HARIHAR PRASAD SINGH AND ORS. versus BALMIKI PRASAD SINGH AND ORS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 10 December 1974 | [1975] 2 S.C.R. 932 | 1974 INSC 263
Key facts
- Decided
- 10 December 1974
- Bench
- M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG*, A. ALAGIRISWAMI, V.R. KRISHNA IYER
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 760/1967
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1975] 2 S.C.R. 932
- Neutral citation
- 1974 INSC 263
Text of the judgment
932
HARlHAR PRASAD SINGH AND ORS ..
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v.
BALMIKI PRASAD SINGH AND ORS.
December 10, 1974
IM. H. BEG, A. ALAGIRISWAMI AND v. R. KRISHNA IYER, JJ.]
Hi11du Law-Successio11-Special family custom, Proof of.
Code of Civil Procedure (Act 5 of 1908) 0.22 a1td 0.41, rr. 4 a1td 3.lF11i/ure to implead parties and legal represematives-Efject of.
A suit was filed by the plaintiffs claiming to succeed to th~ estate of R,, a
Bhu.mihar Brahmin. The basis of the claim was a special custom of the family
to whi:h the parties belonged, though under ordinary Hindu Law they would
not be entitled' to succeed to !he estate being related to R in a distant degree.
For establishini~ the custom the plaintiffs sought to prove 52 instances. The
trial court held that 49 instances ·were proved and decreed the suit. The High
Court, in appeal, held that none of the inslances were proved and allowed the
appeal.
Jn ap~al to this Court, a[>art from the contention that the High Court·was
·Wrong, the app·ellants (plaintiffs) also contended that the respondents' (defondants) 3,ppeal to the High Court should have been dismissed as parties WE>re
riot properly brought. on record; while the respondents raised the preliminary
objection that the appeal to this Court should be dismissed, because the leg.al
:representative of one of the deceased plaintiffs was not brought on record.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD : l(a) A.ccording to the plaint the parties are descendants of M and
·the plaint proceeds on the basis of the custom prevai/i11g i11 the family of M.
Ou! of the 52 instances only 3 belonged to the family of M. Merely because
the evidence with regard to various branches. which are said to be desccndc:d
.from P-a remote ancestor who lived five or six hundred years ago-was llet
in without any objection from the defendants, .it could not be assumed or helld
·that such evidence was admissible. Besides, the evidence put forward, tbou11h
accepted on bol:b sid~s with regard to persons descer.ded from P. is more a
matter of tradition without much historical value. It is of very little eviden!iary
value and of little assi-stance in deciding the issues in the case. The evidenc:e
to be admitted cannot travel beyond the pleadings, and therefore, the only
evidence which can be taken into account is of the three instances in M's family.
1935 C~D, H; 936 B; 938 B; 939 C-G]
(b) What must be proved is that the usage has been acted upon in practice
for such a long· period and with such invariability .as to show that it h:r>, by
common consent. been submitted to as the establiShed governing· rule,, of the
famny. The evicl~n-~,should be clear and unambiguous, thou!?h instances in
support of a family custom may not be many and frequent. [938 G-H; 942
D-E]
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(c) The initilll onus of proving the special family custom lies on the plain-
tiffs. [942 EJ
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Ramalakshmi Ammal v. Siva11atha Perumal Setf111rava, 14 M.l.A. 570, 585
.applied.
Puspavathi v. Vishweswar A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 118, followed.
(d) in a .case' like this it is the documentary evidllnce that would show tM
actual attitude of the parties and their consciousness regarding the cu5tom fa
more important than any oral evi~ence that was given in the case. Till t~!s ·
·.case, the appellar1ts, who are not ignorant persons but who are confirmed ltt1!lllnts nowhere made a claim solely on the basis of the custom which they aw
now putting forward. On the •:Ontrary, they have been siding with the con ..
·testing defendantn. Their attitude throughout is consistent only with their
consciousness that they had no right to any share in R's estate. They had not
ap~ared a» witn~sses and given evidence. where they would have been the best
J)ersons to explain the circumstances relating to the instances or explain the
,contents of documents which _are not consistent with the custom p1caded. Some
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documents in which nearer reversioners seemed to have recognised the right
of more distant reversioners could not be relied upon In the absence of any
evidence by the parties to those documents. who are parties to th~ present suit, ·
as to why and how those documents were executed or why the recitals were p1:.t
in, in those documents. On earlier occasions, whenever they put forward a claim
it was on the liasi-3 of being near reversioners and sometimes on the basis of
false genealogy than on the basis cif custom. [945 E-G; 948 D-F, H 949 CJ
The High Court was, therefore, right in holding that three instanc-~s in 'the
family of M were not proved and that the ,:ustom pleaded was not established .
(949 E]
2(a) In the present CllSe one of the appellants (plaintiffs) died and his
widow and son were substituted in his pla:ce. Thereafter, the widow died,
after the Hindu Succession Act' 1956 had come into force, leaving a daughter.
but the daughter was not added as a party. But there is no substance in the
preliminary objection raised by the respondenl'3 that becac,se the daughter was
not added as a legal representative the appeal to this Court had abated.
(949 F-950 DJ
· In this case each of the reversioners is entitled to his own specifi: share ..
He could have sued for his own share and got 11 decree for it. Therefore, if
one of the· plaintiff• dies and his legal representatives are not brought on
. record the suit or the appeal might abate as far as he is concerned but not a& ·
· regards the other plaintiffs or appellants. Further more, .the principle that
applies in this case ii, whether the estate of the deceased appellant or
respondent is repr~epted. The principle is of representati<?n of the estate of .
the deceased wh11:h need not be by all the ie¥ai representatives of the ·deceased.
D This is not a case where no legal representallve of .the ,deceased was on r:ecord.
Iii' a case where the. ~rson brought on record 1s a legal representative, it
would · be consonant with jll'Stice and principle that, in the absenee of fraud
or collusion. the bringing. on record of such a legal representative is sufficient
to prevent the suit or appeal from abating. · The fraud or collusion must be·
a fraud or cpllusion between the appellant on the one hand and ,the representative of the·' deceased respondent, who is brought on record. on the other and
vice versa, and tile fraud contemplated is a fraud or collu•sion between the parties
on record to the 'dt;.triment of the legal representatives who has not been brought
E on
record. It could not be said that failure to bring the daughter on .record
is fraud on the part of her brother ('who was on record) or that he was in
collusion with respondents, nor can he deprive of her rights by not impleadin11
her as legal representative of their deceased mother. (951 F-H; 952 G, 954
A-B; 955 B-C]
The Stale of P1111jab v. Nathu Ram [1962) 2 S.C.R. 636; Ramesliwar Prasad
v. M /s. Sh~am Behari/al Jagannath (1964] 3 SCR 549; Daya Ram v. Shyam
Sundarl [!965] 1 S.C.R. 2n; Dolai Molliko v. K. C. Pamai [1966) Supp S.C.R.
F 22;
Raton Lal v. Lal Man Das (1970] I S.C.R. 296; Mahabir Prasad v. Jape
Ram (1971) 3 S.C.R. 301; Ram Sarup v. Munshi [1963] 3 S.C.R; 858: N. K.
Mohd. Sulaimari Sahib v. N. C. Mohd. Ismail Saheb (1966] 1 S.C.R. 937 and
Karam Singh Sobir & Anr. v. Shri Pratap Chand & Anr. [1964] 4 S.C.R., refer·
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(b) Against the de:ree passed by the trial court in favour of the appellants
(plaintiffs) 3 appeals were filed in the High Court by the respondents (defen- ·
dants) In two of the appeals one of the plaintiffs was not impleaded as a
party. .The High Court was correct in hold1og that the third appeal atleast,
had not abated because of the failure to implead one cif the plaintiffs as res·
pondent in the other two appeals and that it was open to the High Court to give
relief io alt the appellants in the High Court (respandents in this Court) in
exercise of its powers under 0. 41'. r. 33, C.P.C. [956 B-D: 959 B-C]
In this case. each one of the nla·intiffs could have filed a suit for his share
of the estate of the deceased. The fact that all the re·versioncrn joined together
as plaintiffs and filed one suit does not mean that, if for one reason or another.
the S\!.it of one of them fails or abMes the suit of the others also fails or
abates. The decree is in substance the combination ·of several .decrees in
favom of several plaintiffs. If in an appeal a~ainst the de:rce one of the
plaintiffs is not added as a respondent it only means that the ~ecree in his
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1975] .2 s.c.R.
iavour cannot be set 116ide or modified even if the appeal succeeds against the
o!her plaintiffs in respect of their interest. There would in that case be no c:onll1ct between the decrees as the decree is a combination of many decrees. In
other words the result of the failure to add one of the plaintiffs as a respondent
in. two of the appeals would be that the decree granted in his favour by the
tnal -=ourt would stand but not the decrees granted in favour of the other plain.tiffs. They can be reversed in those appeals. There would be no such djffi.
culty in the third appeal and in that appeal the decree granted in favour of the
particular plaintiff as well as in favour of the other plaintiffs could bi\ve been
reversed. It was, therefore, possible by the application of the provisions of
·0.41 rr. 4 and 33, to have allowed the appeal in full and given rehef not merely
to the appellants in the_ third appeal but also to the appellan~ in the other
.two appeals assuming that they had filed those appeails. It is not a case where
the appellants in those two appeals had not taken the trouble of filing an appeal
and therefore they should not be given the benefit of the appeal filed by the
appellants in the third appeal. They had filed appeals to establish their rights ..
It was by an oversight in filing those appeals that they hail failed to implead
one of the plaintiffs as a party. To' such a case, 0.41, r.33 clearly applies.
1956 ~D; 957 E-HJ
CML Al•PELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 760 to 762
·Of 1'967.
Appeal from the judgment and d1:cree dated the 27th July, 1959
of the Patna High C.ourt in Appeal from Original Decree Nos. 326•
.332 and 333 of 1948.
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S. C. Misra, Indubhanu Singh, Jnderdeo Narain Singh, Gynn
Sudha Misra and D. Goburdhan, for the appellants.
A. K. Se11 (In C.A.No. 760/67), Sarjoo Prasad (In C.A. No. 761-
762/67), Gunteswhar Prasad and R. D. Datar for the respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
ALAGIRISWAMI, J.-In the year l.872 one Ramdhan Singh, a E
Bhumihar Bra.hmin, of village Barhiya in Bihar died leaving behind
two widows, Mosst. Manrup Kumari and Pan Kumari, and about
1700 bighas of land. Manrup Kumari died in 1923 and Pari Kumari
in 1933. Even while Pari Kumari was alive her brother Sunder Si111gh
-seems to have been managing the estate on her behalf. Shortly before
her death he managed to get from her a deed 9f relase in favour of F
1wo persons, Gaya Singh and Falgu Singh, alleged to be the sons of
Ramdhan Sin:gh's daughter, Jayanti Kumari. In spite of the objecticms
by persons who claimed tO be the nearest reversioners of Ramdhan
Singh's estate, the lands were recorded in their names in the land
revenue proo:edings. ThiS led to a number .of proceedings both civil
and criminal. Ultimately thne.Yill;sioners, who are now the respondents
·in these appr,als, filed five suits, T.S. Nos. 53 and 61 of 1934 and G
20, 29 and 41 of 1935 for possesslon._.of the estate. In 1936 anotl:ter
suit, 'f. S. No. 37 of 1936 was filed biy the present plaintiffs 8 to 1.2,
15, 16 and 18 Ito 21 and Kunu Babu Singh, uncle .of the 11th plaiintiff. In that suit also Oaya Singh and Falgu Singh were defendants. In
·addition, the plaintiffs in T.S. No. 53. of 1934 and certain others w11re
added as defcmdants. The plaintitls ill that suit claimed to be the
nearest reven1ioners to the estate of Ramdhan Singh and also that
there was a custom prevalent in the falltlly for a long time that mcire H
distant heirs than !he Shastric heirs of a persori also joined. the latter
in succeedin£ to the properties left behind by him. They wanted to be
H, p, SINGH v. B· 1'. SINGH (Alagiriswami, /.)
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held as the nearest reversion~s to Ramdhan Singh's .estate and thus
entitled to the properties left by Pari Kumari. That suit failed. Thereafter, the suit out of which the present appeals arise was filed. In this
the. plaintiffs in T.S. Nos. 53 and 61 of 1~34, and 20, 29 and 41 of
1935 are defendants;. so also certain alieness from them. Certain
parties who are related to Ramdhan Singh in the same degree as the
plain~s. are also defendants. The plaintiffs in the title suits of 1934
and 19'15 are the nearer heirs of Ramdh.an Singh and are entitled .to
succeed to his estate on the ground of propinquity if the ordinary
rule of Hindu Law applied. The plaintiffs in the- present suit as well
as the defendants who are sailing with. them are related to Ramdhan
Singh in a distant degree and would not be entitle9 to succeed to his
estate under the ordinary rule of Hindu Law. Their claim is based on
the plea of a flpecial c.listom applying to the family to which the
parties belong.
.
According to the plaint the parties are descendants of one
Choudhry Mohkam Singh. The plaint was accompanied by a genealogical table which runs into 26 printed pages in the paper book. But
during the course of the trial evidence has been let in to prove the.
genealogy from the days of one Pran Thakur who is said to have
migrated to the village Barhiya about five to six hundred years ago
from a place called Sandehpur. Though on behalf of the defendants
the fai:t that the original faritily had migrated from Sandehpur was
not admitted, a point whitji is of little importance, it seems to have
been generally agreed among. the parties that the common ancestor
was Pran Thakur and he lived five to six hundred years ago. Instances
to prove the clistom put forward on behalf of _the plaintiffs were given
not merely from tpe family <?~ Mohkam Singh but also from various
other braii.~hes said to. be descended from Pran Thakur. The village
Barhiya is divided· into twelve Tarafs named after twelve of Pran
Thakur's descendants.' The twelve descendants whose names these
Tarafs bear were not necessarily at the same degree of descent from
Pran Thakur but that again is not of much importance. The parties .
to this suit belong to Taraf Ram Charan but in the plaint it was not '
the custoni of Taraf Ram Charan that was pleaded but only the custom
in the family of Ch. Mohkam Singh, Taraf Ram Charan being a
larger group.
·
Fifty two instances were sought to be proved on behalf of I.he
plaintiffs. The learne.d Sub-ordinate Judge who tried the suit held fortythree of them proved. The learned Judges of the High Court felt that
from a reading of the plaint, evid~nce in connection with 'the instances in Ch. Mohkam Singh's family only were admissible and ought
to have been gone into. But as it did not appear that the defendants
had objected to the adducing of evidence from the other families and
Tarafs and the parties perhaps understood the plaint to mean that
their common ancestor was Pran Thakur, they did not rest content
with examining the instances from Mohkam Singh's family only. Out
of the 52 instances only three were from among the descendants of
Mohkam Singh. Out of the other 49 instances, nine were from lhe
Taraf Ram Charan, two of which were held by the learned Subordinate Judge as not proved. He, however, held all the three instances
936
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1975] 2 S.C.R.
from Mohkam Singh's family as proved. The learned Judges of the
A
High Court, ho\'.'f'ever, on an exhaustive review of the evidence helld
that none of the fiftytwo instances hacl been established satisfactorily
the custom alleged in .the family of Mohkam Singh or amongst the
by clear and unambiguous evidence so as to be sure of the existence of
descendants of Pran Thakur.
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After hear)ng both the parties on the question of the admissibility
of the evid~nce we have arrived at the conclusion ¢at the only eYidence which c:an be taken fato account are the three instances in
Mohkam Singh's family. Mohkam Sing_h himself seetns to have been
alive over 150 years ago. When oral evidence is sought to be given
about what happened some generations ago, it has to be assessed with
a great deal of care, which we shall now proceed to do. Before doing
so, however, it is necessary to have a clear idea as to what w~1s
pleaded. The ~'U~tom pleaded was put in the following words in parngraph 5 of the plaint :
"The Kulachar or ancient family c_ustom or usage with
regard to succession which prevails from time immemorial
in the family of the plaintiffs and defendants First, Second
and Third parties arid which has been invaribaly and strictly
followed observed ~d adhere·d to by the ancestors of .the
parties and of which there is a clear consciousness in the
family is that when a separated male member of the family
dies without any issue, his estate devolves in the first instance on his widow or widows, if there be any, and 011 the
death of the widow or widows as the ·case may be or on
the death of the said separated ~ale members dying without
issue and without .leaving any widow the estate reverts_ to
the descendants of the father of the said .male owner and
they take, the estate in equal shares per stripes and not per
capita and brothers of the last male owner share the estate
equally with the sons and grand-sons of de_ceased brothers.
Similarly, if the last male owrier had no brothers and his
reversioners are his un.cles or cousins the !lame rule viz.
that the uncles or cousins inherit the estate alongwith the
descendants of the predeceased uncles or cousins on the
death of the widow or widows and if there be no widow
immediately on the death of such male owner dying 1ssueless.
In other words the rule of Hindu Law yiz. that the nearer
in degree excludes the more remote is mo(Jified by the Kulachar to the extent enumerated above."
It wciuld be noticed that even the question of the father or mother 01
th~ deceased succeeding is not mentioned.
Now let us see if there is atiything in the plaint which had any
reference to the descendants of Pran Thakur or his descendants in
branches other than that of Ch. Mohkal!D Singh. Paragraphs l . 2 and
4 of the plaint are as follows :
"l. The plaintiffs and the defendants who are Bhumihar Brahmins by caste belong to the same family and are
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descended from the same common ancestor. Their relationship will appear from the genealogical table given at the foot
of the plaint. 2. The parties to this suit and other Bhumihar Brahmin
residents of village Burhee (excepting those who are
descendants in the female line or are recent settlers) belong
to the same class of ,Babhans known as Dighwaits and are
descended from the same stock.
3. The Dighwait Babhans who migrated to Burhee were
ordinarily governed by the Benares School of Hindu Law
but the matters of succession they fo!lawed theil' respective
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Kulachars or ancient family customs which have been
prevailing in their families from time immemorial and which
having acquired the force of law modified the general Hindu
Law to that extent."
It would be noticed that in paragraph 1 the plaintiffs and defendanti
are said to belong to the same family and descended from the same
common ancestor. As reference is made to the genealogical tree and
D that starts only from Mohkam Singh, it is obvious that tho reference
to the_common ancestor is reference to Mohkam Singh. From paragraph_ 4 it is clear that in matters of succession Dighwait Babhans
followed their respective ancient family customs showing that each
family had its own custom, Immediately follows the statement in
paragraph 5 earlier extracted which shows that what the plaintiffs are
referring to is the ancient family custom iii the family of the plaintiffs
E and defendants which is tbe family of Mohkam Singh as already
explained. Reference to the male member of the family dying separate and issuless in paragraph 6 can therefore refer only to the family
· of the plaintiffs and defendants mentioned in par~gr'aph · 5. Then
follows the statement in paragraph 7 which by reference to the genealogical table appended to the plaint says that the common ancestor
of the plaintiffs and defendants was Chowflhry Mohkam Singh. ParaF graph 17 again refers to the family custom or usage of all the male
descendants of Ch. Mohkam Singh being entitled to inherit the estate.
Paragraph 18 refers to one of the five sons of Ch. Mohkam Singh
dying issuetess and his property being divided equally per stripes ·
amongst the descendants of the remail).ing three sons. Paragraph 20
again. refers to defendants' second party being descendants of Ch.
G .Mohkam Singh and as such entitled under the Kulachar to inherit
some share in the estate of Ramdhan Singh. Even the prayer is for
a declaration about the ancient custom, usage or Kulachar in the
· family of the plaintiffs and defendants. Nowhere is there any reference to Pran Thakur or his descendants or the twelve Tarafs or
even Taraf Ram Charan as the one to which . the parties belonged.
lssu~ ( 6) in the stiit regarding this question is also as follows :
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" ( 6) Is there any Kulachar or ancient family custom
in the families of the parties in contravention of the established principle of law of succession as alleged by the plain13-L346Sup Cl/75
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tills in para 5 of the plaint? If so, is it valid and binding on
the parties affecting the succeesion of the heritage left by
Ramdhan Singh deceased ?
There isL therefore, no room at all for any argument that the plaint
proceeded on the ba8ia of the custom prevailing among all tho
descendants of Pran Thaklµ'. It sequarely proceeded on the basis of
the custom prevailing in the family of Ch. Mohkam Singh. Indeed
the leal'.DCd Advocate for .the appellants stressed again and again that
the plaint was drafted by a very able advocate and was a very co1rrect
one. It is no doubt true that the witnesses for the plaintiffs as welll as
defendants admit that they are all descended from l'ran Thakur. That
seems to be the tradition in the village. It is said that there are about
two thousand families in that village who claim to be descended from
Pran Thakur. Though th.ere is evidence that youngsters in tlilese
families are made to learn. by heart their genealogy it is probably
only t.o the extent of the names of B!)ven generations which is necessary in the case of. religious ceremonies. Nobody could be remember·
ing the genereallogy of over twenty generations from the days of Jiran
Thakur. At the most it is a matter of tradition and hearsay. We are
saying. nothing about the admissibility or otherwise of hearsay evi·
dence. Suffice it to say· that for the purposes of this .case the evidc1nce
admitted cannot travel beyond the pleadings and therefore has tc1 be
confined to the instances in Mohla!~n Singb's family.
Now on whom does the burden re11t and wh~t is the sc0pe of the
evidence ths~t is admissible ? The earliest decision on the question
regarding proof of custom in variance of the general Jaw is found in
Ramalakshmi Ammal v. Sivanat/IQ Perumal Sethuraya (14 Moo. Ind.
App. 570 @ 585) to the efiect : .
"it is .of the essence of special usages modifying the Qrdi·
nary Jaw of succession that they should be ancient and invariable.; and it is further essential that they should f>e established to be so by clear and unambiguous evidence. It is
only by means of such evidence that the Courts can be
assured of their existence, and that they possess the conditions of: antiquity and certainty on which alone their legal
title t.o {CC()gllition depends.''
This passaSe <!Vas quoted by this Court with approval in its decision
in Pwhpavat_bi Viiayaram v. P. Visweswar (AIR 1964 SC 118) and
tbis Court went on further to observe :
"In dealing with a family C.'UStom, the same principle
will have to be applied, though, of course, in the case of a
family c:ustom, instances in support of the custom may not
be as !llanY or as frequent as in the case of customs pertaining tp ~~ territory or to the community or to the character
of any (iState. In dealing with family customs, the consensus
of opinion amongst the members of the family, the traditional belief entertained by them and acted upon by them
their statements, and their conduct would all be relevant and
it is only where the relevant evidem:e of such a. character
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appears to th.e Court to be suflicien"t that a specific family
custom pleaded in a particular case would be held to be
proved, vide Abdul Hussein Khan v. Blbil Sona (45 llid.
App. 10: A.1.R. 1917 P.C. 181).
What is important is that the specific familr, custom pleaded in a
particular case sholjld be proveo. The specific family custom pleaded
B in this case is the custom of the 'family' of Mobkam Singh. Even
though that 'family' itself consists of numerous fam,ilies descended
from Prall Thakur the custom pleaded was not the custom. prevailing
in the 'family' of Pran Thakur. As we have already mentioned, the
descendants of Pran Thakur seem to consist of at least two thousand
families and it is difficult to use the word 'family' in relation to such
a largti agglomeration of families. We might as well talk of the human
Be that as it mey, there was no mention in the pleadings of
c family.
the i;ustom prevailing_ among the descendants of Pran Thakur. Indeed
nowhere in the course of earlier litigl\tions or documents, including
T.S. No. 37 of 1936, is there a mention of Pran Thakur and his
family. Merely because the evidence with regard to the various
branches, whictl are said to be descended from Pran Thakur, was lef
in, apparently without any objection on the defendants' side, we aie
D not prepared to assume or hold that such evidence was admissible.
The genealogical tree from Pran Thakur to Mohlcam Singh is at best, ,
.of doubtful valae even though the tradition among Pran Thakur'&,,
descendants may be as put forward in ·the suit. The earliest document
which we have examinea, Ext. 23 of the year 1818, shows that even
Mohkam Singh· had died some years before that and between that
date and 1947-1948 when the present case was tried, there have.
E been six generations. From Pran Thakur, who is .supposed to have
lived ab.out 5~6 hundred years ago genealogy is given for only . six
generations that is, till the. formation of the twelve tarafs. That seems
to have been over 400·years ago. Apart from the value to be attached
t<?1.. or the reliability of the evidence regarding this genealogy it is
dimcult to see llllY relevance of this genealogy as there is a gap between that time and Mohkam Singh's days. The fact that a family
·F belongs to a taraf can have no significance as a taraf is only a portion
of the village, and the fact that a taraf is n8.I!led after person is no
,guarantee that all those living in the taraf are bis descendants. The
evidence put forward, even though accepted on both sides1 with regard
to persons descended from Pran Thakur milSt be held at ~st to be
.a matter of tradition without µiuch historical val~ and much less evi•
ilentiary value and of very. little assistance in deciding the question at
G issue in this case. Similarly, any oral evidence even if admissible abciut
what happened in other branches of. the family descended from Pran
Thakur is also not likely to be of much assistance unless they are
. probabilised by some sort of documentary evidence. We do have
some doeuments at least about Mohkam. Singh's family but not about
others. After hearing the parties on both sides and after looking into
the decisions relied upon by the plaintiffs we indicated to the parties
H that. we consider the evidence about instances other than those belong-·
ing to Mohkam Sin~h's descendants were not admissible and we would
not consider the evidence with regard to the other 49 instances. The
decisions cited by plaintiffs with regard to the admissibility of evi-
940
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1975] 2 ~.C.R.
dence in this case in relation to instances of custom in families 011her
than those descend¢ from Mohkam Singh contain certain observa- A
tions which were relied upon by the plaintiffs. The ratio · of those
decisions themselves have. nothing to' do. with the question of admissibility. lnde,ed, it is difficult to see any ratio in those decisions. They
were all decisions as to succession which were based upon the conclusions drawn on the basis of the evidence adduced in those cases.
The decisions contain mostly discussion on the evidence and any B
observations made in the course of those discussion~ should be confined to the circumstances and the evidence in those cases ancf they
cannot provide any guiding principle in appraising the evidence of
different facts and circumstances in other cases. Even so we would
refer to those observations and show how those observations are r1:le- ·
v~t to the facts of those cases and can neither serve as a precedent
ht'this case nor can be considered to have laid down any principle of c
law.
'
In Rajah Rup Singh v. Rani Baisni & the Collector of Eatawah
(11 Ind. App. 149) it was held on the evidence in the case that the
raj in question was an ancient raj and an ancestral estate, and that
by virtue of an ancient custom in the family it was impartible. The
plaint was to the effect that tbe ancient usage of raj of Bhara. in
D
common wit([ .other families of the Rajahs was that upon the decease
of a Rajah his nearest and eldest male heir succeeds him to the ·exclusion of the other male heirs, and that total eitclusion of women. It
was contended that a case· had occurred in respect of the raj of Ruh
Ruh in which a widow had succeeded in preference to a male colla- ·
teral. Ruh Ruh was said to be one of the five branches of whic BhiU'a
was also om:. That was how the instance· regarding the Ruh Ruh
E
estate was considered. That decision is a far cry from the present cme
where evidence regarding 2000 families said to. be descended from
an almost mythical ancestor are sought to be let in without any pleading with regard to it.
In Garurudhwaja Parshad Singh- v. Saparandhwaja Prashad Sin.gh
(7 In_d. App. 238) it was held:
F
"on thti! evidence, reversing the judgment of the · High
Court, that the appellants had satisfied· the serious burden
of proving a special family custom of descent by primo. gcniture.
The evidence shewed that for a period of nearly eighty
years from the .time of the British occupation of the disG
trict in Vihkh lay the estate in suit, the enjoyment had been
consistent 'with the alleged custom, and for the earlier and
greater 11art of that term had been inconsistent with any
other legal basis. Also, that in two other families in the same
district, derived from the same ancestor as the parties to the
suit, the alleged custom prevailed."
It was in comiection with !hese facts that it was observed :
H
"A witness may state his opinion as to the ·existence of
a family custom, and give as the .grounds thereof. informa-
H. p, SINGH v. B. P. SINGH (Alagiriswami, /,)
941
tion derived from deceased persons. But it must be independent opinion based on hearsay, and not mere repetition
of hearsay; see Indian _Evjdence Act, s. 32, sub-s. 5; ss. ·49
and 60. Its weight depends on the character of the witness
and of the deceased persons."
A
In that case it appeared from the evidence that the custom of primogeniture prevailed in twQ other families, derived from _a common
ance&tor and lent strong anteceqent probability to the appellant's
case. In that very . case the Privy Co'lihcil remarked that "a good deal
of the evidence of statements made by deceased persons is of doubtful admissibility'', and after referrin..1f to the evidence of some of the
witnesses the Privy Council said that they would not be disposed to
place much relianee upon it standing alone. There is all the dt!Jerence in the world between two. families and two thousand families.
B
c
In Ahmad Knan v. Channi Bibi (52 Ind. App. 379) it was held
that "the cust9m could (lroperly be proved by general evidence given
by members of the famil_y or tribe without proof of special instances."
In !hat case there was a large body of oral evidence establishing the
custom, wholly unrebutted by the defendants, who relied exclusively
on the district riwaj-i·~ on which neither the High Court nor . the
Privy Council were prepared .to place any. reliance. Suffice it to any
say that the present is ·not a case where no evidence of specific inatances was given ~ut on the other hand evidence was given of a largo
number of instances most of which were held proved by the learned
tri~ Judge and held fDot proved by the learned Judges of the High
Court. We are not concerned in tJ:iis case with the custom prevailin&
in a particular family or tribe without instances.
D
E
In Rohan Ali Khan v. Chaudhri Asghar Ali (57 Ind. App. 29)
in the case of a dispute in one branch of the two families, one in the
ruale line and the other in the female line descended from the same
person, who had ·uved so long under the same conditions and have
been so closely connected fogether as to be treated as one community
the evidence of the custom observed by one family was held to be of
high evidential value as to the custom in the other. Furthermore, there
.was the wajib-ul-araiz _signed by the descendants of both the families
which strongly supported the plaintiffs' case. The distinction between
that case and ille present one is too obvious· to need stress.
F
G
t
The ca8e in Maharaja Sris ,Chandra Nandi v. Rakhalananda
Thakur (6J C.L.J. 520) was one where the evidence given. by the'
plainillfs supported ·a family tradition from generation to· generation
and which evidence was founded upon information derived from
deceased persons and such tradition was also supported by documentary evidence. In that case the proof of the tradition was also to
be found in the documents supporting 'the statements of deceased
persons. It is, therefore, not possible to diss.x:iate one aspect of the
decision from the o~er. It is very difficult to say whether without the
documentary evidence the oral evidep.ce regarding proof would have
been accepted.
·
·
942
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[1975] 2 s:.c.K.
I
In A/ai Verma v. Vijai Kumari (AIR 1939 PC 22} it was said A'"
that the proof of actual instances of a family custom excluding
daughters from the inheritance was not necessary. For this statement
reliance was placed upon th~ decision in Ahmad Khan v. Channi Jiiibi
(supra) to which we have already referred. It was also stated that. the
opinions of responsible ·members of the family as to the existence of
such a custom, and the grounds of their opinion, thmigh generally in
the nature ol; a family tradition, were clearly admissible. In that case
the custom was also :recorded in wajib-ui-arzes of every village owned
by a member of the family and they were very numerous. The Privy
Council refexred to the probative value of these village records which
had been recognised over and over ag~n by the Board. Here again it
is suffice to say that it is not possible to predict what would have been
the decision but for the waj1'b·ul·arus.
The dcchiion in Musammat S11bhani v. Nawab (68 IJ1d. App. p.1)
was arrived at after elaborate discussion of the evidence in the case
and examining numerous ~artier decisions on the point as well as.
Rattingan's Digest of Civil Law for the Punjab and Wilson's Gem:ral ·
Code of the Tribal Customs in the Shahpur District of the Punjab:
Ther!l are some interesting observations therein which show that the
statements iri the Rattingan's Digest cannot be taken at their face D"
value without reference to the circumstances. The final conclusion of
the Privy Council that what must .be proved is that the · usage :has
been acted upon in practice for such a long period and with such
invariability, as to show that it has, by common consent been s111bmitted to as the established governing rule of the particular district;
with the modification that the word 'family' should be substituted for
the word 'district' holds good iQ. every case. They also laid down E
that the initial onus lay on th~ p)aintiffs to prove the special cust·OID
and that doe1; not in any way help the plaintiffs.
We shall now deal with the three instances relating to Mohkam
.Singh's family.
We should probably preface this discussion by saying that in
T.S. No. 37 of 1936 tbel'jl was a half~hearted attempt to prove the
custom and the enly instance given was the present instance 10. It
was held not proved _and as quite a few of the present plaintiffs w1!re
parties to thaf suit, the decision therein would be· res-judicata as
against them. But we prefer to discuss the matter and decide it on its
merits becau!:e there all the distant mversioners were nut parties unlike in this cnse.
.
G
Instance No. 10 is regarding suc~ssion to the estate of Dip
~arain, Who died leaving behind his widow ?!!rkalo Kumari, who
d1~ in th~ year 1914. At that time three nephews of Djo Narain,,
Nirsu-plamtiff 8 .and Rarnnath-plaintifl 9, sons of his brotllellG~nga, as well as Nunubabu the son of his bxother Ajodhya wi:re
alive. Another son of Ajodhya, named Durga, died. leavin2 a s-on
~adharaman, · ~laintiff 11. Bansi, the third brother of Dip Narain had H
. d1~ as al~o his son? Rarnsarup, leaving two sons Sheokumar a]nd
Ra1eshwan. There !~ an ~krarnarna Ext. 18 dated 14-3-1916 as a
~. p, SINGH v. B, p, SINGH (Alaglrlswaml, I.)
A
B
c
D
E
F
.G
H
.943
result of which Sheokumar and Rajeshwari got certain properties. .It ··
is to be noticed that Nirsu and Ramnath are plaintiffs 8 and 9 and
Rajeshwari is plaintiff 10 and Radharaman is plaintiff 11 and they
themselves_ did not give evidence to explain the circumstances undei
which Ext. 18 camJl int~ existence. But the most significant fact is
that Sheokumar ·and Rajeshwari. first claimed that they had been
adopted by i>arkalo Kumari and it was thereafter that Ext. 18 came
into existence. If Sheokumar and Rajeshwari were sure of the custom,
which is now pleaded, they need not have made a claim on the basis
of their being adopted sons. They did not claim on the basis of the
custo!ll when they filed the petition in thl" land registration case. Ext.
18 itself mentions that Sheokumar and R,M,..4hwari filed. an application
in the land registration case on the ground that they were adopted
sons of Parkalo ~umari and also specifically mentions that they have
no interest in title to and concern with the estate left behind by the
said mosamat (Parkalo Kumari) nor can they have any. In the face
of these two significant fac!s we do not think that the mere mention
of the custom in Ext. 18 establishes the existence of the custom now
pleaded. Bx• .18 does not say what the custom was.
·
There was some argument at the bar as to what exactly the. origi.'.
nal word used was, REWAJ DASTURI or REWAJ-0-DASTURI,
whether it was customary usage or custom and usage. Whatever that
may be, we are not able to ·persuade ourselyes that if there was such
a custom ·as alleged Sheokumar and Rajeshwari would not have made
a 'claim even in the first event on the basis of the custom. As Rajeshwari and Sheokumar have not given· any evidence as to why they gave
up the claim on the basis oC the adoption and the document itself,
though it mentions custom, does not say that they were given some
property on the basis of the custorfi or what the custom was, we
· would, giving also full effect to the express disclaimer by both of them
to any right, hold that Ext. 18, does not help to establish the existenc~
qf the custom pleaded. We are, therefore, of the poinion th!lt the
learned Judges. of the High Court were right in holding that this
instance is not established.
Instance 51 relates to the succession to the estate of Net Singh,
one of the sons of Ch. Mohkam Singh. Mohkam Singh had five sons,
Bhairo Narain, Kalyan, Naraindutt, Summer and Net. According to the
plaintiffs Net died issueless and his nephews and grand nephews and
great-grand nephews intferited his property per stripes ~ording to
custom. The plaintiffs examined P.Ws. 53, 61 ·and 64 to· prove this.
The evidence of P.W. 53 was not accepted by the learned Subordinate
Judge, P.W. 61 said that he heard of this instance from Wilayati Babu
10 or 11. years earlier. This witness was examined in 1948 and his
knowledi!e was not even ante-Utem motem. Moreover, the instance
took place more tb_an 100 years before he heard of it from Wilayati
Babu and we find it difficult to agree with the learned Subordinate
Judge that his knowledge is not only baseri ori what he heard from
Wilayati Babu but als"o on his independent opinion about it. The
learned Subordinate Judge does not place much reliance on P.W. 64
who is himself a plaintiff. We are not able to agree with the learned
Subordinate-Judge that if it can.be proved that the families of the five
944
SUPREME COUR1' REPORTS
(1975] 2 s.c.i.
brothers were not. joint but were. separate the defence case must be .A
thrown out and the plaintiffs' case should be accepced. The matter is
not as simple as that Even if Net and his brothers were separate tl1e
question is who was alive when Net died. The learned Subordinate
Judge's decision has simply proceeded on the basis of the brothers
being.11eparak~. Nor is his discussion of th:e importance of Ext. 2:,
correct. When it is stated in Ext. 23,. a document of the year 181.i
which should have been soon after Net's death, that his four brothers B
ii:ot 1/2 anna share each ouf of his two annas share, it of course shows
that the brothers w~re separate but it also shows that the four brother'
were alive at the time of Net's death and they got his property. Thero
is no mention here of other brothers or any of them being dead and
the nephews or the grand nephews succeeding. We fail to undemtand
how the learned Subordinate Judge accepted the submission on plaintiffs' behalf that the reference to four brothers has been made in tlio c
sense of their descendants. One cannot make out a new case that is not
found there. Exhibits 7, 9 and 23 all 1:0 to prove that the family wa.~
divided. Uut the learned Subordinate Judge has missed the crucial
point that Ext. 23, which is the only document which refers to Net
dying issueless and his brothers succeeding equally to his property
gives not merely the share of the four brothers of Net Singh but ali!o
how the descendants of the four brothers divided the property am011& · D
themselves. We, therefore, agree with the learned Jud~s of the Hi1~
Court that when Net Sing!) died his brothers were alive and they got
his share. It does not make any difference to the case whether he dilld
separate <,r 11ot. It is also seen that in view of the statement in El:t.
23 the learned counsel appearing for the appellants could not. prellS
this instance vecy much. We, therefore, agree with the learned Judges I ,r .
of the l:figh Couit that this instance also cannot be said to have betia
proved.
The third instance is instance No. 23 regarding succes~ion to tho
estate of Dr. Rameshwar Singh. Plaintifis' case is that when Ramesl~
war Singh ~ed about 25 years ago his properties were inherited 11y
his brother, Dl:J...1Jll1Ilun, his nephew G<1vind and his grand nephew F
Harbans. P.Ws. 21, 24, 64, 68 and 79 were examined on behalf <:>f
the plaintiffs. As against this D.W.61, who was examined on behalf.~
the defendants, said that Rameshwar died in a state of jointness mth
·· hi4 broth.er and nephew. P.W. 24 said that Rameshwar and lib
brothers were living in the same house:'· and the descendants of his
brothers still live in . the same house. It iS, therefore, ilot clinchil:lll
piece of evidence. The evidence of P.Ws. 68 and 79 is not of niuc::h G
use a,, they de> not say that they witnessed the division. The learned
Subordinate Judge relied on Exts. 43, 28 and 29 series to find i:n
pleinti1fs' favour. On the other hand the defendants relied on Bit. ·
U59, deposition of Harbans Singh. who is plaintiff No. SO in this
case. Ext. 43 shows that Gouri, Dhurunun and Harbans' .names ~eif>
recorded in th~t document. There was also the. name of a stranger to
the family recorded in the document. 'Thc:re are three plots in thi:t H
land more or less of equal area. With regard to one plot it is mellitioned that Harbans is in possession and in regard to another pfot
H. p. SINGH v. B. P. SINGH (Alagimwami, I.)
s•s
that it is in possession of Gouri, Dhunmun and Harbans. There is
also the word "Shamlat" which indicates that the property was undivided. In any case i~ is not a clinching piece of evidence.
''.As regards Ext. 28 series the learneC: 'Judges of the High Court
inspected the counterfoils themselves and found ,that the book which
bore the signatures of defendants is a re-stitched book and therefore
held that. it lost its sanctity. It was also adnµtted that the original
B stiching was broken and a new book was re-stiched and on seeing tho
condition of the counterfoil book the learned Judges did not place any
reliance on the receipts contained in them. We cannot say that . the
learned Judges were not justified in doing so. As against this there
is the deposition of Harbans Singh dated 16-11~1927 (Ext. U59) in
a title swt of 1926. There he said that he, Govind and Harl were joint
and
all their lands were joint. On behalf of the appellants much re·C
liance was placed upon the further statement that their houses wer1
. divided. But curiously though Harl is plaintiff No. 29, Govind's son
is plaintifl No. 49 and Harbans is plaintifl No. 50, none of them
gave evidence to explain either Ext U59 or Ext. 43 or 28 series.
We consider that the criticism by'the learned Judges of the High
Court that the inference drawn by the learned Subordinate Judge that
D Ext. 43 shows that the statement ofHarbaris in Ext. U59 was wrong,
is a curious one is correct. Another important fact L'I that Dhunmu11
was, one of the petitioners in Ext. EE and that he laid .a claim to th•
property of Ramdhan as the next reversioner and not according' to tho
alleged custom. We, therefore, agree with the learned Judges of the
High Conrt that this instance has also not been proved.
, The significant, point in al! these three instances is the attitude of
the parties concerned. ,They did not come and give evidence whero
they would have been the' best perions io explain the ~stances
relating to those .instances even though as many as 81 instances were
examined on their behalf. Y.W. 64 was the sole plaintiff to give
evidence. Till this case started thC)' have nowhere, literally nowhere,
.made a claim solely cm the 'Qasis of the custom which they ,are now
F putting forward .. The (focumentary evidence which shows the actual
attitude of the parties and their consciousness regarding , the cust«:l
is more important than any oral evidence that might have been: given,
in this case. Considerable stress was laid on behalf of the appellants
on the fact that some of the defendants' witnesses had said that scnm
of the witnesses, on the plaintiffs', side ~e respectable persons aDd
they knew the custom better than they themselves knew. But such
statements have to be evaluated iii the background of the history cl. .
.~
this litigation. It is true that $e defendants, who are respondents tn
thiF appeal, also pu~ forward some, 10 instances to disprove the plaintiffs' case but did not succeed in oroviding them. But in the first instance
it is for the plaintiffs to prove the txistence of the custom and it they
fail to do so they cannot succeed on the basis that the defendants did
not succeed in proving that the custom did not exist. In any case 811
ff we have held that instances in families other than those of Ch. Mobbm
Singh are not relevant nothing much depends on it. We shall now
, discuss the attitude of the parties and their consciousness·. based on
their· actions at various stages in this litigation.
A
946
SUPRBMB CCIURT RBPORTS . [1975) 2 s.c.R.
The earlfast of these documents is Ext. BB dated 25-8-1927, an
application filed by Ohunmun Singh, father of Hari Singh, pl'llin.tifl
No. 29 praying that the estate of Ram Ohan Singh may be taken over
by the Court of Wards. , This was accompanied by genealogy
which is found at page 2780 of the paper book. It is -admittedly a
false genealogy and was apparantly prepared in order to show t:ilat
he was the nearest reversioner to Ram Ohan Singh's estate. H the
present case .regarding the special custom obtaining in the family were B
correct this document would certainly have mentioned the custom s1nd
Dhunmun would have claimed to be reversioner on the basis of the
custom. That he had to go to the extent 'of preparing a false genealogy in order to show that he was the: nearest reversioner falsifies the
present coase about the custom. It should also be remembered tl~at
accordmg to the case of the plaintiffs Dr. Rameshwar Singh's property
bad been divided a few years earlier according to custom and Ohunm.un c
was one of the parties involved.
The next document is Ext. E/10 dated S.4.1933. This is 1the
d~d of surrender by Pari Kumari in favour of Gaya Prasad Singh and
Fa!gu Prasad Singh. This document was attested by plaintiff 12; the
father of plaintiffs 13 to 15; Sarobar Saran ancestor of p1'aintiffs 16
to 16E; and plaintiffs 29, 38, 46 and SO as well as defendants 4, ll l, D
26, Jairam father of defendant 52 -and brother of plaintiffs 34 and
35, Ramkishori father of defendants 29 to 31 and Kapildeo father
of plaintiffs 2:2 to 25. Though attestation by itself does not impute
knowledge of the contents of the document to the attestors, it is ve:ry
difficult to believe that the attestors did not know its contents. There
liad been oa number of litigations, both civil and criminal, with reg2ird
to Ramdhan Singh's estate by this tim1~ and an attempt had also· been· E
made, as shown earlier, to- bring it under the Court of Wards. 1he
fact that Sunder Singh, the brother of Pari Kuamri, was managing .
her estate has also been mentioned. The whole history of this aise
shows that this is a highly litigious community and they would certahlly
not have attested the document without knowing what it was abo1~t.
If they knew wlYat the document contained they would have at least
at once seen that it was against their interest if the custom alleged was F
true. On the: other hand if the custom alleged was not true the p1resent defendarlts would be the nearest heirs and thus Uiese plaintiffs
would not mind if somebody else got the property rather than tbe
present defendants. Indeed they may even be interested in seeing
that they also did not get any share out of R:Undhan Singh's estate.
It is, however, urged on behalf of the appellants that Bisheshwar Singh,
father of defendants 7 and 8, whose share comes to h'lllf among the
defondants, was also a party to these proceedings on behalf of Gaya
Prasad Singh and Falgu Prasad Sin!tlt. But that was because he was closely related to Sunder Singh, his son being married to his daughter a11d
he ·stood to gain more by Gaya Prasad Singh and Falgu Prasad Sin1~h
succeedin2 than by his own succession.
The next document is Ex.t.C dated 29.5.1933 an· objection petitic>n
filed by plaintiffs 8, 10, 11, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21 as well as Prabhu O.~
Narain, father of the plaintiffs 13 to 15 and Nuju Babu Singh unc:le
of 11th plaintiff. Along with the objection petition a· genealogy v.•as
H
".
H. p, SINGH v•. B. p, ~!NOH. (Alaglrlswaml, /.)
A
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947
also filed showing Kalyan Singh, son of Ch. Mohkam Singh, as having
two sons Dalip and Niren and thus trying to exclude the branch of
.Sumer and Blrairo Narain, sons of Mohkam Singh, as well as Hamir
and Maniar, sons of Narain Datt. Admittedly this genealogy is false.
They claimed as near and legal heirs of Babu Ramdhan Singh on the
basis of this false genealogy. Even here there was no mention of
the custom now put forward. It was not necessary to put forward
wro:1g genealogy in order to claim to be near heirs of Ramdhan Singh
if the custom were true.
The next document is Ext. 1 dated 1-7-1933, an objection petition
filed by Sia Sarai}. Singh, the 11th defendant. In this document he
denied his signature on Ext. E/10, the deed of surrender and alleged
fraud on the part of Sunder Singh. Though a custom was put forward in this document it was alleged to be custom in the family, in
the village.and in the vicinity and significantly enough· he has notjoined
the plaintiffs in this litigati<:>n in order to support the case of custom.
Another significant fact is that the only plaintiff examined in this case
is Chandrika Prasad Singh, the 1st plaintiff..His b~other, Dwarka Prasad
Singh, the 2nd p~aintiff had given evidence in the land registration case
and his deposition is marked as Ext.U/12. There he deposed that if
anyone dies issueless the. property will be divided according to Khunt
(Branch). That is apparently the reason why he. was not examined ..
Another significant fact is that some of the pfaintiffs, Ram Khilavan
Singh, Ram Kishori Singh,.Nanu Babu Singh, plaintiff 36, Ram Behari
Singh, plaintiff 38 and. Deonath Singh gave evidence on behl;llf of
Gaya Prasad Singh and Falgu Prasad Singh in the land registration
case as is seen from Exts.U/21, U/24, U/52, U/53 and U/54. They
diii not•claim any interest in the estate as they could have if the custom
pleaded· were true. As we explained earlier they were perhaps more
interested in the present defendants not getting •any share in Ramdhan
Singh's estate as they had no hope of getting any share theinselm
being distant heirs.
·
.
.
In the title suits Nos.53 and 61 of 1934 and 20, 29 and 41 of 1935
. filed .by the present defendants evidence was given on behalf of Gaya
F Prasad Singh and Falgu Prasad Singh by Badri Singh, father of plaintiffs 5 and 5-A; Sheobhaju Singh, plaintiff 3; Jittu Singh, plaintiff 7;
Ram Pratap, plaintiff 27, Janardan Singh, 34; Deonath Singh belonging to the family of plaintiff 34; Godawari Singh, defendant 44;
Singheshwar Singh, plaintiff- 46; Vidya Singh, plaintiff 47 and Ram Behari, plaintiff 38 as is shown by Exts. U/2, 7, 8, 9; 13, 35, 26, 38, 56
and 57. None of them dared to come forward and give evidence in the
G
present suit. The criticism which we have made earlier 118. regards
the attitude of the plaintiffs in earlier proceedings applies here also.
H
In title suit No. 37 of 1936 filed by some of the present plaintiffs,
to which we have already referred, though they referred to a custom·
they claimed to be the nearest reversioners according to the Shastras.
Th<: genealogy tree filed in that suit showed Dalip Singh as son of·
Kalya1i Singh although he is one of the sons of Narain Datt. It did·
not refer to the other sons of Mohkam Singh, that is, Sumer, Bhairo·
Narain and Narain Datt. Dalip was also shown as brother of NiraJl.
948
SUPRBMJ! COUl.T REPORTS
{1975] 2 S.C.ll,
In support of their· C'ase Ram Nath Prasad Singh, the present plaintiff
9, who was plaintiff 5 in that suit, was examined. He gave evidem:e
$aying that Mohkam had two sons, Net and Kalyan, that Net died
issueless and that Sumer, Bhairo Narain 'and Narain Datt are not i.ons
of Ch. Mohkam. In that very suit Singheshwar Singh, plaintifi 46,
Ram Kishore father of plaintiff 29, Ramkbelavan Singh, 13th Defendant, Nanu Babu Singh, plaintiff 36, Badri Singh, plaintiff 5 were
examined on behalf of Gaya Prasad Singh and Falgu Prasad Singh 1L&
shown by Ext.U/11, 19, 3, 43 and 44. Sheobhaju Singh, the preseut
plaintiff 3 whose deposition is marked as Ext. U/7, denied the custom
now put forward by the plaintiffs.
·We should, perhaps, at this stage refer to Ext.16, deed of sale by
Zalim Singh, 4th defendant, in favour of Ram Khilavan, 13th defendent; Ext.16-A, deed of sale by B11rho Singh, 5th defendant, to Ram
Saran Singh, 12th defendant; Ext.16-F, deed of sale l)y Za1im Singh,
the 4th defendant, in favour of Bindo Singh, and Ext.16-E, a deed of
sale by Zalim Singh to Ram Saran, 12th defendant. These documents
were like Ext.18 relied upon very .much by the appellants
as showing that as the nearest reversioners they had mcognised the right of the more distruit reversionel'S.
It
should be remembered that thes€: documents are all of
the year 193 7 when the earlier . litigation had not ended.
The documents themselves show that the, executants were poor men
and they were being financed by the more distant relatives. The doctLments themselves purport to be out 'and 1out sale deeds and in the at>sence of anY evidence by the parties to those documents who arc pw:ties in this suit but have· not given any evidence .as to why and ho111
those documents were executed or the recitals in those documents were
put in we cannot place any reliance upon them as establishing that
the documents show a recognition by the near agnates of the rights
of distant agnates. They seem to be.documentS executed because <>f
the financial help received by the executants and partly perhaps to
buy up the rich and powerful relatives who might otherwise give trouble. We are not inclined to attach much importance to them as esU1blishing the custom pleaded. Ext.17-A does not carry the case of
the plairitiffs any further.
We are, therefore, satisfied that the plaintifts ap_pellants have tailed
to prove the c:ustom pleaded by them. Their attitude throughout iis
-consistent only with their consciousness that they had no right to C•r
any share in Ramdhan Singh's estate. If they had they would Jra1·e
joined the plaintiffs in title suits Nos. $3 and 61 of 1934 and 20, 29
and 41 of 1935 or filed independent suits themselves at the same time
puttina forw111d their claim on the basis of custom. On the othe:r
hand they supported the defendants in those suits. It would have 01:curred to the meanest intelligence that if the defendants in those suits
succeeded the present plaiitiffs have no chance of getting anything where
as if the plaintiffs in those suits succeeded and if the custom alleged were
true, they might also get a share. And these are not ignorant men
but confirmed :litigants. Not even one plaintiff among the many wb()
were parties tQ the various documents so far considered has dared t1)
:&ppear 1s a witness ·and explain the contents of those documents whiclil
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are certainly not consistent with the custom pleaded. Even T.S. No. 37
of 1936 was an half-hearted attempt by the present plaintiffs and that
was filed onlv after the success of T.S. Nos. 53 and
61 of 1934 anti 20, 29 and 41 of 1935. They have been more consistently siding with Gaya Prasad Singh and Falgu Prasad Singh b<:cause
they knew that they had no rights and there was no custom and they
had nothin2 to lose if the present defendants-respondents lost in that
B litigation. On the earlier occasions whenever they tried to put forward a
claim it was on the basis of beTug near reversioners and sometimes on
the basis of false genealogy than on the basis of custom. It is easy
enough to get any number of persons to give oral evidence about what
happened many many years ago. It is difficult to disprove ~hem. At
best it will be a case of hard swearing on either side. We would
rather place reliance on the documents and the attitude of the parties
as shown bv them. One has only to read the evidence of P.W. 64,:
c the
star witness on the side of the plaintiffs. The man seems to have
an almost computer like memory but we find it difficult to believe him
when he says that he kept quiet because he was promised a shar~
after the title suits filed in 1934 and 1935 succeed. One, man may
lrave kept quiet .but not a host of people on such a promise. Even
if promises were made they would have insisted on something bein3
D given in writing. In a highly litigious village like this people are not
likely to keep quiet depending upon oral assurance where valuable properties are involved. They would not support the case of imposter~
like Falgu Prasad Singh and Gaya Prasad Singh if they themselves had .
hopes of getting any share. It can only be on the basis of the custom
which is now being put forward that they could have got a share. . It
is. a baseless claim oand the plaintiffs have failed to prove the custom'
E pleaded by them.
A
Before we conclude we must refer to the preliminary objection.
raised on behalf of the respondents that the appeals should be dismissed and the contention on behalf of the appellants that the appeals before the High Court in this case should hoave been dismissed and consequently the present appeals should be allowed simply on that ground:
F The objection on behalf of the respondents is based on the following
facts : Plaintiff No 29, Hari Sin2h soil of Dhunmun Singh died in
1953. His widow Manmohini' and son Raktoo Singh, apJ?eUant 88,
were substituted in his place on 12.8.1953. With the coming intci
force of the Hindu Succession Act the share of the widow in her husband's estoate became a full estate. Manmohini died on 1.11.1967'
leaving behind her daughter Ghia Devi and son Raktoo Singh. The
G
advocate for the appellants wrote to the Court that as Raktoo Singh
· was the only heir of Manmohini and he was already on record it was
not necessary to add Manmohini's legal representatives oand her name
may be struck off. They did not want to proceed with the application
for adding legal representatives. The Registrar also boas recorded that
the application was not pressed. On 27.4.1968 the respondents made
an application stating that the appeal had abated oas Manmohini's
H
dau2hter Ghia Devi had not been added as party. On 30-7-1968 afresh application was filed for adding Ghia Devi as ~ legal r~prese~
tative and. praying that the abatement may be set aside. This applt-·
950
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[1975) 2 S.C.R.
caticm was dismissed on 30.8.1968. The order on that application
'WU:
'.'Delay in making the 'application for bringing on record
Mst. Ghia Devi not condoned. The application for bringing
her on record is dismissed on the ground of delay: 'l'hC
question as .to the effect of this order will be considered at
the time of the final hearing of the appeals."
The contention is that as Ghia Devi was not added as a legal :representative after ~er mother Manmohini's death the appeal had abated
as tar as Manmohini Devi was concerned and as the decree is one and
indivisible the whole appeal had abated. This contention was sou~:bt
to be sustained on the basis of the decisions of this Court in The Smte
of Punjab v. Nathu Ram (1962(2) SCR636) and Remeshwar Pras,rid
'V. M/s. Shyam Behari1al Jagannath (1964(3) SCR549). As against
this, reliance .is placed on behalf of the appellants on the decisions in
Daya Ram v. Shyam Sundari (1965(2) SCR231), Do/oi Mol/iko v.
K. C. Patnalk (1966)(Supp)SCR22), Ratan Lal v. Lal. Man Das
'1970(l)SCR296) and Mahabir Prasad v. /age Ram (1971(3~SC.R
301). We consider that there is no substance In the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents and it shoilld be rejected.
As was ~oipted out by this Court in Daya Ram v. Shyam Sund,1rt
(supra) m Ram Sarup v. Munshi (1963(3)SCR858) one of the appulaants had died pending the appeal and his leial representatives were
not brought on record. As the decree was a JOint one and as part ,of
the decree ha1:l become final bv reason of the abatement it was held
· that the entire appeal must be held to have abated. The State of Pun/ab v. Nathu Ram (supra) was a case where a joint decree had bem
passel:! in favour of two individuals and that was challenged in tile
appeal before the High Court. It was common ground that the appeal
against one of' the joint decree holders and abated owing to none 1:>f
his legal repre~entatives having impleaded within the time limited by
_ law and there being none on record to represent his estate. In such a
<:ase the only question that could arise would be whether the abati~
ment which e.t concessis took place as regards one of the respondents should be confinetl to the share of the deceased respondent .118
against whom the appeal has abated, or whether it would result in tll1e
abatement of the entire appeal. This would depend on the nature <>f
the decree and the nature of the interest of the deceased in the property. If the decree is ·ioint and indivisible, the abatement would be
total. That was nreciselv the question which was raised in Nathu
Ram'&' case and the decision in Ram Sarup v. Munshi is also an
mustration of the same principle.
In Rameshwar Prasad :Y. M/s. Shyam Beharilal Jagannath nine
persons including instituted a suit for ejectment and recovery of ren:t
against two defendants and obtained a decree. During the pendency
of the second appeal in the High Court K died. His legal representatives not having been added the appeal abated as far he was concerned.
When the appeal came up for hearing the respondents took a preliminary objection that the entire appeal had abated. The appellants
claimed tlmt the appeal was maintainable on the ground that the sur·
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951
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viving appellants could have filed the apfeal against the entire decree
in view of the provisions of 0.41, r. 4 o the Code of Civil Procedure
aud that they were, therefore, competent to continue the appeal even
after the death of K and the abatement of the appe'al so far as he was
concerned. It was held that the provisions of 0.41, r. 4 of the Code
of Civil Procedure were not applicable, since the second appeal was
filed by all the plaintiffs and the surviving appellants could not be said
B to have filed the appeal as representing K. It was further held that an
appellate court had no power to proceed with the appeal and to re..
verse and vary the decree in favour of all the plaintiffs or defendants
under 0.41, r. 4 when the decree proceeded on a ground common to
all the plaintiffs or defendants, if all the plaintiffs or the defendants
appealed from the decree and any of lhem died and the appeal abated
so far as he was concerned under 0.22, r. 3. It was also held tliat the
C provisions of 0.41, r. 33 were not applicable. The contention that all
the appellants belonged to a joint Hindu family<was rejected in that
case. It was also heid that 0.41, r. 4 applies to the stage when an
appeal is filed but that once an appeal has been filed by all the plaintiffs
the provisions of 0.41, r. 4 became unavailable.· It was also held that
if sume party dies during the pcndency of the appeal his legal reprc·
sentatives have to be brought on the record within the period of limitaD tion, und if that is not done, the appeal by the deceased appellant
abates and does not proceed any further. In so holding this Court over·
ruled the view t!lken by the Bombay, Calcutta and Madras High Courts
in Shripad Ba/want v. Nagu Kusheba (ILR 1943 Born. 143), Satulal
Bhattachariya v. Asiruddin Shaikh [ILR (61) Cal. 879] and Somasu11daram Chettiar v. Vaithilinga Mudaliar [ILR ( 40) Mad. 846] respectively which had held that if all the plaintiffs or the defendants
E appeal from the decree .•and any of them dies .the appellate court can
proceed with the appeal and reverse or vary the decree in favour of all
the plaintiffs or defendants under 0.41, r. 4 when the decree proceeds·
on a ground common to all the plaintiffs or defendants.
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The important point to note about this litigation is that eoach of the
reversioners is entitled to his own specific share. He could have sued
for his own share and got a decree for his share. That is why five tide
suits Nos. 53 and 61 of 1934 and 20, 29 and 41 of 1935 were filed
in respect of the same estate. In the present case also the suit in the
first instance was filed by the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs for their 1/12th
share. .Thereafter many of the other reversioners who were originally
added as defendants were transposed as plaintiffs. Though the decree
of the Trial Court was one, three appeals Nos. 326, 332 and 333 of
1948 were filed by three sets of parties. Therefore, if.one of the plaintiffs dies and his legal representatives are not brought on record the
suit or the appeal might abate as far as he is concerned but not. 11:s
regards the other plaintiffs or the appellants. Furthermore, the prmc1ple that applies to this case is whether the estate of the deceased
appellant or ·respondent is represented. This is not a case where no
legal representative of Manmohini was on record. Order 22, r. 4 of
the Civil Procedure Code reads :
"4. ( 1) Where . . . a sole defendant or sole surviving defendant di.es and the right to sue survives, the Court, on an
952
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1975) 2 S.C.R.
application made in that behalf, shall cause the legal representative of the deceased defendant to be made a party
and shall proceed with the suit.
A
4. (3) Where within the time limited by law no application is made under sub-rule ( 1) , the suit shall abate as
against the deceased defendant."
As pointed out by this Court in Daya Ram v. Shyam Sundari, the
almost universal consensus of· opinion of all the High Courts is that
where a plaintiff or an appellant after diligent and bona fide enquiJry
ascertains who the legal representatives of a deceased defendant or respondent are and brings them on record within the time limited by law,
there is no abatement of the suit or apjpeal, that the impleaded legal
representatives sufficiently represent the estate of the deceased and the
decision obtained with theni on record will bind not merely those im"
pleaded but tfae entire estate including· those not brought on record.
It was observed by the Madras High Court in
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Kadir v. Muthu-
krishna Ayyar [ILR (26) Mad. 230] :
"In our opinion a person whom the plaintiff alleges to be
· the legal representative of the deceased defendant and whose
name the. Court enters on the record in the place of such defendant sufficiently represents the estate of the deceased for
the purpose of the suit and in the absence of any fraud or
collusion, the decree passed in such suit will bind such estate
........ If this were not the law, it woUld, in no few cases,
be practically impossible to secure a' complete representation
of a party dying penqing a suit and it would be specially so
in the case of a. Muhammadan party and there can be no
hardship in a provision of law by which a party dying during
the peridency of a suit, is fully represented for the purpose
of the suit, but only for that purpose, by a person whose
name is entered on the record in place of the deceased party
under sections 365, 367 and 368 of the Civil Procedure
Code, thpugh such person may be only one· of several legal
representative or may not be the true legal representative."
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After referring to this statement of the law this Court in Daya Ram v.
Shyam Sundari went on to remark :
"In a case where the person brought on record is a legal
representative we consider that it would be conson'allt with
justice and principle tlrat in the absence of fraud or collusion
the bringing on record of such a legal representative is sufficient to prevent the suit or the appeal from abating."
In Dolai Molliko v. K. C. Patnaik on the death of one of the plaintiflsappell'ants in an appeal pending before the Subordinate Judge bis
widow and the major son were substituted on record as heirs. It w:as
later discovernd that the deceased had left some other heirs besides the
two. The respondents raised an objection that as some of the lieirs
of the deceased had been left out and there could be no question of
want of knowledge of the existence of these heirs on the part of the
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953
widow and the mjor son who had applied for being brought on re®rd,
the appeal abated. It would be noticed that the position is exactly
the same here. This Court held :
·
"The 'estate of the deceased was fully represented by the
heirs who had been brought on the record and these heirs
represented the absent heirs also, who would be equally
bound by the result."
It was observed :
"Even where the plaintiff or the •appellant has died and
all his heirs have not been brought on the record because of
oversight or because of some doubt as to who are his heirs,
the suit or the appeal, as the case may be, does not abate
and the heirs brought on the record fully represent the estate
unless there is fraud or collusion or there are other circumst'ances which indicate that there has not been a fair or real
trial or that against the absent heir there was a special case
which was not and could not be tried in the proceedings."
After referring to the decisions in N. K. Mohd. Sulaiman .,Sahib v
N. C. Mohd. Ismail Sahab [1966 (1) SCR 937] and Daya Ram v
Shyam Sundari (supra) the Court went on to o~serve:
"It will be noticed that there is one differeni;e between
the present case and the two cases on which reliance has
been placed on behalf of i.he appellants. This is not a aise
where a plaintiff or an appellant applies for bringing the heirs
of the deceased defendant or respondent on the record; this
·is a case where one of the appellants died and his heirs have
to be brought on record. In such a case there is no question
of any diligent or bona fide enquiry for the deceased appellant's heirs must be known to the heirs who applied for being
brought on the record. Even so we are of opinion that unless there is fraud or collusion or there are other circumstances which indictate that there has not been a fair or real
trial or that against the absent heir there was .a special
which was not and could not be tried in the proceeding, there
is no reason why the heirs who have applied for being brought
on record should not be held to represent the entire estate
including the interests of the heirs not brought on the record.
This is not to say that where heirs of an appellant are to be
brought on record all of them should not be brought on record and any of them should be deliberately left out. But
if by oversight or on account of some doubt as io who are
the heirs, any heir of a deceased appellant is left out that in
itself would be no reason for holding that the entire estate of
the dece'ased is not represented unless circumstances like
fraud or collusion to which we have referred above exist.
case
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In the present case there is no question of any fraud or
collusion; nor is there anything to show that there had not
been a fair or real trial, nor can it be said that against the
absent heir there was a special case which was not and could
not be tried in the proceeding in his abseace."
4-L346SupCl/75
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[1975) 2 S.C.R.
It must be made clear that the fraud or collusion mentioned must be a
fraud or collusion between· the appellant on the one hand and the representative of the deceased respondent who is brought on record on
the other and vice versa. In the present case failure to bring Ghia
Devi, daughter of Manmohil\l, on roo)rd cannot be said to be a fr.iud
on the part of her brother Raktoo Singh in collusion with the respondents nor can he deprive Ghia Devi of her rights by not impleading
her as the legal representative of their deceased mother. The fraud
contemplated is a fraud or collusion between the parties on record to
the detriment of the legal representative who has not been brougllt on
record.
A
B
In Ratan Lal v. Lal Man Das (supra) the respondent obtained a
joint decree against the appellant and his partner M. Against the
decree, the appellant alone appealed to the High Court. M was im- C
pleaded as the second respondent in the appeal. The notice of ap1>e&.1.
sent to M was returned unserved. The High Court dismissed the
appeal. Thi~ Court held :
"The appeal could not be dismissed on the ground that M
was not served with the notice of appeal, nor, in view of the
provisions of Order 41, Rule 4, could the High Court dismiss
D
the appeal on the ground that there was ta possibility of two
conflicting decrees."
and pointed out :
"The object of the rule is to enable one of the partieS to
a suit to obtain relief in appeal when the decree appealed
from pwceeds on a ground common to him and others. The
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Court in such an appeal may reverse or vary the decree in
favour of all the parties who are in the same interest as the
appellant."
This Court referred to the decision i11 Karam Singh Sobti & Anr. v.
Shri Pratap Chand & Anr. [1964 (4) SCR 647], wiiere it was
observed:
·
"The~ suit had been filed both 'against the tenant and the
sub-tenant, being respectively the Association and the appel~
!ant. One decree had been passed by the trial Judge against
both. The appellant had his own right to appeal from that
decree. That right could not be oa.ffected by the Association's
decision not to file an appeal. There was one decree and,
therefori~, the appellant was entitled to have it set aside even
though 1hereby the Association would alsi:> be free from the
decree .. He could say that that decree was wrong and should
be set aside as it was passed on the erroneous finding that the
respondent had not acquiesced in the subletting by the Association .to him. He could challenge that decree on any ground
available. The lower appellate Coilrt was, therefore, quite
competent in the appeal by the appellant from the joint decree
in ejectn1ent against him and the Association, to give him
whatever' relief he was found entitled to, even though the
Association had filed no appeal."
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955
In Mahabir Prasad v. !age Ram (supra) it was held:
"Where in a proceeding a party dies and one oI the legal
representatives is already on the record in another capacity,
it is only necessary that he should be. described by an appropriate application made. in that behalf that he is also on the
record, as an heir and legal representative. Even if there are
other heirs and. legal representatives and no application for
· impleading them is made within the period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act the proceeding ~ill riot abate."
That meets the point raised by the respo11dents exactly. The principle
is of representation of the estate of the deceased which need not be by
all the legal representatives of the deceased. The preliminary objection
is, therefore, overruled.
The above discussion also meets the plea raised on beh«ilf of the
appellants. As We have already mentioned, ·against the decree of the
Sub-Judge First Appeals Nos. 326, 332 and 333 of 1948 were filed
before the High Court. In appeal No. 326 Nirsu Prasad Singh was
made a party but not in appeals Nos. 332 and 333. The parties seem
to have been so confused that only in F.A. No. No. 332 of 1948 an
application was made tQ,implead Nirsu Prasad Singh as a party on the
ground that he was not impleaded as a respondent by mistake. This
was dismissed by the High Court on 1-3-1951. No body seems to have
noticed that Nirsn Prasad Singh had not been made a party in P.A.
No. 333 of 1948 'also. This was noticed by the learned Judges of the
High. Court at the conclusion of the hearing of the appeals before it.
The appeal was, therefore, listed .for being men~ioned and the learned
Judges brought this fact to the notice of the parties and the appellants
in P.A. No. 333 thereafter put in an application under Order 41, rule
20 oand section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for adding the name
of Nirsu Prasad Singh as a party. We will quote the learned Judges
on this point :
~'Although Jeft to ourselves, we would have allowed this
application and added Nirsu Prasad Singh as a party in the
appeal even at that late stage but we did not think it advisable to adopt this course in view of order dated 1-3-1951
passed in 'P.A. 332 / 48 and we, therefore, rejected this application by our order No. 145 dated 22-4-1959 passed in P.A.
333 / 48. The position, therefore, is that Nirsu Prasad Singh,
plaintifi No. 8 is not a party respondent in two of the appeals
but he is 'a party in one of the three. I may note that both
parties agreed before us that the appellants is F.A. 332/48
aild P.A. 333/48 have been impleaded as respondents in
F.A. 326/48. Therefore, even if we dismiss these two appeals
· on the grourid of this highly technical objection, it is possible
to give relief to the appellants of these two appeals in P.A.
· 326/48 under order 41. rule 33 of the Code of Civil Pro• cedure. Since plaintiff .No. 8 is a ll'arty respondent in P.A.
32(\/48 al~ng with ill othei: plaintiffs, ther~ will be no conflict ot·deeree and the result of our allowmg F.A. 326/48,
. which has got
be allowed in view of ~ findin~ ·above,
to·
956
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1975] 2 S.C.R.
would be to set aside the entire decree in favour of the plaintiffs-respondents and that can be done even at the instance of
some of the contesting defendants. I am, therefore, of the
view that First Appeals 332 and 333 of 1948 also cannot and
should not fail on this technical preliminary ground."
We think that the conclusion of the learned Judges of the High Coiirt
was right. Against the same decree passed by the learned Subordinate
Judg(~ there were three appmls. In one appeal, that is P.A. No. 326
of 1948, Nirsu Prasad Singh was impleaded as a party but not in the
other two appeals. P.A. No. 326 of 1948 was filed only by some of
the defendants in the suit. It was, therefore, possible by the application
of the provisions of 0.41 r. 4 and r. 33 to have allowed the appeal in
full and given relief not merely to the appellants in P.A. 326 but also
to the appellants in F.As 332 and 333 assuming that they had not fil1~d
these appeals. The utmost that can tie said is th•at the effect of the
failure to implead Nirsu Prasad Singh as a respondent in F.As. 3;12
and 333 is that these two appeals will have to fail but that does not
mean that P.A. 326 has also to fail. It is not even a case where the
appellants in F.As. 332 and 333 had not taken the trouble of filing an
appeal and therefore it can be said that they should not be given the
benefit of the appeal filed by the appellants in P.A. 326. They had
filed appe•als in order to establish their rights. It was by an oversight
in filing those appeals that they had failed to implead Nirsu Prasad
Singh as a party. To such a case 0.41, r. 33 clearly applies.
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The cases where the provisions of 0.41, r. 33 can be applied have.
if we may say so, been set out correctly after a very full discussion
by a Bench of: the High Court of Madras in its decision in Krishna
Reddy v. Ramired(ii (AIR 1954 Mad. 848). Speaking through
Vcnkatarama Aiyar, J., as he thei:i was, the Court observed :
"Though 0. 41, R. 33 confers wide and unlimited jurisdiction on Courts to pass a decree in favour of a party who has
not preferred any appeal, there are, however, certain well
defined principles in acqoi'dance with which· th'llt jurisdiction
should be exercised. Normally, a party who is aggtieved
by a dect',ee should, if he seeks to escape from its operation,
appeal against it within the time allowed after complying
with the requirements of law. Where he fails to do so, no
relief should ordinarily be given to him under 0. 41, R. 33.
But there are well recognised exceptions to this rule. One
is where as a result of interference in favour of the appellant
it become:s necessary to readjust the rights of other parties.
A second. class of cases based on the same principle is where
the question is one of settling mutual rights and obligations
between the same parties. A third class of cases is when the
relief prayed for is single and indivisible but is claimed
against 'll number of defendants. In such cases, if the suit is
decreed and there is an appeal only by some of the defendants and if the relief is granted only to the appellants there
is the possibility that there might come into operation at the
same time and with reference to the same subject-matter two
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957
decrees which are inconsistent and contradictory. This, however, is not an exhaustive enumeration of the class of cases
in which courts could interfere under OAl, R. 33. Such an
enumeration would neither be possible ncir even desirable.
Considering the question on principle, when a decree isin substance a combination of several decrees agaiiist several
defendants, there is no reason why an appeal presented by
one of the defendants in respect of his interest should enure
for the benefit of the other defendants with reference to their
interests.
Thus where a reversioner files a suit to recover possession
of his share of many items of properties which are held by
different defendants under different alienations, some of
which might be. valid and others not, there is no community
of interest between them. · The plaintiff could have filed a
separate suit in respect of t•ach item and impleaded as defendants therein only the alienee interested in that item. In that
event, if all the suits were decreed but an appeaJ were to be
preferred against the decree in only one of them and that
;ippeal is allowed, that would not operate as reversal of the
decrees in the other suits; not would there be any power in
the Cout to set aside .those decrees under 0.41, R. 33. It
would not make any difference when the plaintiff has, for
convenience, combined several suits into one."
As we have already pointed out, in this case each one of the plaintiffs
could have filed 11 suit for his share of Ramdhan Singh's estate. The
fact-. that all the reversioners joined together as plaintiffs and filed one
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· suit does not mean that if for one reason or other the suit of one of
them fails or abates the suit of the others fails or abates. ·The decree
is in substance the combination of several decrees in favour of several
plaintiffs. If in an appeal against the decree one of the plaintiffs is
not added as a respondent, it only means that the decree in his favour
cannot be set aside or modified even if the appe•al succeeds against
F other plaintiffs in respect of their interest. There would in that case
be no conflict between the decrees· as the decree is a combination of
many decrees. In other words the result of the failure to add Nirsu
Prasad Singh as a respondent in F.A. 332 and F.A. 333 would be that
the decree granted in his fuvour by the Subordinate Judge would stand
but not the decrees granted in favour. of the other plaintiffs. They can
be reversed in those appeals. There was no such difficulty in F:A. 326
G and in that appeal the decree granted in favour of Nirsu Prasad Singh
as well as in favour of other pl'aintiffs could have been reversed. This
is not a case where a party who is aggrieved by a decree fails to file an
appeal within the time allowed by law and should not, .therefore, be
granted relief under 0.41, r. 33.
.
We do not think that the decision 'relied upon by the appell'ants in
lhinghan Singh & Anr. etc. v. Singheshwar Singh & Ors. etc. (C.A.
H Nos. 114-122 of 1958 decided on 20-4-1965) helps the appellants. In
that case.Singheshwar Singh was one of the appellants in C.A. Nos. 114
and 115 and respondent in the other appeals. Kaushal Kishore Pra58d
Singh was one of the appellants in C.A. Nos. 116 and 117· and a res-
958
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1975] 2 S.C.R.
ponden·t in the other appeals. Both of them died and the pending
appeals a1'at€:d against them. The contesting respondents took the
preliminary objection that all the appeals .had become defective for
non-joinder of the legal representatives of Singheshwar Singh and·
Kaushal Kishore Prasad Singh and this objection was accepted. The
decision proc.eeded on the basis that the plaints in the several suits
raised a dispute between a body of landholders claiming khas possession of the lands and a numb~r of perrnns chiming to be occupancy
tenants thereof, that in substance, the plaintiffs asked for an adjudication tliat the lands were bakasht and the first party defendants were not
occupancy terrants and to such suits all the landholders were necessary
parties. It was therefore held that as in the appeals before this Court
the landholders claimed the same relief which they sought in the tdal
Court and in those appeals also Singheshwar Singh and Kaushal
Kishore Prasad Singh were necessary parties, in the absence of tl:J1eir
Je~l representatives the appeals were not maintainable. It would be
seen that the two appellants whose legal representatives were not added
as parties were parties in all the four suits and in all the four appeals
and the question was a common question to which all the land hglders
were necessary parties. As we have explained earlier that is not 1the
position here.
The decision in Kishan Singh & Ors. v. Nidhan Singh & Ors.
(C.A. No. 563 of 1962 decided on 14,-12-1964) •and the statement of
law laid down by this Court therein in the following terms :
"Mr. Bishan Narain points out that in substance, the
present suit is between the landholders on the one hand and ·
those who claimed to be occupancy tenants on the other. It
is true tJtat the plaint alleges that the occupancy rights were
extinguished on the death of the last occupancy tenant Narain
Singh, but that has been denied by the appellants, and .in fact,
round this dispute the whole controversy. centres in the present suit. There is no doubt that the allegations made in the
plaint clearly show that the dispute is between the landholders and the person who claim to· be occupancy tenants,
and so, it is plain that in such a dispute the whole interest of
the landholders an~ the whole interest of the tenants must be
adequately represented. The tenancy rights which the appellants claim are no doubt based o:n the presumption under s.
5(2) of the Tenancy Act. But the relationship in respect of
which the said presumption would arise is a relationship of
landlord and telll1Ilt, and this relationship in the very nature
of things. is one and indivisible. Therefore, when a ~ is
A
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F
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H. p, SINGH V. B. P. SINGH (Alagiri.swami, /.)
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made to evict the persons who allege that they are tenants
the whole of the landlord's iriterest must be before the
Court."
was cited with approval in lhinghan Singh & Anr. etc. v; Singheshwar ·
Singh'& Ors; etc. (supra). It .does not, therefore, stand on any difteB rent footing.
We hold, therefore, drat the learned Judges of the High Court were
correct in holding that at least F.A. 326 had not .abated because of the
faHme to implead Nirsu Prasad Singh as respondent in F.As. 332
and 333 and it was open to the Court in F.A. 326 in .exercise of its
pc>wers under 0.41, r. 33 to give all the appellants therein, that is, the
C respondents in the appeals before this Court, the relief that the appel. !ants in F.A. 326 were entitled to. The plea of the appellants is,
therefore, overruled.
a
In the result the appeals are dismissed with costs, one set, hearing
fee.
V.P.S.
Appeals dilmissed.
".
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