INDIAN CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE versus C.I.T., WEST BENGAL-II, CALCUTTA
Supreme Court of India | Decided 17 September 1975 | [1976] 1 S.C.R. 830 | 1975 INSC 218
Key facts
- Decided
- 17 September 1975
- Bench
- V.R. KRISHNA IYER*, A.C. GUPTA, S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 2129/1970
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Citation
- [1976] 1 S.C.R. 830
- Neutral citation
- 1975 INSC 218
Text of the judgment
8 30
INDIAN CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE
A
v.
-+
C.I.T., WEST BENGAL-II, CALCUTTA
September 17,. 1975
[V. R. KRISHNA !YEI<, A. C. GUPTA AND S. MURTAZA FAZAL Au, JJ.]
l!1come Tax Act (43 of 1961), s.2 (xv)-Charitable purpose, scope ofBurae11 of proof~Activitv for vrofit ~\!hat is.
B
. Under the Income-tax Act_ 1961 one of the items not includ"ed.in the total
income of an assessee for purposes of tax is, under s.11 incon1e derived from.
.property h~.ld under trust wholly for charitable purpose. Charitable purpose
is defined 1n s.2 (xv). Chambers of commerce, promoting the trade interest
of the c~m1?ercial con:imunity, have been regarded as pursuing charitable
purposes w1th1n the n1ean1ng of s.2 (xv). But. under cover of charitable purposes
they have been indulging in various activitie'S and deriving tax free
profit.
Therefore, s. 2 (xv) was amended by adding a clause at the end.
Under the an1ended definition, unless the context: otherwise 1-equires, charitable
purpose includes the advancement of any object df general
publi'c utility
not i111·0/ving the carrying on of any acth·ity for profit.
c
HELD : The ·incon1e of the assessees, which are chambers of commerce.
frorn three sources, namely, (a) arbitration fees levied by them; (b) fees
collected for issuing certificates of origin; and (c) share of profit in another
CGmpany for issue of certificates of weighmient and measurement, which services are extended to members and non-n1embers. that is, to be trade generally,
is. not entitled to the exemption, and is liable to tax. [845E-G]
D
( 1) The teSt is to ask for answers to the following questions :-(a) Is
the object of the assessee one of general public utility; (b) Does the advancement of the object involve activties bringing in money? (c) If so, arc· such
activities undertaken (i) for profit or (ii) with.out profit. Even if (a) and (b)
are answered affirmativ'elY, if (c) (i) is also answered affirmatively the claim for
exemption collapses. [844B-Cl
(2) Section 2 (xv) n1ust be intoerpreted in such a manner that every word
is given a meaning and not to treat any expression as redundant or miss the
So viewed, an institution which carries
accent of the amendatory phrase.
out charitable purposes out of income 'derived from property held under trust
\Vholly for charitable· purposes' may still· forfeit the claim to exemption in
respect of such takings or incomes as n1ay come to it from pursuing any activity
for profil
By the new definition the benefit of exclusion from total income
iSi taken away where~ in accomplishing a charitable purpose, the institution
If' it wants immunity from taxation the
engages itself in activities for profit.
moeans of fulfilling charitable purposes must be
unsuUied by profit-mking
ventures. The advancement of the object of general public utility must not
involve the carrying on of any activity for profit.
Otherwise. it will Jead
to the absurd conclusion that a Chamber of Cbmmerce may run a printing
press. advertisement bu~iness. market exploration activity or even exJ?Qrt promotion business and Jevy huge sums from itSi custimers. whether they are
niembers of the organisation or not. and still c1ain1 a blanket exemption from
tax on the score that the objects of general public utility which it had set forth
for itself implied these activi"t.~es even though profits or surpluses m>iy arise
therefrom. If it runs special types of services for the benefit of manufacturers
and charges remuneration from them. it i<> undontedlv an activity which. if
carried on bv private agencies, would be- taxable. and there is no reason why
The policy of the statute is to
a Chamber Of Commerce should be exempt.
give tax relief for charitable purposes. An undertakin~ hv a busine~s or~anisa
tion is ordinarily assumed to be for profit unless c-xpressly or bv necessarv
implication. or by eloquent surrounding circumstances. the making of pro.fit
o;;tands dearlv negatived. For example. if' there is a restrictive provision in the
hve-laws which insists that the charges levied for services of public utilit"
re"ndered are to be on a 'no profit' basis, that is, that it shall not charge more
E
F
G
H
'
INDIAN CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE V. C.J.T.
A
B
c
•
831
than is actually needed for the rendering of the services, then it earns the
benefit of •.2(xv). It may not be an exact equivalent--£uch mathematical
precision being impossible in such case&-and there may be little surplus at the
end of the year; but the broad inhibition against making profit is a good
guarantee that the carrying on of the activity is not for profit.
[839F-8400, G..S41C]
(3) The answer to the question whether an activity is one for or not for
profit depends on. the facts. An activity which yields profit or gain in the
ordinary course must be presumed to have been done for profit or gain. Thete
may be activities, where, without intent or purpose the activity may yield profit.
Even then it may\ Jegitimatiely be said that. the activity is for profit in the- sense
that it is "appropriate or adapted to'' such profit. [844C, B-FJ
(4) If the activity is prone to yielding income and in fact results in profit
the Reven~e will examine the reality or pretence of the condition that the
activity is not for profit : But, if the broad basis that the activity is ndt for
profit is made out, by the assessee, the Revenue will not be meticuloUs and
charge every chance excess or random surplus. [844G.84SA]
·
(5) The asgessees' contention that the Revenue should only look at the
'dominant intent' or 'real object' of the assessee and that if its activity is
wra_pped up, entangled or intertwined with a public utility object, then any
'incid'ental profit' arising from it is not taxable, does not afford a valid or
satisfactory test. [841D-E]
)
D
(6) Equally, the contention 1 of the Revenue that all activities which arc
prone to produce profits should be excluded. is not correct. [840E-F]
(7) In the present case the issuance of weighment and measurement certi..
ficates, the issuance of certificates of origin, and the settlement of disputes by
arbitration are great facilities for traders of general public utility. There is
however, nothing in the memorandum or articles of association of the assessees
which provides for only nominal fees and sets a limit on making large profits
from the smices. [845B-E. G·H]
E
Loka Shikshana Trust v. C.l.T,. Mysore, [1976] I S.C.R. 471; C.l.T. v. Andhra
Chamber df Commerce [1965] 55 I.T.R. 722 applied.
C.l.T. v. Dharmodayam Co. [1974] 94 I.T.R. 113, overruled.
ARGUMENTS
F
G
For the appellant :_:___
1. The primary or dominant or real objects of the Indian Chamber of
Commerce are to promote, protect, aid and stimulate trade, commerce and
industry in India. (Clause 3 of the 1-.-Iemorandum of Association). The Income
received was to be applied solely for the promotion of the objects and upon
di&Solution n·o property was to be paid or distributed among the members but
was to be given or transferred to some other institution having similar objects.
(Clauses 4 and 8 of the Memorandum of Association). Jt is wen settled. that
these objects which lead to e:.onomic prosperity and enure for the benefit of the
entire community are objects of general public utility and as such, charitable.
See [1965] SC 55 !TR 722-Cdmmissioner
Cluunber of Co1n1nerce.
-
of ·lncome-tax v, Andhra
2. The Indian Chamber. of Commerce provides, inter alia for arbitration
facilities so that trade disputes may be •peedily and efficiently settled. It further
'll:rovides fur certificates of origin and certificates of -wcighment and. measurement
H to be issued u.nder the Commercial Documents Evidence Act, 1939 under Entry
18 Part I P-nd Entry 6 Part II of the Schedule to the said Act respectively.
Theo:;e certificates can only be issued by certain bodies such as· re<;ogniscd
chambers of commerce. The certificates are necessary for facilitating trade.
5-L1127SCI/75
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
832
[1976] 1 s.c.R.
The carrying 011 of the activities of granting ,;:ertificatcs of origin and/or weighme.nt and me.isurement and arbitration are not activities for profit but are in
the nature of sen'ices and/or facilities provided to the commercial community.
As fees are charged the result at the end of the year i~ sometimes a loss and
sometimes a surplus. The dominant purpos'C for these service is not profit
making but rendering a statutory service for trade and commerce generally.
The services :annot be gra·tuitous as the Chamber cannot be exrected to be a
<.:haritable in~titv,tion like a Dharamsala. The fees charged arc related to the
services renered by way of quid pro quo. Quid pro quo does not mean an
equivalent mathen1atically. If incidental to the advancement of the objects of
general public utility some services are rendered for fees as a r~sult of whkh
income results if does not means that the objects of the Chamber involves carrying
on any a;;tivity "f0r profit" in the ~ense of that being the dominant object. The
dominant or real purpose is not to earn profit or income but to serve trade
and help the commercial comnu1nity. As such the above1nentioned activities
carried on by the Chamber will not be activities ''for profit" involving in the
dominant object of the Chamber. In order to be activities "for profit" the
involvement of profit making shouJd be by the objects and must be of such a
degree or to sureh an extent as to lead to the inference that profit ma·king is
the real object. Since the real or don1inant objects of the Chamber are not
for profit and profit is not an essential ingredient but a mere hye-product of the
activities of the Chan1ber. the income must be held to be exempt under S. 11 ( 1)
read with S. 2 {15) of the Act.
See [1976} I S.C.R. 471-The Sole Trustee Loka Shikshana
Commissioner of Income-tax, !i1ysore.
A
B
+
c
Trust v.
D
3. The purpose and/or <lon1inant object must be distinguished from the
powers which are incidental to the carrying out of the objects cf the Trust.
See 27 ITR 279-Commissioner of lnco111e.fax v. Breach Candy Swi1nn1ing
Bath Trust.
[1918] Appeal Cases 514-Cotman v. Brougham [1970} I Ch. 199.
E
4. Under S. 2(15) of the Act the words "carrying on of any a:tivity for
profit'' must mean an activity whose dominant object is profit making and not
an activity which m~y incidentally result in some profit as a bye-product. If
this meaning is not given then there will be .no activity of any institution,
doing work of general public l.fility which will be exempt including activities
like those of All India Spinners Association.
5. If the primacy and dominant purpose is .;;:haritable then even if there are
·some incidental powers which are not charitable it will not prevent the trust
from being a valid charity, The intention will have to be gleaned from the
-Constitution of the Trust or the ¥emorandum of Association.
F
See 7 ITR 415-ln Re: Trustees of the Tribune.
12 ITR 482-All lndia Spinners Association v. Comniissioner of Inconzetax
55 lTR 722-Commissioner of lilcome.tax v. Andhra Cha1nber of
l'ommerce
100 ITR 392-Andhra Pradesh Stote Transport Corporation v. Con1mis-,
G
stoner of Income-tax
6. Under Section 11 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 it is the income derived
from property held, under trust wholly for obaritable purposes which is not to
be included in the· total income. The word property is of wide import and
.can il;iclude. a busines!I! or an undertaking or fees and restaurant charges etc.
12 lTR 482-Alt India Spinners Assoclatio11 v. Commissioner of l11cometa.r
H
IND!'~ (HA:\IBERS OF COMMERCE v. C.l.T.
A
(Kdshna Iyer, J.,833
27 JTR 27~Conunissioner of Income ..fa.'<, Bo1nbay
('andy S1ri1nrni11g Bath Trust
City v.
Breoch
32_ ITR 535-J K, Trust, Bdn-1bay v. Conunissioner of Income-tax, Excess
Profit Tax,, Ro111bay
53 ITR 176-Conunissioner of Inc(nne-tax, Kera/a & Coi1nbatore v.
P. Kri'slina IVarriar
B
7. In any C\'~nt, the activities of <trbitration and grunting certificate& of origin
and wcighrnent and/or measurement are not activities "for profit".
80 ITR 645-Conunissioner of Jnconzd-tax, Kera.la v. Indian Chamber
of Conunerce
~
87 ITR 83--Conunissioner
Commerce
c
of !11Con1e-tax
v.
Kochin
Cha111br:r
of
ll975J 40 Taxa1ion (Ill) 15-Coniniissivnrr of lncon1e-tc•x. Kerolc. v
Ernakulanz Cha1nber of Commerce.
As such the Chamber is entitled to exemption under section 11 read with
2(15) of the Income-tax Act.
For the .Respdndent.-
D
1. The Appellant/Chamber of commerce was deriving in::omc by performin~
three .kinds of services namely, providing arbitration facilities, for standard
weights and measurements to traders in general. "This was in furtherance of
its objects clause 2(a); 2(b); 2(c); 2(d); 2(z); 3(h); 3(i); 3(p); 2(q); 3(v)
The performance of such services. for remuneration clearly was an activity fo1
profit and the 5aid activity was ,closely linked with, or involved with the advancen1ent of the aforesaid objects of the Chamber. Such close-linking and involvement, by itself, rendered the object non-charitable within the meaning of 's. 2 ( 15)
of the Income~tax Act, 1961.
E
2. If ·the Chan1ber of Commerce performed the ~ame kind of services for iN
members for remuneration the income so derived \Vas certainly liable to tax
under s. 28(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The position became worse if
the income was so derived by rendering such services to non~member traders
in general.
3. It was assumed by the Tribl1Ilal and by the High Court, for which there
F
wa·s no warrant, that the income from the said three sources was income derived
from property held under trust and the case proC'eeded on such assumption
although the High Court doubted the validity of such an assumption as is
clear from the text of their judgment at pp. 76-77 of the Paper Book. The
High Court. therefore, proceeded to consider only \vhether the production of
the income from the aforesaid three source":J was involved \Vith the advance'-
G
H
ment of any object of general public utili(f. The Tribunal had held that such
income was derived by carrying out the ancillary object of the Trust and not
the main object, although it found as a fact that the income \\'as derived fron1
carrying on an activity for profit. The High Court did not. recognise such u
distinction and it was urged that the High Court \Vas right.
4. No valid reason could be .found for making a distinction between an\
"individual" or any '"association of persons" on the one hand, and tl1e appellant
on the other hand in respect of producing taxable income by carrying on
identical activities for profit. It was beyond any doubt that if an Individual
or an "association of persons" had 1carried on similar activities for profit thev
would not be entitled to any exemption from tax. The appelJant, tbefefore.
could not be placed at a better level, especially when the words of Statute
themselves had debari'ed it from getting the exemption:
Prior to the introduc·
tion of the qualifying clause in •. 2(15) of the Current Act sucli bodies
or
834
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 1 s.c.R.
organisations were undoubtedly enjoying exemption by virtue of the repealed
Indian Income·tax Act, of 1922. The Legislature clearly intended to rerno\'e
this unreasonable distinction by adding the qualifying cla-use as it is found in
s. 2(15) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The effect of such amendment of the
definition was that the in'Stitutions otherwise regarded as charitable tn1sts have
·now been placed at par with any private organisa-tion or individual who wovld
render the same kind of services to the public for profit.
5. Unless the n1en1orandum or articles governing a Trust or any Institution
prohibited the making of profit by carrying on any activity or the earning of the
profits was not ruled out and in fact profit resulted, the Court would assume
that the activity was carried on for profit. In support of this the Revenue's
counsel relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court recently delivered in
the caso· of Sole Trustee Loke Shiksha11a Trust [1976) 1 S.C.R. 471. Thero
was no such prohibition in the regulations governing the activitie'.i of the Indian
Chamber of Commerce and therefore, its case fell squarely within the principles
laid by the Supreme Court in the case of Loke Shiksliana Trust.
6. In order that an activity might be called a business-activity or any other
activity for profit, it was not necessary to show that it was an organised act_ivity
or that it was indulged in with a n1otive of' making profit; it was well estabh9hed
that it was not the motive of a person doing an act which decided whether
the a.::t done by him was carrying on an activity for profl~. If any activity.
business or otherwise, in fact, produced an income, that v,.:a·3 taxable income
and was none-the-less so becau3C it was carried on without the motive of producing an income. Reference was invited in this connection to the observations
of the Suprcme1 Court in the case of P. Krishna Merion v. Co1nn1issioner df
Income-tax. Mysore (35 l.T.R.-p. 48).
7. Even in the case of classical charities, such ·as promotiou of educa.tion
and giving of medical relief, no exemption is available if these two activities of
charitable nature are carried on for purposes of profit. A fdrtiori, the exemp-tion will be denied in the case of advancement of an object of general public
utility, howsoever charitable it n1ay otherwise be regarded in character, if the
advancement involved the carrying on an activity for profit. The intention of
Legislature was fully vindicated in the language employed in s. 2(15) of the
Act.
A
B
c
D
E
-
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2129 of 1970.
From the Judgment and Order dated the 29th May, 1970 of the
Calcutta High Court in Income Tax Reference No. 1 of 1967 and
F
Civil Appeals Nos. 2455-2457 of 1972
Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the
25th February, 1972 of the Kerala High Court in Income Tax Reference Nos. 9, 10 and 11 of 1970.
A. K. Sen, Mrs. Leila Seth, 0. P. Khaitan and B. P. Mahesliwari
for the appellant in C.A. No. 2129 of 1970.
G
G. C. Sharma, B. B, Ahuja and S. P. Nayar for the respondents in
C.A. 2129 of 1970.
J. Ramamurthy and D. N. Gupta for intervener No. I iu C.A. No.
'
2129 of 1970.
A. K. Sen and D. N. Gupta for Intervener No. 2 in C.A. No. 2129
or 1970.
H
INDIAN CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE v. C.I.T. (Krishna Iyer, J.)
~ • A
835
J. Ramamurthi and D. N. Gupta for Intervener No. 3 in C.A. No.
2129 of 1970.
G. C. Shanna, fl. B. Ahuja and S. P. Nayar for the appellants
in
C.As. Nos. 2455-2457 /72.
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
A. K. Sen and D. N. G,upta for respondent in C.As. 4\os. 245557 /72.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KRISHNA.IYER, J. These four appeals raise but one question, turning on the meaning of 'charitable purpose', as defined ins. 2(15) of
the Income Tax Act, 1961 (Act No. XLIII of 1961) (for short, the
Act). They may be disposed of by one common judgment, although
the two High Courts (Calcutta and Kerala) from where the appeals
have come have taken contrary views on the single point in issue.
What are the.words set for earning exemption by a combined appli"
cation of s. 11(1) read withs. 2(15) of the Act? What is the parameter of the legal concept of charitable purpose ? Are the triune
activities, which have yielded income and have been assessed to tax,
eligible for exemption as falling within the scope of s. 2(15) as it
now stands ? These points of law, in the conspectus of facts presented
in the case, have been argued in the light of conflicting decisions of the
High Courts and illumined in part hy a very recent pronouncement of
this Court in Loka Shikshana Trust v. C,l.T., Mysore.( 1 )
The assessees are the Indan Chambers of Commerce and the
Cochin Chambers of Commerce. Their memoranda and articles of
association are substantially similar and so the facts in the first case
alone need be stated and the question of law discussed with reference
to that case only. Hardly any distinction on facts or law which desiderate a separate consideration exists.
The Indian Chamber of Commerce is a company registered under .
s. 26 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913. Its memorandum and
articles of association spell out the broad objects and there is no doubt
that they fall within the sweep of the expression 'the advancement of
any ... object of general public utility' as set down ins. 2(15) of the
Act. Briefly put, they are primarily promotional and protective of
Indian trade interests and other allied service operations. A general
concluding clause authorizes it 'to do all other things as may be conducive to the development of trade, commerce and industries or incidental to attainment of the above objects or any of them'. It is clear
from clauses 4 and 8 of the Memorandum of Association that the
Jl:iembers of the Chamber do not and cannot stand to gain personally
smce no portion of 'income and property of the association' shall be
paid . . . directly ·or indirectly, by way of dividend or bonus or other-.
wise howsoever by way of profit to the persons who at any time are
. . . Members of the Association ... '. Even on the dissolution of the
.~ss~iation the Members cannot claim any share in the assets. These
highlight the fundamental fact t.hat the Chamber, by and large, strives
to advance the general trade mterests of India and Indians without
(I) 119761-ts-:C.R. 411
I
836
SUPREME C9URT REPORTS
(1976] l s.c.R.
seeking to make profits for its Members. In the light of this Court's
decision in C.l.1'. v. Andhra Chamber of Commerce(") one may
readily state that the Chambers advance objects of general public utility
and, prima facie mow into the exclusionary area of charitable puv•
pose. However, the bone of contention in this case is as to whether
the three seurces of income, viz., (a) arbitration fees levied by the
Chamber; (b) fees· collected for the certificates of origin; and (c) share
of profit in M./ s. Calcutta Licensed Measures for issue of certificates
of weighment and measurement fall within the exclusion. It may be
mentioned that all these three services were extended to Members and
non-Members or, rather, to the trade generally. Had the law bearing
on 'charitable purpose' been what it was prior to 1961, the Chamber
would have won, hands down may be. But then there is a significant
change in the definition of 'charitable purpose' by the addition of nine
new words which cut back on the amplitude of the expression in the
prior Act. The straight question to be answered here is whether in
;plain English the three activities which have yielded profits to the
A
B
c
Chamber involve 'the carrying on of any activity for profit', un-
complicated by casuistic niceties, semantic nuances and case-Jaw conflicts. Unfortunately, legislative simplicity has not been accomplished
by the draftsman in the amended definition and, consequently, interpretative complexity persists. The Judges of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court in A. P. State Road Tran~port Corporation v. C.l.T.(")
observed, while considering the import of s. 2(15) of the 1961 Act:
D
"It is one of the fundamental principles in legislation and
the drafting of statutes that the provisions contained therein
should be clear and cogent and, more so, with regard to the
fucal statutes which impose a burden on the public. But,
in this case, what we find is that the amendment, instead of
being clear and cogent, is complicated and courts have taken
different views in interpreting the same."
E
We dare say that achieving greater simplicity and clarity in statute law
will be taken up by the draftsmen of the legislative bills to avoid playing linguistic games in Court and promotion of interpretative litigation.
Lawyers and legislators must stop confusing each other and start
talking to their real audience-th~ people-so that communication
problems may not lead to prolific forensic battles. We must confess to
having been hard put to it to get at the controlling distinction between
activities which fall on one side or the other of 'charitable purpose'.
The assessee the Indian Chamber of Commerce,_ was assessed for
the accounting year 1963-64 on the income which arose from the three
heads of arbitration fees, fees for certificates of origin and the share
of profits in the firm M/s. Calcutta Licensed Measurers which issued
weighment and measurement certificates charging a fee therefor. The
'.return for the assessment year showed a profit of Rs. 1,58,690/madc up of a small amount from arbitration fees, and a similar sum
from fees for issue of certificates of origin but a substantial sum by
way of share of income from the fees charged for weighment and
measurement. Although the Income-tax Officer repelled the claim of
(I) [1965] 55 l.T. R. 722.
(2) [1975] 100 l.T.R. 392, 397.
).-
F
G
H
-
-
INDIA.'! CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE v. C.I.T. (Krishna Iyer, J.)
837
A
'charitable purpose' on the view that these activities were for profit the
Appellate Tribunal took a contrary view reversing the concurrent findings of the Income-tax Officer and the Appellate Assistant Commi&·
sioner. The conclusion of the Tribunal was that s. 2( 15) applied but
the High Court on a reference under s. 256(1) of the Act, answered
the question in favour of the Revenue.
B
We have indicated earlier that the various High Courts have taken
contrary views. Kerala has consistently held on facts substantially
identical that s. 2(15) is attracted. Andhra Pradesh has concurred,
while Calcutta and Mysore have ranged themselves on the opposite
side. A recent dedsion of this Court earlier mentioned has given
some telling guidelines although the precise facet pressed before us
may not be said to have been wholly covered by it.
c
D
E
/
The scheme of the Act may be briefly indicated to the extent it is
relevant, before entering on the discussion. 'Income' is taxable, but
certain incomes shall not be included in the total incomes of the previous years of the person in receipt of the income. Section 11 excludes
from the computation income derived from property held under trust
wholly for charitable purpose. The Chamber of Commerce is a trade
association which renders specific services to its members and therefore s. 28 will ordinarily apply to its income, unless s. 11 read with
s. 2(15) excludes it from taxability. The income drawn from nonmembers by the Chamber will clearly be taxable unless s. 2(15) comes
to its rescue. Thus the pivotal issue is as to whether the three channels
of income may be treated as charitable purposes and therefore eschewed by s. 11 from the charging provision.
At this stage we may read s. 2(15) :
"2( 15) In this
requires,!_
•
F
G
H
Act,
unless
the
context
otherwise
'charitable purpose' includes relief of the poor, education
medical relief, and the advancement of any other object of
general public utility not involving the carrying on of any
activity for profit.'
The obvious change as between the old and the new definitions is the
exclusionary provision introduced in the last few words. The history
which compelled this definitional modification was the abuse to which
the charitable disposition of the statute to charitable purposes was subr
jected by exploiting businessmen. You create a charity, earn exemption from the taxing provision and run big industries virtually enjoying
the profits with a seeming veneer of charity a situation which exsuscitated Parliament and constrained it to engraft a clause deprivatory of
the. exemption if the institution fulfilling charitable _purposes undertook
activities for profit and thus sought to hoodwink the statute. The
Finance Minister's speech in the House explicates the reason fot the
restrictive condition. He stated in the House;(')
(1) Lok Sabha Dabates, Vol. LV!. 1961, p. 3073 (Aug. 18, 196))
838
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 1 s.c.R.
·'·1 he definition of 'charitable purpose' in that clause is
at present so widely worded that it can be taken advantage
of even by commercial concerns which, while ostensibly
serving a public purpose, get fully paid for the benefits
provided by them, namely, the newspaper industry which
while running its concern on conu;nercial Jines can claim that
by circulating newspapers it was improving the general
knowledge of the public. In order to prevent the misuse of
this definition in such cases, the Select Committee felt that
the words 'not involving the carrying on of any activity for
profit' should be added to the definition."
Beg J., in Lok Shikshana Trust (supra) has adverted to this statement
as throwing light on the new provision. The evil sought to be abolished is thus clear. The interpretation of the provision must naturally
fall in line with the advancement of the object. Of course, there are
borderline cases where it becomes difficult to decide at first sight
whether the undertaking which yields profit is a deceptive device or a
bonafide adventure which results in nominal surplus although substantially intended only to advance the charitable object.
Chambers of Co=erce dot this country and, by and large, they
have the same complex of objects. They exist to promote the trading
interests of the commercial community and, after the Andhra Chaniber
of Commerce Case (supra) have been regarded as pursuing charitable
purposes. This expression, defined in s. 2(15), is a term of art and
embraces objects of general public utility. Ilut, under cover of charitable purposes, a crop of camouflaged organisations sprung up. The
mask was charitable, but the heart was hunger for tax free profit. When
Parliament found this dubious growth of charitable chameleons, the
definition in s. 2( 15) was altered to suppress the mischief by qualifying the broad object of 'general public utility' with the additive 'not
involving the carrying on of any activity for profit'. The core of the
dispute before us is whether this intentional addition of a 'cut back'
clause expels the Chamber from the tax exemption zone in respect of
the triune profit-fetching sub-enterprises undertaken by way of service
or facility for the trading community.
The rival constructions put forward by counsel at the bar may now
be noticed. Shri A. K. Sen's argument for the Chamber is that the
controlling distinction between what is 'charitable purpose' and what is
not lies in discovering the dominant intent as distinguished from the
subsidiary consequence, the principal object,, not the incidental inflow,
the profit motive of the operation as against the service-oriented
activity which may or may not en passa1it yield an income. His stress,
a la the Kerala cases, is on whether the activity is wrapped up, entangled and intertwined with the public utility object. If it is, the
resultant surplus is not an exigible income. Such, certainly, are the
passwords and touch-stones used in several Kerala decisions.
If this be the parameter, he argues, the three activities are saved because
A
B
•
c
D
E
F
G
fl
•
IND!AN CHAMUERS OF COMMERCE v. C.l.T.
A
B
c
D
(Krishna Iyer, J.)839
they render service, promote trade and facilitate the wheels of business
to move. They do not form activities for making profit; they are in
fulfilment of the objects of the Chamber.
Shri Sharma for the Revenue reads into the amended definition a
total exclusion from the charmed circle of charitable purposes all
activities which are prone to produce profits. The telling test, acc?rding
to this view, is to see that the means, like the ends, are charitable,
untainted by gainful stimulus and purged of the potential for profit in
reality. By this canon the Chamber's desire to serve businessmen by
offering arbitral or certificate facilities in return for a price is prima facie
an 'activity for profit' unless the circumstances, express or necessanly
implicit eloquently proclaim a 'no profit' foundation for the undertaking. ' The linkage is not between object of public utility anff the
challenged activity, but between the methodology adopted . for the
advancement of such objects and proneness for profit flowmg from
such method or activity. If this standpoint be sound, the three ser,vices which have yielded profits, although wrapped in, entangled or
inter-twined with the object of promoting trade interests, are still liable
to tax, there being no visible limitation on the revenues that may arise
from them and these precise activities could be carried on by private
individuals for profit.
The legal break-through lies along a realistic line of reasoning, taking
care to avoid the extreme position of Shri Sharma which will render
the last limb of s. 2(15) illusory or ineffectual and as serviceable for
tax exemption of charities as the appendix to the hnman physiology. In
our view the key to the problem is furnished not merely by a careful
look at the history of the evil and the Parliamentary debate-at least
the Finance Minister's speech on the new change-but the language of
s. 2(15) itself read in the light of the guidelines in Lok Shikshana
Trust.(supra).
F
•
G
H
Ta~ing a close-up of s. 2(15) with special emphasis on the last
concluding words, we have to interpret .'charitable purpose' in such
manner that we do not burke any word, treat any expression as redundant or miss the accent of the amendatory phrase. So viewed, an institution which carries out charitable purposes out 0£ income 'derived from
property held under trnst wholly for charitable purposes' may still forfeit the claim to exemption in respect of such takings or incomes as
may come to it from pursuing any activity for profit. Notwithstanding
the possibility of obscurity and of dual meanings when the emphasis is
shifted from 'advancement' to 'object' used in s.- 2(15), wc are clear
in our minds that by the new definition the benefit of exclusion from
total income is taken away where in accomplishing a charitable purpose
the institution engages itself in activities for profit. The Calcutta decisions are right in linking activities for profit with advancement of the
obj~t. If you want immunity from taxation, your means of fulfilling
chantable purposes must be unsullied by profit-making ventures. The
advancement of the object of general public utility must not involve
the carryinJ! ?n of any_ activity for profit. If it does, you forfeit. The
Kerala dec1s10ns. fall mto the fallacy of emphasizing the linkage
betweeen the obiects of public utility and the activity carried on.
- /
840
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 1 S.C.R.
According to that view, whatever the activity, if it is intertwined with,
wrapped in or entangled with the object of charitaJ:le l'.UrJJl?SC cv~n
if profit results therefrom, the immunity from taxation JS still. available. This will result in absurd conclusions. Let us take this very
case of a Chamber of Commerce which strives to promote the general
interests of the trading community. If it runs certain special types
of services for the benefit of manufacturers and charges remuneration
from them, it is undoubtedly an activity which, if carried on by private
agencies, would be taxable. Why should the Chamber be granted
exemption for making income by methods which in the hands of other
people would have been exigible to tax ? This would end up in the
conclusion that a Chamber of Commerce may run a printing press,
advertisement business,, market exploration activity or even export promotion busineS> and levy huge sums from its customers whetl1er they
are members of the organisation or not and still claim a blanket exemption from tax on the score that the objects of general public utility
which it has set for itself implied these activities even though profits
or surpluses may arise therefrom. · Therefore, the emphasis is not on
the object of 11ublic utility and the can-ying on of related activity for
profit; On the other hand, if in the advancement of these objects
the Chamber resorts to carrying on of activities for profit, then necessarily s. 2(15) cannot confer cover. The advancement of charitable
objects must not involve profit making activites. That is the mandate
of the new amendment.
The opposite position in its extreme form is equally untenable.
While Shri Sharma is right that merely because service is rendered to
traders escapement from tax liability does not follow. Every type of
service-oriented activity, where some charge is levied from the beneficiary and at the end of the year some surplus is left behind, does not
lose the benefit of s. 2(15). For, then,, one cannot conceive of any
object of general public utility which can be advanced by lhe Chamber
of Commerce. For every such activity some fee will have to be levied
ii the Chamber is not to turn bankrupt and merely because a fee is
l.evied one cannot castigate the activity as one for profit. Therefore it
is a false dilemma to talk of activity .for profit as against activity
rendered free. The true demarcating line lies in between.
A
B
~
•
c
•
....
D
E
...
•
F
.,. •
In our vie\v, the ingredients essential to earn frec<lo1n from tax arc
discernible from the definition, if insightfully read against the brooding
presence of the evil to be suppressed and the beneficial object to
be served. The policy of the statute is to give tax relief for charitable
purpose, but what falls outside the pale of charitable purpose ? The
institution must confine itself to the carrying on of activities which
are not for profit. It is not enough if the object be one of general public
utility. The attainment of that object shall not involve activities for
profit. What then is an activity for profit ? An undertaking by a
business organisation is ordinarily assumed to be for profit unless expressly or by necessary implication or by eloquent surrounding circumstances the making of profit stands loudly negatived. We will illus. trate to illumine. If there is a restrictive provision in the bye-laws of
- \
G
H
INDIAN CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE v. C.I.T. (Krishna Iyer, l.)
A
B
c
D
E
•
F
G
H
841
the charitable organisation which insists that the charges levied: f~r
services of public utility rendered are to be on a 'no profit' basis, 1t
clearly earns the benefit of s. 2(15). For instance, a funeral home,
an S.P.C.A. or a cooperative may render services to the public but
write a condition into its. constitution that it shall not charge more
than is actually needed for the rendering of the s~rvices,--:-1:11ay b~ it
may not be an exact equivalent, such mathematcrnl prec1s10n bemg
impossible in the case of variables,-may be a little surplus is left
over at the end of the year-the broad inhibition against making profit
is a good guarantee that the carrying on of the activity is not for pr~
fit. As an antithesis, take a funeral home or an animal welfare orgamsation or a super bazar run for general public utility by an institution
which charges large sums and makes huge profits. Indubitably they
render services of general public utility. Their objects are charitable
but their activities are for profit. Take the case of a blood bank which
collects blood on payment and supplies blood for a higher price thereby
making profit. Undoubtedly the blood bank may be said to be a
general public utility but if it advances its public utility by sale of
blood as an activity for (making) profit. it is difficult to call its purposes
charitable. It is just blood business !
In the United States, for instance, there arc many funeral homes
which make considerable profits. There are super bazars and animal
welfare institutions in many countries which may be run on a profit
motive. Inevitably these activites are caught in the meshes of the tax
law. Readymade nostrums like 'dominant intent',, 'incidental profits',
'real object' as against 'ostensible purpose', 'entangled',, 'wrapped .in,'.
'inter-twined' and the like fail as criteria in critical cases, although they
have been liberally used in judicial vocabulary. In this branch of law
verbal labels are convenient but not infallible.. We have to be careful
not to be victimised by adjectives and appellations which mislead, if
pressed too far, although they _may loosely serve in the ordinary run
of cases.
To sum up, s. 2(15) excludes from exemption the carrying on of
activities for profit even if they are linked. with the objectives of general
public utility, because the statute interdicts, for pur,poses of tax relief,
the advancement of such objects by involvement iu the carrying on
of activities for profit. We appreciate the involved language we use,
but when legislative draftsmanship declines to be simple, interpretative
complexity becomes a judicial necessity.
Lok Shikshana Trust (supra) is the latest-perhaps the only case·
of this Court-dealing directly withs. 2(15) of the Act. Khanna J.,.
speaking on behalf of himself and Gupta J., observed :
"As a result of the addition of the words 'not involving
the carrying on of any activity for profit' at the end of the
definition in section 2(15) of the Act even if the purpose
of the trust is 'advancement of any other object of general
public utility', it would not be considered to be 'charitable
purpose' unless it is shown that the above purpose does not
involve the carrying on of any activity .for profit. The result
842
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
( 197 6) 1 S.C.R.
thus of the change in the definition is that in order to bring
a case within the fourth category of charitable purpose, it
would be necessary to show that (I) the purpose of the
trust is the advancement of any other object of general public
utility, and (2) the above purpose docs not involve the
carrying on of any activity for profit. Both the above conditions must be fulfilled before the purpose of the trust can
be held to be charitable purpose."
A
B
*
"lt is true that there arc so1nc business activities like
mutual insurance and cooperative stores of which profit making 1s not an essential: ingredient, but that is so because of a
self imposed and innate restriction on making profit in the
carrying on of that particular type of business. Ordinarily
profit motive is a normal incidence of business activity and
.if the activity of a trust consists of carrying on of a lmsines.v
and there are no restrictions on its 1naking profit, the court
would be well justified in assuming in the absence of some
indicatio11 to the contrary that the object of the trust i11vo/ves
the carryinR on of an activity for profit.';
•
...
c
D
(emphasis, ours)
*
*
"By the use of the expression 'profit motive· it is not
intended that profit must in fact be earned. Nor docs the
expression cover a mere desire to make some monetary gain
uut of a transaction or even a series of transactions. It predicates a motive which pervades the whole series of transactions effected by the person in the course of his activity."
*
•
•
E
•
"We are not impressed by the submission of the learned
counsel for the appellant that profit under section 2 (I 5 J of
the Act means private profit. The word used in the definition
given in the above provision is profit and not private profit
and it would not be permissible to read in the above definition
the word 'private' as qualifying profit even though such word
•
F
is not there."
Beg J., spoke on the subject with different accent but drew pointed
attention to one aspect :
"The deed puts no condition upon the conduct of the
newspaper and publishing business from which we ca,uld
infer that it w_as to be on 'no profit and no loss' basis. I
mention this as learned counsel for the appellant repeatedly
asserted that this was the really basic purpose and principle
for the conduct of the business of the trust before us. This
assertion seems to be based on nothing more substantial than
1hat the trust deed itself does not expressly make profit
G
H
•
INDIAN CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE v. C.I.T. (Krishna Iyer, J.) 843
making the object of the trust. But, as I have already indicated, the absence of such a condition from the trust deed
would not determine its true character. That character is
' determined for more certainly and convincingly by the absence
of terni' which could eliminate or prevent profit making from
becoming the real or dominant purpose of the trust. ft is
what the provisio11s of the trust make possible or permit
coupled with what had been actually do11e without any
illegality in the way of profit nwking, in the case before us,
under the cover of the provisions of the deed, whic/1 enable
us to decipher the meaning and determine the predomi11a11tly
profit maki11g character of the trust."
A
B
(emphasis, ours)
c
..
We do not think it necessary to discuss the various decisions· of. the
High Courts cited before us nor need we seek light from the English
Cases either. After all, Indian law must bear Indian impress derived
from Indian life.
D
In All India Spinners' Association v. Commr. of Income-tax,
Bombay,( 1 ) Lord Wright, speaking for the Judicial Committee, and
considering the subject of 'charitable purposes' as justifying exemption
from Income-tax, observed :
"It is now recpgnised that the Indian Act must be con..
strued on its actual words and is not to be governed by
English decisions on the topic."
E
F
*
*
G
*
*
*
*
"The lndian Act gives a clear and succinct definition
which must be construed according to its actual language and
meaning. English decisions have no bindin~ authority on its
construction and though they may sometimes afford help or
guidance, cannot relieve the Indian Courts from their responsibility of applying the language of the Act to the particular
circumstances that emerge under conditions of Indian life."
*
*
*
*
Crypto-<.:o]onial inclinations have sometimes induced Indian draftsmen
and jurists to draw inspiration from' English law but, for reasons felicitously expressed by Lord Wright, we arc adopting interpretation of
s. 2(15) according to the language used there and against the background of Indian life.
Coming to the facts of the present case, the criteria we have evolved have to be applied .
..
11
Among the Kerala Cases which went on the wrong test we wish to
mention one,, Dharmodayam. ( 2 ). The assessee company was conducting a profitable business of running chit funds and its memorandum
(l) [1944] 12 I. T. R. 482, 486.
(2) C. l. T. v. Dbarmodayam Co.-[1974] 941. T. R. 113.
L
844
SUPREME COURT- REPORTS
. [1976) 1 s.c.R.
.of association had as one of its objects 'to do the ncedfuUor the pro.motion of charity, education and i1ulustry. The court found it possible
on these facts to.grant the benefit of s. 2(15) by a recondite reasoning.
If this ratio were to hold good busin·~ssmen have a highroad to tax
..'.lVoidance. Dharmodayam (supra) shows how dangerous the conscquence .can be ]f the provisions we.re misconstrued.
The true test is to ask for answers to the following questions : (a)
lo tho object of the assessee one of general public utility? (b) Docs
.the advancement of the object involve activities bringing in moneys ?
(c) If so, are'such activities undertaken (i} for profit or (ii) without
profit? Even if (a) and (b) are answered afftrmativcly, if (cl (i} is
answered affirmatively, the claim for exemption collapses. The solution
to the. problem of an activity being one for or irrespective of pro!it is
gathered on a footing of facts. What is the real nature of the activity?
One which is ordinarily carried on by ordinary people for gam ? Is
there a built-in prescription in the constitution against makii1g a profit?
Has there been in practice, profit from this venture ? Although this
last is a weak test. The mere fact that a service is rendered is no
..answer to chargeability because all income is often derived by rendfring some service or other.
·
A
'I
,..
c
•
•
D
Further, what is an activity for profit depends on the correct con.notation of the preposition. 'For' used with the active participle of a
·verb means 'for the purpose of' (Sec judgment of Westbury C., 1127)
'For' has many shades of meaning. It connotes the end with reference
E
to which anything is done. It also bears the sense of 'appropriate'
·or 'adopted to' : 'suitable to purposc'-vide Black's Legal Dictionary. ·
An activity which yields a profit or gain in the ordinary course must
be presumed to have been done for profit or gain. Of course, an
-extreme case could be imagined where without intent or purpose an
activity may yield profit. Even so, it may legitimately be said that the
oactivity is 'appropriate or adapted to such profit'.
F
We may wind up with a brief rounding off and indication on the
oapproach. A pragmatic condition, written or un-written, proved by
a prescription of profits or by Jong years of invariable practice or spelt
from strong surrounding circumstances indicative of anti-profit motivatjon-such a condition will qualify for 'charitable purposes' and legiti·matcly get ronllii the fiscal hook. Short of it, the tax tackle holds you
fast. A word about the burden of proof is necessary here. Income,
·ordinarily chargeable, can be free from exigibility only if the assessee
discharges the onus of bringing himself within s. 2(15). In so doin".
he ,has to attrac~ and. ~epcl-::-attract the condition that his objects a;c
•·Of general public utility' and repel the charge that he is advancin"
·these objects by involvement in actiVities for profit. Once this broad
·dual basis is made out, the Revenue will not go into meticulous ma the-matics and charge every chance excess or random surplus.c If the
:activity is prone to yielding income and~~ fact results in profits, the
•.
B
...
. ~
G
t
..
H
IN!lJAI< CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE v., C.I.T.
A
•
(Knshnn Iyer, J.)845
Revenue will examine the reality or pretence of the condition, that the
activity is not for profit. Here, one may- well say: 'Suit the action to
the word, the word to the action'.
If such be the legal criteria for fixing charitable purpose, how does
the Indian Chamber fare ? The substantial item of income comes from
the share of profits in the firm called M/s. Calcutta Licensed Measu]l
rers. True, the issuance of wcighment and measurement certificates
is a great facility for traders and under the Commercial Documents
Eviden.· ~ Act only recognised institutions are permitted to issue such
certificales. Recognition be speaks the status, integrity and efficiency
of the institution but doei not transmute a service for profit into nonprofitable activity. 1t is irrelevant whether this service is in implementation of or interwoven with trade promotion. What is partinent is
c whether the advancement of trade promotion by issuing such certificates is done for a nominal fee conditioned by the cost of the operation, and profit-making by this !)leans is tabooccl. For there is nothing
in the memorandum or articles of association which sets any limil on
making a large profit this way. And, after all, any institution or individual may set up a weighment and measurement business as a source
of income and if it is of sufficient probity and competence recognition
D ·may well be accorded under the Commercial Documents Evidence Act.
We cannot mix up or confuse the two concepts. The activity of charging fees and issuing certificates of origin, valuable as a service though
it be,. is in no different position. Both these activities are amenable to
tax as being carried on for profit, there being nothing to show that the
Chamber was undertaking this job on a 'no profit' basis. The presumption, if at all, is that a businessman's association ddes a business of it,
E more so when the facility is available to members and non-members.
Not infrequently one comes across weighment stations where loaded
trucks are weighed for payment as a business. So also approved
valuers value property as business and charge for that service.
Merely because it is carried on by a Chamber of Commerce no difference in incidents arises and tax incidence can be repelled only if the
work is done explicitly on a 'no profit' basis. Such is not shown to be
F the case here.
·
G
H.
The ob_jects of the Chamber include settlement of disputes among
traders by arbitration. This is undoubtedly a service of general public
utility-preventing protracted commercial litigation. If the fee charged
for doing so is more or less commensurate with the expense the Chamber bas to incur, a minor surplus will not attract tax. But no such
restriction is written into the rules governing the Chamber. It may
charge a heavy sum and spend much less for hiring experts to decide
the dispute. There is no magna carta binding the Indian or Cochin or
Bengal Chamber of Commerce not to sell arbitral justice. Suppose a
specialist in mercantile law and practice of reputable integrity offers
himself regularly for arbitration of commercial disputes for a high fee,
is be not making an income? The difference between the two is a~
between Tweedledum and Tweedledee. Surely, if an innate articu-·
lated, restraint on the levy for these undoubted services to Trade
existed as a fact; so as to remove the slur of activity for profit tl1en
the umbrella of charitable purpose would protect small surplus~s.
846
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 1 s.c.R.
We hold that the incomes of the Chambers sought to be taxed are
taxable. Civil Appeal No. 2129 of 1970 is dismissed and Civil Appeals
Nos. 2455 to 2457 of 1972 are allowed. Parties will bear their respective costs.
Before parting with the case wc may as well make it clear that our
conclusion would have been the same even without reference to or
reliance on the speech of the Finance Minister we have excerpted
earlier.
·
A
R
..
V.P.S.
A[lpea/s f!CTr//r allowed.
.. ..
Report an error or ask for masking: grievance@lawgrids.org