OFFICIAL LIQUIDATOR, SUPREME BANK LTD. versus P. A: TENDOLKAR (DEAD) BY LRS. AND ORS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 19 January 1973 | [1973] 3 S.C.R. 364 | 1973 INSC 14
Key facts
- Decided
- 19 January 1973
- Bench
- A.N. GROVER*, M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG, A.K. MUKHERJEA
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 195/1967
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Citation
- [1973] 3 S.C.R. 364
- Neutral citation
- 1973 INSC 14
Text of the judgment
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SUPREME DANK LTD. V. P. A: TENDOLKAR (Beg,/.)
365
One of these t\vo directors died pendi~g the grant of his O\\'n appli·
cation for a certific-atc under Art. 136 _of the Constitutio,n. His heirs
got . themselves impleadcd and contended that the proceedings against
them could not continue and also . on the mcfits regarding the liability
of that director.
·
HELD: (I) The contention that s. 235, · Compa;nies Act, 1913,
_could apply to these proceedings is erroneous because, the proceedings
are governed expressly by the spcci-al la\v on the subject contained 1n
s. 45-0 of the Banking Companies Act, [376F-G]
• (2) The plea that 12 years from the 'accrual of claims' had expired
before s. 45-0(2) was amended by the Amending Act of 1959, and
that, therefore; the enlarged period of limitation of 5 years from the
date of the first appointment of the liquidator was not available to the ·
Official Liquidator in the present case is also unacceptable . . The . facts
necessary to determine whether any part of ~he claims ace.rued against
any director have riot bec:n examined. Such a point involvinr;; an
investigation into fresh facts sho\ving when clai1ns for any parttcuh1r
item of loss to the ·company accrued or \Vhen they accrued against the
board of di'rectors, cannot be taken up for the first time in this Court
when the matter was riot .raised and gone into the High Court. [376A-FJ
D
•
,.<(
(3) In any case, the amendment of s. 45(0)(2) conferred a new
nght of counting the period of limitation from the lirH appointment
·of the liquidator. The exercise of that. right by the liquidator, acting
on behalf of the company, certainly took place after..the comnu::ncemcnt
uf the Amending Act of 1959. There was no question hcrc ..Q.f giving
any retrospective operation to any right \'.'hethcr procedural or_ substantive. [377A-C]
(4) The maxim acti.o persOnalis 111orilt1r cu1n persona \vould not be
E . applicable to actions based on· co,nt:ract or. \vhcrc a tort feasor's estate
~!
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had bcncfittcclr from a wro11g done. There is no .reason to extend the
maxim to cases involving breaches ·of fiduciary dut_ies· where the personal
conduct of the deceased director has been fully inquired into and the
only qucsticm for determination, on an appeal, is the extent of the
liability. incurred by the deceased directdr. Such liabilitv must neccs~
sarily be confined to the assets or the estate left by the deceased· director
in the hands of his successors. In so far as a heir or_ legal representativ.:
. has an interest in the assets of the deceased director and . fcpres.enU
the estate, and the Jiquidator represents the interests of t.he compa:n)', .·
.the heirs as well as the 1iquidator should, 'in cquit}r, be able to question
a decision which affects the interests represented.
[3800, E-A]
In re. East of England Bmzk-Feltem's Executors case, [1865] 1 Equi>ry
Cc..ses 219. in re. United English and Scottish Assurance Co.--ex. ·parte
Hawkins, [1867] 3 Ch. A.C. 787, in re. British. Guardian Life Assurance Company, [1880] 14 Ch. D. 3 335, S.B. Billimoria Official :Liqui·
dator v. CecUla Mary Desouza and Ors., A.LR. 1926 Lah. 624. Official Liquidators v. Jugal Kisliore and Ors., A.LR. 1939 All I. Manila/
B:,ijal v. Ve11Jr,1vanc/ras, C. Jadav & Ors., A.l.R. 1944 Boin. 193,
Puttiani Veettil Afcnokki Si!nkarani Ncunblar v. Kottayc.111 Bai1k bv
Official Liquidator, Tellic/zary & Ors., A.LR. 1946 Mad. 304 · and
In re. The Peedan Ju/zarmal Bank Ltd., A;LR.: 1958 Mau 583
referred to.
·
•
(5) While s. 235 of the Companies Act 1913 corresponding ·to
s. 543 of the Companies Act, . 1956, gives a power to the ·court to
inquire into the conduct of any past or present di'rector; the sections
orFICIAL LIQUIDATOR, SUPREME BANK LTD.
A
v.
P.A. TENDOLKAR (DEAD) BY L. RS. AND ORS.
Januar:r 19, 1973
r ..
[A. N. GROVER, M. H. BEG AND A, K. MUKllERJEA, JJ.J
.( "
B
Comp<nie.< Act (1 of 1913), s. 235 and Companies Act (I of 1956),
s. 543-Pou•er of Court to 1nake conzpulsive orders agalnst heirs of deccaJetl director in 111isfeaw111ce p1·ocf.·edings-Actio pei.rsonGlis 111oritt11
cunz persona-Scope of-Rig/it of appeal h,v end again~t heir.
Banking Companies Act (IO of 1949), ss. 45(G) and 45(0)-0fficial
liquidc..tor, •;vhether should apply for public exaniiluztion of directors under.
s. 45(G) to s. 45 0(2) as amended by Act 33 of 1959-Scope of t/ze
fresh petiocl of li111itatiQn-S. 45 (0) (2) pre1:ai/s over s. 235 Co111panies
·Act, 1913, ln relation ~o Banking Co111pa111es.
y
c
'i
Pi1·inciples deter111ini11g liabilit,v of nu;,iaging director and
J)irectors in 111isfeasance proceedlngs,
Board
of
D
On -an app1icati-on tor winding· up 'of a. bank a provisional Jiquidator
was appointed on 15th March 1956. The appellant, who was there·
'after appointed as Jiquidator filed an application o:n 27th August. -1960,.
for misfcasanc.~ proceedings under s. 45H of the Banking Companies
Act, 1949, and s. 235 of the Indian. Companies Act, 1913.
Under s. 45 0 (2) in respect of all other claims by the Banking Company against" its directors, the period of limitation shall be 12 years
E
from thz date of the accrual of such claims'.. By Am·~nding Act 33
of 1959 the words 'or five yea'rs from the date of the first appointment
of the liquidator whichever is longer', \Vere '3.dded at the end of the
sub-section. The official Jiquidator relied upon several reports made by
the Rescrvq Bank and by others under orders of the High Court. The
procecdi,ngs \\Crc taken against the directors, managing director and
officers of the company. Two of the directors died while the proceedings '\-;Cr~ pe;nt.!ing. 1"hc Com~any judge dismissed the proceedings against
F
the employees as time-barred, and held that the heirs of the deceased
l.Jirectors could not be proceeded against: but, in respect of the managing dircc:tor and those Directors \liho were alive \vhen he gave his
<lecision it was held that the procecdCngs v.·.erc \Vithin tin1e, bCir.g
covered by the _special provisions of s. 450 of the Banking Compani-cs
Act. The directors contended that the whole responsibility for- the
fraud and misappropriation 'lay with the managing director." who- had
G
\vide powers under the Articles of ASsociation, and in whose favour
the directors had executed ·a power of attorney. The rna;naging director
however contended that he acted 'according to the policy and in
accordance with directions of the directors in whose hands he \\'as a
mere tool'. The Company Judge determined the loss to the Company
and gave directions as to the liabilities of the managing director n:rrd
other directors. In appeal, the Division Bench reduced the total liabili·
tv of directors and ttte individual remaining' liability of too managing
II
director though it placed a larger share of the .burden of contribution on
.the mana~ing director. The appellant appealed agaimt the order in
relation of the liability of the manoging direc!'or and two other directors.
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SUPREME DANK LTD. V. P. A: TENDOLKAR (Beg,/.)
365
One of these t\vo directors died pendi~g the grant of his O\\'n appli·
cation for a certific-atc under Art. 136 _of the Constitutio,n. His heirs
got . themselves impleadcd and contended that the proceedings against
them could not continue and also . on the mcfits regarding the liability
of that director.
·
HELD: (I) The contention that s. 235, · Compa;nies Act, 1913,
_could apply to these proceedings is erroneous because, the proceedings
are governed expressly by the spcci-al la\v on the subject contained 1n
s. 45-0 of the Banking Companies Act, [376F-G]
• (2) The plea that 12 years from the 'accrual of claims' had expired
before s. 45-0(2) was amended by the Amending Act of 1959, and
that, therefore; the enlarged period of limitation of 5 years from the
date of the first appointment of the liquidator was not available to the ·
Official Liquidator in the present case is also unacceptable . . The . facts
necessary to determine whether any part of ~he claims ace.rued against
any director have riot bec:n examined. Such a point involvinr;; an
investigation into fresh facts sho\ving when clai1ns for any parttcuh1r
item of loss to the ·company accrued or \Vhen they accrued against the
board of di'rectors, cannot be taken up for the first time in this Court
when the matter was riot .raised and gone into the High Court. [376A-FJ
D
•
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(3) In any case, the amendment of s. 45(0)(2) conferred a new
nght of counting the period of limitation from the lirH appointment
·of the liquidator. The exercise of that. right by the liquidator, acting
on behalf of the company, certainly took place after..the comnu::ncemcnt
uf the Amending Act of 1959. There was no question hcrc ..Q.f giving
any retrospective operation to any right \'.'hethcr procedural or_ substantive. [377A-C]
(4) The maxim acti.o persOnalis 111orilt1r cu1n persona \vould not be
E . applicable to actions based on· co,nt:ract or. \vhcrc a tort feasor's estate
~!
F
G
•
II
had bcncfittcclr from a wro11g done. There is no .reason to extend the
maxim to cases involving breaches ·of fiduciary dut_ies· where the personal
conduct of the deceased director has been fully inquired into and the
only qucsticm for determination, on an appeal, is the extent of the
liability. incurred by the deceased directdr. Such liabilitv must neccs~
sarily be confined to the assets or the estate left by the deceased· director
in the hands of his successors. In so far as a heir or_ legal representativ.:
. has an interest in the assets of the deceased director and . fcpres.enU
the estate, and the Jiquidator represents the interests of t.he compa:n)', .·
.the heirs as well as the 1iquidator should, 'in cquit}r, be able to question
a decision which affects the interests represented.
[3800, E-A]
In re. East of England Bmzk-Feltem's Executors case, [1865] 1 Equi>ry
Cc..ses 219. in re. United English and Scottish Assurance Co.--ex. ·parte
Hawkins, [1867] 3 Ch. A.C. 787, in re. British. Guardian Life Assurance Company, [1880] 14 Ch. D. 3 335, S.B. Billimoria Official :Liqui·
dator v. CecUla Mary Desouza and Ors., A.LR. 1926 Lah. 624. Official Liquidators v. Jugal Kisliore and Ors., A.LR. 1939 All I. Manila/
B:,ijal v. Ve11Jr,1vanc/ras, C. Jadav & Ors., A.l.R. 1944 Boin. 193,
Puttiani Veettil Afcnokki Si!nkarani Ncunblar v. Kottayc.111 Bai1k bv
Official Liquidator, Tellic/zary & Ors., A.LR. 1946 Mad. 304 · and
In re. The Peedan Ju/zarmal Bank Ltd., A;LR.: 1958 Mau 583
referred to.
·
•
(5) While s. 235 of the Companies Act 1913 corresponding ·to
s. 543 of the Companies Act, . 1956, gives a power to the ·court to
inquire into the conduct of any past or present di'rector; the sections
orFICIAL LIQUIDATOR, SUPREME BANK LTD.
A
v.
P.A. TENDOLKAR (DEAD) BY L. RS. AND ORS.
Januar:r 19, 1973
r ..
[A. N. GROVER, M. H. BEG AND A, K. MUKllERJEA, JJ.J
.( "
B
Comp<nie.< Act (1 of 1913), s. 235 and Companies Act (I of 1956),
s. 543-Pou•er of Court to 1nake conzpulsive orders agalnst heirs of deccaJetl director in 111isfeaw111ce p1·ocf.·edings-Actio pei.rsonGlis 111oritt11
cunz persona-Scope of-Rig/it of appeal h,v end again~t heir.
Banking Companies Act (IO of 1949), ss. 45(G) and 45(0)-0fficial
liquidc..tor, •;vhether should apply for public exaniiluztion of directors under.
s. 45(G) to s. 45 0(2) as amended by Act 33 of 1959-Scope of t/ze
fresh petiocl of li111itatiQn-S. 45 (0) (2) pre1:ai/s over s. 235 Co111panies
·Act, 1913, ln relation ~o Banking Co111pa111es.
y
c
'i
Pi1·inciples deter111ini11g liabilit,v of nu;,iaging director and
J)irectors in 111isfeasance proceedlngs,
Board
of
D
On -an app1icati-on tor winding· up 'of a. bank a provisional Jiquidator
was appointed on 15th March 1956. The appellant, who was there·
'after appointed as Jiquidator filed an application o:n 27th August. -1960,.
for misfcasanc.~ proceedings under s. 45H of the Banking Companies
Act, 1949, and s. 235 of the Indian. Companies Act, 1913.
Under s. 45 0 (2) in respect of all other claims by the Banking Company against" its directors, the period of limitation shall be 12 years
E
from thz date of the accrual of such claims'.. By Am·~nding Act 33
of 1959 the words 'or five yea'rs from the date of the first appointment
of the liquidator whichever is longer', \Vere '3.dded at the end of the
sub-section. The official Jiquidator relied upon several reports made by
the Rescrvq Bank and by others under orders of the High Court. The
procecdi,ngs \\Crc taken against the directors, managing director and
officers of the company. Two of the directors died while the proceedings '\-;Cr~ pe;nt.!ing. 1"hc Com~any judge dismissed the proceedings against
F
the employees as time-barred, and held that the heirs of the deceased
l.Jirectors could not be proceeded against: but, in respect of the managing dircc:tor and those Directors \liho were alive \vhen he gave his
<lecision it was held that the procecdCngs v.·.erc \Vithin tin1e, bCir.g
covered by the _special provisions of s. 450 of the Banking Compani-cs
Act. The directors contended that the whole responsibility for- the
fraud and misappropriation 'lay with the managing director." who- had
G
\vide powers under the Articles of ASsociation, and in whose favour
the directors had executed ·a power of attorney. The rna;naging director
however contended that he acted 'according to the policy and in
accordance with directions of the directors in whose hands he \\'as a
mere tool'. The Company Judge determined the loss to the Company
and gave directions as to the liabilities of the managing director n:rrd
other directors. In appeal, the Division Bench reduced the total liabili·
tv of directors and ttte individual remaining' liability of too managing
II
director though it placed a larger share of the .burden of contribution on
.the mana~ing director. The appellant appealed agaimt the order in
relation of the liability of the manoging direc!'or and two other directors.
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366
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 3 S.C.R.
•
confine the power of the Court to make orders for repayment or
resroration of money or property or contribution to the assets of the
company •aainst the indjviduals occupying tbe capacities either ~ the
past or present mentioned therein; and, the power does not, on the
language of the provisions, extend to making compulsive orders against
the heirs of the delinquQJlt directo<s or officers. As the power to take
the special proceedings is discretionary and does not exhaust other
remedies, although the court may, as a matter of justice and equity,
drop proceedings against the delinquent directors, managers or officers
who are no longer alive, leaving. the complainant to his ordinary remedy by a civil suit agailnst the <IS,<iets of the deceased, yet, where nd
injustice may be caused by continuing these proceedings against the
past director even though he be dead, the proceedings could continue,
after giving the person who may be interested, an opportunity to be
heard. Jlut ""' such proceedings can only result in a declaration of
tbe liability of a deceased director, because, the language of s. 235
of the 1913 Act does not authorise passing of orders to compel
heirs or legal representatives to do any thing.
SUch compulsive
proceedings as may become necessary against those upon whom
devolve the assets or estate of a deceased delinquent director, who may
have become liable, could only lie outside the section. The power
under the section would not extend beyond malting a declaration against
the deceased director provided he in his Jife time, or, his
heirs, after his death, h ave had due opportunity of putting forward
the case on behalf of the allegedly delinquent director.
U
either a 1i9i<!ator or the heirs of • delinquent director against whom
a declaration of liability has been made, can question the determination of liability of the deceased delinquent, who was alive at the time
of the judgment against him, it is obvious that the appellate court could
give a declaration either reducing or increasing the liability evein thouRh
it may not be able to enforce it by an order under the sect'ion. If the
declaration can be questioned by an appeal the liability can be not
only wiped off or reduced but also increased C1J> an appeal heard after
the death of a director held liable. [381F-H; 382A-B; 383A·Dl
In the p.r:vscnt case, the director whose representatives were impleaded had full opportunity of defending himself in the misfeasance proceed·
ings, he elloercbed his right of appeal against the order of the Company
Judge, and the Division Bench reduced his liability. His heirs were
heard on me<tits in the appeal to this Court, and any order passed by
this Court oould only affect the assets or the estate of the deceased
director. In these proceedings an order cannot be passed against the
heirs of the director so as compel them to do anything and the official
liquidator or the co-directors may take any other prooeeding which
may be open .~ them under the law so as to obtain the contribution of
that director. · !383£-G]
Erkm41r v. New Sombrero Phosphate Co., [1878] 3 App. Cas. 1218,
llJJmskUI v. £ilW<Zrds, [1886] 31 01. D. 100, In re. Sharne, f1894]
I Ch. 154, L.S. Rarrumwnny Iyer ,., Brahmayya cl Co. Official Uqui·
dators. HIJll"""'n ..,,, Liii., (1944) }6 Com Cas 270; New Fleming
)pinning cl Weaving Co. Ltd. v. Xesson/i Na'ik and Ori., I.L.R.. 9
Bom. 373, Gopal Ga11tsh Abhyankar v. Ramachandra Sadashlv
Sahasrebudh-. I.L.R. 26 Bom. 597, Sakvahani Ingle Rao Sahib v.
Bhavanl Bod Sahib and Ors., I.L.R. 27 Mad. 588 and Padarath v.
Raia Ram, (1182) 4 All. 235, referred to.
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SUPREME BANK LTD, v. P.A. TENDOLKAR (Beg, J.)
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367
( 6) It is a question of fact, to be determined upon the evidence in
each cue, whether a Director, alleged to be liable for misfeasance, had
acted reasonably as well as honestly and with due diligence, so that
he could not be held liable for coimllving Qt fraud and misappropriation
which takes place. A Direcror may be shown to be so placed and to
have been so closely and so long ossociated persOJ!O)ly with the management of the Company that he will be deemed to be not merely cognizant of but liable for fraud in the conduct of the business of a Comp...,y
even though no specific act of dishonesty is proved against him personally. He cannot shut his eyes to 'what must be obvious to everyone ~o
examines the affairs of the Company even superficially. If h.e does so
he could be held liable for qereliction of duties \lllldertaken by him
and compelled to make good the losses incurred by the Company due
to his neglect even if he is not shown to be guilty of participating in
the commission of fraud. It is enough if his negligence is of such a
character as to enable frauds to be committed and losses thereby incurred by the Company. [386E-HJ
On the evidence on record. the promoter or founder Directora
who were there since the inception of the Bank, were cognizant of the
nature of the dealings by the Managing Direcror and the officers of the
Bank. The evidence showed that they had bee:n discussing matters
relating to the management of the Company at the meetings of the
Board where items of "policy", which benefited the Directvrs at the
expense of the depositors, must have been discussed. They could not
have been ignorant of the fact !lhit the Account Books contained
fictitious <11>tries showing payments for shares by them when they had
not actually paid for them. Nor could they be so innocent as not to
know of the window dressing and presentation of false balance-sheets
so as to conceal the true st-ate of affairs from the depositors for years.
Any director conscious of his managerial responsibilities. who had
cared to exami:ne the affairs of the Bank, could not have failed to find
out what was really happening in the Bank. The fact that these practices
were tolerated for such a long period without any check by the Board
of Directors indicates that the promoter Directors must be participants
i.n the benefits of widespread misappropriati<?n even though they may
have so operated as not to leave any traces of actual misappropriation
by them in the records of the l!ank.
[398E-G; 399C-EJ
Upon the facts examined by the trial judge it is therefore clear that
although the Managing Director was conducting the day to day affairs
of the company and must therefore be held responsible for greater share
of the loss incurred due to the misappropriation and misuse of manager-
ial power yet his co-directors
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could
not
possibly be ignora.11t of
the nature of such dealings and the activities of the employees and the
Managing Director, simply because they had executed a power of
attorney in his favour. The Company Judge as well as the Division
Bench had referred to the difficulties encountered in determin~g the
actual total loss to the Company because of want of any reliable statement of account. This state of the records of the Bank was itself
evidence of breach of thei'r duties by the Managing Director and
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the
Board of. Directors to see that the business of the Bank was hOOleStly
and eflic1ently conducted. The proved conduct of the other directors
was such that an inference of their complicity in concealing the true
state of affairs from depositors, presumablv because they were
thenl-
selves benefitting from it, could rJOt be avoided. [388B-D E-F; 390E-F]
368
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 3 S.C.R •.
In re. City Equitabre~'Life 'Insurance Co., 1925 Ch. 407, Dovey v.
Cory, [1901] A.C. 477, In re Benham & Co., [1883] 25 Ch. D. 752
and Overand & Guma Co. v. Gibb, {1944) 5 L.R. H.L. 480,
r.cferrcd to.
-(7) The Division Bench erred in reducing the total liability of. t~e
directors an<l the individual liability of the ma;naging_ director. On his
O\\.'ll admissio.n, the managing director was liable for a larger amo":'nt.
· [393C-EJ
(8) The Division Bench <il;o erred in holding that ·a good deal of
evidence was not placed before the Court, which would have been
ava'HabJc had the Official Liquidators asked for public examination of
the Directors under s. 450 of the Banking Companies Act. The Official Liquidator could not possibly have done -anythblg more in __ his
application than to rely on reports available to him and to prove the
·correctness _of their contents by producing, as witness-es, those persons
\\.'ho conducted the investigation and made reports. AH that s. 45G
requires is the submissio:n of a report showing that loss has been caused
to the Ba1>king Company in the opinion of the Official Liquidator, and
thereafter it is for the Court to decide whether the Directors should
be publicly· examined. In the present case; the. Company Judge- did
order the public examination of the Directors. but they v. ere un\1.diling
to give evidence. [395B-C; 396D-N; 397E-HJ
(9) The Division .Be;nch furth~r erred in holding that the allegations
of improper conduct by the Directors in not exercising proper super~ vision~ did not form the subject-matter of any separate issue
framed
by the Company Judge. The issues framed in the case were wide enough
fo cover the question. The DErcctors _had not only an opportunity of
n1ceting the alicgatio.ns contained in the petition. but also had knowlcUge of the material brought on record later. The Directors y;ere in
no way handicapped by the alleged vagueness of charges or a failure
to -frame issues more fully. The Company Judge was therefore tight
in c'onsi<lering the evidence adduced in the case. [396E-G~ 3990-E;
398E-GJ
Nagabai A1111nal and Grs. v. B.San1a Rao & Ors.• [1956] S.C.R.
45 J, followed.
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[Applying the above principles the liabilHv of the managing director
a:nd the other directors, including .that-· of the deceased director were
fixed and the case was 'remitted to the trial Judge for passing orders
against the managing directors and the director who was alive \\'hen
Judgment in proceedings under s. 235 of the Comp<inies Act, 1913,.
was- gh:en. As regards the liabilities of other deceased directors it was
open to the. official liquidator and the director who is alive, to take
any other proceedings which may be available u:n<ler the. law againSt his
estate or assets in the hands of his hc'irs.] ·
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos; 195197, 234 and 300 of 1967.
-.
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Appeals bly a certificate from the judgment an\! order . dated
January 7, 1966 of the Mysore High Court at Bangalore in Company Appeals Nos. 9 and IO of 1967.
S.· C, Sundraswamy, Ram~shwar .Nath and K.Suryanarayana
Rao, for the appellants (in C, As. Nos. 195-197 and Respondent
No. 1 (in C. As. Nos. 234 and 300).
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SUPREME BANK LTD. v. P.A. TENDOLKAR (Beg, J.)
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369
C. K. Daphtary, S. K. Mehta, K. R. Nagaraja and Qamuruddin,
for appellant (in C.A. No. 234) respondent No. 1 (in C.A. No.
195).
V. S. Desai and P. C. Bhartari, respondent No. 2 (in C.As.
196 and 197) and respondents Nos. 3-6 (in C.A. No. 300).
R. B. Datar, for respondent No. 4.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BEG, J.-These are five appeals by grant of certificates under
Article 133(l)(a) of the Constitution by the Mysore High Court
where the orders of the leamed Company Judge, in misfeasance
proceedings, under Section 45H of .the Banking Companies Act,
1949, (hereinafter referred to as 1the Act'), read with Section 235
of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, (hereinafter referred to as
the Act of 1913') had been modified by a Division Bench. These
proceedings were instituted bi)- >the Official Liquidator againilt seven
Directors, including the Cha_i_rman of the Board of Directors and
the Managing Director, and the Cashiers, the Accountant, too
Branch Managers, another officer, and an auditor of the Supreme
Bank of India Ltd., Balgaum, (hereinafter referred to as 'the
Bank') under liquidation. The Bank, incorporated on 27-5-1939,
commenced business on 6th October, 1939. It suspended business on 27-11-1954 as a result of gross mis-management which
enabled large sums of money to be misappropriated and false
and fictitious ell'lries to be made in its account books.
Out of the seven Directors mentioned above, five, namely,
S. G. Pant, 'the Chairman of the Board of Directors, S. K. Sawant,
the M?naging Director from July, 1946. P. A. Tendo[kar, D. R.
Angolkar, and L. S. Ajgaonkar, were promoter or founder Directors. The sixth Director, R. W. Forwal, joined the Board in 1961.
The seventh Director, R. N. Kalghatgi, took charge of his office
in July, 1953, on the death of his elder brother G. N. Kalghatgi.
Before the Company Judge could give his decision, on 8-11-1963,
S. G. Pant, the Chairman of the Board of Directors, had expired
on 29-8-1961. and D. R. Angolkar, Director, had died on
10-10-1962. During the pendency of the applications for certification, under Article 133 of the Constitution, for appeals to this
Court, another founder Director, P.A. Tendolkar died, 10-8-1966.
so that his legal representatives were substituted for subsequent
proceedings.
The Official Liquidator had alleged, in the application for misfeasance proceedings, dated 27-8-1960, that "the Directors and
the employees Of the Bank had misapprooriated or become liable
or acoountablle for a total sum of Rs. 26,000/ ·" due to the Com-
370
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[1973] 3 s.c.R.
pany, and were guilty of "misfeasance, breach of trust, and fraudulant conduct in relation to the Company". The Official Liquidator had prayed that the Court may be pleased to take cognizance of the application against the Respondents and examine
their conduct and "direct them all or such of them as may be held
liable, particularly or generally, severally or jointly, and, in such
manner as it may deem just, fit, and proper, to repay and restore
the money of the Bank, together with interest, or, to contribution
such amounts to the assets of tthe Company by way of compensation in respect of mis-application; retainer, misfeasance or breach
of trust" as the Court may deem just. Thus, the prayer for relief
covered every type of order tthe learned Company Judge could
consider fit and proper to meet the needs of the case.
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We may now glance at the background of investigations and
reports made which led up to the misfeasance proceedings, befor.:
we consider the issue raised and decision given on these by the
learned Company Judge and then by the Division Bench,
On 7-3-1951, after the coming into force of. the Banking Com- D
panies Act 1949, on 16-3-1949, the Reserve Bank of India had
given its short inspection report (A-1 ) on the affairs of the Bank
under Section 22 of the Act. This n::port showed that even necessary formalities with regard to opening of deposit accoums were
not complied with, over-drafts were allowed in 'savings' Bank
accounts, unsecured advances were disproportionately large, rates E
offered on some fixed deposits wer" abnormally high, the Bank
was constantly blorrowing from other Banks by pledging its investments, 16% of the advances were irregular, records to indicate
the correct value of goods pledged or hypothaticated were not
maintained, effective steps against those who obtained proved
irregular advances were not taken, sufficient information was not F
available about the means and standing of the borrowers, neither
periodical returns, particularly of advances by ithe Branches, were
made, nor were the Branches inspected periodically, the usual
practice of Balancing the ledger at frequent intervals was not
observed, and account books and records of the Bank were not
duly maintained. The Reserve Bank, therefore, suspended its G
decision about issue of a licence to the Bank to carrv on banking
business until the Bank had removed these shortcomings.
On 5-3-1953, a second report (A-2), under Section 22 of the
Act, was given by the Reserve Bank, in which it was observed.
inter-alia, that the Bank had not rectified the defects painted out
in the' previous inspection report, that the Board of Directors did
not show sufficient interest in the working of the Bank, and that
there was no proper supervision and control over the activities of
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SUPllBME BANK LTD. v. P.A. TENDOLKAR (Beg, J.)
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the Managing Director. The question whether the Bank was
eligi!ile or not for a licence was still left undecided after listing
irregularities found under fourteen heads.
On 13-9-1954, a very detailed inspection report (A-3), under
Section 35, sub.s(l) of the Aot, carried out on 26-3-1954, was
sent by the Resenle Bank to the Bank, with a covering letter, in
which the following conclusion was recorded : "On the basis of the above report, it appears that
the banking company is conducting its affairs in a manner detrimental to the interests of its depositors. The
Reserve Bank of India, therefore, proposes to give it a
notice in writing in terms oi the first proviso to subsection (2) of Section 22 of the Act that a licence to
carry on banking business in India cannot be granted
to it''.
,,.The Bank was given an opport11nity to make a
against the report.
representation
After suspension of payments by the Bank on 26th November.
1954, the Bank had applied, on 1-12-1954, 'to the High Court of
Bombay, under Section 37 of the Act, praying for the grant of a
moratorium and for opportunity to be given to reconstruct the
Banking Company as a going concern. An iD'terim order was
passed by the Bombay High Court granting moratorium for a
period of two months and staying all actions against the Company
for this period. Shri V. R. Kothagi, an Advocate of Belgaum, was
appointed as Special Officer of the Bank under Section 37(3) of
the Act, with powers to file suits.
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Under the directions of the Bombay High Court the Reserve
Bank deputed Shri Amrit Lal Bhatia to inspect the records and
the working of the Bank and to submit a rep<)rt under the proviso
to sub.s (2) of Section 37 of the Act. This report, submitted on
13-1-1955 (A-4), disdosed a deplorable state of accounts
which contained a number ef false and fraudulent entries, want
of supervision by either the officials or the Directors, unauthenticated erasures and alterations in- the accounts, and a shortage of
cash to the extent of 2.01 lakhs. It showed that the total liability
of the Bank, excluding its share capital, amoull'!ed to Rs. 14.83
lakhs.
On 20-12-1954, the Directors of the Bank, wfth the concurrence of the Special Officer, had appointed Shri K. Y. Wagle as
Officer to examine the records of the Company with a view to
372
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1973] 3 S.C.R.
e\plore the possibilities of its reconstruction. This report, dated
J 6-2-1955 (A-21) said :
"On going through the books of accounts, it is observed that the mis-appropriation penetrates imo the books
from 1948 and still earlier and the amounts misappropriated are through entries from (a) Cash, ( b) Bank
accounts with other Bankers, ( c) Branch accounts".
A list of cash deficits and fictitious entries who also given here.
The report mentions that the assets and liabilities of 1the Bank could
not be verified as no regular audit had been carried out and that
the records had been maintained in "a most deceptive manner"
so that 1the amounts involved could not be ascertained correctly.
The total amount "involved in the fraud" was assessed rou~hly at
Rs. 4.26 lakhs. It said : "So far an amount of Rs. 3. 75 lakhs has
·been traced from various sources. The balance can be traced
provided the accounts are reconciled''. After this report, the
Bombay High Court rejected the application for further moratorium and for a reconstruction of the Company.
On 8-3-1956, a deposi!or of tlte Bank applied to the Bombay
High Court for the winding up of the Banking Company. On
13-3-1956, a provisional liquidator was appointed, and, on
J 6-4-1956, the Bank was ordered to be wound up. As a result
of reorganisation of States, the winding up proceedings were transferred to the High Court of Mysore, and, the Official Liquidator
at the Mysore High Court was appointed as the Liquidator of the
flank.
On 22-7-1958, the Official Liquidator brought to the notice
of the Company Judge an elaborate report (A-9), dated
10-5-1957, made by M/s. D. D. Joshi & Co., Auditors, appointed
by the Direction of the Bank themselves. Here, after a survey of
the Bank's history and conduct of its affairs by its Directors and
officers we find, among 1the conclusions. recorded ·
" ( I ) The Directors, by accepting a responsibility
which they never intended to accept, laid the foundation
for the fraud. They have misled the share holders and
the depositors b!)' presenting false Balance Sheets and
Profit and Loss Accounts, at least from 1946 onwards.
knowing them to be false.
(2) The Managing Director Shri S. K. Samant, the
Accountant Shri R. S. Deshpande and the three Cashiers.
K. V. Saudi. V. K. Nadgouda, S. N. Ajrekar took full
advanta2e of the weakness of the Directors, the neglij!ance of the Auditors, and fraudulently mis.appropriated
the monies individually and collectively".
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SUPREME BANK LTD. v. P.A. TENDOLKAR (Beg, J.)
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The Chartered Accountants were unable to ascertain 'the exact
amounts misappropriated. They gave the following reasons for
coming to the conclusion that the "Balance Sheets and the Profit
and Loss Accounts for the years from 31-3-1946 onwards are
false and incorrect":
(a) The staff and the Directors know that the Bank
had not received. the share amount for the majority of the shares allotted which was made up
of the fictitious credits given against these share
applications, and which did not represent the
actual physical cash on hand on that day.
(b) The amount of unclaimed dividends taken to
interest account was illegal and against the
provisions of the . Articles of Association of the
Bank.
( c) The Auditors, when they counted the cash on
24th March, 1954, could have known that the
actual cash on hand verified tly them was far
short of <the cash balance shown by the Day
Book of that day had they tallied the cash
counted by them with the Day Book.
( d) The Bankers' Balances as shown in the Balance
Sheets did net show the correct balances inasmuch as false debits were made to these Banks
by misappropriating the amounts shown as sent
to the Bank for credit.
( e) The remission of Rs. 1,000 shown in the Profit
and Loss Account of 1947 is a misnomer and the
·wording seems to have been purposely used to
mislead all concerned. Moreover, there is no
sanction also for this remission.
( f) Due to suppression of overdrafts in the Savings
Bank Accounts, the figures oi deposits and
consequently of loans, as shown in the Balance
Sheets were incorrect, etc. etc.
In D. D. Joshi Co's report it is also stated :
H
373
"On the event of the commencement of our work,
the Directors had resolved to repay a part ( 10% ) of
the deposit amounts to the depositors, This was the best
opportunity to bring forth oass,books and other records
~ the J?05session of the depositors.. for getting the deposits verified for our purposes. The matter was discussed
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 3 S,C.R.
with the Chairman and some of 1the Directors and we
handed them a specific form for obtaining letters ol
confirmation of balances from the depositors. The Chairman and the Directors assured us to give due publicity
to the matter before disbursing the amount and upon
insisting on the production of pass-books and other
records available from the depositors at the time of
making the payments. However, it was later on discovered that this proposal of ours had not been carried
out and that the deposit amounts were being disbursed
without insisting upon the production of the pass-books.
When the matter was again referred to the Chairman
we were surnrised to learn 'that the Directors had not
approved o( our proposal on the ground that it would
have caused unnecessary inconvenience and harassment
to the depositors ( Annexure No. 4). By this failure on
the part of the Chairman and the Directors a vary good
opoortunity available to us and the management for
verifving the accounts of the Bank from sources independent of records at the Bank was denied and lost to
us. Thus, the Directors themselves who had apoointed
us and promised us all facilities and co-operotion did not
ex1end the same as and when it was essential. From the
facts !hat came to our notice subsequentlv durin~ the
course of our investigation. it •ee1rn th"t this act of
theirs might even have been deliberate".
After giving 'the Directors and Officers of the Bank due
opportunitv to rePlv to D. D. Joshi Co's report. the Official
Liauidator had filed the apnlication of 27-8-1960, under Section
45H of the Act read with Section 235 of the Indian .Companies
Act. on the s1reneth of all the above mentioned reports. copious
extracts from which were 1 annexed to a dulv sworn aflidavit supporting the application for misfeasance proceedings.
In reolv to the application. the Directors complained of
vegueness and lack qf particulars of the alleqed wrongful acts
and omissions. Thev also relied strongly on Articles 109 and 112
of the 'Articles of Association' relating to the powers and duties
of Managing Director in whose favour thev are said to have
executed a oower of artornev. Thev tried to out the whole responsibili!v for the alleged fraud and misanoronriations and loss
on the Managing Director. S. K. Samanth. annointed in 1946 and
some officers· of the Bank. denied that the Managing Director
consulted them before taking anv action in !he d•v to dav transactions of the Bank. On the other hand. the Managing Director.
S. K. Samanth. pleaded that the whole business of the Bank was
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SUPREME BANK LTD. V. P.A. TENOOLKAR (fJeg, J,}
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conducted "according to the policy and in accordance with the
instructions of the Board of Directors" in whose hands he was "a
mere tool." All the opposite parties to the application pleaded
that the proceedings were barred by limitation.
The learned Company Judge had dismiSsed the proceedings
against employees of the Bank as time barred on the ground that
B their cases were governed by the limitation provided for in Section 235 of the Companies Act of 1913, the application of Section
543 of the Companies Act of 1956 having been. expressly exclnded by Section 647 sub. s ( 2) oi. that Act, in a' case in which the
winding up of the Company had begun, as it did in the instant
case, before the commencement of the 1956 Act on 1-4-1956.
But,
in respect of the Managing Director and those Directors who
c
were alive when the learned Company Judge gave his decision
on 8-11-19~3, it was held that the proceedings were covered by
the special provisions of Section 45(0) of the Banking Companies
Act applicable to them. The first two clauses of Section 45(0)
read as follows :
"45 (0). Special Period of limitation : D
( 1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Indian Limitation Act, 1908
(IX of 1908) or if any other law for the time
being in before,, in computing the period of limitation prescribed for a suit or application by a
banking company which is being wound up,
E
the period commencing from the date of the
presentation of the petition for the winding up
of the banking Company shall be excluded.
(2) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary con•
tained in the Indian Limitation Act, 1908
(IX of 1908) or Section 235 of the Indian
F
Companies Act, 1913 (VII of 1913), or in any
other law for the time being in force, there
shall be no period of limitation for the recovery
of arrears of calls from any Director of Banking
Company which is being wound up or for the
enforcement
by the Banking Company against
G
any of its directors of any claim based on a
contract, express or implied; and in respect of
all other claims by the Banking Company
against its Directors, the period of limitation
shall be twelve years from the date of the accrual
of such claims".
H
By the Act XXXIII of 1959. the following words were added at
the end of Section 45 ( 0 )(ii) : "or five years from the date of
first appointment of the liquidator whichever is longer".
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SUPREME RANK·LTD. V. P.A .. TENDOLKAR (Beg, J.)
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against its Board of Directors itself cannot be taken up for the
· first ·time in this Court: It was not taken, and, therefore, not gon~
into in the High Court.
'
In any case, the amendment of Section '45(0)(ii) of the Act
had conferred a new right of counting the period of limitation
from •rhe first appointment of the liquidator. The exercise of that
right by the liquidator, acting on behalf of the Company, certainly took place after the commencement of Act XXXIII of 1959.
There was no question here of giving any retrospective operation
to any right· whether procedural or substantive. We, therefore,
think that the claims against the· Directors, which ·were prima
facie made within time,· were not shown to have been barred by
limitation.
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We will now consider another question of preliminary nature
with regard to the liabilities of legal representatives of the deceased
respondents. The Company Judge had held that misfeasance
proceedings were of a special nature involving an enquiry into'
the alleged wrongful conduct. of Directors personally. The liability of a Director for such wrong doing was held to b~ of personal
character which vanished with the death of a Director, Reliance
had been placed, by the Company Judge, on : In Re, East of
England Bank-Fe/tom's Executors Case,( 1 ) which had been
followed in Re : United English and Scottisl1 Assurance Companyex-purte Hawkins,(") and in Re: British Guardian Life Assurance Company.(') The learned Judge observed that 1the principle
lai<l down in these English cases had been followed by Indian
High Courts in the. cases mentioned by him which · were : (I )
S. B. Billimpria, Official Liquidator Vs. Cenilla Mary Desouza &
Ors.,(') (2) Official Liquidators Vs. /ugal Kishore & Ors.,(')
(3) Mani/a/ .Brijlal Vs, Vendravandas C. Jadev & Ors.,(') (4)
Pattiam Veetti/ Menokki Se11kara111 Nambiar Vs. Kottayam Bank
b.v Official Liquidator, Te/lichery & Ors.,(1) (5) In Re: The
Peerda11 Juhaymal Bank Ltd.( 8 ),
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377
'The learned Judge, •therefore, held that proceedings could
not continue· against the heirs of either the Chairman of the
Board, S. G. Pant, or the Director Angolkar, who had died before
the Company Judge gave his decision on 8-11-1963. The correctness of the decision of the Company Judge to exempt heirs and
legal representatives of the Chafrman Pant and the Director
Angolkar was not questioned by any party in the five appeah
before the Division Bench. Their possible liabilities, as persons
up~n whom the assets and properties of Pant and Angolkar may
(I) 1865 (I) Equity C'Ses 219.
(3) 1880 (14) ch. Division 335.
. (5) A.1.R. t939 All. I.
(7) A.1.R. 1946 Mad. 304.
<2) 1867 (3)ch. APPe'I Ca"s 787@791.
(4) A.1.R. 1926 Lahore 624.
(6) AJ.R. 1944 Bom. 193.
(8) A.LR. 1958 Mad. 583.
376
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973) 3 S.C.R.
The Company Judge had held that the nature of the claims
in the misfeasance proceedings against the Diredors in the instant
case fell under the category of "all other claims", mentioned in
Section 45(0)(ii), for which the period of limitation was either
twelve years from the dates of "accrual of claims" or five year;
from the date of. the first appointment of the Liquidator "whichever is longer", The learned Company Judge held that the first
clause of Section 45 (0) of the Banking Companies Act, 1913.
<lid not apply to a case in which the period of limitation had not
begun to run before the filing of the winding up petition, and
that the misfeasance proceedings against D;rectors, having ~tarted,
on 27-8-1960, within five years of the first appointment of the liquidator on 13-3-1956, were clearly within time. Incidentally, the
finding that limitation did not begin running before filing the misfeasal)ce application implied th:rt this was not a case in which a
claim had "accrued" before the filling of the application. The
objection.that Section 45(0) of the Act 'would apply to claims
made by the Company itself and not to those by a liquidator was
rightly over-ruled on the ground that the Liquidator ·really represented the Company and that a claim made by the liquidator w:1s •
therefore, a claim "by the Banking Company"', as was held in
Jaivala Prasad Vs. Official Liquidator,(1) within the meaning
of this expression used in Section 45(0) of the Act. The Division
Bench, in five appeals by the Directors, had concurred with the
Company Judge's views on the issue of limitation.
It has, however, b~en urged before m, on behalf of the
Directors, that, the period of .three years, provided by Section
235 of the Companies Act of 1913, as well as 12 years from
"accrue! of claims", prescribed by Section 45(0) (ii) of the Act.
having expired before the Act XXXIII of 1959, by which Section
45 (O)(ii) was amended on 1-10-1959, time barred claims couhl
not be revived whether the case was governed by the limitation
laid down in Section 235 of the Act of 1913, or that in Section
45 (0) of the Act.
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The contention that Section 235 of the 1913 Act could apply
to these proceedings, governed expressly by the special law on th~
subject contained in Section 45(0) ·of the Act, is plainly erro- G
neous. The plea that twelve years from the "accrual of claims" had
expired before Section 45(0)(ii) was amended on 1-10-1959 h
also unacceptable. It does not seem to have been specifically
advanced in the High Court so that the facts may be examined
there to detennine when any part of the claims "accrued" against
any Diredor. Such a point, it is obvious, involving ·an investiga- . II
tion into fresh facts, showing when claims for any· particular
'terns of Joss to the Company accrued, or when they accrued
(l) A.l.R.1962 All. p. 486.
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SUPREME RANK·LTD. V. P.A .. TENDOLKAR (Beg, J.)
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against its Board of Directors itself cannot be taken up for the
· first ·time in this Court: It was not taken, and, therefore, not gon~
into in the High Court.
'
In any case, the amendment of Section '45(0)(ii) of the Act
had conferred a new right of counting the period of limitation
from •rhe first appointment of the liquidator. The exercise of that
right by the liquidator, acting on behalf of the Company, certainly took place after the commencement of Act XXXIII of 1959.
There was no question here of giving any retrospective operation
to any right· whether procedural or substantive. We, therefore,
think that the claims against the· Directors, which ·were prima
facie made within time,· were not shown to have been barred by
limitation.
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c
We will now consider another question of preliminary nature
with regard to the liabilities of legal representatives of the deceased
respondents. The Company Judge had held that misfeasance
proceedings were of a special nature involving an enquiry into'
the alleged wrongful conduct. of Directors personally. The liability of a Director for such wrong doing was held to b~ of personal
character which vanished with the death of a Director, Reliance
had been placed, by the Company Judge, on : In Re, East of
England Bank-Fe/tom's Executors Case,( 1 ) which had been
followed in Re : United English and Scottisl1 Assurance Companyex-purte Hawkins,(") and in Re: British Guardian Life Assurance Company.(') The learned Judge observed that 1the principle
lai<l down in these English cases had been followed by Indian
High Courts in the. cases mentioned by him which · were : (I )
S. B. Billimpria, Official Liquidator Vs. Cenilla Mary Desouza &
Ors.,(') (2) Official Liquidators Vs. /ugal Kishore & Ors.,(')
(3) Mani/a/ .Brijlal Vs, Vendravandas C. Jadev & Ors.,(') (4)
Pattiam Veetti/ Menokki Se11kara111 Nambiar Vs. Kottayam Bank
b.v Official Liquidator, Te/lichery & Ors.,(1) (5) In Re: The
Peerda11 Juhaymal Bank Ltd.( 8 ),
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377
'The learned Judge, •therefore, held that proceedings could
not continue· against the heirs of either the Chairman of the
Board, S. G. Pant, or the Director Angolkar, who had died before
the Company Judge gave his decision on 8-11-1963. The correctness of the decision of the Company Judge to exempt heirs and
legal representatives of the Chafrman Pant and the Director
Angolkar was not questioned by any party in the five appeah
before the Division Bench. Their possible liabilities, as persons
up~n whom the assets and properties of Pant and Angolkar may
(I) 1865 (I) Equity C'Ses 219.
(3) 1880 (14) ch. Division 335.
. (5) A.1.R. t939 All. I.
(7) A.1.R. 1946 Mad. 304.
<2) 1867 (3)ch. APPe'I Ca"s 787@791.
(4) A.1.R. 1926 Lahore 624.
(6) AJ.R. 1944 Bom. 193.
(8) A.LR. 1958 Mad. 583.
376
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973) 3 S.C.R.
The Company Judge had held that the nature of the claims
in the misfeasance proceedings against the Diredors in the instant
case fell under the category of "all other claims", mentioned in
Section 45(0)(ii), for which the period of limitation was either
twelve years from the dates of "accrual of claims" or five year;
from the date of. the first appointment of the Liquidator "whichever is longer", The learned Company Judge held that the first
clause of Section 45 (0) of the Banking Companies Act, 1913.
<lid not apply to a case in which the period of limitation had not
begun to run before the filing of the winding up petition, and
that the misfeasance proceedings against D;rectors, having ~tarted,
on 27-8-1960, within five years of the first appointment of the liquidator on 13-3-1956, were clearly within time. Incidentally, the
finding that limitation did not begin running before filing the misfeasal)ce application implied th:rt this was not a case in which a
claim had "accrued" before the filling of the application. The
objection.that Section 45(0) of the Act 'would apply to claims
made by the Company itself and not to those by a liquidator was
rightly over-ruled on the ground that the Liquidator ·really represented the Company and that a claim made by the liquidator w:1s •
therefore, a claim "by the Banking Company"', as was held in
Jaivala Prasad Vs. Official Liquidator,(1) within the meaning
of this expression used in Section 45(0) of the Act. The Division
Bench, in five appeals by the Directors, had concurred with the
Company Judge's views on the issue of limitation.
It has, however, b~en urged before m, on behalf of the
Directors, that, the period of .three years, provided by Section
235 of the Companies Act of 1913, as well as 12 years from
"accrue! of claims", prescribed by Section 45(0) (ii) of the Act.
having expired before the Act XXXIII of 1959, by which Section
45 (O)(ii) was amended on 1-10-1959, time barred claims couhl
not be revived whether the case was governed by the limitation
laid down in Section 235 of the Act of 1913, or that in Section
45 (0) of the Act.
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The contention that Section 235 of the 1913 Act could apply
to these proceedings, governed expressly by the special law on th~
subject contained in Section 45(0) ·of the Act, is plainly erro- G
neous. The plea that twelve years from the "accrual of claims" had
expired before Section 45(0)(ii) was amended on 1-10-1959 h
also unacceptable. It does not seem to have been specifically
advanced in the High Court so that the facts may be examined
there to detennine when any part of the claims "accrued" against
any Diredor. Such a point, it is obvious, involving ·an investiga- . II
tion into fresh facts, showing when claims for any· particular
'terns of Joss to the Company accrued, or when they accrued
(l) A.l.R.1962 All. p. 486.
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have devolved, do not, therefore, call for a decision from us. But
the general question of liability of heirs and legal representatives
of delinquent Directors has arisen .before us in respect of the
liabiility, if any, of the heirs and legal representatives of Director
Tendolkar who died on 10-8-1966 pending the grant of his application for certification of fitness of the case under Article 13 3 of
the Constitution for an appeal to this Court. · Tendolkar's heirs
got themselves impleaded so as to prosecute the application for
certification of fitness of the case for appeal, and, after obtaining
it, they filed their appeal in this Court against the order of the
Division Bench holding Tendolkar liable. Learned Counsel representing them was heard in suppor~ of objection that the proceedings against them could not continue and also. on merits of
the order determining the liability of Tendolkar. Learned Counsel
for the Official Liquidator, on the other hand, pressed his appeal
against the order of the Division Bench reducing the liability of
Tendolkar.
In Re : East of Eng/and Bank-Fe/tom's Executors Case
(Supra), the question was left undecided whether the remedy
against the estate of a delinquent Director was bY way of a surt
or in winding up proceedings. It was certainly not held there that
there was no remedy. In Re : British Guardian Life Assurance
Company (Supra), it was observed that the Directors were liable
for breaches of trust for moneys not rightly invested, although, it
was held that, on the language of Section 165 of the En~lish
Companies Act, which was very similar to Section 235 of the
Act of 1913, these summary proceedings were not available
against the heirs of a delinquent Director. English Courts have,
however, held that equitable relief against the d.eceased Director's
estate, which may have benefitted from breach of trust, was not
biarred. (See: Erlanger Vs. New Sombrero Phosphate Co.;( 1 )
Ramski/l Vs. Edwards;(') Re : Sharne(').
In W. S. Ramaswamy Iyer & Anr. Vs. Brahmavya & Co.,
Official Liquidators. Hanuman Bank Ltd.,(')., a Division Bench
of the Madras High Court held that, as the position of a Director
of a Company was analogous to that of a trustee with regard to
powers over the funds of the Company, and, as his office was of
a fiduciary character, he would be liable for breaches of trust if
he misused his powers. It was held that the liability incurred by
Directors by such misuse of power was neither exhausted by proceedings against them in the course of a Company's liquidation
nor did it vanish with the death of a Director.
(1) (1878) 3 App. cas. 1218.
(3) (1892) I Ch. 154.
(2) (1886) 31 Ch. Dvn. JOO.
(4) Company Cases Vol. 36, p. 270.
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379
In the New F/emirg Spinning & Weaving Co. Ltd. Vs.
Kessorji Nalik & Ors.,(') it was held that misfeasance by a
Director was a breach of trust and not merely a personal default
so that the estate of the deceased Director would be liable to
make good the loss caused to a Company by the misfeasance of
the deceased. But, this was a case in which a regular sui1 had
been filed.
In Official liquidators Vs. Jugal Kishore & Ors., (Supra), it
was pointed out that Section 235 of the Companies Act 1913
contemplates proceedings against Directors and no~ against their
heirs or legal representatives, and that, although, Section 306 of
the Indian Succession Act gives a right to continue even special
proceedings against executors or administrators of the estate of
the deceased, yet, it did not e:ttend to mere heirs and legal representatives. It was also ob!>erved here that the provisions of Section
235 of the Companies Act of 1913 do not bar suits by the Official
Liquidator, in suitable cases, against the heirs of the deceased.
Similar views were adopted in : S. B. Blllimoria. Official Liquidator Vs. Cecilla Mary De'Souza'& Ors. (Supra); Mani/al Brijlal
Vs. Vendravandas C. ladev & Ors. (Supra); and in Re : The
Peerdan luharmal Bank Ltd. (Supra).
Two cases, Gopal Ganesh Abhyankar Vs. Ramchandra
Sadashiv Sahasrabudhe(') and, Sakyahani Ingle Rao Sahib Vs.
Bhavani Bozi Sahib & Ors.,(') were cited on the application of
the maxim "actio personalis moritur cum personal". In
Abhyankar's case (Supra) the Defendant against whom a suit for
damages for defamation had been decreed had died during the
pendency of the appeal against the decree p~ssed. At the hearing
of the appeal, the plaintiff had objected that the appeal had
abated. The Bombay High Court held that the Defendant's legal
representatives had a right to continue the proceedings and to
question the decree. The High Court referred to several cases,
including a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in
Padarath Vs. Raja Ram,(') where Edge, C.J. had said :
"I have always understood the law to 1:1e that, in
those case in which an action would abate upon the
death of the plaintiff before judgment, the action would
not abate if final judgment had been obtained before the
death of the plaintiff",
Then the Court held :
"The result of these authorities would cfearly seem
to be that, where the claim has been perfected by a
judgment, t)l.e nature of the relief claimed on appeal
(I) l.L.R. IX Born. 373.
(3) I.L.R. 27, Mad. 58R.
9-L796Sui:.c .1./73
(2) I.LR. 26 Bombay 597.
(4) 0882) 4 All. 235.
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stands on a different footing and there will be no abate-
A
ment".
We think that the ratio decidendi of this case helps the Official
Liquidator appellant. In S. I. JJ.ao Sahib's case (Supra) it was
held that a reversioner's right was "personal" which vanished
with the death of the plaintiff. Hence, rthe appeal of the plaintiff,
in which the heirs had been substituted, was held to have abated.
We fail to see how this case helps the heirs of Tendolkar.
The decisions of our High Courts, while keeping in view the
consideration that a misfeasance proceeding, c;ontemplated by
Section 235 of the Act of 1913, involving an inquiry into the
personal conduct of persons acting in capacities mentioned therein, may attract the applicaion of the maxim "actiO personalis
moriture cumpersona", have proceeded, very rightly, more on
an interpretation·of the provisions of Section 235 than on the
application of that maxim.
The maxim Actio persona/is moritur cum persona, as pointed
in Winfield's "Law of Tort (Eighth Edn. p. 603-60S), was an
invention of English Common Lawyers. It seemed to have
resulted from the strong quasi-criminal character of the action
for trespass. Just like a prosecution for a criminal offence, the
action for trespass, which was 'lthe parent of much of our modem
law of tort", was held, by applying this maxim, to be incapable
of surviving the death of the wrongdoer, and, in some cases,
even of the party injured..The maxim, with its extensions, was
criticised by Winfield and found to be "pregnant with a good
deal more mischief than was ever born of it". Whatever view one
may take of the justice of the principle, it was clear that it would
not be applicable to actions based on contract or where a tort
feasor's estate had benefitted from a wrong done. lrts application
was generally confined to actions for damages for defamation,
seduction, inducing a spouse to remain apart from the other, and
adultery.
We see no reason to extend the maxim, as a general principle,
even to cases involving breaches of fiduciary duties or where the
personal conduct of. the deceased Ditector has been fully enquired
into, and the only question for de<ermination, on an appeal, is
the extent of the liability incurred by the deceased .Director. Such
liability must necessarily 'be confined to the assets or estate left
by the deceased in the hands of the successors. In so far as an
heir or legal representative has an interest in the assets of the
deceased and represents the estate, and the liquidator represents
rthe interests of the Company, the heirs as well as the liquidator
should, in equity, be able to question a decisbn which affects
the interests represented.
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We may now consider the meaning and effect of Section 235
of the Act of 1913 which reads as follows :
"235. Power of Court to assess damages against
delinquent directors, etc.-( I) Where, in the course of
winding up a company, it appears that any person who
has taken part in the formation or promotion of the
company, or any past or present Director, Manager or
liquidator, or any officer of the company has misapplied
or retained or become liable or accountable for any
money or property o{ the company, or been guilty of
.any misfeasance or breach of trust in relation to the
company, the Coun may, on the application of the
liquidator, or of any creditor or contributory made
within three years from the date of the first appointment of a liquidator in the winding up or of the misapplication, retainer, misfeasance or breach of trust,
as the case may be, whichever is longer, examine into
the conduct ol the promoter, director, manager, liquidator or officer, and compel him to repay or .restore the
money or property or any part thereof respectively with
interest at such rate as the Court thinks just, or to
contribute such sum to the assets of the Company by
way of compensation in respect of the misapplication,
retainer, misfeasance or breach of trust as the Court
thinks just.
(2) This section shall apply notwithstanding that
the offence is one for which the offender may be crimi·
nally responsible."
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It will be seen that, while Section 235 of the Act of 1913,
like Section 543 of the Companies Act ol 1956, to which it correspond~, gives the power to the Court to enquire into the conduct of "any past or present Director", yet, both Section 235 of
the Act of 1913 and Section 543 of the Companies Act of 1956
confine the power of the Court to make orders for repayment or
restoration ol money or property or contribution to the assets of
the Company against the individuals occupying the capacities,
either in the past or present, mentioned therein. This power does
not, on the language of these provisions. extend to making compulsive orders against heirs of delinquents. As the power to take
these special proceedings is discretionary and does not exhaust
other remedies, although, the Court may, as a mat!er of justice
and equity, drop proceedings against delinquent Directors,
Managers, or Officers who are no longer alive, leaving the complainant to his ordinary remedy bv a civil suit against the assets
of the deceased, yet, where no injustice mav be caused b~ continuing these pro~edings against a past Director, even though he
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
3S2
[1973] 3 s.c.R.
be dead, the proceedings could continue after giving persons
who may be interested opportunities to be heard. But, even such
proceedings can only result in a declaration of the liability, of a
deceased director, because the .language of Section 235 of the
Aot of 1913, as already noticed, does not authorise passing of
orders to compel heirs or legal representatives to do anything.
Such compulsive proceedings as may become necessary against B
those upon whom devolve the assets or the estate oi a deceased
delinquent Director, who may have become liable, could only lie
outsid~ Section 235 of the Act of 1913.
There was nothing in the Act of 1913 which corresponded to
Section 542 of the Companies Act of 1956, the relevant part of
c
which lays down :
"542. Liability for fraudulent conduct of business : ( l) If in the course of the winding up oi a company, it appears that any business of the
company has been carried on, with intent to
defraud creditors of the Company, or any othsr
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persons, or for any fraudulent purpose, the
Court, on the application of the Official Liqui. dator, or the liquidator or any creditor or
contributory of the Company, may, if it thinks
it proper so to do, declare that any persons
who were knowingly parties to the carrying on
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of the business in the manner aforesaid shall be
personally responsible, wi!hout any limitation of
liability, for all or any of the debats or other
liabilities of the company as the Court may
direct.
On the hearing of an application under this subF
section the Official Liquidator or the liquidator,
as the case may be, may himself give evidence
or call witnesses.
(2) (a) Where the Court makes any such declarntion, it may give such further directions as it
thinks proper for the purpose of giving effeot
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to that declaration .
(b)
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further order as may be necessary for the purpose of enforcing any charged imposed under
· this sub-section,
(d)
(3) (4)
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SUPREME BANK LTD, V. P.A. TENDOLKAR (Beg,!.)
383
It may be possible ('though we need express no final opinion on
the matter) where a proceeding under Section 543 is covered
also bty the terms of Section 542 of the Companies Act of 1956,
to give directions to persons other than 1those whose conduct is
enquired into, including directions to heirs and legal representatives, for the purpose of enforcing a declaration. But, we think
that the power under Section 235 of the Aot of 1935, which corresponds to Section 543 of the Act oi 1956, would'not extend
beyond making a declaration against a deceased Director provided he, in his life time, or his heirs, after his death, have had
due opportunity of putting forward the case on behalf of the
allegedly delinquent Director. If either ~. Liquidator or the heirs
c of a deliquent Director, against whom a declaration of liability
has been made, can question the--Oetermination of liability of the
deceased delinquent, who was alive at the time of the Judgment
against him, it is obvious that the Appellate Court could give a
declaration either reducing or increasing the liability even though
it may not be able to enforce it by an order under Section 235
of the Aot. If the declaration can be questioned by an appeal, as
D we think that it can, the liability can be not only wiped off or
reduced but also increased on an appeal heard after the death of
a Director held liable.
Applying the principles laid down above to the case before us,
we find that Tendolkar had a full opportunity of defending him·
E sell against the misfeasance proceedings taken by the liquidator.
He also exercised his right of appeal against the order of the
Company Judge. The Division Bench, as already observed,
·reduced his liability. His heirs were heard on merits in the appeal
before us. Any order passed by us could only affect the assets or
the estate of the deceased Tendolkar. But, as already indicated
by us, we cannot, in these proceedings, pass an order against the
F heirs of Tendolkar so as to compel them 1to do anything. The
Official Liquidator or the co-Directors may, however, take any
other proceeding which may be open to them under the law so
as to obtain the contribution of Tendolkar.
Before we consider the manner in which the liabilities of the
Directors were determined, on the evidence on record, by the
G •Company Judge and then by the Division Bench, we will refer
to the principal· authorities, cited before the High Court and also
before us, with regard to the principles on which liabil!ties ?'Managing Directors and other Directors may be determmed m
such cases.
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In Re: City Equitable Life Insurance Co.,(') which is
regard as the locus classicus on the subject, was relied upon by
(1) [1925] Ch. 407 at 427.
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[1973] J S.C.R.
both sides. Here, Romer, J., after considering earlier authorities, A
said:
"In order, therefore, to ascertain the duties that a
person appointed to the board of an e&tablished company undertakes to perform, it is necessary to consider
not only the nature of the company's business, but also
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the manner in which the work of the company is in
fact distributed between the Directors and the other
officials of the Company, provided always that this
distribution is a reasonable one in the circumstances,
and is not inconsistent witb. any express provisions of
the articles of association. In discharging the duties of.
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his position thus ascertained a Director must, of course,
act honestly, but he must also exercise some degree of
both skill and diligence. To the question of what is the
particular degree of skill and diligence required of him,
the authorities do not, I think, give any very clear
answer. It has been laid down that so Jong as a Director
acts honestly he cannot be made responsible in damages
unless guilty of gross or culpable negligence in a business sense. But, as pointed out by Neville J. in Re.
Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates Ltd., (1911) l
Ch. 425), one cannot say whether a man has been
guilty of negligence, gross or otherwise, unless one can
determine what is the extent of the duty which he is
alleged to have neglected. For myself, I confess to
feeling some difficulty in understanding the difference
between negligence and gross negligence, except in so
far as the expressions are used for the purpose of. drawing a distinction bJ;otween the duty that is owed in ome·
case and the duty is owed in another ....
"There are, in addition, one or two other general·
proposi1tions that seem to be warranted by the reported
cases : (I ) A director need not exhibit in the performance of his duties a greater degree of skill than may
reasonabily be expected from a person of his knowledge
and .experience. A director f)f a L>fe Insurance Company
. for instance, does not guarantee that he has the ski11
of an actuary or' of a physician. In the words of
Lindley M.R.; 'If Directors act within their powers;.
if they act with such care as is reasonably to be expected
from them, having regard to their knowledge and experience, and if they act honestly for the benefit of the
Company they represent, they discharge both their
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equitable as well as their legal duty to the Company'
(Lagunas Nitrate
Co. Vs. Lagunas Syndicate(1899)2 Ch. 392, 435). It is perhaps only another
SUPREME BANK LTD. V. P.A. TENOOLKAR (Beg, J.)
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way of stating the same proposition to say that
Directors are not liable for more errors of judgment.
(2) A Director is not bound to give continuous atten·
tion to the affairs of his Company. His duties are of an
intermittent nature to be performed at periodical board
meetings; and at meetings of any committee of the
board upon which he happens to be placed. He is not,
however, l:iound to attend all such meetings, though
he ought to attend whenever, in the circumstances, he
is reasonably able to do so. ( 3) In respect of all duties
that, having regard to the exigencies of business, and
the· articles of association, may properly be left to some
other official, a director is, in the absence of grounds
for suspicion, justified in trusting that official to perform such duties honestly".
It must, however, be remembered that these remarks were made
in the context of a case in which the honestly of the conduct of
the Directors had not been questioned at all.
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In Dovey Vs. Cory,( 1) which was also cited, the question
comidered by the House of Lords was whether a Director,
though, in fact innocent of any complicity in fraud, was liable
to the Company for negligence in not having discovered the
fraud perpetrated by othi:rs. In that context, Lord }Ialsbury L.C.
had ob~erved as follows :
"It is obvious if there is such a duty of detecting frauds
it must render anything like an intelligent devolution
of labour impossibfo ..... I cannot think it can be
expected of a Director that he should be watching
either the inferior officers of the bank or verifying the
calculations of the auditor himself. The business of life
could not go on if people could not trust those who
are put into a position of trust for the express purpose of
attending to details of management".
In this very case, Lord Davey said :
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"I think the respondent (Cory) was bound to give
his attention to and exercise, his judgment as a man
of business on the matters which were brought before
the board at the meetings which he attended, and it is
· not proved that he did not do so. But I think he was
entitled to rely upon the judgment, information. and
advice of the Chairman and general manager, as to
whose integrity, skill, and competence he had no reason
for suspicior..".
t1l _11901] A.C. 477.
386
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 3 S.C.R.
In Re : Danham & Co.,(') a Director was held not liable for
the fraud of his Co-Directors in issuing false and fraudulent
reports and balance sheets. But, even in this case, it was found
that the books of accounts of the Company had been properly
kept and duly audited so· that· the Director concerned had no
reason for suspecting fraud and was misled "by reason of the
extraordinary powers conferred by the Articles upon the
Chairman".
In Palmer's "Company Law" (21st Edn. 1968 p. 575),
alter a citation of the three cases mentioned above, we find the
comment:
"It is doubtful whether, if similar facts arose today,
the court would decide in the same manner, because
now a days the courts take a stricter view of the duties
of a director than they took some twe1_1ty-five years
ago".
It is certainly a question of fact, to be determined upon the
evidence in each case, whether a Director, alleged to be liable for
misfeasance, had acted reasonably as well as honestly and with due
diligence, so that he could not be held liable for conniving at
fraud and misappropriation which takes place. A Director may be
shown to be so placed and to have been so closely and so long
associated personally with the management of the Company that
he will be deemed to be not merely cognizant of but liable for
fraud in the conduct of the business of a Company even though no
specific act of dishonesty is proved against him personally. He
.cannot shut his eyes to what must be oblvious to everyone who
examines the affairs of the Company even superficially. If he does
so be could be held liable for dereliction of duties undertaken by
him and compelled to make good the losses incurred l:>Y the Company due to his neglect even if he is not shown to be guilty of
participating in the commission of fraud. It is enough if his negligence is of such a character as to enable frauds to be committed
and losses thereby incurred by the Company.
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In the case before us, strong reliance has been placed, on be·
half of the Directors, on articles 109 and 118 of the Articles of
Association which read as follows:
"Duties of the Managinl! Director.
(I) (18831 25 Ch. Divn. 7l2.
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SUPREME BANK LTD. V. P, A. TENOOLKAR (Beg, J.)
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109 (a) The Managing Director, shall out of the
money received by the Company make all necessary and
proper disbursements, in carrying on the business of the
Company, and shaU cause proper accounts to be kept
of all transactions of the Company and shall once in
every year, settle and adjust such accounts with the
Board and Auditors and shall make out the BalanceSheet and Profit and loss account and all the returns, and
statements required by the Acts, to be audited and
signed.
Appointment of Managing Director.
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(b) The Directors may from time to time appoint
any one from their body to the Managing Director of
the Company, either for a fixed perfod, or without any
limitation as to the period for which he is to hold such
office, on such terms, provisions, and conditions as to
remuneration, management of the Company's business
and affairs and removal, which may be mutually agreed
upon between the Directors. and the Managing Director."
"Power to appoint Committee and to delegate.
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118. The Directors may delegate any of their
powers to committees consisting of such member or
members of their body as they think fit. Any committee
so formed shall, .in the exercise of the powers so delegated, conform to any regulations that may from time
to time, be imposed upon it by the Directors".
But, despite these articlei and the power of attorney executed
in favour of the Managing Director, article 125 gave the Directors
atleast supervisory powers of management. The Managing Director
S. K. Semant, who had tried to prove that it was the Board of
Directors which really and actually conducted the affairs of the
Company and that he was merely a tool, had relied on this article
which reads as follows :
"Powers of Directors.
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124. The Management oi the business of the Company shall be vested in the Directors, who in addition to
the powers and authorities by these presents or otherwise expressly conferred upon them, may exercise all
such powers and do all such acts, and, things as may
be exercised or done by the Company and are not here-
388
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[1973) 3 S.C.R •.
by or by statute expressly directed or required to be
exercised or done by the Company in general meeting,
but subject nevertheless to the provisions of the statutes,
and of the presents, and to such regulations being not
inconsistent with the aforesaid provisions as may from
time ito time be made by the Company in General Meeting; Provided that no regulation so made shall invalidate
any prior act of the Directors which would have been
valid if such regulation had not been made".
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Upon the facts examined by the learned Company Judge very
fully and less fully by the Division Bench and the findings recorded
thereon, it is clear to us that, although the Managing Director was
conducting the day to day affairs of the Company and must, there- c
fore, be held responsible for a greater share of losses incurred·
due to misappropriations, dishonesty, and misuse of managerial
powers, yet, his Co-Directors could no~ possibly be ignoran~ of
the nature of such dealings and activities of the employees and the
Managing Director simply because they had executed a power of
attorney in favour of the Managing Director. The Company Judge, D
relying upon observations in Overend & Gurney Co. v. Gibb,(')
had held that :
"The Directors were cognizant of circumstances of
such a character, so plain and so manifest, that. no men
wi1th any ordinery degree of prudence, acting on their
own ~half, would have conducted themselves in the
manner the Directors of this Company have done".
The proved conduct of the founder DirectOrs was such that an
inference of their complicity in concealing the true state of affairs
from depositors, presumably because they were themselves benefitting from jt, could not be avoided.
The learned Company Judge had rejected the plea of the
Directors that they had acted both honestly and reasonably in the
performance of their duties.
The learned Company Judge had observed : .
"It has been argued on beha1f of the Liquidator,
and suggestions have also been made to the Directors
when they were in the witness box, that they did not take
immediate steps to remove dishonest members of the
staff from service and to set right things because they
were afraid of their own dishonest conduct heing exposed by the staff members if they persisted in taking
action against them. Two circumstances relied upon in
support of this argument are that in spite of promises
(I) L.R. 5 H .. L 480.
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made to the Reserve Bank, no reconciliation statements
were got prepared for fear that any such reconciliation
would bring to light false entries in account books.
Secondly, it appears that one R. P. Joshi was appointed
as Manager or Chief Officer but unceremoniously
removed from service shortly after his appointment because with a view to set right matters he !ltarted taking
steps which might have brought to light several irrigularities in the loan accounts of the Directors themselves.
so' far as reconciliation is concerned. the position
appears to have been that the discrepancy in bank
accounts could not possibly be explained by cheques,
bills or other instruments instransit. The discrepancy,
as it turned out, was a result of malCTng false entries and
making unauthorised advances out of the cash. The subsequent taking of loan documents was the only type of
reconciliation that was possible.
That R. P. Joshi was removed from service shortly
after his appointment is admitted. The reason given is
that his behaviour towards the customers was found to
be not quite good. But it has been established by evidence that the supervision of his conduct during the
initial period of probation was entrusted to a committee
of Directors of whom Tendolkar was one. Tendolkar
denied that he was a member of that committee. But
Kalghatgi in his evidence stated that Tendolkar was one
of them but declined to admit that he also was a member
thereof. It has been possible for these Directors to give
these answers because the record in the rough minutes
books relating to the appointment of this Committee is
not signed by any of the Directors. But I am satisfie4 on
the evidence that there was such a committee. The disinclination on the part of these Directors to admit that
they were members of the said committee leads to the
conclusion that they do not wish directly to be associated
with the decision to terminate R. P. Joshi's service, whiclr
lands some supoort to the sugge!ltion on behalf of the
Liquidator that the principal or operative reason for the
said decision was that he started looking into loan account
of the Directors and pointing out irregularities in them".
He went on to observe :
"As I have already stated, the making of loans and
advances to the Directors may not in itself be irregular
or dishonest, provided that no difference is made in the
matter of procedure and scrutiny between the loans to
389
39~
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 3 S.C.R.
A
Directors and loans to other persons. If (certain preferences or concessions are made in favour of the Directors
including the omission to adopt proper procedure and
.scrutiny, it is a legitimate criticism to make that the
Directors have taken undue advantage of their position
as Directors which undoubtedly is a departure from the
B
standard of care and rectitude expecte~ of them. As I
have already o~erved, if men at the top are guilty of
departure from proper conduct, they place themselves
in a position which makes it difficult, if not impossible,
for them to correct their subordinates. There is. therefore.
force in the argument that this particular si'tuation · in
which the Directors found themselves might be one of the
c
reasons for not taking stern action against dishonest
members of the staff. This circumstance is enough, in
my opinion, to disentitle the Directors from saying that
their only fault was honest error of judgment or that they
:have acted reasonably in the circumstances of this case.
I hold therefore that the Directors, other than the
D
Managing Director, are also liable for the loss because
they must be held to have failed in their duty of providing for good and efficient manag~ment oi affairs of the
Company and because they cannot in the circumstances
claim that they were entitled to rely upon either the
Managing Director or any members of the supervisory
E
staff".
The learned Company Judge as well as the Division Bench
had referred to the difficulties encountered in determining the
actual total loss to the Company because of want of any reliable
statement of account. This state of the records of the Bank was
itself evidence of breach oi their duties by the Managing Director
and the Board of Directors to see that the business of the Bank was F
honestly and efficiently conducted.
The learned Company Judge, after considering all the items
of proved loss to the Company and making appropriate deductions
for assets which could be considered even of doubtful value, had
found that. at least a loss of Rs. 2,50,000 was caused by the mismanagement of the Managing Director and the Co-Directors. The
1ea,rned Company Judge had ordered the Managing Director as
well as the Directors Tendolkar and Ajgaonkar and Porwal and
Kalghatgi to contribute jointly and severally a sum of Rs. 2,50,000
with interest at 6 per cent per annum from the date of his order
on 8-11-1963 until payment, to the assets of the Company, but
the learned Judge limited the liabilities of Porwal and Kalghatgi
to Rs. 15,000 each, provided they paid this sum within three
months of his order.
G
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SUPREME BANK LTD, V, P.A. TENDOLKAR (Beg, J.)
A
8
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The Division Bench found the estimate of the Company Judge
about the total loss due to mismanagement to be not only reasonable, but record findings. showmg that loss incurred under the two
heads of loss for the whole period was. more. Speaking about the
loss shown bty ,proved shortage of cash and manipulation c:J.
balances with the other banks and the extent of the liability of the
Managing Director for these it said :
"Though the total loss to the Bank under the aforesaid two heads (shortage of cash and manipulation of
balances with other Banks) may be estimated at Rs.
2,65,000, he is liable for only that portion of the said
loss which occurred after he became the Managing
Director in July, 1946. Unfortunately, neither the
Official Liquidator nor the witnesses focussed their
attention to apportionment of the loss between the period
prior to July 1946 and the period subsequent to July
I 946".
It rejected the plea of the Managing Director that he had executed
promisory notes in favour of the Bank for Rs. 53,000 and Rs.
58,500, on 19-11-1954, and 3-12-1954 respectively, under flOJllC
pressure, threat, or coercion. It relied upon a statement in writing
of the Managing Director (A. 25) addressed to the Special
Officer on 8-12-1954 in which the amounts of the two pronotes
totalling upto Rs. 1,11,500 to the Bank constituted an admission
E and undertaking to repay atlea5t this amount to the Bank. It
observed that even on 8-12-1954 the Managing Director did not
deny his liability to pay this amount. It then held :
"Hence, this can safely be taken as his liability for
his negligence and breach of duty. Rs. 14,000 has been
realised from him by the sale of his car and truck and
F
another sum ol Rs. 24,000 has been realised by the sale·
deed executed by him in favour of the Bank conveying
his house. Deducting these two sums, he is still liable
for a sum of Rs. 73,500. Thus, his liability to contribute
to the assets of the Company can safely be fixed at
Rs. 73,500 though it is likely that the extent of Joss
resulting from his neglige11ce and breach of duty as
G
Managing Director, is much larger. He is also liable to
pay interest on this sum of Rs. 73,500 at 6 per cent
per annum from the order ol the learned Company Judge
till payment".
D
II
\
The Division Bench, after holding that the Managing Director
S. K. Samant was liable to contribute atleast Rs. 73,500 more
with interest, actually reduced the liability of S. K. Samant individually to Rs. 58,500 and of Directors Tendolkar and Ajgaonker
392
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 3 s.c,a..
jointly and severally to Rs. 50,000 only. After that, it added that, A
.out of the sum of Rs. 5 8,500 payable initially by S. K. Samant,
th~ liabilities of the Co-Direct.ors Tendolkar and Ajgaonkar would
be joint and several with the Managing Director S. K. Samant to
the extent of Rs. 50,000 only. This meant that the joint and several
liabilities of Ajgaonkar with the Managing Director S. K. Sama.nt
would only come into play if S. K. Samant failed to discharge his B
own liability to the extent of Rs. 58,500. The result of the orders
.of the Division Bench was that the amount to be repaid to the
Bank by the Managing Director and the four Directors totall~,d
up to Rs. 1,23,500. This total liability was determined after deducting Rs. 24,000 already realised from the sale of the house and
Rs. 14,000 from the sale of a car and truck of S. K, Samant.
C
It was contended before us that the Division Bench had erred
in reducing the total liability of the Board of Directors from
Rs. 2,50,000 to Rs. 1,61,500 (i.e. Rs. 1,23,500 plus Rs. 38,000)
on a rather arbitrary view that this is all that could be definitely
proved to be the total loss to the Company due to the misfeasance
-Of the Board, as a whole, after all .the Directors had had clear and
definite notice of the irregularities commit1ted in the management D
.of the Bank from the Reserve Bank's first report, although the
.Division Bench had itself held that the total loss covered by the
two heads of 'shortage of cash' and 'manipulation of balances with
-other banks' over the whole period of management by the Board
was Rs. 2,65,000. The Division Bench confined the liabilities of
the whole Board of Directors, apart from those of the Managing E
Director individually, to only Rs. 65,000 "proved to have taken
place subsequent to March 1951, when they became aware of Ex.
A 1 ithe first report of the Reserve Bank".
The learned Company Judge had separately considered the
cases of Porwal, who joined as Director in 1951 after the first
Inspection Report by the Reserve Baitlc had already been given, F
and of R. N. Kalghatgi, who became a Director only in July 1953,
-0n the death of his elder brother G. N. Kalghatgi. They had
pleaded that they were ignorant of the mal-practices and misappropriations which had taken place before they joined the Board
·of Directors. The Company Judge had noted that no suggestion
<>f dishonest conduct had bee.n made against them and .that they
had not borrowed any money from the Company. Nevertheless, as
they were
with the knowledge of the contents of the several
reporta of the Reserve Bank, meDtionecl above. they were held
liable to-contribute Rs. 15,000 each, as mentioned above, ~or
their negligence .ind breach of duty to provide and ensure honest
-and efficient management of the affairs <Ji the Bank. The Division .:L
Bench had, in view of the short period for which they .had tune- H
. tioned on the delinquent Board of Directors, reduced the
~ tolle made by R. W. Porwal and H. ·N. Kalghatgi .to
a
fixvc!
eontrl-
·~·.·.·.
SUPREME BANK LTD•. v. P.A. TENOOLKAR (Beg, J.)
393
Rs. 10,000 and Rs. 5,000 respectively with interest at 6 per cent
per annum from 8-11-1963, the date of the order of the Company
Judge, until the date of payment. Having regard to the mitigating
circwnstances, and, particularly, the shortness of the period for
which these two Directors served on the delinquent Board of
Directors, with the nature of activities of which they could not
B possibly have been ignorant after the reports of the Reserve Bank,
we consider the orders of the Division Bench reducing the liabilities of these two Directors to be just and reasonable. It may also
be mentioned here that Porwal and Kalghatgi appear to have
accepted the justice oi. assessment of their liabilities as they had
not appeal_ed against the order of the Division Bench so that no
c question of any further reduction of their liabilities arise before
us.
A
While we think that the Division Bench was justified itli placing
a larger share of the burden of contribution on the Managing
Director, upon the facts and circumstances of this case, it had
manifestly erred in passing an order which not only reduced the
D total liability of the Directors, but had, without giving any good
reason for it, reduced the individual remaining lia~ty of S. K.
Samant to Rs. 58,500 only. It had iteslf held, that, even according
to the admission of the Managing Director, he was liable to the
extent of Rs. 1,11,500 and that, as this was a fair measure of the
'extent of the loss caused by the Managing Director, the amount
E still payable by him was Rs. 73,500 (i.e. after deducting Rs. 38,000
for the amounts already realised from Samant).
We may here indicate the nature of the evidence, discussed at
length by the learned Company Judge, on which findings relating
to mismanagement by the Board of Directors were based. Shri
A. L. Bhatia (P.W. 1), Banking Officer of the Reserve Bank of
F India, had .duly proved facts disclosed in the reports, dated
7-3-1951(Al), dated 5-3-1953 (A2), dated 13-9-1954 (A3),
and dated 13-1-1955 (A4), which were made after carrying out
inspections of the records disclosing the manner in which the business of the .Bank was conducted. He had been fully crossexamined on the contents of the reports. Shri B. D. Joshi,
G Chartered Accountant (PW. 2), who stated that he had been
appointed to examine and audit the accounts of the Company by
the Board of Directors, at the instance of the CID, for the period
from 1948 onwards, had proved the contents of his report (A9)
dated 10-5-1957. He was also thoroughly cross-examined on
behalf of the Directors. Shri K. Y. Wagle (PW. 3), Auditor, was
H examined biy the Official Liquidator to prove and support the contents of his report (A. 21) dated 16-2-1955. Shri
R. Kotbaqi,
Advocate (PW. 4) who, as indicated above, had been appointed as
the Special Officer, under Section 37 of the Act, and who func-
v.
394
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 3 S.C.R.
tioned from 7-12-1954 to 4-4-1955 in that capacity, had duly
proved and was fully cross-examined about the admissions made
in writing (Ex. A. 25) by S. K. Samant. No objection had been
taken on behalf of the Directors to the admissibility of any of the
reports or other documents exhibited on behalf of the Official
Liquidator.
A
B
In addition to the considerable evidence given by the witnesses
mentioned ablove, the learned Company Judge, in order to give
the fullest possible opportunity to , the Directors to meet the
prima-facia case of misfeasance, by misconducting the affairs of
the Bank in a manner which could not be honest and which caused
heavy losses to the Bank, had ordered the Directors, who had
produced no witness in defence, to appear and give evidence in c
court, particularly because the defence of the Directors seemed to
the learned Judge to be proceeding on the wrong assumption that
the whole burden of proof rested upon the liquidator. The learned
Judge, in this connection, referred to the provisions of SeCllion
45H of the Act which laid down :
D
"45H. Special provisions for assessing damages
against delinquent directors, etc.(1 ) Where an application is made to the High
Court under Section 235 of the Indian Companies Act,
1913 (7 cf 1913), against any promoter, director,
manager, liquidator or officer of a banking company {or
E
repayment or restoration of any money or property and
the applicant makes out a prima facie case against such
person to repay and restore the money or property uniless he proves that he is not liable to make ithe repayment or restoration either wholly or in part :
Provided that where such an order is made jointly
against two or more such persons, they shall be jointly
f
and severally liable to make the repayment or restoration of the moiley or property.
(2) Where an application is made to the High
Court under Section 235 of the Indian Companies Act,
1913 (7 of 1913), and the High Court has re11Son to
believe that a property belongs ID any promotor,
G
Director, Manager, liquidator or officer of the banking
Company, person as an ostensible owner, then the High
Court may, at any time. whether the property stands in
the name of such person, or any other whether before
or after making an order under sub-section ( 1) direct the
attachment of such property, or such portion thereof, as
H
it thinks fit and the property so artached shall remain
subject to attachment unless the ostensible owner can
prove to the satisfaction ol. the High Court that he is the
SUPREME BANK LTD. v. P.A. TENOOLKAR (Beg,/.)
A
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395
.real owner and the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act 5 of 1908), relatin~ to attaclunent of
property shall, as far "as may be, apply to such attachment".
The Directors, apparently unwilling to appear in evidence, had
questioned the power of the learned Company Judge to order them
to appear and give evidence in open Court. Their appeal ag_ainst
the order for the examination of the Directors had been dismissed.
There was no further appeal against that order which became
binding on "the parties. The Division Bench, however, to support
its view that the Directors other than the Managing Director could
not be made liable before the Reserve Bank report came to their
knowledge in March 1951, observed that a good deal of evidence,
which may have been available if the official Liquidator had
asked for the public examination of the Directors under Section
45G of the Act, could not be placed before the Court. The
Division Bench had also held that the allegations of improper
conduct by the Directors, in not exercising proper supervision,
did not form the subject matter of any separll'le issue or poinr
formulated by the Company Judge. Furthe_rmore, the Division
Bench held that allegations of improper conduct on the part of
Directors, in obtaining excessive loans for themselves, which the
Directors were not called upon to meet, should be ianored in
determining the liability of the Directors for makin111 good loss due
to shortage of cash and manipulation of bank balances. It had,
nevertheless, held the Directors liable inasmuch as they could not
"totally abdicate their powers and .functions and divest themselves
of responsibility for proper management of the Company". The
Division Bench had also commented upon the vagueness of allegations against the Directors individually.
We find, as the judgment ol the learned Company Judge also
shows, that each allegation in the misfeasance application was
supported by sufficient particulars and evidence. In paragraph 12
of the application, it was stated that, although the books of the
Bank showed a cash balance of Rs. 1.50,471-15-7, yet, the actual
cash found on 26-11-1954 when the Bank closed business was
Rs. 645.04. In addition, there was a cash deficit of Rs. 8773-15-8
revealed in the earlier report, so that the total dellcit of cash was
Rs. 1,58,600-14-11. In paragraph 13, the unexplained difference
between the accounts at the Branches, with particulars given, was
shown to be Rs. 1,44,500. In paragraph 14, details of unreconciled dift'erences in accounts with other Banks, referred to in the
Reserve Bank report of 13-9-1954, were given. Paragraph 15 Jiave
the details of allotment ol new shares to the Directors and their
these shares,
friends without payment of any cash whatsoever
in 1946, although fictitious entries were made to shov; payment.•
for
10,-L7%Sup. Cl/73
396
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 3 S.C.R.
bty the Chairman by G. N. Kalghatgi, and by L. S. Ajgaonkar. It
was stated here that the Directors were fully aware of the fictitious
nature of these entries. To explain them away, debits were made
to a suspense account for the purpose of preparing the balance
sheet ending on 31-12-1947. It was not only alleged but shown
that the Directors were debarred by Article 147 of the Articles
of Association from transferring unclaimed dividends to any funds
or other accounts before the expiry of a year and that this had
been done to cover up the fictitious entries. It was asserted there
that the Auditor's repo~t had also concealed the true facts and that
this was a deliberately fraudulent conduct. Paragraph 17 of the
application gave a list of amounts shown to have been withdrawn
by the Directors and their friends within a week before the closing
of its business by the Bank. In earlier paragraphs of the petition,
details of reports of Shri K. Y. Wagle, dated 16-2-1955, and of
B. D. Joshi, given on 10-5-1957, and the explanations given bty
the Directors, were mentioned. The ~ports of the Reserve Bank of
India were also mentioned in the application.
A
The Official Liquidator could not possibly have done anything
more in his application than to rely on reports available to him
and to prove the correctness of 'their contents by producing, as
witnesses, those individuals who had conducted the investigations
and made the reports. He was not personally aware of the affairs
of the Bank before he was appointed to wind up the Company. We
think that, in the circumstances of the case, sufficient particulars
had been furnished in the misfeasance application. The Directors
not only had an opportunity of meeting the allegations contained
in the petition, but they also had knowledge of the material brought
on record afterwards.
D
B
c
E
It is true that there was no separate issue on the extent of the
liability of the Managing Director and the Directors due to F
neglect in exercising proper control and supervision over officers
of the Bank. But, we think that the gravemen of the charges against
the Directors was more serious than that. The learned Company
Judge' had framed three issues apart from two on the preliminary
questions. disposed of by us already. These three issues were
framed as follows :
G
"1. Whether the Official Liquidator proves that on
the date the Company closed its business, viz.,
on 27-11-1954 there was shortage in cash and if so, in
what sum?
2. Whether the Liquidator proves that loss was
occasioned to the Company by misapplication of cash
H
or funds shown to have been ·credited to the accounts of
the Company with the other Banks but not so actnally
_,
credited?
SUPREME BANK LTD. V. P.A. TENDOLKAR (Beg,/.)
A
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F
G
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397
3. Whether and if so, which of the respondents is
or are liable to make good the shortage in cash and loss
occasioned to the Company; if found liable, are the
respondents so liable jointly and severally and if severally,
to what extent in the case of each of them ?".
The third issue involved determination of liabilities under the
various heads on which evidence was led by both sides.. The
observations of the learned Company Judge about the failure of
the Board of Directors to exercise proper control over the activities of the employees and the effect of setting bad examples before
the employees were made as an answer to the attempts made by
the Directors themselves to shift responsibility for the losses incurred, due to dishonest dealings which were not questioned, upon
the shoulders of the employees of the Bank. The want of proper
supervision was not, as is clear~ from the issues, a · separate or
easily separable head of liability. No separate liability for it was
determined. The two· heads of liability, covered by the 'first two
issues, were wide enough to cover the. various causes of shortage
and misapplication of funds and modes of falsification of accounts
and other documents to conceal the true state of affairs left for
elucidation by evidence. The remainder was, apparently, meant
to be covered by the third issue.
We may point out that the report-cum-application made by the
Official Liquidator for proceedings against the delinquent Directors
did record the Liquidator's opinion that loss had been caused to
the Company, since its formation, by the acts and omission of the
Directors, so '!hat the High Court could order the production of
the Directors for such examination as the High Court considered
fit and proper. The High Court did make, an order for their examination in Court. The Directors had not only had an opportunity
of showing cause why they should not be so examined but had
questior.ed the order for their examination by an appeal which
failed. It is immaterial that the particular examination of the
Directors. was not described in the orders made as "public examination" within the meaning of Section 45 G of the Act.
We think that the Division Bench had erred inasmuch as it proceeded on the assumption that the Liquidator has to make a
specific or separate application for publlic examination of Directors.
All that Section 45G oi the Act requires is the· submission of a
repott showing that loss has been caused to the Banking Company
in· the opinion of the Official Liquidator. After that, it is the
opinion of the Court, on the question whether the Director concerned should be publicly examined, that matters. In the case before us, the Company Judge was certainly .of opinion that the
interests of justice required the examination of the Directors which
had been·ordered. We think that the Division Bench had erred inl
398
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 3 s.c.R.
holding that the Directors had not had due opportunity of meeting allegations made against them.
It is true that rthe issues were rather broadly framed and could
have been fuller. But, after considering the nature of charges and
their particulars, the cases set up by the Directors in defence,
the evidence led, and the very full and fair opportunities given by
rthe learned Company Judges to the Directors to defend themselves,
we are unable to agree with the Division Bench that the Directors
were in any way handicapped by alleged vagu~ness of charges or
a failure to frame issues more only or that a good deal of evidence
led could be ignored for these reasons. It was pointed out bjy this
Court, in Negubai Ammal & Ors. v. B. Shama Rao & Ors.,(')
with regard to the rule that evidence should not be looked into at'
all on matters neither pleaded nor put in issue :
"The true scope of this rule is that evidence let in on
issues on which the parties actually went to. trial should
not ~ made the foundation for decision of another and
different issue, which was not present to the minds ot the
parties and on which they had no opportunity of adducing evidenr.e. But, that rule has no application to a case
where parties go to trial with knowledge that a particular
question is in issue, though no specific issue has been
framed thereon and adduce evidence relating thereto."
We/ think that the learned Compiµiy Judge was right in coming •io the conclusion, on the evidence on record, that the promoter or founder Directors who were there since the inception of
the Bank, were cognizant of the nature of the dealings by the
Managing Director and the officers of the Hank. The evidence
showed that they had been discussing matters relating to the
management of the Company at the meetings of the Board where
items of "policy", which benefited th~ Directors at the expense of
the deposi~rs. must have been discussed. They could not have
been ignorant of the fact that the Account Books contained
fictitious entries showing payments for shares by them when they
had not actually paid for them. Nor could they bc so innocent as
not to know of the window dressing and presentation of false
balance sheets so as to conceal the true state of affairs from the
depositors for years.
Consider;tble importance was attached, Ori behalf of the
Directors, to the following statement in the Inspection report
(Ex. A3) dated 27-8-1954 under Section 35(1) of the Act; '"Ibei
cash in hand at the Head office was verified on 17th May 1954,
and it was foulld that it was shon to the extent of Rs. 53-15-9".
Apparently, this statement was made on the strength of entries
(I) [19S6) S.C.ll. 451 at 461.
B
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SUPREME BANK LTD, V. P.A. TENDOLKAR (Beg, J.)
399
in the account which were not really reliable. If the statement
could be correct, it would only mean that practically whole of
the total deficit in cash at the bank shown as R.s. 1,73,000 in the
report of Shri Wagle (Ex. A.21) dated 26-11-1954 represented
misappropriation which took place between May and November,
1954. The report of Shri Wagle (Ex. A.21) also showed that
B when the Auditor's clerk counted the cash on 24-3-1954, it was
Rs. 15,712-13-2 whereas the Day Book written th~reaiter showed
a closing balance of Rs. 3,07,555-2-10. It appears that cooking
up of accountS and presentation of false ~lance sheets were the
usual practice of the Bank.
A.
c
D
Any Director conscious of his 11\anaglerial responsibilities,
who had cared to examine the affairs of the Bank, could not have
failed to find out whm was really happening in the Bank. The
fact that these practices were tolerated for such a long period
without any check by the Board of Directors indicates that the
promoter Directors must be participants in th.e benefits of widespread misappropriation even though they may have so operated
as not to leave any traces of actual misappropriation by them in
the records of the Bank. The circumstancial evidence against
them is too damaging, considerable, and unanswered.
The result is that we think that the learned Company Judge
was correct iri assessing the total liability of those members of the
Board of Directors who were founder or promoter Directors. We
also think that the Division Bench correctly came to the conclusion that it was jllllt and proper to place a greater share of liability
upon the Managing Director. We, however, think that the Division Bench erred in reducing the liability of the Managing
Director and the Directors as a whole. We think that the reF maining liability of the Managing Director to pay Rs. 73,500
with interest at six per cent per annum from the date of the order
of the Company Judge until payment is a correct measure of the
initial separate liability of the Managing Director S. K. Samant
as held by the Division Bench. But in case this amount cannot
be realised from S. K. Samant in the fi~t instance, the remainder
G should become ihe joint and several liability of the remaining two
Direct!5rs before. the Company Judge, namely, P. A. Tendolkar
and L. S. Ajgaonkar.
B
As we concur with the assessment of the total liability of the
delinquent Board of Directors at Rs. 2,50,000 by 'the learned
Company Jndge, with which the Division Bench had not differed,
we thii1k that this should be the total amount which the Direcfors
who Were alive when the Company Judge passed his order ar~
liallle to contribute to the assets of the Company,
'
400
SUPREME COURT 'REPORTS
[1973] 3 S.C.R.
The result is that we allow the tliree appeals of the Liquidator
bearing Civil Appeal Nos. 195-197 oi. 1967 and set aside the
orders of the Division Bench determining the liabilities of S. K.
Samant and P.A. Tendolkar and L. S. Ajgaonkar. We substitute
:he following determination of their respective liabilities and
directions :
(I) The total remaining liabilities of the Managing
Director S. K. Samant and Directors P. A. Tendolkar
and L. S. Ajgaonkar, R. K. Porwal and R. N. Kalghatgi
are held to be Rs. 2,50,000 minus· Rs. 38,000: which
has already been realised by the sale _of a house
and a truck and car of S. K. Samant that is to say
Rs. 2, 12,000.
(2) We hold that as, out of this remaining sum
of Rs. 2,12,000 the liabilities of Porwal and Kalghatgi
have. been correctly determined and restricted to
Rs. 10,000 and Rs. 5,000 respectively, and discharged,
these amounts will be deducted from the amount to be
contribll'ted by the remaining three Directors S. K.
Samant, P. A. Tendolkar, and Ajgaonkar, and no
further contribution will be demanded from Porwal and
Kalkhatgi who have already paid these amounts. Thus,
the remaining further liability of S. K. Samant and
P. A. Tendolkar and Ajgaonkar is red11ced to
Rs. 1,97,000..
( 3) Out of this remaining liability Of Rs. 1,97 ,000
the .initially separate Jiabiility of Managing Director
S. K. Samant is Rs. 73,500 toge!her ll(ith interest at six
per cent per 'annum from the date of the order of the
learned Company Judge until payment.
( 4) The still remaining liability to the extent of
Rs. 1,23,500 with interest at six per cent per annum
from the date of the order of the Company Judge,
upto the date of payment will be the joint and several
liability of the Man.aging Director S. K. Samant and the
Directors Tendolkar and Ajgaonkar.
(5) ·The Directors Tendolkar and Ajgaonkar are
held jointly and severally liable · in case the amount,
if any, which, out of the initially separate liability of the
Managing Director S. K. Samant, that is to say
J!ls. 73,500, cannot be recov~ed from S. K. Samailt
only.
( 6) The case is fC'Dl•nded to the learned Company
. Jiidge for pa.lling such orders againat the Managing
Director Samant and Director Ajgaonkar, under
A
c
D
G
B
SUPREME BANK LTD. V. P.A. TENOOLKAR (Beg, J.)
40 I
A
c
Section 235 of the Act of 1913, as may be needed for
discharging the Ha_!>ilities determined above, but no. such
orders will be passed against the heirs and legal representatives of deceased Director P. A. Tendolkar under
Section 235 of the Act of 1913, although their liabilities
are declared. The Official Liquidator and L. S. Ajgaonkar are, however, left free to seek such other remedies,
if necessary, by appropriate proceedings under the
law, against the estate or assets of P. A. Tendolkar, as
may be open to them.
The separate appeal (Civil Appeal) No. 300 of 1967 by
L. S. Ajgaonkar is hereby dismissed.
D
The separate appeal (Civil Appeal) No. 234 of 1967 oJf.
P. A. Tendolkar, now represented by his heirs, is all0wed only
to the extent that the order passed under Section 235 of the Act
of 1913 for compelling P .. A. Tendolkar to contnoute his share
is withdrawn 'as it has become infructuous and 'it is dismissed as
regards the rest of the claim.
·
B
Costs of the appeals in this Court shall be payable by all the
Respondents with the exception of the legal representatives of
P. A. Tendolkar. There will be no order as to costs in Civil
Appeal No. 234 of 1967. One set of hearing fee.
V.P.S.
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