K.K. CHARI versus R. M. SESHADRI
Supreme Court of India | Decided 16 March 1973 | [1973] 3 S.C.R. 691 | 1973 INSC 48
Key facts
- Decided
- 16 March 1973
- Bench
- C.A. VAIDYIALINGAM*, I.D. DUA, A. ALAGIRISWAMI
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 447/1971
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1973] 3 S.C.R. 691
- Neutral citation
- 1973 INSC 48
Text of the judgment
6!H
K. K. CHARI
v.
R. M. SESHADRI
March 16, 1973
[A. ALAGJRISWAMI, J. D. DUA & C. A. VAIDIALINGAM,
JJ.J
M~dras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control)
Act, 1960,-Section
10(3) (a) (i)-Bonafide requirement of land!ord-Co111pron1h.: decreewhether a separate enquiry and satisfaction ap~1rt /roni the cvmpron1ise
necessary for passing eviction order.
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The appellant bought. the suit premises and filed legal proceedings
against the respondent, who was a tenant in the suit premisl!s, for eviction on the ground of appellant's bonafide requirements u/s 1()(3) df the
Madras Rent Control Act. The tenant contested the Jandlord's ct-aim
inter a/ia, on the ground that the appellant's claim was not bona fide, At
the trial, the appellant examined himself, and produced voluminous documentary evidence. The appellant was· not cross-exan1ined.
The
appellant and the respondent then entered into a
compro~ise
in which the tenant gave up all his defences and was gtven
three months'' time to vacate the premises. A decree for eviction was
accordingly passed by the Small Causes Court. The respondent did not
vacate the premises and when the decree was sought to be executed
challenged the decree of eviction principally on the ground that the Small
Causes Court had no jurisdiction to pass a decree only in t.erms of the
compromise decree and that Court had a duty to independently satisfy itself
about the bona fide requirement of the landlord. The High Court held
that the order of the Small Causes Court was without jurisdiction.
Allowing the appeal,
HELD : (i) The true position is that an order of evictiCJ> based on
consent of the parties is not necessarily void if the jurisdictional fact.
namely, the existence of one or more df the .conditions mentioned in
Section 10 were shown to have existed when the Court made the order.
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Satisfaction of the Court which is a pre-requisite for the order of eviction,
need not be by the manifestation borne out by judicial findings. It at some
stage, the Court was called upon to apply its mind to the question and
there was sufficient material before it before the parties in,·it-ed it to pass
an order in terms of their agreement, it is possible to postulate that the
Court was satisfied about the grounds on which the order of eviction \\'as
based. In the instant case, withdrawal of defences by the tenant expressly
amounts to the tenant admitting that the landlord has made out his case
regarding his requirement requiring the premises for his O\Vn occupation
belr.g bona fied. [704E]
(ii) From the particular facts of this case, it can be said that the
decree for eviction has not been solely passed on the bas'is of the com·
promise. The evidence adduced by the respondent upto the stage at
which the compromise was entered into, was enough to establish the land·
lord's claim.
Bahadur Singh and another v. Muni Subrat Das [1969] Z S.C.R. 432,
Kaushalya Devi v. K. L. Bansal A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 838, and Ferozi Lal v.
Manmal and Others A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 794, distinguished on facts.
692
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 3 S.C.R.
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Per Alagiriswami, J. An eviction order based op a compromise
where the landlord has asked for possession on any one of the grounds
on the basis of which he could ask for possessio~, is valid. [708Dl
Barton v. Fincham, [1921] 2 K.B. 291, Babu Ram Sharma v. Pal
Singh, [1959] P.L.R. 33, V~cs Dev v. Nikhiram, A.I.R. 1960 Punjab 514
cited with approval.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 447 of
1971.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
September 15, 1970 of the Madras High Court in C.R.P. No. 797
of 1970.
M. C. Setalvad, and K. Jayaram, for the appellant.
V, M. Tarkundi:, E. C. Agarwala, A. T. M. Samptith and
M. M. L. Srivastava, for the respondent.
The Judgment of I. D. DuA and c. A. VAID!ALINGAM, JJ.
was delivered by VA!D!ALINGAM, J. A. ALAGIRISWAMI, J. gave a
separate opinion.
VAIDJALINGAM, J .-The short, question that arises for consideration in this appeal, by special leave; is whether ~ order dated
March 31, 1969, passed by the Court of Small Causes, Madras,
in H.R.C. No. 983 of 1968 directing the eviction of the respondenttenant is a nullity and as such not··executable. The facts leading
upto the passing of the order niay be stated :
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The appellant was occupying a premises in Madras as a tenant
His landlady filed an application H.R.C. No. 1924 of 1967 seeking eviction of the appellant on the ground that she bona fide required the premises for her own occupation. At that time the
suit premises No. 64, Lloyds Road, Royaspettah, Madras-14 was F
advertised for sale. The appellant for purposes of his occupation
purchased the premises on October 23, 1967, as per registered
document No. 1633 of 1967 in Sub-Registrar's Office, Mylapore.
The respondent was then a tenant of the suit premises under the
vendor. After the purchase, he attorned in favour of the appellant
and has been paying rent. An eviction order was passed by con- G
sent against the appellant in H.R.C. No. 1924 of 1967 on January
27, 1968. He was given time till January 27, 1969, to vacate
the premises, of which he was in occupation as a tenant, by virtue
of the said decree. On the same day i.e. January 27, 1968, the
appellant issued two notices to the respondent, his tenant in respect
of the suit premises, terminating tenancy ol the Respondent under
section 106 of the Transfer of Property Ac<t and calling upon him H
to quit and deliver vacant possession on February 29, 1968. The
two notices were given because _of the fact that the first notice had
K. K. CHARI v. R. M. SESHADRI (Vaidialingam, I.)
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6 93
asked for vacant possession on Fe!miary 28, 1968 and to avoid any
objection regarding the first notice probably the second notice was
also given asking for possession on February 29, 1968. In both
the noitices, the appellant had referred to the purchase of the
bungalow in question for his own occupation and also attributed
knowledge of the said purpose to the tenant. There is a reference
B to the appellant being a tenant of premises. No. 2, Lakshmipuram,
1st street, Madras-14, and to his having no other house of his own
in the city of Madras except the suit premises. It is further stated
that in view of the fact that an eviction order against him has been
passed on January 27, 1968, in H.R.C. 1924 of 1967, the appellallt requires his own bungalow, namely, the suit premises in the
occupation of the respondent for his own bona fide use and
c occupation.
As the respondent did not surrender possession of the premises,
the appellant filed H.R.C. No. 983 of 1968 in the court of Small
Causes, Madras, under section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Madras Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to
as
the Act) . In this petition, after referring to the purchase of
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the suit premises, as well as the order ol' eviction passed against
him ia H.R.C. No. 1924 of 1967, the appellant has stated that
he has no other house! of his own any where in. the city of Madras
excepting the suit premises of which the respondent is the tenant.
He has further averred that he has terminated the tenancy of the
respondent by issuing notices on January 27, 1968, and that the
E tenant has not vacated the premises though he has received the
notice. There is also a reference to the fact that the respondent
is not in essential service and that the suit premises is not exempt
under section 30 of the Act. He has further stated that he requires the house for his bona fide us~ and occupation. Accordingly be prayed for eviction of the respondent and for possession
F being delivered to him.
The respondent filed two counter-affidavits, one on July 19,
1968 and another on January 14, 1969. In the former he has
raised the contention that he is not a tenant of the suit premises,
either under the appellant or under the previous owner of the
premises. According to him, the tenant of the premises was and
G continues to be at the relevant time M/ s. R. M. Seshadri, a partnership firm. He has further pleaded that as he was never a tenant,
the claim made by the appellant of having terminated his tc;nancy
is meaningless. Finally he has stated that the application is not
maintained against him and prayed for its being dismissed. In
the additional counter-affidavit, the respondent pleaded that the
H appellant does not require the house for his occupation and that
his claim is not bona fide. He has also controverted the claim of
the appellant that an eviction order had been passed against him
12-L76!Su!i.CI/73
694
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 3 S,C.R,
in H.R.C. No. 1924 of 1967. In any event, the order of eviction
against the appellant is a collusive one and. ii only a devise to
evict the respondent. He further pleaded that the purchase by the
appellant itself is not lawful. Finally he raised a contentiQn that
the tenant, M/s. R. M. Seshadri, has spent enonnous amounts on
the house acting on the assurance of its previous owner that the
house would never be sold and the tenant of the premises would
never be evicted. Finally there is a challenge also to the notices
determining the tenancy not being in accordance with Jaw.
The enquiry before the Cour·t of Small Causes appears to have
commenced on January 16, 1969. The appellant was examined
on that day as PW 1 and his evidence appears to have spread over
till February 20, 1969. In the course of his evidence, he has
spoken to him being a tenant of a house of which one Seethalakshmi
Ammal was the landlady and to her having filed an awlication for
eviction agains't him, to his purchasing the present suit premises
on Octobier 23, 1967, for purposes of his own occupation, to the
respondent having been a tenant against the original landlord at
the time of purchase and later attorney to him, to the payment of
rent by. the respondent, subsequent to the purchase and to the
notices issued to the respondent terminating hi$ tenancy under
section I 06 of the Transfer of Property Act and requiring him
to deliver possession of the property for purposes of his occupation. He has also filed a large volume of exhibits in respect of the
matters spoken to by him before the court. He has particularly
mentioned the fact that he purchased the said house for purposes
of his occupation, as he was under orders of eviction in H.RC.
No. 1924 of 1967 and to his having no other house in the city
of Madras. The last exhibit rthat was filed by him was Exhibit
P. 45, which was a certified copy of the order in H.R.C. 1924 of
1967, which showed that an order of eviction had been passed
against the appellant on January 27, 1968, and he was given time
till January 27, 1969, for vacating the premises. It was no doubt
a consent order. But all the exhibits filed by him clearly go to
establish that his evidence that he required the suit premises bona
fide for his own occupation, was true. The respondent had not
chosen to LTOss-examine the appellant. On March 31, 1969, both
parties entered into a compromise in the following terms :
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"MEMO OF COMPROMISE
The Respondent hereby withdraws his defence in
the aforesaid uetition and submits to a decree for eviction
unconditionally.
( 2) The Re~pondent prays that time for vacating
uo to 5th June 1969 might please be given and the Petitioner aifCCs to the aame.
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K, K, CHARI V, R. M. SESHADRI
(Vaidia/ingam, J.)
6~5
( 3) The Respondent agrees to vacate the petition
premises and hand over possession of the entire petition
premises to the petitioner on or before the said date 1·iz.
5th June 1969 without fail under any drcumstances and
undertakes not to apply for extension of time.
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( 4) It is agreed by both the parties that this Memo
of Compromise is executable as a Decree of Court.
Dated at Madras, this the 31st day of March, 1969".
The compromise petition was signed by both the appellant and
the respondent as well as the advocate appearing for them The
court, af>ter referring to the petition of the landlord.. being under
section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act on the ground of his own <'ccupation, passed the following order : ."Compromise memo filed and recorded. By consent
eviction is ordered granting time to vacate till 5-6-1969.
No cost''.
The terms of compromise, which have been already set out, were
also incorporated in the order.
It will be noted that the respondent had raised substantially
the following defence to the application filed by !he appellant,
namely( 1) he was not a tenant of the premises and that on
the other hand, the tenant of the pre.mises was
M/s. R. M. Seshadri, a partnership firm;
'( 2) the claim of the appellant that he requires the
house for the occupation is not bona fide;
'(3) the purchase of the premises by the appellant is
not lawful;
{ 4) the tenant, M/s. R. M. Seshadri, has spent enormous amounts by way of repairs and improvements; and
( 5) the notice determining the tenancy is not in
accordance with law.·
It was to meet the above defence and also to establish his claim
of requiring the premises bona fide for his own occupation, ·the
landlord-appellant gave the evidence and also produced about
45 exhibits. It is needless to state that the respondent, who is a
retired I.C.S. officer and an advocate, must have been fully aware
of the averments made by the landlord, the pleas raised in defence
as well as the nature of the evidence led by ihe landlord to meet
his defence. The respondent, apart from not having cross-examined the landlord, when he gave evidence, has also by the co111-
696
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 3 s.c.R.
promise withdrawn all his defence to the application filed b(y the
landlord and submitted to a decree for eviction unconditionally.
It is with this background that one has to appr~ciate the nature of
the decree passed by the Court on March 31, 1969.
It is also seen from the records that the appellant paid a sum
of Rs. 20,000/- on March 31, 1969, to the respondent towards
the cost of repairs and improvements effected by him during his
occupation of the suit premises. On the same date, as the compromise i.e. March 31, 1969, the respondent passed a letter to the
appellant. In this letter after referring to the compromise filed
in the court as well as the order passed thereon, he gave an under'
taking 'to vacate the premises on or before June 5, 1969. He also
acknowledged the receipt of the sum of Rs. 20,000/- from the·
landlord towards the cost of repairs and improvements. The
respondent has also further agreed to refund the sum of Rs.
20,000 /- if he does not vacate the premises within time and he
has also further agreed to pay an additional sum of Rs. 10,000/ as damages. We are not concerned with this sum of Rs. 20,000/or the further agreement of the respondent to pay damages. The
respondent has further stated in the sai.d letter that in the event
of his failure to vacate the premises within time, the landlord is
at liberty to execute the decree of eviction without any further
notice to him.
The assurance and the undertaking given by the respondent
to abide by the compromise decree and to vacate the premisei
without raising any objection have proved to be of no avail, as will
be seen from the events that followed. When the time lor delivery
of property was drawing near, the respondent's son, one S. M.
Sundararn, filed a suit in the City Civil Court, Madras, for a declaration that the purchase by the appellant of the suit property
was void. The son also obtained an mterim injunction against the
appellant from executing the order of eviction passed in H.R.C.
No. 983 of 1968 and disturbing his possession. The suit was
tried on merits and was ultimately dismiSsed by the City CiV11 Court
on December 12, 1969 with costs of the appellant. According to
the appellant, this .suit was engineered by the respondent himself
in order to put off his eviction ftom the suit property.
After the dismissal of the above suit, the appellant filed Execution Petition No. 953 of 1969 in the City Civil Court, Madras
(which was the competent Court for purposes of execution) to
execute the order of eviction against the respondent in H.R.C.
No. 983 of 1968. The respondent filed B. A. No. 1314 of 1969
objecting to the execution of the decree on the ground that it was
a null,ity and inexecutable; and as such he prayed for the warrant
of possession issued in Execution Petition to be recalled and to
dismis.s the Execution Petition itself., His main plea in this apptt.
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K. K. CHARI v. R. M. SE_SHADRI (Vaidialingam, /.)
697
cation was that the decree sought to ~~.executed was one based·
on comproinise or consent without the Rent Control Court having
satisfied itself by an independent consideration regarding the bona
fide requirement of the property by the landlord for his own occu- ·
pation; and as such the decree contravened section 10 of the Act.
· This application was opposed by the appellant in a lengthy counteraffidavrt. In this counter-affidavit, the landlord, after referring
n to
the various items of evidence adduced before .the court, which
have been referred to earlier, has stated that it was when· the respondent found that the pleas raised by him could not be sustained
nnd that the landlord's case was true that he unconditionally
withdrew his defence and submitted to a decree. . He has further .
pleaded
c infirmity.that the ·decree sought to be executed does noi suffer any
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The learned City Civil Judge b\y his order dated March 18,
1970, over-ruled the objections· raised 1:zy the respondent and dis- .
missed E. A. No: 1314 of 1969 and gave time to the respondent ·
till April20,' 1970, to vacate and deliver the possession! of the
D :property. : The respondent carried the matter to the High Court in
Civil Revision Petition No. 797 of 1970. The High Court by its
judgment and· oroer dated September 15,· 1970, has reversed the, ·
urder. of the City Civil Court and accepted the contentions of
the respondent. · The learned Judge has held that the decree for
eviction dated March 31; 1969, is solely passed on the basis of the
E compromise and the Rent Controller has· not applied his mind to
satisfy' himself whether the bona: fide requirement of the landlord
has been established. It is the further view of ·the High Court
that even if ·there was enough· material before the Rent Control
Court, when· it passed the' order' of eviction by consent, the decr.-e
will, nevertheless, be void· so long as the Rent Controller has not.
F given his dedsion regarding the requirement of the landlord being
bona fide.· .. On this line of reasoning, the learned Judge held that
the eviC'lion order is ·a nullity and is·not executable.''" · ·
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Mr. M~ c.· Setalvad, learned counsel for the appellant; has
urged that the High Court has misunderstood and. mis-interpreted
the decisions ·of this Court b~aring on the point. ·· He pointed out
J:; that the appellant had specifically pleaded that· he required the
house bona fide for his own occupation, which is one of the circumstances under which a landlord can claim eviction of the tenant
under the Act. The circumstances under which the house was
:required by him were also' spoken to by the landlord when he gave
evidence and he sought supp9rt by filing as niany. as forty-five
H exhibits before the court. The respondent had denied the plea of
the landlord in his counter-affidavit. Nevertheless, when the entire evidence was placed before the . court by tli landlord, the
tenant did not choose to c'ross-examine him, as he· must have felt
(1973] 3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
698
that 1he landlord's claim would be accepted by the court and his
defence rejected. It was under ilhose circumstances that the respondent unconditionally withdrew his defence and submitted to
a decree for eviction. That conduct of the respondent clearly
establi~hes that he has accepted as true the claim of the landlord
that be bona fide required the premises for his own use and· occupation. The materials on record also show that the court was satisfied
atput the bona fide requirement of the landlord and hence it
accep1ed the compromise and made it a decree of court. Under
those circumstances, the counsel contended that it cannot hS said
that" the decree is one passed only on the basis of the compromise
so as to rriake it void.
Mr. Tarkunde, learned counsel for the respondent, urged that
the de~ree for evictioh has been passed exclusively on the basis
of the compromise entered into by the parties. There is no indication that the court at any stage applied its mind and satisfied itself
regarding the premises being required by the landlord bona fide
for his own occupation. The relevant provision of the Act, the
counsel pointed out, is quite, clear and it makes it mandatory that
the court must apply its mind and satisfy itself that the claim for
eviction falls within one or other of the provisions which enables
· a landlord to get possession. He further pointed out that if the·
satisfaction _of the court is not expressed in the decree, the executing Court has no option but to hold that the same is void. as
laid down by this Court, and it cannot go into the question whether
from the materials on record the Rent Control Court was
satisfied or not. Such an enquiry, it is pointed out, will
be asking the executing Court also to go into the question wheth~ the landlord has made out a case for eviction-a question which
· falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Rent Control Court.
Mr. Tarkunde finally pointed out that the decision of the High
Court holding that the decree in question is void is correct, as it is
in accordan~e with the decisions of this Court.
It is now necessary to refer to the material Provisions of the
Act. Section 10 deals with eviction of tenants .. T.he relevant part
of section 10, necessary for our purpose, is as follows : Eviction of tenants. "10( 1) A tenant shall not be
evicted whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of this section or
~ctions 14 to 16 :
x
x
x
x
x
2 (a) A landlord may, subject to the provisions of
clause ( d), apply to the Controller for an order direct-
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K. K. CHARI v. R. M. SESHADR! (Vaidialingam, J.)
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699
ing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the
building'
(i) in case it is a residential building if the landlord requires it for his own occupation or for the occupation of his son and if he or his son is not occupying a
residential building of his own in the city, town or village
concerned;
x
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(a) The Controller shall, if he is satisfied that the
claim of the landlord in bona fide, make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the
building on such date as may be specified by the Controller and if the Controller is not so satisfied he shall
make an order rejecting the application :
x
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Provided further that 'the Controller may give the
tenant a reasonable time for putting the landlord in possession of the building and may extend such time so as
not to exceed three months in the aggregate."
. Section 10 (1) places an embargo on the right of a landlord
to get a tenant evicted except in accordance with the provisions
of that section or sections 14 to 16. We are not concerned with
sections 14 to 16 in this case. Sub-section 2 enumerates certain
circumstances under which a landlord can ask for eviction.
We are not also concerned with that provision. Sub-section 3
again enumerates certain other circumstances under which a landlord, subject to the provisions of clause ( d) , can ask for possession
of' the building from the tenant. It is accepted by both parties
that clause ( d) has no application. Sub-clause ( i), which deals
witla a residential building, enables a landlord to ask for possession
of a building in the circumstances mentioned therein. Under subclause ( e) , if the Controller is satisfied that the claim of the landlord
is bona fide he may pass an order of eviction.
In this case, the landlord has asked for· eviction on the ground
that he requires the premises for his own occuoation. The Controller can pass an order in his favour only if he is satisfied that
his claim is bona fide. The statute says so and that has to be given
full effect. The question is whether in the case before us, it can
be stated that the Controller was so satisfied when he passed the
order of eviction on March 31, 1969.
Our attention has been drawn to certain English decisions
rendered under the Rent Restrictions Aot, wherein it has b~n held
that though the court has jurisdiction to order possession in favour
of a landlord only on one or other of the ~pecified statutory
700
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 3 S.C.R.
grounds, the court may act on an admission made by a tenant in
that behalf and pass an order of eviction without being obliged
to hear a case out. It is not· ·necessary for us to refer to those
decisions as, in our opinion, the case on hand will have to be
decided in accordance with the .principles laid down by this Court.
A
111ere are three decisions of this Court which require to be
considered. In Bahadur Singh & Anr. v. Muni Subrat Dass &
Anr., (') a decree for eviction passed on the basis of a compromise
between the parties, was held, by this Court, to be a nullity as
contravening section 13 (1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control
Act, 1952. The facts therein were as follows : -
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The tenant and the son of the landlord referred the disputes
between them to arbiitration. The landlord was not a party to
this agreement. The arbitrators passed an award whereunder the
tenant was to give vacant possession of the premises in favour of
the landlord within a particular time. This award was made a
decree of court. The landlord, who· was neither a party to the
award nor to the proceedings, which resulted in the award being
made a decree of court, applied for eviction of the tenant on the
basis of the award. The tenant resisted execution by raising
various objections under section 4 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure. One of the objections, was that the decree. for eviction
based upon the award was a nullity as being opposed to the Delhi
and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. This Court held that the
decree directing the tenant to deliver possession of the premises to
the landlord was a nullity, as it was passed in contravention of
section 13 ( 1) of the relevant statute. After quoting the subsection, this Court further held that the decree for eviction passed
according to an award, in a proceeding to which the landlord
was not a· party, and wrtholl't the court satisfying itself that a
statutory ground of eviction existed, was a nullity and cannot be
enforced in execution. It will be seen from this decision that
the decree was held to be a nullity biecause the landlord was not
a party thereto, and also because the court had not satisfied itself
that a ground for eviction, as required by the statute, existed.
This decision is certainly an authority for the proposition that a
court ordering eviction has to satisfy itself !hat a statutory ground
of eviction has been made out by a landlord. How exactly that
satisfaction is to be expressed by the court or gathered from the
materials, has not been laid down in this decision, as this Court
was not faced with such a problem.
Jn Kaushalya Devi & Ors. v. Shri K. L. Bansal,(') the question again arose under the same Delhi statute regarding the validity
(I) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 432.
(2) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 1048.
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K. K. CHARI V, R. M. SESHADRI (Vaidialingam, J.'I
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of a decree passed for eviction on compromise. The plaintiff
therein filed a suit for eviction of the tenant on two grounds : (a) the premises were required for their own use; and
(b) the tenant had committed default in payment of
reni.
The tenant filed a.written statement denying both these allegations.
He disputed the claim or' the landlord regarding his requiring the
premises for his own use bona fide and also the fact of his being
in arrears. When the pleadings of the landlord and the tenant
were in this state, both parties filed a compromise memo in and
by which they agreed to the passing of. a decree of eviction against
the tenant. Representations to the same effect were also made by
the counsel for both parties. The court passed the following
order:"In view of the statement of the parties' counsel and
the written compromise, a decree is passed in favour of
the plaintiff against the defendant".
The tenant did not vacate the premises within the time mentioned
as per the compromise memo. On the other hand, he filed an
application under section 47, Civil Procedure Code, pleading that
the decree is void as being in contravention of section 13 of the
E Delhi statute. The High Court held that the decree was a nullity,
as the order was passed solely on the basis of the compromise
without indicating that any of the statutory grounds mentioned in
section 13 existed. Following the decision in Bahadur Singh &
Anr.,(1) this Court upheld the order of the High Court. Here
again, it will be seen that the manner in which the court's satisF faction is to be expressed or gathered has not been dealt with.
A similar question came up again before this Court in Ferozi
The landlord filed an application for eviction of the tenant on the ground that he had sublet
the premises without obtaining his consent in writing. Subletting,
without the consent of the landlord in writing, was one of the
G grounds under section 13 ( 1) of the Delhi statute entitling a landlord to ask for eviction. The tenant denied the allegation that be
had sublet the premises. B.oth the landlord and the tenant ·entered
into a COJllllromise and the court, after recording the same, passed
the following order : Lal Jain v. Man Mal & Anr.(')
'
H
"As per compromise, decree for ejectment and for
Rs. 165 /- with proportionate costs is ,passed in favour of
the plaintiff and against the defendant. The parties
(I) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 43".
CZ) A.T.R. 1970 S.C.794.
•
702
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 3 s.c:R.
shall be bound by the terms of the compromise. The
terms of the compromise be incorporated in the decreesheet. ......... "
As 'lhe tenant did not surrender possession of ihe properties within
the time mentioned in the compromise memo. t!Ie landlord levied
execution. It was resisted by the tenant on various grounds one
of which was that the decree for eviction was a nullity, being in
contravention of section 13 of the Delhf statute. This contention
was accepted by the execution Court, as well as by the High Court.
This Court, alter a reference to the provisions of section 13, held
that a decree for recovery of possession can be passed only if the
court concerned is satisfied that one or other Of 'lhe grounds mentioned in the section is established. This Court, further observed :
"From ihe facts mentioned earlier, it is seen 'lhat at
no stage, the Court was called upon to apply its mind to
the question whether the alleged subletting is true or not.
Order made by it does not show that it was satisfied that
the subletting· complained of has taken place, nor is
there any other material on record to. show that it was
so satisfied. It is clear from the record that the court
had proceeded solely on the basis of the compromise
arrived at between the parties. That hieing so there can
be hardly any doubt 'lhat the court was not competent
to pass the impugned decree. . Hence the decree under
execution must be held to be a nullity".
Reference was also made to the two earlier decisions holding
such decrees to be void. It is significant to note that this Court
in the last mentioned decision referred to the facts leading upto
the compromise decree, namely, the basis of the Claim of the landlord, the denial by the tenant and both of them filing a memo of
compromise without any reference to the plea of subletting made
by the landlord. In the said decision this Court haS held that the
compromise decree is void, as there could have been no satisfaction of this Court regarding the statutory requirement in view .of
the following three circumstances : -
B
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(I) At no stage the Court was called upon to apply
itS mind to the question whether .the plea of subletting is tiue or not.
( 2) The order made !:ti' the Court does not show that
it was satisfied that the subletting complained of
has taken place.
( 3) There was no other material on record to show
that the court was so satisfied.
B
K .. K. CHARI .v. R. M. SESHADRI (Vaidia/ingam,
A
)
{
•
•
•
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G
"
703'
The view of this Court further k that the decree for eviction has
been passed solely on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties.
·
In the last decision, in our opinion, there is an indication as tCY
how the satisfaction of a court can be expressed or gathered irr a
particular case. If a stage had been reached in a particular pron ceeding for a court to apply its mind regarding the existence of a
·satutory condition, it may be held that it was so· satisfied .about
the plea of the landlord. Again from other material on record,
it can be inferred that the court was so satisfied.
We are not inclined to accept the contention of Mr. Tarkunde·
that
for eviction in the case before. us has been passed
c solelytheon.decree
the basis of the compromise arrived at : bet\veen the
parties. No dout~ a .. reading of the order of die. court dated
March 31, 1969, isolaied from all other circumstances, may give
the impressio·n that the decree for eviction is passed because of
the compromise between the parties. . It is no doubt true that the
order on the face of it does not show that the court has expressed
D
its satisf:iction that• the requirement of the landlord is bona fide.
Jf the court had expressed its satisfaction in the order itself, that
will conclude the matter. That the court was so· satisfied can also
be considered from the point· of view whether a stage had beerr
reached in the proceedings for the court to apply its mind to the
relevant question? Other materials on record can also .be taken
E into account to find out if the court was so satisfied. The High
Court has proceeded on the basis that even if there was materiaf
before the court, when it passed the order of eviction by. consent,
from which it can be shown that the court was satisfied about the
requirement of the landlord being bona fide, nevertheless such an
order will be a. nullity unless the Rent Controller has given his
decision in favour of the landlord. In our opinion, .this view i"
F
.erroneous.
\
•
J.)
H
We have very exhaustively referred to the plea of the landlord
as well as the evidence let in by him regarding his requiring the
building bona fide for his own occupation. There is no contto~
versy that if such a plea is established, an order of eviction of the
tenant can be obtained by the landlord under section 10 of the Act.
The respondent no doubt at the initial stage denied the claim of
the landlord. . The landlord gave evidence on various matters
with particular reference to his requiring the house bona fide for
his own occupation. · He had also filed, as referre.d by us earlier,
as many as 45 exhibits, one of which was the order of eviction
·obtained against him, being Ext. 45. The respondent did not
cross-examine the appellant. When the· evidence of the landlord
was before the court supported, as it was, bv the innumerable
exhibits filed by him, it can surely be stated that a stage had been
'
·~
' 704
~
[1973} 3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
.
readied when the Controller was called upon to apply his mind tri A
the question whether the plea of the landlord that he required the
\ premises for his own occupation was bona fide. There is the
further circumstance that the tenant did not cross-examine the
plaintiff. On the other hand, he entered into a compromise in
..._and by which he withdrew his defence and suljmitted to a decree
·f for eviction unconditionally. His withdrawal of the defence, after B
& the plaintiff had given evidence and filed exhibits in support of
,., his plea, clearly shows that he accepted as true the. claim of the
.{~landlord that he requires the premises bona fide fqr his own occupa)"S:1ion. He has accepted the position that the landlord has made
[-.,, 'out the statutory requirement, entitling hini to ask for possession
'·
of the premises. It is this unconditional withdrawal of the defence c
regarding the statll'lory condition pleaded by the landlord, :md the
compromise following it, that was accepted by the court aud a
·decree for eviction passed thereon. Under those circumstances,
when the tenant has accepted the plea of the Jandlordr in our
opinion, it is futile to hold that the Rent Controller must- again
embark upon an enquiry regarding the requirement of the land- .
lord being bona fide and adjudicate upon the s·ame. Of course, 0
if there is a dispute between the landlord and tenant, the court
must.decide the matter and adjudicate upon the plea of the fondJord.
The true position appears to be that an order of eviction based
on consent of. the parties is not necessarily void if the jurisdictional
fact viz. the existence of one or more of the conditions mentioned
in section 10 were shown to have existed when the Court made
the order. Satisfaction of the Court, which is no doubt a pre<_ requisite for the order of eviction, need not be by the manifestation
•borne out by a judicial finding. If at some stage the Court was
'called upon to apply its mind to the question and there was suffi1
: cient material before it, before the parties invited it to pass an
order in terms· of their agreement, it is possible to postulate that
the Court was satisfied about the grounds on which the order of
eviction was based.
It is no doubt true that before making an order Jor po;;ession
the court is under a duty to satisfy itself as to the truth of the
landlord's claim, if there is a dispute between the landlord and
tenant. But if the tenant in.fact admits that the landlord is entitleQ, to possession on one or other of the statutory ground, mentioned in the Act, it is open to the court to· act on that admission
and make an order for possession in favour of the landlord without
further enquiry. It is no doubt true that each case will have to
be decided on its own facts to find out whether there is any material
to justify an inference that an admission, express oi implied. has
been made by the tenant about the existence of one- or other of the
E
F
(.
II
K. K. CHAR! v. R. M. SESHADR! (Vaidialingam, J.)
A
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705
statutory grounds. But in the case on hand, we have already
referred to the specific claim of the landlord as well as the fact
nf. the tenant withdrawing his defence. According to us, such
withdrawal of the defence expressly amounts to the tenant admitting that the landlord has made out his case regarding his requiring
the premises for his own occupation being bona fide. In the three
decisions of this Court, to which we have already referred, the
position wa~ entirely different. In none of those cases was there
any material to show that the tenant had expressly or impliedly
accepted the plea of the landlord as true. Therefore those decisions do not assist the respondent-tenant.
For all the reasons mentioned above, it· cannot be held, in the
particular circumstances of this case, that the decree for eviction
has been passed solely on the basis of the compromise entered
'into between the parties. On the other hand, it is clear from
the various matters Teferred to, that the court was satisfied about
the bona fide requirement of the landlord. Therefore, the decree
for eviction is neither void nor inexecutable.
Mr. Tarkunde, learned counsel, contended that if the execution Court is to find out whether the court, which passed the decree,
was satisfied about the statutory requirement in a particular case;
it will have to conduct a very elaborate enquiry. We are not
impressed with this contention. Once it is accepted that the question about a decree being void and as such not executable on any
ground available in law can be raised before the executing Court,
it is needless to state that the executing Court will have to adjudicate upon that plea and for that purpose the relevant materials
have to be considered. If that is so, there is no insurmountable
difficulty, as envisaged by Mr. Tarkunde. in an executing Court
considering whether a particular decree for eviction is void as
being contrary to the relevant section of the statute governing
the matter.
Mr. Tarkunde, learned counsel, contended that the tenant had
disputed the title of the landlord as well as the validity of the notice
issued under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. As
these matters have not been considered by tlie courts below, he
requested that the proceedings may be"remanded for this purp?se.
We are not inclined to accede to this request. The tenant raISed
these objections also in his original plea, but he has unconditionally withdrawn all his defence. That means these pleas also no
longer survive for consideration.
In the result the appeal is allowed. The order and judgment
dated September 15, 1970, of the High Cou~ ~re set aside and
the order dated March 18, 1970, of the City ClVll Court, Madras,.
will stand restored with costs throughout.
706
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 3 S.C.R.
ALAGIRISWAMI., !·-:---! agree with the order proposed by my
Jearned brother, Va1d1ahngam, J. but I think it is necessary to
add a few words of my own. The law on this subject has got into
a labyrinth and I think it is time we took a hard look at it and laid
down the correct position.
A
The learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court, who
~llowed the re~pondent'.s petition, w~s mainly influenced by the
JUdgme11ts of thts Court m Bahadur Smgh v. Muni Subrat Dass('),
Ferozi Lal v. Man Mal(') and Kaushalya Devi v. K. L. Bansal(').
Before him the cases in Remon v. City of London Real Property
Co. Ltd.,(') Thorone v. Smith(') and Middleton v. Baldock
(T.W.) ( 0 ) were cited in support of the contention taken on behalf c
.of the landlord, as also the decision in Jagan Nath v. Jatinder
Nath(') and Vas Dev v. Milk hi Ram ( 8 ) • In spite of this he felt
bound by the decisions of this Court and on the ground that the
·Order of the Rent Controller on the face of it does not show that
he had applied his mind and was satisfied Jhat there was a bona
fide requirement of the premises by the landlord for his personal
.occupation it was a nullity. He thought that even if there was D
.enough material before the Court when it passed the order of
eviction by consent so long as the Rent Controller had not applied
his mind and given his decision in the matter as to whether the
respondent was bona fide in requiring the premises for his own
.occupation, the eviction order cannot be held to be an order
passed on merits under section 10 ( 3) of the Act. · He further
thought that having due regard to the decisions of this Court it
was not possible for him to accept the contention of the learned
counsel for the appellant that a finding on merits in his favour had
to be implied from the order of the Rent Controller in view of the
·existence of adequate material before him to support an implied
finding. He also thought that even in case where the tenant F
bona fide admits that the ground of eviction existed, the Rent
COntroller must apply his mind and hold, basing himself on such
admission. by the tenant, that the ground for eviction put forward
by the landlord existed and that he is entitled to an eviction order,
without solely relying on the compromise.
I am of opinion that in this· approach learned Judge relied
·more on the form than the substance of the matter. The true
approach has been pointed out by our learned brother, V aidialin·gam J. He has pointed out that while the decision in Bahadur
.'Singh's('i case was an authority for the proposition that a court
. (1) [1%9] 2 S.C.R. 432.
(3) A ,J.R. 1970 S.C. 838.
(S) [1947) I K.B. 307.
17) A.l.R.1961 hnjab S7'1.
(2) A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 794.
(4) [192i] 1 K.B. 49.
(6) (19.50] I K.B. 6S7,
(8) A.I.R. 1%0 Punjab Sl4.
G
H
K, K, CHARI v. R, M. SESHADRI (Alagiriswami, J.)
A
707
.
ordering
. . eviction has to satisfy itself that a statutory •'round of
ev1ct10n has been made out by a landlord; how exactly that satisfaction was to be expressed by the court or gathered from the
materials, has not been laid down in that decision; that in
Kausha/ya Devi's case also the manner in which the court's satisfaction was to. be expressed or gathered has not tJeen dealt with;
B mor has the decisioµ in Ferozi Lars case given an indication as
to how the satisfaction of a court could be expressed or gathered
in a particular case. He has pointed out that "if a stage had been
reached in a particular proceeding for a court 'to apply its mind
regarding the existence. of a statutory condition, it may be held
that it was so satisfied about the plea of th~ landlord. Again,
c from other material on record it can be inferred that the court was
so satisfied." He has also pointed out how in the particular circumstances of the present case as the tenant had withdrawn his
defence and submitted to a decree for eviction unconditionally,
he had accepted the claim of the landlord that he required the premises bona fide for his own occupation; that he has accepted the
D position that the landlord has made out the statutory requirement
entitling him to ask for possession of the premises; that by this
unconditional withdrawal Of the defence regardinJ!: the statutory
condition pleaded by the landlord, and the compromise following
it that was accepted by the court, the tenant has accepted the plea
of the landlord, and it is futile to hold that the Rent Controller must
again embark upon an enquiry regarding the requirement of the
E
landlord being bona fide and adjudicate upon the same. He has
also pointed out that the true position appears to be that an order
of eviction based on consent of the parties is not necessarily vojd
ii the jurisdictional fact, viz. the existence of one or more of the
conditions mentioned in section 10 were shown to have existed
when the court made the order; that the satisfaction of the court.
F which is no doubit a pre-requisite for the order ol' eviction, need
not be by the manifestation borne out bv a judicial finding; and
that if at some stage the court was called upon to aoply its mind
to the question and there was sufficient material before it before
the parties invited it to pass an order in terms of their a2reement,
it is possible to postulate that the court was satisfied about the
G grounds on which the order of eviction was based. He has further
pointed out that if the tenant in fact admits that the landlord is
j:ntitled to possession on one or other of the statutory grounds
mentioned in the Act. it is open to the court to act on that admission and make an order for possession in favour of the landlord
without further enquiry. It is on these 2rounds that he has come ·
H to the conclusion that the facts in this c"se satisfied these tests ·
and. therefore. the "r,der of the Madras High Court should be
set aside. In so far as it is necessary for the purpose of this case
this is a satisfactory conclusion.
708
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 3 S.C•.ll.
Let us, however, consider this question based on principles. A
The Rent Controller is a quasi- judicial tribunal created for the
purpose of discharging certain functions under the Act. Not being
an ordinary civil court to which ihe provisions of section 9 of the
Code of Civil Procedure applies the Rent Controller gets ju~isdic
tion to order eviction of a tenant only in case one or other of the
various circumstances laid down in the Act like the bona fide B
requirement of the landlord of the building for his own occupation, wilfol default in the payment of rent by the tenant etc. are
satisfied. But once these grounds are alleged and found to be established no further question of its jurisdiction arises. A quasi-judicial
tribunal acting within jurisdiction may decide rightly or may decide
wrongly, If it decides wrongly there are provisions in the Act itself
for appeal, revision and ultimately even revision by the High Court c
under the provisions of section 115 of the C.P.C. or even under
Article 227 of the Constitution. Of course, by a wrong decision
on a jurisdictional fact a quasi-judicial tribunal with a limited
jurisdiction cannot con.fer jurisdiction on itself. But in the case
of a compromise such a question does not arise. Where as in
this case the landlord has asked for possession of the building on D
the ground that he wants it for his own personal occupation which
is one of grounds for eviction under the Act, the Rell't Controller
has, of course, to bie satisfied that this requirement is real and
bona fide. In regard to his decision on this point, as already
pointed out, there are provisions for appea1. revision etc. The
words in section 10 'if the COntroller is satisfied' do not have any E
special ;ignificance. An ordinary civil court tryinj!; a suit either
on a mortgage or on a promissory note has necessarily to be satisfied about the execution of the document, the passing of consideration etc. before it can pass a decree on the basis of either the
mortgage or the promissory note. Therefore, the fact tr.at under
section 10 the Controller has to ~ satisfied that the ground for
eviction exists does not mean that his satisfaction cannot be based F
on the same considerations on the ba&is of which the civil courts
can be satisfied. Let us take a suit on a promissory note. The
defendant can appear before the court and admit the plaintiffs
The suit can be decreed on that basis. The defendant may be
absent and the case may be set ex-parle. In such a case the plaintiff lets in the evidence and on the basis of that evidence the G
suit may be decreed. Or the defendant might appear and file
a written statement denying the execution of the promissory note
or denying the receipt of consideration or even putting forward a
plea of discharge. Now in these circumstances the court will not
pass a decree unless it is satisfied that the promissory note was
executed, that consideration passed and that it had not been dis- H
charged. This does not prevent the defendant at any stage of the
suit either submitting to a decree or entering into a compromise
cC'nsenting to a decree. The fact that the consent to a decree takes
K. K•. CHARI v. R. M. SESHADRI (A/agiriswami, J.)
A
/
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709,
the form of a compromise cannot make the consent.any the !es> a
consent. Under Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure
all matters to be decided in a suit -can be settled by means of a
compromise. The application of Code of Civil Procedure is not
excluded in proceedings before the Rent Controller and in any
case there is no reason why the principle underlying Order 23,
R Rule 3 should not apply to those proceedings. It is not clear why
a tenant should be treated as a minor or as an imbecile. In the
case of a minor the Order 32, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure specifically lays down !!hat the court should be satisfied·
before it sanctions a compromise binding the minor. There is no
such provision in the Rent Control Act. I think, therefore, the
time
has come when a hard look must be taken on this point and
c it should
be held that there is no objection to a compromise consenting to an order of eviction in rent control proceedings.
Of course, a compromise can be valid only if it is in accordance with the Act, i.e. only if the landlord has asked for possession
of the building on one oi the grounds laid down in the Act. For
.. D instance, a. landlord merely on the ground that he is the owner
of the building cannot come to the Rent Controller and ask for
possession of the property and the Rent Controller cannot pass
a valid order merely because the tenant submits to an order of
eviction. Bahadur Singh's case is an instance in point. In that
case the landlord did not even apply for eviction. Bnt where the
landlord
speciJically asks for possession on any one of the grounds
E
on the basis of which he is entitled to ask for possession under
the provisions of the Act there will be no objection to the tenant
erther submitting to an order of. eviction or entering into a compromise submitting to an order of eviction. There is no magic .
in the words. 'if the Controller is satisfied' in section 10(3)(e).
The section would have been as effective even if those words were
F not there and the section had read as follows :
"If the claim· of the landlord is bona fide the Controller shall make an order directing the tenant to put
the landlord in possession of the building on such date
as may be specified by the Controller; otherwise he shall
make an order rejecting the application."
G
It is not :necessary to refer to the three decisions of this Court
which have been sufficiently discussed by our learned brother,
·
Vaidialingam, J.
I may now refer to certain English decisions. In Barton v.
Fincham( 1 ) Lord Scrutton L.J. observed : . ·
H
"If the tenant is willing to go out, I do not see why
any ordeT is wanted; let him go; but at present
(!) [1921) 2 LK.B. 291 at 298.
l3-L76! Sl'q.C!/73
710
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1913] 3 S.C.R.
advised I do not see any reason why the judge on being
satisfied that a tenant is then ready to go out (not that
he was once williing lilt has changed his mind) should
not make an order for possession."
Lord Atkin L. J. observed :
"If the parties before the Court admit that one of the
events has happened which give the Court jurisdiction,
and there is no reason to doubt the bona {ide3 of the admission, the Court is under no obligation to make further enquiry as to the question of fact."
In Thome v. Smith after referring to the observations of Atkin,
LJ. and Scrutton, L.J. (supra), Lord Bucknill, L.J. pointed out:
"But in the present case it is, I think, reasonably
clear that the tenant, in effect, agreed to the order because at the time when the landlord asked the court to
make the order the landlord by his own statements had
satisfied the tenant that he intended to occupy the house
himself and he, the tenant, could not hope successfully
to resist the claim. If the tenant )lad stated this expressly in the court the judge would surely have had jurisdiction to make the order on that ground. I think ~n the
events which happened here, the tenant being legally
represented, the judge was entitled to proceed on the
view that this was the true position. Before making an
order for possession the judge is under a duty to satisfy
himself as to the truth if there be· a dispute between
landlord and tenant, but if the tenant in effect agrees
that the landlord has a good claim to an order under
the Acts, I think ithe judge has jurisdiction to make the
order for possession under the Acts, without further inquiry."
Lord Justice Somervell referred to rule 18 of the rules made under
the Act of 1920, there under consideration, to the following
effect :
"Where proceedings are taken in the county court
for the recovery of rent of any premises to which the Act
applies, or of interest on a mortgage to which the Act
applies, or for the recovery of possession of any premises to which the Act applies, or for the ejectment of
a tenant from any such premises, the court shall, before
makin!( an order for the recovery of such rent or interest,
or for the recovery of possession or ejectment, satisfy
itself that· such order may properly be made, regard
being had to the provisions of the Act."
A
B
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F
G
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K, K, CHARI v .. R, M. SESHADRI (Alagiriswami, /.)
B
c
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7 J.I
and observed :
"Nothing in !he decision that we are giving in any
way, as it seems to me, diminishes the scope of that rule.
We are deciding that on what happened in this case,
the tenant being, as he was, legally represented, the
county court judge was rightly "satisfied" lhat the order
could properly be made.
The other point arises from the use oi. the word
"consent" as applied to the order made herein. The expression "a consent order" may suggest some compromise or arrangement which might be inconsistent with
the provisions of die Acts. When the defendant is agreeing to submit to judgment because he is satisfied that
the plaintiff can establish his right to an order under the
Acts, it might be advisable to avoid the use of the word
"consent", which may have a wider meaning and .cover
cases where the "consent" was the result of an arrangement which could not properly be made the basis of an
order."
These observations very clearly show that the fact the Court had
to satisl'y itself did not prevent a consent order. It also shows
clearly that a compromise or arrangement as long as it is not
inconsistent with the provisions of the Act would not be objectionable.
In Middleton v. Baldock (supra) it was held :
"that a landlord seeking to recover possession
against a tenant protected by the Rent Restriction Acts
must establish the right to possession on one of the
grounds stated in the Acts, unless, after possession had
been claimed on such a ground, the tenant admitted
facts to suppovt it, in which event the court need not
itself investigate the matters of fact admitted."
In its decision in Babu Ram Sharma v. Pal Singh(') the
Division Bench of the Punjab High Court, of which our learned
brother Dua, J. was a member, had this to say on the point at
issue :
"According to this section the landlo!'d is entitled to
seek eviction of his tenant on certain grounds, and the
Rent Controller, after giving notice to the tenant, is empowered. to give his own finding and then to pass the
necessary order. In the present case the ground on
which the landlord had sought eviction was non-payment
of rent. Such a ground is within the express language of
section 13 of the aforesaid Act. It was, therefore, open
(]) [1959] P.L.R. 33.
712
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 3 s.c.R.
to the Rent Controller to determine whether or not the
allegations of the la.ndlord that the tenant had not paid
the rent was correct. It appears that the tenant admitted
that he had not paid the rent as alleged by the landlord.
In this view of things, I do not understand how it was
necessary for the Controll~r to hold any further enquiry.
After fully considering the matter I am definitely of
the opinion that il the compromise decree is bilsed on
the grounds on which the landlord· could claim a decree
for eviction undzr section 13 of the East Punjab Urban
Rent Restriction Act, then it is within the jurisdiction
and competence of the Rent Controller to pass such a
decree with a default clause; it is similarly competent for
the civil court to execute such a decree when default
has occurred. The proviso to sub-section 2 of section
13 of the Act is not attracted in such circumstances as
no question of extending time granted to the tenant for
putting the la.ndlord in possession arises. In the result
my answer to the two questions relerred would be in the
affirmative.
A
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In Vas· Dev v. Milkhi Ram (supra) Justice Grover of the Punjab
High Court (as he then was) after referring to the three English
cases, already referred to above, observed :
"From the above discussion of the English cases, the
principle which has also been· accepted by the Bench of
this Court is quite clear that if the tenant admits after a
suit for ejectment has been filed that the landlord is entitled to possession on one of the statutory grounds the
·court can make an appropriate order or ii the landlord
has made some representation within the terms of the
statute to the tenant and which is one of the ingredients
of a ground on which possession can be ordered and the
tenant accepts that representation and submits to an order,
then also the Court will ble fully justified in making a
valid order of eviction. Each case, therefore, will have
to be decided on its own facts and if will have to be seen
whether there is any material to justify an inference that
an admission, be it express or implied, has been made by
tlie tenant on the existence of one of. the statutory
grounds.
There is a good deal of force in the submissions of
the learned counsel for the landlord that enough material
and evidence had come on the record to satisfy the Court
as well as the tenant that the grounds on which ejectment had been sought would be ultimately established
E
F
G
H
K, K, CHARI v. R. M, SESHADRI (Alagiriswami, !.)
A
•
c
713
and when the tenant entered into the compromise, it was
implicit in the aforesaid circumstances that he was admitting the correctness of the grounds which had been
taken for his ejectment. I am, therefore, of the opinion
that the tests which have been laid down by the au'lho·
rities have been fully satisfied and it cannot be said that
the decree which was passed on the basis of compromise
was a nullity or could not be executed."
That is exactly the position here.
All these decisions amply support the proposition that I have
put forward that an eviction order based on a compromise where
the landlord has asked for possession on any one of the grounds
on the basis of which he could ask for possession would be valid.
This would, however; have to be considered when a _proper occa·
sion arises. The present appeal is allowed.
S.B.W.
Appeal allowed.
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