberties, hearths and h<Jmes, occupations and means of liverlihood, religions, language~, and ~ultures.
Inevitability of change is, according to some, the b~s1c a.nd i_nescapable law of all life, the only questions to be cons1dcrco t,emg its
pace and direction : how soon or how late and whether the change
is to be for the better or for the worse ? "El Dorado'', some believe,
lies ahead. Our march towards it, they say ,should be orderly and
disciplined. · To others all change is anathema as it is generally for
the worse. The Golden Age, some believe, lay in the past. Salvation of mankind, they think, lies in a return to the ima&ined pristine
virtues of that past.
Some assert that certain ame"11dm;outs of our
Constitution have "defaced and defiled" it (See : Mr. Palkhivala's
"Our Constitution"). Others maintain that these very amendments
have made our Constitution a more potent instrument of those socioeconomic and cultural transformations for which the Co.nstitution was
designed (Sec: Dr. V. A. Seyid Muhammad's "Our Constitution
for Haves or Have-nots").
Judges must, no doubt, be . impartial and independent. They
cannot, in a period of intensified socio-economic conflicts, either
become tools of any vested interests, or functions, from the bench,
as zealous reformers propagating particular causes. Nevertheless, they
cannot be expected to hav~ no notions whatsoever of their own, or to
have completely blank minds on important questions indicated above
which, though related to law, really fall outside the realm of law.
They cannot dwell in ivory towers or confine their processes of thinking
in some hermetically sealed chambers of purely legal logic artificially
cut off from the needs of life around to which law must respond.
Their differing individual philosophies, outlooks, and attitudes on
vital questions, resulting from differences in temperament, education,
tradition, training, interests and experiences in life, will often determine
their honest choices between two or more reasonably possible interpretations of such words as "amendment" or "constituent power" in the
Constitution. But, on certain clear matters of principle, underlying
the Constitution, no reasonable person could entertain two views as to
what was or could be really intended by the Constitution makers. One
of these matters, clear beyond the region of all doubt, seems to me to
be that the judicial and law making functions, however broadly conceived, could not possibly have been meant to be interchangeable.
They are not incapable of distinction and differentiation, in any constitutionally prescribed sphere of operation of power including that of
"constituent power". Each has its own advantages and disadvantages
and its own natural m'?dus operandi.
A lamentable example of what took place in the course of English
Constitutional history when a House of Commons, composed of very
intelligent and learned people, one of whom, Holt subsequently became a distinguished Chief Justice of England, took upon itself to sit
in judgment on a decision of two Judges of the King's Bench Division, one of whom was suspected of being a partisan of Royal prerogative and power at a time when a struggle for supremacy between, the
competing legal claims of the King, as the titular sovereign, and those
of the House of Commons, as representing the people, was still going
A
B
c
I>
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
604
A
B
c
D
E
F
[1976] 2 S.C.R.
on. In strict law, which was unwritten, the position on that problem
of power was not quite clear at that time. The episode is thus described by Lord Denman, C.J., in Stockdale v. Hansard(1') (at p.
1163) :
"The next case to which I advert in truth embraced no
question of privilege whatever; but, as one of the highest
authorities in the State has thought otherwise, I shall offer
some comments upon it; I mean Jay v. Topham (112 How
St. Tr. 821). The House of Commons ordered the defendant, their serjeant-at-arms, to arrest and imprison the
plaintiff for having dared to exercise the common right of all
Englishmen, of presenting a,petition to the King on the state
of public affairs, at a time when no Parliament existed.
For this imprisonment an action was brought. The declaration complained, not only of the personal t~espass, but also
of extortion of the plaintiff's money practised by defendant
under colour of the Speaker's warrant. The plea of justification under that warrant, which could not possibly authorise
the extortion, even if it could the arrest, was over-ruled by
this Court, no doubt with the utmost propriety, for the law
was clear; Lord Ellenborough points this out in the most for~
cibly manner, in 14 East, 109. Yet for this righteous
judgment C.J. Pemberton and one of his brethren· were
summoned before the Convention ~rliament, when they
vindicated their conduct by unanswerable reasoning, but
were, notwithstanding, committed to the prison of Newgate
for the remainder of the session. Our respect and gratitude
to the Convention Parliament ought not to blind us to the
fact that this sentence of imprisonment was as unjust and
tyrannical as any of those acts of arbitrary power for which
they deprived King James of his Crown. It gave me real
pain to hear the Attorney-General contend that the two
Judges merited the foul indignity they underwent, as they
had acted corruptly in concert with the Duke of York. In
support of this novel charge, he produced no evidence,
nor any other reason but that the plea, as set out .in
Nelson's Abridgement( a), appears to have been in bar,
and .not to the jurisdiction. But the .Commons, who
knew their own motives, made no such charge : the record
produced there, on law, exhibits a bad plea for the reasons
assigned by Lord Ellcnborough; and the judgment punished
by the Commons could not have been different without a
G
H
desertion of duty by the Judges."
[(a) 2 Nels. Abr. 1248. The plea there is that pleaded,
not in Jay v. Topham, but in Verdon v. Topham,
See 14 East, 102 note (a) .J
In Stockdale v. Hansard (supra) the action of the House of Commons on Jay v. Topham (supra), was practically declared to be illegal or unconstitutional for arbitrariness. The sovereign British Parliament, however, did not alter but has acquiesced in the law as stated
(l)
112 English Rep. 1112@ 1163.
-
•
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN (Beg, J.)
605
by Lord Denman who pointed out, by reference to a number of precedents, that Common Law Courts had continuously been determining
questions relating to the very existence of an alleged privilege and
defining its orbit on claims based on the ground of a Parliamentary
privilege. And, English Courts have gone on doing this unhesitatingly
after Stockdale v. Hansard (supra), just as they had done earlier, as
a part of their function and duty to interpret and declare the law as
.it exists.
Let me go back a little further to the time when another _Engli~h
·Chief Justice, Sir Edward Coke who on being summoned, with bJS
brother Judges, by King James the 1st, to answer why the King could
not himself decide cases which had to go .before his own Courts of
Justice. asserted: " .... no king after the conquest assumed to himself
to give any judgment in any cause whatsoever, which concerned the
administration of justice within this realm, but these were solely determined in the Courts ofJustice". When the king said that "he thought
the law was founded on reason, and that he and others had reason, as
well as the Judges'', Coke answered :
"True it was, that God had endowed his Majesty with
excellent science, and great endowments of nature; but his
majesty was not learned in the laws of his realm of England,
and causes which concern the life, or inheritance, or goods,
or fortunes 0£ his subiects, are not to he decided by natural
reason, but by the artificial reason and judgment of the law,.
which law· is an act which requires long; study and experience, before that a man can attain to the cognizance of it;
and that the law was the golden met-wand and measure to
try the causes of the subjects; and which prot·3cted his Majesty
in safety and peace."
A
B
c
D
E
(The "Higher Law" background of American Constitutional law
'
by Edward S. Corwin p. 38-39).
We know that Coke even advanced the claim, in Bonlzam's('1 )
case, that Courts could invalidate acts of Parliament if they contravened rules of natural justice such as that a man shall not be heard
before he is condemned or that he should be a Judge in his own cause.
As Ivor Jennings points out, in an appendix to "The law and the
Constitution" (5th Edn. 1959 p. 318) the theory of Parliamentary
sovereignty or supremacy· could, by no means, b3 said to be firmly
established in England in Coke's time.
Blackstone, while enunciating the theory of Parliamentary sovereignty in the 19th century, as it was to be later expounded in the 20th
century by Prof. A. V. Dicey,, also claimed superiority for "the law
of nature which was common to all mankind". · He said about this
law:
"It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at
ali. times : no human laws are of anv validity if contrary to
This; and such of'them as are valid derive all their force and
(I)
(1610) 8 Co. Rep. 118.
F
G
H
60 6
A
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 S,C,R~
all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original;"
(See : Dicey-Law of the Constitution p. 62).
B
c
D
E
F
G
It is a matter of legal and Constitutional history that English Judges
finally rejected claims based upon vague philosophical concepts or upon
a law of nature or appeals to the "yej auguster thing" pitted against
statutory law excegt in so far as certain rules of natural justice and
reason could impliedly b~ read .into acts of Parliament due to absence
of statutory prohibition and the need to observe them having regard
to th·~ character of the function required by a statute to be performed.
Constitutional historians, such as Holdsworth, have pointed out how
English Common Lawyers, some presiding as Judges over King's Courts
of Justice, others sitting in Parliament as Legislators, joined hands to·
evolve., sustain, and give life to principles of "Sovereignty of Parliament" and the "Rule of Law" as understood by them. Dicey asserted,
in his "Law of the Constitution", that both these principles so operated
as to reinforce each other instead of comini? into conflict with each
other. One wonders whether this could be ~said of later times when
the need for more rapid transformations of social and economic orders,
in an effort to build up a welfare State in Britain, led to serious cur-·
tailments · of what were at one time considered natural and inviolable
rights and to adoption of legislative devices such as Henry VIIIth clause.
We know that these developments evoked a powerful protest from a
Chief Justice of England, Lord Hewart, who wrot·~ a book on the
subject : "New Despotism". Today, however, it cannot be said that
th·~ Courts of Justice in England do not see the implications of a
welfare Socialistic State which may demand the curtailment of Jibertie'>
of subjects in many directions in order that the substance of democratic freedom, only attainable through removal of economic, social,
and educational disl)arities and barriers, may be attained.
Willis, dealing w.ith the development of American Constitutional
Law, wrote about the claim of Coke, mentioned above, to invalidate
Acts of Parliament by reference to certain fundamental principles of
natural justice and of common Jaw (See : Willis on Constitutional'
Law-Edn. 1936 p. 76) :
''This dictum of Coke, announced in Dr. Bohrnan's case
( 1610), 8 Co. Rep. 11 SA) was soon repudiated in England,
but the doctrine announced in Coke's dictum found fertile
soil in the Unit·~d States and sprouted into such a vigorous
l!rowth that it was applied by the United States Supreme
Court in the decision of cases ~orning before it; and it has
been said that the doctrine of the supremacy of the Supreme
Court is the logical conclusion of Coke's doctrine of control
of the Courts over leg)sla ti on".
H
It seems to me that judicial review of all law making,, whether it
appertains to th-::: sphere of funrlamental law or of ordinary law, is
traceable to this doctrine of judicial control by reference to certain
•
•
•
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
(Beg, J.)
607
basic principles, contained in a Constitution' and c~nsidere_d t?o inviolable to be easily alterable. It may be that this doctrm~ 1s l!nsuitable for our country at a time when it is going through rapid _soc1~
economic transformation. Nevertheless, so long as the doctrine 1s
found embodied in our Constitution, we can.not refuse to recognise it.
Jn America there was some doubt whether the doctrine of judicial
review of all l~gislation naturally flowed out of the vesting of judicial
power by Sectio'Il 1 of Article 3 of their Constitution which says :
B
"The judicial power of the United Stat-es shall be vested
in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish ...
(Willis on Constitutional Law-p. 1020).
Then.~ is no c:.i-ticle there, like Article 13 of our Constitution, which
declared any kind of legislation abridging or taking away fundamental
rights to be "void". The doubt was not without substance. It was
removed by Chief Justice Marshall whose judgment in Marbury v.
Madison('), firmly established the doctrine of judicial review and the
supremacy of the Supreme Court of America, in the judicial field of
interpretation, as the mouthpiece of the Constitution, and, therefore,
of the "Real Will'' of the people themselves. The Constitution,, as the
basic or fundamental law of the land, was to operate there as the
touchstone of the validity of ordinary laws just as the validity of laws
made by British colonial legislatures was tested by refere.nce to the
parental Act of the British Parliament.
;
Under our Constitution, by Article 141 of the Constitution, power
is vested only in the Supreme Court and in no other organ or authority
of the Republic to declare the law "which sha]J be binding on all
Courts within the territory of India". Section 143 of the Constitution
of India also shows that whenever questions of fact or law have either
mi sen or are likely to arise, the President of India may, in view of
their public importance, seek the opinion of the Supreme Court, by
a reference mad·e to the Court. The procedure on such a reference is
that of a Judicial authority which hears those interested and then gives
its opinion .. Article 32 of the Constitution gives a wide power to the
Supreme Court "to issue dir-ections or orders or writs", which is larger
than· that of the British Courts issuing prerogative writs, although it is
c~nfined to the en~orcemirnt of the rights conferred by part 3 dealin'!
with fundamental nghts. The power of the High Courts of the various
States under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue appropriate directions., orders, or writs "to anv p'erson or authority includin'! in appropriate cases any Government": within the territories under its jurisdiction. extends to "any other purpose", that is to say, to purposes
other than enforcement of fundamental rights. Article 227 also contains the power of a High Court to superintend the functioning of "all,
Courts and Tribunals" within its jurisdiction. These powers of the
High Courts are subject to appeals to the Suoreme Court which is
also a repository of a special jurisdiction uode-r Article 136 to grant
special_!eave to appeal "from any judgment, decr.:!e, determination;
(!)
(1803) Cranch 137.
c
·608
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 s.c.R.
sentence or . or~er ~n any ca~se or matt.er passed or made by any
Court or Tribunal Ill the territory of India". It is true that there is
no mention ~r vesting of judicfal _Power, as __such,, in the Supreme Court
by any Article of our Constitution, but, can it be denied that waat
vests in th~ S1:1preme Court and Hi~ Courts is really judicial power ?
The Constituti<;n undoubtedly specifically vests such power, that is to
say, power which can properly be described as "judicial power", only
in the Supreme Court and in th~ High Courts and not in any other
bodies or ~u~orities, whether executive or legislative, functioning under
the Const1tut10n. Could such a vesting of power in Parliament have
been omitted if it was the intentfon of Constitution makers to clothe
it also with any similar judicial authority or functions in any capacity
whatsoever ? ·
IB
D
E
F
The claim, therefore" that an amalgam or some undifferen,tiated
residue ~f inherent power, incapable of precise definition and including
judicial power, vests in Parliament in its role as a constituent authority,
cannot be substantiated by a reference to any Article of the Constitution whatsoever, whether substantive or procedural. Attempts arc
made to infer such a power from mere theory and speculation as to
the nature of the "Constituent power" itself. . I do not think that,
because the c-0nstituent power necessarily carries with it the power to
constitute judicial authorities, it must also, by implication, mean that
the Parliament,, acting in its constituent c!apacity, can. exercise the
judicial power itself directly without vestingi it in itself first by an
amendment of the Constitution. The last mentioned objection may
app-~ar to be procedural only, but, as a matter of correct interpretation of the Constitution, and, even more so, from the point of view
of correct theory and principle, from which no practice should depart
without good reason, it is highly important.
This impels me to consider such theories of sovereignty as we may
find embedded in our Constitution. It is noteworthy that the phrase
"Sovereignty and integrity of India" was inserted in 1963 in Article
19(2), (3) and (4),, to denote the political independence and wholeness of th~ country vis a vis other countries. It was also introduced
in the oaths of "allegiance" to the Constitution prescribed in the Third
Schedule indicating that the duty uphold "the Sovereignty and integrity
of India" follows from a recognition of the Supremacy of the Con·stitution. The term "sovereign" is only used in the preamble of our
·
Constitution, which says :
"We, the people of India, having solemnly resolved to
constitute India into a Sovereign Democratic Republic and
to secure all its citizens :
•
"
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
•••
_H
,.
6
#
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
ln our constituent Assembly this twentysixth day of
November, 1949, do hereby adopt, enact and give to ourselves this Constitution".
r
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN (Beg, J.) •
•
J
609·
This Court, exercising the powers vested in it under the Constitution to declare the law of the land, cannot go behind the clear words
of the Constitution on such a matter.. We have to presume that the
Constitution was actually made by the people of India by virtue of
their political sovereignty which enabled them to create a legally
Sovereign Democratic. Republic to which they consigned or entrusted,,
through the Constitution, the use of sovereign power to be exercised,
in its different forms, by the three different organs of Government,
each acting on behalf of the whole people, so as to serve the objects
stated in the Preamble. This reference to "the people of India" is
much more than a legal fiction. It is an assertion in the basic legal
instrument for the governance of this country of the fact of a new
political powers. The legal effect of the terms of the instrument . is
another matter.
It has been pointed out, in the Kesvananda Bharti's case (supra),
that the preamble of our Constitution did not, like that of the American
6onstitution, "walk before the Constitution",, but was adopted after the
rest of the Constitution was passed so that it is really a part of the
Constitution itself. It means that the Constitution is a document recording an act of entrustment and conveyance by the people of India,
the political sovereign, of legal authority to act on its behalf to a
"Sovereign Democratic Republic". "This Constitution'' has a basic.
structure comprising the three organs of the Republic : the Executive,
the Legislature and the Judiciary. It is through each of these organs
that the Sovereign Will of the People has to operate and manifest itself
and not through only one of them. Neither of these three separate
organs of the Republic can! take over the function assigned to the other.
This is the basic structure or scheme of the system of Government of
the Republic laid down in this Constitution whose identity cannot,
according to the majority view in Kesvananda's case (supra), be
changed even py resorting; to Article 368. It necessarily follows, from
such a view, that Sovereignty,, as the power of taking ultimate or fina]
decisions on broad politico-legal issues involved in any proposed
changes in the law, becomes divisible. The people are not excluded
from the exercise. of it. They participate in all the operations of the
Republic through the organs of the State. They bind themselves to
exercise their. individual and collective rights and powers only in the
ways sanctioned and through agencies indicated by the Constitution.
The Republic is controlled and directed by the Constitution to proceed
towards certain destinations. and for certain purposes only. The power
to clrnnge even the direction and purposes is itself divided in the sense
that a proposed change, if challenged, must be shown to have the
sanction of all the three organs of the Republic, each applying its own
methods and principles and procedure for testing the correctness or
validity of the measure. This result, whethfr we like it or not, necessarilv follows from our present Constitutional structure and scheme.
If the judicial power operates here like a brake or a veto, it is not
one which can be controlled by any advice or direction to the judiciary
as is the case in totalitarian regimes. In our system, which is democratic, its exercise is let to the judicial conscience of each individual
judge. 'This is also a basic and distinguishing feature of democracy
c
D•
E.
F
G
H
'61 0
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 :;.c,R.
as Prof. Friedman indicated in his "Law in a Changing Society" (p:
61) quoted by me in Kesvananda Bharati's case (supra) at p. 859).
B
•C
iD
:F
~H
In. Kesvananda Bharati's case (supra), I had approvingly quoted
the views of Prof. Ernest Barker, who, in his "Social and Political
Theory", claiming to be elaborating the theory underlying the preamble
to our own Constitution, pointed out that, ina.>much as the Constitution is the instrument which regulates the distribution betw~en and
exercise of sovereign power, by the three organs of the Stat·~. and it
is t.here constantly to govern and to be referred to and to be appealed
to m any and every case of doubt and difficulty, it could itself,. conceptually, be regarded as the true or "ultimate" soverci1m. that is to
say, Sovereign as compared with "immediate" sovereignty of an organ
of the Republic acting within its own sphere and at its own level.
Of course, inasmuch as the power of altering every feature of the
Constitution remains elsewhere politically, the Constitution is neither
the ultimate "political" sovereign nor a legally unalterable and absolute
soverei!1n. All constitutional and "legal" sovereigns an~ necessarily
restrained and limited sovereigns. I thought and still think that such a
working theory should be acceptable to lawyers, particularly as the
dignitaries of. State, including Judges of superior Courts, and all the
legislators, who have to take oaths prescribed by the Third Schedule
of our Constitution, swear "allegiance" to the Constitution as tliough
the document itself is a personal Ruler. This accords with our own
ancient notions of the law as "The King of Kings" and the majesty of
all that it stands for : The Rightfulness of the Ends as well as of the
Means.
·
The theory outlined above would, of course, b~ unacceptable if
sovereignty must necessarily he indivisible and located in a determinate living person or persons-a really medieval concept which is not
generally employed today even to describe the titular hereditary
monarchs as "sovereigns", although the dictionari·~s may still give the
derivative meaning of "sovereign" as the human ruler. Modern theories
of even political sovereignty advanced by the Pluralist School-e.g.
Gierke, Duguit, Mciver, Laski-look upon it as divisible and not as
absolute and unlimited. Indeed, they go to the etxent of practically
denuding sovereignty of all its customary connotations. Duguit abandons "sovereignty" as an obsolescent doctrine and displaces it by the
ruling principle of "social solidarity". Mciver thinks that. t~1e trad!tional concepts of sovereignty, dommated too long by legahst1c Austtnian views. needs to be discarded. His conclusion is that the State,
with which' doctrine of sovereignty has been bound up, is "the association of associations", merely regulates the "orinciples of .association"
or relations between individuals and associations in the mterests of
Society as a whole.
He wrote :
"At any moment the State is more the official guardian
than the maker of the law. Its chief task is to ·uohold :th~
rule of law. and this imolies that it is itself also the sub1~t
of Jaw, that it is bound in the system of legal values which
it maintains."
(See: R. M. Maclver: "The Modern State" p. 478)
•
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
(Beg, J.)
611
Laski, while mainly acc<:pting this rather negative approach, reminiscent of 19th century Liberalism, would acc?rd the State a much m~re
positive role in the interests not only of social order but also of soc10economic engineering and progress.
Marxists who saw in the State and its laws and all institutions
supporting ~n -~xisting social order, the means of oppr~ssio~ and e~~
ploitation of the mass of the p_eople, dreamt of the ··w1thermg away
of the State with its claims to 'Sovereignty'. But, the Russian Revolution was followed by the· vastly increased powers of the State run
for the benefit of the proleta,r_iat. Nevertheless, the Constitution of the
U.S.S.R. guarantees to citizens not merely fundamental rights, including
the right to work, but has a si;>ecial department of the Procurator
General to enforce due observance of legality, according to the law
of th-~ Constitution, by all the functionaries of Staie. Article 104 of
their Constitution reads :
"104. The Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. is the highest
judicial organ. The Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. is charged with the supervision of the judicial activities of all the
judicial organs of the U.S.S.R. and of the Union Republic
within the limits established by Jaw."
A
B
c
D
(See : A Denisov, M. Kirichenko' Soviet State-Law p. 400).
It is true that legality is enforced in the U .S.S.R. not merely
through the organs of the State but the vigilance of the Communist
Party which consists of selected persons keeping a watch on the
policy of the State. A. Y. Vyshinski, bowever, explained (See: Fundamental Tasks of Soviet Law 1938) that Soviet "law can no more
be reduced simply to policy than cause can be identified with effect".
Strict observance of "Socialist Legality", under the supremacy of the
Constitution, is entrusted to the care of the State, with its three ornans,
the Communist Party, and the people of the U.S.S.R. (See : "'The
Soviet Legal System" by M/s. John N. Hazard and Issac Shapiro).
Although, Art. 15 of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. speaks of the
"Sovereignty" and "Sovereign Rights" of the Union Republics, yet,
it is made clear that these Republics function subject to the supremacy
'Of the Constitution. Hence, the supremacy of the Constitution is a
principle recognised by the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. also as
operating above and limiting the Sovereignties of the Socialist Repubiics.
E
F
Gierke made a wide survey and a penetrating analysis of juristic
thinking, upto the end of the 19th century, on sovereignty, derived, on
the one hand, from t~e·ories of the sovereignty of the Ruler, and, on
the other, from theones of popular sovereign1y. He observed: (See:
"Natural Law and theory of Society" by Otto Gierke translated by
Ernest Barker, Vol. I, p. 153) about the approach of Kant:
G
"Kant sketches, indeed, an ideal O:institutional State in
which popular sovereignty is nominally present; but no living 'subject' of supreme authority is anywhere really to be
H.
,
612
A
B
c
·suPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 2 S.C.R.
I
found in this State. ·The 'bearers' of the different ·powers
(legislative, executive and judicial) are supposed to govern,
but each is subject to a strict legal obligation apv.ropriate to
its own sphere; and over them all, as the Sovereign proper,
the abstract Law of Reason is finally enthroned."
He concluded (at p. 153) :
"The history of the theory of constituti:onalism shows
how a doctrine derived from the principle of popular sover. eignty could produce almost the same results as the other
(and apparently opposite) system uf thought which started
from the principle of the sovereignty of the Ruler. In the on'e
case, just as in the other, the inviolability of sovereignty, and
the unity of the personality of the State, are sacrificed, in
order to attain the possibility of a constitutional law which
is binding even on the Sovereign."
D
E
A thoory of a "Legal Sovereignty" must necessarily demarcate
the sphere of its "legal" or proper operation as opposed to mere use
of power either capriciously or divorced from human reason and
natural justice. Ernest Barker's statement of it, quoted by me in
Kesvananda's case (supra), seemed to me to satisfy this requirement.
After pointing out that Sovereignty, by which I understand one recognised by lay.', is limited both by its own "nature" as well as its "mode
of action", it coli.eludes: (at p. 867-868) :
"Sovereignty moves withinl the cireie of the legal association, and only within that circle it decides U{YOn questions
of a legal order, and only upon those questions. Moving within that circle, and deciding upon those questions, sovereignty
will only make legal pronouncements, and it will make them
according to regular rules of legal procedure. It is not a
capricious power of doing anything in any way : it is a legal
po!Ver of settling finally legal questions in a legal way."
F
G
H
There should be no difficulty in• accepting such theory if one can conceive of an ordered system or "government of laws" as opposed to a
"Government of men" placed beyond limitations of this kind. At
any rate, it is implicit in the very idea of a Constitution. Our Comstitution not only regulates the operations of the organs of State but
symbolises the unity of the Republic and contains the inspiring hopes
and aspirations and cherished goals of all the efforts ·of the nation.
It operates not merely through the law but also on the minds and
feelings of the people.
Prof. Willis, in his "Constitutional Law of the United States" advocates the doctrine of "Sovereignty of the People" for which ·he
finds support in Abraham Lincoln's well known description 0f the
American system as "a Government of the people, for the people,
by the peuple" as well as in a number of pronouncements of the
American Supreme Court. After considering and rejecting a whole
host of theories of political philosophers and jurists, including those
Qf Bodin, Hegel, Hooker, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Fichte, Kant,
•
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN (Beg, J.)
Austin, Brown, Dicey, Willoughby, Duguit, and Laski, he
(at p. 51):
613
opines :
"As Dewey says, the forces which detennine the government are sovereign. The effective social forces are not the
Union, nor the States, nor .the oligarchy of States, nor the
organs of Government, nor the Constitution, n'Or natural law,
but those forces which created these organisations and agents
and institutions, and to whom they are all ultimately responsible."
According to him, the "Sovereignty .of the People" which he advocates
does not mean an anarchic licence given to each individual or group
to do as he or it pleases, but stands for the power of the people, "organised in Goveinment to express and adjust their will either directly
or through representatives". He explains, in the rest of his work, how
the government of the U.S.A., in the broader sense of all that social
control which, operating through the three departments of State, has
to take place iu accordance with the Constitution. This concept of
a nation "organised in Government" appears to me to clearly introduce the idea of a Constitution which lays down what that organisation
is and how it must operate. Although Prof. Willis rejects the vit:w
that the Constitution is' "Sovereign", bccau~e it can be altered by the
people, he is obliged to accept something resembling it because he
sees that the "people", though of as a mere aggregation or an amorphous mass, is too nebulous. Any satisfactory theory of sovereignty
must account for the power of the people to act in certain ways or to
move in certain directions. A 'hydra-headed' multitude 'Or mass of
people will not know how to act or in which direction to move. It
is its "Organisation" which provides that. And, its effort to organise
itself and to rationalise will produce a Constitution for it which em. bodies its will as organised in the form of a government. The will of
the people is thus inseparable from a Constitution which enables it
to be expressed and then to govern. The Constitution neither is nor
can be sovereign in the sep.se that the people who made it cannot unmake it or change it. It only prescribes the correct mode of doing
everything, including that of changing the very system of Government.
It is only in this sense that it can be "Sovereign" or "supreme" and
rule the life of a nation.
..
.
'
I
·· Another American writer, Willoughby, has put forward the view
that sovereignty, as an attribute of the State, conceived of as a juristic
entity apart from its governmental organs, cannot be legally limited.
According to him, to limit it is destroy it. He says (See : Willoughby
Oil'· "F\Jndamental concepts of Public Law-Tagore Law Lectures,
1924, at p. 77) : "There would seem to be no more value in attaching legal rights and duties to the sovereign State than there is in pre~licating the attributes of goodness and justice of a Divine Being who
1s regarded as Himself the creator, by His own un-restrained will of
all distinctions between goodness and badness". But, this seems more
a metaphysical than a realistic, more amoral Hobbes-Machiavellian
than a Dante-Gandhian stance. If one's concept of the Divine Being
arc ro be introduced into law, one could refer to those also which sec
19-126 SCI/76
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
614
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976) 2 S.C.R.
A
Divinity only in that order and that Law which seems to prevade and
govern the whole physical world and the universe. Indeed, there are
judicial dicta t-o the effect that God himself considered Himself bound
by those elementary principles of justice whose love was planted in
·man by Him. In Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works(1) Byles,
J. observed :
.
B
"The laws of God and man both give the party an opportunity to make his defence, if he has any. I remember to have
heard it observed by a very learned man, upon such an Occasion, that even God himself did not pass sentence upon
Adam before he was called upon to make his defence. 'Adam'
(says God), 'where art thou? Has thou not eaten of the tree
whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat'?
And the same question was put to Eve also".
c
D
E
F
G
H.
It is cle-ar that no simpie theory of sovereignty fits the complex
facts of modern life.
Every theory of today, ultimately, rests on
concepts more refined than the physical or spiritual might of some
ruler, in whom executive, legislative, and judicial powers coalesce to
take away all legal distincti0',1s between them. Even if thal was ever
the concept of Sovereignty anywhere, it was cert•ainly not that of our
Constitution makers and it is not ours today.
Even Willoughby,
dealing with Constitutionalism (Willoughby on "Nature of the State"·
1928, at p. 302) says: "the value of Constitutional government is not
that it places sovereignty in the hands of the people, but that it prescribes definite ways in which this sovereign power shall be exercised
by the State". Hence, he too admits that the Constitution does place
some limitation on exercise of sovereign power. That seems to me to
be the essence of a Constitution and the rationale of its existence.
Still another American writer, Orfield, in the course of his discussion (See : The Amending of the Federal Constitution" by Lester
B. Orfield 1971), of a number of concepts of sovereignty, seeins sometimes to almost consider Article 5 of the American Constitution, containing the constituent power and its procedure, to be soverein. He
concludes his discussion on the subject as follows (at p. 166) :
"Each part of the amending body is subject to law, and
may be altered or abolished. . The amending boely itself
may be altered through the amending process, and limitations on the future am<mding capacity may be imposed.
The amending body is an artificial sovereign deriving its
being from a law in the form of Article Five. The amending groups hold office for but a short time, and may be supplanted by others in the elections in which an increasingly
larger electorate p•articipates.
The theory of sovereignty,
moreover, presupposes the continued orderly existence of the·
government. In case of a revolution the commands of the
(1) (1863), 14 C. B. (N. S.) 180.
...
I •
SMT. JNDlRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
(Beg, J.)
615 ,
·sovereign would be disregarded, and authority could no
longer be ascribed to the amending body either in fact or
in law. T.fle moral, religious, physical, and other factual
limitations on the supposed sovereign are so important that
it may p.erhaps be correct to say that they are also legal
limitations; as there comes a time when law and fact ~bade
into one another. Finally, when it is rememl)ered that
throughout •all history, American as well as European, there
never has beea a consensus as to the meaning of sovereignty,
it seems that the term should be used only with the greatest
circumspection."
..
A
B
I
J
He rejects the concept of. sovereignty of the people as too vague and
meaningless. And, for the reasons given above, he rejects the
theory of a sovereignty of the amending body. His final conclusion
seems to be tlrat it is better to avoid altogether eatangiement in the
concept of sovereignty.
This view, however, overlooks the fact that
lawyers need a working theory of sovereignty to be able to decide legal
<1uestions before them. As between the sovereignty of the amending Article and the sovereignty of the Constitution there should be
little doubt that lawyers should and would prefer the sovereignty or
supremacy of the whole constitution rather than of a,1y part of it.
On the face of it, it appears more reoasonable and respectable to swear
allegience to the whole Constitution, as we actually do, rather than to
Article 368 or to the amending powers contained in it. If there is
a part of our Constitution which deserves greater devotion than any
other part of it, it is certainly the preamble to our Constitution.
The American Supreme Court, in the context of the especially
American conditions and needs, ·after leaning sometimes towa!ds a recognition of "State Sovereignty" (Sec : Ware v. Hylton(1), Dred
Scott v. Sandford) (2) and at others towards a recognition of the
<lual system of Government which has prevailed in America See :
e.g. Gibbus v. Ogde11(3) has, on the whole opted for the "Sovei reignty of the People which unifies the nation (see : e.g. White v.
• Heart('), Keith v. Clark("), National Prohibition cases( 6 ).
c
D
E
F
I cannot, while I am on the subject of American conditions, resist
the temptation to quote the trenchant comments of Prof. Willis on
• what he considers to be the dangers of the American system of government. He wrote (at p. 68-69) :
,. '
"But the greatest danger in popular sovereignty does
not lie in the intellectual field, but in the moral.
While
our i•atellectual level is not as high as it ought to be, our
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(1876) 3 Dall 199.
(1856) 19 How. 393.
(1824) (9 Wheat p. 1)
(1871) 13 Wall. 646.
(1878) 97 u. s. 454.
(l 920) 253 u. s. p. 350.
G
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
616
[1976] 2 S.C.R.
moral level is much lower than it C'an safely be if our form
o~ _government is to endure permanently.
Millions of our
citizens are already members of the criminal class. Millions
of other citizens who are not yet members of the criminal
class ~re in t~e ec.onomic world doing things just as bad. as
th~ ~hmgs which members of tiie crimr~al class arc doing.
Millions of our people are concerned_ with their own selfish
interests instead of the common good. Millions of our
citizens are only too ready to ruin themselves and the rest
of our people physically, intellectually, and morally by drugs
and intoxicating liquors and vices. Our people do :not seem
to be much concerned with high ideals in any of the fields
of human endeavour. Our people as a whole do not seem
to be seriously concerned with social planning for the purpose of obtaining an ideal social order. They are more
i•11terested in rotation in office than they are in good government. They are more interested in winning law suits than
in ideal system for the administration of justice. They
are more i'11terested in making fortunes in the practice of
medicine than in the prevention of disease. They are more
interested in profits in the business world than they arc in
a well-planned system of business organisation adapted to
the needs of our social order.
They are more interested
in individualism than they arc in collective planning for the
good of all.
A
B
c
D
E
F
The effects of the moral standards of our people arc al~
ready manifest. As a result of our political and economic
theories, there has developed a concentration of wealth unparalleled in human history. While on the whole the economic level is comparatively high in the United States, the
difference between the wealth of the many and that of the
few is startling. One-fourth of the families in the United
States before the depression had incomes of less tJian $ 500
and two-thirds of tl1e families in the United States i_neomes of
less than $ 1 000 while 2 per cent of our populatmn owned
65 per cent ~f the wealth. There were .f~ur men any one
f horn had an income as large as five million of the poorest
0
le in the United States.
This e()ncentration Qf we~lth
~asp robably one of the primary causes ef .th~ ~epre~s1on,
and ~he depression has thrc.atcned ~ur cap1tal!~tie sy~e~.
This only shows the danger rnhercnt 111 our poht1C'al or,,amsation."
e:
G
If the people of an advanced country like the U.S.A., left denftirely
H
f
J
overeignty have revealed the nee or a
to the e~t~ccp~,fctiifcro~~ :o~lding role 'of their State so as to overcomde
more pos1 ive ,.,- "
'll' h
uch greater arc the nee s
the dangers advert~d to by Prof. Wi is, u~f 1!1o backward economically
of a people potentially so great but act
y t"ll are ? Our concepts of
• 11
s taken en masse s 1
•
and e~ucat1ona y as oudr , 'th the needs df the people of our country.
sovereignty must accor Wl
\
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN (Beg, J.)
61 7
Our Constitution, which has been described by G. Austin as "the cornerstone of the Nation'', was devised as a means to serve those needs. It
has not only. the elevating preamble, deserving the allegience of every
rational human being, but, unlike the American Constitution, the whole
of Part IV of our Constitution which contains "Directive Principles of
State Policy" to guide the future course of State action particularly in
the legislative field. It is true that provisions of Part IV are not enforceable through the Courts against the State, but they are declared as
fundamental in the governance of the country and are used to interpret
the Constitution and to fix its meaning. I think, from this point of view
also, we can say that the concept of the Supremacy of the Constitution
is, undoubtedly, more suited to the needs of our country than any other
so far put forwards. It not only places before us the goals towards
which the nation must march but it is meant to compel our Sovereign
Republic, with its three organs of Government to proceed in certain
directions. l t assumes that each organ of State will discharge its trust
faithfully. Can we deny it that supremacy which is the symbol and
proof of the level of our civilisation ?
I find that the doctrine of the supremacy or sovereignty of the
Constitution was adopted by a Bench of seven learned Judges of this
Court in Special Reference No. 1 of 1964(1), where Gaiendragadkar,
C.J., speaking for six learned Judges of' this Court said (at p. 446)
I.
.
'
"In a democratic country governed by a written Constitution, it is the Constitution which is supreme and sove-reign. It
is no doubt true that the Constitution itself can be amended
by the Parliament, but that is possible because Art. 368 of the
Constitution itself makes a provision in .that behalf, and the
amendment of the Constitution can be validly made only by
following the procedure prescribed by the said article. That
shows that even when the Parliament purports to amend the
Constitution, it has to comply with the relevant mandate of
the Constitution itself. Legislators, Ministers, and Judges all
take oath of allegiance to the Constitution, for it is by the relevant provisions of the Constitution that they derive their
authority and jurisdiction and it is to the provisions of the
constitution that they owe allegiance. Therefore, there can be
no doubt that the sovereignty which can be claimed by the
Parliament in England, cannot be claimed by any Legislature
in India in the literal absolute sense."
The principle of the supremacy of the Constitution was then declared by the majority of the learned Judges of this Court in Kesvananda's case (supra) to be a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. The minority opinion, while not specifically dissenting from this
view was that even what was considered by the majority to be a part
of 'basic structure " was alterable under Article 368. But, no judge of
this Court has so far held that, without even attempting to change what
may be the basic structure of constitu!ion itself, by appropriate ame:idments, judicial power could be exercised by Parliament under Article
368 on the assumption that it was already there.
(I)
[1965] 1 SCR 413.
I
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
618
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 s.c.R.
M. C. Setalvad, a distinguished jurist of India, said (See : "The·
Common Law of Jndia" Hamlyn Lccturcs·12th scrics-1960 (at p.
174-175) :
· "The Constitution divides the functions of the Union
into the three categories of executive, legislative and judicial functions following the pattern of the British North ·
America Act and the Commonwealth of Australia Act.
Though this division of functions is not based on the doctrine of separation of powers as in the United States yet
there is a broad division of functions between the appropriate authorities so that, for example, the legislature will
not be entitled to arrogate to itself the judicial function of
adjudication. 'The Indian Constitution has not ind..:ed
recognised the doctrine of separation of powers in its
absolute rigidity but the functions of the different parts of
branches of the Government have been sufficiently differentiated and consequently ft can very well be said ·that our
Constitution docs not contemplate assumption, by one
organ or part of the State, of functions that essentially
belong to another'. [Sec Rai Saheb R. J. Kapur & Ors. v.
State of Pzmjab (:1)]. _Thi~ will no doubt strike one
accustomed to the established supremacy of Parliament in
England as unusual. In the course of its historical development Parliament has performed and in a way still performs judicial functions. Indeed the expression 'Court of
Parliament' is not unfamiliar to English lawyers. However, a differentiation of the functions of different departments is an invariable feature of all written constitutions.
The Yery purpose of a written constitution is the demarcation of the powers of different departments of government
so that the exercise of their powers may be limited to their
particular fields. In countries governed by a written constitution, as India is, the supreme authority is not Parliament but the Constitution. Contrasting it with the supremacy of Parliament, Dicey has characterised it as the
supremacy of the Constitution."
A. V. Dicey, the celebrated propounder of the doctrine of the
sovereignty of Parliament, had criticized Austin for frequently mixing
up "legal sovereignty" and "political sovereignty" (Sec : Law of the
Constitution by A. V. Dicey-10th Edn. p. 72). He contrasted the
British principle of "Parliamentary Sovereignty" with what was des- , •
cribed bv him the "Supremacy of the Constitution" in America. He
observed (at p. 165) :
"But. if their notions were conceptions derived from
English law, the great statesmen of America gave to old
ideas a perfectly new expansion, and for the first time in the
history of the world formed a constitution wl1ich sl1ould
in strictness be 'the law of the land', and in so doing
(l)
[1955] 2 SCR 225 at p. 235.
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARA.IN (Beg, J.)
619
created modern federalism. For the essential characteristics
·of federalism-the supremacy of t~e constitutio~-~~e distribution of powers-the authority of the 1ud1ciaryreappear, though no doubt with modifications, in every
true federal state."
He said (at p. 144) :
"A federal state derives its existence from the constitution, just as a corporation derives its existence from the
grant by which it is created. Hence, every power, exe~u
tive, legislative, or judicial, whether if belongs to the nation
or to the individual States, is subordinate to and controlled
by the constitution."
He wrote about the American Supreme Court (at p. 159) :
"Of the nature and position of the Supreme Court itself
this much alone need for our present purpose be noted. The
. court derives its existence from the Constitution, and stands
therefore on an equality with the President and with Congress; the members thereof (in common with every Judge
of the Federal Judiciary) hold their places during good
behaviour, at salaries which cannot be diminished during a
judge's tenure of office."
The theory of the Supremacy of the Constitution is thus not a
new one at all. It is inherent in the very concept of "the auguster
thing" which lies behind Parliament or king and is sought to be
embodied in the Constitution of a country. The Judges, who are
vested with the authority and charged with the duty to uphold the
Constitution, do so as the mouthpieces of what has been called the
"Real Will" of the people themselves by political philosophers such
as Bosanquet. That, as I have indicated earlier, is the theory underlying the system of judicial review. Such a system may delay
changes but should not, I think, speaking entirely for myself, deny
or defeat the right of the people to bring about any change, whether
basic or not, in the Constitution. Indeed, in Kesvananda's case
(supra), I indicated that I thought that the most proper and appropriate function of the amending power in a Constitution, which is
also a part of the Constitution, and, indeed, its most potent partwas that of making basic changes so as to avert constitutional breakdowns and revoultions if possible. However, we are precluded from
acting upon such a broad view of amending power in this case as we
arc bound by the majority opinion in Kesvananda's case (supra) that
implied limitations of "a basic structure", operating from even outside the language of Art. 368, as it stood before the 24th amendment,
restrict its scope. These limitations must however, be related to
provisions of the Constitution.
It has not been argued before us that the introduction by the 24th
amendment of the new clause· (1) in article 368, containing the
"constituent power", itself amplifies or increases the contents or
changes the character of the power in Article 368 by making it a
A
B
c
D
E
F.
G
H
620
A
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976) 2 S.C,R.
composite power so as to include a new type of judicial or quasiIt is evident from the judgments of learned Judges of this Court in Golaknath's case (supra)
that possible distinctions between amending power and "constituent
power" and "Sovereign power" figured prominently in arguments in
that case. Wanchoo, J., in his minority opinion [see: 1957(2) SCR
at p. 833), saicj that it was not necessary, for the purposes of that
case, to decide whether the amending power was as wide as the
"sovereign power" of the Constituent Assembly which had framed
our Constitution. After all the discussion that had taken place th~n,
came the 24th amendment. It does not use the words "sovereignty"
or "sovereign ·power". I presume that the words "constituent power"
were advisedly used in it so as to clarify the position and not to put
in or to include anything beyond constitution making power in Art.
368.
The "constituent power" is still bound by the exclusively prescribed procedure to "amend by way of addition, variation, or repeal"
any provision of the Constitution. It is entirely a law making procedure elaborately set out in clause (2). In fact, Art. 368 contains
so much of the fundamental law making or legislative procedure that
five judges of this Court, led by Subba Rao, C.J., opined in Golaknath's case (supra), that it wa~ confined to procedure and did not
contain at all the substantive power to amend. Clause ( 1) of Art.
368, introduced by the 24th amendment, was, apparently, meant to
remove this objection and to do no more. It could not be intended
to pour some new amalgam of executive and judicial or quasi-judicial
substantive powers into it also by some implication so as to do away
with the very need for snch an elaborate and carefully drawn up
Constitution such as ours. The absence of ·any quasi-judicial procedure, from the comprehensively framed procedural provisions of Art.
368, seems extremely significant. It indicates that it was the clear
intention of Constitution makers that no judicial or quasi-judicial
function could be performed by Parliament whilst operating in the
special Constituent field of law making. An omission to provide
any quasi-judicial procedure in Article 368, which, apparently, furnishes a self-contained code, means that no such power was meant
to be included here at all. Proper exercise of judicial power is
inseparable from appropriate procedure.
j udcial power also within its fold now.
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
Learned Counsel supporting the 39th Amendment tried to find
the meaning of "constituent power" in theoretical speculations about
the meaning of "the sovereignty of the people", on the one hand, and
the sovereignty of the medieval monarch, on the other, instead of
looking to the. legislative history of the "constituent power". I have,
therefore, also referred to some of these theories and practices from.
ancient times so as to be able to indicate the precise significance or
relevance of various concepts and decisions placed before us. These
theories and practices could •have only an indirect bearing on the
meaning of the term "constituent power" in Article 368. They are
more germane to a statement of a correct theory of sovereignty which
underlies what has been called the "basic structure" of our Constitution.
.
,
'
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN (Beg, J.)
621
There are scattered dicta in the judgments of this Court speaking A
Qf the "sovereignty of the people" which, in my opinion, ~an only be
related to the political sovereignty of the people recogm_sed by the
preamble to our Constitution where the. pe?ple are desenbed a~ t~e .
Co11stitution makers who gave the Const1tut1q_n unto themsel~es. fh1s,
however, docs not, in my opinion, mean that the peoi;ile retamed u_nto
tllemselves any residue of legal sovereignty. They did not presenbe,
B
apart from dividing the exercis~ of sover~ig~ power roughly betwee~
the three organs of the Republic, each with its own modus operandi,
any other or direct method, such as Initiative or ~eferendum, ~or
exercising their politically sovereign power. The view I have tned
to put forward in the foregoing pages is that the people entrusted to
the three organs of the Sovereign Democratic Republic they constituted the exercise of three aspects of sovereign power on behalf of c
the people. This seems to ml;)_ to be the only way of reconciling the
_idea of a sovereign people, in the political sense, and the sovereignty
of the Republic, represented by a legally _supreme constitution, so
that the "sovereign" powers of each of the three organs of the Republic had to be exercised in conformity with the mandates, both positive and negative, express and in1plied, of the Constitution. I would
prefer to describe this concept as one of the "supremacy of the Cons- D
titution" instead of "sovereignty" of the Constitution because of the
theoretical, speculative, and "emotive" clouds which have gathered
around the term "sovereignty".
'
.
'
I have tried, to point out that the term sovereignty in its origin is
associated with the actual human ruler or authority wielding theoretically absolute or final powers. Political philosophers are particularly concerned with the problem of determining the location and
manner of exercise of such powers if any. Jurists, however, have
also occupied themselves with these problems partly because constitutional law, as Dicey once ppinted out, has some overlapping territory with the political theory which underlies it. Some Constitutional
lawyers, such as Ivor Jennings, have said that it is flirtation with
political theory which has brought into the juristic fold a term such
as 'sovereignty'. On the other hand, political theorists, such as Mc
Iver, have blamed, far less justly, ·jurists like Austin for infecting
pol~t~cal theory wi!h leg~listic authoritarian notions of sovereignty.
Poltt1cal theonsts, m their attemQts to understand and rationalize, and
sometimes to justify or condemn a system are more concerned with
the operations of all those socio-economic-cum-political· forces which
govern society. Law is, for them, one of these forces and reflects
them. Lawyers have been compelled to 'Flirt' (if I may employ the
term used by Sir Ivor Jennings. with sovereignty) only because they
have to look for some final authority which determines the validity
of the claims they have to deal with. Political theory, faced with
the complexities of modern life, finds location of sovereignty as a
power concept too elusive and difficult a task to be satisfactorily
carried out. . Some of them would like to banish the term to the
region of purely moral philosophy where it could be reserved for such
freedom or thought and will and action as even the most powerful
E
F
G
H
SUI' REM E COURT REPORTS
622
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
[ 197 6) 2 S.C.R.
totalitarian State, employing all the techniques based on Prof.
Pavlov's theories for purpq_ses ·of propaganda, cannot take away
from the individual. Others find it of use only in International Law
to denote that independence of the national State and the freedom
which it c!aims and is entitled to from outside interference. Jurists
as well as practical lawyers have to be content with finding an ulti- ""
mate measuring rod in a fundamental law which could test the validity
of exercise of every kind of governmental power. Their quest for
certainty is even more pressing and urgent than that of the political
theorist. For their purposes, the supremacy of the Constitution, of
which a very vital and necessary part is the constituent power, is
sufficient. Of course, they have to determine the content of "consti- '
tuent power" itself in the light of all relevant considerations which, as
I !Jave indicated above, may take us outside the ordinary range of
Law. Nevertheless, our deviation from the ortbodox canons of
construction and interpretation, when faced with such a problem,
must not be so wide as to rob our method of construction itself of
legal propriety or give rise to th9 suspicion that we have ourselves
clearly trespassed into the territory of law making. The lines of
demarcation, though difficult to draw sometimes, arc, nevertheless,
there.
I do not think that it is at all helpful to refer to certain authorities
of this Ccurt which were, rather surprisingly, relied upon by learned
Counsel supporting the 39th amendment to discover the nature of the
"constituent power" contained in Art. 368. I will content myself by
citing a passage from the last of these cases relied .upon which mentions the earlier cases of this Court also on the effect of a "Firman",
in Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. The State of Rajasthan &
Ors.( 1), Gajendragadkar, J., speaking for this Court said (at p.
591) :
"In appreciating the effect of this Firman, it is first
necessary to decide wheth_cr the Finnan is a law or not. It
is matrer of common knowledge that at the relevant time
the Maharana of Udaipur was an absolute monarch in whom
vested all the legislative, judicial and executive powers of
the State. In the case of an absolute Ruler like the Maharana of Udaipur, it is difficult to make any distinction between an executive order issued by him or a legislative command issued by him. Any order, issued by such a Ruler
has the force of law and did govern the rights of the parties
affected thereby. This position is covered by dec\sions of
this Court and it has not been disputed before us, Vide
Madhaorao Phalke v. the State of Madhya Bharat ( 1960) 1
SCR 957, Ammer-un-Nisa Begum v. Mahboob Begum
(AIR 1955 SC 352), and Director of Endowments, Government of Hyderabad v. Akram Ali (AIR 1956 SC 60)."
It is evident, from the quotation, relied upon by the SolicitorGeneral. that tl1is Court was not deciding whether the Firman was
eve1' a "law'' in the sense of a general norm which had to be applied
---- -··----- (J)
(19641 (I) SCR p. 561 @ 591.
\
,
.
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN
...•
.,..
.\
·•
•
(Beg, /.)
623
A
to the decision of cases. It was held that whatever be its juristic
character, it had the "force of law" inasmuch as the Ruler of Udaipur
was an absolute ruler who combined in his person the legislative,
the judicial and executive authority of the State. That was the Constitution of Udaipur. . The doctrine of separation of powers, in such a
context, was really irrelevant. Art. 368 of our Constitution, however,
is not a power acquired by our Republic by State Succ~ssion from the
powers of Indian ruling princes. The legislative. history behind it is
entirely different.
As a matter of legislative history, we will find the source of the
"constituent power" in Section 6 & 8 of the Indian Independence Act
passed-by the British Parliament. Section 6 of that Act constituted a
'"Legislature" fot each of two Dominions set up with plenary powers
c
of Ic~islatin.1. The legislative powers of the Legislature of each
Dominion were so enlarged by Sec. 8 that it could frame the Constitution of the_ Dominion concerned. This was a transfer of only a
legislative power. Sec. 8 said : "for the purpose of making provision
as to the Con;titution of the Dominion, the legislature of the dominion
was recognised as the constituent assernb1y of the Dominion". l"hcse
po,vc~ were "pienary"" in the sense· in which this term is used in
O·.
Qa~eii v. Burah( 1), but they were confined to law making and did
not extend to adjudication or decision of .individual cases which is
certainly distinguishable from a law making power. For purposes
other than framing of the Constitution, provision of the Government
of India .Act operated until they were repealed and . replaced by
other. relevant provisions. Such was the process of a le2islative
s_uccession through which institutional transformation or transition to
a new but corresponding set of institutions was brought about. In
the eyes of law; this was an evolutionary process through constitutional channels and not a revolutionary break with the past.
It is true that, in the exercise of the law making constituent power,
brought in by Sec. 8 of the Indian Independence Act, the legislatures
could be armed with judicial. powers as well if appropriate laws were
made to that effect.
But, as no law, either Co'astitutional or ordiF
nary was passed, preceding. 39th amendment to repeal the Act of
1951 and then to vest a judicial power in Parliament, so as to enable
it to take over and decide election disputes itself directly, I do not
sec how clause (4) of Art. 329A, if it contained certain provisions
on the assumption that. such a judicial power was already there ih
Parliament, could be valid as a piece of mere ·1aw making.
How- ·
ever, Counsel supporting the 39th Amendment had, submitted that
G·
Article 329A (4) evidenced and constituted. an exercise of some
"unbroken" or a combined legislative and judicial power a proposition for which no precedent of any such consolidated action of a constituent body was cited from any part of the world. T11e Firmans of
former Indian ruling princes were hardly suitable or applicable precedents.
An attempt was made to convince us that what may not have H
been otherwise possible for Parliament to do bceoame possib_lc by ·
(I) 5 T. A. 178.
624
A
B
c
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976) 2 S.C.R.
invoking the presumed exercise of some judicial power imported by
Art. 105 (3) of the Ca.istitution which says :
'
"105(3) ...... the powers,
privileges and immunities
of each House of ParHament, and of the members and the
committees of each House, shall be such as may from time
to time be defined by Parliamenf by law, and, until so
defined, shall be those of the House of Commons of the
Parliament of the United Kingdom, and of its members·and
committees, at the commcncefilent of this ConstitutiO'il",
I am unable to see how what was not .conferred upon Parliament
itself, in its constituent capacity, could be impliedly assumed to be
there by virtue of certain "powers, privileges and immunities" which
belong separately to each House of Parliament. Such a claim could
not be based upon what is to be found directly' in Art. 368. It
is sought to be derived from .Art. 105. This reasoning would.
obviously, conflict with the provisions of Art. 329(b) of the Constitution which indicates that an· cledion dispute can only be resolved
by an election petition before a forum provided by an ordinary enactment. Article 329(b) says;
D
"329(b) No election to either House of Parliament or
to the House or either House of the Legislature of a State
shall be called in question except by an election petition
presented to such authority and in such manner as may be
provided for by or under :tay law made by the appropriate
·
Legislature."
E
In exercise of its powers under Art. 329(b) our Parliament had
. enacted the Act of 1951. The procedure provided by the Act had
the binding force of a constitutionally prescribed procedure. It could ·
not be circumvented unless, with reference to cases covered by Art.
329(4), it had been first repealed. Only after such a repeal could
any other forum or procedure be legally adopted. It could not be
assumed, by reason of Article 105 (3), that the prescribed forum had
shifted, to Parliament itself, 'md that Parliament, in exercise of its
constituent function, had both legislated and adjudicated. That is
w~at we ·were-asked to accept.
F
G
The well recognised rule of construction of statutes, which must
apply to the interpretation of the Constitution as well is : ."Expressio
Unius Est Exclus/o Alterius". From this is derived the subsidiary
rule that an expressly laid down mode of doing something necessarily
prohibits the dobg of that thing in any other manner. .The broad
general principle is thus summarised in Crawford's "Statutory Co11structions" -(1940)
at p.- 334 : ·
-"Express Mention and Implied Exclusion (Expressio
Unius Est Exclusio Alterius.-As a general rule, in the
interpretation of statutes, the mention of one thing implies
the exclusion of another thing. It, therefore, logically follows
that if a statute enumerates the thiags upon which it is to
operate, everything else must nec~ssarily, and by implication,
~
H
.
,
,_ r
•
•
•
,.
SMT. INDIRA 'GANDH,I V. RAJ NARAIN (Beg, J.)
62 5
be excluded from its operation and effect. For instance,
if the statute in question enumerates the matters over
which a court has jurisdiction, no other matters may be included. Simi1'arly, where a statute forbids the performance
of certar,1 things, only those things expressly mentioned are
forbidden.
So also, if the statute directs that certain acts
shall be done i,n a specified manner, or by certain person,
their performance in any other manner than that specified,
or by any other person than one of those named, is impliedly prohibited".
·
•
lt is interesting to note that in the Australian Constitution, where
there is Art. 49, using la.nguage very similar to that of Art. 105 ( 3)
of our Con~titution, there is also a separate but difforentlv cast Article
4 7 of the· Australian Constitution corresponding to Art.- 329 (b) of
our Constitution. This article runs as follows :
"Art. 47.
Until the Parliament otherwise provides,
any question respecting the qualification of a senator or of
a member of the House of Representatives, or respecting a
vacancy in either House of the Parliament, any question of
disputed election to either House, shall be determined by the
House in which the question arises".
)
A
B
c
D
What is separately, expressly, and es.pecially provided for by Art.\
329(b) must necessarily fall outside the purview of Art. 105(3) on,
the principle srated above. M<:Jreover, Art. 105(3) contained a ternE
porary provision until other pr9vision was made by Parliament in
that behalf. Appropriate provisions were enacted by the Act of 1951
in compliance with Art. 329(b) because that was the proper Article
for it. It would be idle to contend that these provisia,1s suddenly
lapsed or ceased to exist as ·soon as Parliament took up consideration
of the issues and the grounds of the decision on them by the High
Court to which reference is made· in Art. 329A(4). Again, a purpor-r F
ted exercise of power, in enacting Article 329A(4), could only be a
law making power a!nd not any other power which could conceivably
Nevertheless, it was suggested;
fall under Art. 105, sub. Art. (3).
by copious references to the origin of the power of the House of
Commons to decide disputes relating to elections, that such a power
exists in each House of our Parilament as its inherent power. Such
G
an argument completely overlooks that, quite apart from the great
difference made by prnviding both the forum and the procedure for
deciding election disputes indicated by Art. 329 (b) of our Constitution,
Art. 105 (3 ). itself could only refer to such power as were still exercis-\
able by the House of Commons at the time when our Constitution was .,,
passed. Long before tlrat, the House of Commons in England had
ceased to decide election disputes itself.
It had transferred this
H
Ill\ fact, the
power to Courts by statute and has not resumed it.
Jaw enacted i~1 the Representation of People Act, 1949, by the British
Parliament confirmed this transfer or delegation of power, Section
626
A
B
SUPRH!E COURT REPORTS
(1976] 2 S.C.R.
107 of that Act makes it clear, like Art. 329(b) of our Constitution,
that the statutory remedies are the only ones open for election disputes.
The reasons why the House of Commons itself saw the nct:d for
entrusting to a rota of High Court Judges, the jurisdiction at one time
exercised by it directly to determine its election disputes, is found
thus stated by Blackstone, quoting Erskine May's "Parliamentary
Practice and Procedure (at p. 153-166) :
'
c
D·
E
F
G
H
"For a considerable time after the house had obtained
this jurisdiction, controverted elections were tried by committees specially nominated, composed of privy councillors
and burgesses, well qualified for the duties entrusted to them.
But after 1672, it becarµe an open committee, in which 'all
who came had voices; and at length a hearing at the bar of
the House was considered preferable to an inquiry by a
committee.
Here again, to use the words of Sir Erskine
May, "fhe partiality and injustice of the judges was soon
notorious. Parties tried their strength-the friends of rival
candidates canvassed and manoeuvred, and scats corruptly
Such
gained, were as corruptly protected or voted away.
were the results of the usurpation of judicial functions by a
popular body".
In order to remedy, if possible, these uaquestionable
evils, the statute 10 Geo. III c.16, called from its author the
Grenville Act, was passed in 1770, and the trial of election
petitions transferred to a select committee of thirteen members, which it was thought would be 'a court independent of
the house, though composed of its own members'.
For a
time there was a marked improvement in the decision of
controverted elections.
'But too soon it became evident
that corruption and party spirit had not been overcome.
Crowds now attended the ballot, as they had previously come
to the vote :-not to secure justice, but, to 'aid their own
political friends'.
The party, whether of the petitioner or
sitting ·member, which attended in the greatest number
inevitably had the numerical majority of names drawn for
the committee, and from this list, the petitioner and sitting
member struck out alternately O'ae name untiJ the commitee
was reduced to thirteen : the majority of the house was
The result it
necessarily a majority of the committee.
was not difficult to foresee.
Though the members 'were
sworn to do justice between the rival candidates, yet the
circumstances under which they were notoriously chosen,
their own party-bias, and a lax conventional moralityfavoured by the obscurity and inconsistencies of the election
law, and by the conflicting decision of incapable tribunals,
led to this equivocal result : that the right was generally
discovered to be on the side of the candidate who professed
'
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
(Beg, J.)
the same political opinions as the majority of
mjttee'.
the
627
Com-
. :'By these means the majority of the house continued,
with less directness ~ad certainty, and perhaps with less
open scandal, to nominate their own members, as they had
done before the Grenville Act.
And for h•alf a century,
this system with siight variations of procedu_re, was suffered
to prevail.
In 1839, however, the ballot was at length
superseded by Sir Robert Peel's Act; committees were reduced to six members, and nomr,rntcd by an impartial bodythe General Committee pf Elections.
The same principle
of selection was adhered to in later Acts, with additional
securities for i~partiality, and the committee was finally
The evil was thus greatly dimireduced to five members.
nished; but still the sinister influence of party was not wholly
In the nomination of ele9tid11 committees, one
overcome.
party or the other necessarily had a majority of one, and
though these tribunals undoubtedly became far J:llOre able
and judicial, their constitution and proceedings often exposed them to imputation of political bias'.
•
A
B
c
D
At length by the statute 31 & 3 2 Viet. c.125, the trial of
)
election petitions was tra•asferred to certain of the puisne
judges a Westminster, who are selected annually to form a
rotµ for this specific purpose; and who inquire upon the
spot_ in open court into the allegations of a petitioner, either
seat, or alleging an undue r(!turn. or election.
claiming
The decision of the judge, who has power to reserve his
judgment until he has consulted the Common Pleas division
of the High Court, in which these proceedings are instituted,
is final to all intents and purposes; the House of Comnwns
being bound to 'give the necessary directions for confirming
or altering the returns or for issuing a writ for a new election,
or carrying such detennination into execution as circumstances may require". And this abstract of the proceedings
at elections of knights, citizens, and burgesses, concludes
our inquiries into the laws and customs more peculiarly
relative to the House of Commons".
a
)
> '
;
E
F
I do not think that it is possible to contend, by resorting to some
concept of a succession to the powers of the medieval "High Court
G
of Parliament" in England, that a judiciaJ__power •also devolved upon
our Parliament through the Constituent Assembly, mentioned in Sec.
8 of the Indian Independence Act of 1947.
As already indicated
by me, the Constituent Assembly was invested with law making and
not judicial powers.
Whatever judicial power may have been possessed once by English Kings, sitting in Parliament, constituting the
highest Court of the realm i.n medival England, have devolved solely '/ H
on the House of Lords as the final court of apeal in England. "King
in Parliament" had ceased to exercise judicial powers in any other
And, the House of Commons had certainly
way long before 1950.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
A
B
[1976] 1 s.c.R.
not exercised a judicial power as a successor to the one time jurisdiction of the "King in Parliament'', with the possible exception of the
power to punish for its contempts. I use the qualifying word "poS:sible" because the more correct view of it today may be that this power
is •also, as it is considered in America, a mere incident of legislative
power, necessary for the due performance of law making functions and
not an "inheritance".
.
In Erskine May's Parliamentary Practice (18th Edn), after citing
the opinions of Judges, to whom a reference was made by the House
of Lords in Thorpe's case (1451), that "Lex Parlioamenti" seemed
something as strange and pecvliar as foreign law is for Common Law
Courts, it was explained (at page 187)
c
D
E
"These views belonged to a time when the distinction
between the judical and legislative functions of Parlrament
was undrawn or ~mly beginning to be drawn, and when the
separation of the Lords from the Commons was much less
complete than it was in the seventeenth century.
Views
about the High Court of Parliament and its powers which
were becoming antiquated in the time of Coke, continued to
be repeated far into the eighteenth century, although :iftcr
the Restoration principles began to be laid down which were
more in accord with the facts of the modern constitution.
But much confusion remained which was not diminished-.
by the use of t\1e phrase 'privilege of Parliament' . This
only means a body of rights comD!_<1,1 to both Houses, but
it suggests joint action (or enforcement) by both-Houses,
as in legislation, whereoas from Ferrers' case in Henry VIII's
reign, in 1543 each House enforced its own privileges separately.
Three notions arise from this confusion of thought :
F
1. That the courts, being inferior to the High Court of
Parliament, cannot call in question the decision of either
House on a matter of privilege.
2. That the lex et consuetndo Parliamenti is a separate law,
and therefore unknown to the. courts.
G
H
3. That a Re~olution of either House declaratory of privilecre
is a judicial precedent bindi'ng on the courts".
"'
The confusions mentioned above misled some people in this country, due to the provisions of Article 194(3) of our Constitution' on
the question whether a House of a Legislature had not only the power
to punish a citizen for contempt but also to exercise what is really a
j~dicial baw_:r to interpret if,1d deter~ine the a~bit of its o~n jurisdic1endragadkar, C.J., speakmg for this Court m Sp.'!cial
tion.
Reference No. 1 of 1964 (supra), rejected this claim and explained
the Eng~is~ law on the subject.
Th~, learned Chief Justice· pointed
out the mc1dental character of any claim to a power, privilege, or
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
(Beg,/)
629
imunity which could be covered by Article 194 ( 3), a provision identically similar to Art. 105 ( 3) . He pointed out that the only exception to this rule was the power to punish for its own contempt which,
since the decision of Privy Council in Kielley v. Carson(!), could
be thought of as a power of the House of Commons even acquired
as a kind of "inheritance" from the powers once possessed by the High
Court of Parliament in England. But, as all judicial or quasi-judicial power is, under our Constitution, expressly made cxerciseable
under the supervision of the judicial organs of the State, it was held
that a decision about the existence of the power to punish for contempt, on the facts of a particular case, is vested in the High Court.
Even Sarkar, J. in his dissentbg minority opinion, said (at p. 513) :
"I do not think that the House of Commons was itself ever a Court.
The history of that House does not support such a contention." The
result is similar to that in England where Courts do determine
the orbit ·of a claim to a power as •a Parliamentary preserve, on the
facts of a case, although, once it is established that the claim. is to
a powe_r confined to its proper sphere, they will not decide. a mere
question of its proper exercise. .
•
Whatever view one may take of any other powers of Parliament,
by reason ·of Art. 105 ( 3) of the Constitution, I am unab,le.. to see
how exercise of the jurisdiction to determine an election dispute, which
was, in accordance with Article 329 (b), already vested in the High
Court by the Act of 1951 for all elections to the House or the People,
could not o'aly be taken away by a Constitutional amendment, purporting to repeal retrospectively the provisions of the Act of 1951, a
piece of ordinary legislation, in their application to •a particular class
of cases, but at the same time, a declaration given of the rights of
the parties to a judgment, without first performing a judicial filnction
also which was not it1cluded in the "constituent" or ::tny other law
making power.
•
,
The question was not clearly raised before us whether ·a· Constitutional amendment could partially repeal the provisions· of an ordinary piece of legislation, that is to say, the Act of 1951, in so far
as its application to a certain class of cases is concerned. -One of the
submissions of the learned Counsel for the election petitioner, however, was that, inasmuch as the Constitution lays down -the norms ·to
which ordinary legislation must conform, its proper sphere of operation
is different from that of ordinary legislation which takes place u~1der
the provisions of Articles 245 to 255 of the Constitution.
The argument seemed to be, that, if ordinary law µiaking and constitution making took place in different orbits or on different planes of law' making
power what could be done by one method was necessarily prohibited
by the otl!er.
Learned Counsel. relied upon a number of passages
from the judgment in Kesvananda Bhart•i's case (supra), and, i\1
particular, on what Ray, J., (as he then was) said (at p. 386)
--
.
"The constituent power
is sui generis.
The majority
view in Golak Nath case that Article 13 ( 2) prevails over
{I) 4 Moore P. C. 63.
19-12'1S1p. Cl'76
A
B
c
E
F
G
H
630
A
B
c
D
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 197 6] 2 ·s.C.R.
Article 368 was on the basis that there was no distinction
between constituent and legislative power and an amendment
of the Constitution was law and that such law attracted the
opening words of Aricle 245 which in its turn attracted the
provisions of Article 13 (2).
Parliament took notice of
the two conflicting views which had been gi.ken of the unamei..ided Article 368, took notice of the fact that the preI>ondering judicial opilllion, namely, the decision in Shankari
Prasad case, Sajjan Singh case and the minority views C'.i. five
learned Judges in Golak Nath case 'Yere in favour of the
view that Article 368 contained the power of amendme'at
and that power was the constituent power belonging to Parliament. Wanchoo, J. rightly said in Golak Nath case that
the power under Article 368 is a c~nstituent power to
change the fundamental law, that is to say, the Constitution
and is distinct from ordinary legisl'ative power.
So long
as this distinction is kept in mind Parliament will have
power under Article 368 to amend the Constitutid11 and
what Parliament does under Article 368 is not ordinary law
making which is subject to Article 13(2) or any other Article of the Constitution.
This view o( Wa~choo, J. was
adopted by Parliament in the Constitution 24th Amendment
Act which made explicit that under Article 368 Parliame',1t
has the constituent power to amend this Constitution".
On the other hand, le;;irned Counsel defending the 39th Amendment relied on ;;i number of passages from various judgments, including
E mine, in Kesvan;;inda Bharati's case (supra), indicating tl1at atle;;ist the
minori~y view there was that the power of amendment contained in
Art. 368 was only- limited by the procedure laid down in Art. 368(2)
of the Constitution ;;ind nothing else. It is true that thfa is what was
emphasized by several learned Judges, including myself, in dealing
with a C'aSe where the real question was whether th~ constituent power
embraced ;;in amendment of the Constitution in such a way as to take
F away fundamental rights. But, •,1either the question whether "constituent power" itself cont;;iined judicial power within its fold nor the
question whether "constituent power" operated on a plane or in a
sphere which excluded altogether what could be done through ordinary
legislation were under consideraticm in Kesvananda's case (supra).
Some passages were cited from my judgment in that case indicating
that the constituent plane of basic changes ex~luded the ordinary law
making plane of legislation, the two belonging, so to speak, to diffe.
G
rent spheres or orbits .of operatid11.
I think I had only cited Prof.
Ernest Barker's statements of his theory some. of whi~h could convey
that sense. But, I had not committed myself to view on the question
whether there was a limit on the subject matter of constituent law
making.
H
It could be and has been argued, not without force, that there are
no legal limitations upon the subject matter which may be cCJ1,1sidered
fit for inclusion or incorporation in a constitution. This is left to
•
•
'
.
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v.. RAJ NARAIN· (Beg, J.)
A._
"
•
631
the good sense of the Constitution ,m~~ers.
Consti!uti?ns,, differ
greatly in this respect (See : Wheare s ~ode~n Cons.titutl~a p.49
to 51). What may be the ideal, from this pomt of-view, is not always the actual.
Reference was also made in. support of this submission to Rottschefer on "Constitutional Vaw" (1939 edn. p.10).
It is not necessary to pursue this question any further here.
A
J had ·said in Kesvananda's case (Supra) after dealing with
amending po~er in Article 368, on the assumption that it was an
.exercise of a "sovereign power" (at p. 870) :
B
"No doubt the judicial organ has to decide the question
of the limits of sovereign authority as well as that of other
authorities in cases of dispute. But, when these authorities
act within these limits, it cannot interfere".
In other words, I look upon a "sovereign power"
c
itself, under the
Constitufa~n, as limited by the supremacy of the Constitution.
If the constitutional provisions compel us to hold, as I think they
do, that no form of judicial or quasi-judicial power is included in the . D
"'constituent power", contained in Art. 368 of the Constitution, no
further question need really be considered by us if we. were to hold
that the insertion of clause (4) in Article 329A necessarily involved,
as a condition precedent to the makin__g: of the declaration found r.t
the end ·of it, the performance of a quasi-judicial or judicial function.
But, I do not think that we could go so far as that. "Legislative action
can sometime be made to serve as an unobjectionable substitute for
E
what could and should, strictly and properly, be done judicially. But,
could this be done here without legally insurmountable difficulties ?"
'
•
..
'
The Act of 1951, enacted under the provisions of article 329{b)
of the Constitution, provided a procedure which could not be circumvented. This procedure was certainly applicable until 10.8.1975
when the 39th Amendment received Presidential assent. Rights of
appeal under Sec. 116A of the Act having been invoked by the Original Respondent as wen as by the election petitioner, and the operation of
the High Court's order having been suspended, the position was, in
the eyes of law, that of the election dispute was continued by a proceeding, exclusively prescribed by article 329(b) for the resolution of
the dispute, pending in this Court. I do not think, that despite the
impression created by the terms of the declaration at the end of clause
(4) of Article 329A and the opening statement of the counsel for the
original respondent, we can assume that Parliament took over the case
into its own hands to. decide it and to incorporate the result in the
form ·of Article 329A(4) so that this may take the place of a possible
judgment of this. Court. . Parliament could not be deamed to be unaware of the bar created by article 329(b) and the 1951 Act.
At one stage, counsel supporting the 39th amendment said that
the ~orms of the Act of l 951, together with the amendment of the
·Act m 1974 and the very recent ones of 1975, must have been oresent in the minds of members of Parliament and applied to the facts
F
G
H
632
A
B
c
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 S.C.R.
of the case. Such a contention, apart from overlooking the effect of
thei bar of article 329(b), which operated against the case being taken
up in Parliament directly until atleast 10.8.1975, just as Sec. 107 of
the British Representation of People Act, 1949" operates against the
adoption of such a course in England, overlooked the legal effect of the
deeming prov,ision which, if valid, would repel such a submission of
counsel supporting the 39th amendment. The deeming provision
appeared to be quite sweeping. It said :
"No law made by Parliament before the commencement of the Constitution (Thir.ty-ninth Amendment) Act,
197 5, in s·o far as it relates to election petitions and matters
connected therewith, shall apply or shall be deemed ever to
have applied to or in relation to the election of any such person a?, is referred to in clause (1) to either House of ParliJment.
The effect of such a provision is thus stated, in the oft quoted
passage from East End Dwellings Co. Ltd v. Finsbury Borough
Council('~) :
D
E
F
G
H
"If you are bidden 'to treat an imaginary state of affairs
as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so,
also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which,
if the putative state C>f affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it......... . . The
statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs,
it does not say that having done so, you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs."
When the effect of Article 329(b) and of the deeming provision
was pointed out to learned counsel supporting the 4th clause of 329A,
they took up the position that Parliament must have applied its own
norms. We, however, do not kilow at all and cannot guess what matters were considered or the norms applied by' Parliament. No speeches
made in Parliament on the proposed 39th amendment were cited before us by either side. We only know that the Objects & Reasons oi
the 39th Amendment contain the following statements to show us whv
Article 329A(4) was believed to be necessary:
"Article 71 of the Constitution provides that disputes
arising out of the election of the President or Vi.:e President
shall be decided by the Supreme Court. The same ~rticle
provides that matters relating to their election shall be regulated by a parliamentary law. So far as the Prime Minister
and the Speaker are concerned, matters relating to their
election are regulated by the provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Under this Act the High
Court has jurisdictiora to try an election petition presented
against either of them.
(I) [1952] A.C. 109
•
,
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
t
.. .
(Beg, J.)
633
2. The President, the Vice President, the Prime Minister
and the Speaker are holders of high offices. The President
is not answerable to a court of law for anything done, while
in office, in the exercise of his powers. Afortiori matters
relating to his election should not be brought b~fore a court
of law but should be entrusted to a forum other than a
court. The same reasoning applies equally to the incum. bents of the office of Vice-President, Prime Minister and
Speaker. It is accordingly proposed to provide that disputes
relating to. the election of the President and Vice-President
shall be determined by a forum as may be determined by a
Similar provision is proposed to be
parliamenary law.
made in the case of the election to either House of Parliament or, as the case may be, to the House of the People of
a person holding the office of Prime Minister or the Speaker, it is further proposed to render pending proceedings in
respect of such election under the existing law null and void.
The Bill also provides that the parliamentary law creating a
new forum for trial of election matters relating to the incumbents of the high offices above mentioned shall not be called
in question in any court."
•
I think that this statement of Objects & Reasons and other reasons
mentioned above by me lend support to the submission, to which Mr.
Kaushal confined himself whilst other counsel supporting the validity
of 329A(4) offered it only as an alternative submission. This was
that the whole procedure adopted and needed being a law making
procedure and nothing more there was no need to look for norms or
for law applied as no judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding was involved. This approach certainly avoids the extraordinary anomalies and
results involved in the proposition that "constituent power" embraces
some indefinable or "unbroken" power to override laws and to withdraw and decide all disputes, particularly in election matters, in Parliament itself. As already indicated, there is no provision anywhere
'for the exercise of overriding judicial or quasi-judicial powers by
Parliament, It is difficult to conceive a case being considered by
Parliament and the ratifying legislatures as. a case on trial. Parliament could not, therefore, be assumed t!O have withdrawn and then
to have decided a particular case in a particular way by applying its
own· norms. If is presumed to know the l_aw. Ostensibly, Article
329A(4) is part of an amendment of the Constitution for the purp<)ses
!found in the Statement of Objects & Reasons. Only the declaration
given at the end of it suggests that, in the course of it, the effect upon
the case before us was considered and dealt with.
If Article 329A(4) constituted only a piece of · purported law
making, the next question, which deserves very serious consideration
by us, is whether such purported law making is not fully covered by
the undoubted law making power of Parliament to make law pros. pectively as well as retrospectively, inter alia, to get rid of the legal
effect or result of. a jud2)J1ent considered erroneous by it or to retrospectively validate an election it considers valid whatever may be its
reasons for reaching this conclusion. I will answer this question after
considering the relevant case law cited on the subject.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
634
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
[ 197 6] 2 S.C.R.
A number of cases have been cited before us; some on retrospec·
tive validation of taxing provisions, by removing defects, others 011
removal of the basis of or grounds of decisions given by Courts mak
ing their judgments in effective, others affecting the jurisdiction of
Courts in cases pending, either in the original Courts or in Courts of
Appeal, so as to render proceedings infructuous, and still others cur·
ing legally defective appointments or elections It is not necessary
to discuss these cases separately and individually as the principleslaid down there are well recognised. I will be content with mention- ·
ing the cases cited. They were: M. P. V. Sudararamier & Co. v,
The State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr.(1); Sri Vinod Kumar & Ors. v,
The State of Himachal Pradesh(2); Jadab Singh & Ors. v. The Hima··
chat Pradesh Administration & Anr. (3); Udai Ram Sharma & Ors. etc.
v. Union of India & Ors.( 4 ); Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of
lndia( 5 ); Jagannath etc. etc. v. Authorised Officer Land Reforms &
Ors. etc( 6 ); Khyerbari Tea Co. Ltd. & Anr. v. The State of Assam(7);
M/s. Tirath Ram Rajindra Nath. Lucknow v. The State of U.P. &
Anr.(S); Krishna Chandra Gangopadhyaya etc. v. The Union of India
& Ors. (P): Pandia Nadar & Ors. v. The State of Tamil Nadu(1°);
State of 0.rissa v. B. K. Bose( 11 ).
Cases were also cited where rights having been altered during the
pendency of proceedings, Courts had to give effect to the rights as
altered, and judgments .already .given on the strength of the previous
law had ceased to have a binding force as res-judicata between parties
or had to be set aside where appeals against them were pending. These
were : State of U.P. v. Raja Anand Brahma Shah(l 2 ); Shn Prithvi
Cotton Mills Ltd. & Anr. v. Broach Borough Municipality & Ors.(1 3 );
Janapada Sabha, Chhindwara etc. v: The Central Provinces Sy11dicate
Ltd. & Anr. etc.(114 ); Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad
etc. v. New Shorock Spg. & Wvg. Co. Ltd. etc.(l"); State of Tamil
Nadu & A nr. v. M. R. Gounder & Anr. ('1 6 ); Amarjit Kaur & Ors. v.
Pritam Singh & Ors. (:17); Qudrat Ullah v. Municipal Board, Bareilly(11B).
Cases were also cited of the exercise of Constitutional power of
amendment, by placing Aots in the 9th Schedule, under the provisions
of Article 31B of the Constitution, such as Jagannath etc. etc v.
Authorised Officer, Land Reforms & Ors. etc., (supra) so that Acts
so included in the 9th Schedule were immune from attack on the
ground of alleged violation of any fundamental rights. It is not necessary to cite them as this is now a well recognised Constitutional device
whose validity has been upheld by this Court in Kesvananda Bharti'&
case (supra).
(1)
(3)
(5)
(7)
(9)
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(II)
(13)
(15)
(17)
[1958] S. C. R. 1422.
[1960] (3) SCR 755.
[1970] (3) SCR 530.
[1964] (5) SCR 975.
AIR 1975 SC 1389.
[1962] Suppl. (2) SCR 380.
[1970] (1) SCR 382. @392.
[1971] (I) SCR 288.
AIR 1974 SC 2068.
(2) [19591 Suppl. (I) S.C R. 160.
(4) [1968] (3) SCR 41.
(6) [1972] (I) SCR 1055.
(8) AIR 1973 SC 405.
(10)
(12)
(14)
(16)
(18)
[19741 (2) sec 539.
[1967] (1) SCR 362.
[1970] (3) SCR 745.
AIR 1971 SC 231.
AIR 1974 SC 396 ..
•
\
'
•
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ .NARAIN
(Beg. J.)
635
Our attention was especially invited to passage from Udai Ram
Sharma & Ors. etc. v. Union of India & Ors. (supra), where it was
A
said (at page 54) :
"In our opini9n no useful purpose will be served by refrrring to tbe clear demarcation between tbe judicial powers
and legislative powers in America and attempt to engraft the
said principle in the· working of our Constitution. This development of the law, as pointed out in A. K. Gopalan v. StatP
(1950 S.C.R. 88 @ 198) was due to historical reasons".
)-
B
After that, the following pass~ge fiom the judgment of Das, J.,
in A. K. Gopalan's case was quoted (at page 55) :
"the Supreme Court of the United States, under the
leadership of Chief Justice Marshall, assumed the pow·er to
declare any law tinc,onstitutional on the ground of its not
being in "due process of law," ........ It is thus that the
Supreme Court established its own supremacy over the ~xe
cutive and the Congress. In India the position of the Judiciary is somewhere in between the Courts in England and
the United States. While in the main leaving our Parliament
and the State Legislatures supreme in tbeir respective legislative fields, our Constitution has, by some of the articles,
put upon the Legislatures certain specified limitations ....
Our Constitution, unlike the English Constitution, recognises
Court's supremacy over the legislative authority, but such
supremacy is a very limited one, for it ,is confined to the field
where the legislative power is circumscribed by limitations
put upon it by the Constitution itself. Within this restricted
field tbe Court may, on a scrutiny of tbe law made by the
Legislature, declare it void if it is found to have transgressed
the constitutional limitations".
In Udai Ram Sharma's case (supra),, the following passage from
Willoughby's Constitution of the United States, second edition, Vol. 3,
was also cited :
"If the legislature would prescribe a different rule for tbe
future from tbat which the Courts enforce, it must be done
by statute, and cannot be done by a. maRdate to the courts
which leaves the law unchanged, but seeks to compel the
courts to construe and apply it not according to the iudicial,
but according to the legislative judgment .. ,.... If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts,
by requiring of them a construction of the law according to
its own views,, it iS very plain it cannot do so directly, by
setting aside their judgments, compelling them to grant
·new trials, ordering the discharge of offenders, or directing
what particular steps shall be taken in the progress of a judi-
cial inquiry".
·
c
D
E
F
G
H
636
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 S.C,R.
Willoughby's statement of Jaw in the United States of America
showing that retroactive legislation which does not impair vested or
substan~ial right.s or constitutional prohibitions, is permissible and his
conclus10n, relymg on Cooley's "Constitutional Limitations", was also
quoted:
"The legislature does, or may, prescribe the rules under
which the judicial power is exercised by the courts; and in
doing so it may dispense with any of those formalities which
are not essential to the jurisdiction of the court; and whatever it may dispense with by statute anterior to the proceedings, we believe it may also dispense with by statute after the
·proceedings have been taken, if the court has failed to observe
any of those formalities. But it would not be competent for
the legislature to authorise a court to proceed and adjudicate
upon the rights of parties, without giving them an opportunity
to be heard before it and, for the same reason it would be
incompetent for it, by retrospective legislation, to make valid
any proceedings which had been had in the courts, but which
were void for want of jurisdiction over the parties".
In Udai Ram Sharma's case (supra) an argument, based on some
observations in B. C. Ghose v. King Emperor(') was that the provisions of an amending Act amounted to passing a decree. But, this
Court repelled this argument relying on principles laid down in Q. v.
Burah (supra) :
"If what has been done is legislation,, within the general
scope of the affirmative words which give the power, and if it
violates no express condition or restriction by which that
power is limited (in which category would, of course, be
included any Act of the Imperial Parliament at variance with
it), it is not for any Court of Justice to enquire further, or to
enlarge constructively those conditions and restrictions".
A case strongly relied upon by learned Counsel supporting the
validity of Article 329A(4) was: Kanta Kathuri v. Manci/c., Chand
Surana.(2) In this case, decided by five Judges of this Court, there
was unanimity on the conlusion that the State Legislature had power
to retrospectively remove the disqualification of a candidate. The
following quotation from the judgment (at page 851) shows the reasoning adopted :
·
"Mr. Chagla, learned Counsel for' the respondent, contends that the Rajasthan State Legislature was not competent
to 'declare retrospectively' under Art. 19l(l)(a) of the Constitution. It seems to us that there is no force in this contention. It has been held in numerous cases by this Court
that the State Legislatures and Parliament can legislate retrospectively subject to the provisions of the Constitution. Apart
from the question of fundamental rights, no e.xoress restriction has been placed on the· power of the Legislature of the
(])
------
[1944] F. C. R. 295.
(2)
[1970] (2) SCR 835.
..
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
(Beg, J.)
637
State, and we are unable to imply, in the context, any restriction. Practice of the British Parliament does not oblige
us to place any implied restriction. We notice that the British
Parliament in one case validated th~ election : (Erskine
May's Treatise on the Law, Privileges Proceedings & Usage
of Parliament-Seventeenth ( 1964) Edition)"After the general election of 1945 it was found that the
persons elected for the Coatbridge Division of Lanark and
the Springbourn Division of Glassgow were disqualified at the
time of their election because they were members of tribunals
appointed by the Minister under the Rent of Furnished
Houses Control (Scot1and) Act, 1943, which entitled them·
to a small fee in respect of attendance at a Tribunal. A
Select Committee reported that the disqualification was incurred inadvertently, and in accordance with their recommendation the Coatbridge and Springbourn E:ections (Validation) Bill was introduced to validate the irregular elections
[H. C. Deb (1945-56) 414, c. 564-6]. See also H. C. 3
(1946-46); ibid, 71 (1945-46) and ibid. 92 (1945-46) ".
We have also noticed two earlier instances of retrospective legislation e.g. The House of Commooo (Disqualification) Act, 1813 (Halsbury Statutes of England p. 467) and
Sec. 2 of the Re-election of Ministers Act. 1919 (ibid, p.
515).
6reat stress was laid on t]Je word "declared' in Art. 191
(l)(a), but we are unable to imply any limitation on the
powers of the Legislature from this word. Declaration can
be made effective as from an earlier date.
-
A
B
c
D
E
The apprehension that it may not. be a .healthy practice
and this power might be abused in a particular case. are again
nq- grounds for limiting the powers of the State Legislature".
(
•
_..l.
Another case on which a great deal of reliance was placed by Mr.
A. K. Sen, was the case of the Vf!lidation of the elections of John Clarke
Geo_rge, Esquire, and Sir Roland Jennings, Knight,( 1 ) by the British
Parliament. Here, the two gentlemen named above were "discharged,
freed and indemnified from all penal consequences whatsoever incurred
by them respectively by sitting or voting as Members of the Commons
House of Parliament while holding their said offices". It was also
declared tllat they "shall be deemed not to have been incapable of
being elected members of the Commons House of Parliament, or to
have been or to be incapable of sitting or voting as members thereof,
by reason .only of having at any time before the passing of this Act
held office :
"(al in the case of the said Joh111 Clarke George, as Director
appointed by the Minister of Works of Scottish Slate
Industries Limited,
(I)
1955 Law Reports Statute~ 4 Elit. "·
F
G
H
638
A
B
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976) 2 S.C.R.
( b) in the case of the said Sir Roland Jennings, as Approved Auditor appointed under the Industrial and
Provident Societies Act, 1893, and
the Friendly
Societies Act, 1896".
Learned Counsel for the election petitioner replied that it is noticeable that no English case could be cited where any attempt. was made
by the British Parliament to circumvent Section 107 of the Representation of the People Act, 1949, which lays down :
"Section 107. Method of questioning Parliamentary election.
c
(1) No parliamentary election and no return of Parliament shall be questioned except by a petition complaining of an undue election or undue return (hereinafter
referred to as par!;•amentary electio,1 petition) presented in
accordance with this Part of this Act.
D
(2) A petition complaiti.ing of no return shall be deemed
to be a parliamentary election petition and the High Court
may make such order thereon as they think expedient for
compelling a return to be made or may allow the petition
to be hrnrd by an election court as provided with respect
to ordi•,rnry election petitions". ·
E
F
G
H
He also submitted that, in none of the cases of validation, was
any election dispute shewn to 6e pending. No judgment was actually set aside in contravention of the binding constitutionally prescribed procedure or to decide such disputes. He submitted that, in
the case of a•a election to a Parliamentary seat in this· country, this
could be done by Parliament itself only after first repealing the application of the 19 51 Act and amending Article 329 (b) in such a W'i>-Y
as to vest the power in itself to decide the dispute.
Learned Counsel, for the election petitioner, relied upon the
following statement in the American Jurisprudeace, 2nd Edn. Vol.
46, at page 318 :
"The general rule is that the legislature may not destroy, annul, set aside, vacate, reserve, modify, or impair the
final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, so as
to take away private rights which have become vested by the
judgment. A statute attempting to do so has been h~ld
unconstitutional as an attempt on the part of the legislature to exercise judicial power, and as a violation of
the constitutional guaranty of due process of law. The
legislature is not only prohibited from reopening cases
previously decided by the courts, but is also forbidden to
affect the inherent attributes of a judgment. That the
statute is under the guise of an act affecti>11g remedies does
not alter t}1e rule".
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
(Beg, ].)
639
On the other hand, learned Counsel supporting the · validity of
Article 329A( 4) relied on the following passage :
A,.
It is worthy . of notice, however, that there are cases
in ~hich iu.dgments requiring acts to be done in the future
may validly be affected by subsequent legislation making
illegal that which the judgme11t found to be legal, or making legal that which the judgment found to be illegal".
-
They also pointed out :
"With respect to legislative interference with a judgment, a distinction has been made .between public and
private rights under which distinction a statute may be
valid even though it renders ineffective a judgment cO'acerning a Public right. Even after a public right has been
established by the judgment pf the court, it may be annul-.
Jed by subsequent legislation".
It is contended that the election of a candidate is the result of
the exercise of their rights of voting by the electorate. An election
results from public action and produces a "public right" inasmuch
as the electorate and the public become interested parties acquiring
the right to be represented by the elected candidate. The right to
challenge that election is a statutory right. What the statute gives
can be taken away by statute. The grounds for challenging the
election could also be altered. No one, it was urged, could be heard
to say that he had ariy vested or inherent right to challenge an election. It was contended that once the applicability of all law previous to the 39th amendment to the class dealt with by 329A(4)
was removed retrospectively, the resulting legislative declaration followed automatically even if it had not been inserted. Its h1clusion
was a superfluity. Article 329A( 4) was said to be merely incidental
and consequential to what was done by earlier clauses (1) to (3).
It is difficult to see how Art. 329A( 4) which relates to what was past
could be incidental or consequential to what was intended to be done
in future. Moreover, more serious difficulties, dealt with below, are
found here than those which could arise in ordinary cases of retroactive validation.
,. .
Learned Counsel for the election petitioner relied 0'11 Don John
Francis Douglas Liyanage & Ors. v. The Queen,(') where the Privy
Council, considered the validity of the Criminal Law Special Amendment Act of 1962, passed by the Parlioament of Ceylon, which had
purported to legalise ex post facto the detention of persons for having committed offences agarast the State, by widening the class of
offences for which trial, without jury, by nominated judges could
be ordered. The scope of the offence of waging war against the
Queen was widened and new powers to deal with offenders were
(1)
[1967] (Vol. 1) A. C. 259.
H
640
A
B
·c
D
E
F
lI
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 S.C,R.
given and •additional penalties were. prescribed. It was held that,
althoug~, no fundamental principles of justj_c:e could be said to have
been v10lated by th~ A~t, Yet, the Act of 1962 and an amending
Act of 1965, were lnvaj_Jd on the ground SU111ll\arised in the headnote as follows (at p. 260) :
"That the Acts, directed as they were to the trial of
particurar prisoners charged with particular offences of a
particular occasion, involved a usurpation and infringement
by the legislature of judicial powers inconsistent with the
written Constitution of Ceylon, which, while not in terms
·vesting judicial functions in the judiciary, manifested an intention to secure in the .iu.diciary a freedom from political,
legislative and executive control and, in effect, left untouched the judicial system established by the Charter of
Justice, 1833. The silence of the Constitution as to the
vesting of judicial power was consistent with its remai',1ing
where it was and inconsistent with any intention that it
should pass to or be shared by the executive or the legislature. The Acts were accordingly ultra vires and void, and
the convictions could not stand".
If the constituent bodies, taken separately or together, could be
legally sovereign, in the same. way as the British Parliament is, the
Constitutional validity of no amendment could be called in question
before us. But, as it is well established that it is the Constitution
and not the constituent power which is supreme here, in the sense
that the Constitutionality of the Constitution cannot be called in
question before us, but the exercise of the constituent power can be,
we have to judge the validity of exercise of constituent power by testing it on the a:avil of constitutional provisions. According to the
majority view in Kesavananda's case (supra), we can .find the test
primarily in the Preamble to our Constitution.
A point emphasized by J. C. Gray (See : "Nature & Souces of
Law" p. 96) is that unless and until Courts have declared and recognised a law as enforceble it is not law at all. Kelsen (See : "General Theory of Law & State" p. 150) finds Gray's views to be extreme.
Courts, however, have to test the legality of laws, whether purporting
to be ordinary or constitutional, by the norms !'aid down in the
Constitution. This follows from the Supremacy of the Constitution.
I mention this here in answer to dae of the questions set out much
earlier : Does the "basic structure" of the Constitution test only the
validity of a constitutional amendment or also ordinary laws ? I
think it does both because ordinary law making itself can not go beyond the range of constituent power. At this stage, we are only concerned with a purported constitutional amendment. According to
the majority view in Kesavananda Bharti's case, the preamble furnishes the yard-stick to be applied even to constitutional amendment~.
Leamed Counsel for the election petitioner has strongly relied
upon the very first purpose of the constitution stated in the preoamhl_~
•
..
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
.,
•
··~A.
(Beg, J.)
641
to be Justice (with a capital "J") which includes "political justice". A_
His contention is that, if a majority party is to virtually act as the
judge in an election dispute between itself and minority parties whose
cause, according to the learned Counsel, the election petitioner represents, it would be a plain denial of "political" justice. I do not
know why this question should be termed as one of "political justice"
and not of plain and simple elementary justice except that the contending parties represent political causes which are, for purposes of B.
plain and simple justice with which we are really concerned, irrelevant. We are not asked to judge •a political issue directly .as to who
should be the Prime Minister of this couatry. We are only asked
to hold that even a constitutional amendme·nt, when made by Members of a majority party to enforce their own views of what is politically and legally right, as against the views, on these matters, of
c
minority parties, when the representatives of the minority parties
allege a misuse of constitutional powers by a deviation from ll. constitutionally laid down purpose, such a legal question of fact and' law
should be capable of trial and decision by an independent authority
on such exclusively legal grounds as may be open. That is the 8implc
princirle on which learned Counsel for the election petitioner rests
his case, irrespective of the rights und wrongs of the merits of his
client's case-and, I have found it impossible to decide it, as I have
decided it against the election petitioner, without going into facts and
merits of the appeals-for the submission that our jurisdiction to try
this case on merits cannot be taken away without injury to the basic
postulates of the rule of law and of justice within a politkally democratic constitutional structure. I do not think that we can consistently with the objects of justice, including what is claimed as "political
justice"; which are parts of what is called the "basic structure, deny the E
right to claim an adjudication from this Court on exclusively legal
issues (not political ones) between the majority party and the minority
groups of parties, however large and legally right the majority
party may be and however small and legally wrong the minority
groups or parties may be. Can the legal rights and wrongs, on such an
issue, be resolved, in accordance with the objects of the Preamble, anyF
where other than this Court now ? I think that it would be a very
dangerous precedent to lay down that they can be and need be
determined nowhere at all. That is what acceptance of total validity
of Article 329A(4) may mean if it bars our jurisdiction to hear and
decide such a case on merits .
What was sought to be done by the Constitutional amendment
may be politically very justifiable. The question before us, however,
is whether it is also legally justifiabk. Here,, we are back again in the
realm of basic principles of iustice. We are not to decide a political
question her·:: at all. But, we have to decide legal questions even if
they have; as many legal issues have, political consequences and
repurcussions which we cannot entirely ignore. Perhaps we have to
go back to Marbury v. Madison (supra), where Chief Justice Marshal
said (at p. 162) :
"The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the
right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,
·G
H
642
_A
JB
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
( 197 6] 2 'S.C.R.
whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of
government is to afford that protection. In Great Britain
the king himself is, sued in the respectful form of a petition,
and he never fails to comply with the judgment of his court.
In the 3d. vol. of his Commentaries, p.23,. Blackstone
states two cases in which a remedy is afforded by mere
operation of law.
'ln all other cases, he says it is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also
a legal remedy by suit, or action at law, whenever that right
is invaded''.
It is true that the right which the election petitioner claims is a
purely statutory right. The right to come to this Court under Section ll 6A of the Act of 1951 is also a creature of statute and can
be taken away retrospectively. But, where this taking away also involves the taking away of the right to be heard by this Court on a
grievance, whether justifiable or not, that minority party is being oppressed by the majority,, can we deny the spokesman of the minority
even a right to be heard on meri.ts ? Such an issue is constitutional
Confession of our inability to resolve it judicially would be, according
to learned Counsel for the election ·petitioner a denial of "political
justice". This issue is extrinsic so far as the Act of 1951 is concerned.
The election petitioner has complained of the taking away of his right
to be heard with a view to depriving him of "political" justice with
an ulterior object and politic;al motivation. I have dealt with the
merits of the case to show that, from the legal aspect, his grievance,
on the merits of his case, is misconceived. He has no vested right
under a palpably erroneous judgment which was the subject matter of
the two appeals to this Court. Nevertheless, this could only be demonstrated ~fter we had gone into the merits of the case and rendered our
decision on the issues in accordance with the law in the 1951 Act.
Thus, what is involved is the right of the election petitioner to be heard
on merits and the power of this Court to look into the merits of the
case in order to determine whether the election-petitioner's grievances
could have any real legal foundations. I think that this is a basic
consideration which must compel us, in the light of the pri11ciples laid
down by us in Kesvananda Bharti's case (supra), to hold that we must
look into his grievances and determine, for ourselves, where his case
stood on the law before it was am~nded. Our jurisdiction, at any
rate, cannot be barred without creating the impression that what the
election petitioner calls "political iustice" is being denied to him.
The question which arises now is : was clause 4A of Act 329A
read with clauses (5) and (6), really meant to be our jurisdiction
to consider the grievances of the petitioner and to decide them, or, can
they be so interpreted as to preserve this court's jurisdiction ?
H.
Broadly speaking the election petitioner has two heads of grievance : firstly, that the election of the original responder..t is vitiated
by corrupt practices which, as I have indicated, after considering the
case set up by him and the evidence tendered and the law applicable,
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
j
•·
,.. .·
-
(Beg. /.)
6 43
· could not possibly succeed even under the law as It stood before the
amendment, and, secondly, that our very jurisdiction to go into these
grievance is sought to be debarred by clauses (4), (5) and (6) of
, Article 329A with the political object of stifling opposition, and, therefore, according to the election petitioner, we must declare clause ( 4)
and the connected clauses (5) and (6) of Article 329A to be invalid.
Although, the 1st set of complaints is based upon the provisions of
the Act of 1951, the second set arises because of impugned clauses
of the 39th Amendment. 'For the second set of grievances, the action
complained of is that of the State itsel£ acting through· its law making
organs. It is because of this intt:rest of the Union of India, acting
in its Jaw making capacity, that we have heard the Attorney General
and the Solicitor General. Although, the second set of grounds may
arise as a result of the 1st set, yet,, they are different. Our jurisdiction
to consider these different grounds of complaint does not ordinarily
arise at all in the exercise of our jurisdiction under Section ll 6A of the
Act of 1951. It is for this reason, that the election petitioner had
filed a separate Writ Petition in the High Court to challenge an amendment of the Act. · But, we decided to hear arguments on constitutional
issues also without a separate proceeding. The causes of action arising out of the amendments have become attached, if I may so put it,
to the appeals under Section 116A of the Act because we could not,
under the law, hear the appeals unless these obstacles, if any, were
overcome.
Indeed,, so far as the original respondent is concerned, the eff~ct
of clauses (4), (5) and (6) of Article 329A would be, if we were
to hold that they bar our jurisdiction to ,go into the merits of the
appeals under Section 116A of the Act, that her grievance against
the judgment under appeal also could not be gone into or dealt with.
In other words, the original respondent would also be denied an
opportunity of asserting her rights under the 1951 Act and of vindicating her stand in the case by showing that there was really no
sustainable ground for the findings given by the learned Judge of the
High Court against her. We would, therefore, be prevented from
doing justice to her case as well as if we were to accept the contention
that the 39th. Amendment bars our jurisdiction to hear the appeals
under Section ll 6A of the Act on merits. The total effect would be
that justice would appear to be defeated even if, in fact, it is not so
as a result of the alleged bar to our jurisdiction if it were held to be
there. Could it be the intention of Parliament that iustice should
appear to be defeated ? I think not.
It was also contended before us that we should not go at all into
the merits of the case before us as .it was a political matter. In other
words, the "political question" doctrine was invoked in aid of the
submission that we should voluntarily abstain from deciding a question
of a "polil:ical nature". It is true that the "political question doctrine"
has been sometimes invoked, in the past, by the American Supreme
Court to abstain from taking a decision. In answer to this argument,
learned Counsel for the election petitioner cited before us from comments on the Constitution of the United States of America (Analysis
and Interpretation by the Congressional Research Service-1973 Edn.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
644
A
B
S.UPREME COURT REPORTS
. [1976) 2 S.C.R.
p. 665) that the "political question" doctrine is the result of a prudential" attitude Courts adopt when they find that their jud~ents may
not be enforced. It was described there as "a way of avoiding a
princip:ed decision damaging to the Court or an expedient decision
damaging to the principle". It was also pointed out there that this
doctrine has been rationalized and considerable narrowed down by the
American Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr(!), where it was explained
that "nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily function of
separation of powers". It really means that there are matters about
which declarations made or certificates granted by the executive Wing
of Government would be treated as conclusive so that Courts will not
go behind them. It was also said there :
•
....
c
D
E
F
G
H
"Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been
committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever
authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise
in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of
this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution".
Learned Counsel for the election petitioner also relied upon
H. H. Maharajadhiraja Madhav Rao Javaji Rao Scindia Bahadur & •
Ors. v. Union of lndia( 2 ) where this Court said (at p. 75) :
"The functions of the State are classified as legislative,
judicial and executive : the executive function is the residue
which does not fall within the other two functions. Constitutional mechanism in a democratic policy does not contemplate existence of any function which may qua the citizens
be designated as political and orders made in exercise whereof
are not liable to be tested for their validity befbre the lawfully
Constituted courts : Rai Sahib Ram J:iwaya Kapur and
Others v. State of Punjab (1955 (2) SCR 225), Jayantilal
Amri//al Slwdhan v. F. N. Rana (1965) 3 S.C.R. 201); and
Halsbury's Laws of England 3rd Edn. Vol. 7, Art. 409, at
p. 192".
Learned Solicitor General also contended that we w;:rc passing
through critical times when a state of Emergency had heen declared.
He submitted that the decision of the constituent authorities, in excluding a particular case from the jurisdiction of this Court, should be treated as an exercise of a very special power under very unusnal conditions in which internal and external dangers, with which the country
was surrounded, required that the position of the Prime Minister should
be declared unequivocably unassailable so that the heed for further
examinaiion of the question of her election to Parliament may not be
raised anvwhere else. This seems to be another form in which
"political'question" argument could be and was addressed to us. Undoubtedly, clause ( 4) of Article 329A could be said to have a political
objective, in the context in which it was introduced, and we could perhaps take judicial notice of this context. Even if it was possible to go
(1) 369 U. S. 186.
(2)
[1971] (3) SCR 9..
•
.
I
.
-
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
.,
(
..
(Beg. /.)
645
beyond the statement of objects and reasons and to ~10ld that clause ( 4)
of Article 329A is there essentially for demonstratmg the strong position of the Government and of the Prime Minister of this country to all
inside and outside the country so as to inspire the necessary confidence
in and give the necessary political and legal strength to the Government to enable it to go forward boldly to deal with internal economic
and law and order problems and international question. Yet, I fail to
see why this could make it necessary to exclude the jurisdiction of this
Court so as to prevent it from considering a case which would have
been over much sooner if we had not been confronted with difficulties,
at the very outset, in examining the merits of the case. Speaking for
myself, I fail to see what danger to the country could arise or how
national interests could be jeopardised by a consideration and a decision by this Court of such a good case as I find that the Prime Minister
of this country had on facts and law. Nevertheless I am prepared to
concede that there may be and was some very useful political objective
to be served by demonstrating the strength and ability of the Government to face the difficulties with which it had been confronted. If that
be so, we can certainly say that clause ( 4) of Article 329A had a political objective and uti!i~y which has been served. And, if that was the
real object behind its enactment, it could not be really to injure the interests of minority poliitical parties or groups which is what is contended for on behalf of the election petitioner. I think that the context
and the political consideration placed before us could be relevant ·in
understanding the real meaning of clause ( 4) of Article 3"29A of the
Constitution.
It is a well established canon of interpretation that, out of two possible interpretations of a provision, one which prevents it from becoming
unconstitutional should be preferred if this is possible-ut res magis
vakat quam per at. It is true that the deeming provision seems to
stand in the way of our examination of the merits of the case even
though there is no direct provision taking away our jurisdiCtion to consider the merits of the appeals before us. It has, however, been repeatedly laid down that a deeming provision introducing a legal fiction
must be confined to the contest of it and cannot be given a larger effect:
(See Radha Kishan Vs. Durga Prasad-AIR 1940 P.C. 167). In
Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. The State of Bihar & Anr.(i1). it was held
by this Court that a legal fiction is created for some definite purposes
and should not by extended beyond its legitimate field rletennincd by
its context. The same view has been expressed by this Court in other
cases : C.l.T., Bombay v. James Anderson( 2 ); C.l.T., 1Wadras v. Express Newspapers Ltd., Madras( 3 ); Sri Jagadguru Kari Basava Rajendraswami of Gavimutt v. Commissioner of Hindu Religious Charitable
Endowments, Hyderabad( 4 ).
In Ex-Parte Walton, In Re: Levy( 5 ), James LJ said:
"When a statute enacts that something shall be deemed
to have been done, which in fact and in truth was not done,
A
(1) [1955] (2) SCR 603.
(3) [1964] (8) SCR 189.
(5) [1881] 17 Ch. d. 746.
20- l 26SCI/7 6
H
(2) [1964] (5) SCR 590.
(4) [1964] (8) SCR 252.
B
c
D
E
F
G
646
·A
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 S.C.R.
then the court is entitled and bound to ascertain for what
purposes and between what persons the statutory fiction is to
be resorted to ?"
In other words, we have to examine the· context and the purpose of the
legal fiction and confine its effects to these.
c
D
E
F
G
H
If the purpose of the clause ( 4) of Article 329A was purely to
meet the political needs of the country and was only partly revealed
by the policy underlying the statement of reasons and objects it seems
possible to contend that it was not intended at all to oust the jurisdiction of the Court. Hence, Article 329A Clause (5) wiil not, so
understand, bar the jurisdiction of the Court to hear and decide the
appeals when it says that the appeal shall be disposed of in conformity
with the provisions of clause ( 4).
1n tlJe circumstances of this case, it would seem that conformity
with the declaration embodied in Article 329A clause ( 4) is possible,
if we confine the meaning and effect of the deeming pmvision to what
was needed only for the declaration to be given at the end of clause ( 4)
by.the constituent bodies, with a political object, and not for the purposes of affecting our jurisdiction which determines legal effects of what
is sought to be done. Of course, the mere national interpretation would
appear to be that the deeming provision should apply for "all purposes"
including those for consideration of the appeals before us. But, if it is
not possible to decide those appeals without giving a different meaning
to the deeming provision, on which the final declaration in clause ( 4)
rests, and clause (5) leaves us free to decide how we could conform
with clause ( 4), ne~d our jurisdiction to decide factual and legal issues
judicially be said to be affected ? If the fiction was only a logical step
in the process of the declaration to be made by constituent authorities
but not of ours, it would only attach to the declaration contained at
the end of clause ( 4) . Perhaps it could be argued, by applying the
doctrine of "reading down", that clause ( 4) was not intended to oust
the jurisdiction of this Court altogether to tr:Y the case.
No such
attempts· at reading it down have, however, been made by learned
counsel supporting the validity of Article 329A ( 4). It is not unlikely
that Article 329A (4) was based on the misapprehension that the High
Court's judgment may be legally correct or that there was a possibility,
even for a case so ill-founded in fact and in law as the one put forward
on behalf of the election-petitioner, to succeed in this Court if it had
succeeded in the High Court. We cannot indulge in guess work on
these matters. In any case, no useful purpose will be served now by
our declaring anything beyond that clause 4,of Article 329A (4) does
not so operate as to bar jurisdiction of this Court to go into and determine the merits of the appeals before us by applying the Act of 1951.
Even if we were to consider matters of expediency and national interest,
as we should in appropriate cases, it. does not appear to me to be
either expedient or in conformity with national interests to leave the
matter in doubt whether the judgment under appeal before us could
or could not legally stand on its own legs under the unamended law.
. '(
\
'
)..
'
SMT. INDJRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN (Chand~achud, J.)
647
For the reasons given above, I declare that Article 329A ( 4) does
not stand in the waiy of the consideration of the appeals before us on
merits under the Act of 1951 or the validity of the amendments of the
Act. On a consideration of the merits of Appeals Nos. 887 and 909
-of 1975, I have come to the conclusion, as indicated above; that Appeal
No. 887 must be allowed and the cross-appeal No. 909 of 1975 must
fail. The result is that the judgment orders and passed by the learned
Judge of the Allahabad High Court on the election case are set aside,
and, in such conformity With Article 329A clause ( 4) as is possible for
us, I also .declare the jud~ment and the findings contained in it to be
void and of no effect whatsoever. It is not necessary for me to add
that the order of the learned Judge, holding the original respondent disqualified from occupying her office, disappears ipso facto and it neither
has nor will be deemed over to have had any legal effect whatsoever.
In the circumstances of the case, I think the parties should bear their
own costs throughout.
-
CHANDRACHUD, J.:.-The Election Petition out of which these
appeals arise involved the question of the validity of the election of
Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi to the Lok Sabha. In the General Parliamentary Elections of 1971, she was declared as the successful candidate
from the Rae Bareli constituency in Uttar Pradesh. She won the election by a margin of 1,11,810 votes over her nearest rival, Shri Raj
Narain.
I
Shri Raj Narain, who was sponsored by the Samyukta Socialist
Party, fifod an election petition under section 80 read with section 100
of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, to challenge the election
of the successful candidate. Originally, the challenge was founded on
numerous grounds but during the trial of the petition in the High Court
of Allahabad, the challenge was limited to seven grounds.
A
B
c
D
E
A learned Single Judge of the High Court, M. L. Sinha, J., upheld
the challenge ori two grounds, rejecting the other grounds of challenge.
That explains the cross-appeals.
'
The High Court held that the successful candidate was guilty of
having committed two corrupt practices within the meaning of section
123 (7) of the Representation of the People Act : Firstly, she obtained
the assistance of the Gazetted Officers of the Government of Uttar
Pradesh for furthering her election prospects; and secondly, she obtained the assistance of Shri Yashpal Kapoor, a gazetted officer in the
Government of India holding the post of Officer on Special Duty in the
Prime Minister's Secretariat, for furthering the same purpose. Acting
under section 8-A of the Act the learned Judge declared that the
successful candidate would stand disqualified for a period of six years
from June 12, 1975 being the date of the judgment. Aggrieved by
this part of the judgment, Smt. Indira Gandhi has filed appeal No.
887 of 1975.
The other five grounds of challenge were : ( 1) The successful candidate procured the assistance of the ~med Forces for arr~nging her
flights by Air Force aeroplanes and helicopters; (2) Her election agent,
Shri Yashpal Kapoor, and others distributed clothes and liquor to induce
F
G
H
648'
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 s.c.R.
the voters. t? vote_ for her; ( 3) She and her election agent made appeali>
to the rehg1ous symbol of cow and calf; ( 4) Her election agent and
others procured vehicles for the free conveyance of voters to the polling.
stations; and (5) She and her election agent incurred or authorized
expenditure ·in violation of section 77 ( 3) of the Act read with Rule 9()
of. the Conduct ~f Election Rules, 1961. These grounds having been
re1ected by the High Court, the defoated candidate has filed appeal No.
909 of 1975. The first two grounds were given up in appeal for the:
reason that the evidence on record was not likely to Ix: accepted by this.
Court in proof thereof.
The defeated candidate did not lead evidence in the High Court to
show that any part of tQ_e expenditure in excess of. the permissible limit
of Rs. 35,.000 was incurred b..Y the successful candidate or her election·
agent. His contention was that J4e expenditure incurred for her elec-tion by the political parly which had sponsored her candidature, the:
Congress (R), was liable to be included in the expenses incurred or
authorized by her. This contention was founded on a decision rendered
by a Division Bench of this Court on October 3, 1974 in Kanwar Lal'
Gupta v. Amarnath Chawla(1).
On October 19, 1974 the President of India promulgated 'The:
Representation of.the People (Amendment) Ordinance, 1974' providing.
that "Nothwithstanding any judgment, order or decision of any court
to the contrary, any ~penditure incurred or authorized in connection
with the election of a candidate by a political party or by any other
association or body of persons or by any individual (other than the
candidate or his election agent) shall not be deemed to be, and shall
not ever be deemed to have been,, expenditure in connection with the
election incurred oi; authorized by the candidate 9r by his election
agent
." This provision was added by the Ordinance by way
of an Explanation to section 77 ( 1) of the1 Representation of the People
Act, 1951. It expressly excepted from its operation decisions of the
Supreme Court voiding an election before the commencement of the
Ordinance. Shri Amarnath Chawla fell outside the Ordinance.
Jt
al9o excepted similar decisions of High Courts provided that they had
become final or unappealable. The Ordinance was replaced by the
Representation of the People (Amendment) Act, 53 of 1974, which
was brought into force retrospectively from October 19, 1974.
The defeated candidate filed Writ Petition 3761 of 1975 in theHigh Court to challenge the constitutional validity of the Ordinance and
the Act of 1974. In view of his finding that the total amount of expenditure incurred or authorized by the successful candidate or her election
agent, together with the amount proved to have been incurred by the
political Party or the State Government in connection with her election
did not exceed the prescribed limit, the learned Judge thought it unnecessary to inquire into the constitutionality of the Ordinance and the
Act of 1974. He, therefore., dismissed the Writ Petition. An appeal
was filed to a Division Bench of the High Court from the aforesaid
(I)
A. I. R. 1975 S. C. 308.
'
\
•
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN (Chandrachud, J.)
. 649
<>rder but, by consent of. parties, thls Court decided to hear the points
involved in the Writ Petition and in the appeal therefrom.
)
During the pendency of these cross-appeals, the Parliament
passed the Election Laws (Amendment) Act, 40 of 1975, which came
into force on August 6, 1975. This Act, if valid,. virtually seals· the
~ontroversy in the appeal filed in this Court by the successful candidate
from the decision of the Allahabad High Court. It also takes car-e- of
a considerable gamut of the appeal filed in this court by the defeated
-candidate. It substitutes a new section 8-A in the Representation of
the People Act, 1961 empowering the President to decide whether a
person found guilty of corrupt practice shall be disqualified and if so,
for what period. By section 6 it amends section 77 of the Act of 1951
making pre-nomination expenses a matter of irrelevant consideration.
It declares that the expenditure incurred by a Government servant in
the discharge of his official duty in connection with any arrangements or
facilities and such arrangements or facilities shall not be deemed to be
expenditure or assistance incurred or rendered for the furtherance of
the election prospects of the candidate concerned. By section 7, it redefines a "candidate" to mean a person who has been or claims to have
been duly nominated as a candidate at any election. By section 8, it
provides that no symfol allotted to a candidate shall be deemed to be
a religious or a national symbol. And it says, to the extent relevant,
that the publication in the Official Gazette of the resignation of a
Government servant shall be conclusive proof of the fact of resignation. If the effective date of the resignation is stated in the publication,
it shall also be conclusive proof of the fact that the Government servant
<:eased to be in service with effect from the particular date. The amendments made by sections 6, 7 and 8 of the amending Act have retrospective effect and expressly govern election appeals pending in this Court,
among other proceedings.
A
B
C
D
E
The amendments brought about by Act 58 of 1974 and Act 40 of
1975 have an incisive impact on the cross-appeals but their edge was
blunted by the Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment) Act which
F
came into force on August 10, 1975. The 39th Amendment introduces
two new articles in the Constitution: article 71 and 329A; and it puts
in the Ninth Schedule three Acts : (i) The Representation of the
People Act, 43 of 1951; (ii) The Representation of the People (Amendment) Act, 58 of 1974; and (iii) The Election Laws (Amendment)
Act, 40 of 1975. The new Article 71 which replaces its precursor empowers the Parliament to pass laws regulating the elections of the
G
President and the Vice-President,, including the making of a provision
for the decision of disputes relating to their election. Article 329A _
has six clauses out of which the first three deal with the future election
to the Parliament of, persc;ms holding the office of Prime Minister or
Speaker at the time of the election or who' are appointed to these offices
after their election to the Parliament. These clauses aim at depriving
the courts of their jurisdiction to try election petitions. in which the
H
election of the Prime Minister or the Speaker to the Parliament is
challenged. Clause 4 frees the disputed election of the Prime Minister
and the Speaker to the Parliament from the restraints of all election laws.
650
A
B
C
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 S.C.R.
It declares such election as valid notwithstanding any judgment and
· clause 5 ordains that any appeal or cross-appeal pending before the
Supreme Court shall be disposed of on the assumption that the judgment.
undei; appeal is void, that the findings contained in the judgment never
had any existence in the eye of law and that the election declared void.
by the ju9gment shall continue to be valid in all respects. Clause 6
provides thi,tt article 329A shall have precedence over the rest of the.
Constitution.
At first blush, what remains to be decided judicially in face of the:
39th Agiendment? As an .exercise of Constituent power,· the 39th
Amendment must reign supreme. The political sovereign having reposed its trust in the legal sovereign, the doings of the Constituent As-·
sembly have an aura of sanctity that legal.ingenuity may be powerless;
to penetrate. But that is an uninformed approach to a field strewn with
various shades of legal landmarks.
While repelling the challenge to the First Constitutional Amendment
which was passed in June 1951, this Court held in Sri Sankari Prasad
Singh Deo v. Union of India and State of Bihar('1) that the power of
amendment conferred by article 368 was not subject to any limitations,
express or implied, and that fundamental rights were within the sweep
D of the amending power. The Seventeenth Constitutional Amendment
passed in June 1964 was similarly upheld by a majority decision of this
Court in Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan( 2 ) which took the view
that the fundamental rights were not intended by the framers of the .
Constitution to be finally and immutably settled when the Constitution
was passed. But the Seventeenth Amendment came to be challenged
3
E once again in J.C. Golak Nath & Others v. State of Punjab and Anr.( ).
By a majority of 6 : 5, this Court held that the Seventeenth Amend-·
ment was ultra vires the Parliament's power to amend the Constitution.
Five out of the six learned Judges held that article 368 did not c.onfer
any power to amend but merely prescribed the procedure for amendment. The sixth learned Judge held that the article 368 did contain the
power of amendment but that the Parliament must amend Artier~
F · 368 to convoke another Constituent Assembly, pass a law under item
97 of List I of Schedule 7 to call a Constituent Assembly and tnen that
Assembly may be able to abridge or take away the Fundamental Rights
ff~~.
'
The decision in Golak Nath's case raised a debate of national
dimensions as the Parliament's power to amend the Constitution
so as to abridge or take away the fundamental rights virtually beG
came a dead letter. Under the majority judgment, the Constituent
Assembly alone, called by virture of a law to be passed und.er Entry
97 of List I, could abridge or take away the fundamental rights. The·
Parliament, in a resolve fo reaffirm its powers, passed the Constitution
(Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act on November 5, 1971 and the Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act on April 20, 1972 .. By the24th Amendment, the Parliament amended articles 13 and 368 of the
H
Constitution so as to provide that nothing contained in article 13 shalt
(l)
[1952] 3 S. C. R. 89.
(2)
(3) [1967) 2 S. C. R. 762.
[19651 1 S. C.R. 933.
-
\
r
•
•
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN (Chandrachud, J.)
)
•
651
apply to any amendment of the Constitution made under article 368
and that notwithstanding anything in the Constitution, Parliament may,
in the exercise of its constituent power, amend by way of addition,
variation or repeal any provision of the Constitution in accordance witn
the procedure laid down in article 368. As an instance of the amendatory power re-acquired under the 24th Amendment, Parliament, by the
25th Amendment, substituted a new clause (2) in article 31 and intro-.
duced a new article 31-C in the Constitution. By the 29th Amendment, Parliament placed the Kerala Law Reforms (Amendment) Acts
of 1969 and 1971 in the Ninth Schedule.
A Bench of thirteen Judges of this Court sat to consider the constitutionality of the 24th, 25th and 29th Amendments. The eleven judgments delivered in that case are reported in Kesavananda Bharati v.
State of Kerala(I), commonly known as the Fundamental Rights case.
Golak Nath's case stood overruled as a result of the decision in this
case. But six learned Judges out of the thirteen (Sikri C.J. and Shelat,
Grover, Hegde, Reddy and Mukherjea JJ.} accepted the contention of
the petitioners that though article 368 conferred the power to amend
the Constitution, there were inherent or implied limitations on the
power of amendment and therefore, article 368 did not confer power
to amend the Constitution so as to damage or destroy the essential elements or basic features of the Constitution. Fundamental Rights, being
a part of the essential features of the Constitution, could not therefore
be abrogated or emasculated in the exercise of the power conferred by
article 368, though a reasonable abridgment of those rights could be
effected in the public interest. Brother Khanna J. found it difficult, in
face of the clear words of article 368, to exclude from their operation the
articles relating to fundamental rights in Part III of the Constitution.
But proceeding to consider "the scope Qf the power of amendment under
article 368", the learned Judge_ held that the power to amend did not
include the power to abrogate the Constitution, that the word "amendment" postulates that the old Constitution must survive without loss of
identity, that the old Constitution must accordingly be retained though
in the amended form, and therefore the power of amendment does not
include the power to destroy or abrogate the basic structure or framework of _the Constitution. The remaining six Judges took the view that
there were no limitations of any kind on the power of amendment,
though three of them seemed willing to foresee the limitation that the
entire Constitution could not be abrogated, leaving behind a State without a Constitution. Some scholars have clapped and some scholars have
scoffed at the decision in the Fundamental Rights case. These criticisms,
I cannot deny, cause a flutter in the ivory tower. But by article 141 of
the Constitution, the Law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on
all courts within the territory of India. The law declared bv the majority of 7:6 in the Fundamental Rights case must therdore be accepted
by us, dutifully and without reserve. as good law. The history uf law
courts abounds with memorable decisions based on a thin majority.
These appeals have therefore to be decided in the light of the principle emergin)! from the majority decision in the Fundamental Rights
case, that article 368 does not confer power on the Parliament to alter
0)
[1973] (Sup:·) S. C.R. I.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
652
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 197 6] 2 S.C.R.
the basic structure or framework of the Constitution. Arguments of
the learned counsel appearing on both sides have taken many forms
and shapes but they ultimately converge on the central theme of basic
strq,cture.
I would like first to deal with the constitutional validity of the 39th
Amendment. On that question, the arguments of Mr. Shanti Bhushan,
who appears for Shri Raj Narain, may be summed up this: (i) The 39th
Amendment affects the basic structure or framework or the institutional
pattern adopted by the Constitution and is therefore beyond the amendmg power conferred by article 368. It destroys the identity of the
Constitution. (ii) Separation of powers is a basic feature of the Constitution and therefore every dispute involving the adjudication of legal
rights must be left to the decision of the judiciary. Clause ( 4) o~
anicle 329A introduced by the 39th Amendment takes away that
jurisdiction and is therefore void. (iii) The function of the Jegislature
is to legislate and not decide private disputes. In the instant case th·:
Constituent Assembly has transgressed its constituent function by
adjudicating upon a private dispute. (iv) Democracy is an essential
feature of the Constitution. Free and fair elections are indispensable
for the successful working of any democratic government. By providing
that the election of the Prime Minister shall not be open to challenge and
shall continue to be valid despite the judgment of the Allahabad High
Court holding that the election is vitiated by corrupt practices, the
Constituent Assembly has destroyed the very core of democracy.
( v) Equality is an essential feature of a Republican Constitution. The
39th Amendment puts the Prime Minister and the Speaker above the
law and beyond the reach ofthe quality principle. The classification
made by the 39th Amendment bears no nexus with the sort of immunity granted to two high personages, from the operation of election laws. (vi) Rule of law and judicial review are also basic
features of the Constituion. To free certain persons from the
constraints of law and to place their conduct beyond judicial
review is to destroy the identity of the Constitution. No freedom is secure without the court to protect it. The organic
balance between the three branches, the legislature, executive and the
judiciary, is upset by eroding the authority of the Supreme Court in
a vital matter like elections. And the Rule of Law is abrogated by
providing that the election of the Prime Minister shall continue to be
valid and will be open to no challenge before any court or any authority
whatsoever. (vii) The concept of political justice recognized by the
Preamble is violated by the 39th Amendment. The Constitution can
always be subverted by revolutionary methods. The question is whether
it is perlI\issible to the Parliament to use the legitimacy of constitutional
provisions for effecting revolutionary changes. (viii) The constituent
power partakes of legislative power and can only be exercised Within the
highest ambit of the latter power. Therefore, even with a two-third
majority, the constituent body cannot exercise executive or judicial
power. For example,. the- .power to appoint or dismiss a Govemment
servant or the power to declare war which are executive powers cannot
be exeficsed by the Constituent Assembly. Similarly, it cannot, in the
guise of amending the Constitution, provide that an accused arraigned
\
..
.
'
~1
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN (Chandrachud, J.)
653
before a criminal court ~hall be acquitted and shall be deemed ~<? be
innocent. The constituent body can make chang,es in the cond1t10ns
of the exercise of judicial power but it cannot usurp that power; and
lastly (ix) The question in the Fundamental Rights case was whether
Parliament can, in the exericse of, its power of amendment abridge or
take away Fundamental Rights and whether there are any inherent or
implied limitations on the Parliament's power of amendment. In other
words, the question was whether the power of amendment can be
.exercised so as to destroy or mutilate the basic structure of the Constitution. The Fundamental Rights case did not involve the consideration
of the question as to what the power of amendment comprehends.
Promoting and demoting Government servants, passing and failing stu·dents who have appeared in an examination, granting or withdrawing
building contracts and last but not the least, declaring who has won and
who has lost an election are matters clearly outside the scope of the
amending power tinder article 368, which means and impli·es the power
to alter the fundamental instrument of country's governance.
r
)
'
A
B
c
Learned counsel appearing for the Union of India and for Smt.
Indira Gandhi did not dispute the contention that the appeals before
us must be disposed of on the basis of the law laid down by the majoD
rity in the Fundamental Rights case.
The learned Attorney General contended that : (i) The majority
decision in the Fundamental Rights case is not an authority for the pro_position that there could be no free or fair elections without judicial
review. The Constitutions and laws of several countries leave the deci'Sion of the election disputes to the judgment of the legislatures-themselves. The history of the Representation of the People Act,, 1951 as
E
·also various articles in our Constitution show tliat judicial review can
be excluded in appropriate cases as a matter of policy. (ii) That
validation of elections is a process wellknown to democratic forms of
'Government. (iii) That a law may be constitutional even if it relates
to a single individual if on account of special reasons, the single indivi- ·
dual could be treated as a class by himself. (iv) That it is clear from
articles 326 and 327 of the Constitution that the Constitution makers
F
thought that as a matter of high policy election ought to be dealt with by
'the Constitution itself and not by ordinary legislation passed within the
framework of the Constitution. How much of elections should be dealt
with by the Constitution and how much should be relegated to ordinary
legislation is not a matter for the courts to decide. If the constituent
body thought that "the offices of the Prime Minister and the Speaker
-are important enough to_ be dealt with by the Constitution itself in the
G
matter of their elections to the Parliament, it cannot be said that the
-decision is frivolous or without jurisdiction; and that (v) The contention that the 39th Amendment is not an c;:xericse of cznstituent power
should not be allowed to be taken up because every possible aspect
of the matter was argued in Sankar_i Prasad's case, Sajjan Singh's case
-and the Fundamental Rights case. The basic question involved in
these cases was as to what is the meaning of the word 'amendment'.
H
The argument now is that there is further limitation on the amending
power. If it is the same question and has been decided, it cannot be
reopened by saying that the question has a new aspect which was not
654
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 2 S.C,R.
considered then. lf the question is new, the principle of the Funda-- .
mental Rights case cannot l>e extended any further. Therefore, the
constituent power must be held to be a plenary power on which the
only limitation is as regards the inviolability of the basic structure.
The learned Solicitor-General who continued the unfinished argu-ments of the learned Attorney-General urged that (i) Article 14 is
founded on a sound public policy reco_gnised and followed in all civilised States. The exclusion of judicial review does not by itself mean tile
negation of equality. Article 3 lB which on the face of it denied
equality to different sections of the community attained the ideal of
economic justice by bringing about economic equality. Artic!e 33 also
shows that the demands of public problems may require the adjustment of Fundamental Rights for ensuring greater equality. (ii) What
a Constitution should contain depends on what permanency is intended
to be accorded to a particular provision included in the Constitution.
(iii) Exclusion of judicial review is at least permissible in those fields
where originally the Constitution qid not provide for or contemplat·::
judicial review (iv) If the election law does not apply, as it ceases to
apply by virtue of article 329A (4), it is the function of the legislature
to declare whether or not a particular election is good or bad; and that
by Rule of Law is not a part of the basic structure of the Constitution
and apart from article 14, our Constitution recognises neither thedoctrine of equality nor the Rule of Law.
Shri A. K. Sen who appears for Smt. Indira Gandhi defended the
39th Amendment by contending; that : (i) The Amendment follows the
well-known pattern of all validation Acts by which the basis of judgments or orders of competent courts and Tribunals is changed and
the _judgments and orders are made ineffective. (ii) The effect of
validation is to change the law so as to alter the basis of any judgment. which might have been given on the basis of old law and thusto make the Judgment ineffective. (iii) A formal declaration that the
judgment rendered under the old Act is void, is not necessary. If thematter is pending in appeal, the appellate court has to give effect to
the altered law and reverse the judgment. If the matter is not pend·
ing in appeal, then the judgment ceases to be operative and binding
as res judicata. (iv) The rendering of a judgment ineffective by chang-ing its basis by legislative enactment is not an encroachment on judicial power but a legislation within the competence of the legislature rendering the basis of the judgment non est. (v) The constituent
power has retrospectively changed the law in so far as if relates to
election. The constituent authority could have left the application
of the changed law either to Parliament or to any other body. But
it has chosen to assume the duty of determination in this particular
case for itself. (vi) The determination of election disputes and the
validity of elections is not an exercise of judicial power. 111is function may be left either to courts, proper so-called or to Tribunals or to
other bodies including the legislature itself. (vii) The rigid separation
of powers as it obtains in the United States or in a lesser degree under
the Australian Constitution does not applv to India. Many powers,
. which are strictly judicial, have been excluded from the purview of
the courts. There is, therefore, no question of any separation of
1
'
i /
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN (Chandrachud, J.)
65 5
powers being involved in matters concerning elections and election
petitions. (viii) There is no question of separation ~f P?wers when
the constituent authority exercises either a power "'.h!ch is allocated
to the Legislature, or to the Executive o~ to the Jud1c;iary under. the
Constitution. In the hands of the constituent authonty there is n?
demarcation of powers. But the demarcation emerges only when 1t
leaves the hands of the constituent authority through well-defined
channels into demarcated pools. The constituent power is independent of .the fetters of limitations imposed by separation of powers in
the hands of the organs of the Government, amongst whom the supr~me
authority of the State is allocated. (ix) The Constituent power sprmgs
as the fountainhead and partakes of sovereignty and is the pow~r
which creates the organs and distributes the powers. Therefore. m
a sense, the constituent power is all-embracing and is at ·once judicial,
executive and legislative. It is, in a sense, a "super power". (x) E~en
if the preamble lays down as its objective the attainment of equality,
the 39th Constitution Amendment does not violate the said concept
of equality as the same is based on a rational classification and has
a reasonable nexus with the object of the amendment. (xi) The Preamble to the constitution only refers to securing "equality of status
and opportunity". Equality of status and opportunity has got many
facets : soine of these facets are guaranteed as fundamental rights
under articles 14 to 18 of the Constitution. These facets alone can
be considered to be basic features of the Constitution, assuming that
equality was a basic feature of the Constitution. (xii) "Free and fair
election" does not postulate that there must be a constituticilal provision focr determining election disputes by a separate Tribunal or Court.
(xiii) The 3S'th Amendment Act does not affect the structure of a
Republican Democracy, assuming that the same is a basic feature ot
the Constitution. The validation of one ele.ction does not alter the
character of the democracy; and (xiv) a Constitutional amendment
need n·0t necessarily relate to the structural organisation of the State.
r
•
Shri Jagannath Kaushal supported the arguments of Shri Sen by
citing pragmatic illustrations. He gave interesting statistics showing
that a very small percentage of election petitions succeed · eventually
which, according to him, is evidence that such petitions are used by
defeated candidates as an instrument of oppression against successful
candidates. Parliament, therefore, wanted to save high personages from
such harassment. A law may benefit a single individual and may still
be valid. According to Shri Kaushal, the judgment of the Allahabad
High Court became a nullity by reason of that Court ceasing retros·
pectivelv to have jurisdiction over the dispute and a iudgment which
is a nullity need not be set aside. It can even be challenged in a collateral proceeding.
I thought it only fair to indicate broadly the line of approach
adopted by the various learned counsels to the question as regards
the validity of the 39th Amendment. It will serve no useful purpose
to take up each one of the points for separate consideration and indeed
many an arnument is inter-related. It wonk! be enough for my purpose to deal with what I consider to be points of fundamental impor·
tance, especially as my learned Brethren have dealt with the other
points.
A
c·
D•
E
F'
G
H
656
A
B
D
E
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 2 S.C.R.
This Court has strictly adhered to the view that in Constitutional
matters one must decide no more than is strictly necessary for aa
effective adjudication of the points arising in any case. By that test.
a numerically substantial part of the 39th Amendment has to be defer·
red for consideration to a future occasion. We are clearly not con·
cerned in these appeals with the new article 71 introduced by the 39th
Amendment, which deals with the election of the President and the
Vice-President. We are concerned with the new article 329A but not
with the whole of it. Clauses ( 1) to ( 3) of tliat article deal with
future events and the validity of those clauses may, perhaps, be
examined when those events come to happen. Clauses (4) to (6) of
article 329A are the ones that' are relevant for our purpose am~ I
propose to address myself to the validity of these provisions.
J
•
11
Clause (4) of article 329A, which is the real focus of controversy,
may conveniently be split up as follows f'Or understandin.g its true
nature and effects: (i) The Laws made by Parliament prior to August
10, 1975 in so far as they relate to election petitions and matters connected therewith cease to apply to the Parliamentary election of Smt.
Indira Gandhi which took place in 1971. (ii) Such Laws are repealed retrospectively in so far as they governed the aforesaid election, with
the result that they must never be deemed to have applied t0 that
election. (iii) Such an election cannot be declared to be void on auy
of the grounds on which it could have been declared to be void under
the Laws which were in force prior to August 10, 1975. (iv) The
election shall not be deemed ever to have become void on any ground
on which, prior to August 10, 1975, it was declared to be void.
( v) The election shall continue to be valid in all respects notwithstanding the judgment of any court, which includes the judgment dated June
12, 1975 of the High Court of Allahabad. (vi) The jud[.!mcnt of the
Allahabad High Court and any finding on which the judgment and
order of that court is based are void and shall be deemed always to
have been void.
Shri Shanti Bhushan has, as it were, a preliminary objection to
the 39th Amendment that the election of a private individual and
the dispute concerning it cannot ever be a matter of Constitutional
amendment. Whether this contention is sound is another matter but
I do not see the force of the argument of the Attorney-General that
in view of the decisions in Sankari Prasad's case, Sajjan Singh's case
and the Fundamental Rights case, the contention is not open to be
taken. The question raised by Shri Shanti Bhushan was not raised
or considered in either of the three aforesaid cases and I do not see
how the question can be shelved. The argument is not a new facet
of the theory of inherent or implied limitations on the amending
power, in which case it might have been plausible to contend
that the last word was said on the subject by the Full Court
in the Fundamental Rights case. The question now raised touches
a totally new dimension of the amending power : Can the Constituent Assembly, while amending the Constitution, pronounce upon
•
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN (Chandrachud, !.)
I
'
(
657
A
private disputes or must it only concern itself with what
may be termed organisational matters concerning the country's governance? The question has the merit of novelty, but ~ see no substance in it. But I must clarify that I prefer to examine the point in
isolation, that is, divorced from considerations arising from the theory
of separation of powers. Whether the amendment constitutes an encroachment on judicial functions and thereby damages one of the
basic structures of the Constitution may best be examined separately. B
The reason why I see no substance in Shri Shanti Bhushan's contention is that what the Constitution ought to contain is not for the
Courts to decide. The touchstone of the validity of a Constitutional
amendment is firstly whether the procedure prescribed by Article
368 is strictly complied with and secondly whether the amendment
destroys or damages the basic structure of the Constitution. The
subject-matter of constitutional amendments is a question of high
policy and Courts are concerned with the interpretation of laws, not
with the wisdom of the policy underlying them. I do not see why
the Constitution cannot be amended so as to provide that wagering
contracts shall be void or that bigamous marriages shall be unlawful
or that economic offenders shall be visited with a higher penalty.
The Indian Constitution is not like the American Constitution an
instrument of few words. The range of topics it covers would bemuse
any student of foreign Constitutions which do not even skirt the
problems with which our Constitution deals in copious details. In
fact, there is hardly any important facet of national life which our
Constitution does not touch. Along with matters of high priority like
citizenship, Fundamental Rights, Directive Principles of State policy
and the relations between the Union and the States, it deals with
matters not normally considered constitutionally important like the
E
salaries of high dignitaries, the ·power of the Supreme C1ourt to
frame rules for regulating its practice and procedure, officiitl language for communication between on~ State and another and last
but not the least, elections to the Parliament anQ the State Legislatures. Those to whose wisdom and judgment the constituent power is confided, will evoke scorn and derision if that power is used
for granting or withdrawing building contracts, passing or failing
F
students or granting and denying divorces. But the electorate lives
in the hope that a sacred power will not so flagrantly be abused and
the n1oving finger of history warns of the consequences that inevitably flow when absolute power has corrupted absolutely. The fear
of perversion is no test of power.
But the comparison is odious between the instances given by
Shri Shanti Bhushan and the subject-matter of Article 329A(4) of
the Constitution. In the first place, elections to legislatures were
considered bv Constitution-makers to be a matter of constitutional
importance. -Secondly, though the power of the Prime Minister in
a cabinet form of democracy are not as unrivalled as those of the
President in the American system, it is undeniable that the Prime
Minsiter occupies a unique position. The choice of the subject for
constitutional amendment cannot, therefore, be characterized as trifling, frivolous or outside the framework of a copious Constitution.
In America, the challenge to the 18th Amendment on the ground
;
G
H
658
B
D
E
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976) 2 5.C.R.
that ordinary legislation cannot be embodied in a constitutional
amendment was brushed aside as unworthy of serious attention.
Rottschaefer endorsed it as consistent with the ultimate political
theory on which the American constitutional system is based. "The
people, acting through the machinery provided by the existing Constitution, must be accorded the legal power to change their basic
law by peaceable means (1) ". In fact, it is worng. to think that elections. to the country's legislatures are a private affair of the contestants. They are matters of public interest and of natioP.:il importance. Every citizen has a stake in legislative elections for, his·
social and economic well-being depends upon the promis~s and performance of the legislators. Such elections, and more so th.e election of the Prime Minister who is at least primus inter pares, can
legitimately form the subject-matter of a constitution provision.
The validity of what is brought into the Constitution has to b:: judged
by different standards.
Ther.o was some discussion at the Bar as to which fca1urcs of the
Constitution form the basic structure of the Constitution accvrding
to the majonty decision in the Jjundamental Rights case. That, to
me, is an inquiry both fruitless and irrelevant. The ratio of the
majority decision. is not that some named features of the Constitution are a part of its basic structure but that the power of amendment cannot be exercised so as to damage or destroy the essential.
elements or the basic structure of the Constitution, whatever these
expressions may comprehend. Sikri, C.J. mentions suprcnmcy of the
Constitulion, Republican and Democratic form of the Government,
secular character of the Constitution, separation of powers, fdcralism
and dignity and freedom of the individual as essential features of the
Constitullon. Shclat and Grover, JJ. have added to the list two other
featur;:s : the mandate to build a welfare State and unity and integrity
of the Nation. Hegde and Mukherjea, JJ. added sovereignty of India
as a fundamental feature of the Constitution. Reddy, J. thought that
a sovt,reie;n democratic republic, Parliamentary democracy and tr·e
three organs of the State form the basic structure of the Constitution.
Khanna J. held that fundamental rights are not a part of the basic
structure and therefore they can be abrogated like many other provisions. He ol.Jserved that basic structure indicates the broad outlines
of the Constitution and since the right to property is a matter of details,
it is not a part of that structure. The democratic form of Government, the secular character of the State and possibly judicial review
are according to Brother Khanna a part of the basic structure of the
Constitution. It is obvious that these are merely illustrations of what
constitutes the basic structure and are not intended to be exhau<tive.
Shelat and Grover JJ., Hegde and Mukherjea JJ., and Reddy J. say in
their judgments that their list of essential features which form the basic
structure of the Constitution is illustrative or incomplete. For determining v1hethcr a particular feature of the Constitution is a part of its
basic structure, one has perforce to examine in each individual case the
place of the particular feature in the scheme of our Constitution, its
ohiect a:-id purpose, and the consequences of its denial on the integrity
(1)
Rottschaefer on Constitutional Law (Ed. 1939) page 397.
'
....
SMT. lNDlRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN
(Clzandraclzud, !.)
659
'ilf the Constitution as a fundamental instrument of country's gover-
A
nance. But it is needless for the purpose of these appeals to .ransack
·every nook and cranny of the Constitution to di~cover the. b1:ick~ of
the basic structure. These that are enumerated m the maionty iudg~
.:ments are massive enough to cover the requirements of Shri Shanti
Bhushau's challenge.
I consider it beyond the pale of reasonable controversy that if there
be any unamendable features of the Constitution on the score that they
form a part of the basic structure of the Constitution, they are that :
(i) India is a Sovereign Democratic Republic; (ii) Equality of status
.and opportunity shall be secured to all its citizens; (iii) The Sta~e shall
have no reJiofon of its own and all persons shall be equally entitled to
freedom of ;onscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion and that (iv) the Nation .shall b~ . governed by a
'Government of laws not of men. These, m my op1111on, are the pillars
of our constitution;! philosophy, the pillars, therefore, of the basic
structure of the Constitution.
)'
..
I find it impossible to subscribe to the view that the Preanible of
the Constitution holds the key to its basic structure or that the pream'ble is too holy to suffer a human touch. Constitutions are written, if
they are written, in the rarefied atmosphere of high ideology, whatever
be the ideology. Preambles of written Constitutions are intended primarily to reflect the hopes and aspirations of people. They resonate
ihe ideal which the Nation seeks to achieve, the target, not the achievement. In pnrts, therefore, they are metaphysical like slogans. For
example, the concept of Fraternity which is referred to in our Preamble is not carried into any provision of the Constitution arid the concept is hardly suitable for encasement in a coercive legal formula. The
'Preamble, generally, uses words of "passion and power" in order to
move the hearts of men and to stir them into action (:1} Its own meaning and implication being in doubt, the Preamble cannot affect or throw
li.~ht on the nmming of the enacting words of the Constitution( 2 ).
Therefore. though our Preamble was. voted upon and is a part of the
Constitution, it is really "a preliminary statement of the reasons" which
made the passing of the Constitution necessary and desirable(3). As
observed by Gajendragadkar J. in In re : Berubari Union & Exchange
of Enclaves( 4 ), what Willoughby has said about the Preamble to the
American Constitution, namely, that it has never been regarded as the
source of any substantive power, is equally true about the prohibitions
.and limitation•. The Preamble of our Constitution cannot, therefore,
be regarded a~ a source of any prohibitions or limitations.
B
c
D
E
F
G
Judicial review, according to Shri Shanti Bhushan, is a part of the
basic structure of the Constitution and since the 39th Amendment by .
·articles 329A ( 4) and (5) deprives the courts, including the Supreme
------
Constitutional Law of India, 2nd Ed., (1975) p. 76-H. M. Seervai.
'(2) See Attorney-General vs. Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover [19571 A. C.
436, 463.
(3) Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Ed., p. 370, para 343.
'(4) [1960] 3 s. c. R. 250, 282,
(1)
H
660
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 2 S.C.R.
Court, of their power to adjudicate upon the disputed election, the
Amendment is unconstitutional. The fundamental premise of this
argument is too broadly stated because the Constitution, as originally
enacted, expressly excluded judicial review in a large variety of important matters. Articles 31(4), 31(6), 136(2), 227(4), 262(2) and
329 (a) are some of the instances in point. True, that each of these
provisions has a purpose behind it but these provisions show that the
Constitution c.liJ not regard judicial review as an indispensable measure
of the legality or propriety of every determination. Article 136(2)
expressly took away the power of the Supreme Court to grant special
leave to appe<il from the decisions of any court or Tribunal constituted
by a law relating to the Armed Forces. Article 262(2) authorized the
Parliament to make a law providing that the Supreme Court or any
other court shall have no jurisdiction over certain river disputes. But
what is even more to the point are the provisions contained in articles
103 ( 1) and 329 (b). Article 102 prescribes disqualifications for
membership of the Parliament. By article 103 (1), any question
arising under article 102 as to whether a member of the Parliament
has become subject to any disqualification has to be referred to the
President whose decision is final. The President is req uircd by
article 103(2) to obtain the opinion of the Election Commission and
act according to its opinion. Thus, in a vital matter pertaining to
the elec}ion for membership of the Parliament, the framers of the
Constitution had left the decision to the judgment of. the executive.
Articles 327 and 328 give power to the Parliament and the State
legislatures to provide by law for all matters relating to elccti0ns to
the respective legislatures, including the preparation of electoral rolls
and the delimit:.tion of constituencies. By article 329(a), the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of constituencies- or the
allotment of seats to such constituencies cannot be called in question
in any court.
The provision contained in article 329 (b) is decisive on the question under consideration. That article provides that no election to
the Parliament or the State legislature shall be called in question
except by an election petition presented to such authority and in
such manner as may be provided for by or under any law made
by the appropriate Legislature. It was; therefore, open to the legislature to leave the adjudication of election disputes to authorities other
than those in the hierarchy of our judicial system. In fact, until the
passing of the Representation of the People (Amendment) Act, 47
of 1966, by which High Courts were given jurisdiction to try election
petitions, that jurisdiction was vested first in a tribunal consisting of
three members and later in a tribunal consisting of a single member
who was to be a sitting District Judge. The decisions of those tribunals could eventually be brought before the Supreme Court •.mder
article 136(1) of the Constitution but it is at least plausible that were
the Legislatures to pass laws leaving the .decision of election disputes
to themselves, judicial review might have stood excluded. Since the
Constitution, as originally enacted, did not consider that iudicial
power must intervene in the interests of purity of elections, judicial
review cannot be considered to be a part of the basic structure in so
'
{
' 'j
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN
v
(Chandraclrnd, J.)
661
far as legislative electioll$ are concerned. The theory of Basic
Structure has to be considered in each individual case, not in the
abstract, but in the context of the concrete problem. The problem
here is whether under our Constitution, judicial review was considered as an indispensable concomitant of elections to country's legislatures. The answer, plainly, is no.
A
In England, prior to 1770, controverted elections were tried by
the whole House of Commons as mere party questions but in order
"to prevent so notorious a perversion of jus_tice", the House consented to submit the exercise of its privilege to a Tribunal composed
of its own members('!). In 1868, the jurisdiction of the House to
try election petitions was transferred by statute to the Courts of Law.
A Parliamentary election petition is now tried by two judges from
out of three puisne judges of the Queen's Bench Division who are
put on the rota for trial of such petitions by selection every year by
a majority of votes of the Judges of that Division. At the conclusion
of the trial, the Court must forthwith certify the determination to
the Speaker. The determination, upon such certification, is final to
all intents and purposes. Thus, in England, the Election Court is
con5tituted by a special method, it exercises a jurisdiction out of the
ordinary jurisdiction which is normally exercised by Courts of Law
and its determination acquires finality upon certificatiOn to the
Speaker of the -House of Commons. No appeal lies against the decision of the Election Court save by leave of the Court and if leave is
granted, the decision of the Court of Appeal is final and conclusivc( 2 ).
B
Under· /\;ticle 1, section 5, clause 1 of the American. Constitution, each House is the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own members. Each House, in judging of elections under
this clause, acts as a judicial tribunal( 3 ). Any further review of the
decisions of the two Houses seems impermissible.
I am therefore unable to accept the contention that articles 329A( 4) and ( 5) are unconstitutional on the ground that by those provisions, the election of the Prime Minister is placed beyond the purview of courts.
·
Equally, there is no substance in the contention that the relevant
clauses of the 39th Amendment are in total derogation of 'political
justice' and are accordingly unconstitutional. The concept of political _justice of which the Preamble speaks is too vague and nebulous
to permit by its yardstick the invalidation of a Constitutional amendment. The Preamble, as indicated earlier, is neither a source of
power nor of limitation.
c
D
E
F
G
The contention that 'Democracy' is an essential feature of the
Constitution is unassailable. It is therefore necessary to see whether
(1) See Mary's Parliamentary Practice, 18th Ed., pp. 29, 30.
(2) See Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Ed., Vol. 14, p. 250 (para 436), p. 311
(para 562); p. 324 (para 591).
(3) See The Constitution of the U. S. A-Lester Jayson.
(1973)
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
662
[1976] 2 S.C.R.
the impugned provisions of the 39th Amendment damage or destroy
that feature. The learned Attorney-General saw an unsurmountable
impediment in the existence of various forms of democracies all over
the world and he asked : What kind and form of Democracy constitutes a part of our basic structure ? The cabinet system, the Presidential system, the French, the Russian or any other ? This approach
seeks to make the issue unrealistically complex. If the democratic
B form of government is the corner-stone of our Constitution, the basic
feature is the broad form of democracy that was known to Our Nation
when the Cm,.i.stitution was enacted, with such adjustments and modifications as exigencies may demand but not so as to leave the mere
husk of a popular rule. Democracy is not a dogmatic doctrine and
no one can suggest that a rule is authoritarian because some rights
and safeguards available to the people at the inception of its Constic tution have been apridged or abrogated or because, as the result of a
constitutional amendment, the form of government does not strictly
comport with some classical definition of the concept. The needs of
the Nation may call for severe abnegation, though never the needs
of the Rulers and evolutionary changes in the fundamental law of the
country !fo not necessarily destroy the basic structure of· its government. What does the law live for, if it is dead to living needs? We
D cannot therefore, as lawyers and judges, generalize on what constitutes 'Democracy' though we all know the highest form of that idealistic concept-the state of bliss-in political science.
A
E
F
G
H
The question for consideration is whether the provisions contained in articles 329A ( 4) and ( 5) are destructive of the democratic
form of government. The answer does not lie in comparisons with
what is happening in other parts of the world, those that stake their
claim to 'democracy', because we are not concerned to find whether
despite the 39th Amendment we are still not better off, democratically,
than many others. The comparison has to be between the pre-39th
Amendment period and the post-39th Amendment period in the
context of our Constitution.
"Those of us who have learned humility have given over the
attempts to define law". This statement of Max Radin(!) may be
used to express a similar difficulty in defining 'Democracy' but just
as legal scholarc;, not lacking in humility, have attempted to define
'Law', so have political scientists attempted a satisfactory definition
of 'Democracy'. The expression is derived from the Greek word
'Demos',. which was often used by the Greeks to describe the many,
as distinct from the few, rather than the people as a whole. And
Aristotle defined democracy as th.e rule of the poor, simply because
they formed, always and necessarily, the more numerous class. But
the word is commonly used "in the sense of the rule of the majority
o~ the co~munity as a whole, including 'classes' and 'masses' .... ,
smce that is the only method yet discovered for determining what is
(1)
"A Restatement of Honfeld", Harvard Law Review (1938) Vol. 51, p. 1141,
1145.
-~.
'
SMT. JNDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN
(Chandrachud, !.)
663
deemed to be the will of a body politic which is not unanimous. This
will is expressed through the elect~?n of representation" (1) .. C .. F.
Strong detines democracy to !llean that form of g?vernment m ~h1ch
the ruling power of a State is legally vested, not m any particular
dass or classes, but in the members of a community as a whole".
This may more aptly be called a description rather than a definition
'[, of democracy because it is beyond human ingenuity to foresee the
. _... possible permutations and combinations of circumstances to which a
generalisation may have to be applied.
.
1
1
.,
Foruetting mere words which Tennyson said : 'Like Nature, half
reveal :nd half conceal the Soul within', the substance of the matter
is the rule of the majority and the manner of ascertaining the will of
.the majority is through the proces~ .of elections. I find myse~ unable
to accept that the impugned provlS!ons destroy the democratic structure of our government. The rule is .still the rule of the majority des,pite the 39th Amendment and no law or amendment of the fundamental instrument has provided for the abrogation of the electoral
,process. In fact it is through that process that the electorate expressed its preference for Smt. Indira Gandhi over Shri Raj Narain
and others. Article 326 of the Constitution by which the elections
to the House o[ the People and to the State Legislative Assemblies
shall be on the basis of adult Suffrage still stands. Article 79 which
;provides that "There shall be a Parliament .... which shall consist
-0!: ... two Houses,'' articles ~O and 81 which prescribe the compos1tt011 of the two Houses, article 83 which provides for the duration
·of the Houses, article 85 \1hich directs that six months shall not inter,vene. bet\Veeu the :wo sessions of Parliament, article 100(1) which
provides that all questions shall be determined by a majority of votes ,
-0f the membe:s. present. and voting, article 105 which preserves the
powers and privileges of the members of Parliament and the counterPa!t~ of th.ese articles in regard to State Legislatures retain their
pnstme pnmacy. These articles, unimpaired as they remain even
-'.lfter the 3?th Amendment, arc enough assurance that the Parliament
,is not leadmg the country to a totalitarian path.
r
This is not to put a seal of approval on the immunity conferred
•on any election but it is hard to generalize from a single instance that
such an isolated act of immunity has destroyed or threatens to destroy the democratic framework of our government. One swallow
·does not make a summer. The swallow with its pointed wings,
forked tail. a curving flight and twittering cry is undoubtedly a harbinger of summer but to see all these in the 39th Amendment and to
argue that the suminer of a totalitarian rule is knocking at the threshold is to take an unduly alarmist view of the political scene as
painted by the Amendment. Very often, as said by Sir Frederick
Pollock. "If there is any real danger it is of the alarmist's own
making" (2).
(1) Modern Political Constitutions by C. F ,Strong; (E. L.B. S. Edn., 2nd Impression, 1970) p. 172.
'(2) Ethics and Morals (Essays in Jurisprudence) p. 303.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
664
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 S.C.R.
f •
The 39th Amendment is, however, open to grave objection on
other grounds, in so far as clavses (4) and (5) of Article 329A are
concerned. Generality and equality are two indelible characteristics
of justice ad)J1inistered accordipg to law. The Preamble to our
Constitution by which the people of India resolved solemnly to se~ure
to all its citizens equality of status and opportunity finds its realization in an amnler measure in Article 14 which guarantees equality
before the Ja\v and the equal protection of laws to all persons, citizens and non-citizens alike. Equality is the faith and creed of our
Democratic Republic and withollt it, neither the Constitution nor thr
laws made ui1der it could reflect the common conscience of those who
owe allegiance to them. And if they did not, they would fail to
command respect and obedience without which any Constitution
would be doomed to founder on the rocks of revolution. A Constitution which, without a true nexus, denies equality before the law
to its citizens may in a form thinly disguised, contain reprisals directed against private individuals in matters of private rights and wrongs.
The English Acts of Attainder beginning with the one passed by the
English Parliament in 1459 after the commencement of the wars ot
Roses or the 'Privilegium' .in Rome are only some of the historical
instances in point. Speaking of Bracton's .famous passage which
contains the admonition that the King ought to be under the law
because the Jaw makes him King, Sir Frederick Pollock says that there
you have in a nutshell the great point of Constitutional freedom that
law is not merely the instrument of Government, but the safeguard
of each individual citizen's public rights and liberties(!).
Article 329A ( 4) makes the existing election laws retrospectively
inapplicable, in a very substantial measllre, to the Parliamentary elections of the Prime Minister and the Speaker. The inapplicability at
such laws creates a legal vacuum because the repeal, so to say, of
existing laws is .only a step-in-aid to free the election from the restraints and obligations of all election laws, indeed of all laws. The
plain intendmcnt and meaning of clause (4) is that the election of
the two personages will be beyond the reach of any law, past or present. What follows is a neat logical corollary. The election of the
Prime Minister could not be declared void as there was no law to
apply to that election; the judgment of the Allahabad High Court
declaring the election void is itself void; and, the election continues
to be valid as it was before the High Court pronounced its judgment.
These provisions arc an outright negation of the right of equality
conferred by Article 14, a right which more than any other is a basic
postulate of our Constitution. It is true that the right, though
expressed in an absolute form, is hedged in by a judge-made restriction that it is open to the Legislature to make a reasonable classification so that the same law will not apply to all persons alike or diffcrcn! law~ n:iay .g~vern the rights and obligations of di~erent persons
fallmg w1thm d1stmct classes. The boast of Law that it is no respector of persons is the despair of drawers of waters and hewers of
wood who clamour for a differential treatment. The judge takes
(1) Jurisprudence and Legal Essays (1961) p. 195.
.. J
•
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN. (Chandrachud, J.)
665
that boast to mean that in an egalitarian society no person can be
above the law and that justice must be administered with an even hand
to those who are situated equally. In other words, all who are equal
are equal in the eye of Law and it will not accord a favou!ed treatment to persons within the same class. Laws, as Plato said, would
operate "iike an obstinate and ignorant tyrant if they imposed inflexible rules without allowing for changed circumstances or exceptional
cases( 1) .''
I
This Co~ut, atleasCsince the days of An~ar ~li Sarkar's case(2),
has consistently takeu- the view that the classification must be founded
on an inte!lioible differentia which distinguishes those who are grouped together from those who are left out and that the di!ferentia must
have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the
particular law. The first test may be assumed to be satisfied s~ce
there is no gainsaying that in our system of Go~ernment, the Pnme
Minister occupies a unique position. But what is the nexus of that
uniqueness with the law which provides that the election of the Prime
Minister and the Speaker to the Parliament will be above all laws,
that the election will be governed by no norms or standards applicable
to all others who contest that election and that an election declared
to be void by a High Court judgment shall be deemed to be valid,
the judgment and its findings being themselves required to be deemed
to be void ? Such is not the doctrine of classification and no facet
of that doctrine can support the favoured treatment accorded by the
39th Amendment to two high personages. It is the common man's
sense of justice which sustains democracies and there is a fear that
the 39th Amendment, by its impugned part, may outrage that sense
of justice. Different rules may apply to different conditions and
classes of men and even a single individual may, by his uniqueness,
form a class by himself. But in the absence .of a differentia reasonably related to the object of the law, justice must be administered
with an even hand to all.
It follows that clauses (4) and (5) of Article 329A are arbitrary
and are calculated to damage pr destroy the Rule of Law. Imperfections. of language hinder a precise definition of the Rule of Law
as of the definition of 'Law' itself. And the Constitutional Law of
1975 has undergone many changes since A. V. Dicey, the great
expounder of the rule of law, delivered his lectures as Vinerian Professor of English Law at Oxford, which were published in 188S
under the title, 'Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution.' But so .much, I suppose, can be said with reasonable certainty
that the rule of law means that the exercise of powers of govemment
1lhall .be conditioned by law and that subject to the exceptions to the
<loctnne. of Equality, no one shall be exposed to the arbitrary will of
the Government. Dicey gave three meanings to rule of law :
f\b~ence of arbitrary power, equality before the law or the equal sub1ectton of a~l classes to the ordinary law of the land administered by
(1)
See "The Sense of Injustice" by Edmond Cahn 0964) p. 161 in which the
reference is made to Plato's Politicus', p. 294.
(2) [1952] S, C.R. 284.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
666
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 ·s.c.R.
ordinary law courts and that the Constitution is not the source but the
consequence of the rights of individuals, as defined and enforced by
the Courts. The second meaning grew out of Dicey's unsound dislike of the French Droit Administrate which he regarded "as a misfortune inflicted upon the benighted folk across the Channel" (I) .
Indeed, so great was his influence on the thought of the day that as
recently as in 1935 Lord Hewart, the Lord Chief Justice of England,.
B dismissed the term "administrative law" as "continental Jargon". The
third meaning is hardly apposi5e in the context of our written Constitution for, in India, the Constitution is the source of all rights andi
obligations. We may not ther~fore rely wholly on Dicey's exposition of the rule of law but ever since the second World War, the rule
has come to acquire a positive content in all democratic countries ( 2 ) .
The International Commission of Jurists, which has a consulmtive
c status under the United Nations, held its Congress in Delhi in 1959•
where lawyers, judges and law teachers representing fifty-three
countries afiirmed that the rule of law is a dynamic concept which
should be· employed to safeguard and advance the political and civil
rights of the individual in a free society. One of the committees of
that Congress emphasised that no law should subject any individual
to discriminatory treatment. These principles must vary from
D country to country depending upon the provisions of its Constitution
and indeed upon whether there exists a written Constitution. As it
has been said in a lighter vein, to show the supremacy of the Parliament, the charm of the English Constitution is that "it does not
exist". Our Constitution exists and must continue to exist. It
guarantees equality before law and the equal protection of laws to
every one. Th. denial _of s1;1ch e_quality, as modified by the judicially
E evolved theory of class1ficatJon, 1s the very negation of rule of law.
A
F
G
H
The argument directed at showing the invalidation of the 39th
Amendment on the ground that it abrogates the principle of 'Separation of Powers' is replete with many possibilities since it has several
sidelights. But J will be brief since I have already held that clauses
( 4) and ( 5) of Article 329A are unconstitutional. I cannot regard
the point as unnecessary for my determination since the noint seems
to me of great constitutional importance.
·
'
The Indian Constitution was enacted by the Constituent Assembly
in the backdrop of the National struggle for Independence. The
Indian people had gone through a travail and on the attainment of
Independence, the country had to face unique problems which had
not confronted other federations like America, Australia, Canada or
Switzerland. These problems had to be solved pragmatically and not
by confining the country's political structure within the straitjacket of
a known or established formula. The Constituent Assembly, therefore, pursued the policy of pick and choose to see what suited the
genius of the Nation best. "This process produced new modifications. of established ideas. about the construction of federal governments and their relations with the governments of their. constituent
(1) See Judicial Reveiw of Administrative Action-S. A. de Smith, (1968) p. 5
(2) See Wade and Phillips' Constitutional Law (Sixth Ed.) pp. 70-73.
•
•
I
" J
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ.NARAIN
I
•
A
1
(
•
667
units. The Assembly, in fact, producec! a new kind of federalism to
meet India's peculiar needs"('1). While introducing the Draft Constitution in the Constituent Assembly, Dr. Ambedkar who was one of
the chief architects of the Constitution said that our Constitution
avoided the tight mould of federalism in which the American Constitution was caught and could be "both unitary as well as federal
according to the requirements of time and circumstances". We have
what may perhaps be described by the phrase, 'co-operative federalism', a concept different from the one in vogue when the federations
of United States or of Australia were set up.
-t
l
((;handrachud, !.)
The American Constitution provides for a rigid separation of
goverhlllental powers int.o three bas~e div~si~ns-the executive'. le¥islative and judicial. It is an essential pnnc1ple of that Constitution
that powers entrusted to one depart~ent sho~ld . not be exercised by
any other department. The Au~trahan Constitution follows. the same
pattern of distribution of powers. Unlike these Constitut10ns, the
Indian Constitution does not expressly vest the three kinds of power
in three different organs of the State. But the principle of separation of powers is not a magic formula for keeping the three organs of
the State within the strict confines of their functions. As observed
by Cardozo, J. in his dissenting opinion in Panama Refining ComPany v. Ryan(2), the principle of separation of powers "is not a
doctrinaire concept to be made use of with pedantic rigour. There
must be sensible approximation, there must be elasticity of adjustment in response to the practical necessities of Government which
cannot foresee today the developments of tomorrow in their nearly
infi.nite variety". Thus, even in.America, despite, the theory that the
legtslature cannot delegate its power to the executive a host of rules
and regulation are passed by non-legislative bodies ~hich have been
'
judicially recognized as valid ( 3 ).
The truth of the matter is that the existence, and the limitations
on the powers of the three departments of government are due to the
normal process of specialisation in governmental business which becomes more and more complex as civilization advances. The Jegis!ature· must make laws, the executive enforce them and tJ1e judiciary
mterpi:ct the1!1 because they have in their respective fields acquired an
expc~hsc which. makes them competent to discharge their duly
appomted funch<;>ns. The Moghal Emperor, Jehangir, was applauded . as a reformist because soon after his accession to the throne in
1605, he got a golden chain with sixty bells hung in his palace so
that the common man could pull it and draw the attention of the
~uler to his grievances and sufferings. The most despotic Monarch
m .t~e modei;n world prefers to be armed, even if formally, with the
op1ruon of his Judges on the grievances of his subjects.
·
B
c
D
E
F
(1) The Indian Constitution : Cornerstone of a Nation by Granville Austin
(1972) p. 186.
(2) 293 u. s. 388, 440.
(3) See thejudgmenfof Mukherjea, J. in the Delhi Laws Act case, [1951] S. C.R.
747, 964.
.
H
668
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 S.C.R.
A
The polj_tical usefulness of the doctrine of separation of powers is
now widely recognized though a satisfactory definition of the three
functions is difficult to evolve. But the function of the Parliament
is to make laws, not to decide cases. The British Parliament in its
unquestioned supremacy could enact a legislation for the settlement
of a dispute or it could, with impunity, legislate for the boiling of
B the Bishop of Rochestor's cook. The Indian Parliament will not
direct that an accused in a pending case shall stand acquitted or that
a suit shall stand decreed. Princely ·India, in some parts, often did
it.
The reason of this restraint is not that the Indian Constitution
recognizes ariy rigid separatfon of powers. Plainly, it does not. The
reason is that the concentration of powers in any one organ may, by
c upsetting that fine balance between the three organs, destroy the
fundame_ntal premises of a democratic government to which we are
pledged. Sir Carleton K. Allen says in his 'Law and Orders' (1965
Ed., p. 8) that neither in Montesquieu's analysis nor in Locke's are
the governmental powers conceived as the familiar trinity of legislative, executive and judicial powers. Montesquieu's "separation"
took the form not of impassable barriers and unalterable frontiers,
but of mutuaf restraints, or of what afterwards came to be knovm as
D
'"checks and balances". (p. 10). The three organs must act in
concert, not that their respective functions should not ever touch one
another.· If this limitation is respected and preserved, "it is impossible for that situation to arise which Locke and Montesquieu regarded as the eclipse of liberty-the monopoly, or the disproportionate
accumulation, of power in one sphere". (p. 19; Allen). In a
E federal system whicb distributes powers between three co-ordinate
branches of government, though not rigidly, disputes regarding the
limits of constitutional power have to be resolved by courts and therefore, as observed by Paton, "the distinction between judicial and
other powers may be vital to the maintenance of the Constitution
itself" ('1) • Power is of an encroaching nature, wrote Madison in
'The Federalist'. The encroaching power which the Federalists
F
~eared most was the legisla!ive power and that, according to Madison,
1s the ~anger of all rcpubhcs. Allen says that the history of both
the Umted States and France has shown on many occasions that the
fear was not unjustified( 2 ).
I do not suggest that such ari encroaching power will be pursued
relentlessly or ruthlessly by our Parliament. But no Constitution can
. survive without a conscious adherence to its fine checks and balances.
G
Just as Courts ought not to enter into problems entwined in the "political thicket", Parliament must also respect the preserve of the Courts.
The principle of separation of powers is a principle of restraint which
"has in it the precept, innate in the prudence of self-preservation (even
if history has not repeatedly brought it home) , that discretion is the
H
better part of valour" ( 3 ). Courts have, by. and large, come to check
(1) A text-book of Jurisprudence (1964) page 295.
(2) Allen, Law and Orders, p. 12.
(3) Social Dimensions of Law and Juslice-Julius Stone (1966) p. 668.
•
..
i
l
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN (Chandrachud, J.)
'
669
their valorous propensities. In the name of the Constitution, the Parliament may not also turn its attention from the important task of
legislation to deciding court cases for which it lacks the expertise and
the apparatus. If it gathers facts, it gathers facts of policy.. If it
records findings, it does so without a pleading and without frammg any
issues. And worst of all, if it decides a Court case, it decides without hearing the parties and in defiance of the fundamental principles
of natural justice.
·
The Parliament, by clause (4) of Article 329A, ha~ decide~ a
matter of which the country's Courts were lawfully seized. Neither
more nor less. It is true, as contended by the learned AttomeyGeneral and Shri Sen, that retrospective validation is a well-known
legislative process which has received the recognition of this Court in
tax cases, pre-emption cases, tenancy cases and a variety of other
matters. In fact, such validation was resorted to by the legislature
and upheld by this Court in at least four election cases, the last of
them being Kanta Kathuria v. Manak Chand Surana( 1 ). But in all
of these cases, what the legislature did was to change the law retrospectively so as to remove the reason of disqualification, leaving it to
the Courts to apply the amended law to the cjecision of the particular
case. In the instant case the Parliament has withdrawn the application of all laws whatsoever to the disputed election and has taken
upon itself to decide that the election is. valid. Clause (5) commands the Supreme Court to dispose of the appeal and the crossappeal in conformity with the provisions of clause ( 4) of Article
329A, that is, in conformity with the "judgment" delivered by . the
Parliament. The "separation of powers does not mean the equal
balance .of powers", says Harolc;i Laksi, but the exercise by the legislature of what is purely and inciubitably a judicial function is impossible to sustain jn the context even of our co-operative federalism
which contains nQ rigid distribution of powers but which provides a
system of salutary cllecks and balances.
·
I find it contrnry to the basic tenets of our Constitution to hold
that the Amending Body is an amalgam of all powers-legislative,
executive and judicial. "Whatever pleases the emperor has the
force of law" is not an article of democratic faith. The basis of our
Constitution is a well planned legal order, the presuppositions oE which
are accepted by the people as determining the methods by which the
functions of the government will be discharged and the power of the
State shall be used.
So much for the 39th Amendment. The argument iegarding the
invalidity of the Representation of the People (Amendment) Act, 58
of 1974, and of the Election Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975 has,
however, no substance. The Constitutional amendments may, on
the ratio. of the Funtlamental Rights, case, be tested on the anvil 0£
basic structure. But apart from the principle that a case is only an
authority for what it decides, it does not logically follow from the
majority .iudgment in the Fundamental Rights case that ordinary
(1)
[1970] 2 s. c. R. 835,
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
670
A
B
c
D
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(197 6] 2 S.C.R.
legislation must also answer the same test as a constitutional amendment. Ordinary laws liave to answer two tests for their validity :
(1) The law must be within the legislative competence of the Iegislaturn as defined and specified in Chapter I, Part XI of the Constitution and ( 2) it must not offend against the provisions of Articles.
13 (1) and (2) oi the Constitution. 'Basic structure', by the majority judgment, is not a part of the fundamental rights nor indeed a
provision of the Constitution. The theory of basic structure is
woven out of the compectus of the Constitution and the amendin<>
power is subjected to it because it is a constituent power. 'The powe~
to amend t~e fundamental instrument cannot carry with it the power
to destroy its essential featurcs'-this, in brief, is the arch of the
~heory of bas!c. structure.. It is wholly out of place in matters relatmg t9 the vahd1ty of ordmary laws made under the Constitution.
Shri Shanti Bhushan thought it paradoxical that the higher power
should be subject to a limitation which will not operate upon a lower
power. There is no paradox, because certain limitations operate
upon the higher po.,•er for the reason that it is a higher power. A
constitutional amemlment has to be passed by a special majority and
certain such amendments have to be ratified by the Legislatures of
not less the::m one-half of the States as provided by article 368 (2) ..
An ordinary legi&lation can be passed by a simple majority. The
two powers, though species of the same genus, operate in different'
fields and are therefore subject to different limitations.
No objection can accordingly be taken to the constitutional validity of the two impugned Acts on the ground that they damage or
E destroy the basic structure. The power to pass these Acts could be·
exercised retrospectively as much as prospecjively.
These Acts effectively put an end to the two appeals before us for
they answer the totality of the objections which were raised by Shri
Raj Narain against the election of Smt. Indira Gandhi. The basis
of the findings on which the High Court held against the successful
candidate is removed by Act 40 of 1975 retrospectively. Were the
F law as it is under. the amendments introduced by that Act, the High . ~
Court could not have held that the election is vitiated by the two· ·~'
particular corrupt practices. In regard to the crossappeal filed by _•
Shri Re>.i Narain, Shri Shanti Bhushan thought that a part of it .
escapes through the crevices in the Act but I see no substance in that
contention either. I would like to add that the findings recorded
· by the High Court in favour of Smt. Indira Gandhi are amply borne
G out by the evidence to which our attention was drawn briefly by the
learned counsel for the parties. The expenses incurred by the political party together with the expenses incurred by her are not shown
to exceed the prescribed ceiling. Apart from that, Act 58 of 1974
makes that issue academic.
H
Finally, there is no merit in the contention that the constitutional
amendment is bad because it was passed when some members of the
Parliament were in detention. The legality of the detention orders
cannot be canvas~ed in these appeals collaterally. And from a practical point of view, the presence of 21 members of the Lok Sabha and
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
(Beg, J.)
671
10 members of the Rajya Sabtia who were in detention c0uld not
have made a difference to the passing of the Amendment.
f
A.
In the result, 1 hokl that clai;ises (4) and (5) of Article 329A arc
unconstitutional and therefore void. But for reasons aforesaid I
allow Civil Appeal No. 887 of 1975 and dismiss Civil Appeal No.
909 of 1975. There will be no order as to costs throughout.
ORDER (in review application)
BEG, J.-This application purporting to be "for review of judgment and/or for clarification and/or expunging of the observations
from the judgment" has been filed under Order 4 7 of the Supreme
Court Rules which indicates the inherent powers of this Court.
The body of the petitio>.i as well as the prayers made show that
the applicant has no grievance against the common conclusions of the
five learned Judges of this Court, including myself, who delivered five
separate judgments in the election Civil Appeal No. 887 of 1975 and
the cross appeal No. 909 of 1975, the first by Shrimati Indira Nehru
Gandhi and the second by Shri Raj Narain; who were candidates at an D·
election held in Rae Bareli constituency in Uttar Pradesh in the first
week of March, 197L This petition of the election petitioner sets
out the issues framed in the Trial Court. It then states facts showing that the 39th Amendment of the Constitution as well as some
amendments by· the Election Laws (Amendment) Act 40 of 1975,
were made before the above mentioned appeals, filed under Secticn
116A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 against the same E
judgment, were taken up for hearing by this Court. Thereafter,
the petition gives an accou1at of the hearing of the appeals by this
Court in the conrse of which, after hearing arguments on the constitutional amendment, His Lordship the Chief Justice, speaking for
this Court, directed the parties to address their arguments on merits
as well, as is admitted in paragraph 12. of .the petition. TQ.e petitioner states that, as one of the learned Judges, Hon'ble Mr. Justice F
Mathew, i11dicated, while Mr. A. K. Sen was arguing the appeal No.
887 of 1975 on merits and dealing with facts, that arguments should
first be heard on the amendment of the election laws, and, after
that, as Hon'ble Mr. Justice Khanna also indicated that arguments
on the amendment of election laws should be heard first, the Counsel
for the electio'.1 petitioner understood that he would have to confine
his arguments .to the validity of these amendments. The petition
before us also contains statements showing that, so far as I was concerned, I had indicated to the parties that I regarded consideration
of the merits of the case also to be essential for a just and proper
decision and disposal of the appeals. Indeed, the directiol! give'n
by His Lordship the Chief Justice to the parties to address their
arguments on merits, after those on the constitutional amendment,
necessarily meant, I think, that a consideration of merits could not H
be separated from questions of validity of the amendments of the
election laws.
672
A
B
E
F
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 s.c.R.
. M{' own recollection of the hearing of the case is that merits,
rncludmg bro.ad question .of fact, were suffi~iently gone into to enable
u~ to deal with all qu.est1ons of law emergmg out of findings of fact
given by the learned judge a'ad that questions were also put by me
to l~arned Counsel for the election petitioner asking him to justify
findn~gs ~f fa~t .on the only two questions on merits arising for considerat10n m ClVll .Appeal No. 887 of 1975. Indeed, it appeared
to me that quest10ns of fact a~ad law were very much inter-twined.
It was for this reason, amongst others, that I had repeatedly tried
to draw the attention of Counsel, during the hearing, to these intertwined questions of law and fact with a view of getting their assistance
a'ad points of view on these questions.
The gravamen of the attack by the learned Counsel for the election petitioner on the amendments was that "the rules of the game",
as the learned Counsel for the election petitioner called theni, had
been so altered that the party disqualified at the election, according
to the law as it existed when the election petition was filed, became
qualified and duly elected. This, it was vehemently urged, was
completely destructive of the basis of a "free and fair" election. It
was the contention of the learned Counsel or the election petitioner
that the respondent in the High Court, being the advantageous and
powerful position of the Prime Minister of ~e country, supported by
a large majority i:n Parliament, had obtained a change of laws in her
favour so as to convert a defeat into a victory. It was, therefore,
essential for the decision of this issue raised by the learned Counsel
for the election petitioner himself to convince us that the case of the
election petitioner, according to the laws as they stood at the time
when the election was held, was bound to succeed on merits. It
was only if it could be shewn that the amendments of election laws,
by additions to them, had really altered the law, and also that this
had the effect of so changing "the rules of the game" (the very words
used by the Counsel for the election petitioner) as to remove disqualifications actually incurred, that this line of argument could possibly succeed. I, at any rate, am unable to understand how this
issue, raised by the learned Counsel for the electio'n petitioner himself, could possibly be decided satisfactorily without going into the
facts of the case. And, if raised, as it was, it did call for a decision.
It is true that my learned brethren did not consider it necessary
to go into either the abovell1entioned issue or the merits of the case
in such depth as I did possibly because of the concession of the leru;ned
G
Counsel for the election petitioner that it was unn~essary to cons1d~r
the merits at all if all the amendments of the election laws were valid
and his interpretations of those amendments ~ere no~ .to l:le a~cep~ed.
According to the learned counsel for the election pet1t10ner, his chent
could not succeed if our view on the validity a!nd meaning of amend. ments was against his submissions. I, however, not on:Iy concluded,
in agreement with my learned brethren that the. amendments of el~c
H
tion laws were valid but reached that conclusion by an alternative
route. I found that there was no alteration of the election laws, except in one respect, and, therefore, there could be no question of
i
•
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI V. RAJ NARAIN
t
j
(Beg, J.)
. 673
an alteration of "the rules of the game" to the disadvantage of the
election petitioner. Once I had reached this conclusion, it was not
possible to avoid consideripg findings on merits. . Lear11~d Counsel
for the election petitioner had conceded, no doubt m the mterests of
his client, that the findings of the learned trial Judge were unsustainable if the amendments were valid a'nd his interpretation~ of these
amendments were rejected. I do not think that I could possibly
decide the case on this concession after reaching a conclusion, possibly not anticipated by the learned. Counsel for the election petitione!,
that the election laws were not really changed except m
one respect. I came to the conclusions I reached after considering the findings on merits and the law applicable at the time when
the election was held.
. I do not think that we are required, by any rule of natural justice,
to intimate to learned Counsel what particular route or reasd.ning will
finally appeal to us or be adopted by us in reaching a particular
conclusion in our judgment. All I can say is that if a counsel raises
an issue which, in the opinion of a•ny one of us, can only be answered
by going into findings of fact, he should anticipate the possibility
of such a view. I can also say that I gave enough indication, during
the course of arguments, of the course I could and did finally adopt
for reasons fully set out in my judgment.
The main grievance of the election petitioner before us seems to
be that his counsel understood, from the course of the proceedings
and observations made by some of us, after the Hon'ble Chief Justice ')lad, on behalf of the whole Court, informed learned Cou11$el
that this Court will hear. argume)1ts on merits as well, that such arguments should be confined to questions of }aw relating to the validity
of amendments in electfon laws and will not touch questions of fact
at all so that he did not argue· on questions of fact. But, my view
was .that a decision on questions of law relating to the validity_ of the
a!lle:ndments themselves necessitated consideration of all the· findings
given and the meanings of the laws applied by the trial Court.
· It may be difficult for learned Counsel sometimes to anticipate
and meet the requirements of every learned Judge of this Court when
there are five of us hearing arguments. It is, however, the duty of
Counsel who raise issues, which may necessitate cqnsideration of
questions of fact and law, to satisfy the requirements of any 0!1e of
us who may be of opinion, as I am, that these issues could not possibly be decided properly without considering findings of fact and
the applications of law to them. It is too late now for the learned
Counsel to complain that he misunderstood the position despite the
efforts made by me to make clear my desire to hear arguments on
facts a'nd findings on them. Speaking for myself, I can only say that
I could not possibly do full justice in this case and satisfy my conscience without a considera,tion of all those findings and facts which
I felt bound to consider and did consider and decide. That could
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
674
A
B
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 S.C.R.
not be avoided at all after the conclusion I reached-that the amendmc'ats did not amend the law except in one respect. The issues,
whether the rules of the game were at all altered and if so whether
this had the effect of converting a defeat into a' vict~ry w;re raised
by ~he counsel for the election petitioner himself. If, therefore, the
findmgs and the facts of the case were exercised by so to a greater
extent then a party or his learned Counsel relish, so as to be able
to decide those issues, I am unable to do anything about it on a
petitio~1 ~uch as the one n?w befo~e _us. Learned Counsel had ample
opp~rtumty to. make all his subm1ss1?ns. If, d~e .to some misapprehension, he failed to make any particular sub1111ss1ons, the case cannot be reopened particularly when nothing which could possibly
affect the result is indicated even now.
·C
It seems, from the petition now before us, that the greatest concern of the election petitioner and his learned Counsel is not the
result of the election petition or the common conclusions reached by
all the five learned Judges, with which no fault has been found in
this petition, but that the merits of the case, on facts, where examined
at all by me. If this is part of a political game, I think tlYat it is
high time that it was realised by everyone that Courts are not
:0 meant for political tactics or propaga.nda. Those who k'now what
mctics were adopted by some people to defeat the course of justice
in this Court in this particular case will _pot be mistaken if they held
that the view tlYat, if this Court has erred at all ti dealing with these
methods, it has done so on the side of leniency. I will not say
. anything more about this unsavoury aspect of the case here ..
E
F
G
H
After having heard arguments of learned Counsel for the election petitioner on the two appeals which definitely involved allegations of misuse of power by the Parliament and by the Prime
Minister of this country. I was rather ama,zed to hear from learned
Counsel arguing the application before us that no question of bonafides or malafides was raised by him. It may be that the learned
Counsel, without using any particular label to describe the issqe
raised by him, made all the allegations and suggestions necessary
to raise it. If he did not mean to argue such an issue seriously I
do not think that learned Counsel for the petitioner was justified in
taking up so much of this Court's time in arguing that could be the
purpose behind and the effects of the amendments assailed by learn- '
ed Counsel. I do not think th•at I could, after the conclusion reached by me, as I have already mentioned above, properly deal with the
issues raised hy learned Cou'asel, whatever be the term employed to
describe them, without examining the validity of findings of fact and
Jaw on the only two questions involved in Appeal No. 887 of 1975.
It became imperative •and unavoidable on the view I took. Those
who asked for justice got it even though it involved doing some justice to those who did not ask for it. The judicial process does 'not
always produce the expected.
Learned Counsel for the election petitioner also seemed to complain that my judgment contained some remarks indicating that he
JI
'
SMT. INDIRA GANDHI v. RAJ NARAIN
(Beg, J.)
675
<lid not discharge his professional duties towards his client satisfactorily. If -that is so, I would like to remove this grievance by saying!
that he discharged his duty towards his client so well that he succeeded in averti'ag a closer and more detailed scrutiny by all of us
of the pleadings, the evidence, and the patently erroneous conclusions
of the trial Judge in this case. I think that his client shouid be thankful for this success of his counsel added to the successful attack on
the relevant party 39th Constitutional Amendmelli. There is, however, ·also a duty towards this Court which has to be performed by'
trying to meet the possible point of view of requirements of every
learned Judge hearing the appeals irrespective whether this suits the
party represented by Counsel.
A
B
I was initially inclined even to let learned Counsel for the_ election
C
petitio•aer file written arguments on such other questions of law and
fact as he may have, due to some misapprehension, failed to place
before this Court so that I may consider these also now. _But, I
have after giving the matter further thought, reached the conclusion
that the view of my learned brethren on this matter is correct and
must be preferred to my initial desire to give learned Counsd a
further opportunity. This view is that no useful purpose could be . D
served by spending more time on this case which has already occupied enough of valuable time of this Court. The contents of the
review petition also show that there is nothing overlooked which is
worth co11sidering upon any application for review. As already mentioned above, learned Counsel for the election petitioner doe~ not
question at all the correctness of the common conclusions of all the
learned Judges of the Constitution bench.
·
E
The application before us seems to be only ·an explanatiO'u of the
reasons for which learned Counsel for the election petitioner did
not advance more detailed arguments on findings of fact. I am indined to accept that explanation a~ bollafide and sufficient for what,.
ever may be the reasons for the learned Counsers failure to submit
more argument in support of the findiugs of the trial Court than he
,.
. did offer in addition to those contained in the judgip.ent under appeal.
. , I am sure that the course adopted by the election petitidner's learned
Counsel has not injured his client's case or interests at all even if it
- { did not fully succeed in completely warding off a closer scrutiny of
• ' the pleadings, the evidence, and the findings of the trial Court than
tha~ which was good for the election petitioner's case. It is U\1<loubtedly a feather in the cap of the learned Counsel who conducted the case before the High Court also, that a case s~ flimsy as that
of his client succeeded in the High -Court. And I do not think that
the election petitioner's case could have been m~re skilfully conducted in. this Court then it was done by his counsel Mr. Shirnti Bhushan.
· I have, however, closely gone through my judgment again as it
had to, f~r reasons beyonq our contr~l, be dictated, typed, an~ cyclos~yled m great hurry w1th?ut sufficient opportunity for careful
reasJmg and necessary corrections of accidental slips and errors
!
F
G
H
•
676
A
B
c
•
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
(197bJ· .2 'S.C,R.
before and after it was cycl6styled. I have done so particularly because I found that a number of typing errors had crept into th~"Cy
clostyled copies of'my judgment which had t9 be ordered by meot<J>
be corrected.· I find that there are still two er_rors left in my judgment which call for correction. The first is at page 11 of my judgment where section 116A ( 4) has been wrongly mentioned instead of
Section 116B (3) due to some accidental slip or clerical error.
Again, at page 23 of my judgment, I find that, while considering the
provisions of Section 100(1) (d) (ii), it has gone down that the p:ovision "postulates : firstly, a corrupt practice which can 'be . ~om
mitted only by an agent; and, secondly, the existence' of
such an agent". I think that the first postulate is ' stated incorrectly by some error. It should be: "firstly, a corrupt practice
which is committed only by an agent". I, therefore, order.that ·my
judgment be corrected in ·these two respects. I am unable to find
any other error in the judgment \Vhich calls for correction.
.~
I
'1
..
Subject to the correction in the two respects mentioned above,
and the clarificatidns given above, this application is dismissed. '
I
ORDER
D
In view of the fact that one of us (Beg, J.) is of the opini6n that
there is no sufik!cnt ground for reviewing the judgment, this review
application is dismissed.
S.R.
Review petition dismissed.
'
!
'
126 SCI/76-2,500-26-6-76-GIPF.
,I
Report an error or ask for masking: grievance@lawgrids.org