KATIKARA CHINTAMANI DORA & ORS. versus GUNTREDDI ANNAMNAIDU & ORS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 11 December 1973 | [1974] 2 S.C.R. 655 | 1973 INSC 237
Key facts
- Decided
- 11 December 1973
- Bench
- D.G. PALEKAR*, V.R. KRISHNA IYER*, R.S. SARKARIA
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 1936/1967
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1974] 2 S.C.R. 655
- Neutral citation
- 1973 INSC 237
Text of the judgment
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655
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KATIKARA CHINTAMANI DORA & ORS.
P.
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GUNTREDDI ANNAMNAIDU & ORS.
December 11~ 1973.
(0, G. PALEKAR, V, R. KR!SHl'\A !YER AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.]
Madras Estates (A bolltlo11 and Conversion Into Ryotwarl) Act 1948-.1.
9(1)-Jurlsdlctlo11 of th• Stttl•ment Of/im and Civil Court-Wliethtr finding
of Selllement Of!im could b• qumlo11•d in a Clvll Court-Effect of A·me11dln1
Act on pending act/0111,
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The Settlement Officer under the Madras Estates (Abolition· and Conversion
into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 s110 motu made an inquiry as to whether a parti•
cular villa*e notified by the State Government was an estate or not within the
contemplation of s. 9(2) of the Act and held that it was not an "inam eslate"
within the meaning of s. 2(7) of the Abolition Act b'ut that the villaae become
an estate by virtue of Madras Estates Land (3rd Amendment) Act, 1936.· The
appellants unsuccessfully appealed to the Estate Abolition Tribunal. The appel·
lant then instituted a suit (O.S. 47 of 1953) against the State Government for
a declaration that the village was not an ''estate" under s. 3(2)(d) of the
Madras Estates Land Act. 1908 and consequently Madras Estate (Reduction
of Rent) A'ct, 1947 and the Abolition Act were not applicable ·to it. The
trial court decreed the suit. The State preferred an appeal. During the pen·
dency of the appeal the appellant filed a suit (0.S. No. 101 of 1954) agoinst
the respondents for recovery of certain amount as rent or damages in respect
of lands cultivated by them in the village in dispute. The respondents con·
tended that the village was an estate within the meaning of the Act and that
it had been so held by the Settlement Officer. Ultimately both the parties.
filed a joint memo on 26th March, 1958 that they would abide by the decision
of the High Court or the Supreme Court in the appeal or revision arising. out
of the suit (O.S, 47/53) on the question whether the village was or-Was not
an "estate'' ur:der s. 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act. The Hi~h
Court (in A.S. No. 668 of 1954 which was an appeal arising out of o.s~ 47
of 1953) confirmed the decree of the trial court that the :village in dispute was
not an 'estate'. The State did not appeal, with the result that the High Court's
decision became final and the decree dated 28th March, 1958 became effec·
tive.
Against the decree of 28th March, 1958 the· appellants preferred an appeat.
(A.S. 239 of 1961) to the High Court. The appeal related only to the extent
of the land in the possession of the respondents and the quantum of rent or
damages. The appellants• claim was, that the entire land ~as under cul!ivation
of the respondents and so the tower court was wrong 1n not decreeing the
appellants' claim for rent or damages i1? toto. The respondents raised :1 rreli~
minary objection at the time of hearing of the appeal that the ~uit itsel was
incompelent as the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to decide whether the suit
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village was an estate or not and, therefore, any dCcision given by the High
Court would not bind the parties and the decree in O.S. 101 of 1954 would
be without iuri-;diction rendering it null and void and that the Settlement Officer
was the competent authority to decide the tenure of the village and his deci·
sion had be·come final in view of the introduction .of s. 9A by Act 20 of 1960.
The High Court upheld the preliminary otijection of the re~pondent!' and
rejected the contentions of the appellants that since s. 9A was inserted by an
amendment which came into force on 23rd June, 1960, it could not affect the
compromise decree of the court passed on March 28, 1958 or the decree of
H the High Court by which both the parties agreed to abide by the decision of tbeHigh Court or the Supreme Court in appeal or revision arising out of O.S.
47 of 1953. The High Court held that the Civil Court was not the forum for
the suit a~ framed by the a.ppella.nts and the questions raised in the suit ~.
2-L748SupCf/74
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SUPREME COURT REPCJKTS
(1974] 2 s.C.R,
including tbe claim for arrears of rent or damages, were outside the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, and so dismissed the appeal.
Allowing the appeal.
HELD : I (a) There is no doubt that the question was within the competence of the Civil Court. Under the Abolition Act, as it stood at the material
date, the inquiry of the Settlement Officer could legitimately be confined to the
ascerrainment of only two disputes of fact, viz., (i) Was the village an "inam
village''? (ii) If so, was it an 'Inam Estate' as defined in s. 2(7) of the
Abolition Act'! Once issue (ii) was determined, the _inquiry would be comple:e and the limits of his exclusive jurisdiction circumscribed by s. 9(1)
reached; if he went beyond those limits to investigate and determine something
which is unnecessary or merely incidental or remotely related to issue No. (ii),
then such incidental or unnecessary determination could be questioned in a
Civil Court. [668FGJ
(b) Any finding recorded by the Settlement Officer regarding the property
in question being an 'inam village' or not, is not final or conclusive it being a
finding of a jurisdictional fact only, the pre-existence of which is a sine (lua nou
to the exerciSe of his exclusive jurisdiction by the Settlement Officer. [668H]
(c) The legislature Oiust have visualised that under the cloak of an erro..
neous finding as to the existence or nan-existence of this pre-requisite, the
Settlement Officer may illegally clutch at jurisdiction not conferred on him or
refuse to exercise jurisdiction vesting in him. Perhaps that is why the statute
does not leave the final determination of this preliminary fact to the Settlement
Officer /Tribunal and his erroneous finding on that fact is liable to be questioned
in a Civil Court. Once it is held that determination of this fact is not a
matter of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer, the appellants
cannot be debarred on the basis of any docbine of res /udicata from getting
the matter fully and finally adjudicated bv a court of competent jurisdiction.
[669B-C; El
Addanki Tiruvenkata Tata ·nesika Charyulu v. State of Andhra Pradesh
A.LR. 1964 S.C. 807 followed.
District Board, Taniore v. Noor Mohammed, (19S2) 2 MJ. S86 (S.C.) re·
ferred to.
(2) It is well settled that ordinarily when the· substantive law is altered
during the pendency of an action, rights of the parties are decided according
to law, as it existed when the action was taken unleu the new statute shows a
clear intention to vary such rights. A plain reading of the impugned Act
would show that there was nothing of this kind which expressly or
by necessarv intendment affects pcndi112 actions. [670C-D]
(b) There is no iion-obsrante clause in the amendin.Q: Acts 17 and 18 of
1957 with reference to pending or closed civil actions. These amending Acta
were published in the government gazette of December 23, 1957 and will
therefore be deemed to have come into force from that date only. They could
therefore be construed as having prospective operation only. [670G-HJ
(c) In the Amending .fiCt 20 of 1960 also no back date for its commencement has been mentioned. It will, therefore, be deemed to have commenced
on June 23, 1960 which is the date on which it was published in the Goverr.ment gazette. r674El
Section 9A takes iil its retrospective sweep only those deci!ions of the
Settlement Officer or the Tribunal which at the comencement of the Amending
Act 20 of 1960 were subsisting and had not been totally vacated or rendered
non-est by a decree of a competent court. [675~FJ
In the instant case the decision of the Settlement Officer dated September 2,
1950 was not such a decision. It had ceased to exist as a result of the inter-·
linked decree in O.S. 47 of 1953 and 0.S. 101 of 1954 passed before the
enactment of the Amending Act. The Amending Act of 1960, therefore, does
not in any way affect the finality or the binding effect of those decrees.
[67501
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(d) Order 23 rule 3 C.P.C. not only permits a partial compromise and
adjustment of a suit by a lawful aa;reement, but further gives a mandate to
the court to record it and pass a decree in terms of such compromise or
adjustment in so far as it relates to the suit. If the compromise agreement
was lawful the decree to the extent it was a consent decree was not appealable
because of the express bar in s. 96(3) of the Code. [672E]
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Raja Sri Sai/endra Narayan Bhanja Deo v. State of Orissa [1956] S.C.R. 72,
Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality [19701 1 S.C.R.
388 and Reid v. Reid 118861 31 Ch.D. 403 at 408, followed,
(e) In any suit the parties, in order to ·avoid unnecessary expenses and
botheration, could legitimately make an agreement to. abide by a determination
on the same point in issue in another pending action in an advanced stage.
There was nothing unlawful and improper in such an arrangement particularly
when the interests of the respondents wei'e sufficiently safeguarded by the State.
By no. stretch of reasoning it could be said that the agreement was collusive
or was an attempt~ to contract out of the statute. In the instant case as soon
as the parties made the agreement to abide by the determination in the appeal
( A.S. (i68) and induced the court to pass a decree in terms of that agreement
the principle of estoppel underlying s. 96(3) C.P.C. became operative and the
decree to the extent it was in terms of that agreement became final and binding
between the parties. It ·was as effective in creatina; an estoppel between the
~artics as a iudgmcnt on contest. [672F·G & 673C]
·
In the instant case that part of the decree in suit No. 101 'of .'1954 and
the appee.t from that decree could not be said to be a continuatiQD. 'Of that
part of the claim which had been settled by agreement. The combined effect
of the two integrated decrees was to completely vacate and render non-td
decision dated September 2. 1950 of the. Settlement Officer. {673Fl
Raja Sri Sailendra Narayan Bhanja Deo v. State of Orissa [1956] S.C.R. 72
applied.
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Per .f(rishna Tyer, I. concurring:
Courts have to be anchored to well-known canons of statutory comtructlon
and if they ate out of tune with the law maker's meaning and purpose the legitimate means of setting things. right is to enact a new Interpretation AcL
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f678Bl
The .Indian Constitution, adopting the fighting faith of equal; protection of
the laws to all citizens, necessarily contemplates a new jurisprudence where
vested rights may be, and qften-times are, ex~ensively interfered with for
achieving the founding fathers' social goa~s. Legislative exercises directed towards distributive justice as in the present case, cannot be considered in the
Ji~ht of" .dated value system, tflough sanctified by bygone decisions of Courts.
T677Hl
In the present case the Act in question is clear about its intent '1ld its application giVes little difficulty.
CIVIL APPE LLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Ap~al No. 1936 of 1967
From the Judgment and Decree dated the 14th October, 1966 of
Andhra Pradesh High Court in Appeal No. 239 of 1961 and Memo
of Cross Objections therein arising out of the judgment and decree
dated 28th March 1958 of the Subordinate Judge, Srikakulam in
Original Suit No. 101 of .1954.
M. Natesan, K. Jayaram and R. Chandrasekhar, for the appellant,
P. Parmeshwara Rao and T. Satyanarayana, for the respondent.
The Judgment of D. G. PALEKAR, and R. s. SARKARIA JJ. was
delivered by SARKARIA, J. v. R. KRISHNA IYER, J . gave a separate
Opinion.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1974) 2 s.c.R.
SARKARIA J.-This appeal by certificate involves an examination of
the limits of the respective jurisdictions of the Settlement Oflicer/Tribu·
oal and the Civil Court in relation to an inquiry uoder s. 9 ( 1) of the
Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948
(for short Abolition Act) and the effect of the Amending Acts 17 and
18 of 19S7 and Act 20 of 1960 on cases regarding such an inquiry
pending in or decided by the Civil Courts. It arises out of the following facts :
The lands in dispute are situated in village Kadak:alla, Taluk
Palakonda. On June 13, 1950, the then State Government issued
and published a notification under the Madras Estates (Reduction of
Rent) Act, 1947 (for short, Rent Reduction Act) in respect of this
village. ·Subsequently, the Settlement Officer of Srikakulam suo mot11
made an enquiry as to, whether this village was an "estate" or not
within th~ contemplation of s. 9(2) of the Madras Estates (Abolition
and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 (for short, called Abolition
Act) and by an o;der, dated September 2, 1950, held that it was
not an 'inam estate' within the meaning of s. 2(7) of the Abolition
Act. The Settlement Officer further recorded a finding that village
Kadakalla became an estate. by virtue of the Madrns Estntes Land
(3rd Amendment) Act, 1936. Against that order of the Settlement
Officer, the appellants herein carried an appeal to the Estates Abolition
Tribunal, Vizianagaram. The Tribunal by its order, dated Septem·
ber 16, 1952, dismissed the appeal in limine, with the observation
that the decision of the Settlel)lent Officer being in their favour the
appellants had no right of appeal.
The appellants then instituted O.S. 47 of 1953 in the Court of
the Subordinate Judge, Srikakulam against the State Government for
a declaration that Kadakalla village was not an 'estate' under s. 3(2) (d)
of 1908 Act, and consequently, the Rent Reduction Act and tne Abolition Act were not applicable to it. The trial court decreed the suit.
Aggrieved by the decree, the Stnte preferred an appeal (AS. 668 of
1954) to the High Court of Andhra Pradesh.
During the pendency of the said appeal, the appellants instituted
Original Suit No. 101 of 1954 (out of which the present appeal has
arisen) in the Court of Subordinate Judge Srikakulam, against the
respondents herein and others for the recovery of Rs. 15.681 '19 as
rent or damages for the year 1953 in respect of the Innds cultivated
by them in the area of village Kadakalla.
The suit was resisted by the respondents inter alia on the ground
that the suit village was an 'estate' as defined in s. 3(2)(d) 'of the
1908 Act, and that it had been so held by the Settlement Officer '"
per his Order dated September 2, 1950. Tt was further averred rhat
the defendants not being parties to O.S. 47 of 1953. were not bound
by the dec_isio~ iri that case. Tt was added t~ot the question us ro
whether this village was an estate cir not. was pending in the Hkh
Court of Andhra Pradesh in anpeal from the decision 'in O.S. 4;
1953, and as such, was sub iudice. The jurisdiction of the Subordinate
of
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Judge to try the suit (0.S. 191 of 19541) was also questioned. The
claim for rent or damages was also resisted.
On January 22, 1958, the respondents herein made an application
for permission to file an additional written statement for addinf the
pica that the. suit village is an 'inam estate'. On M~h 17, 958,
the trial court dismissed this application holding that the question
sought to be raised, was already covered by Issue .No. I.
The trial court framed as !llany as eleven issues, out of which
Issues I, 6 and 8 were as follows :
( 1) Whether the suit village is an es.tale within the meaning of Section 3(2) (d) of the Madras Estates Land
Act?
( 6) Whether the plaintiffs are barred and estopped to
claim rents in view ol prior pattas and rent decrees
that were previously obtained?
( 8) Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to try the
suit?
On .March 26, '1958, the o'.\dvocates for the part.ies filed a joint
memo to the effect that "both parties agree to abide by the final de·
cision whether in the High Court or in the supreme Court,. as the ..
case may be, in the appeal or revision, arising .out of 0.S. No. 47 of
1953 on the file of this Court on the question whether the ··suit village Kadakalla is not an estate under s. 3(2) (d) of the Madras
Estates Land Act, as amended upto date". As a result of this com.promise, .it was held that the decision of Issues I, 6 and 8 would
follow the final decision in O.S. 47 of 1953.. The remaining Issues
were tried and decided on merits. On March 28, 1958, the trial
court keeping in view the. joint memo filed by the parties and its findings on the other Issues, passed a decree in these terms :
"In case it is ultimately decided by the High Court or
the Supreme Court, as th~ case may be, in the appeal or
revision arising out of O.S. No. 47 of 1953 on the file of this
Court that the.(uit village Kadalrnlla is not an estate within the
mem1ing;of s. ~(2) (d) of the Estates Land Act, the defen'dants t.o pay to the plaintiffs the sum of Rs. 3,000/. with in·
terest at St per cent per annum from 26-3-1958 with interest
thereon and for costs, and that otherwise suit should stand
dismissed with costs and that the decree should take effect
from the date of the final decision of O.S. No. 47 of 1953 referred to above."
The appeal (AS. 668 of 1954) arising out of O.S. 47 of 1953
was decided by the High Court on Febru~ry 12, 1959 whereby the
decree of the triaj court declaring that village Kadakal!a was not an
estate, was confirmed. The application of the State for issuance of
a certificate of fitness for appeal to the Supreme Court w,ns dismisseil
by the High Court. The State ctjd not prefer any Special Leaye Peli-
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[1974] 2 s.c.R.
tion in this Court, with the result, that the High Court's decision in
that case became final and the decree, dated March 28,.1958, of the
Subordinate Judge in O.S. 101 of 1954 also.became effective. After
the disposal of its appeal (A.S. 668 of 1954), the Government issued
G.O.R.T. No. 619-Rev. dated June 30, 1966, cancelling the earlier
notifications in respect of this village notwithstanding the fact that
prior to such denotilication, section 9-A had been inserted m the
Abolition Act by the Amending Act 20 of 1960.
Appellant~ preferred an appeal (A.S. 239 of 1961) against the
said decree, dated March 28, 1958, of the Subordinate Judge, to
the High Court. Though in the Memorandum of Appeal, it was
said. as usual, in general terms, that the "decision of the lower court
is against law, weight of evidence and probabilities of the case", and
not conform to the rethat its decree was "worthless and did
auhements of section 2(2) of the Civil Procedure Code, yet, in
substance, the appeal related only to the extent of the land in the
possession of the respondents and the auantum of rent or damages.
The appellants' claim was that the entire suit land, as alleged in
the plaint, was under the cultivation of the respondents, and ,:onseauentlv, the lower court was wrong in not decreeing the appellants'
claim for Rs. 15,681119 as rent or damages, in toto.
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On April 6. 1962. the respandents filekl cross·objections conthat the auestion as to whether Kadakalla village is or is
not an 'estate' as defined in ~· 3(2}(d) of the 1908 Act, should
have been gone into by the trial court and that the rent should have
been decreed only in the sum 0f Rs. 551129.
tendin~
The High Court posted the appeal and the cross-objections for
hearing in July, 1965. At that stage, on July 19, 1965 . an application was made by the respondents praying that Exhts. B-196 and
B-197. bein2 copies of the order. dated September 2, 1950, of the
Settlement Officer anki the order dated September 16, 1952, of the
Estate Abolition Tribunal, respectively, be read as additional
evidence. It was contended that the Amentlin2 Act 20 of 1960 had
added s. 9A to the Abolition Act, as a result of which, the order of
the Settlement Officer had acqvired 'statutory validity'; antl since the
appellants did not file an appeal within two months from the com·
mencement of the Amendme-nt Act, the decision of the Settlement
Officer became fipal and binding on all the parties · including the
appellants. In spite of opposition by the appellants, the High Court
by its order, dated August 23, 1956, allowed this additional evidonce
and the settin2 up of the new plea.
The appeal and the cross-objections were heard together in
Au2Ust. 1966. The respondents raised a preliminary objection that
the suit itself was incompetent .·as the Civil Court had no jurisdiction
to decide whether the suit villa~e is an estate or not and, therefore,
any decision given by the High Court in appeal (A.S. 668 of 1954)
would not bind the parties and the decree in the present suit (0.S.
101 of 1954) on the basis of the judgment and decree in A.S. 668
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ol 1954. would be without jutisdictiQll renderin& it nu,! inti void,
that the Settlement Officer was the competent authority to decide tho
tenute of the villa2e and his decision bad become final in view of
the introduction of Section 9A by Act 20 of 1960.
The preliminary objection of the respondents was uphell:l. The
contention of the appellants, that since s. 9A was inserted by an
B amendment which came into force on June 23, 1960, it could not
affect the compromise decree of the Court passed earlier on March
28, 1958 or the decree of the 'High Court whereby both the parties
a~ed to abide by the decision of the High Court or the Supreme
Court in appeal or revision arising out of O.S. 47 of 1953, wa.&
rejected in these terms :
"We see no force in this contention as Section 9A
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is desiimed to meet such of the decisions where it has
been held that the villa2e is not an inam estate as it stood
after the 1936 Act and certainly the respondents can take
advantaae of chanao in statute, if it is to their benefit and
there could be no estoppel against a statute and the rights
accrued undcc a statute. It cannot reasonably be contend·
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ed that the suit filed by :the appellants and the decree obtained have reached anv finality as an appeal is only the
~oll.tinualion · ot the proceedings instituted by the plaintiffs."
In the result. it dismissed the appeal holding that tile Civil Court
was not the forum for 'the suit as framed by the appellants and the
Questions raised in the snit includin2 the claim for arrears of rent or
E dama2es. were outside the iurisdiction of the Civil Court.
Before dealin2 with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful
to have a clear idea of the relevant statutory provisions, including
the expressions uinam village", "inani estate'' and estate" as defined
therein.
S. 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Lank:! Act. 1908, as it origiF nally stood, defined "estate" as "any village of which the land
revenue alone (i.e. melwararn alone) has been granted in inam to a
person not owing the kudiwaram (rights in soil) thereof, provided
the irant has been made, confirme!i or recognised by the British Governinent or as separated part of such villaJ?;e." In this definition, it
wa.• not clear whether the inarndar had the melwaram alone or both
melwaram arid kudiwararn. To remove this obscurity, the Madras
G Estates Land <Third Amendment) Act, (18 of 1936), substituted
for the original sulrclause (d) in s. 3(2), this new clause:
"(d) anv jnam villaJ?;e of which the ifant has been made, confirmed or recognised by the Government notwithstanding
that subseauent tq the 21"ant, the village has been partitioned
amon2 the nantees or the successors-in-title of the grantee
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or grantees."'
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Section 3(2)(!1) was further amended by Madras Estates Land
Amendment Act JI of 194'5 with retrospective effect from the date
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
662
[1974] 2 s.C.R.
on which the Third Amendment Act 18 of 1936 came into force. It
inserted (among others) Explanation I, to this clause, which reads :
'·Where a i:rant as an inam is expressed to be of a named
vi!la)!;e, the area which forms the subject-matter of the grant
shall be deemed to be an estate notwithstanding that it did
not include certain lands in the village of that name woulli
have already been µanted on service or other tenure or
been reserved for communal purpose•."
Explanation T makes it clear that (apart from being made, con·
firmed, or recognised by the Government) , an in am grant in order to
come within the purview of "estate" under s. 3(2)(d) has to be a
grant expressly made of a named village or whole village, and not only
of a part od' the villa~e or of some defined area in a village. However, it remains and is \ieemed to be a grant of a whole village notwithstandin2 the exclusion of certain lands already granted on service
or other tenure or reserved for communal purposes; nor does it cease
to be a grant of an entire village merely because the village has been
subsequently partitioned amongst the grantees or their successors.
The interpretation of "estate" has behind it the authority .of a
beadroll of decisions. indudin2 that of this Court in District Board,
Tanjore, v. Noor Mohammed(')
Next, in chronological order, is the Madras Estates (Abolition and
Conversion into Ryotwari) Act. (XXVI of 1948). Section 1 (3)
thereof provided that "it applies to all estates as defined in section 3,
clause (2) of the Madras Estates Land Act. 1908 (except inam villages
which became estates by virtue of the Madras Estates Land (Third
Amendment) Act, 1936. The material part of s. 2 of this Act says:
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(3) "Estate" means a zamindari or an under-tenure or an
undertenure of an inam estate.
(7) "Inam Estate" -means an estate within the meaning of
section 3. clause (2) (\!), of the Estates Land Act, but
does not include an inam villa2e which became an estate
by virtue of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936".
Thus. to be2in with. this Act did not take in its fold post-1936
inam estates. Its operation remained confined to pre--1936 inam
estates till the commencement of Act 18 of 1957, which we shall
presenttv notice.
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Section 9 of the AbolitiP:\I A;;t indicates the authorities empowered
to determine Inam estate. It savs :
soon as ~y be after the passinl! of this Act, the
Settlement Officer may suo motu and shall, on application enauire and determine whether an inam village in
hii; jurisdiction is an inam estate or not.
.. <I) As
(1) (1952) 2 ~· J 586 (S. C.)
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(2) Before holding the inquiry, the Settlement Officer shall
cause to be J!ublished in the village in the prescribed
manner. a nqtice requiring all persons claiming an in·
terest in any land in the village to file before him statements bearing on the auestion whether the village is an
inam estate or not.
( 3) The Settlement Officer shall then hear the parties and
afford to them a r~asonable opPQrtunity of adducing all
such evidence either oral or documentary as they may
desire to examine all such documents as he has reason to
believe are in the PQssession of the Government and have
a bearing on the question before him and give him decision in writina.
(4) (al Any person deeming l)imself aggrieved by a decision
of the Settlement officer under sub-section (3) may within two months from the date of the decis_ion or such further time as the Tribunal mav in its discretion allow,
appeal to the Tribu_nal.
(b) Where any such appeal is preferred, the Tribunal shall
cause, to be publisheli in the village in the prescribed
manner a Jl.Olice reauiring .all persons who have applied
to the Settlement Officer under sub-section ( 1) or filed
before him before it, and after giving them a reasonable
OPPOrtunitv of bein~ heard, give its decision.
( c) The decision of the Tribunal under this sub-section shall
-be final and not be liable to be questioned in any court
of la"I.·
(5) No decision of the Settlement Officer under sub-section
(3) or of the -Tribunal u~der sub-section (4) shall be
invalid bv reason of any defect in the form of the notice
referred to in .sub-section (2) or sub-section (4) as· the
case mav be. or the manner of its publication.
( 6.) Everv decision of the Tribunal and subiect to such deci·
sion; every decision of the Settlement Officer under this
section shall be binding Qtl all persons cJaimin~ an in·
terest in any lan'd in the village, notwithstanding that any
such person h~s. not oreferred any application or filed
anv statement or adduced any evidence or appeared or
participated in the oroceedin~s before the Settlement
Officer or the Tribunal as the case may be.
(7) In the absence of evidence to the contrary the Settlement
Officer anl::l the Tribunal mav presume that an inam
village is an inam estate".
Madras Amendment Act 17 of 1951, introduced s. 64-A, which
runs thus :
"64-A. (1) The decisiiln of a Tribunal or Special Tribnnal in anv proceeding un4er th;s Act. or of a Jud~e of the
664
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1974] 2 s.c.R.
A
High Court hearing a case under Section 51(2), on any
matter fallin~ within it! or his jurisdiction shall be binkling
on the parties thereto, and persons claiming under them,
in any suit of oroceed_ing in a Civil Court in so far as such
matter is in issue between the parties or persons aforesaid
in such suit or proceeding.
(2) The decision of a Civil Court (not being the Court
of Small Causes) on any matter within its jurisdiction shall
be binding on the parties thereto and persons claiming under
them in any proceeding under this Act before a Tribunal
or Special Tribunal, or a Judge of the High Court under section 51 (2) in so far as such matter is in issue between the
parties or persons aforesaid in such proceeding."
B
c.
Jn 1957, two Amending Acts, both of which came into force on
December 23, 1957, were passed. One was Andhra Pradesh Act 17
of 1957, which substituted the followin11 clause for clause(al in subsection ( 4) of s. 9 of the. Abolition Act, 1948 :
(a) (i) Against a de. aion of the Settlement Officer under subsection ( 3), the Government may, within one year
from the date of the decision or if such decision was
given before the commencement of the Madras Estates
(Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) (Andhra
Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1957, within one year
from such commencement and any persons aggrieved
by such decision may within two months from the
date of the decision or such further time as the Tribunal may in its discretion allow, appeal to the Tribunal.
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Iii) If, before the commencement of th< Madras Estates
(Abolition and Conversion into Ry-0twari) (Andhra
Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1957, any order has been
passed by the Government against a decision of the
Settlement Oftlcer on the ground that the Government
were not competent to file an appeal under this clause
or that such appeal was time-barred, the Tribunal
shall on an application filed by the Government within one year from the commencement of the Amend·
ment Act aforesaid, vacate the order already passed
by it and pass a fresh order on merits."
In clause (b) of s.9(4) of the Abolition Act, after the words
"where such appeal is preferred", the words "by an aggrieved person,
the Tribun'!J shall gi,,.e notice to the Government and in the case of
all appeals whether by the Government or by an aggrieved person"
were inserted.
The second Amending Act was Andhra Pradesh Act 18 of 1957,
section 2 of which substituted the following section for sub-section (3)
of s. I of the Abolition Act :
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"It applies to all estates as defined in section 3, clause
(2), of the Madras Estates· Land Act, 1908, (Madras Act I
of 1908)."
This Act further substituted the following clause for clause (7) of
s.2 of the principal Act:
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"In an estate" means an estate within the meaning of
section 3, clause (2) (d) of the Madras Estates Land Act,
1908 (Madras Act I of 1908)''.
In s.9 of the principal Act, after the words "lnam 'village" or "the
village", wherever they occurred, the words "or hamlet or khandriga
granted as inam" were inserted.
It will be seen that Act 18 of 1957, made the Abolition Act appli·
cable even to villages that became estates under the 1936 Amendment
of the 1908 Act. For the purpose of the Abolition Act that distinc·
lion between pre-1936 and post-1936 inam grants disappeared, and
this Act becam.e applicable to all estates faUing under the definition in
section 3( 2) of the 1908 Act.
Andhra Pradesh Act No. 20 of 1960, which came into force on
the 23rd of June,. 1960 inserted in the Abolition Act, s.9-A, which
provides :
. " Inquiry under section 9 not necessary in certain cases :
If before the commencement of the Madras Estates (Aboli·
tion and Conversion into RyotY<ari) (And.bra Pradesh Se·
cond Amendment) Act, 1957 (Andhra Pradesh Act XVIII of
1957) (any decision was given under section 9 in respect of
any village that it was not an inam estate as it stood defined
before such commencement, and that decision was based on
the finding that the inam village became an estate .by virtue
of the Madras Estates Land (Third Anwndment) Act, 1936
(Madras Act XVlll of 1936) then :
ta) if the decision based on the finding aforesaid was
given by the Tribunal under sub-section{4) of section
9, no fresh inquiry under that section shall be necessary for taking any proceedings under this Act on
the basis of that finding; and
(b) if the decision ·based on the finding aforesaid was
given by the Settlement Officer,· and no appeal was
filed to the Tribunal, the Government or any person
aggrieved, may appeal to the Tribunal against the
decision and finding within two months from the com·
mencement of the Madras Estates (Abolition and
ment) Act, 1960 and if no such appeal is flied, tile
finding of the Settlement Officer shall be final and no
fresh inquiry shall be necessary for taking any proceedings under· this Act on the basis of that finding."
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
666
(1974] 2 s.c.a.
The same Act 20 of 1960 introduced this section in the present
.Act:
"12(1) No notification issued under sub-section (4) of
section 1 of the principal Act duiing the period between
the 23rd December, 1957, and the commencement of this
Act, on the basis of finding recorded in any decision given
l>~fore the said date by the Settlement Officer, or the Tribunal
under section 9 of the principal Act (such finding being to the
effect that the inam village l>ecome an estate by virtue of the
Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936 (Madras Act XVIll of 1936), shall be deemed to be invalid or ever
to have been invalid merely on the ground :
(a) that before issuing the notification no fresh inquiry
·was made by the Settlement Officer undtt the said
section 9 after the said date; or
,(b) that the landholder or other person aggrieved had no
occasion to appeal to the Tribunal against the decision and finding of the Settlement Officer; and all
such notifications issued and. actions taken in pursu·
ance thereof during the period aforesaid shall be
deemed always to have been validly issued and taken
in accordance \Vith law.
(2) No suit or other proceeding challenging the validity
of any such notification or action or for any relief on
the ground that such notification or action was not
validly issued or taken shall be maintained or continued in any court, and no court shall enforce any
decree or other holding any such notification or
action to be invalid or grant any relief to any per-
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son."
The first question that falls for decision is : To what extent and in
what circumstances the Civil Court is competent in a suit to go into
the question whether a particular village is an "estate"?
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By virtue of s. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Civil Courts
have jurisdiction to decide all suits of a civil nature excepting those of
which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. The
exclusion of the civil court's jurisdiction, therefore, is not to be readily
assumed unless the relevant statute expressly or by inevitable impli·cation do'5 so. The question thus further resolves itself into the
issue: How far s.9(1) of the Abolition Act confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Settlement Officer to determine inam estates?
G
This matter is not res integra. In Addenki Tiruvenkata Thata
Desika Charyu!.u v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (') this Court held that
there is an express bar to the jurisdiction .of the civil court to adjudioeate upon the question, whether "any inam village•• is an "inam
I. A.J.R. 1964 S. C. 807
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667'
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pstate" or not, and that "to the extent of the question stated in
s. 9(1), the jurisdiction' of the Settlement Officer and of the Tribunal
are exclusive". It was pertinently added that this exclusion of the
jurisdiction of the civil court would be subject to two limitations. First,.
the civil courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provi•ions ·of the Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of
B judicial procedure. The second is as regards the exact extent to which
the powers of statutory tribunals are exclusive. The question as to
whether any particular case falls under the first or the second of the
above categories would depend on the purpose of the statute and its·
general scheme, taken in conjunction with the scope of the enquiry
entrusted to the tribunal set up and either relevant factors.
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Applying the above principles, the Court clarified the limits ofi
the respective jurisdictions of the Settlement Officer/Tribunal and the.
civil court, thus :
". . . the object of the Act is to abolish only "inam
estates". This determination involves two distinct matters
in view of the circumstances that every "inam village" is not'
necessarily "an inam estate" viz., (I) whether a particular
D
property is or is not an '.'inam village" and (2) whether
such a village is "an inam estate" within the definition of s.
2(7). ·The first of these questions whether the grant is of
an "inam village" is referred to in s. 9 (I) itself as some ex·
trinsic fact which must pre-exist before the Settlement Officer
can embark on the enquiry contemplated by that provision
and the Abolition Act as it stood at the date relevant to this
E
aopeal, makes no provision for this bein~ the subject of en-·
quiry by the Settlement Officer ...
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Where therefore persons appearing in opposition to the•
rroceedings initiated before the Settlement Officer under s. 9
question the character of the property as not falling within
the description of an "inam village". he has of necessity to
decide the issue, for until he holds that this condition is
satisfied he cannot enter on the further enquiry which is the
one whieh bys. 9(1) of the Act he is directed to conduct.
On the terms of s. 9(1 ), the property in question being an
"inam village" is assumed as a fact on the e~istence of which
the competencv of the Settlement Officer to determine the
matter within his jurisdiction rests and as there are no words
in the statute empowering him to decide finally the former.
he cannot confer jurisdiction on himself by a wrong decisioff
on this preliminary condition to his jurisdiction. Any determination by him of this question, therefore. is (subiect to the
result of an appeal to the Tribunal) binding on the parties
anlv for the purposes of the proceedings under the Act, hut
no further. The correctness of that finding may be questioned in any subsequent legal proceedin11 in the ordinary
courts of the land where the qu~stion might arise for deci~.ion."
668
SUPREME COvt\T REPORTS
[1974] 2. S.C.R.
Now let us approach the problem in hand in the light of
principles enunciated in Desika Charyulu's cdse (supra).
the
Mr. Natesan, learned Counsel for the appellants, contends that in the
instant case, the decision, dated September 2, 1950, of the Settlement
.Officer fell within the second category of cases pointed out in Desika
Charyulu's case (supra) which could be challen~ed in the civil court,
because, firstly, Kadakalla village was not an "inam village" as the
g:rant was not of the whole village, and the Settlement Officer had
grievously erred in assuming it to be so; secondly, as soon as the
Settlement Officer reached the finding that the villa$e was not an
"inam estate" within the then extant definition in s. 2(7) of the Abolition Act, he became functus officio and had no further jurisdiction
under s. 9(1) to proceed with the enquiry and hold that it was an
"estate" under s. 3(2) (d) of the Estates Land Act, 1908.
In reply, Mr. P. Rameshwara Rao, learned Counsel for the respondents, maintains that under s. 9 (I), the Settlement Officer had
the jurisdiction to determine all the three facts, namely : (I) whether
Kadakalla was an 'inam village'; (2) if so, whether it was a pre-1936
'inam estate' falling under the definition in s. 2(7) of the Abolition
Act, or (3) a post-1936 'inam estate' under s. 3(2)(d), of the 1908
.Act. The decision of the Settlement Officer, according to the learned
Counsel, as to fact No. ( 1) was conclusive and operated as res
judic'ata under s. 64-A, of the. Abolition Act, between the parties, because before the Settlement Officer, it was no·body's case that. K.adakalla was not an "inarn village". In these circumstances, !he decision
of the Settlement Officer not being ia excess of his jurisdiction, could
not be questioned in a-~ court. The argument, though seemingly
attractive, does not stand a close examination and we are unable to
acc:ept it. On the- other hand, we find force in what has been contended from the appellants' side.
Under the Abolition Act, as it stood at the material date, the en.quiry by the Settlement Officer could legitimately be confined to the
ascertainment of only two issues of fact, viz.(!) Was Kadakalla an
"in am village" ? ( 2) if so, was it an 'in am estate' as defined in
s. 2(7) of the Abolition Act? Once issue (2) was determined, the
enquiry would be complete and the limits of his exclusive jurisdiction
<:ircumscribed by s. 9 (1) reached; and, if he went beyond those limits
to investigate and determine further something which was winecessary
or merely incidental or remotely related to issue \Z), then such incidental or unnecessary determination, could be questioned in the civil
.court.
Again, any finding recorded by the Settlement Officer regarding
the property in question being an 'inam village' or not, is not final or
conclusive it being a finding of a jurisdictional fact, only, the preexistence of which is a sine qua 1Wn to the exercise of his exclusive
jurisdiction by the Settlement Officer. Investigation as to the existence
or otherwise of this preliminary fact is done by the Settlement Officer
to ascertain whether or not he has jurisdiction to determine that the
particular property is an 'inam estate'. If upon such investigation, he
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669
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finds that the properly is an 'inam village', the foundation for the exer·
cise of his exclusive jurisdiction is laid, and he can then, and then
only, embark upon the enquiry envisaged by the statute. If such investigation reveals that the property is not an 'inam village', the condition precedent to the exercise of such jurisdiction by him, would be
lacking.
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The Legislature must have visualised that under the cloak of an
erroneous finding as to the existence or non-existence of this pre·
requisite, the Settlement Officer may illegally clutch at jurisdiction not
conferred on him, or, refuse to exercise jurisdictiorf vesting in him.
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Perhaps, that is why the statute does not leave the final determination
of this preliminary fact to the Settlement Officer/Tribunal and his erroneous finding on that fact is liable to be question in civil court.
The contention of Mr. Rao that before the Settlement Officer the
fact of Kadakalla village being an "inam village" was not disputed,
does not appear to be borne out by the record. A perusal of the
Settlement Officer's order dated September 2, 1950, would show
that it was contended before him on behalf of the Inamdars "that there
was no village at all at the time of grant" and "that there were more
than one grant as Inam in the village".
Assuming for the sake of argument that the appellants had failed to
Officer that Kadakalla
was not an 'inam village', then also, we fail to appreciate how, on
principle, that would m&kc the case any different so as to preclude the
appellants from reagitating that matter in the civil court. Once it is
held that determination of this fact is not a matter of the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer, the appellants cannot 'be debarred
on the basis of a~. doctrine of res-judicata from getting the matter
fully and finally adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction.
~ontest or adduce proof before the Settlement
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Jn view of the above discussion, it is clear t.hat under the law in
force at the material time, ..a: suit for a declaration that the decision of
the Settlement Officer ffri.Qunal holding certain propertie& to be an
'estate' under s. 3(2)(d) of the 1908 Act was void, was maintainable
on the ground that the suit property was not an 'inam village'.
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There can be no dispute that Suit No. 47 of 1953 is of that ca(egory
and falls well nigli. within the ratio of Gosukonda I'.enkata.
Narasayya v. State of Madras,(') which was approved by this Court
in Desika Charyulu's ca.ve (supra). The main contention of the appellants in this suit was that the village Kadakalla was not in 'inam village'
as the grant did not comprise the w-.ole village and consequently,
it is not an 'estate' within the definition in s.3(2)(d) of the 1908
Act. The trial court accepted this contention and decreed the suit.
The High Court confirmed that decision •. holding that .when the .i grant
was made (in 1774), it was neither of the whole village nor of a naircd
villa~ within the meaning of Explanation 1 to s.3(2)(d) of the l.~08
Act. In Original Suit 101 of'!954, also, the relief of rent or damages
(t) A. I. R. 1953 Madras 60.
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670
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ,
[1974] 2 s.c.a.
is con1\itional and dependent upon and linlced up (by an aareement
between the parties) with the determination of the main question in·
volved in the former suit.
We have, therefore, no hesitation i.n coming to the conclusion
that the common question in both these suits regarding Kadakalla
being an estate or not, on the ground that it was not an inam village,
was within the competence of the civil court.
B
Further point to be consi<iered is : whether the jurisdiction of the
civil courts to proceed with and determine the aforesaid suits was,
in any way, affected by the enactment of Amending Acts 17 and 18
of 1957, For reasons that follow, the answer to this question, in
·
our opinion, ,must be in the negative.
It is well settled that ordinarily, when the substantive law is
altered during the pendency of an action, rights of the parties are
decided according to law, as it existed when the action was begun
unless the new statute shows a clear intention to vary such rights
(Maxwell on Interpretation, 12th Edn. 220).
That ii to say, in
the absence of anything in the Act, to say that it is to have retros.
pective operation, it cannot be so construed as to have the effect of
altering the law applicable to a claim in litigation at the time when
the Act is passed.
Let us, therefore, see whether there is anything in the Amending
Acts 17 and 18 of 195'1 which in clear language gives them a retros·
pective effect. A plain reading of these Amending Acts would show
that there is nothing of this kind in them, which, expressly or by
necessary intendment, affects pending actions. The only major change
introduced by Act 17 of 1957 was that it gave to the Government
a right to file an appeal to the Tribunal, if it felt aggrieved against
the decision of Settlement Officer under sub-s. (3) of s.9 of the Abo-·
lition Act, within one year from the date of the decision, or, if such
decision was rendered before December 23, 1957 i.e. the commencement of Act 17 of 1957, within one year from such date. It further entitled the Government to get its appeal, if any, dismissed, as
incompetent, by the Tribunal restored within one year of the commencement of the Amending Act. Likewise. the only effect of the
Amending Act 18 of 1957 was that it enlarged the definition of 'inam
estate' for the purpose of Abolition Act by taking in post-1936
Inams.
There is no non-obstante clause in these Amending Acts of 1957
with .reference to pending or closed civil actions. Nor is there anything in the scheme; setting or· provisions of these A,Jllending Acts
which fundamentally alters the conditions oil which such actions were
founded.. No back date or dates of their commencement have been
specified in the body of these statutes as was done in Madras Estates
Land Amendment Act II of 1945 which was expressly enforced.with
effect from the date of the commencement of Act 18 of 1936. These
Amending Acts were published in· the Government Gazette on December 23, 1957, and will therefore 'be deemed to have come into force
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from that date only. The provisions of these Amending Statutes ar~
not merely procedural but affect substantive rights, and impose new
obligations and disabilities. In them, the Legislature has not spo1ten
in clear language that they would unsettle, settled claims or take
away or abridge rights already accrued, or cause abatement of pend·
ing actions. These Amending Acts, therefore, can be construed as
having a prospective operation only. They cannot be in,terp1eted as
B taking away the rights of the litigants in Suits O.S. 47 of 1953.,.(!nd
0.S. 101 of 1954 (which were at the commencement of these A'm!!!d·
ments pending at the appellate or original stage) to have their res·
pective claims determined in, accordance with the law in force at the
time of the institution of the actions.
Before we come to the Amending Act 20 of 1960, it is necessary
c to' examine whether the decrees in O.S. 47 of 1953 and O.S. 101 of
1954 had attained finality. And, if so, when and to what extent?
So far as the decree of the High Court (in A.S. 668 of 1954
arising out of O.S. 47 of 1953) is concerned, there is no dispute
that it had become final and conclusive between the ·parties to that
action, namely, the State Government and the present appellants on
D February 12, 1954. Learned Counsel are, however, not agreed 'as
to whether the decree, dated March 28, 1958, passed by the civil
court in Suit No. 101 of 1954 had also assumed such a charac·
ter.
Mr. Natesan, vehemently contended that this decree in so far as it,
pursuant to the agreement between the parties, incorporated in it, the
final determination of the High Court in A.S. 668 of 1954-that
E Kadakalla was not an estate-was a consent decree, and as such, was
final and non-appealable in view of s. 96(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure .
On .the rtspondents' side Mr. Rao argued that no part of this
decree was final and conclusive between the parties on the ground of
estoppel or otherwise, because-(a) the appellants-had in grounds 1
.F and 2 Cjf the Memo of Appeal presented in the High Court, challenged
the decree in its entirety; (b) the joint memo filed by the Advocates,
concerned legal issues, including that of jurisdiction. and as sueh the
agreement was not lawful that would bind the parties; (c) the respondents wer~ not a party to the proceedings in A. S. 668 of 1954 and
(d) the arrangement arrived at ,Py the Advocates, being dependent on
the happening of a future event, did not amount to a lawful adjustment
G of the claim, and the. decree based on it, was inchoate.
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None of the points urged by .Mr. Rao appears to bold water.
The allegations in grounds J. and 2 of the Memo of Appeal (which
haw been referred to in a foregoing parr of this .iudgment) are too
vague and general to amOU!!t to an averment. They appear to have
been introduced just as a !natter of form and habit by the draftsman.
From the Memo of Appeal, read as a whole, it is cl.ear that, in substance and truili, \he challenge was directed only agamst that part of
3-L748SCl/74
672
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1974] 2 S.C.R.
the decree which fixed the quantum of rent and damages. In fact,
before the High Court it was vigorously contended on behalf of the
appellants that that part of the decree which, in effect, declared that the
village is not an 'estate' under s. 3(2J(d), having been imported with
the consent of the parties, was not appealable under s. 96 ( 3), Code of
Civil Procedure, and, in reality, had not been appealed against. In
support of this contention, reliance was placed on the Division Bench
decision in Srinivasa v. Tathachariar('). The High Court did not
discuss or distinguish this decision. Nor did it say in so many words
that the whole of the decree including the part based on compromise,
was under challenge in the appeal. lt rejected the contention with the
remark that it had already "observed that the appeal is but a continuation of the suit and there could be no estoppel ' against a statute".
Perhaps, it was assumed that in the Memo of Appeal, every bit of the
decree was .being challenged by the appellants. We think, with all respect, that such an assumption was contrary to the well·estabiished
principle that in construing a pleading or a like petition, in this
country, the court should not look merely to its form, or pick out from
it isolated words or sentences; it must read the petition as a whole,
gather the real intention of the party and reach at the substance of the
matter. Thus construed, the Memo of Appeal in .this case could not
be said to contail\ a challenge to that part of the d"4'ree which was in
terms :of the compromise agreement between the parties.
Order 23, Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure, not only permits a
partial compromise and adjustment of a suit by a lawful agreement, but
further gives a mandate to the court to record it and pass a decree in
terms of such compromise or adjustment in so far as it relates to the
suit. If the compromise agreement was lawful-and, as we shall presently discuss, it was so-the decree to the extent it was a con.sent
decree, was not appealab!e; because of the express bar in s. 96(3) of
the Code.
Next point is, whether this agreement was lawful? We have
already discussed that the Amending Acts of 1957 did not affect pending actions in which a dedaration is sought that a particular property
is not an estate, on the ground that 1it is not an 'inam village'. This
issue which was intertwined with that· of jurisdiction, was very largely
a question of fact. It follows therefrom that in any such suit, the
parties in · ' ·· to avoid unnecessary expense and botheration, could
legitimate!,
~e an agreement to ab'.de by a determination on the
samo point m issue in another pending action in an advanced stage.
There was nothing unlawful and improper in such arr arrangement
particularly when the interests cf the respondents were sufficiently safeguarded by the State which was hotly controverting the decree of the
trial court regarding Kadakalla being an estate. By no stretch of
reasoning it could be said that this .agreement v.·as collusive or -was. an
attempt to contract out of the s'atute.
There can b' no doubt that as soon as the Court accepted the compromise agreement between the parties, and, acting on it, passed a
(t) A. I. R 1918 Mad. 54$.
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decree in terms thereof, the compromise, to the extenf of. the matter
covered by it, was complete. Nothing further remained to be done by
the parti~s in pursuance of that agreement. The decree had beccime
absolute and immediately executable on February 12, 1959 when th&
High Court in A.S. 668 of 1954 finally decided that Kadak~lla was
not an estate.
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Be that as it may, the bar to an appeal against a consent ,decree, in
sub-s. (3) of s. 96 of the Code is based on the broad principle of
estoppel. It presupposes that the parties to an action can, expressly
or by implication, waive or foregi:i their right of appeal by any lawful
agreement or compromise, or even by conduct. Therefore, as soon as
the parties made the agreement to abide by the determination in the
appeal ( A.S. 668) and induced the co.urt to pass a decree in terms of
that agreement, the principle of estoppel underlying 1. 96(3) .became
operative and the decrt!C to the extent it was in terms of that agreement, became final and binding befween the parties. And it was as
· effective in creating an estoppel between the parties as a judgmen,t on
contest. Thus, the determination i~ A. S. 668-that Kadal!;alla was
not an 'estate'-became as much binding on the respondents, as on the
parties in that appeal.
In the. view we talce, we can derive support from the ratio of this
Court's decision in R11ja Sri Sailendra Narayan Bhanja. Deo ,v. State of
Orissa( 1). In that case, there was a compromise decree between the
predecessors-in-title of the appellant therein on the one hand, and. the
Secretary of State on the other, that Kanika Raj was an . :estate' . as·
defined by Orissa Estates Abolition Act of 195 !. ·This Court held
that the appellant was estopped by the compromise decree from denying that the Raj was noquch an 'estate'.
In the light of the above discussion, we would hold that that part
of the decree in Suit No. 101 of 1954 which was irt terms of the com·
promise agr~ement had become final between the par;lies, and' the
appeal from that decree could riot be said to be a continuation of that
part of the· claim which had been: settled by agreemeni. The com·
bined effect of the two integrated decrees in Suit No, 47 and Suit
No. 101, in. so far as they, d.eclarc;d that. Kadakalla, not being 'Ill
'inam villlage', was not an estate under s. 3(2)(1<1) of the 1908 Act,
was to completely .vacate and render non-est the decision dated Sep· ·
tember 2, 1950 of the Settlement Officer.
Against the above background, we have to consider whether the
.Amending Act .20 of 1960 operates retrospectively to nullifv final
decrees of civil couits which had b'fore its commencement, declared
such decisions of Settlement Officer totally void and non-existent ?
Does the Act expressly or by necessary intendment bring into life
again all su~h dead· deC:•ions of the Settlement Officer ?
In approaching these questions, two fundamental principles of interpre•ation have to be kept in view. The first is, that if the Legislature,
(I) [1956] S.C.R. 72.
.,;
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acting within its legislative competence, wants to neutralise or reopen
a court's decision, "it is not sufficient"-to use the words qf Hidaytullah C.J. in Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality(')-"to declare merely that the decision of the Court shall
not bind, for that is tantamount to reversing the decision in exercise of
judicial power which the Legislature does not possess or exercise. A
court's decision must always bind unless the conditions on which it is
based are· so fundamentally altered that the decision could not have
been given in the altered circumstances." Thus, the first test to be
applied is, whether the Amending Act 20 of 1960 has
radically
altered the conditions on which the said decrees pr_gceed, that they
would not have been passed in the altered circumstances ? The point
is that the law which was the basis of the decision must be altered and
then, the foundation failing, the binding value of the decision fails when
the. non obstante clause is superadded. As shall be presently s~en, by
this test, the answer to this question must be in the negative.
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The second principle-to recall the words of Bowen L.J. in Reid
v. Reid(')-is, that in construing a statute or "a section in a statute
which is to a certain extent retrospective, we ought nevertheless to bear
in mind the maxim (that is, except in special cases, the new law1ought
to be construed so as to interfere as little as possible with 'Vestecf'rigbts
as applicable whenever we reach the line at which the words of the
section cease to be plain. That is a necessary and logical corollary of
the general proposition that you ought not to give a larger retrospective
power to a section, even in an Act which is to some extent intended to
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be retrospective, than you can plainly see the Legislature meant. 0
With the above principle in mind, let us now examine the provisions of the Amending Act 20 of 1960. In this Act, also no back date
for i'ts commencement has been me11tioned. It will, · therefore, be
deemed to have commenced 0n .June 23, 1960, which is the dale on
which it was published in the Govt. Gazette. It does not say (excepting in s. !'2 inserted by it which obviously does not apply to the facts
of this case) that the amendment would have effect and would be
deemed always to have had effect from the inception of the parent Act,
nor does it use any equivalent expressions or similar words which are
usually found in Amending Acts intended to have retrospective operation without any limit. Section 9-A inserted by this Amending Act in
the parent Act, does not begin with any non-obstante cause, whatever
having reference to decrees or orders of civil courts. In terms, it concerns itself only with a certain category of decisions given before the
commencement of Act 18 of 1957 by the Settlement Officer/Tribnna!,
under s. 9 of the Abolition Act. Such decisions are those which were
based on the finding that a particular Inam village had become estate
by virtue of the Miidras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936.
The Order, dated September 2, 1950, of the Settlement Officer in
the instant case, was a decision of this category, inasmuch as he held
that Kadakalla was not an 'inam estate' be~ause it was a post-1936
(I) ll970] I S.C.R. 388.
(2) (1886) 31, Ch. D 402 at 408,
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K. c. DORA v. GUNTREO:ll (Sarkaria, 1.)
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675
inam, and as such, was not covered by the definition in s. 2(7) of the
Abolition Act. But, before the coll).lllencement of the Amending Act,
1960, this decision as a result of the High Court's decree, stood finally
vacated. It is not at all c\ear from the language of this Amending Act,
that the intention was to revive even such legally non-existent decisions
of the Settlement Officer. On .tlle contrary, definite indications ire ·
available that the section was not intended to have unlimited retrospective operation. The firfat oi such indications is available from the marginal heading of s. 9-A, itself,. which is to the effect : "Inquiry under
section 9 not necess,Al'y in certain cas.es". The heading discloses the
purpose as well as the ~xtent of the new provision. It envisages only
such cases in which the decision of the · Settlement . Officer wa5 not
successfully challenged in the civil court on the ground that the particular property was not an inam village; for, it would be pointless, only
in such cases, to.hold a further inquiry into.the matter.
The second hint of legislative intent is available in s. 64-A (2)
which has not been touched by the Amending Act. Section 64-A(2)
provides. that the decision of the civif court on any matter within its
jurisdiction shall be binding on the parties thereto arid persons claimD ing under them in any proceeding under the Ab.olition Act .before the
Tribunal or the Special Tribunal. If. the intention was to exclude the
jurisdiction of the civil court altogether, s.64-A(2) would either have
been deleted or drastically [\mended so as to alter the. basic conditions
with effect from the very inception of the parent Act, that in the altered
conditions those decisions CQ\114 not have been rendered by the civil
courts. For instance, it could sa.y that the decision ·of the Settlement
E Officer on the question whether a particular property is an 'inam village'
or not, would be conclusive and final and would always be deemed to
have been so."
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In view of what has been said above,. we are of the opinion that
s. 9·A takes in .its retrospective sweep only those decisions of the
Settlement 'Officer or the Tribunal which at the commencement·of the
Amending Act 20 of 1960 were subsisting and had not been totally
vacated or rendered non-est by a decree of a competent court. The
decision dated September 2, 1950 of the Settlement Officer in the
instant case, was not such a decision. It had ceased to exist as ·a
result of the int~-linked decree in O.S. 47 of 1953 and 0.S. 101 of
1954, · passed bebe the enactment of this Amending Act. The
Amending Act of 1960\. therefore, does not in any way, affect the
finality or the binding effect of those decrees.
Quite a number of ·authorities were cited by the learned Counsel
on both sides, but it is not necessary to notice all of them because in
most of them the facts were materially different. Only ·one of those
cases in which the interpretation of ss. 9-A and 64-A was involved
deserves to be noticed. It is reported in Yeliseth Satyanarayana v.
Aditha agannat<harab and ors.(')
(!) [1966) I.L.R. A.P. 729.
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[1974) 2 S.C.R.
The writ petitioners in that case had. challenged the order of. the
Estates Abolitioh Tribunal which had held ( 1) that the previous order
of the Civil Court holding the suit lands to be an estate by virtue of
the Amending Act XVlll of 1936 to the Madras Estates Land Act,
1908, was noLres iudicata under s. 64·A of the Abolition Act and
(2) that the land-holder had a right of appeal under s. 9-A of. the
said Act, and that the inam was not of the whole village and, consequently, was not an 'estate'.
The first ·question for consideration by the High Court was, whether the appeal filed by the land-holder before the Estates Abolition
Tribunal was maintainable notwithstanding the fact that such an
appeal was not entertained, earlier by the Tribunal on the ground of
its being incompetent. On the construction of s. 9-A(b), this question was answered in the affirmative.
The second question Q.efore the High Court was, whether the
previous judgments of the Civil Court were res iudicata under s. 64-A.
The Bench analysed and explained the circumstances in which. the
first or.the second sub-s of s. 64-A operates. It will be usefol to
extracf those observations here :
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"The bar under s. 64-A is applicable in two sets of circumstances; one, where the decision was of a Tribunal or
Special Tribunal or of a Judge of the High Court hearing a
case under seflion 51; (2) the other, where it is a decision
of. a Civil Court on any matter falling within its jurisdiction.
The decisions mentioned_ in the first category are binding on
the Civil Courts and the decisions mentioned in the second
category are binding on the Tribunal or Special Tribunal or
a Judge of the High Court when he hears a case under
s. 51 (2). In so far as the facts of this case are concerned, it
is sub-section (2) of section 64-A that. is applicable."
On the second question, the learned Judges held that the previous
decision' of the Civil Court could not operate as res iudicata because
the issue as to wheth<;r the suit property was an estate under the
Amending Act of 1957, was not under contest. Both the parties
us a matter of concession, had conceded that fact and· the Government was not a party to the proceeding. In these peculiar circumstances, it was held that the concession or assumption made in the
previous proceedings, was not a 'decision' within the meaning of
s. 64-A(Z). In the case before us, as already observed, the State had
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contested this issue regarding Kadakalla being an estate or not, right
upto the High Court. It would, therefore, operate as res iudicata
between the State and the land-owners. The same binding effect is
produced by estoppel raised by the consent decree in the suit out of
which the present appeal has arisen. Thus, this ruling does not
advnncc the case of the respondents.
For all the foregoing reasons, we a110w this appeal, reverse the
judgment of the High Court and send the case back to it for decision
H
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K. c. DORA v. GUNTREDDI (Krishna Iyer, /.)
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on the remaining issues in accordance with law. We make no orders
as to the costs of this Court.
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KRISHNA IYER, J.-The judgment just delivered has my concurrence.
But a certain juristic thought expressed therein and consecrated in an
authoritative passage which has fallen from Bowen, L.J., in Reid v.
Reid(') persuades me to break my silence not so. much in dissent but
in explanatory divagation. The proposition tnere expressed and here
followed relates to the presumption against vested rights being affected by subsequent legislation. Certamly this legal creed of Anglolndian vintage has the support of learned pronouncements,_ English
and Indian. But when we apply it in all its sternness and sweep, we
err. Precedents should not be ·petrified nor judicial dicta divorced
from the socio-economic mores of the age. Judges are not prophets
and only interpret laws in the light of the contemporary ethos. To
regard them otherwise is unscientific. My thesis is that while applying the policy of statutory construction we should not forget the con·
ditions and concepts which moved the judges whose rulings are cited,
nor be obsessed by respect at the expense of reason. Justice Gardozo(2)
has in felicitous words made the same point :
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"There should be greater readiness to abandon an untenable position .... when in its origin it was the product of
institutions or conditions which have gained a new signifi. cance or development with .the progress of.the years. In such '
circumstances, the words of Wheeler, J., in Dwy v. Connecticut Co., 89 Conn. 74, 99, express the tone and temper in
which problems should be met : "That court best serves the
Jaw which recognizes that the rules of law which grew up in a
remote generation n1ay, in the fulness ·of experience, be ·
found to serve another generation badly, and which discards•
the old rule when it finds that another rule of law represents
what should be according to the established arid settled
judgment of society, ~nd no considerable property rights
have become vested in reliance upon the old rule. It is thus
great writers upon the common law have discovered the
source and method of its growth, and in its growth found its
health and life. It is not and it should not be stationary,
Change of this character should not be left to the legislature." If judges have woefully misinterpreted the mores of
their day, or if the mores of their day are no longer those
of ours, they_ ought not to tie , in helpless submission, the
_hands of their successors."
The Indian Constitution, adopting the fighting faith of equal _protection of. the _laws to al! citizens, necessarily contemplates a new
jurisprude_!lce where vested rights may be, and often-times are, extensively interfered with for achieving the founding fathers' so.cial goals.
(I) [18861 31 Ch.D.402;408.
{2) Cardozo The Nature of Judicial Process; PP. l~l-52.
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(1974] 2 S.C.R.
Legislative exercises directed towards distributive jusmce, as in the present case, cannot be considered in the light of a dated value system,
though sanctified by bygone decisions of Courts.
However, in the present case, let me hasten to repeat, the Act
in question is clear about its intent and its application gives little
difficulty. I have said these- words only to enter a mild caveat, on
the lines indicated, so as to obviate future misapprehensions about
the rule of interpretation-not to add a new element of judicial subjectvism. Speaking generally, courts have to be anchored to_ wellknown canons of statutory construction and if they ,are out of time
with the law-makers' meaning and purpose the legitimate means of
setting things right is to enact a new Interpretation Act.
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Appeal allowed.
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