GURUCHARAN SINGH versus KAMLA SINGH & ORS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 9 September 1975 | [1976] 1 S.C.R. 739 | 1975 INSC 206
Key facts
- Decided
- 9 September 1975
- Bench
- V.R. KRISHNA IYER*, A.C. GUPTA, S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 716/1968
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1976] 1 S.C.R. 739
- Neutral citation
- 1975 INSC 206
Text of the judgment
739
A
GURUCHARAN SINGH
v.
KAMLA SINGH & ORS.
September 9, 197 5.
[V. R. KRISHNA IYER, A. C. GUPTA ANDS. MURTAZA FAzAL ALI, JJ.]
B
BUiar Land Reforms. Act, 19501 Sections 2K, 3, 4 and 6 and rule 7-Il of the
Rules-Khas possession-Right to possess, if aniounts to possession in law.
Section 3 of the Bihar Land Reforms. Act, 1950, transfers all interests in
estates or tenures of a proprietor or t:'!nure-holder to the State as flrom a date
notified under section 4. Section 6 carves out of this land mass .and leaves
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untouched, apait from raiyati holdings the bakasht lands in Khas possession
of the 'intermediary' i.e., the prior full owner.
Several items of property were gifted by one Ram Badan Singh to bis_ two
wives whose names were duly mutated in the revenue register. By further
gift deeds and transfers the lands covered by the original gift deeds came to
vest Ln the plaintiff and defendants, second party. They divided then1 as per a
partition deed Exhibit 4/a dated October 30, 1952 whereby the suit lands fell·
to the exc1usive share of the plaintiff along with some other' items while other
properties were similarly allotted to defendants 2nd party. Despite this fact
defendants, second party, sold the suit lands to the defendants first party alleging· an oral partition sometime before August 1952 and under l:'OVer of that
case. committed trespass. Thereupon, a scramble for possession of these prcr
perti:es and a proceeding under s. 145 Cr. P.C. ensued in which the defendants.
first party, got their possession upheld by Magistrate"s order dated 5-4-1954.
The plaintiff brought the present suit in April 1955 for a declaration of his
title, for possession and mesne profits on the score that his exclusive pos9ession
was by force taken away in July-August 1954 by defendants first party.
The
latte.r put forward the plea of prior oral partition and exclusive hostile· posse&s.ion, tracing their claim through dtfendants-'>econd party. The courts of fact
found against the defendants and decreed the suit, but in Letters Patent Appeal,
the respondents. i.e., the defendants 1st party s.ucceed-ed on the ground that the
plaintiff had! lost his title on account of the operation of' sections 3 ·and 4 of the
Bihar Land Reforms Act. 1950.
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In this appeal filed on the basis of the special leaw granted by this Court,
it was contended for the appellant that (i \ Section· 6 of the Act applied to
the facts of the case and so there wasi no vesting of title in the Stat~ of the
suit lands; (ii) This case, resting- on the Act, which had been on the statute
book for several' years, had not been set up at the, earlier ·stages of the litigation at and should not have been permitted at the Letters Patent Appeal stage
in the High c·oun for the first time; and (iii) The deed Of partition was not
legally divestative of rights in view of the provisions of the Estates Partition
Act, 1897, which empowered the Collector along to partition the preperties,
which not having been done, the lands remained in co-ownership wherefore the
possession of the defendants first party, was that of co-sharers. If that were so.
the possesslon of one co.sharer was constructive possessioill of the other CO"'\Sharer
and the plaintiff was thus 'in khaS possoosion under s. 2k of the Act and, on that
basis, s. 6 of the Act saved the disputed properties from· vesting in the State.
Rejecting the contentions exC'ept to, a small extent of modifying the decree,
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HELD : (i) It is well settled that a pure question of law going to the root
of the ca"'e and based- on undisputed· or proven facts could be raised even
before the Court of last resort, provided the opp06iie side was not taken by
surprise or otherwise unfairly prejudiced [745·E·FJ
Connecticut Fire Insurance Company v. Kavanach. [1892) A.C.
r~ferred to.
473.
480.
740
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[J 976] 1 S.C.R.
In the present case, the new plea springs from the common case of the
parties and nothing which may work injustice by allowance of this contention
has been made out. [746--A]
(ii) The Magistrate did not direct possession of the B-Schedule properties
to be handed over to the defendants, first party, but declared their actual
possession. He has done no wrong nor conferred any unjust advantage. There
is no principle on which it could be held that these circumstances deprive a
party of the benefit of his possession and or the dispossession of the plaintiff
flowing from sr.6 of the Act.
[746D-E]
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(iii) Neither the provisions of section 6(1) nor those of section 3.5 contain any prohibition against the civil court's power to decide the issue of title
and right to. possession of the plaintiff and. as a necessary corollary,. the claim
of actual possession set up by the defendants, first party. Nor can section
6(2) inferentially interdict the plenary power of the civil court.
[746.A-B]
(iv) The partition is valid, it divests title. it binds all; but, so far as land
revenue liability is co·ncemcd, it relieves parties from the burden falling on
the other sharer's land only if the exercise pres·cribed in the F..states Partition
Act is gone through. The statute 'is a protective fiscal armour, not a monorail for division among co-owners to travel. Section 7 makes it clear. Not
that Courts have lost power to decree partition nor that co-owners have become
powerless to separate their sh.ares voluntarily but that land revenue shall not
be prejudiced without the prl'Cedure under that Act being gone through. More
clinching is the fact that the plaintiff has .here come. to Court on the sole case
of partition by metes and bounds and has founded his relief not as co-sharer
but as exclusive owner. [747-G-H, 748 Al
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Mahanth Rarn Bhushan Das v. Ranirati Kuer, 1965 Bihar L.J. 119, refrred
to.
(v) The purpose and purport of section 6(1) is to allow the large land
holders to keep possession of' small areas which may be designated. as the priw
vate or priv:ileged or mortgaged lands traditionally held directly and occasionally
made-over to others, often servants or others, in the shape of lea5>es or mortgages. It is obvious that section 6(1) uses the word 'including' to permit enlargement of the meaning of khas possession for the limited purpose of that
section, emphasising thereby that, but for such enlargement, the expression
klzas possession excludes lands outstanding even with temporary lessees. It
is perfectly plain, therefore, that khas possession has been used in the restricted
sense of actual possession and to the small extent it had to be en1arged for
giving relief to proprietors in respect of 'private', 'privileged' and mortgaged
lands, inclusive expressions had to be employed. Khas possession is ,actual
possessi'on. Constructive possession or possession in law is what is covered
by sub-clauses of section 6(1). It ·is not correct to say that posse&Sion is so
wide as to include a mere right to possess. wheri the actual dominion over the
property is held by one in hostility to the former. [751-AB, G-H, 752-C-E.]
(vi) In Anglo-American jurisprudence also possession is actual possession
and in a .limited set of cases, may -include constructive: possession, but when
there is a bare right to possess bereft of any dominion or factum of control, it
will be a strange legal travesty to assert that an owner is in possession merely
bacuse he has a right to possess when a rival, in the teeth of owner's opposi·
tion, is actually holding dominion and control over the land adversely, openly
and continuously. This Court has rejected the theory that the possession of
a tre.spasser was that of the o\.vner. [752 H, 753A, 754-D.]
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Surajnath Ahir v. Prithinath Singh, [1963] 3 S.C.R. 290, Rav1~ Ran Bijai Siflgh
& Ors. v. Behari Singh @ Bar::andha Singll [1964] 3 S.C.R. 363 relied on.
Brij Nandan .Singh v. Jamuno Prasad, A.LR. 1958 Pat. 589, referred to.
(vii) It is undeniable that the plaintiff had title to the entire B Schedule
properties as against defendants. first party, and second party. If defendants,
first party, were not in possession, the plaintiff· would still be entitled to a dec:ree
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GURCHARAN SINGH v. KAMLA SINGH (Krishna Iyer,!.)
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for possession of the same.
If neither is in possession, the presumption that
the owner is in possession holds good and he_ is entitled' to that possession being
restored to him. Therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for possession
regarding the items of property covered by paragraph, 27 of the written statement
filed on behalf of the contesting defendants, first party. The rights of the State,
as against the plaintiff in regard these items of propert.y, will not in any manner
be effected. [754H. 755-A-B]
Observatidn : Prima fade section 4 (f) and (g) of the Act and rule 7-H
of the Rules framed under the Act attract the jurisdiction ot the State and its
4
re~nue authorities.
In the present case, the defendants. first party, are rank
trespassers and have n() equity in their favour. Section 4(f) declares that the
Collectors shall be deemed to have taken charge of the estates and interests vested
in the State. This means he has a public. duty to take charge of )ands vested
in the State. Surely, a responsible public officer like the Collector, charged wi!h
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a duty of taking delivery of possessfon of lands which by virtue of the vesting
the State is entitJed to take direct possession, will proceed to disposses the
trespas.ser. In this case, defendants, first party. are trespassers and the plaintiff bi:ing out of the pale of section 6, the State is entitled to the direct posses-
sion of the suit lands.
[756B, 755\J]).E]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 716 of 1968.
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Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the
2nd March, 1967 of the Patna High Court in Letters Patent Appeal
No. 5 of 1962.
S. C. Mishra and U. P. Singh for the appellant.
S. N. Prasad, A. K. Srivastava, M. s. Narasimhan and B. P. Singh
for the respondents.
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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KRISHNA IYER, J.-TI1is appeal, by special leave, turns substantially on the application of section 6 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act,
1950 (hereinafter called, the Act), to the case situation the facts
having been decided concurrently a:nd finally in favour of the appellant. Still he lost at the stage of the Letters Patent Appeal, because
a Division Bench of the High Court held that he had been robbed of
his right to sue by Section 6 of the Act.
We may set out the relevant facts briefly. Although a number of
items of immovable property were involved in the suit, which was for
ejectment on title, the lands now in dispute are bakasht lands in the
'B' Schedule to the plaint, for easy reference called suit lands. Regarding the rest the plaintiff's suit has been decreed. Several items of
property were gifted by one Ram Badan Singh to his two wives whose
names were duly mutated in the revenue register. The further course
of the proprietary history takes us to the creation of a wakf and the
office of mutawalli which are not relevant flo the controversy before us
but are interesting when we remember that the donees were Hindus
and yet they had executed a wakf and constituted themselves as mutawallis. This shows how community iife absorbs and blends jural concepts, overriding-religion in the creation of an inter-laced legal culture.
This is by the way.
742
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] [ S.C.R.
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We may now take up the thread at the point where by further gift
deeds and transfers the lands covered by the original gift deeds came
to vest in the plaintiff and defendants, second party. They divided
them as per a partition deed E~bit 4/a dated October 30, 1952
whereby the suit lands fell to the exclusive share of the plaintiff, along
with some other items while other properties were sintilarly allotted
to defendants 2nd party. Undaunted by this fact defendants, second ti
party, sold the suit lands to the defendants first ,party allegin& an
oral partition sometime before August 1952 and under cover of that
case, committed trespass. Thereupon, a scramble for possession
of these properties and a proceeding under s. 145 Cr.P.C. ensued in
which the defendants, first party, got their possession upheld by the
Magistrate's prder dated 5.4.1954. Inevitably, the plaintiff brought
the present suit in April 1955 for a declaration of his title, ~r posses- c
sion and mesne profits on the score that his exclusive possession was
by force taken away in July-August 1954 by defendants, first party.
The latter put forward the plea of prior oral partition and exclusive
hostile possession, tracing their claim through defendants-s,econd party.
The courts of fact found against the defendants and decreed the suit
as prayed for, but in Letters Patemt Appeal, the ,present contestingrespondents, i.e., the defendants 1st party, urged with success that I>
the plaintiff had lost his title thanks to the operation of ss. 3 and 4
of the Act and could not salvage any interest under s. 6 thereof. The
defeated plaintiff has come up to this. Court, as appellant, assailing
the findings of the High Court mainly on three grounds : According
to Shri S. C. Misra, learned counsel for the appellant, s. 6 of the
Act applied to his case and so there was no vesting of title in the State
of the suit lands. He further pressed that, any way, this case, resting E
on the Act, which had been on the statute book for several years,
had not been set up at the earlier stages of the litigation and should
not have been permitted at .the Letters Patent Appeal stage in the
High Court for the first time. His third contention was that the
deed of partition Exhibit 4/a was not legally divestative of rights in
view of the provisions of the Estates Partition Act, 1897 which, in
his submission, empowered the Collector alone to_ partition the pro- F
perties, which not having been done, the lands remained in co-ownership wherefore the possession of the defendants, first party, was that
of co-sharers. If that were so, the possession of one co-sharer was
constructive possession of the other co-sharer and the plaintiff was
thus in khas possession under s. 2k of the Act and, on that basis, s. 6
of the Act saved the disputed properties from vesting in the State. All
these three-fold contentions were sought to be repelled by counsel for G
the respondent and we proceed to examine them.
We may as well mention here, but dilate on it later, that certain
items out of the B-Schedule bakasht lands are, on the showing of
defendants second party, not in their possession, although the plaintiff has averred,. in his pleading, dispossession of all the B-Schedule
lands. The legal impact of this circumstance on s. 4(a) and the H
schemes of the Act has to be gauged, in the context of the relief
claimed by the plaintiff and the eligibility of possessory benefits of
the contesting defendants.
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GURCHARAN SINGH
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The central issue obviously is the resolution of the competition
between vesting of the suit lands in the State by virtue of ss. 3 and 4
a11d their exemption from such deprivation by the saving provision in
s. 6 in favour of the plaintiff.
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v .. KAMLA SINGH (Krishna Iyer, J.)
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A close-up of the profile of the land reform law would help us
appreciate the purpose and pllOgramme of the statute and the meaning
of the provision under construction. The project, as highlighted in
the Preamble in grnndiose and in keeping with Part IV of the Constitution, but in actual implementat\ton drags its feet. Indeed. counsel
011 both sides were readily agreed only on one point, viz., that neither
this Act nor the law setting a ceiling on land ownership slumbering
on the statute book since 1962, has been seriously enforced. The Ninth
Schedule to the Oonstitution can immunise a legislation from forensic
challenge but what schedule can invigorate a half-inert Administration
into quick implementation of welfare-oriented, urgently needed, radical
legislation now lying mummified in the books? If the assertion of
non-implementation of land reforms laws made at the bar were true,
the Bihar State Government has much to answer for to 'We, the People
of India' and to the stultified legislature whose 'reform' exercise remains in suspended amimation. In this very case, before the High
Court, the Advocate General has appeared for the plaintiff-landowner
and yet the State has nq> bestirred itself to appear and claim the suit
lands. We are left in obscurity on the vital point, neither counsel
nor the records throwing any light on whether the State has been given
notice in the case in the High Court. The social transformation
cherished by the Constitution involved re-ordering of the land system
and a vigilant administration would have intervened in this 20-year-old
litigation long ago and extinguished the private contest to the advantage
of the State. The feudal will may, not unoften, furtively hide, in
strategic positions may be.
We may begin consideration of the merits of the rival cases by a
broad projection of the Act. Its basic object is to extinguish the
proprietary rights and transfer absolutely, and free from all private
interests, such ownership to the State. The tillers are riot to be uprooted and so, they i.e., the raiyats and under-raiyats are to be settled
on terms of fair rent. The Act, mak:iing a simplistic dischotomy sufficient for our study, thus absolutely vests in the State all lands, freed
from all private rights (sec. 3) as from a date notified under}. 4, but
carves out of this land mass and leaves untouched, apart from taiyati
holdings, the bakasht lands in the khas possession of the 'intermediary'
i.e., the prior full owner (sec. 6). Lands not falling within the saved
category will be directly managed by the State (sec. 13), if need be,
by ejecting trespassers if they are found in illegal occupation [sec. 4(g) ].
'The valuable rights attached to or imbedded in lands, like trees, fisbe. ries, minerals also go to the State. A seemingly bold legislation strokeof substantial land nationalisation will be reduced to pathetic futility
if the flood-gates of evasion are kept aiar by plausible but diluted interpretation of s. 6 as urged by the landlords. The Court must suppress
the mischief and advance the remedy. Indeed, if we may anticipate
our conclusion, the pronouncements of this Court in Surajnath Ahir vc.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
744
[1976] 1 S.C.R.
Prithinath Singh(1) and Ram Ran Bijai Singh & Ors. v. Behari Singh
@ Bagandha Singh,(') bar and bolt the door of escape in a big way
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and counsel for the appellant has striven to impress on us the need
to reconsider and distinguish that view because it is inconsistent with
vintage jurisprudence and Ang\0-American concepts bearing on possession of an owner.
Let us get down to an openheart surgery in a limited way to check
upon the soundness of this cardinal submission. The consternation
expressed by appellant's counsel that the High Court's interpretation
of sec. 6 will create rights in rank trespassers and distort and defeat
the right to possess enjoyed by Zamindars does not, by itself, disturb
us. We are in a juridical province of agrarian reform. The creative
legal ideas needed to effectuate this developmental plan are conceptually
alien to the old land law and 'rural' jurisprudence, wearing as they
do a radical contenamce. The Court, in the process of construction,
must help the chariot of land reform move forward and sections 3 and
·6 are the vital wheels.
Having regard to the significance of the State's presence even in
private litigation bearing on eviction and the like, s. 4( ee) provides
for notice to the State in certain classes of cases but the uresent suit
and later proceedings are not covered by the tenn of s.-4 (ee) and
counsel on either side, when we enq)!ired, did not show interest in
taking steps to implead the State or otherwise to give notice to it in
the present appeal. We have to leave it at that. The consequence
of non-impleader or absence of notice to the State will naturally be
visited on the parties, in the sense that the State will not be bound
by this adjudication and its rights vis-a-vis the plaintiff and the defendants, first party will remain unaffected. So also of other third parties
on the suit lands.
We have already adverted to the skeletal scheme of the Act, of
vesting the lands in the State and saving in the hands of proprietors
such lands as are in their khas possession, including certain categories
spelt out in s.6 by settling them on fair rents under the State. So, the
crucial concept of khas possession calls for judicial scrutiny rather
closely so that loopholes for escape .through the meshes of s.6 mav
not frustrate the land reform law itself. But what is legitimately due
by way of legislative ju_s_tke to erstwhile proprietors should not be
denied. With this and in vieW, the Legislature has definoo khru
possession in s.2k which reads thus :
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"2. Definitions-In this Act, unless there is anything
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(k) 'khas possession' used with reference to the
possession of a proprietor or tenure-holder of anv land used
for agricultural or horticultural purposes means the
pos.session of such proprietor or tenure-holder by cultivating
(1) (19631 3 S.C.R. 290.
(2) (1964] 3 S.C.R. 363.
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GURUCHARAN SINGH
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v. KAML,<\ SINGH (Krishna Iyer, J.)
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such land or carrying on horticultural operations thereon
· himself with his own stock or by his own servants or by
hired labour or with hired stock;
Explanation :-"Land used for horticultural purposes"
means lands used for the purpose of growing fruits,
flowers or ve&etables."
B He who runs and read w.il! readily make out that what is meant is
actual possession with one's feet on the land, plough in the field and
hands in the soil, although hired labour is also contemplated. The
emphatic point is. that possession is actual possession and admits of
no dilutioo except to the extent s.6 itself, by an inclusive process,
permits. This basic idea banishes the i~portation of the right to
possess as tantamount to kha.s possession. It would be a perversion
c of definition to equate the two. Of course, Shri S. C. Misra,
appearing for the appellant, has pressed before us that jurisprudentially even the. right to possess should be regarded as possession.
Inl::leed, this Court has had occasion to consider and construe the
relevant provision in Surajnath Ahir and Ram Ran Bijai Singh (supra)
and our task is largely to explain and adopt.
Before we examine this _9uintessentfal aspect presented before us
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witi1 complex scholarship by Shri S. C. Misra we had better make
short shrift of certain other questions raised by him. He has desired
us, by way of preliminary objection, not to give quarter to the plea,
founded on s. 6 of the Act, to non-sui~ his cli·ent, since it was a point
raised de """'' at Letters Patent stage. The High Court gave thouJ);ht
to this objection but overruled it, if we may say so, rightly. The
E Court narrated the twists and turns of factual and legal circumstance>
which served to extenuate the omission to urge the point earlier but
hit the nail on the head when it held that it was well-settled that
a pure question of law going to the root of the case and based on
undisputed or proven facts could be raised even before the Court
of last resort, provided the opposite side was not taken by surprise
or otherwise unfairly prejudiced. Lord Watson, in Connecticut
F Fire Insurance Company v. Kavanach,(1) stated the law thus :
"When a Question of law is raised for the first time in
a Court of last resort upon the construction of a document
or upan facts either- admitted or proved beyond controversy, it is not only competent but expedie.nt in the inter.est
of justice to entertain the plea. The expediency of adoptmg
that course may be doubted when the pica cannot .be disG
posed of without deciding nice questions o~ fact m ~on
sidering which the Court of ultimate review JS placed m a
much less advantageous position than the courts below.
But their Lordships have no hesitation in holding that the
course ought not in any case to be followed. unless the
Court is satisfied that the evidence upon which they ac:e
asked to decide establishes beyond doubt that the f~cts if
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fully investigated would have supported the new plea.
(1) [1892] A. c. 473, 480.
t7-L925SupC1ns
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SUPREME .COURT REPORTS
[1976) J S.C.R.
We agree with the High Court that the new pica springs from the
common case of the parties and nothing which may work injustice
by allowance of this contention at the late stage of the Letters Patent
Appeal has been made ciut to our satisfaction. Therefore, we proceed
to consider the impact and applicability of s.6 of the Act to the
circumstances of the present case.
Counsel for the appellant, in his turn, in this Comt went a step
further to p_ise two new. points not urged in the prior stage of the
litigation. We have heard him but are not persuaded to agree with
him. According to him, the defendants, first party, had stated in
their written statement that their possession of the disputed items
was base\l on the order of the Magistrate under s.145 Cr. P.C. That
order having been found erroneous, no benefit <:ould accrue to the
defendan!S. So stated, it is a little obscure and indeed the point
itself is obscure. There was a proceeding under s.145 Cr. P.C. before
the criminal court in view of the dispute regarding the claims '.o actual
possession. In the order of the Magistrate, the oral partition relied
on bv the defendants was held proved an\.l the subsequent deed of
partition relied on by the plaintiff held not been acted upon. Counsel
says that this led to the occupation by trespass of the suit properties.
Since the Magistrate's order had led to· !his prejudicial consequence,
it was not proper to permit the party to benefit by his own wron~
founded on an 'actus curiae'. We sec no force at all in this cont-ontion.
The Magistrate did not direct possession of the B-Schedule properties
to be handed over to the defendants. first party, but declared their
actual possession. He has done no wrong nor conferred any unjust
advantage. There is no principle on which it could be held that
these circumstances deprive a party of the benefit of his possession
and of the dispossession of the plaintiff flowing from s.6 of the Act;
if any rights accrueU from a statutory provision, it could not b'
withheld for the reasons urged by counsel for the appollant.
The next new discovery in this Court turns on the absence of
jurisdiction of the civil court to give relief when the substance of
the matter falls within the spec'al jurisdiction of the I revenue authorities. Counsel submitted that this new point occurred to him on
reflection and was being pressed by him because it had force. The
plaintiff's prayer for declaration of title and for possession was
negatived by the High Court in the light of s.6 of the Act wherein
it was held that. be had no khas possession and his interests could
not in any manner be save\i by that provision. lt was not a case
of the defendant claiming or seeming any relief regarding possession
but the plaintiff's title standing negatived. The suit itself was for
ejcclment on litle and, sans title, ejectment could not be granted. The
title of the plaintiff was sought to be rested on s.G at the Letters
Patent Appeal level, but on a constr.uclion of th~t provi.sion th~ Cou~t
held against him. In short, the High Court dtd i:othmg to mvesl!gate into the possession of parties hut ~n· the admitted fact that t:he
defendants,, first party, were in possess10n by trespass-the. plamt
alleges this-the Court dismissed the suit, since s. 6 of the Act dtvested
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GURUCHARA.N SINGH V, KAMI:,A SINGH (Krishna Iyer,!.)
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the plaintiff of his quondam proprietorship. Moreover, there. is nothing in s. 35 of the Act, relied on by counsel to substantiate l11s
submission, depriving the civil court of its jurisdiction to· decide
questions of declaration of title . and . consequential relief . of
possession.
Section 35 deals with d11Ierent types of sutts.
Indeed, s.6(1) with which we are concerned, also contains no mhibition against the civil court's power to decide Lli.e issue of title
and right to possession of the plaintiff and, as a nec.:ssary corollary,
the claim of actual possession set up ·by the defe1idants, first partl:'.
No( can s. 6(2)' inferentially interdict the plenary power of the clVll
court In short,· the plea of bar of the rcsuiction is specious and fails.
Another peripheral issue invoked before the High Court and here
to undo the defendant's claim of exclusive possession and consequential absence of khas possession in the plaintiff was based . on
the provisions of the Estates Partition Act, 1897.
Shri Misra propounded what, unfortunately, strikes us as a fallacious proposition. He went to the extreme extent of maintaining that
a partition of lands, to be valid, should be in terms of the Estate~ Partition Act, 1897 and, until then, a deed or decree effecting division by
m.~tes and bounds does not legally operate. If so, Ex.4/a remains an
arrangement for separate enjoyment between co-owners, title continuing joint, The follow-up of this reasoning is that the suit properties
arc in the possession of co-shares viz., defendants first party (derived
from defendants,, second party) and possession of one co-sharer is
posse>Sion of 111e other. The plaintiff thus is in constructive possession.
good enough to bring him into the rescue shelter provided by s. 6 of
the Act. He relied on the ruling ii1 Malzanth Ram Blwshan Das v.
Ramrati Kuer(') and the various provisions of the Estates partition
Act to make out his thesis. The support derived from the decision is
mc:rc apparent than real because, as noticed by the High Court, the
suit there was not, unlike here, brought on the foot of a partition and
the ruling laid down that any 'amicable division' among co-sharers
would not bind the Revenue until the partition was efiectcd as visualised under the Estates Partition Act. . Shri Misra's study of the provisions of the said Act is free from confusion, save in one fundamental
rcsi:cct.. That one point, missed by him, is that the whole statutory
project 1s to protect the land revenue, not to afiect title. The partition is valid, it divests title, it binds >ll; but, so far as land revenue
liability is concerned, it relieves parties from the burden fallin" on the
other sharer's I.and only if the exercise prescribed in the Estat~s Partition Act is gone through. The statute is a protective fiscal "rmour.,
not a mono-rail for division among co-owners to travel. Section 7
makes it clear. Not that Courts have lost power to decree partition
nor that co-owners have bec0111e impotent to separate their shares
voluntarily but that land rev~nue shall not be prejudiced without the
procedure unde~ t~iat Act bemg gone through. More clinching is the
fact that the plarn!Jff bas here come to Court on the sole case of partition by metes and bounds and has founded his relief not as co-sharer
(I) 1965 Bihar L. J. 119.
7 48
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 1 S.C.R.
but as exclusiv.e owner. Seeming legal ingenuity has small chance in
court and to miss the point and pertinence of a measure is to travel to
a wrong destination.
Now we come to the master problem presented at learned length
by Shri S. C. Misra and deferentially. listened to by us to discover its
substanre and the solution. 'A blind understanding' has been the
result, and as his argmnent concluded we 'came out by the same door
as in (we) went'. It behoves us to >el out counsel's submission and
the setting of the Act to ·~xplain why we do not agree with him and
what we regard is the master-key to the construction of section 6.
We must first appreciate that it is a land reform law we are interpreting and not just an ordinary statute. The social-economic thrust
of the law in this area should not be retarded by judicial construction
but filliped by the legal process, without departing from the plain
meaning and objective of the Act. We may delineate the content and
contours of section 6 with which we are directly concerned in the
present case. The preamble to the Act, which sheds skylight on the
statute, reads :
A
B
c
"An Act to provide for the transference to the State of
the interests of proprietors and tenure-holders in land and
of the mortgages and lessees of such interests including inc
terests in trees, forests, fishries, jalkars, ferries, hats,, ba.zars,
mines and minerals and to provide for the constitution of a
Land Commission for the State of Bihar with powers to
advise the State Government on the agrarian policy to be
pursued by the State Government consequent upon such transference and for other matters connected therewith".
E
From this it is fairly clear that the legislative goal is to liquidate all
intermediary interests and vest the ultimate ownership on land in the
State. In this sense, the import of the Act is a tepid measure of land
nationalisation. Section 3 in umnistakable language ves·ts the absolute
proprietorship in all the lands in Bihar in the State, the succeeding:
sections spel! out details.
F
D
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We may here read sections 3, 4(g) and 6(1) of the Act:
•(
"3. Notification vesting an estate or tenure in the State(1 ) The State Govermnent may, from time to time, by
notification declar,, that the estates or tenures of a proprietor
or tenure-holder, specified in the notification, have passed to
and become vested in the State.
(2) The notification referred to in sub-section (1) shall
be published in the Official Gazette. A copy of such notification shall· be sent by registered post, with acknowledgement .due, to the proprietor of the estate recorded in the
general registers of .revenue-payingi or revenue-free lands
maintained under the Land Registration Act, 1876 (Ben.
Act 7 of 1876), of'in case where the estate is not entered in
,.,
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GURUCHARAN SINGH v. KAMLA SINGH (Krishna Iyer,!.)
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749
any such registers and in the case of tenure-holders, to the
proprietor of the estate or to the tenureholder of the t~nure
ii the Collector is in possession of a list of such propnetors
or l'enure-holders together with their addresses, and such
posting shall be dee!I!~d to be sufficient servi.ce o! th~ notitication on such propnetor or,, where such notification 1s sent
by post to the tenure-holder, on such tenure-holder for the
purposes of this Act.
( 3) The publication of such notification, in the Official
Gazette shall be conclusive evidence of the notice of the
declaration to such proprietors or tenure-holders whose
interests are affected by the notification."
c
"4. Consequences of the vesting of an estate or tenure
in the State-Notwithstartding anything contained in any
other law for the time being in force or in any contract, on
the publication of the notification under sub-section ( 1) of
section 3 or sub-section (1) or (2) of section 3A the
following consequences shall ensue, namely :
D
F
(g) Where by reason of the vesting of any estate or
tenure or any part thereof in the State under provision of
this Act, the Collector is of opinion that the State is entitled
to the direct possession of any property he shall, by an
order in writing served in the prescribed manner on the
person in possession of such property, require him to deliver
possession thereof to the State or show cause, if auy, against
the order within .a time to be specified therein and if such
person fails to deliver possession or show cause or if the
Collector rejects any cause shown by such person after giving
him a reasonable opportunity of being heard, the Collector
shall for reasons to ~ recorded,, take or cause to be taken
such steps or use or cause to be used such force as, in his
opinion, may be necessary for securing compliance with the
order or preventing a breach of the peace :
G
Provided that if the order under clause (g) is passed
by an officer below the rank of the Collector of a district,
an appeal shall, if preferred within sixty days of the order,,
lie to the Collector of the district and the Collector shall
dispose of the appeal in accordance with the prescribed
procedure."
H
"6. Certain other lands in khas possession of intermediaries to be retained by them on payment of rent as raiyats
having occupancy rights-(1) On and from the date of
vesting all lands used for agricultural or horticultural purposes, which were in khas possession of an intermediary on
the date_ of such vesting, including-
E
**
**
••
**
(a)(i) proprietor's private lands let out under a lease
for a term of years or under a lease from year
,,
750
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] ] S.C.R.
to year, referred to in section 116 of the Bihar
Tenancy Act, 1885 (8 of 1885),
A
(ii) landlord's privileged lands let out under a register-
ed lease for a term exceeding one year or under
a lease, written or .oral,, for a period of one year
or less, referred to in section 43 of the Chota
Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 (Ben. Act 6 of 1908),
B
( b) lands used for agricultural or horticultural purposes 3i1d held in the ,direct possession of a
temporary lease of an estate or tenure and cultivated by himself with his own stock or by his
own servants or by hired labour or with hired
stock, and
c
( c) lands used for agricultural or horticultural purposes forming the subject matter of a subsisting
mortgage on !he redemption of which the intermediary is entitled to recover khas possession
thereof;
Ll
shall, subject to the provisions of section 7A and 7B be
deemed to be settled by the State with such intermediary
and he shall be entitled to retain possession thereof and hold
them as a raiyat under the State having occupancy rights
in respect of such lands subject to the payment of such fair
and equitable rent as may be determined by the Collector
in the prescribed manner :
·E
Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall
entitle an intermediary to retain poss~ssion of any naukarana
land or any land recorded as chaukidari or goraiti jagir or
mafi goraiti in the record-of-rights or any other land in
respect of which occupancy right has already accrued to a
raiyat before the date of vesting.
F
Explanation.-For the purposes of this sub-section,
'naukarana land' means land held as a grant burdened with
service in lieu of rent or held simply in lien of wages for
scrvicis to be rendered."
Although there is a blanket vesting of proprietorship in all the lands
in the State, the legislation is careful, in this initial stage of 'agrarian
reform, not to be too deprivatory of the cultivating possession of those
who have been tilling the land for Jong. Therefore,. while the consequence of the vesting is stated to be annihilation of all interests,. encumbrances and the like in the land, certain special categories of rights
are saved. Thus, raiyats and under-raiyats are not dispossessed and
their rights are preserved. The full proprietor's khas possession is
if so .not disturbed. Certainly, the large landhold·~rs, whose lands have
for longi been under tenancy, lose their lands to the State by virtue
of the vesting operation (of course, compensation is provided for).
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GURUCHARAN SINGH
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v. KAMLj\. SINGH (Krishna Iyer,!.)
751
Nevertheless, the reform Jaw concedes the continuance of a limited
species of interests in f;wour o[ those Zamindars. The three-fold class
of lands is brought into the saving bucket by includinl'J them in the
khas possession of the proprietors. They are legislatively included
in khas possession by an extended itemisation in section 6(1). The
purpose and the puq>ort of the provision is to allow the large landholders to keep possession of small areas which may be designated
as the private or privileged or mortgaged lands traditionally held
directly and occasionally made-over to others, often servants or others,
in tht} shape of leases or mortgages. The crucial point to remember
is that section 3 in its total sweep,, transfers all the interests in all lands
to the State, the exception being· lesser interests under the State set
out in detail in sections 5, 6 and 7. ·So much so, any person who
claims full title after the date of vesting notified under s. 4 has no
longer any such proprietorship. All the same, he may have a lesser
right if he falls within the saving provisions viz., sections 5, 6 and 7.
Sections 5 and 7 do not apply here. The claim of the plaintiff is that
he can sustain his right to recover possession in this suit, as coming
within the oasis of section 6 (1).
There is no case that the sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of section
6( 1) apply. Counsel's contention is that he comes within the ambit
of the main paragraph, being allegedly in khas possession. To appreciate the further discussion, i~t is useful to recapitulate thai the appellant
has averred in his plaint that he had been dispossessed as early as
1954 by a brazen act of trespass by the contesting respondents who
were holding adversely to him. Undaunted by this fatal fact counsel
claimed to be in possession and argued still. The focus was turned
E
by him on the concept of khas possession defined in section 2(k).
He presented a historical perspective and suggested that the genesis of
khas possession could be traced to the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885.
May be, the dr~ftsmen might have drawn upon those earlier land tenure
laws for facility, but we must understand right at the outset that the
Constitution of India has inaugurated a new jurisprudence as it were,
guided by Part IV and reflected in Part III. When there has been a
F determined break with traditional jurisprudence and a big endeavour
has been made to over-tum a feudal land system and substitute what
may be called a transformation of agrarian relations, we cannot hark
back to the bygone jura or hold a new legislation captive within the
confines of vanishing tenurial thought. De hors the historical links-a break-away from the past in the socio-legal system is not accomplished by worship of the manes of the law-khas posseSsion means
G what !he definition, in plain English, says. The definition clause is
ordinarily a statutory dictionary, and viewed that way, we have in the
early p~rt of this. judgment ex.Plained how it means actual, cultivatory
possess1on-nofhing less,, no!hmg else. Of course, section 6(1) makes a sp'7ial addition by 'including' oilier demised lands by express
enumeratton.
D
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Section 6 does not stop with merely saving lands in khas possession of !he intermedia;y (erstwhile proprietor) but proceeds to include
certam lands outstanding .on temporary leases or mortgages with others.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 1 S.C.R.
A
as earlier indicated. These are private lands as known to the Bihar
Tenancy Act, pri_vileged lands as known to the Chota Nagpur Tenancy
Act, land ontstanding with mortgagees, pending redemption and lands
which are actually being cultivated ·by the proprietor himself. Ordinarily what is outstanding with lessees and mortgagees may not fall
within khas possession. The Legislature, however, thought that while
the permanent tiller's rights should be protected and therefore, raiyats B
and under-raiyats should have rights directly under the State, eliminating the private proprietors, the Zarnindar or proprietor also should
be allowed to hold under the lltate,, on payment of fair rent, such lands
as have been in his cultivatory possession and other lands which were
really enjoyed as private or privileged lands or mortgaged with possession by him. With this end in view, section 6(.1) enlarged its scope
by including the special categories. The word 'include' is generally c
used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the. meaning of the
words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute. It is obvious
that section 6( I) uses the word 'including' to permit enlargement of
the meaning of khas possession for the limited purpose of that section.
emphasising thereby that, but for such enlargement, the expression khas
possession excludes lands outstanding even with temporary lessees.
It is perfectly plain, therefore, that khas possession has been used in. D
the restricted sense of actual possession and to the small extent it had
to be enlarged_ for giving relief to proprietors in respect of 'private',
'privileged' and mortgaged "!ands inclusive expressions had to be
employed. Khas possession is actual possession, that is "a foothold
on the land, an actual entry, a possession in fact, a standing upon it,
an occupation of it, as a real, administrative act done"('). Constructive possession or' possession in law is what is covered by the sub- E
clauses of section 6( 1). Even so, it is impossible to conceive, although
Shri Misra wanted us to accept, that possession is· so wide as to include
a mere right to possess, when the actual dominion over the property
is held by one in hostility to the former. Possession, correctly understood, means effective, physical control or occupation. . "The word
possession .is sometimes used inaccurately as synonymous with the right
to possess". (Words and Phrases, 2nd Edn., John B. Sounders., F
p.151). "In the Dictionary of English Law (Earl Jowitt) 1959 at
p. 1367 "possession" is defined as follows : 'possession, the visible
possibility of exercising physical control over a thing coupled with the
intention of doing so, either against all the world, 'or against all the
world except certain persons. There are, therefore, three requisites
of possession. First, there must be actual or potential physical control. Secondly, physical control is not possession, unless accompanied G
by intention; hence, if a thing is put into the hand oti a sleeping person,
he has not possession of it. Thirdly, the possibility and intention mu~t
be visible or evidence by external signs, for if the thing shows no
signs-of being under the control of anyone, it is not possessed; ... '.
In the end of all, however. the meaning of 'possession' must depend
on the context." (ibid. p. 153). May be, in certain situations, possession may cover right to possess. It is thus clear that in Anglo- H
American jurisprudence also, possession is actual possession and in a
limited set of cases, may include constructive possession, but when
(1) /\.rncrican Jurisrirudence, Words & Phrases Vol. 33, p. 103.
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GURUCHARAN SINGH V, KAMI.,A SINGH (Krishna Iyer, !. )
A
B
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D
E
F
G
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75 3
there is a bare right to possess bereft of any dominion or factum of
control, it will be a strange legal travesty to assert that an owner is in
possession merely because he has a right to possess when a rival, in
the teeth of owner's opposition, is actually holding dominion and control over the land adversely, openly and continuously. Admittedly.
in the present case,, the possession of the plaintiff had ceased totally
at least two years before the vesting under section 4 took place. This
·
situation excludes khas possession.
We have the uniform authority of this Court to hold that the possession of a trespasser, by no stretch of imagination, can be deemed
to be khas possession or even -constructive possession of the owner. In
Surajnath Ahir (supra) this Court considered thi; definition of khas
possession in the Act .in the context of section 6 and after adverting
to Brij Nandan Singh v. Jamuna Prasad, on which Shri Misra placed
massive reliance, observed :
"Reliance was placed by the High Court on the case
reported as Brijnandan Singh v. J.amuna Prasad for the construction put on the expression 'khas possession' to include
subsisting title to possession as well, and therefore for holding that any proprietor, whose right to get khas possession
of the land is not barred by any provision of law, will have
a right to recover possession and that the State of Bihar
shall treat him as a raiyat with occupancy right and not as
a trespasser. We do not agree with this view when the
definl:tion of 'khas poss_ession' means the possession of a
proprietor or tenure-holder cith.er by cultivating such land
himself with his own stock or by his own servants or by
hired labour or with hired stock. The mere fact that a proprietor has a subsisting title to possession over certain land
on t11e date of vesting would not make that land under his
'khas possession' ".
The attempt to distinguish this decision on the score that the observation is obiter does not appeal to us and the rule laid down there is in
conformity with the principle as we have earlier expounded. The
law has been indubitably laid down in Ram Ran Bijai Singh (supra)
where a Bench of five Judges of this Court discussed khas posses~911
,in section 2k and the scope of section 6 of the Act. The same Full
Bench(') case earlier referred to was pressed before the learned
Judges, and over-ruling that case, Ayyangar, J. speaking for the Court,
stated
the law in these unmincing
words :
.
'
.
"Mr. Sarjoo Prasad however relied on certain observations in the judgment of the Full Bench of the Patna High
Court in Sukdeo Das v. Kashi Prasad where the learned
Judges appeiar to consider the possession even of a trespasser
who has not perfected his title by adverse possession for
the time requisite ul)der the Indian Limitation Act as the
khas possession of the true owner. We consider that this
equation of the right to possession with 'khas possession'
(I) A.I.R. 1958 Pat. 589.
754
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] [ S.C.R.
is not justified by principle or authority. Besides this is·
also inconsistent with the reasoning of the Full Bench by
which constructive possession is treated as within the concept of khas possession.
The possession of the contesting defendants in the present case was in their own right and adverse to the plaintiffs,
even on the case with which the appellants themselves came
into Court." . . . . . . In this context the plea made by the
plaintiffs relevant to the character of the possession of the
contesting ded'encfants assumes crucial importance, for if
they were admittedly trespassers then they could not be said
to hold the property on behalf of the mortgagors and the
entire basis of the argument as to the property being in the
khas possession of the plaintiffs would disappear. . . . It
was on the basis of their possession being wrongful that a
claim was made against them for mesne profits and it was on
the footing of their being trespassers that they were sued
and possession sought to be recovered from them. In these
circumstances we consider that it is not possible for the
appellants to contend that these tenants were in possession of
the property on behalf of the mortgagor and in the character of their rights being derived from the mortgagor."
The Court rejected the theory that the possession of a trespasser was
that of the owner. Other decisions of the Patna High Court and
this Court were referred to at the bar but the position having been
made unmistakable by the two cases just mentioned, we do not wish
to burden this judgment with case law any further.
A
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The conclusion we, therefore, draw is that on the facts found- .
Y
indeed,. on the facts averred in the plaint-the plaintifl' had no khas
possession of the suit lands and cannot use section 6 as a rescue raft.
His title was lost when section 4 was notified as applicable to the suit
lands by section. 3 in 1956. Without title he couid not maintain the
•
action for recovery of possession. But that is not the end of the F
matter. He is certainly entitled to mesne profits from the defendants,
first party, until the date of vesting, i.e.,, January l, 1956. We grant
-('
him a decree in this beha.lf subject to the qualification mentioned below. Again, the contesting defendants, in paragraph 27 of their
.....
written statement, have admitted that they had no possession of or
-~
connection with some of the plots mentioned in Schedule B to the
plaint and set out .therein. The High Court has dismissed the suit G
I
in entirety after noticing the admission of the contesting defendants
t
that they have not been in possession of those items covered by paragraph 27 of the writte1n statement. The plc~ in that paragraph is that
.-.~
these lands have been made over to the defendants, second party. It
is undeniable that the plaintiff had title to the entire B Schedule properties as against defendants, first party, and second party. If defendants, first party, were not in oossession and defendants, second party,, H .
were in possession, the plaintiff would still be entitled to a decree for
possession of the same. If neither is in possession, the presumption
that the owner is in possession holds good and he is entitled to that
GURUCHARAN SINGH v. KAM~ SINGH (Krisl11w Iyer, J.)
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755
possession being restored to him. Therefore, a decree for possession
of these items covered by paragraph 27 of the written statement filed
on behalf of the contesting defendants, first party, is also granted.
Here we must utter a word of caution and condition our decree accordingly. The State, by the vesting operation, has become the owner and
very probably the plaintiff cannot sustain any claim to be in posses·
sion as against the State. While we do not investigate this aspect, we
wish to make it perfectly plain that the rights of the State, as against
the plaintiff, in regard to the items for which we are givinlJ him a
decree, will not in any manner be affected. Likewise, if some third
party is in possession of those items unclaimed by the defendants, first
party, their possession, if any, also will not be prejudiced. After all,
the.decree of this Court can bind and regulate the rights of the parties
to the litigation and not others. Inevitably, the mesne profits which
we have decreed will be confined to those items which are found to
be in the possession of the defendants, first party.
Thero is a disturbing feature about this case. We have already
indicated how there. is an apparent indifference on the part of the State
in securing its rights granted by the Act. . Here is a case where the
defendants, first party,, arc rank trespassers and have no evident equity
in their favour. Section 4(f) cjeclares that the Collector shall be
deemed to have taken charge of the estates and interests vested in the
State. This means he has a public duty to take charge of lands vested
in the State. Surely, a responsible public officer like the Collector,
charged with a duty of taking delivery of possession of lands which
by virtue of the vesting the. State is entitled to take direct possession
of, will proceed to dispossess the trespasser. In this case, defendants:
first party, are trespassers and the plaintiff being out of the pale of
section 6, the State is entitled to the direct possession of the suit lands.
We e)\pect the Collector to do his duty by section 4(g). Counsel for
the respondents drew our attention to rule 7H :
"7-H. How to deal with cases in which proprietor, etc ..
not found in possessici11 on the date of vesting-If the Collector holds on the report of enquiry held under rule 7-E
or 7-F that the outgoing proprietor or tenure-holder, or his
temporary lessee or mortgagee,. was not in possession of the
lands or buildings referred to in rule 7-0, he shall fix the
fair rent or ground-rent thereof in the manner prescribed
in these rules and the person who may be found to be in
possession of such· lands or buildings shall thereupon be
liable to pay the rent or ground-rent so fixed to the State
Government with effect from the date of vesting."
Although we need not elaborately study the implications of this provision, it is fairly clear that this rule does not confer any right or
equity to be in possession in favour of a trespasser. All that it does
is to make the man in possession, be he trespasser or not, "liable
to pay !lie rent or ground-rent so fixed to the State Government with
effect from the date of vesting". It is the liability to pay rent that is
created, not the equity to claim possession. After all, the land reform
756
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[J 976] J S.C.R.
.measure is intended to conserve as much land as is available in the
hands of the State and any trespasser who distorts this claim and
snatches possession, cannot benefit by his wrong. May be, there are
special circumstances which may persuade the State to give possession
of any land either to its erstwhile proprietor or to one who hns been
in long possession rightly or wrongly. We do not make any observation in that behalf but point out that prima facie section 4(f) and (g)
anq rule 7-H attract the jurisdiction of the State and its revenue
authorities. The policy of the Act includes the State taking over and
managing lands not saved by sections 5, 6 and 7 and arc not found to
be in possession of the proprietor so that the eventual distribution to
the landless and the like may be worked out smoothly.
The appeal is dismissed in substantial measure except to the extent of the relief by way of mesne profits and possession in regard to
a few items mentimed in paragraph 27 of the contestants' written
statement. The parties will bear their costs throughout in the peculiar
·circumstances of the case. This judgment wi]] not affect the rights,
if any,, either party may seek or has secured from the State.
V.M.K.
A
B
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Appeal dismissed.
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