CAREW AND COMPANY LTD. versus UNION OF INDIA
Supreme Court of India | Decided 22 August 1975 | [1976] 1 S.C.R. 379 | 1975 INSC 173
Key facts
- Decided
- 22 August 1975
- Bench
- A.N. RAY*, KUTTYIL KURIEN MATHEW*, V.R. KRISHNA IYER*, S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI
- Bench size
- 4
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 1308/1973
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1976] 1 S.C.R. 379
- Neutral citation
- 1975 INSC 173
Text of the judgment
379
A
CAREW AND COMPANY LTD,
V,
UNION OF INDIA
August 22, 1975
[A N, RAY, C.J-, K K MATHEW, V, R KRISHNA !YER AND
B
S. M. FAZAL A.LI, JJ.]
Monopolies and Restrictire Trade Practices Act, 1969, Sections 2(v). 22 a1ul
23 ( 4 )-Undertaki{1g, 111eani11g of-Appellant proposing to for11i new conzpany
for taking over suf?ar unit owned bv it-New co1npa11y, if can be said to be en~
~aged in production.
Section 2(v) of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act. 1969,
defines an "undertaking" as an undertaking which is engaged in the production,
supp1y, distr~bution or control of goods of any description or the provision of
service of anv kind. Section 22 provides for the establishment of new undertakings. It says that no person or authority, other than government, shaU, after
the co~ncement of this Act, establish anv new undertaking which. when established would become an inter-connected undertaking of an undertaking to which
clause (a) of s. 20 appl!.es, except under, and in accordance 'vith the previous
oermission of the Central Government, Sub-section (2) of the section provides
for an application for that purpose to the Central Government. Section 23 ( 4)
Jays down that if an undertaking to which Part A of Ch. III applies proposes to
acquire by purchase, take over or otherwise the whole or part of an undertaking
D
which will or mav result ehher (a) in the creation of an undertaking to which
Part A would apply; or (b) in the undertaking becoming an inter-connected
undertaking of an undertaking to which Part A applies. it shall, before giving any
effect to its proposals, make an appEcation in writing to the Ceritral Government
in the prescribed form of its intention to make such acquisition. stating therein
information regarding its inter-connection with other undenakings the scheme of
finance with regard to the proposed acquisition and such other information as
may be prescribed.
E
The appellant is a public limited company and is a subsidiary of Un:.ted
Breweries Ltd. and other comoanies interconnected with it. The appeIIant's
undertaking consists of a sugar factory and a distillery for manufacture of liquor
at Rosa, Shahjahanpur and another d~stillery at AsansoI. The appellant's sugar
factory at Rosa had been facing difficulties for some years on account of inadequate supply of sugarcane and to ensure regular and adequate supply of sugarcane, the appellant prooosed to float a company with a share capital of Rs. 50
lakhs for the puroose of taking over the sugar unit of the aonellant and for workF ing it as arr ·undertaking of the company to be formed. The proposal was that
the ;ppellant would be entitled to an allotment of 100 per cent shares in the nelv
companv and a further sum of Rs. 15.77.093/~ as consideration for transfer of
the sugar unit. The aope11ant apolied to the respondent for perm'.ssion under
s. 372 of the Companie". Act to acquire the 100 oer cent shares of the new company uoon its incorooration. The ~wellant was told by the Central Government
in ito letter dated 5-1-1972 that sections 22 and 23 of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969, would vrhna facie be atlracted and that the
appellant should file a separate application under the relevant section. The
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appellant fil»<l an application dated 5-5-1972 purporting to be under S. 23(4) of
the Act. The new cornnany proooc;ed to be set uo by the apoellant was incorporated on June 15, 1973 under the name of Shahiahannur Sugar Private Limited. 'By order dated July, 2, 1973, tha Central Government, in the Department of
Comoanv Affairs reiected the apoeltant"S anplication under s. 372(4) of th"' Companies Act for inveS.tinl! R". 50 Iakhs in the equity shares of the Canital of <::bnhjahanpur Sugar Private Limited. Bv another order dated 30-6-1973, the Central
Government, in the Department of Company Affairs also rejected the annellant'~
aoolication under s. 23 ( 4) of the Act. This appeal is against the order dated
30-6-1973 under s. 55 of the Act.
H
It was contended for the appellant that, (i) in order that an enterprise may
become an 'undertaking' within the definition of the word 'undertaking' in s.
2(v) of the Act, it !s necessary that the enterprise must be engaged in produc-
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SUPREME C.OURT REPORTS
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tion,. supply, distribution Or control of goods of any descriptiod or ihe -provis\on A
of service of any kind and that when the appellant proposed to form the new
company for taking ovc.r the sugar unit of the appellant in consideration of 100
per cent shares in the new company, that company had not acqu:.red the sugar
unit of the appellant nor \Vas it engaged in the production, supply, distribution
or cont.rel of goods, etc. as an enterprise of Shahjahanpur Sugar Private Limited
and so there was no proposal to acquire by purchase, take over or othervrise
o! ~ v.:hole or pti.rt of any undertaking_ within the the mean!ng of s. 23(4); and
(u) tn any event the prorosfil to acquire 100 per cent shares in Shahjahanpur
Sugar Private Limited by the appellant would not involve a proposal to acquire
an undertaking to be owned or even ov:ned _ by Shahjahanour Sugar Private
Limited,, ~·the acqu~sition of_ 100 per cent"shares would onl:Y.vest in the appel-"'
!ant, the right to controt· and manage the affairs of Shahjahanpur-Sugar Private
Limited.
·1_
Accepting the .contentions and allowing the appeal,
HEW;_ (Per_ Ray, C.J. and hfathew J.) _(i) The sugar unit of the appellant
. \\'a'i no doubt engaged in production of goods. etc., when the proposal was
made and was. therefore. an undertaking; but it was only an undertaking of the
appellant as the sugar un.'..t had not been transferred and had not biconu an
enterprise of Shahja~anpur Sugar Private Limited. The sµgar unit did. - ·not
become an undertaking of Shahjahanpur Sugar Private Limited as it was not and
could not be engaged irt th.: production of goods, etc., on· it-; behalf before it v:as
transferred to iL Sub-section (4) of s. 23 :S confined to the case of a proposal
to acquire an undertaking by purc\l.."lSe, take over or O'ther\vi_se but, to become
. an undertaking, it must presently be engaged in the production of g(Jods, et::.
The mere fact that the ~lemorandum of A~sociation of Shahjahanpur Sugar
·Private Limited contained an object clause v,:hich provided for product:.On of
sugar ~·oul<l not necessarily mean that the company would go into production
. and thu1 become .the owner of an undertaking as defined in s. 2(v) of the Act.
Even if the phrase •engaged in business' in the definition conveys the !dea of
embarking on it, it is not correct to say that Shabjahanpur Sugar Private Limited
had embarked on the business of production of sugar merely because· its memo-. randum of associat'.on provided that the object of the compri.ny was to produce
segar. [3878-C, E-FJ
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The Union of India· v. Tata £11gineerit1g and Loconiotive Co.~Ltd.• [1972] 74
Bombay.Law Reporter; 1 and In l'e Canara Bank Ltd.,-A.1.R. 1973 Mysore, 95.
referred to_
·
(ii) Jt is \Veii settled ihai a company has sePerate Itigal _pe'rso-nalitf . apaft
· from its shareholders and it is only the company as a juristic person- that could
own the undertaking. -. Beyond obtain:ng control and the right of management
. of Shahjahanpur Sugar Private Limited, the purchase of 100 per _cent shares had
· nOt the effe=t of ·an a£quisition of. the undertaking owned by it. [388F·Gl
Per Krishna Iyer. I. (cOncurri11g) (1) An •ufidcrtaking' is defined as an un·deftaking .... ·which itself d:Scloses the ditTiculty felt _by the draftsmen in delineating the precise content. _Obviously~ a dynamic economic concept cannot be
: imprisoned into ineffectua1nes:i by_ a static· strict - co_nstructic~_n.- •1s ·engaged in
-. product'..on·, in the context ta~es 1n not merely P\OJects w~1ch hav~ !Jeen com. pleted and gone in!-0 J?rod~ct1on but. also blue:pnnts. It. 1s. dcsr;nptive _of the
series of steps culminating in production. On~ IS engaged tn an undertaking; for
. ·production of certain goods whe~· he seriously ~et about. t~e job of ·gett~ng e~e_ry
thin"" essential to enable production. Economists, administrators and tndu~.na
lists0UnderstanJ the expression in that sen'3e and_. Often .times project~ in imme. d'..ati prospect are legitimately Set. down ~ undertakings ~ngaged _i~ th~ particular
line. Not the tense used but the 1ntegratton of the steps 1s \vhat ts decisive. What , v.ill materialse as a productive enterprise in futuro can be regarded currently ~s
a~ undertaking. in the industrial sense. [391F-H]
-.-\t~sa~h;;.1etts B.& ·f,uur'1n~e
v. U.S. 351, U.S. 128. 138, anJ. Gyn11.!tana,_
Club, [1968] 1 S.C.R. 742, referred to.
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CAREW & co. LTD. v. UNION (Mathew, J.)
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(2) Sections 22 and 23 ( 4), when placed in juxtaposi.tion suggest that the
appellant's operation is to establish a new undertaking (out of its old sugar uait,
though) which, in view of the share-holding, will inevitably become an interconnected. undertaking of Carew & Co. (the original undertaking, i.e., the appellant). Not rto much to acquire an existing undertaking as to establish, by a
concealed expansionist objective, a new un4ertaking with sugar manufacture is
the core of the operation. Therefore, it is not s. 23 ( 4) that magnetizes the appellant's proposal but, prima fa:ie, Sec. 22. [395EF]
Per Fazal Ali, J. (Concurring) The object of the Act appears to be to prevent concentration of wealth in the hands of a few and to curb monopolistic
tendencies or expansionist industrial endeavours. This objective is soughl tu be
achieved by placing three-ti.er curb on industrial activities to which the Act applies, namely :-(1) By providing that if it is proposed to substantially expand
the activities of a Company by issue of fresh capital or by installation of new
machinery, then not~.ce to the· Central Government and its approval must be taken
under s. 21 of the Act. (2) In the case of establishment of a new Company
by !insisting on the previous permission of the Central Government under s ..22
of the Act. (3) In the case of acquisition of an existing Company by another
Company by requ.iring the sanction of the Central Government to be taken by
such Company under s. 23 of the Act. The present case may fall within the
second cMegory. [398-H, 399ABJ
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1308 of 1973.
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From the Order dated the 30th June, 1973 of the Central Government, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, Department of
Company Affairs.
S. V. Gupfe and Vinoo Bhagat, for the appellant.
P. P. Rao and S. P. Nayar, for respondent.
Shri Narain, for interveners.
The Judgment of A. N, Ray, C,J., and K. K. Mathew, J. was delivered by Mathew, J. V. R. Krishna Iyer, J. and S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, J.
gave separate Opinions.
MATHEW, I. This appeal is from an order dated 30-6-1973 pasied
by the Government of India dismissing an application filed by the appellant on 5-5-1972 nnder s. 23(4) of the Monopolies and Restrictive
Trade Practices Act, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') for
acquiring 100 per cent share capital of Shahjahanpur Sugar Private Ltd.
The appellant is a public limited company and is a subsidiary of
United Breweries Ltd. and other companies interconnected with it. The
appellant's nndertaking consists of a sugar factory and a distillery for
manufacture of liquor at Rosa, Shahjahanpur and another distillery at
Asansol. The appellant's sugar factory at Rosa had been facing difficulties for some years on account of inadequate supply of sugarcane and
to ensure regular and adequate supply of sugarcane, the appellant proposed to fioat a company with a share capital of Rs. 50 lakhs for the
purpose of taking over the sugar unit of the appellant and for working
it as an undertaking of the company to be formed. The proposal was
that the appellant would be entitled to an allotment of 100 per cent
shares in tho new company and a further sum of Rs. 15,77.093(- as
consideration for transfer of the sugar unit. According to the appellant, its object in getting 100 per eent shares in the new company was
to offer tho aharCi to cane growers later on.
11-U39SupCl[75
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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[1976] 1 S.C.R.
The appellant wrote a letter to the Secretary of the Company Law
Board on 15-10-1971 stating that since the new company would be a
subsidiary of the appellant, the approval of the Company Law Board
under s. 372 of the Companies Act would not be necessary, in view of
the provisions of clause (d) of sub-section 14 of the said section. The:
Central Government in the Ministry of Industry and Company Affair;
replied by a letter dated November 1, 1971, that the provi;ions o!
s. 372(2) of the Companies Act would be applicable to the acquisi~iO'l
of the shares by the appellant in the company proposed to be formed.
The appellant, therefore, applied for permission under s. 372 of the:
Companies Act to acquire the 100 per cent shares of the new company
upon its incorporation. The appellant was also told by the Central
Government in its letter dated 5-1-1972 that sections 22 and 23 of the
Act would prima jacie be attracted and that the appellant should file a
separate application under the relevant section. The appellant had
already intimated the Central Government, Department of Company
Affairs on 17-11-1971 that the provisions of sections 21, 22 and 23 o[
the Act would not apply to its proposal to acquire the shares of the company proposed to be formed for taking over the sugar unit of the appellant. However, the appellant filed an application dated 5-5-1972 purporting to be under s. 23 ( 4) of the Act. The new company propc<cd
to be set up by the appellant was incorporated on June 15, 1973 under
the name of Shahjahanpur Sugar Private Limited. By order dated
July 2. 1973, the Central Government, in the Department of Company
Affairs rejected the appellant's application under s. 372(4) of the Companies Act for investing Rs. 50 lakhs in the equity shares of the capit:ii
of Shahjahanpur Sugar Private Limited. By another order datc·l
30-6-1973, the Ccntra.l Government, in the Department of Companv
Affairs also rejected the appellant's application under s. 23 ( 4) of tl:c
Act. As already stated, this appeal is against the latter order, t1mLl·
s. 55 of the Act.
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The point for consideration in this appeal lies in a narrow compa's
yiz., whether s. 23 ( 4) was attracted to the facts of the case. To decil'e
the question it is necessary to refer to certain provisions of the Act.
The object of the Act as is clear from the preamble is that the operation of the economic system should not result in the concentration d
economic power to the comn1on detriment, for prohibition of taonopolistic and restrictive trade practices and for matters connected thercwich
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or incidental thereto.
"Undertaking" is defined under s. 2 (v) :
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"undertaking" means an undertaking which is engaged in
the production, supply, distribution or control of goods of any
description or the provision of service of any kind".
Chapter III is concerned with concentration of economic power and
s. 20 occurring in Part A of that chapter states that this part shall apply
to an undertaking if the total value of(i) its own assets, or
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CAREW &
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co. LTD. v. UNION (Mathew, J.)
383
(ii) its own assets together with the assets of its interconnected undertaking is not Jess than twenty crores
of rupees;
and, to a dominant undertaking-
B
(i) where it is a single undertaking, the value of its asset»
or
(ii) where it consists of more than one undertaking, the
sum-total of the value of the assets of all the inter-connected undertakings constituting the dominating
undertaking, is not less than one crore of rupees .
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Section 21 deals with expansion of undertakings. It provides that
where an undertaking to which this Part applies proposes to substantially expand its activities by the issue of fresh capital or by "Lhe installation of new machinery or other equipment or in any other manner, it
shall, before taking any action to give effect to the proposal for such
expansion, give to the Central Government notice of its intention to
make such expansion stating therein the scheme of finance with regard
to the proposed expansion, whether it is connected with any other undertaking or undertakings and, if so, giving particulars relating to all the
inter-connected undertakings and such other information as may be
prescribed. Section 22 provides for the establishment of new undertakings. It says that no person or authority, other than g11yernment,
shall, after the commencement of this Act, establish any new undertaking which, when established would become an inter-connected
undertaking of an undertaking to which clause (a) of s. 20 applies,
except under, and in accordance \Vith the previous permission
of the
Central Government. Sub-section (2) of that section provides for an
application for that purpose to the Central Government. Section 23
provides:
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"23. Merger, amalgamation and take-over-(!) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the
time being in forcc,(a) no scheme of merger or amalgamation of an undertaking to which this Part applies with any other
undertaking,
(b) no scheme of merger or amalgamation of two or more
undertakings which would have the effect of bringing into existence an undertaking to which clause (a)
or clause (b) of s. 20 would apply.
shall be sanctioned by any Court or be recognised for any purpooe or
be given effect to unless the scheme for such merger or amalgamation has
been approved by the Central Government under this Act.
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(2) If any undertaking to which this Part applies frames
a scheme of merger of amalgamation with any other undertaking or a scheme of merger or amalgamation is proposed
384
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976) 1 S.C.R.
between two or more undertakings, and, if as a result of such
merger or amalgamation, an undertaking would come into
existence to which clause (a) or clause (b) of s. 20 would
apply, it shall, before taking any action to give effect to the
proposed scheme, make an application to the Central Government in the prescribed form with a copy of the scheme
anmixed thereto, for the approval of the scheme.
(3) Nothing in sub-section (1) of sub-section (2) shall
apply to the scheme of merger or amalgamation of such intercounected undertakings as are not dominant undertakings and
as produce the same goods.
(4) If an undertaking to which this Part applies proposes
to acquire by purchase, take over or otherwise the whole or
part of an undertaking which will or may result either-
A
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(a) in the creation of an undertaking to which this Part
would apply; or
(b) in the undertaking becoming an inter-connected
undertaking of· an undertaking to which this Part
applies,
it shall, before giving any effect to its proposals, make an
application in writing to the Central Government in the prescribeli form of its intention to make such acquisition, stating
therein information regarding its inter-<:onnection with other
undertakings, the scheme of finance with regard to the
proposed acquisition and such other information as may be
prescribed.
( 5) No proposal referred to in sub-section ( 4) which has
been approved by the Central Government and no scheme
of finance with regard to such proposal shall be modified
except with the previous approval of the Central Government.
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(6) On receipt of an application under sub-section (2)
or sub-section ( 4), the Central Government may, if it thinks
fit. refer the matter to the Commission for an inquiry and the
Commission may, after such hearing as it thinks fit, report
to the Central Government its opinion thereon.
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(7) On receipt of the Commission's report the Central
G~vernment may pass snch orliers as it may think fit.
( 8) Notwithstanding anytltliig contained in any other
law for the ti.Jne bein~ in force, no proposal to acquiro bv
purchase, take-over or otherwise of an undertaking to which
thill part appliei: 'hall be given effect to unless the Central
Government has made an order according its approval to the
proposal.
!
(~>. Nothing in
sub-~ection ( 41)
shall apply to the
acqms1t1on by an undc11aking which is not a dominant under-
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CAREW & co. LTD. v. UNION (Mathew, J.)
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385
taking, of another un,l:lertaking which is not also a dominant
undertaking, if both such undertakings produce the same
good~:
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Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply, if,
as a result of such acquisition, an undertaking coll!-cs into
existence to which clause (a) or clause (b) of sectJon 20
would apply."
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Section 28 states that the Central Government before accoAfing
approval in the exercise of its powers under Part A or Part · B of
Chapter III shall take into account all matters which appear in the
particular circumstances to be relevant and enjoins that regard shall
be had to the neelcl _consistently with the general economic position of
the country to achieve the production, supply and distribution, by
most efficient and economical means, of goods of such types and
qualities and several other c_:onsiderations specified therein.
The submission of the coµnsel for the appellant was that in order
that an enterprise may become an 'undertaking' within the definition
D of the word 'undertaking' in s. 2(v) of the Act, it is necessary that
the enterprise must be engaged in production, supply, distribution or
control of goods of any description or the provision of service of any
kind and that when the appellant proposed to form the new company
for taking over the sugar unit of the appellant in consideration of 100
per cent shares in the new company, that company had not acquired
the sugar unit of the appellant nor was it engaged in the production,
E supply, l:listribution or control of goods, etc. as an enterprise of Shahiahanpur Sugar Private Limited and so there was no proposal to acquire
by purchase, take over or otherwise of the whole or part of any
undertaking within the meaning of s. 23 ( 4). According to counsel, it
is only when an 'undertaking' to which Part III applied proposes to
acquire by purchase, take over or otherwise, the whole or part of an
undertaking which would result in the creation of an undertaking to
F which that Part applies that s. 23 ( 4) would be attracted. In other words,
the argument was that as the proposal was only for acquirising 100 per
cent shares in Shahjahanpur Sugar Private Limited, the proposal
was not to acquire the
whole or
any part of
an undertaking since neither Shahjahanpur Sugar Private Limited had
become the owner of the sugar unit of the appellant as there was only
a proposal to transfer it to it, nor was that unit engaged in production,
G supply, distribution or control of goods as an enterprise owned by
Shahjahanpur Sugar Private Limited. The further submission was that
in any event the proposal to acquire 100 per cent shares in Shahjahanpur Sngar Private Limited by the appellant would not involve a pronosal to acauire an undertaking to be owned or even owned by
Shahiahanpur Sugar Private Limited, as the acquisition of 100 per cent
shares would onlv vest in the appellant, the right to control ant! manage
H the affairs of Shahjahanpur Sugar Private Limited.
Section 2 of the Act makes it clear that the definitions ~ven in
that section will be attracted only if the context so requires. The word
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SUpREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 1 S.C.R.
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'undertaking' is a coat of many colours, as it has been used in different
sections of the Act to convey different ideas. In some of the sections,
the word has been used to denote the enterprise itself while in many
other sections it has been used to denote the person who owns it. The
definition of the word 'undertaking' ins. 2(v) of the Act would indicate
that 'undertaking' means an enterprise which is engaged in production,
sale or control of goods, etc.
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We think that the question to be asked and answered in this case
in terms of s. 23 ( 4) is : Did the appellant make a proposal to acquire
any undertaking of Shahjahanpur Sugar Private Limited by purchase,
take over or otherwise? To answer this question, it is necessary to see
whether the sugar unit which was proposed to be transferred to Shahjahanpur Sugar Private Limited hatl been engaged in the production of c
goods, etc., as an enterprise of that company. It is clear that on the
date of the proposal the sngar unit of the appellant had not become
an undertaking of Shahjahanpur Sugar Private Limited as it had not
been engaged in the production of goods, etc., as an enterprise owned
by that company. It is only possible to visualize two possibilities when
the proposal was made : either the sugar nnit remained an undertaking
of the appellant, although it was proposed to be transferred to Sha- D
iahanpur Sugar Private Limited or that the sugar unit became an
enterprise of Shahjahanpur Sugar Private Limited. If the sugar unit
remained part of the undertaking of the appellant when the proposal
was made to take the 100 per cent shares, the proposal cannot be
one to acauire an undertaking, as ex hypothesi the undertaking had not
been transferred to Shahjahanpur Sugar Private Limited. But, if the
proposal to take 100 per cent shares involved an acquisition in future E
by th,: appellant of the sugar unit after it has been transferred tu the
new company, there was no proposal to acquire by transfer, take over
or otherwise of an 'undertaking' .as the sngar unit was not at the time
of the proposal engaged in prolduction of goods, etc. as an enterprise
of Shahjahanpur Sugar Private Limited.
An enterprise can be characterized as an undertaking within the
definition . of. the. term only when it is engaged in the production,
supply, d1stnbut1on or control of goods of any description or the
provision of service of anv kind. In The Union of India v. Tat<:
EnRineerin.~ and Locomotive Co. Ltd. ( 1 ), the Coun held that a more
capacity or a !Uere intention by an undertaking to carry on an activit'·
?s referred tom ~lause (v) of s. 2 of the Act in future alone without
its bcmg so done m the present, i.e., at the material date or some time
in :he past i.e., before the material date, cannot mean that the undcrtakrng 1s engaged in an activity as contemplated ins. 2(v) of the Ac:.
No tloc;bt, a temporary cessation of the activity will not detract an
enterpr~s~ from its character as an undertaking, if the animus to resume
the ac~1v1ty as s?on as possible is there. If a factory has had to close
tlown. its operations on account of a strike, lock out, shortage of raw
materials, shortage of power, or even want of finance, it cannot be said
(!) [1972] Bombay Law Reporter 1.
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that it is not engaged in the production of goods, if the intention of
the owner is to resume its activities. The view taken in In re Canara
Bank Ltd. ( 1 ) is much the same. There the Court followed the decision
of the Bombay High Court referred to above and said that until a
concern goes into the actual production, it cannot be said to be an
'Undertaking'.
B
The sugar unit of the appellant was no doubt engageld in production
of goods, etc., when the proposal was made and was, therefore, an
undertaking; but it was only an undertaking of the appellant as the
sugar unit had not been transferred and had not become an enterprise
of Shahjahanpur Sugar Private Limited. The sugar unit did not
become an undertaking of Shahjahanpur Sugar Private Limited as it
was not and could not be engaged in the production of goods, etc.,
on its behalf before it was transferred to it. Sub-section ( 4) of s. 23
is confined to the case of a proposal to acquire an undertaking by
purchase, take over or otherwise but, to become an undertaking, it
must presently be engaged in the production of goods, etc. The mere
fact that the Memorandum of Association of Shahjahanpur Sugar
Private Limiteld contained an object clause which provided for production of sugar would not necessarily mean that the company would
go into production and thus become the owner of an undertaking
as defined in s. 2 ( v) of the Act. Take for instance the case of an
individual or a firm. Does he or it become an 'undertaking' merely
because he or it entertains an object to produce goods unless he or
it is actually engaged in production of goods, etc.? .Certainly. not.
If that is so in case of an individual or a firm, we see no reason why a
different standard should be applied in the case of a company merely
because the object or one of the olijects of the company is to produce
goods, etc., if it is not actually engaged in production of goods.
Reference was made to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 4th edition, Vol.
1, p. 909 where it is stated that the phrase "engaged in any business"
is apt to include employment at a salary as well as embarking on a
business or in partnership. We do not think that even if the phrase
'engaged in business' conveys the idea of embarking on it, Shahjahanpur
Sugar Private Limited had embarked on the business of production of
sugar merely because its memorandum of association provided that
the object of the company was to prolduce sugar. It is, therefore,
difficult to imagine how when the proposal was made there was ?n
enterprise engaged in the production of sugar and owned by Shahjaha'npur Sugar Private Limited which could be acquired .
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To put the matter in a nutshell : The sugar unit of the appellant
was an undertaking of the appellant. . Even if the proposal to acquire
100 per cent shares in Sh:J4jahanpur Sugar Private Limited is considered to be a proposal to acquire either Shahjahanpur Sugar Private
Limited or its sugar unit, since neither Shahjahanpur Sugar Private
Limited nor its sugar .unit as an enterprise owned by it had gone into
production of goods, the proposal did not involve the acquisition of
an undertaking. Until the object in the memorandum of association
(I) A. T. R. 1973 Mysore 95.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 1 S.C.R,
of Shahajahanpur Sugar Private Limited was realized by the sugar
unit going into production on behalf of the new company, it cannot
be said that either Shahjahanpur Sugar Private Limited or the sugar
unit transferred to it was_ an 'undertaking'. An entity which is not
engaged in actual productio_n of goods or supply of services is of no
economic significance and has to be excluded from the purview of the
Act. Hence, what may be done by an individual, firm or company in
future has no present economic significance. Therefore, even if it
be assumed that acquisition of 100 per cent shares could result in the
acquisition of the new company or of an undertaking, the appellant
was not acquiring an 'undertaking' as defined in the Act as the new
company would not be engaged in production of goods etc. at the
time of the acquisition of the shares by the appellant and s. 23 ( 4) of the
Act would not be attracted.
We also think that by the proposal to acquire the 100 per cent
shares in Shahjahanpur Sugar Private Limited or by the actual
'acquisition of the shares, the appellant acquired only the control and
the right to manage the company. The word 'undertaking' in the
latter part of s. 23 ( 4) denotes an enterprise which is considered as an
entity engaged in the production of goods, etc. By getting: 100 per
cent shares in Shahjahanpur Sugar Private Limited, the appellant never
acquired that undertaking owned by the new company by purchase.
take over or otherwise. The undertaking remained the undertaking of
Shahjahanpur Sugar Private Limited. In other words, the purchase
of 100 per cent shares in Shahjahanpur Sugar Private Limited cannot
be eQuated to the purchase of the undertaking owned by Shahjahanpur
Sugar Private Limited. What s_ 23 ( 4) requires is the acquisition by
purchase, take over or otherwise of an undertaking. As we said, by
getting the 100 per cent shares in Shahjahanpnr Sugar Private Limited,
the appellant only acquired the control and the right of management
of Shahjahanpur Sugar Private Limited; but that will not amount to
a purchase of the undertaking owned by that company. It is wcil settled
that a company has separate legal personality apart from its shareholders an:l it is only the company as a juristic person that could own
the undertaking. Beyond obtaining control and the right of management of Shahjahanpur Sugar Private Limited, the purchase of 100
per cent shares had not the- effect of an acquisition of the undertaking
owned by it. No doubt, on a dissolution of the company, the shareholders would be entitled to a distributive share of the assets of the
company. But it does not follow that while the company is a going
concern, the sharehoWers are the owners of its assets including any
undertaking. It is the company as a separate entity which alone can
own the nndertaking and the purchase by the appellant of 100 per
cent shares did not make it the owner of the undertakinp:. We ~re
aware that we are dealing with an economic legislation calculated to
give effect to the Directive Principles of State Policy set out in clauses
(b) and ( c) of Article 39 of the Constitution and that the purpose
of the legislation shonld be kept in mind in interpreting its provisions;
but we are not prepared to assume that the le!!islature has, bv a sidewind, swept awav the well established fundamental legal concepts of
the law of corporation in making the legislation. We do not pause
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389
to consider whether the circumstances which the Central Gove=ent
took into account in passing the order were germane in the light of
the provisions of s. 28 of the Act as we hold that s. 23 ( 4) has no
application at all to the facts of the case.
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No arguments were addressed at the bar as to whether the facts
of the case would attract the provisions of s. 22. We, therefore, think
it not proper to express any definite opinion about the applicability
of that section and we refrain from doing so. If, however, the facts
of the case attract the provisions of s. 22, it goes without saying that
the appellant will have to apply and obtain the approval as visualized
in that section.
We allow the appeal but make no order as to costs.
KRISHNA IYER, J.-1 have had the advantage of perush1g the
judgment of my learned brother, Mathew J. but, while concurring in the
conclusion, desire to append a separate opinion since the strands of
my reasoning differ. Mathew, J .'s judgment presents the necessary
facts in the simplest form, sets out the scheme and the object of the
Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (for short, the Act)
whose construction falls for decision, but perhaps tends to petrify the
pivotal concepts of 'undertaking' defined in s. 2(v) and acquisition in
the comext of Part A of Chapter III of the Act, if I may say so with
respect. Perhaps we are hearing the first case in this Court under
this 'economic' legislation, although three rulings from two High Courts,
having some bearing on the controversy before ns, were cited at the
bar.
Shri Gupte, appearing for the appellant, posed the issue in a
neatly simplistic way when he assailed the order of the Central Government under s. 23 ( 4) of the Act on the score that, absent acquisition
of an 'undertaking' in terms of s. 2(v), the order was devoid of jurisdiction. This provision deoals with concentration of economic power
whose inhibition is one of the paramount purposes of the statute. Section 23 falls within Chapter III, Part A, of the Act. Section 20 states
that that Part shall apply oaly to certain types of undertakings. Admittedly, the appellant is a big, plural undertaking falling within this Part
and proposes to make over the sugar unit (which is one of the enterprises of this large multi,production concern) to •a new company to be
floated. This latter company is to have 100% of its shares owned by
the appellant and, what is more, by a process of inflated valnatida of
the assets of the sugar unit, the appellant will also appear to be
advancing a loan of several lakhs of rupees to it. According to the respondent (the- Union of India) and the State of U. P., this new scheme
is dubious in many ways and more si,1ister than seems on ·the surface.
We need not go into the details except to state that if the facts urged
by counsel for the respondent were true, it is a high risk to the community to approve of the proposed scheme from the point of view of
the purposes of the Act and the Directive Principle enshrined in Art.
39(c) of the Constitution.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 1 S.C.R.
It is unfortunate that in cases where the economic object and
impact of special types of legislation call for judicial interpretation, the
nece5'ity for a detailed statement of the background facts and supportive data, apart from some sort of a Brandeis brief illuminating the
social purpose of the statute, is not being fully realised by the State.
In the present appeal materials were read out from the files which disturbed me but no comprehensive affidavit marshalllag the social and
economic facts relevant to the case and the statute was filed.
(At
kast copies of the Monopolies Inquiry Commission's Report, extracts
from the draft Bill, Notes on Clauses c.:1d the Objects and Reasons of
the Act were made available while arguments started). Even so, the
Court should hesitate to upset the Central Government's order without a strong case of glaring error oa the merits and clear excess or
absence of jurisdiction being made out by the appellant.
Shri Gupte, has, however, by-passed the controversial area of facts
by a line of legal reasoning which is attractive but specious.
He
contents that s. 23'( 4) cannot apply save where the dominant undertaking (in this case, the appella'at) proposed to acquire 'the whole or
part of an undertaking which will or may result either in the creation of
a undertaking to which Part A will apply or in the undertaking becoming an inter-connected undertaking of a'a undertaking To which Part A
applies'. Therefore, runs the argument, what is sought to be acquired must be an undertaking. In the present case the sugar unit is
already an asset of the appellant's concern a'ad what is proposed is
nothing more than to float a i;ew company whose shares will be acquired
i11 toto by the appellant.
Only when that company goes into production it becomes an 'undcctaking' and onlv then can s. 23(4) poss'blv
cover the case, the reason being that an 'undertaking', by definition in
s 2 ( v). 'means an undertaking which is engaged in the production ....
of goods .... '.
The acce'at placed by counsel is upon 'is engaged in
the production'. He submits that the new company does not become
an 'undertaking' until is is 'engaged in the production of goods'. What
is not in esse but only in posse is not an undertaking. So much so
the application of s. 23 ( 4) is premature and the Central Government's
order is illegal. Moreover, no acquisition of the new company is
contemplated, the owning of 100% shares thereof not being in law
an acquisition of the undertaking as such by the appellant. I concede
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there is force in this argume•at.
The crucial submissions of counsel for the appellant, however,
stand exposed to the criticism made by Shri P. P. Rao for the rcspondent that they turn more or less on a play of words in the definition
of 'undertaking' in s. 2(v) and legal ingenuity about acquisition thereof.
Is there substance in these contetionc;; or are thev Ic,gn!
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suhter-
fuges to escape from the statutory meshes ?
The law is not 'a brooding omnipotence in the sky' but a pragmatic
instrument of social order. It is an operational art controlling economic life, and interpretative effort must be imbued with the statutory
tmrpose. No doubt, grammar is a good guide to meaning but a bad
/
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391
master to dictate. Notwithstanding the traditional view that grammatical construction is the golden rule, Justice Frankfurter used words
of practical wisdom when he observed : (1)
'There is no surer way to misread a document than to
read it literally".
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Indeed, this case really tur,1s on the Court's choice of the correct
canon of construction as between two alternatives. Is an 'undertaking' an economic enterprise which is actually producing goods ? Here
we <Dvcr-stress the 'in praesenti' aspect and thereby undermine the
legislative object. Oa the contrary, is an 'undertaking' used in its
economic sense and in its wider connotation of embracing not merely
factories which have been commissioned but projects which are emc bryonic and designed to go into production immediately formal legal
personality is acquired and statutory approval under the Act secured ?
fa the present case there is already a sugar unit which is working and
this mill is being transferred as the asset of the new company. The
new company, immediately it is registered and the Central Government's approval under s. 2314) obtained. will go on stream since the
mill's wheels will continue to turn regardless of the legal metempsyD chosis of ownership. In such a case it would be aba'adoning com1nonsense and economic realitv to treat the proposed uEdc1·taking as
anything less than an 'undertaking' (as defined in the Act) because it
is only in immediate prospect. For certain purposes, evea a child in
the womb is regarded as in existence by the law and I cannot bring
myself to an understanding of the definition which will clearly defeat
the
anti-concentration-of-ecoaomic-power objective of the legislation.
E
Moteovcr, 'to undertake' is to set about; to attempt to take upon oneself solemnly or expressly; to enter upon; to endeavour to perform
(sec Black's Law Dictionary). If what the appellant intends to
acquire or establish is as undertaking in fact and therefore in law, the
:ransformation device and the .. refuge in grammar cannot I1elp hin.1. the
expression being capable of taking in not merely what is, but what
F is c-bow to be. An 'undertaking' is defined as an undertaking ..... .
which itself discloses the difficulty felt by the draftsmen in delineating
the precise content. Obviously, a dynamic economic concept cannot
be imprisoned into ineffectualness by a static strict constructida. 'Is
engaged in production', in the context, takes in not merely projects
which have been completed and gone into production but also blueprint stages, preparatory moves and like a'ate-production points. It
is descriptive of the series of steps culminating in production. You
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are engaged in an undertaking for production of certain goods when
you seriously set about the job of getting everything essential to enable
production. Ecol10mists, administrators and industrialists understand
the expression in that sense and oftentimes projects in immediate prospect are legitimately set down as undertakings engaged in the particular
line. Not the tense used but the integration of the steps is what is
decisive. What will materialise as a productive enterprise in futuro
H can be regarded curreJ,1tly as an undertaking, in the industrial sense.
l_:_!_"__not distant astrology but imminent futurology, and the phrases
(I) Massachusetts B. &Insurance Co. v. U.S. 352 U.S. 128, 138.
'
392
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] l s.c.R.
of the statute are amenable to service of the purposes of the law, liberally understood.
Likewise, acquisition of an undertaking is to be
viewed not in a narrow sense but as a broad business operation.
Surely, the new company is an undertaking which, by the vesting of
l 00% of its share-holding in the appellant, is going to belong to the
latter. It is either acquiring or establishing the new adventure. That
is the plain truth and law must accord with it. After all, a broaclened,
sophisticated and spectral sense must be given to these words of economic connotatio,1 without being hide-bound by lexicography or legalism.
Of course, any infant in law knows that holding shares is not acquiring
the companv with its distinctive personality. But any adult in corporate economics knows that controlling the operatici;is of an industrial
unit is to acquire or establish it for all economic purposes-depending
on whether that one is new or pre-existing.
The word 'undertaking' takes in also enterprises attempted (See
Webster's Dictionary on 'undertaki'ag', the meaning having received
judicial approval in AIR 1960 Bom. 22 at p. 24, paragraph 4). This
Court in Gymkhana Club( 1) has accepted the meaning given in Webster.
Similarly, 'engaged in' takes within its wings 'embarking on'
(Vide : Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edn. Vol. 2, p. 909).
1f the language used in a statute ca<a be construed widely so as
to salvage the remedial intendment, the Court must adopt it.
Of
course, if the language of the statute does not admit of the construction sought, wishful thinking is no substitute and then, not the Court
but the Legislature is to blame for enacting a damp squib statute. In
my view, minor defi;iitional disability, divorced from the realities of
industrial economics, if stressed as the sole touchstone, is sure to prove
disastrous when we handle special types of legislation like the one in
this case. 1 admit that viewed from one stal}dpoint the logic of Shri
Gupte is flawless. but it also makes the law lifeless, since the appellant
is thereby enabled neatly to nullify the whole object of Chapter III
which is to inhibit conc<Jatration of economic power.
To repeat for
emphasis, when two interpretations are feasible, that whlch advances
the remedy and suppresses the evil, as the legislature envisioned, must
find favour with the Court. Are there two interpretations possible ?
There are, as I have tried to show· and I opt for that which gives the
law its claws.
I am alive to and have kept within the limitations of judicial
·Options indicated by Cardozo in a different context :
"The Judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly
free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knighterrant roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty
or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from cO'asecrated principles ae is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence.
He is to
exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by
(I) [1968] l S. C.R. 742.
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CAREW & co. LTD. v. UNION (Krishna Iyer,!)
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analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinated to 'the
primordial necessity of order ia the social life'. Wide
enough in all conscience is the field of discretion that
rcmaini-."
(Benjamin Cardozo's 'The Nature of the Judicial Proceis'-Yale Uai-·
versity Press (1921). While judicial review, at least on processual
B issues, is the hallmark of fair dealing with rights of persons in a Republic, there are expanding areas of economic and techno!ogical codes
where the adjudicator has to tread warily alild pause circumspectly,
especially because the-expertise needed to unlock the statute is ordinarily unavailable to the judicial process and the subject matter is too
sensitive and fundamental for the uninstructed in the special field to
with confidence. The Constitution, in its essay in building
c handle
up a just society, interdicting 'concentration of economic power to the.
detriment of the community, has mandated the State to direct its policy
towards securing that end. Monopolistic hold on the nation's economy
takes many forms and to checkmate these manouvres, the administration
has to be astute enough. Pursuant to this policy and need for flexible
actiO'a, the Act was enacted. A variety of considerations (set out in
s. 28) amenable to subtle administrative perception and expert hand!D ing but falling beyond the formalised processes unaided by research·
and study that the Court is prone to adopt, may have to be examined
before reaching a right decision to allow or disallow seemingly inno-.
cuous but really or potentially anti-social moves of domrrrant undertakings. It is well-known that backdoor techniques, and corporate
conspiracies in the economic sense but with innocent legal veneer, have
been U$ed by oligopolistic organisations and mere juridical verbalism.
E ca:.mot give the Court the clue unless there is insightful understanding
of the subject which, in specialised· fields like industrial economics, is
beyond the normal ken or investigation of the Court or the area of
traditional jurisprudence. I must however emphasize that Court supervision and correction, within well-recognised limits, is not an expendable item since the rule of law is our way of constitutional l.ife. In
our
jural order, 'the ethos of adjudication' on independent court scruF
tiny is too qur,1tessential to be jettisoned without peril to those founding values of liberty, equality and justice, even though Judges considering comp]e)( a;ad technical legislations, may often leave the Executive
and other specialised bodies as the 'untouchable' Controllerate. There
is power for the Court to interfere, but it will be exercised 01aly when
strong circumstances erist, or other basic guidelines for control come·
G into play.
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Even so, this functioN, so vital to cry a halt wllen executive powers
exceed their bounds or are obliquely, oppressively or illegally used,
has meanin~ful dimensions and creative directioni wlien disp11tes dealing with futricate economic legislation fall for consideratfon. The
absence of research or 11.Ssessor assistance with special skill, knowledge
and experience in fields unfamiliar for jurists is a handicap which
demands attention for the sake of competent justice beittg administered
by superior Courts. After aJI, law must grow with life, if it is to do
justice to Developmeat, e'pecially in developing countries.
394
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 1 S.C.R.
Here -w·e come upon one of the basic deficiencies of our hnv
studies which do not yet take within their sweep, apart from jurisprudence, economics, politics and sociology. These arc distinct enough
at the core but shade off into each other. As Roscoe Pouud observed :
"All the social sciences must be co-workers, and emphatically all must
be co-workers with jurisprudence". Georges Gurvitch suppkmentecl
the statemeat by observing : "A little law leads away from sociology
but much law leads back to it". The desiderata arc neither nuvel
nor detractory but a n:<:ognilion of the new status of Law i';s a vis
Development in the context of the Court's high function of :.<eeping
the Executive and allied instrumentalities wisely within the leading
strings and formidable grip of the law. A1athony Dickey, in a University of London Public Lecture in Laws, advocates the need for making
judicial review of administrative action more of a reality than it is
as present and adverts to the court having to possess 'adequat•o background training' and 'first class research assistance'. In another
.article,(') the same author explains the permissibility in English Courts
of the practice of seeking asscssor-•assistance where specialist kn<)\vle<lge
and expert advice arc called for in complex case situations.
These observations are made by me to clear the ground for
approaching an 'economic' /is of a complex nature in a socio·kgal way
and not in the traditional liligative style. So viewed, what does on
'undertaking' mean in s. 23 ( 4) of the Act? Surely, 'definitions in the
Act are a sort of statutory d'ctionarv to be departed from when the
context stronglv suggests it. The central problem on which Shri Gupte,
appearing for the appellant, staked his whole case largely is as to whether
an undertaking covers only a going concern, a running frldustry and
not one in the offing or process of unfolding.
The decisions of the High Courts cited before us do not convince
1ne. On the other hand, the reasoning based on the present tens(: is
faulty as alreadv elaborated. lf this Court accepts the legalis:ic connotation of 'undertaking' a disi agcnuous crop of ne\V co1npanics \Vi.:h
~dterior designs n1ay v,:cll be floated taking the cuc~a c::inscqu-:;ncc
which this Court should thwart because lhcrcbv the law will be ccndemned to a pathetic futility. But in the view I take, may be s. 22though not s. 23 ( 4 )-is possibly attracted.
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I have already indicated my view on this issue. In the instant
case, the move is to de-link the sugar unit a1.1d re-incarnate it as t~12
Shahjahanpur Sugar (P) Ltd. We have two provisions which come
up for consider•ation in this expansionist and acquisitive situation.
Section 22 reads :
"22(1) No person or authority, other than Government,
shall, after the commencement of this Act, establish any new
undertaking which, when established, would become an interconnected undertaking of an undertaking to which clause
(a) of section 20 applies, except under, and in accorda\1ce
with, the previous permission of the Centml Government.
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(1) P. 497 Modern Law Review. Vol. 33, Septeo1ber 1970.
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(2) Any person or authority intending to establish a
new undertaking referred to in sub-section (1) shall, before
taking a11y action for the establishment of such 1'.ndertakmg,
make an application to the Central Government m the prescribed form for that Government's approval to the proposal
of esrablishing any undertaking and shall set out in such application information with regard to the i',1ter-connection, if
any, of the new undertaking (which is intended to be established) with every other undertaking, the scheme of finance
for the establishment of the new undertaking and such other
informatiO'a as may be prescribed.
(emphasis, mine)
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Section 23 ( 4) runs :
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"If an undertaking to which this Part applies proposes to
acquire by purchase, take-over or otherwise the whole or
part of an undertaking which will or may result either(a) in the creation of an undertaking to which this Part
would apply; or
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(b) in the undertaking becoming '1<1 inter-connected undertaking of an undertaking to which this Part applies,
it shall, before giving any effect to its propos'als, make an
application in writing to the Central Government in the prescribed form of its inte1i1tion to make such acquisition, stating
therein information regarding its interconnection with other
undertakings, the scheme of finance with regard to the proposed acquisition and other information as may be prescribed."
(emphasis, mine)
The sections when placed in juxtaposition, suggest that the appellant's operation is to establish a new undertaking (out of its old sugdr
unit, though) which, in view of the share-holding, will inevitably bocome an inter-cO'.mected undertaking of Carew & Co. (llK original
undertaking, i.e., the appellant). Not so much to acquire an existing
undertaking as to establish, by a concealed expansioaist objective, a
new undertaking with sugar manufacture is the core of the opcratioa.
Therefore, it is not s. 23 ( 4) that magnetizes the appel!<1nt's proposal
but, prima facie, Sec. 22. The $pecial provision must exclude the general and. in this view, the acquisition of an existing undertaking stands
repelled. The scheme of the Act deals both with establislzi11g a new
undertaking and acquiring (by contrast) an existing undertuking. So
J airee with my learned brother Mathew J. that the order under s. 23
( 4) is beyond its pale but add that this looks like a case for the applicati0'.1 of s. 22. If the appellant intends to go ahead with the new
adventure, he is trying to establish, he may, prima facie have to apply
for and get the previous permission of the Central Government under
s. 22. I am not pnrsuing this aspect of the application of Sec. 22 as
that will be decided, if found necessary, ufter fuller investigation fro.n
the angle of that provision.
[1976] 1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
396
The problem of interpretation of statutes raised ia this case is far
too important for me to ignore the manner in which jurists have been
viewing the question in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. I therefore
extract relevant excerpts from Harry Bloom who wrote on this topic
in the Modern Low Review, p. 197, Vol. 33, March 1970:
"The Law Commission (of Bagland) and the Scottish
Law Commission have dealt with one aspect of this problem,
but on the whole they have prudently steered clear of wider
issues. Their White Papor is a trenchant essay on the shortcomings of the present techniques & rules of interpretation,
and a mild rebuke of judges who arc still too faithful to the
Literal Rule. Its main burden, however is to make the case
for the use of extraneou_s docum~atary aids to interpretation,
and it does so, I should think, in a way that puts the answer
to this long-debated question beyond doubt. Among the recommendations (summed up in draft clauses at the end of
the Report} are that courts when interpreting statutM, should
be allowed to consider the following :
(oa) all iadications provided by the Act as printed by authority including punctuation and side-notes, and the short
title of the Act;
(b) any relevant report of a Royal Commission, Committee
or other body which has been presented or made to or
laid before Parliament pr either House before the time
when the Act was passed;
(c) any relevant treaty or other international oagreement
which is referred to in the Act or of which copies had
been presented to Parliament by command of Her
Majesty before that time, whether or not the United
Kingdom were bound by it at that time;
(d) any other document bearing upon the subject-matter'of
the legislation which had been presented to Parliament by command of Her Majesty before that time;
(e) any document (whether falling within the foregoing
paragraphs or not) which is declared by the Act to be
a relevant documei,1t for the purpose of this section."
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"In time, however, somebody will hal'e to tackle the bask
question-how long can we sustain the fiction that when the
legislature prescribes for a problem, the court, when eo10fronted with a difficult statute, merely uses the techniques
G
of construction to wring an innate mcani ag out of the word~?
1
One cannot, these days, approach the problem of statutory interpretation in isolation from the legislative proce&>.
And I do not think the proposal to allow the court to consult
parliamentary documeJ,1ts meets this objection. As long as the
li:ction persist that the courts merely 'interpret' itatutes, Parliament will co11ti11ue to put out legislation of ever increasing
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detail and complexity in the belief that it mnst provide a
complete set of answers. This is a self-defeating ambition.
Wbere does one look for the intention of the legislature in
today's monster Acts, with their flotillas of statutory instruments and schedules, the plethora of boards, tribunals and
committees, with delegated powers, which they set up, the
myriad of subjects they deal with, their confusing cross·
references to other statutes, and their often opaque and tortured language that defies translation into intelligible ideas/"
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"What exactly are the respective roles of Parliament and the
courts as regards legislation ? Since it is a fictio,1 that the
courts merely seek out the legislati~e intent, there must be a
margin in which they would or 'creatively' interpret legislation. The courts are 'finishers, refiners and polishers of
legislation which comes to them in a state requiring varying
degrees of further processing,' said Donaldson J. in Corvcraft Ltd. v. Pan American Airways, Inc., (1968 3 W.L.R.
714, 732) and indeed it i£ no secret that courts constantly
give their own shape to enactments."
x
x
x
x
x
."How do the present rules help, when a statute passzd
ad-hoc, to deal with a situation clearly envisaged by the legislature, is then applied to a whole new state of affairs that
were never originally cont~mplated ?"
To conclud~ on the poiat with which I began, 'undertaking' is an
expression
of flexible sementics and \•ariable conn9tation, used in this
E
very statute in different senses and defined in legal dictionaries widely
enough. In sum, what the appellant proposed to the Central Government was to establi$h a new undertaking, if we throw aside legal cam. ouflagcs built around a verb •and pierce the corporate veil. Therefore,
while jurisdiction in the respondent to apply s. 23.( 4) of the Act is
absent, the appellant may caught within the spider's web of s. 22--I
F do not express myself finally. The appeal must now succ~ed, but the
legal drama may still have its fifth Act for the appellant-I cannot be
futuristic as the full facts will first be examined by Government for
that purpose in case he chooses to apply.
G
iI
'
For these reasons I allow the appeal but, in the circumstances,
make· no order as to costs.
FAZAL Au,'J.-,---I agree with my brother Mathew, J., thats. 2~ of
the Mo·nopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969--herea(ter
to be referred to as 'the Act'-has absolutely no application to the
facts and circumstances of the present case. In this view of the matter
the impugned order of the Centml Gover.iment must, therefore, be
quashed. · Section 23 of the Act would apply only if the undertr.king
sought to be acquired is in actual and physical existence· and has gone
into actual production. The scheme which is the subject-matter of
this case is merely a proposal and unless the undertaking is in existence
mid doing business it wiU not fall within the meaning of s. 2(v) of the
Act which defines an "undertaking".
12-1839 Sup. CI/75
398
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976} 1 S.C.R.
I, however, entirely agree with my brother Krishna Iyer, J., that on
the facts disclosed in the appeal the Scheme propounded by the appellant may prima facie fall within the four corners of s. 22 of the Act.
The resolution passed by the appellant for setting up a new Company
may be extracted thus :
"RESOLVED that the Board of Directors be and is
hereby authorised to form a separate Compa'ay to be called
"SHAHJAHANPUR SUGAR (PRIVATE) LIMITED", as
a wholly-owned subsidiary of this Company, to ultimately
take over and operate the Sugar Factory undertaking of this
Company at Rosa (Uttar Pradesh) as a going concern.
FURTHER RESOLVED that the transfer of the assets
of the Sugar Factory unde1:taking to the newly formed subsidi•ary, viz. "SHAHJAHANPUR SUGAR (PRIVATE)
LIMITED"', be made on the basis of the valuation of the re>pective assets made by Messrs. LEES & DHAW AN, Chartered Surveyors on May 29, 1970."
This resolution unmistakably reveals the following essential features :
A
B
c
D
( 1) that the appellant intended to establish a new Company
and this proposal was approved by virtue of the resolution quoted above;
(2) that the new Company was to be floated by transferring
100 per cent shares from the Sugar Unit of the Company so that the appellant could retain effective CCJ1,1trol
over the new Company;
E
( 3) that the new Company after being established was to
be known -as "SHAHJAHANPUR SUGAR (PRIVATE) LIMITED"; and
( 4) that after. the establishment of the new Company the
appellant would become the owner of the new Company
as well as Carew Company Ltd. a'ad thus the proposed
new Company would be an inter-connected undertaking of the appellant.
These facts, therefore, may attract the essential ingredients of s. 22
of the Act and, if so, the appellant cannot be allowed to float & new
Company without complyl,1g with the statutory requirements of s. 22
of the Act iri which case fuller facts may have to be investig~ted for
that purpose.
The object of the Act in my opinion appears to be to prevont concentration of wrolth in the hands of a few and to curb monopolistic
tendencies or expansionist industrial endeavours. This objective is
sought to be achieved by placing three-tier curb on industrial activities
to which the Act applies, namely : (I) By providing
that if it is proposed to substantially
expand the activities of a Company by issue of fresh capi-
F
G
H
•
. CAREW &
A
co. LTD. v. UNION (Fazal Ali,!.)
3 99
ta! or by instoallation of new machinery, then notice to
the Ce'atral Government and its approval must be taken
under s. 21 of the Act.
(2) In the case of establishment of a new Company by insisting on the previous permission of the Central
·
Government under s. 22 of the Act.
B
•
(3) In the case of acquisition of an existing Company by
another Company by requ'iring the sanction of the ·
Central Government to be taken by such Company under
s. 23 of the Act.
The present case, in my opinion, may fall within the second category mentio.ned above.
V.M.K.
•
Appeal allowed .
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