SRI KRISHNA KHANNA versus ADDITIONAL DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, KANPUR AND ORS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 26 February 1975 | [1975] 3 S.C.R. 709 | 1975 INSC 48
Key facts
- Decided
- 26 February 1975
- Bench
- KUTTYIL KURIEN MATHEW*, P.N. BHAGWATI, N.L. UNTWALIA
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 38/1968
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1975] 3 S.C.R. 709
- Neutral citation
- 1975 INSC 48
Text of the judgment
709'
A
SRI KRISHNA KHANNA
~.
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, KANPUR AND ORS.
February 26, 1975.
[K. K. MATHEW, P. N. BHAGWATI AND N. L. UNTWALIA, JJ.]
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U.P. (Temporary) Control df Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, Sections 3, 7
and 7A and Control of Rem and Eviction Rules, 1949, Rules 3, 4, 5 and 6lntimation of racancy by landlord-Allotment order made afrcr expiry af rflc
ri'quircd period-Allotment order, if i11valid.
Compromise Decree-Compromise void, being w1/awful a11d opposed to
public policy-Respo11dent. if committed fraud in ignoring void compromise
while l•Pf'fyi11g for eviction of appellant.
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The appellant who is the owner of the building bearing No. 24/6, Tulsa
Kathi, Kanpur, lives in the upper floor of the building with his son and other
members of the family. There are two shops in the ground floor in which
tenants had been inducted. One of the shops has been in possession of Raghu.
nath Prasad Mehrotra, respondent no. 3 and his brother Kanahyalal Mehrotra
who have been carrying on the business of Druggists and Chemists in the said
shop as partners of the firm Pioneer Drug Stores. The other shop was in the
teaancy of Bata Shoe Company Ltd. Since the said Company had taken
another shop on rent sometime in the year 1961 it was about to vacate the shop
in the building of the appellant. He, therefore, filed an application on
7.. J 1-1961 before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer (Rent Controller) with
a copy to the District Magistrate, Kanpur under Rule 6 of the Control of Rent
and Eviction Rules, 1949 framed under Section 17 of the U.P. (Temporary)
Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 praying for the release of the shop in
his favour on the ground that he requ,ired the ao:ommodation for his own use
for establishing a· business for his son. On 2-5-1962. respondent No.· 3 made
an application under section 7 ( 2) of the Act for allotment of the accommodation to him. There were four more applicants under section 7(2). The shop
was actually vacated by Bata Shoe Company on 15-8-1962. On 16-8-1962 intimation was given by the apPellant to the Re.nt Controller about the vacancy of
the shop in accordance with section 7(1 ). The Additional District Magistrate,
to whom proceedings had been transferred, made an order on 17-9-1962 refusing to release the shop to the appellant and directed its allotment to respondent
No. 3. In pursuance of the orc!er made in his favour, the respondent got
actual possession of the shop from the appellant who had occupied the shop fn
the meantime.
Before the filing of the application by the third respondent on 2-11-1962
under section 7A of the Act, the appellant had filed on 22-9-IQ62, suit No.
132/ I 962 in the Court of First Civil Judge at Kan,pur challenbing the allotment order of the Additional District Magistrate and the Rent Controller
i\mpleading the third respondent as the sole defendant in the suit. A decree
for permanent injunction was asked for. Interim injunction was granted. The
suit ended in compromise on 11-10-1%2. The appellant filed an application
for review on 17-11-1962 before the Rent Controller asking him to review bis
e·{·parte order dated 15-11-1962 made under section 7A of the Act chiefly on
two grounds viz. (!) that no notice was served upon the appellant; (2) that
the third respondent had obtained the order fradulently by suppressing the fact
of compromise entered in Suit No. 13211962. The Rent Controller refused to
review his oruer and disrnissed the application on 8-1-1963. The appellant on
the same date i.e. on 8-1-1963 filed a petition in the Allahabad High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution to challeng~ the various orders of allotment and delivery of possession made by 1 ~spondents I and 2 from time tc
time. The Writ J>etition was dismissed by a learned single Judge on 7-5-1963.
Special Appeal No. 254/1963 was dismissed by a Bench of the Allahabad High
Court on 3-2-1964. The present appeal was preferreti in this Court on grant
of certificate by the High Court.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
·.110
(1975] 3 S.C.R.
It was contended on behalf of the appellanC that
A
(i) The order of allotment havini not been made within 30 days of
the receipt oi' the intimation sent by the landlord under s1:ction
7 (1) (a) of the Act as required by Rule 3 of the Rules was llltr11
~ire~ and void;
(ii) Respondent No. 3 had no right to apply for possession under
section 7A of the Act after having entered into a compromise in
Suit No. 132/ 1962;
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(iii) that the order of allotment issued by the Rent Controller was bad
as it was mechanically issued on the basis of the order of the Additional District Magistrate and without any application of the miad
by the tormer.
Dismissini the appeal,
HELD : (By Court)
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(i) Section 3 of the Act providing for restrictions on eviction is baS<:d oil
public policy. It is intended to protect the weaker section of the commwlity
in gem:ral by granting equality of bargaining power. [714D; 718E]
Murlidhar Agarwal and A11r. v Slate of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.; A.I.R. 1974
S.C. 1924, relied on
In Jiwa11 Singh v. Rajindra Pra~ad & Anr., Civil Appeal No. 999(N") of
1971 decided on 18-12-1974, this Court held that if the landlord failed to ducharge his obligation of giving 7 days' notice in accordance with !ll~tio•
7(1)(a), he !Olli bis right of making a nomination under Rule 4. The District
Magistrate has got to i;riakc the orde~ of allotment within 30 days of the r•eccipt
of the intimation sent by the landlord under 11ection 7 (1 )(a) of the Act H•
has, at the same time, to give notice of bis order of allotmeni to the landlord.
If the landlord receives no notice from the District Magistrate within 30 days,
which as a matt.er of construction under Rule 4 must mean shortly after th•
expiry of 30 days of the receipt by the landlord under section 7(1)(a), of an
order of allotment having been made within that period, he gets a right to
nominate ~ tenant. Ordinarily and generally the District Magistrate shall bav•
to allot the accommodation to the nominee o_f the landlord but for special
reason~ to be recorded in writing, he may depart from the nomination made by
llhe landlord and allot the accommodation to some other person, even to a
person who was an appiicant before him before the expiry of the period Of 30
days and due to one reason or the other no order of allotment could be made
in his favour .within the said period. If, however, the landlord does not mat.
a nomination in accordance with Ruic 4 he cannot challenge the order of allotment subsequently made by the District Magistrate on the expiry of .the 'ieriod
of 30 days only on the ground of its having been made beyond the timr.
[7150-E, F-716B; 718E-719F]
(ii) In the instant caac it is not correct to say that the order of allotment
·made on the 17th September, 1962-two days after the expiry of the period of
30 days was invalid on that account alone. The High Court is also right in its
view that no order of allotment was poMible to be made in this case before
disposal of the landlord's claim under Rule, 6. There is no time limit fixed for
disposal of. such a claim. Of course it should be disposed of u quicklJ as
possible; preferably within the period of 30 days mentioned in Rule 3. Thaa
being so even, in the light of Rule 6 it is difficult to nullify an order or allot.ment made by the District Magistrate metely on the ground of havin1 been
made on the expiry of the period -0f 30 days. On the facts of this case !lllrely
the order of allotment was not invalid. [716D-E; 719F-720B]
(iii) The order of allotment in this case was made by the Additional Dia·
trict Ma~strate, respondent No. 1. It inay not be quite correct to say th11t it
was purely an administrative order as has been the view of the Hilb
·Court in the Special Appeal. But the order was made by him in
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a quasi-judicial manner after hearing the parties concerned and after fully applying his mind. He, being a delegate of the District Magistrate, waa compelftt
to make order of allotment. So was the Rent Controller. But the latter morely
issued the formal order made by the former. It was not a case where die
authority competent to make the order mechanically did it on the directioa or
in pursuance of an order of a differenr authority not competent to pa9' the
order. [717G-718B; C-D]
(ii) By majority (Mathew and Untwalia, JJ.)
The appellant filed Civil Suit No. 132/1962 against tire third respondent to
challenge the order of allotment made in his favour by respondent Nos. 1 aad
2. Neither of the said two respondents was impleaded as a defendant in ti.
suit. But that apart, the agreement entered into between the appellant amid
~spondent No. 3 embodied in the compromise petition dated 11-10-1962 Wfll
void under section 23 of the Contract Act as it was unlawful and against tit•
public policy of the Act under the Rules. So long as the Act and the llules
continued in force the control of letting vested in the Districl. Magistrale a"'
not in the portie8, By an agreement of the kind embodied iri the compromi!e
petition the parties could not curtail the wwers of the District Magistrate. n
was unlawful and against the public policy of the law to do so. RespondeDt
No. 3 committed no fraud in ignoring the void compromise when he applied
for eviction of the appellant under section 7A of the Act and for dcliYerv of
aclulll, physical possession to him. [717C-FJ
Per Bhagwati, J. (dissentina)
Even if the compromise was unlawful and the consent decree was oa taa\
account void, t'he very fact of the 3rd respondent having submitted to the
sent deem:, declaring the order of allotment to be invalid and recognising the
right of the appellant to occupy the shop for himself vi.r-a-vl.t the 3rd respoa.
dent, was a highly relevant circumstance bearing on the exercise of the discretion of the District Magistrate, and it ought to have been disclosed to the
District Magistrate. It is a well settled proposition of law and this propositioa
should apply equally in the field of administrative law, that when a. party
approaches a tribunal for discretionary relief, he must not only come wi1Ja'
clean hands but must also show the utmost good faith and disc!<* all material
facts having a bearing on the exercise of discretion of the authority which are
within bis knowledge. He cannot escape this obligation on the plea that th•
other side can always, if it so chooses, appear and bring the material facts to the
notice of the authority. It is an obligation of confidence which he owes to the
authority and this obligation is impoeed by law in the larger interesta of administration of justice so that justice, whether dispensed by Civil court or by
admini~trative authority, remains pure and unsullied. The non-disclOSUI'I of
the fact of consent decree by the 3rd respondent in the application made by
ltim vitiated the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Ofticer under 111Ction
"!A. [722C-723B; 72•A-EJ
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Civ1L APPELLATE JURISDICTION :
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Civil Appeal 1;0, 38 of 1968.
From the Judgment and Decree dated the 3rd February, 1964
of the Allahabad High Court in Spl. Civil Appeal No. 254 of 1963.
S. T. Desai, S. S. Bhatia, J. P. Goyal and S. M. Jain, for the
11ppellant.
.f3ishan Narain, B. P. Maheshwari and Surtsh Sethi, for respondent
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No. 3.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Untwalia,
.P. N. Bhagwati, J. gave a dissenting Opinion,
J.
712
sUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1975] 3 s.c.R.
J.-There is a building bearing no. 24/6, Tulsa
Kothi, situated at Mall in the City of Kanpur, The appellant in this
appeal filed by certificate of the Allahabad High Court is the owner
of the said building. He lives in the upper floor of the building with
his son and other members of the family. There are two shops in the
ground floor in which tenants had been inducted. One of the shops has
been coming in possession of Raghunath Prasad Mehrotra, respondent
no. 3 and his brother Kanahyalal Mehrotra who have been carrying
on the business of Druggists and Chemists in the said shop as parilners
of the firm Pioneer Drug Stores. The other shop was in the tenancy
·of Bata Shoe Company Ltd. Since the said Company had taken
another shop on rent sometimr in the year 1961 it was about to vacate
the shop in the building of the appellant. He, therefore, filed an applic;;. ~ion on 7-11-1961 before the Rent Control and Eviction OUicer
(fc,r brevity, Rent Controller) with a copy to the District Magistrate,
Kanpur under Rule 6 of the Control of Rent and Eviction Rules, 1949
framed under section 17 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent
and Ewction Act, 1947-herein'l\fter called respectively the Rules
and the Act praying for the release of the shop· in his favour on the
~ound that he required the accommodation for his own use for establishing a business for his son. On 2-5-1962, respondent no. 3 111adC'
an application under section 7(2) of the Act for allotment' of the accommodation to him. There were four more applicants under sec:tion
7(2). The shop wa,s actually vacated by Bata Shoe Company on
15-8-1962. On 16-8-1962 intimation was given by the appellant to
the Rent Controller about the vacancy of the shop in accordance with
seotion 7(1). It may be stated here that the Additional District Magistrate, respondent no. 1 as also the Rent Controller, respondent no. 2
had been authorised by the District Magistrate of Kanpur to exercise
powers under the Act. On 18-8-1962 Ike Rent (',,ontroller heard the
matters and fixed 27-8-1962 for orders. Due to some reason he felt
difficulty in dedding the 'Jlatter of the release of shop in favour of the
appellant or its allotmelit to any of the five f!pplicants including respondent no. 3. In due course, the District Magistrate transferred the
proceedings to the Additional District: Magistrate, respondent no. 1.
After hearing all the parties concerned he made an order on 17-9-1962
refusing to release the shop to the appellant and directed its allotrnent
to respondent no. 3 Thereupon a formal order of allotment alloting
the shop accommodation to respondent no. 3 was issued by the Re1H
Controller, respondent n·o. 2 on 18-9-1962.
UNTWALIA,
It appears that the appella.nt had in the meantime occupied the
shop when it was vacated by Bata Shoe Company. Respondent no. 3.
l!herefore filed an application under section 7A of the Act on 2·· 111962, which was allowed by the Rent Controller ·on 15-11-1962. The
order was ex-parte in absence of the appellant as he is said to have
not responded to the notice issued and alle!!ed to have been served
on him uuder sec~ion 7~(1) of the Act. The shop was got vacated
and act.ual possess10n delivered to respondent no. 3 with the help of
the pohce force on 16-11-1962 in accordance with section 7A(3) of
ilieAd
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s. K. KHANNA v. A.D.M. (Untwalia, J.)
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Before the filing of the application by the third respondent on
2-11-1962 under section 7 A of the Act, the appellant had filed on
22-9-1962 Suit No. 13211962 in the Court of First Civil Judge at
Kanpiur challe~ging the allotment order of the Additional District
Magistrate and the Rent Controller implementing the third respondent
as the sole defendant in the suit. A decree for pel'Qlanent injunction
was asked for. Interim injunction was granted. The suit ended in compromise on 11-10-1962. The terms of the compromise will have to be
considered at the appropriate place in this judgment. It may also be
noted here that Kanahyalal Mehrotra, brother of the third respondent, filed another suit to challenge the compromise decree dated
11-10-1962 claiming that the order of allotment had been made in
favour of the partnership firm and the third respondent had no right
to nullify the said order by the compromise. The suit was decreed
and we were informed at the Bar that an appeal from the decision of
the Trial Court is pending.
The appellant filed an application for review on 17-11-1962
before the Rent Controller asking him to review his cx-parte order
dated 15-11-1962 made under section 7A of the Act chiefly on two
grounds viz. ( that no notice was served upon the appellant; (2) that
D the third respondent had obtained the order fraudulently by suppressing
the fact of compromise entered in Suit No. 13211962. The Rent Controller refu•ed to review his order and dismissed the application on
8-1-1963. The appellant on the same date i.e. on 8-1-1963 filed a
petition in the Allahabad High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to challenge the various orders of aUotment and delivery of p0ssession made by respondents 1 and 2 from time to time. The
E Writ Petition was' dismissed by a learned single Judge on 7-5-1963.
Special Appeal No. 25411963 was dismissed by a Bench of the Alla·
habad High Court on 3-2-1964. The present appeal was pre·
ferred in this Court on grant of certificate by the High Court.
The appellant had urged five points before the High Court in the
special appeal. Mr. S. T. Desai appearing for him in this Court pressed only 3 points for our consideration in support of this appeal. They
.F are : (1) The order of allotment having not been made within 30 days
of the receipt of the intimation sent by the landlord under section 7(1)
(a) of the Act as required by:Rule 3 of the Rules was ultra vires and
void; (2) Respondent no.3 had no right to apply for possession under
section 7A of the Act after having entered into a compromise in Suit
No. 13211962; (3) thac the order of allotment issued by the Rent
G Controller was bad as it was mechanically issued on the basis of the
order of the Additional District Magistrate and without any application of the mind by the former.
Mr. Bishan Narain, learned counsel for resrandent no. 3 submittmentioned in Rule 3 was
ed that the period o~ 30 days
directory, or, in any view of the matter in the facts and circumstances
of this case the order of allotment was not bad on that account. He
further submitted that the allotment order was in favour of the partH
nership firm, respondent no. 3 had applied for the allotment as a partner of the firm and the compromise entered into between the appellant
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15-L 470 Sup.CI/75
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ll975J 3 s.c.a.
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and the said respondent was not bi.nding on the firm. Moreover, it
was illegal, null and void. He further argued that there was no sulJ..
:;tance i'l the third point urged on behalf of the appellant in as much
,ilS the order was. really that of the Additional District Magistrate who
had made it after fully hearing tl-te parties concerned.
The High Court in appeal has expressed the view that the requirement of passing the order of allotment within the period of 30 days
is directory or in any view of the matter on the facts of this ca!;e it
could not be made before disposing of the appellant's application for
. release of the accommodation under Rule 6. In the opinion of the High
Court the compromise was a fraud on the officers empowered to act
. under the Statute and was of no avail to the appellant. The order of
allotment was in fact made by the Additional District Magistrate and
the formality of issuing the order could be done either by him or by
the Rent Cuntroller, as it was an administrative order.
The object of the Act as its Preamble indicates is to provide for
continuance of powers to control the letting and the rent of residential and non-residential accommodation and too prevent the eviction
of tenants therefrom. Section 3 providing for restrictions on eviction
as held by one of us (Mathew, J.) delivering the judgment on behalf of
this Court in the case of Murlidhar Aggarwal Another v. State of Uttar
.Pradesh and others(') is based on Public Policy. It is intended, to
protect the weaker section of the community in gep.eral by granting
equality of bargaining power. The protection is based on public policy.
Similarly, the Scheme of the Act as per the· provisions contained. in;
Section 7 and 7A and Rules 3 to 6 is to curtail the right and freedom
of the landlord to a large extent in the matter of letting out of accommodation. Section 7 provides for control on letting; sub-section ( 1) of
which casts a duty on the landlord to give notice in writing of the
vacancy of the accommo::lation to the District Magistrate. Under subsection (2) the District Magistrate may "by general or special order
require a landlord t· · ,,,. ·r not to let to any person any accommodation which has fallen vacant or is about to fall vacant. The provision of sub-se1;tion r'.'1 has to be read in conjunction with the relevant rules. Section 7A empowers the J:?istrict Magi5trate to take action
against the unauthorised occupants by directing their eviction and in
case of necessity even with force. Proviso to sub-section (1) of Section
7A enjoins upon the· District Magistrate not to pass any order of eviction if he is satisfied that there has been undue delay or it is otherwise inexpedient to do so. In order to appreciate the true purp-ort of
the law contained in Section 7 of the Act it is necessary to read Rtaes
3 to 6 of the Rules in full :
3. "Allotment Order-'-The District Magistrate shall
make an allotment order within thirty days of the receipt of
the intimation sent by the landlord under section 7 (1 )(a) of
the Act and shall give notice thereof to the landlord.
4. Landlord's Right to Let-If the landlord, receives no
notice from the District Magistrate w~thin thirty days of the
(1) A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1924.
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s. K. XHANNA v. A.D.M. (Untwalia, !.)
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receipt by District Magistrate of the intimation given by
landlord under section 7(l)(a), the landlord may nominate a
tenant and the District Magistrate shall allot the accommodation to hiS nominee unless,
reasons to be recorded in
writing, he forthwith · allots the accommodation to other·
person.
5. Liability for Rent from the date of allotment-Th,:
allottee shall, unless he intimates in writing to the District
Magistrate his. refusal to accept the accommodation within
seven days of the receipt of the order, be liable for rent from
the date of allotment.
6. Occupation by landlord-When the District Malstrate is satisfied that an accommodation, which has fallen
vacant or is likely to fall vacan is bona fide needed by the
landl-ord for his own personal occupation, the District Magis- ·
trate may permit the landlord to occupy it himself."
for
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Recently in the case of Jiwan Singh v. Rajindra Prasad & Anr.('f,
j 11dgment of which was delivered by Mathew, J. on behalf of this very
Bench on 18-12-197 4, it was pointed out that if the landlord failed to
discharge his obligation of giving 7 days' 11otice in accordance with
section 7(1)(a), he lost his right of making .a nomination under Rule
4. It is to be noticed that on the failure of the District Magistrate to
make an ailotment order within the period pmvided in Rule 3 the landlord gets a right to nominate a tenant. The District Magistrate under
Rule 4 has got to allot the accommodation to the nominee of the landlord unless for the reasons to be recorded he allots it to somebody else.
Under certain circumstances therefore the Di~trict Magistrate is empowered to make an order of allotment even after the expiry of the
period of 30 days by ignoring the nomination made by the landlord.
In such a situation and in the context of the Rules it is difficult to
holdl that the period fixed for the making of an allotment order in
Rule 3 is mandatory in the sense of resulting in the nullification of the
order of the District Magistrate if made after the expiry of the period.
Without resorting to the well-known expressions of the requirement
of the law being mandatory or· directory we would rest our view on
the plain readin,g of the language of the Rules. The District Maoistrate .
.as we have said above, has got to make the order of allotment within
30 days of the receipt of the intimation sent bv the landlord urder
section 7(1)(a) of the Act. He has, at the same time, to give notice of
his order of allotment to the landlord. If the landlord receive8 no
notiee from the District Magistrate within 30 days, which as a mutter
of construction under Rule 4 must mean shortly after the expiry of
30 days of the receipt byl the District Magistrate of the intimation
)!iven by the landlord under section 7(1)(a), of an order of allotment
having been made within that period, he gets a right to nominate a
tenant. Ordinarily 1.ttd generally the District Magistrate shall have to
allot the accommodation to the nominee of the landlord 1- 1t for special reasons to be rec;.orded in writing, he. may dep::.:: from the nomination made by the landlord and allot the accommodation to some
(!) Civil Appeal No. 999 (N) of 1971.
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716
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1975] 3 S.C.R.
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other person, even to a person who wa.s an applicant before him be- .
fore the expiry of the period of 30 days and due to one reason or the
other no order of allotment could be made in his favour within the
said period. If, however, t!le landlord does not make a nomination in
accordwice with Rule 4 he cannot challenge the order of allotment
subsequently made by the District Magistrate on the expiry of the
period of 30 days only on the ground of its having been made beyond B
the time.
It is no doubt true that the liability for rent of the allottee begins
only from the date of allotment under Rule 5 and the landlord suffers
if there is delay in the making of the allotment by the District Magistrate. The landlord may move the legal machinery for forcing the
District Magistrate to make the allotment. Jt may well be that in some
case the order of allotment made after undue delay will be found to c
be bad. In the instant case it is not correct to say that the order of aliotment made on the 17th September, 1962-two days after the expiry
of' the period of 30 days was invalid on that account alone. The High
Court is also right in its view that no order of allotment was possible
to be made in this case before disposal of the landlord's claim under
Rule 6. There is no time limit fixed for disposal such a claim. Of
course it should be disposed of as quickly as possible, preferably with- D
iti the period of 30 days mentioned in Rule 3. That being so even in
the light of Rule 6 it is difficult tQ nullify an order of allotment made
by the District Magistrate merely on the ground of having been made
·on the expiry of the period of 30 days. On the facts of this case surdy
the order of allotment was not invalid.
The appellant filed Civil Suit No. 13211962 against the third res- E
pondent to challenge the order Qf allotment made in his favour by r·espondent nos. l ancl 2. Neither of the said two respondents was impleaded as a defendant in the suit. But that apart, the agreement entered
into between the appellant and respondent no. 3 embodied in the
compromise petition dated 11-10-1962 was void under section 23 of
thie Contract Act as it was unlawful and against the Public Policy o~
the Act under the Rules. The four terms of the compromise are as F
onder
(a) "That it is admitted by the defendant that at the
expiry of 30 days from the date of intimation the
shop in dispute automatically stood released t~ the
plaintiff and the allotment order dated 18th Sevtember, 1962 was not at al! effective vis-a-vis the
rights of the plaintiff as a landlord to use the said
premises.
(b) That the defandant has no ·objection if the plaintiff
continues to utilize the accommodations for his. own
busirn~ss or a business of his son whether himself or
in partnership with any person and till such time as
the plaintiff and his son utilize the accommodation in
this manner, the defendant will not be entitled to enforce his allotment order against him.
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(c) That the plaintiff has agreed that if at any time he
wants to discontinue the business established by
him in the said shop and wants to let out the shop
to any person, he will do so in favour of the defendant and unless he refuses to take the lease on reasonable terms, the plaintiff will not let out the shop to
any third party.
(d) That the shop is already in possession or the plaintiff
and the defendant will not be entitled to take any
steps till the landlord himself desires to let out the
shop to the defendant."
By clause (a) the parties agreed to the statement of the law which in
our judgment was not sound and correct. It will be hazardous to
permit a landlord and a tenant to agree to such a position of law.
It was not open to respondent no. 3 to permit the appellant to utilize
the accommodation for his own business or business of his son as was
done under clause (b). Nor was it open t'o the appellant to agn:e to
let out the shop, if in future he let it out to anybody, after giving
first preference to the third respondent as was agreed to be done
under clause (c). So long the Act and the Rules continued in force
the contml of letting vested in the District Magistrate and not in the
parties. By an agreement of the kind emobodied in the compromise
petition the parties could not curtail the powers of the District Magistrate. It was unlawful and against the public policy of the Jaw· to do
so. The Public Policy behind the Act and the Rules is to vest lhe
control o~ letting in the District Magistrate for the benefit of the
general public or to be more precise such members thereof who were
in need of accommodation on rent. In our opinion, therefore, respondent no. 3 committed no fraud in ignoring the void compromise
when he applied for eviction of the appellant under section 7A of
the Act and for delivery of actual, physical possession to him. We
do not accept the alternative argument put furward by Mr. Bishen
Narain as correct in respect of the compromise. It was not bad for
the rtason of having been entered into by respondent no. 3 .alone.
After perusing the application for allotment made by respondent
no. 3, the order of allotment made by respondent no. 1 and the order
made by respondent no. 2 under section 74(3) of the Act, we have
come to the conclusion that the allottee of the accommodation in
question was respondent no. 3 although he may have taken it for the
purpose of extending his business of Chemists and Druggists run in'
partnership with his brother.
The third submission made on behalf of the appellant has no
force and must also be rejected. The order of allotment in this case
was made by the Additional District Magistrate, respondent no. 1.
It may not be quite correct to say that it was purely an administrative
order as has been the view of the High Court in the Special Appeal.
But the order was made by him in a quasi-judicial manner after hearing the parties concerned and after fully applying his mind. He,
being a delegate of the District Magistrate, was competent to make
the order of allotment. So was the Rent Controller. But the latter
718
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1975] 3 S.C.R.
merely issued the formal order made by the former. It was not a
c:ase where the authority competent to make the order mei.:hanic:ally
did it on the direction or in pursuance of an order of a different
authority not competent to pass rhe order. In our judgment, therefore, the order of allotment allotting the accommodation to responde:nt no. 3 was not bad. 'Nor had the order made by the Rent Controller under section 7A of the Act any infirmity.
In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed..
A
B·
No orders a:; to
cost.
BHAGWATI, J.-1 have had the advantage of reading the judgment
of brother Untwalia, J. Hi:.; has discussed the three contentions
urged by Mr. S. T. Desai on behalf of the appellant and rejected
them. Whilst agreeing with the view taken by him in regard to the
first and the third contentions, I find myself unable to subscribe to
the view taken by him in regard to the .second contention. I shall
immediately proceed to give my reasons why I take a diITcrent view
as regards the s.econd contention, but before I do so, I would like to
add a few words in reference to the first contention.
The Act with which we are concerned in this appeal is the United
Provinces (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947.
The object of this Act, as may be gathered from its preamble, i~. tJ
provide for conl.:inuance of powers to control the letting and the rent
of residential and non-residential accommodation and to prevent the
eviction of tenants irom such accommodation. Section 7, which is
the material section, enacts various provisions relating to control on
le:tting. It consists of four sub-sections, but of them only twc are
material. Sub-s. l(a) requires the landlord to give notice of vaca:ncy
to the Distrkt Magistrate within seven da:ys after the accommodation becomes vacant by his ceasing to occupy it or by the tenant
vacating it or otherwise ceasing to occupy it or by termination of
tenancy or by release from requisition or in any other manner whatsoever. A similar obligation is laid on the tenant vacating the accommodation under sub-s. l(b). Sub-s. (2) then proceeds to say that
the :District Magistrate may by general or special order require a
landlord to Jet or not to let to any person any accommodation .which
is or has fallen vacant or is about to fall vacant. It may be noted
that the power conferred on the District Magistrate under sub-section
(2) is absolute in tel'l11s. The vacant accommodation is placed completely under the control of the District Magistrate and he may require
the landlord to let the accommodation to any person nominated by
him or he may even make .a negative order that the landlord shall
not let the accommodation to a par!icular person. Morco\·er, this
power may be exercised by the District Magistrate at any time. There
is no provision in the statute requiring the District Magistrate to
exercise this power within a particular time limit. The question is
whether there is anything in the Rules which imposes any such limitation ODI the District Magistrate ? Rule 3 provides that the Distdct
c
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s. K. KHANNA v. A.D.M. (Bhagwati, !.)
A
719
Magistrate shall make an allotment order within thirty days of the
receipt of the intimafron sent by the landlord under s. 7(1)(aj and
shall give notice thereof to the landlord. This Rule obviously contemplates that the District Magistrate must make an order requiring
the landlord to let the accommodation to a specified person within
thirty days of the receipt of the intimafron ·of vacancy from the landlord. But does it also carry with it by necessary implication a negaB
tive prohibition that if the District Magistrate does not make such an
order within the stipulated time, he shall be precluded from making
such order thereafter. We do not think so. The only· consequence
·of the District Magistrate not making an- order of allotment within the
period o~ thirty days is that set out in Rule 4. It confers. a right on
the landlord to nominate a tenant and where the landlonl makes such
a nomination, the District Magistrate is bound to allot the accomc modation to such n'ilminee "unless for reasons to be recorded in
writing he forthwith allots the accommodation to other persons".
It is significant to note that Rule 4 does not provide that if the District
Magistrate fails to make an order cf alh;tment within the period of
. thirty d~ys, the landlord may occupy the accommodation himself.
The only right which enutes to the landlord in', such a case is to
nomiillate a tenant. This he may do or may not do depending on his
D
volition. But he does not get a right to occupy the accommodation
for himself. Moreover, even where the landlord nominates a tenant,
the District Magistrate may, for reasons to be recorded in \vriting.
disregard such nomination and allot the accommodation to another
person notwithstanding the expiJiation of the period of thirty days.
It would, therefore, be seen that the time limit of thirty days is not
intended to operate as a fetter on the right of the District Magistrate
E to
make an order of allotment in the sense that he cannot thereafter
make such an order. The only reason why the period 'Of thirty days
is provided is that thereaf1ter the landlord gets a right to nominate a
tenar.t, thou!!h even this right can be displaced by the District Magistrate in a proper case. But if for some reason, the landlord does not
exercise this right and nominate a tenant, the power of the District
Magistrate to make an order of allotment conferred under s. 7(1)(-a)
F i&. not affected. There is nothing in the Rules which says tlii;t the
landlord shall be entitled to occupy the accommodation himself or
that the District Magistrate shall be precluded from making an order
of allotment ,after the expiration of the period of thirty days. Rule
4 in fact indi.::ates to the contrary. And so also does Ruic 6. That
rule provides that if the landlord want.s the accommodation bona fide
for
his own personal occupation, he must obtain permission of the
G District
Magistrate to occupy it himself. This provision also suggests
that the landlord does not become entitled to occupy the accommodation himself on the ·expiration of the period 0£ thirty days, but
he can do so only if the necessary permi$sion is granted by the District Magi~lrate. If is, therefore, clear, on a con;spectus of the provisions contained in s. 7, sub-ss. (1) and (2) Rules 3, 4 and 6, that
H even if an order of allotment is not made bv the District Magistrate
within the period of thirty days, the landlord does not become entitled
to occupy the accommodation himself in defeasance of the power of
the District Magistrate to make an order of allotment and the Dist-
720
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1975] 3 s.c.R.
rict Magistrate can, notwithstanding the expiration ~f the period ~f
thirty days, make an order of allotment under s,. 7.(lJ(a). . The va~1dity of the order of allotment made by the D1stnct Magistrate. m
favour of the third respondent could not, there£ore, be assailed on the
ground that it was made after the expiration of thirty days from the
receipt of intimation of vacancy from the appellant.
A
I would now turn to examine the third contention on which I
find myself in disagreement with my learned brother Untwaiia, J. The
facts which bear on this contention are fully set out in the judgment •of
my learned brother Untwalia, J. and I need not reiterate them. It
would be enough for my purpose to state that Civil Suit No. 132 of
1962 was filed by the appellant against the 3rd respondent in the
Court of the First Civil Judge, Kanpur challenging the validity of the
order of allotment made by the District Magistrate in favour of the
3rd respondent. Immediately on filing the suit, the appellant obtained an injunction restraining the 3rd respondent from taking any steps
to enforce the order of allotment or to interfere with the possession
of the appellant in respect of the shop. The result was that the 3rd
respondent was prevented from obtaining possession of the shop from
the appellant and he could ll'Ot even move the District Magistrate for
evicting the appellant and handing over possession of the shop to
him. The 3rd respondent, therefore, within a few days after the suit
was filed and the mjunction was obtained, entered into a compromise
with the appellant for settlement of the suit and the terms of this
compromise were as follows :
B
"(a) That it is admitted by the defendant that at the expiry
of 30 days from the date of intimation, the shop in
dispute automatically stood released to the plaintiff
.and the allotment order dated 18th September,
1962 was not at all effective vi.s-a-vis the rights of'
the plaintiff as a landlord to use the said premises.
(b) T!:Jat the defen.dant has no objection if the plaintiff
continues to utilize the accommodations for his own
business or a business of his son whether himself or
in partnership with any person and till such time as
the plaintiff and his son utilize the accommodati'Jn
in this manner, th; defendant will not be entitled to
. enforce his allotment qrder against him.
(c) That the plaintiff has agreed that if at any time he
wants to discontinue the busim;ss established by him
in the said shop and wants to let out the shop to any
person, he will do so in favour of the defendant and
unless he refuses to take the lease on reasonable
terms, the plaintiff will not let out the shop to any
third party.
(d) That the shop is already in possession of the plaintiff
and the defendant will not be entitled to take any
steps till the landlord himself desires to let out the:
shop to the defendant."
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s. K. KHANNA v. A.D.M. (Bhagwati, J.)
A
721
The learned Civil Judge presumably on the view that the compromise between. the partie~ was lawful, passed a decree in terms
of the compromise on 11th October, 1962 under Order XXIII, rule
3 of' the Code of Civil Procedure. One consequence of thjs consent
decr_ee was that the injunction against the 3rd respondent·. came to
an end. The 3rd respondent, thus freed from the inhibitory mandate
of the injunction, immediately proceeded to make an application
B to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on 2nd November, 1962
under s. 7A fur an order directing the. appellant to vacate the shop
on the ground that he was in occupation of, it in contravention of
the order of allotment made in favour of the 3rd respondent. The
application was in effect and substance one for enforcement of the
order of allotment under s. 7A. Now, under the consent decree the
order of allotment was declared void and ineffective and the right
c of the appellant to use the shop for his personal occupation was
recognized vis-a-vis the 3rd respondent, but the 3rd respondent did
not disclose this fact in the application, nor did he make any reference
in it to the consent decree. There was a di9pute between the parties
in regard to the service of the notice of the application on the
appellant, but it was found by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer,
as also by the High Court in the writ petition, out of which the
D present appeal has arisen, that the appellant refused to accept the
notice of the application and hence we must proceed on the basis
that the notice of the application was duly served on the appellant.
The appellant did not appear at the hearing of the application and
proceeding ex parte, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer passed
an order dated 15th November, 1962 directing that the appel!ant be
evicted from the shop and the 3rd respondent be put in possession
E of the same. Though this order was not contemplated to be
executed before 18th No~mber, 1962, the appellant was forcibly
evicted from the shop in pursuance of the order on 16th November,
1962 and possession of the shop was immediately on the same day
handed over to the 3rd respondent. The appellant applied for a
review of the order to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer but the
application
for review was rejected on 8th January, 1963. This
F
led to the filing of the .writ petition out of which the present appeal
has arisen before us.
The principal question which arises for consideration on these
facts is as to whether the order passed by the Rent Control and
Eviction Officer under s. '7 A was vitiated by reason of non-disclosure
of the fact of. consent decree by the 3rd respondent in the application
G made by him. It would be convenient at this stage to refor to the
relevant provisions of s. 7 A under which the application was made
by the 3rd respondent. Section 7A was introduced in the Act at
a later point of time in order to ann the District Magistrate with
the power to enforce the order of allotment made by him~ Sub-s. (1)
of that section provided inter alia that "where an order requiring
any accommodation to be let or riot t\) be let has been duly passed
H under sub-section (2~ of section 7 and the District Magistrate believes
or has reason to beheve, that any per~on has in contravention of the
said order, occupied the said accommodation or anv pa1t thereof
he may call upon the person in occupation to show cause, withi~
722
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1975] 3 s.c.R.
A
a time to be fixed by him, why he should n·ot be evicted therefrom . "
There is a proviso to this sub-section which is very m.aterial a.nd . it
says that "n,o order under this section shall be passed 1f t?e. D1stnct
Magistrate is satisfied that there has been undue delay or 1t is otherwise inexpedient to do so." Therefore, it is not in every case where
a person is in occupation ofl accommodation in contravention of an
order of allotment that the District Magistrate is required to maKe an B
order evicting such person and putting the allottee in possession of
the accommodation. Tite District Magistrate has a discretion in the
matter and if he finds that there has been undue delay on the part
of the allottee or that 0 n the facts and circumstances_ it is inexpedient
to make such a,n order, he may decline to do so. It must, therefore,
follow a fortiorari that all the facts and circumstances bearing on
the exercise oB his discretion should be before the District Magistrate c
in order to enable him to exercise his discretion in a just and proper
manner. Now, in the present case, there can be no doubt that the
fact rof consent decree having been obtained by the parties in the
suit was a very material fact which could have considerable bearing
on the question whether it was inexpedient to make an order under
s. 7A. The 3rd respondent having himself agreed with the appellant
and obtained consent decree in the suit, that the order of cllotment D
in his favour was void and ineffective and the appellant could occupy
the shop for himself, there can be no doubt that this piece of conduct,
unless satisfactorily explained, was bound to have its impact on the
exercise of discretion by the District Magistrate. The District Magistrate woultl certainly ask ~imself : "why should I exercise my discretion in favoUr of a person who has himself conceded in the consent
decree obtained from the Civil Court that the order of allotme:nt in E
. his favour is invalid and he has no objection to landlord occupying
the accommodation ?" Such conduct on the part of the 3rd respondent could be: inspired only by one of two reasons. It may be. that
the 3rd respondent submitted to the consent decree because the wanted
to get rid of the ittjunction issued against him by the Civil Court. So
long as the injunction stood, he could not obtain possession eve.n by
moving the District Magistrate under s. 7A. He, therefore, resorll~d to F
this device for the purpose of getting the injunction out of his way, so
that thereafter he could make an application to the District Magistrate
under s. 7A suppressing the fact of the consent decree and take a
chance of obtaining an order of eviction under that section. Or, it is
possible that at some poin,t of time subsequent to the p_assing of the
consent decree, the 3rd respondent was advised that the consent decree was void and inoperative and it did not preclude him from mak- G
in~ ~n application to the Di~trict Magistrate and obtaining an order of
ev1ct10n under s. 7A. In either case, he ought to have disclosed the
fact of the consent decree in the application made by him under s.
7A. If he thaught that the consent decree was valid, then obviously
non-?isclosure of it by him in the application made to the District
Magistrate was fraudulent, for it is difficult to see how he could have
possibly persuaded himself to believe that, notwithstanding the consent H
decree, he could make such an application. The inference in that
case would be irresistible that he submitted to the consent decree for
s. K. KHANNA v. A.D.M. (Bhagwati, /.)
723
A
the purpose of getting rid of the injunction, so that he could thereafter obtain an order of eviction from the District Magistrate by keeping back the fact of the consent decree from him. But even if I take
a charitable view of the conduct of the 3rd respondent and assume
that after the passing of the consent decree, he was advised that the
consent decree was null and void, I cannot exonerate him from blameworthiness in not disclosing the fact of the consent decree in the apB
plication made by him to the District Magistrate.
·
I do not think that it is open to a party against whom a decree
has been passed by a court of law, whether by consent or in invitum,
to arrogate to himself the right of adjudging that the decree is a nullity
and to disregard or to disobey it on that hypothesis. It is true that
a consent decree is based on an agreement between the parties and,
pointed out in Wentworth v. Bullen,( 1 ) "the contract of the parties
c isas not
the less a contract, an,d subject to the incidents of a contract,
bec:rnse there is superadded the command of the Judge." It would,
therefore. seem to be in·controvertible that a consent decree can be
avoided or declared void on the same grounds as a contract.
If
tthe compromise on which the consent decree is based is induced
by fraud, mistake, undue in,fiuence or any other ground which would
D avoid a contract, the consent decree would be liable to be set asic!e
but that would have to be done by the aggrieved party by filing a
suit. So Jong as the consent decree is not set aside in such suit,
it would be binding on the parties as such as a decree in invitum
and it would npt be open to either party to disregard or disobey
it. Similarly, if the compromise is unlawful, Order XXIII, rule 3
prohibits the court from passing a decree in accordance with' it and
E even if such decree is passed because neither party raises an objection,
it would be void. But the question is : can a party to a litigation
be permitted to decide for himself that the consent decree is void
and on' that view ignore it altogether as if it did not exist ? I do
not think so. Whether the compromise is unlawful so as to render
the consent decfee void· must be left to the determination of the
appropriate authority b'efore whom the question may arise and it
F .cannot be allowed to be determined by a party himself according
question may raise difficult and
to his personal judgment. Such
complex issues. It is not always easy to determine whether an
agreement is unlawful as being opposed to public policy or contrary to Jaw. The decision of such issues requires a certain amount
of legal training and skill and o'6jectivity of approach and these are
matters "hardly fit for final determination by the self-interest of a
G party". They must be left to the judgment of the appropriate
authority "and not the personal iudgment of one of the parties".
That is both a postulate and a requirement of the democratic form
of government. Jt was pointed out by Frankfurter, J., in United
States v. United Mine Workers of America( 2 ) : "No one, no matter
how exalted his oublic office or how righteous his private motive,
can be iudg:e in his own case." Otherwise society will be ruled not
H bv law but by brute power. "If one man can be allowed to determine for himself what is law, every man can. ?'hat means first chaos,
a
(I) (1829) 9 B & C 1840 N.
(2) 330 U.S. 258; 91 Law. Ed. 884.
724
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1975] 3 S.C.R.
.then tyranny." Legal process is an essential part of the democratic A
process. Therefore, to my min,d, there can be no doubt that if the
3rd respondent was of the view that the compromise was unlawful
and the consent decree was on that account void, he should have
taken appropriat~ proceedings in the civil court and got the consent
decree declared void before making an application to the District
Magistrate unlder s. 7A, or at the least, disclosed the fact of the B
consent decree to the. District Magistrate in his application under s.
7A and pointed out to the District Magistrate that the consent decree
was void on the ground that the compromise was against public
policy or contrary to the Act and did not, therefore, preclude the third
respondent from making an application for enforcement of the order
of allotment nor did it stand in the way of the District Magistrate
in making an order of eviction in favour of the 3rd respondent. The c
District Magistrate could not be asked to enforce the order of allotment in favour of the 3rd respondent unless the consent decree,
holding the order of allotment to be invalid, was first found to be
void, because, if it was valid, it would be binding on the 3rd respondent and he could not, in that event, seek the order of eviction
in his favour. This was, therefore, a material fact which ought to
have been disclosed by the 3rd respondent in the application made D
by him under s. 7A. But on 'this ground alone I would not be
inclined to quash and set aside the order made by the Rent Control
a11d Eviction Officer as delegate of the District Magistrate under s.
7A because, as pointed out by my learned brother Untwalia, J., in
his judgment, and there I agree with him, that the consent decree was
void by reason of the compromise being against the public policy of the
Jaw and hence there would be no point in interfering with the order of E
the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on this ground.
There is, however, one other aspect of this question which requires
consideration. It cannot be seriously disputed, and I have already reiferred to the aspect a little earlier, that the District Magistrate had
a discretion under s. 7A not to enforce an order of allotment, if he
thought that, en the facts and circumstances of the case, it was inexpedient to do so. Even if the compromise was unlawful and the consent decree was on that account void, the very fact of .the 3rd respon•
dent having submitted to the consent decree, declaring the order of allotment to be invalid and recognising the right of the appellant to occupy the shop for himself vis-a-vis the 3rd respondent, was a highly
relevant circumstance bearing on the exercise of the discretion of the
District Magistrate, and it ought to have been disclosed to the District
Magistrate. It is a well settleU proposition of law and this proposition
should apply equally in the field of administrative law, that when a
party approaches a tribunal for discretionary relief, he must not only
come with clean hands but must also show the utmost good faith
disclose all material facts having a hearing on the exercise of discretion
of the authority which are within his knowledge. He cannot escape
this obligation on the plea that the other side can always, if it so
chooses, appe~r and bring the material facts to the notice of the
F
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s. K. KHANNA v. A.D.M. (Bhagwati, !.)
A
B
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725
!authoriiy. It is an obligation of confidence which he owes to the
authority and this obligation is imposed by law in the larger interests
of administration of justice so that justice, whether dispensed by civil
court or by administrative authority, remains pure and unsullied. I
am, therefore, of the Opinion that the non-disclosure of the fact of
consent decree by the 3rd respondent in the application made by him
vitiated the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer under
s. 7A
I would, therefore, allow the appeal and quash and set aside· the
order made by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer as delegate of
the District Magistrate under s. 7A and direct the 3rd respondent to
hand over possession of the shop to the appellant. It would be open
to the District Magistrate to take such action under s. 7, su~s. (2)
as he thinks fit including making· of an order of allotment in favour
of any person he thinks proper. The District Magistrate may even, if
he so thinks fit, make a fresh order of allotment in favour of the 3rd
respondent. Each party will bear and pay his own costs of this
litigation.
D
ORDER
In view of the majority judgment the Appeal is dismissed with no·
order as to costs.
V.M.K .
.,
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