SRI MAHALINGA THAMBIRAN SWAMIGAL versus HIS HOLINESS SRI LA SRI KASIVASI ARULNANDI THAMBIRAN SWAMIGAL
Supreme Court of India | Decided 19 October 1973 | [1974] 2 S.C.R. 74 | 1973 INSC 189
Key facts
- Decided
- 19 October 1973
- Bench
- KUTTYIL KURIEN MATHEW*, M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG, A.K. MUKHERJEA
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 1677/1969
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1974] 2 S.C.R. 74
- Neutral citation
- 1973 INSC 189
Text of the judgment
74
SRI MAHALINGA THAMBIRAN SWAMIGAL
A
v.
HIS HOLINESS SRI LA SRI KASIVASI ARULNANDI
THAMBIRAN SWAMIGAL
October 19, 1973
[K. K. MATHEW, M. H. BEG AND A. K. MUKHERJEA, JJ.)
B
Hindu Law-of Religious and Charitab.'e Trust-By a will, the head 'Jf the
A-full nominated the iunior Elavarasu but later, by another will, terminated the
appellant-If valid-Whether status was acquired by the junior after nomina·
tion-Meaning of 'Status'.
The appellant filed a suit for a declaration that he was entitled to continue
as the junior head (Elavarasu) of the Tiruppandal or the Kasi Mutt ·and for a
perpetual injunction against the .defendant, the head of the Mutt.· Iroµi inter·
fedng with his functioning as the junior head of the Mutt.
The defendant, now dead, contended that the appellant was not validly
nominated as the junior head of the Mutt and that even if he was nominated as
such, the appellant acquired no right by the nomination to continue as the
junior head after the head of the Mutt cancelled the nomination by another
document Ex. B-9 will.
The trial court found that by Ex. B-1 will, the defendant nominated the
appellant as the Elavarasu of the Mutt but that he-'acquired no status nor did
he become the holder of an office by virtue of the nomination. The court
further fo1.in<l that the defendant was competent to cancel the noinination and
that he had cancelled it by executing Ex. B-9 will. The trial court, therefore,
dismissed the suit. The District Co.urt _also confirmed the findings of the trial
court and dismissed the appeal. ,
In the second appeal, the learned single judge of the High Court granted a
decree to the appellant on the .sround that by the nomination of the appellant
he acquired a status and be beCame a holder of an office and that the defendant
coqld terminate t_he office :o'"r status only on good cause; but since the appellant
was not guilty of any misconduct, the cancellation of the nomination by Ex. B-9
will was ineffective. "
On appeal, the Division Bench of the High Court reversed the decree passed
by the single judge on the basis of its finding that the appellant did not become
a h'Jlder of an office by virtue of the nomination and so it was open to the
defendant to cancel the nomination without notice and without assigning any
reas·on.
The questions for .consideration before this Cou~t were : ( 1) \Vhether. by virtue of the nomination, the appdlant obtained a status
or a right .in law or became the holder of an office, and
(2) whether the defendant was competent to cancel the nomination without
good cause.
Allowing the appeal,
HELD : (i} During the first part of the 19th century, there were two manaa:ing Thambirans both at Banaras and at Tiruppanandal, a senior and a junior;
and the peculiar feature of th'is period consisted in this double agency tit each
centre Of control. r7SF1
Succession to the office of Mahant or Head of a Mutt is ta be regulated by
the custom of the particular Mutt and one who claims the office by right of·
succession is bound to allege and prove what the custom of the particular insti..
tution is. [78GJ
Giyana Sambandha Pandra San11adhi v. Kandasanii Thambiran, l.L.R.
10 Madras 375; Greedharee Doss v. Nandokissore Doss Mohunt [867]
M.l.A. 405: Ramalingam Pillai v. Vythial'ngam Pillai [1893] 20 I.A. 150 etc.,
!Ire referred to.
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MAHALINGA THAMIHRAN v. LA SRI KASIVASI (Mathew, J.)
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(ii) The custom in the Kasi Mutt was for the head of the Mutt to nol'.hinate:
a successor to succeed him by will and was attended by c~rtain religious ceremonies. The appellant, in th~ present case, was nominated by Exhibit B-1
will and whether the nomination was accompanied by perfornlance of any
religious ceremony was not essential-[79C]
B. K. J.fukherjea's Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts" 3rd Ed.
1940 p. 257 and M. B. Bhagat v. G. N. Bhagat [1972] 2 S.C.R. 1005·
Krishnagil'i, Trikanigiri v. Slzeriddar Kavlekar A.I.R. 1922 Bombay 202 and
Raghunarh v. Ganesh A. I. R. 1932 Allahabad 603, refe·rred to.
(iii) In the present case, although the power of nominai:fon was exercised by
a will, it is pro-tanto a non-testamentary instrument. The definition of ''Will".
in Section 2(h) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, would show that it is the
legal declaration of the intention of the testator with respect to his :property
which he desires to be carried into effect after his death. By exercising the
power of nomination, the head of a Mutt is not disposing any 'property belonging to him which is to take effect after his death. He is simply exerdsing a
power to which he is entitled to under the usage of the institution. A nomi..
aation takes effect in praesenti. It is the declaration of the intention of the head
cf the Mutt for th~ time being as to who his successor would be; therefore,.
although it is said that the usage in the Mutt is that the power of nomination is
exercisable by will, it is really a misnomer, because, a will in the genuine sense·
of the term, can have no effect in praesenti and it does not become revocable
without good cause merely because the power is exercised by a will. [80B·F]
Ram /'lath v. Ram Nagina A.LR. 1962 Patna
Nc;ttu·aja A.LR. 1918 Madras 1016 referred to.
481
and
Kailasam v.
(iv) It is not correct to say that Mahantship is property and nomination by
a :t-.Jahant of a successor is a: disposal of that property to take effect after the
denth of the Mnhant. Nomination is not a disposal sinipliciter of the office of
Mahantship of the Mutt ot its properties, to take effect after the death of the
incun1bent. It is the creation of a relationship generating a capacity in the
nominee to Succeed to the Mutt on the death of the incumbent This concept,
however, cannot be put in a straight jacket of any jurisprudential concept. The
Division Bench opined that the junior as the succe~or designate, carried with
him a certain status and received dignity and honours befitting that status. [82BJ
(v) The fundamental difference-between relationship or status and capacity
is !hat tbe former is a legal state of being while the latter is a legal power of
doing. The imposition of status carries with it attribution or a fixed quota of
capaci~ies and incElpacities, but it does not directly compel the holder to do or
refrain froffi doing any particular act. Capacity on the other hand, ls a legally
conferred power to affect the rights of oneself and other persons to whom the
experience of the caparity is directed subject to certain defined limits. Capacity·
in this form is an incident of status. rs4Bl
R. H. Grare!.on's 'Status in the Common Law' p. 127, Allen on Legal Duties,
p. 33: Treatise on the Conflict of Laws 1935 _p, 649; "Status and Capacity'' 46;
l.,aw flllrlrtrrlv Ri::view, 277: .~alvese11 v. Administrator of Austrian Property
[1927] A.C. 641: Wiborel v.. Niboret 1878 P.O. (CA) 1 and Ross v. Ross 129'
Mass. 243, referred to.
(vi) The fact of a person being legally nominated as junior, having a pecu··
liar relationship with the senior is status, and the capacity to succeed. to ,the
head is the incident of that status. The status, when created by a nomination,
cannot be withdrawn or cancelled at the mere will. of the parties. [85C·D.l
Tiruvambala Desikar v. Manikkavachaka Desikar, I.L.R. 40 M3d,
H
177,.
referred to.
The nomination when made can be cancelled or revoked only for a good'
cause and as admittedly, there was no good cause shown in this case for can..
cellation of the nomination by Ex. B·9, the cancellation was bad in Jaw. The·
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
76
( 1974] 2 S.C.R.
~ppe~lant was holding the status of the Elavarasu of the Kasi Mutt during the
A
hfe-ttme of the defendant. Now that the defendant is dead, it is declared that
the appellant was boldina" the position of the Slavarasu during the life-time of the
defendant, that the revocation of the nomination was bad and the appe1lant was
entitled to succeed to the headship of the Mutt on the death of the defendant
-[89CJ
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CIVIL APPLLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1677 of 1969.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the
12th January, 1968 of the High Court of Madras in Letters Patent
Appeals Nos. 4 and 29 of 1967.
B
K. S. Ramamurthy and K. Jayaram, for the appellant.
S. V. Gupte, S. K. Sastri, S. Gopa/an and M. S. Narasimh1111, ior
:the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
MATHEW, J. The appellant as plaintilf filed a suit for a declaration
that he was entitled to continue as the Elavarasu or Junior Head of
the Tiruppan~ndal or the Kasi Mutt and for a perpetual injunction
restraining the defendant, the Head of the Mutt, from interfering in
any way with his functioning as the Elavarasu or Junior Head of tine
Mutt.
The defendant, who is now dead, contended that the appellant was
not validly nominated as the Elavarasu of the Mutt, that even if he
was nominated as the Elavarasu, the appellant acquired no right by
the nomination to continue as the Elavarasu, that the appellant's con·
duct after he became tlie Elavarasu was such that he was unworthy
to become the future head of the Mutt, that he (the defendant)° cancelled the nomination and so the appellant had no right to get the
declaration prayed for.
The questions which arose for consideration in the trial court were:
whether the appellant had been nominated by the defendant as the
Elavarasu of the Kasi Mutt; whether, by virtue of the nomination,
the appellant was holding an office or had acquired any right or
status; whether the appellant was guilty of misconduct which disen·
titled him to continue as the Elavarasu and whether the appellant's
nomination as the Elavarasu was validly cancelled by the defendant.
The trial court found that by Exhibit B· 1 will, the defendant nomi·
nated the appellant as the Elavarasu of the Kasi Mutt, but that he
acquired no status nor did he become the holder of an office by
virtue of the nomination. The court further found that the defendant
was competent to cancel the nomination even though the. appellant ~as
not guilty of any misconduct and that he had cancelled it by executmg
Exhibit B·9 will. The V-ial court, therefore, dismissed the suit.
The District Judge, in appeal by the appellant, confirmed the
findings of the trial court and dismissed the appeal.
In the second appeal filed by the appellant, a learned single .iudge
of t"e High Court of Madras found that by the nomination of the
'llppellant as the Elavarasu, he became the holder of an office or that,
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MAHALINGA THAMBIRAN v. LA SRI KASIVASI
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(Mathew, 1.)
77
at any rate, he acquired a status and that the defendant could terminate
the office or status only for a good cause and in the light of the 'find·
ing of the trlal court as affirmed by the first appellate court that the
appellant was not guilty of any misconduct, the cancellation of the!
nomination by Exhibit B-9 will was ineffective. The learned judge
therefore, granted a decree to the appellant declaring that he was th~
duly appointed junior head of the Kasi Mutt and that he was entiUed
to continue as the junior head, subject to the right of the head of !he
Mutt to remove him for good cause. The learned judge, however did
not make a declaration that the appellant had a right to succeed to the
headship of the Mutt after the life time of the defendant, nor was the
appellant granted an injunction restraining the defendant from, interfering with the appellant exercising the right as the junior head.
B
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Appeals were preferred against this decree by both the appellant
and the defendant to a Division Bench of the High Court.
D
The Division Bench reversed the decree passed by the learned
single judge on the basis of its finding that the appellant did noe
become the holder of an office by virtue of the nomination and so it
was open til the defendant to cancel the nomination without notice to
the appellant and without assigning any reason.
Jt is against this decree that this appeal has been preferred by
special leave.
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The questions which fall for consideration in this appeal are:
whether, by virtue of the nomination, the appellant obtained a statuJ
or a right in law or became the holder of an office, and, whether the
defendant was competent to cancel the nomination without good
cause.
Jt is not disputed that on September 12, 1951, the defendant eioecuted a will (Exhibit B-1) reciting that he had nominated t!Je appel·
!ant as the Elavarasu of the Kasi Mutt. The will also stated that certain ceremonies were performed on the occasion of the nomination. It
then provided that by virtue of the nomination, the appellant will
succeed the de(endant as the Head of the Mutt. There is also no
dispute that till January 2, 1960, when the defendant ·revoked ,the
will (Exhibit B-1) by Exhibit B-9 stating that "it was not necessary to
appoint the appellant as the ElavarasU:', the appellant was the Elavarasu by virtue of his nomination.
In Giyana Sambendha Pandara Sannadhi v. ~andasami 7.'hambi- ,
ran(') herinafter referred to as "Sambandha Case:, Muttusam1 Ayyar,
J has traced the historical evolution of the Kasi Mutt and the Dharma·
puram Adhinam. The Dharmapuram AdbJnam, and the ~asi Mutt are·
monastic institutions. They are presided over by asceucs who have
renounced the world. The Mutt at Tiruppanandal i.e. Kasi Mutt was
affiliated to the Dharmapuram Adhinam .as a disciple Adh,inam, ,An
Adhinam is a central institution from which the chief ascetic exercJSeS
(1) LL.R, 10 Madras 375.
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[ 1974] 2 S.C.R.
control and supervision over a group of endowed institutions and reli- A
gious trusts. A Thambiran is an ascetic attached to an Adhinam and
when he becomes the head of the Adhinam, he is referred to as Pandara
Sannadhi. A Mutt was originally established at Benares by one Kumaragurupara Thambiran of the Dharmapuram Adhinam. The Dharmapuram Adhinam had come into existence several centuries before the
institution of the Mutt at Benares. The Mutt at Tiruppanandal was
established later in aid of the Mutt at Benraes by Tillanayaka Tham- B
biran,
a
successor of Kumaragurupara Thambiran who
functjpned between 1720 to 1756. In course of time, the
Mutt at Tiruppanandal became the principal Mutt and the Mutt at
Benares a subsidiary one. As the Mutt advanced in fame, endowments and trusts began to come in. So, subsidiary institutions came
to be established and the Tiruppanandal Mutt ceased to be an isolated
institution. It became an important centre exercising supervision and c
control over several subordinate Mutts in Southern India, over the
Mutt in Benares, and over Mutts. at Merangi in Nepal and at Acbiram
in Travancore so much so that in some of the later correspondence
one finds that Tiruppanandal is referred to as an Adhinam.
The Dharmapuram Adhinam was regarded by the Thambiran at Tiruppanandal as his Gurupitham, the seat of his religious pre·ceptor. The Thambirans at Tiruppanandal were, in a spiritual sense, D
subordinate to the Panda~a Sannadhi at Dharmapuram. In course
of time, a junior Thambiran came to be associated with the senior
Thambiran in the management of the Tiruppanandal Mutt. The necessity for the services. of a junior at Tiruppanandal was felt, because,
it would on the one band, give an opportunity to the senior to see
whether the junior might be relied upon as a competent successor,
while, on the other hand, it would enable the junior. to acquire experi- E
ence before he became the head of the Mutt. The practice in the
Dharampuram Adhinam of there being a senior and a junior Pandara
Sannadhi at one and the same time was the probable origin of the
double agency at Tihuppanandal. But, as only a Pandara Sannadhi
could initiate a Thambiran, it came about that the Thambirans for the
Mutt at Tiruppanandal and Benares came from the Dhamapuram
Adhinam. During the first part of the 19th century (1833 to 1841) F
there were two managing Thambirans both at Benares and at Tiruppanandal, a senior and a junior; and the peculiar feature of this
period consisted iii this double agency at each centre of control, which
was probably due to the considerable increase in the number and
value of endowments to be superintended.
Succession to the office of Mahan\ or Head of a Mutt is to be G
regulated by the custom of the particular Mutt and one who claims
the office by right of succession is bound to allege and prove what
the custom of the particular insitiution is, for, the only law regulating
.succession to such institutions is to be found in the custom and practice of that institution (see the decisions of the Privy Council in
Greedharee Doss' v, Nandokissore Doss, Mohunt(I) and Ramalingam Pillai v. Vythialingam Pillai('). As was observed in Vidya- H
purna Tirthaswami v. Vidvanidhi Tirthswami('), in most cases,
(I) (1867) M.l.A. 405.
(3) I.L.R. 27 Madras 435.
(2) (1893) 20 I.A. 150.
MAHALINGA THAMBIRAN v. LA SRI KASIVASI
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(Mathew, J.)
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especially in Southern India, the successor is ordained and appointed
hy the Head of the Mutt during hi• own life time and in default of
such appointment, the nomination may rest with the head of some
kindred institution or the successor may be appointed by election by
the disciples and followers of the Mutt or, in the last instance, by
the court as representing the sovereign. Where the head of a religious
institution is bound by celib!fcy, it is frequently the usage that he
nominates his successor by appointment during his own life time,
or by will. Such a power of nomination must, however, be exercised
not corruptly or for ulterior reasons, but bona fide and in the interests
of the Mutt; otherwise, the appointment will be invalid [see Nataraja
v. Kaliasam( 1 ); 11.amalingam Pillai v. Vythialingam Pillai('); Ram
Prakash Das v. Anand Das(') and Vailyanatha v. Swaminatha(<)l.
c
From the decision in the Samba11dha Case it is clear that the
custom in the Kasi Mutt is for the head of the Mutt for the time being
to nominate a successor to succeed him from one among the Thambirans of Thirukkuttam of the Dharmapuram Adhinam; that the
nomination is mad,e by will and that is attended by certain religious
ceremonies like Manthakashyam, Deekshha, Pooja and Arukattai.
D
There was no contention in the written statement that the necessary ceremonies for a valid nomination of a junior head in the Kasi
Mutt were not performed. Exhibit B-1 states in unambiguous language that the ceremonies were performed. Both the trial court as
,well as the first appellate court fpund, on the basis ·of the oral evidence, that the religious ceremonies for the nomination were not
performed at the time of the nomination, but at an anterior date. When
the defendant had himself admitted in Exhibit B-1 will that the nomination was made after the ceremonies were performed, there is no
scope for any controversy as to whether the ceremonies were performed. The statement in Exhibit B-1 that the ceremonies were performed
was made at a time when there was no controversy between the parties.
And, it was on fhe basis that there was a valid nomination that the
appellant was associated with the defendant from 1951 to 1960 as the
Elavarasu of the Mntt.
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Quite apart from these circumstances, we do not think that for a
nomination to be valid, performance of any religious ceremony is
necessary, unless, of course, the usage of the institution has made it
mandatory. "In many cases when a successor is appointed by Mohunt,
he is installed in office with certain ceremonies." This cannot be
deemed to be essential" (see B. K. Mukherjea, "Hindu Law of Religious
and Charitable Trusts", 3rd ed. (1970), p. 257). This observation
was quoted with approval by this Court in M. B. Bhagc! v. G. N.
Bhagat('). See a110 the decisions in Krishnagiri Tr .•·:2mgiri v.
Sheriddar Kavlekar(') and Ra11hunath v. Ganesh(1).
The Division Bench of the High Court was of the opinion that as
the n(llllination was made by Exhibit B-1 will, there was no reason
.Pfo (1920) 48 I.A. I. (2) [1893] 20 I.A. I SO. (3) (1916) 43 I.A. 73.
(4) (1924) 51 I.A. 282.
(5) (1972) 2 S.C.R. 1005 at 1010.
(6) A.l.R. 1922 Bombay 202.
(7) A.l.R. 1932 All. 603.
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[ 1974] 2 S.C.R.
why that will could not be revoked under law and therefore the nomination stood revoked by the execution of Exhibit B-9 will. In other
words, one line of reasoning adopted by the High Court was that, as
a will is revocable at the pleasure of the testator at any time before his
death, the nomination made by Exhibit B-1 will was revocable without
assigning any reason.
B
The definition of "will" in s.2 (h) of the Indian Successon Act,
1925, would show that it is the legal declaration of the intention of a
testator with respect to his property which he desires to be carried
into effect after his death. By exercising the power of nomination,
the head of a Mutt is not disposing of any property belonging to him
which is to take effect after his death. He is simply exercising a power
to which he is entitled to under the usage of the institution. A nomi- c
nation makes the nominee stand in a peculiar relationship with the
head of the Mutt and the Hindu community and that relationship
invests him with the capacity to succeed to the headship of the Mutt.
A nomination takes effect in presenti. It is the declaration of the
intention of the head of the Mutt for the time being as to who his
successor would be; therefore, although it is said that the usage in
the Mutt is that the power of nomination is exercisable by will, it is D
really a misnomer, becii_use, a will in the genuine sense of the term
can have no effect in presenti. There can be no dispute that a nomination can be made by deed or word of mouth. In such a case, the
nomination invests the nominee with a present status. That status
gives him the capacity to succeed to the headship of the Mutt on the
death of the incumbent for the time being. If that is the effect of
nomination whl.P made by deed or word of mouth, we find it difficult E
to say that when a nomination is made by will, it does not take effect
In presenti,. and that it can be cancelled by executing another will
revoking the former will. Such, at any rate, does not seem to be
the concept of nomination in the law relating to Hindu Religious
Endowments. A nomination need not partake of the character of a
will in the matter of its revocability, merely because the power of
nomination is exercised by a will. In other words, the nature or F
character of a nomination does not depend upon the type of document
under which the power is exercised. If a nomination is otherwise
irrevocable except for good cause, it does not become revocable without good cause, merely because the power is exercised by a will. If
the power of nomination is exercised by a will, it is pro-tanto a nontestamentary instrument. A document can be partly testamentary and
partly non-testamentary. In Ram Nath v. Ram Nagina(l), the head G
of the Mutt for the time being exercised his power of nomination, more
or less in terms of Exhibit B-1 here, namely, by making the nomination of a successor and providing that he will be the owner of the properties and charities of the Mutt and also of the other properties standing in the name of the bead of the Mutt. The court held tbat so
far as the nomination and devolution of the properties of the Mutt
were concerned, the will operated as a non-testamentary instrument. H
The Court said that the condition which must be satisfied before a
(I) A.LR.
1962 Patna 481.
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MAHALINGA THAMBIRAN V. LA SRI KAs!VASJ (Mathew, J.)
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document can be called a will is that there must be some disposition
of· property and that the document must contain a declaration of the
intention of the testator not with respect to any thing but with respect
to his property. According to the Court, if there is a declaration of
intention with respect to his successor, it cannot constitute a will even
il' the document were to state that the nominee will become the owner
of the properties of the Mutt after the death of the executant of the
will as that is only a statement of the legal consequence of the nomination.
Ill Kailasam v. Nataraja( 1), the court expressed the view that
a will making a nomination is only the evidence of a past event. In
other words, a will is the record of a nomination and that it is not by
the will that a nomination is made.
Exhibit B-1 makes it clear that the nomination had already been
made. It says :
"I have nominated as my successor Mahalinga Thambiran,
who is one among the Thambirans of Thirukkutta;n of
Dharmapuram Adinam and obtained Manthakashyam,
Deeksha, Pooja and Arukatti and who is performing pooja
in our Mutt."
The statement in the will that after the death of the Head, the Junior
will be the owner of the properties pertaining to the Mutt is a declaration as to the legal consequence of the nomination. The fact that in
the Kasi Mutt there is no usage that the power of nomination was
exercised otherwise than by will does not mean that a nomination will
stand cancelled when the will is revoked.
Mr. Gupte for the respondent argued that Mahantship is property
and nomination by a Mahant of a successor is a disposal of that property to take effect after the death of the Mahant and, therefore, the
power of nomination can be exercised only by a wilJ, and, if it is
exercisable only by a will, it follows that when the wi!J is revoked, the
nomination would stand cancelled.
We do not think that this contention is correct. As we said, the
power of nomination is a concept pertaining to the law of Hindu Religious Endowments. It is not because the Mahant.ship was treated as
property that in the Sambandha Case it was observed that in the Kasi
Mutt nomination is made by a will, but because it was the custom of
that Mutt. The Privy Council has said that a nomination can be
made by word of mouth (see Greedharee Doss v. Nandokissore Doss,
Mo/111111( 1), And there is no reason why it cannot be made by a deed.
If the power of nomination is exercised by word o! mouth or by deed,
it is not clear how the exercise of the power would be valid if Mahantship itself is property and nomination is regarded as the disposition
of that property to take effect after the death of the head of the Mutt.
For, if nomination is merely a declaration of the intention of the head
of the Mutt as to the disposal of the office of Senior Pandara Sannadhi
(!) A.I.R. 1918 Madra_s 1016, at 1018.
7-L447Sup.CI/74
(2) [18671 MIA 405
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[ 1974] 2 S.C.R.
which is generally regarded as property or of the properties appertaining to th~ office, to take effect after the death of the incumbent of the
office for the time being, then the power of nomination can be exercised only by a will. The fact that ac~ording to the law of Hindu
Religious Endowments, a nomination can be made by doed or word
of mouth is positive proof that nomination is not a mere disposal of
the office or of the properties appertaining to it, but the creation of
a present relationship generating the capacity to succeed to the office
and to the properties appertaining to the office. In other words, by
word of mouth or deed_ one caonot dispose of an office, if it is property, to take effect after the death of the person uttering the word or
executing the deed and, therefore, nomination is not a disposal simpliciter of the office of the headship of the Mutt or its properties, to take
effect after the death of the incumbent. It is the creation of a relationship generating a capacity in the nominee to succeed to the headship of the Mutt on the death of the incumbent. What, then, is the
na!!Jre of that relationship ?
Mr. G~te said that so long as no present right or status is con•
!erred or created by a nomination, the Head of the Mutt can cancel
on revoke the nomination at any time he pleases and that there is
no foundation for the a;sumption that nomination can be canc•lled
only for good cause.
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All already stated, a nomination is a c.oncept pertaining to ffindu
Religious Endowments. And it is s•ui generis. One cannot put it in
the straight jacket of any jurisprudential concept.
The Division Bench was of the view that "the junior as the suc<:essor designate of the headship of the Mutt carried with him a certain
status on account of that fact and received dignity and honours befitting that status".
'f!ie question is whether, by the nomination, the appellant ac9uired a status in law, and, if he acquired a status, whether it was liable
to be put an end to by the defendant at his whim.
John Austin has,said that status is "the most difficult problem in
the whole science of jurisprudence." The question whether the junior
Pandara Saonadhi or the__Second occupies a status, has to be decided
with reference to the Jaw relating to Jilndu Religious Endowments.
It is a well known custom in several Mutts, for the heads to nominate
their successors. Junior heads so nominated form _a class by themselves and as they stand in a relationship with the senior heads which
is peculiar in the sense that no other class of persons hold that relationship with them, the question is whether, according to the Jaw of
Hindu Religious Endowments, they acquire a status in law. The
custom or usage will certainly govern the question whether the heac1
of the Mutt has the power to make a nomination during his life time,
and the manner of its exercise and the religious ceremonies to be performed at the time of the nomination. But, in the absence of any
custom or usage, the question whether nomination would confer a
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MAHALINGA THAMBIRAN v. LA SRI KAslVASI (Mathew, !.)
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status upon the junior heads so nominated is a matter for the court ·
to decid~ in the light of the law relating to Hindu Religious Endowments. And, in deciding it, the interests of the Hindu religious community and of the Mutts in general are of paramount importance.
Whether or. not a particular condition or relationship is one of status
depends primarily on the existence and extent of the social interest
in the creation and supervision of such a condition or relationship.
The test is not a simple one of the existence or non-existence of the
concern of the society; it is also one of the degree of sqch concern. It
is, further, abvious, that the degree and even the existence of this
concern in a ·particular condition will vary from time to time in the
same society. It is not possible to draw a clear line of distinction in
a dogmatic and a priori manner between conditions of status and
special conditions not of status. In other words, the picture of status
cannot be painted in elemental colours of black and white on any
a priori considerations. "It is rather a matter for a court to decide
at the time of action whether a particular condition dues or does not
involve a sufficient degree of social interest to be characterised as
status, assuming that all other features of status are present"('').
Bentham's. idea of status was that it was "a quality or condition.which
generates certain rights and duties"(•). Beale defines status as a
personal quality or relationship not temporary in nature nor terminable
at the mere will of parties with which third parties and even the State
are concerned('). C. K. Allen said that status is a condition of
belonging to a particular class of persons to whom law assigns certain
capacities and incapacities(<). Status is defined by Graveson as a .
special condition of a continuous and institutional nature, differing
from the legal position of the normal person which is conferred by
law .and not purely by the act of the parties, whenever a person occupies a position of which the creation, continuance or relinquishment
and the incidents are a matter of sufficient social or public concern(•). The distinguishing mark of a class for the purpose of
status is that legal consequences result to its members from the mere
fact of belonging to it.
In Salvesan v. Administrator of Austrian Property('), Lord
Haldane asked the question : "For what does status mean in this connection?" and answered it by saying that in the case of marnage,
it is something more than a mere contractual relation between the
parties to the contract of marriage. He also said that status may result from such a contractual relationship, but only when the contract
has passed into something which Private International Law recognizes
as havin~ been superadded to it by the authority of the State, so'llething "which the jurisprudence of the State under its law imposes when
"ithin its boundaries the ceremony has taken place."
(1) See RH. Oraveson, "Status ih the Common Law". p. 127.
(2) see Allen, "Legal Duties, p. 33.
(3) see "Treatise on the Conftict of Laws" (1935). p, 649.
(4) see "Status and Capacity" ,46 Law Quart"rly Review, 277.
(S) sec "Status in the Common Law", P .2.
(1927] A.C. 641
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[ !974) 2 S.C.R.
In Nibovet v. Nibovet('), Brett, L. J. said:
"The status of an individual, used as a legal term, means
the legal position of the individual in or with regard to the
rest of the community".
The fundamental difference between status and capacity is that
the former is a legal state of being while the latter is a· 1egal power of
doing. Status det~rmines a person's legal condition in community by
reference to some legal class or group and cannot normally be voluntarily changed. The imposition of status carries with it attribution of
a fixed quota of capacities and incapacities, but it does not directly
compel the holder to do or refrain from doing any particular act.
Ca_pacity, on the other hand, is a legally conferred power to affect the
rights of oneself and other persons to whom the exercise of the capacity
is directed, subject to certain generally and legally defined limits-limits
which vary in rel_ation to each particular form of capacity. Capacity
in this foqn is an incident o! status. And, a distinction therefore
must be made between the legal principles applicable to !he major
~onception of status and those affec.ting the minor conception of its
incidents ( 2 ). The closest approach to a judicial statement o( the
distinction between status and its incidents is found in the judgment
o.f Gray, C. J. in Ross v. Ross(•) :
"The capacity or qualification to inherit or succeed to
property, which is an incident of the status or condition,
requiring no action to give it effect, is to be distinguished
from the capacity or competency to enter into contracts
that confer rights upon others."
It would follow that status is a condition imposed by law and
not by act of parties, though it may be predicated in certain cases
on some private act as the contract of marriage. Whether the
condition of status will be imposed as the result of private contract
or private or public act depends on the public interest in the relation
created by the contract or act. In other words, as we said, the interest
and concern of the society of which parties form part determine
whether or not status will be imposed or conferred as the result of
private contract or by private or public act. Social interest is a
feature of the concept of status; unfortunately, this aspect has been
little stressed in the cases. "Austin's neglect of this aspect of status
has made no small contribution to the judicial disregard of social
interest involved in the concept"(').
In Ross v. Ross('•~· , Chief Justice Gray said :
"A general principle that the status or condition of a
person, the relation in which he stands to another fJ'rson,
and by which he is qualified and made capable to take certain
rights in that other's property, is fixed by the law of
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domicile".
(I) (1878) P. D. (C.A.) 1at11
(2) see C.K. Allen, "Le~al Duties and Other Essays in Jurisprudence";'(J93J)
pp. 28.ff and also his article "Status and Capacity", 46 Law Qu3:rterly
Review, 277.
(3) 129 Mass. 243 (1880).
l4)see R,H1 Graveson, "Status in the Common Law"-, p, 60.
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MAHALINGA THAMBIRAN v. LA SRI KASJVASI (Mathew, 1.)
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In Tarak Chandra Das and Another v. Anukul Chandra
Mukherjee('), B. K. Mukherjea, as he then was, said:
"Now, legal character is the same thing as status."
What is the telationship in which junior heads stand to their
seniors? In Sambandha Case (supra), Muttusami Ayyar, J. said (at
P. 493) :
"By appointment as junior, the Tambiran became a
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spiritual brother or a brotherly companion and by both the
senior who appoints and the junior who is appointed belonging to the same Adhinam, they were asJociates in holiness."
As we said, status is something apart from and be,yond its incidents,
"The status of a child is not his duties or disabihtiea in relation tG
his parents, but ·the legally recognised fact of being a child"(').
fact of a person being legally nominated as junior, having a
c The
peculiar relationship with the senior is status, and the capacity to
succeed to the head is the incident of that status. The status, when
created by a nomination, cannot be withdrawn or cancelled at the
mere will of the parties. The law must determine the condition and
circ.umstances under which it can be terminated. Merely because the
status originated from the act of a senior head in making the
D nomination, it would not follow that the senior head can put an end
to it by another act. In other words, the junior heads as class
occupy a position of which the creation, contlouance or relinquislament, and its prindpal incident, namely, sucmsion to the olliCe ot
the headship of the Mutt are matters of sufficient social or public
concern in the sense that the Hindu religious community is vitally
interested in all of them.
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There was some debate at the bar on the question · whether, by
nomination, the junior gets a contingent interest in the office or in the
properties of the Mutt, the contingency being the survival by the junior
of the head of the· Mutt. A contingent interest or ownership is a present
right. But we do not propose to decide that point in this appeal.
As we said, the concept of nomination· is sui generis; and that
makes it rather difficult to bring it under any legal rubric.
F Perhaps, it has its analogue in Canon Law and that was the reason
why Bhashyam Ayyangar, J. in Vidyapurna Tirthaswami v. Vidvanidhi
Tirthaswami(') likened the position of a junior head to that o{' a
co-adjutor in Canon Law. A co-adjutor stands in a peculiar relationship with the Bishop. He has a right to succeed the Bishop; while
he is a co-adjutor, he has no administrative functions of his own,
but has only to do the work assigned to him by the Bishop. But,
G nevertheless, dµring the life time o~ the Bishop he enjoys a status
and is accorded honours and regard by the religious community,
second only to those accorded to the Bishop. ·
Even if it is assumed !hat the position of a junior head is not
a status as known to Jaw, we· think that the relationship created by
the nomination is one which cannot be put an end to by the head
at his sweet will and pleasure.
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(!) A.I.R.1946 (33) Calcutta 118, nt 119,
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(2) see R.H. Gravcson, "Status in the Common Law'\ pp, 122-127.
(3) I. L. R. 27 Mad. 435.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1974] 2 s.c.R.
In Tiruvambala Desikar v. Kanikkavachaka Desikar( 1), the
question was whether the bead of the Dharmapuram Adhinam has,
after making a valid nomination, an uncontrolled right to cancel it
and nominate another person as the junior head. A Division Bench
of the Madras High Court consisting of Wallis, C. J. and Seshagiri
Ayyar, J. held that the Head of the Mutt, after making a valid nomi·
nation cannot revoke the nomination at his sweet will and pleasure,
hut only for good cause Wallis, C. J. said (at P. 190) :
"It has been contended before us that the defendant only
held office at the pleasure of the Pandarasannadbi and that
consequently the latter was entitled to dismiss him without
giving him any opportunity of being heard. The nomination
and ordination of a junior Pandarasannadhi is the customary
manner of providing for the line of succession in Mutts of
this kind, and it is not shown that the Pandarasannadhi has
any power of arbitrary dismissal, while on the other hand,
it has been held in a previous suit relating to the institution
that he may dismiss for good cause. In v1dyapurna Thirtha.
swami v. Vidvanidhi Tirthaswami(') where the question
was whether a Pandarasa11nadhi forfeited his position as
such by reason of lunacy, recourse was had to the analogies
of the Canon Law and applying those analogies to this case,
the position of the junior Pandarasannadhi during the life
time of the elder would appear to be that of a co-adjutor
with the right of succession, a right of which he cannot be
deprived except for grave cause."
Seshagiri Ayyar, J., after stating that the ordinary mode of
succession in Mutts is by appointment by the head either by will
or by word of mouth observed :
" ... I feel no hesitation in holding that the appointer
has not the absolute power to dismiss which is claimed for
him .... I shall refer to what takes place on the nomination
of a successor in this Mutt. Exhibit-C. . . mentions. . the
ceremonies that have to be gone through in selecting a
successor and also those which the person selected has to
undergo. The most important of these is the abishegam.
The rites to be. observed on this occasion are described by
the plaintiff as bis thirty-third witness. This may be taken
to represent correctly what happens when a junior Pandarasannadhi is appointed. It is also in evidence that th<> s"nior
Pandarasannadhi himself oilers puja to the junior because
by the abishegam the junior attains Godhead. He pe•forms
separate puja to Gods Vigneswara and Subrahmanya. He
is called the Sadhaka Acharya, or co-adjutor with the
senior ... '' (PP. 194-195).
The learned judge then said that a person appointed by will and
on whom abishegain has been performed becomes heir presumptive
entitled to succeed to the headship on the happening of a vacancy.
(I) 1.L.R. 40 Madras 177.
{2) I. L. R. 27 Mad.43S.
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He further said that when the nomination carries with it certain dignity
and is construed by the worshippers as implying sanctity of the person,
it would lead to disastrous results to hold that the appointee is
dependent for his position upon the will of the appointer as the
conscience of the people regards him as the unquestionable successor.
He then summaris~d his conclusions as follows : (at P. 197)
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"(1) that the heaq of the Mutt is entitled to appoint a
Junior Pandharasannadhi; (2) that this junior has a recognized status; (3) that he is entitled to succeed to the
headship, if he survives the appointer; ( 4) that for good cause
shown he can be. removed; (5) that the tenure of his position
is not dependent upon the goodwill of the appointer; and
(6) that it is not open to the head of the mutt to dismiss him
arbitrarily'".
Counsel for the appellant argued that this decision lays down
the correct law and there is no reason why it should not apply to
the case in hand. He said that it is from the Dharmapuram Adhinam
that the Kasi Mutt took its origin and that the same principles must
apply to the Kasi Mutt. As regards the Dharmapuram Aclhinam,
Muttusami Ayyar, J. said in Sambandha Case(') :
"It should be observed here that there were a senior and
a junior Pandara Sannnadhi at one and the same time, and
that the j.unior succe¢ed the senior unless dismissed for
misconduct, and that a will was left at times by the senior
Pandara Sannadhi appointing his junior as his successor.
This indicates probably the source from which the course of
sur:cession at Tirupranandal was originally derived."
The Division Bench of the High Court was of the view that the
decision in Tiruvamba/a Desikar v. Manikkavachaka Desikar(') was
inapplicable to resolve the controversy here for the reason that
Achariya Abishegam ceremony which invested the junior head there
with certain spiritual powers was admittedly not performed in the
instant case. It was submitted by Mr. Gupte for the respondent that
the foundation of the decision in the above case was the finding in
that case that there was the ceremony of Achariya Abishegam on
nomination and that that had the effect of investing the junior bead
with certain spritual powers and as the nomination of the appellant
was not attended with Achariya Abishegam, the nomination did not
invest the appellant "ith any spiritual capacity so as to make the
nomination irrevocable. In Sambandha Case('), Muttusami Ayyar;
J. said :
" ..... a ceremony called Achariya Abhishegarn is
performed only in the case of Tarnbirans who are raised
to the position of a senior or junior Pandara Sannadhi. It
consists in anointing and bathing him as an achariya or
preceptor and consecrating him as such with the recitation
of religious texts prescribed for the occasion. The belief
. with which it is performed is that unless a Tambiran is
solemnly consecrated as a preceptor, he is not competent
{l) I. L. R. 70 Mad. 37l.
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(2) I. L. R. 40 Mad. 177.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
; [ 1974 J 2 S.C.R.
to initiate laymen. in formi of prayer conduciv~ to their
spiritual happiness and to ordain laymen as Tambirans with
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eilicacy" (Para 8 of the judgment).
: -· What 1this parairaph says is that Achariya Abhishekam ceremony
, is performed only for raising a Tambiran to_ the position of a_ junior
or senior Pandara Sannadhi in the Dharmapuram Adhinam. It would
· not follow from what Muttusami Ayyar, J. has said that the right
to succeed which is the invariable legal incident of a nomination is
conferred by virtue of Achariya Abhishekam. ·Nomination must, in
logic and . in fact, always precede the Achariya Abhishekam. The
effect of Achariya Abhishekam, according to the learned judge, is to
confer on the junior head the spiritual capacity to ordain Tambirans
Or, in other words, to initiate laymen into the spiritual fold (Thirukkuttam) of Tambiran. The learned judge did not say that Achariya
Abhishekam has the effect ·of investing the junior head \\ith an
indefeasible right to. succeed to the headship of the Mutt. In other
words, if revocability is otherwise a characteristic of nomination, it
would not cease to be so by virtue of the religious ceremony of
Achariya Abhishekam. Even if it be assumed · that Achariya
Abhishekam would invest a junior head with the power to ordain
Tambirans which he would not otherwise have, it would not follow
that by virtue of Achariya Abhishekam he would ·obtain a right,
much less an indefeasible right, to succeed if nomination per se has
no such effect.
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In the· judgment in Sambandha Case(I), Muttusami Ayyar, J. has
referred to a case where the head of the Dharmapuram Mutt-one
Sadayappa-made three wills in succession nominating the same
person. Counsel for the respondent wanted us to infer from this
that a power to nominate, if it is exercised by a will, can also be
revoked by ·another will; but as already stated, the will, in most
cases, is only a record of the exercise of the power of nomination and
the mere fact that the head of the Mutt in question executed three
wills successively naming the same person as the junior head would
not in any way militate against the contention of the appellant that
nomination once made carmot be revoked arbitrarily. If there was
. an instance in the particular institution of a head who, after having
exercised the power of nomination by a will, executed, another will
nominating another person, the position would probably have been
different.
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Looking at the matter from another angle, we come to the same
·Conclusion. We have· already said that the power of nomination must
be exercised not corruptly or for ulterior reason but bona fide and in
the interest of the Mutt and the Hindu community. It then stands
to reason to hold that power to revoke the nomination must also be
exercised bona fide and in the interest of the institution and the
community. In other words, the power to revoke can be exercised
not arbitrarily, but only for good cause: We do not pause to consider
· what causes would be good and. sufficient for revoking a nomination
as th" defendant had no cgse before us that he revo)<ed that nomination fcir a good cause.
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(I) I. L. R. 10 Mad. 375.
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MAHALINGA THAMB!RAN v. LA SRI KASIVAS!
(Mathew, J.)
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We hold that a nomination when made can be cancelled or revoked
only for a good cause and, as admittedly, there was no good cause
shown in this case for cancellation of the nomination by Exhibit B-9,
the cancellation was bad in law. Therefore, it must be held that
· the appellant was holding the status of the Elavarasu of the Kasi Mutt
during .the life time of the defendant. Normally, a court will declare
only the rights of the parties as they existed on the date o! the
B institution of the suit. But, in this case, on account of the subsequent
event, namely, the death of. the defendant, we have to mould the
relief to suit the altered f.ircumstance. If the defendant had been alive,
it would have been sufficient if we had declared, as the learned single
judge has done, that the appellant was the Elavarsu of the Kasi Mutt.
Now that the defendant is dead, we make a declaration that the
appellant was holding the position of the Elavarasu during the life
time of the defendant, that the revocation of the nomination of the
appellant as the Elavarasu by Exhibit B-9 wos bad, and that the
appellant was entitled to succeed to the headship of the Mutt on the
death of the defendant.
The decree passed by the Division Bench of the High Court is
set aside and the appeal is allowed. In the circumstances, We make
D no order as to costs.
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Appeal allowed.
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