STATE OF U.P. versus IFTIKHAR KHAN & ORS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 15 January 1973 | [1973] 3 S.C.R. 328 | 1973 INSC 11
Key facts
- Decided
- 15 January 1973
- Bench
- C.A. VAIDYIALINGAM*, I.D. DUA, A. ALAGIRISWAMI
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 252/1969
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1973] 3 S.C.R. 328
- Neutral citation
- 1973 INSC 11
Text of the judgment
328
A
STATE OF U.P.
v.
IFTIKHAR KHAN & ORS ..
January 15, 1973
[A. ALAGIR!SWAMI, I. D. DUA AND C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.J
Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 136-Appeal against acqw'rt~l
B
by
.-special leave-Power of the Supreme Court.
Indian Penal Code (Act 45 of 1860), ss. 34- Scope of.
Criminal law-Practice and Procedure-Duty
of
Prosecution
I{)
examine all wi'tntsses.
Sentence-Murder-When accused may be sentenced
men for life.
to
imprison-
On the day the deceased was murdered. the four accused-two of
whom were bitterly inimical to the deceased, the other two beilng their
.close associates came k>gether in a body to the shop of deceased.
Two of the accused, who had pistols, shot at the deceased. The other
two had lathis. No overtact was attributed to them, but there was
nothing to suggest that they did not know that their associates had
the pisk>ls. After the shooting, all the four accused ran away together
when an alarm was raised. Two brothers of the deceased, were eye
witnesses •to the occurrence and ac'cording to them there were three other
persons who witnessed the occurrence. Tilose three peI"SCllns however
filed affidavits in the Committing Court that they had seen notliing and
hence they we're not examined as witnesses for the prosecution. According to one of the eye-witnesses the affidavits were false aind those
persons filed them because they were afraid of the accused. One of the
accused pleaded alibi and examined defence wit:aesses, but that evidence
did not rule out the possibility of the particular accused being present
at the sceno of occurrence, and in fact did not crea.te 911>y reasonable doubt
in favour of that accused.
The trial eoort .accepted the evidence of the two eye witnesses. The
two accused who took part in the shooting were convicted under s. 302,
I. P. C. and sentenced to death. The other two were convicted under
ss. 302 and 34, I.P.C. and were se:ntenced to imprisonment for life.
c
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The High Court dealing with the matter in appeal as well as under
s. 374, Cr. P.C., rejected the evidence of the two eye witnesses characterising them as partisan witnesses.
Allowing the appeal to this Court,
G
HELD : (I) The approach of the High Court t<> the evidence of
the eye witnesses was erroneous. [335CJ
(a) The High Court did not give a specific finding o.n the plioa
ot aUhi of the coneemed accused. [337D-EJ
(b) It did not consider whether there were any discrepancies in the
evidence of the two eye-witnesses, and whether their evidence sounded
true and genui1ne, but rejected the evidence merely on the ground that
~ were brothers of the ~ceased and hence were partisan or interested witnesses. [337E-G]
H
U.P. STATE v. IFTIKAR KHAN (Vaidialingam, J.)
329
(c) It assumed that the evidence of one of them was not acceptable,
and therefore the evidence of the other also could not be accepted
because the witnesses were brothers. [336HJ
A
(2) J,n appeals against acquittal by special leave under Art. 136,
this Court has power to interfere with findings of fact, no distinction
being made between judgments of acquittal and conviction, but thi•
Court will not <irdinarily interfere with the appreciation of evidence or
with lhndings of fact unless the High Ccurt has acted perversely QI'
otherwise improperly on grounds which ore plainly untenable or there
has b,een a grave miscarriage of_ justice, and the view taken by the
High Court 'is clearly unreasonable on the evidence on record. In a
B
reference made by the Sessions Courti under s. 374, Cr. P. C., for
cotnfirrnatiQn of the sentence of death passed by it, there is a duty on
c
the High Court to independently consider the matter carefully and
examine all relevant and material circum.stances; but if the High Court
reverses the decision of the trial court on grounds which are pla'inly
faHacious and untenable, -and grave ~t!justiCe has been done, this Court
will interfere with the order of the High Court. [335B-C, F-HJ
D
Ma.valti v. State of U.P., [1964] 8 S.C.R. 133, Himachal Pra6.esh
Administration v. Om Prakosh, A.LR. 1972 S.C. 975 and State of
Uttar Pradesh v. Saman Doss Criminal Appeal No. 17 of 197! declded
on 11-1-1972 followed.
(3) For invoking s.34, I.P.C. against an accused prior concert or
a pre-arranged plan has to be established. But as it is difficult to prove
the intention of an individual, it has to be inferred from his act, or
conduct and other relevant circumstan~s.
The section \\ill be attract-
ed if it is established that the criminal act has been done by any one
of the accused persons in furtherance
E
of
the
common
intention.
A
common intetntion-a meeting of minds-to commit an offence and
participation in the commission of the offen~ 'in furtherance of that
common intention invite the application· of the section. But participation need lOOt in all cases be by physical presence. In offences involving
physical violence, normally presence at the scene of offen~ of the
F
offenders sought to be rendered liable on th~ principle of joint liability
may be necessary, but it is not necessary, to attract the section, that
any overt act must be dlY,ne by the particular accused who was present.
[344-C; 345 A-Ill
In the c'ircumstances of this Case, the accused with the Iathis must
be held to be guilty under s. 302 read withs. 34 I.P.C. [344-HJ
G
Pandurang, Tukia and Bhi/lia v. The State of Hyderabad, ll955J
S.C.R. 1083, Krishna Govind Patil v. State of Maht;·rashrra, (1964]
1 S.C.R. 678 and Jaikrishnadc.s Manohardas Desai and Anotht?lr v.
The State of Bomba,v, [1960) 3 S.C.R. 319 followed.
Mahbub Shah v. King-Emperor, [1945] L.R. 72 I.A. 148 and
Barandra Kumar Ghose v. The King Emperor, [1924] L.R. 52 I.A.
40 applied.
H
( 4) Otdinarily, it 'is the duty of the prosecution to examine all
material witnesses essential to the unfolding of the narrative on which
the prosecution is based, whether in the result the effect of that testimony is for or against the case of the prosecutio:i. But no purpose.
would have been served in the prese;nt case by insisting on the prosecution examining the othell! as witnesses, in view of the affidavits filed
by them. [3380-B, HJ
...,
'
330
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 3 S.C.R.
A
Habeeb Mohammad v. The State of Hyd«abad, [1954] S.C.R. 47:;
and Sahai Rcmi & Others v. The State of U.P. Criminal Appeal No. 131
of 1969 decided on 17-11-1972 followed.
Staphen Senevirathe v. The King, A.LR. 1936 P .C. 289, applied.
(5) Since more than 4 years had passed since the sent<;>ee of death
was passed and in between, there was an acquittal by the High Court,
interests of justice would be served by sentencing the accused to imprisonment for life. [347A-Cl
8
CRIMI'>AL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Cr. Appeal No. 252
of 1969.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
8th May 1969 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal
No. 199 of 1969.
c
0. P. Rand, for the appellant.
Vimal Dave, for respondents Nos. 1 & 3.
C. B. Agarwa/a, for respondent No. 4.
D
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
VAIDIALINGAM, J.-This appeal, by special leave, by the
State of U.P. is directed against the judgment and order dated
8-5-1969 in Criminal Appeal No. 199 of 1969 (Referred No. 21
of 1969) allowing the appeal of the four accused, respondents
herein. ap<l set'in~ a~;de the conviction recorded against them by
the learned Civil and Sessions Judge, Hardoi, under sections 302
and 302 read with 34 I.P.C.
E
The four respondents herein were tried by the Civil and
Sessions Judge for the offence of committing the murder of
Sikande:· Khan on October 16. 1967. After the filing of this
appeai, the second respondent, Ishitiaq Khan is reported to have
been murdered and hence the appeal as against him has become
infruC'tUOUS.
F
In this appeal by the State, we are at present concerned only
with Iftikhar Khan. son of Mohammad Hasan, Anwar Khan, son
of Mohammad Hussan Khan and Syeed Khan, son of Refiq
Hussain Khan, who are respondents one, three and four respectively.
G
The prosecution case was as follows :
All the respondents and the deceased, Sikander Khan, are
residents of village Garni Chand. Iftikhar Khan and Anwar Khan,
respondents one and three herein, are real brothers and the other
two respondents are their associate~. About two years or so.
prior :<' the murder of Sikander Khan, Aqil Khan, a brother of
H
U.P. STATE v. IFTIKHAR KHAN
A
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(Vaidialingam, I.)
33 I
respondents of one and three, was murdered. In connection with
the said murder, the deceased, Sikander Khan, Ilyas Khan and
two or three others were tried. However, they were acquitted
about ten months prior to this incident. On October 16, 1967,
the day on which Sikander Khan was murdered, a case of attempted murder of Ilyas Khan was pending against respondents one
and two herein. Both of them had been released on bail about
a momh prior to October 16, 1967. Respondents one and three
strongly suspected that Sikander Khan was responsible for the
murder of their brother, Aqil Khan, though there has been an
acquittal by the court in his favour. On October 16, 1967, at
about 8.30 P.M., Sikander Khan was sitting on a cot in front of
hi' >hop and was reading 'Jang Nama'. His brothers, P.Ws one
and two, along with one Laddan Khan were also sitting near
Sikander Khan listening to the reading of the epic. Respondents
one and two armed with country made pistols and respondents
three and four armed with lathis came in a body to the place where.
Sikander Khan was seated. The first and the second respondents
fired shots in quick succession at Sikander Khan.. The shots
strllCk Sikander Khan in his chest and neck and he fell down dead.
On hearing the alarm of P.Ws one and two, the neighbours came
and saw all the accused running away. Sikander Khan, on receiving the gun-shots died on the spot. The first information report
was given by P.W. 1 at about 11.35 P.M. and it was recorded by
the Head ConstaMe, P.W. 7. The investigation was taken up by
P.W. 8. The respondents surrendered in court on November 4,
1967. The doctor, who performed the postmortem on the body
ot Sikander Khan, had given the opinion that the gun-mot injuries
on the chest and the neck were individually sufficient to cause
death in the ordinary course of nature.
Respondents one and two were tried for the offence of committing the murder of Sikander Khan under section 302. The
other two respondents were tried under section 302 read with
section 34. The respondents three and four pleaded !hat they
had been implicated in the case due to enemity. The first respondent, apart from adopting the said plea, further set up an alibi.
G According to him he was an in-patient in the District hospital,
Bareilly, from 14-10-1967 to 31-10-1967 and that he was openrted upon for hydrocele at the said hospital on 18-10-1967. In
view of the fact that he was in the hospital on 16-10-1967, the
evidence given implicating him in the murder is false. The prosecution mainly relied on the evidence of P. Ws 1 and 2, the
H brothers of the deceased, to prove its case against the accused.
The first respondent also examined the doctor of the Bareilly hospital and two nurses working there in support of his plea of alibi.
The court examined a student nurse working in the same hospital
F
6-L796Sup.C.I.f' 3
.
332
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1973) 3 S.C.R.
as C.W. I. Notwithstanding the fact that P.Ws 1 and 2 were
brothers of «he deceased and as such can be described as partisan
witnesses, the learned Sessions Judge accepted their evidence as
true. Regarding the plea of alibi set up by the first respondent,
the learned Sessions Judge, after consideration of the evidence of
P.Ws 1 to 3 as also the evidence of C.W. 1, held that the said
plea cannot be accepted. The Court ,further held that though
the first respondent was operated upon for hydrocele on October
18, 1967, the evidence of the doctor and the nurses of the Bareilly
hospital establish that it was possible for the first respondent ta
move about and it was further possible for him to be absent frorn
the hospital on October 16, 1967. In fact the view of the learned
Sessions Judge is that the murder of Sikander Khan had been
planned and the first Respondent, in order to create the evidence
of alibi, got himself admitted in the district hospital at Bareilly
on the 14th and that he successfully manoeuvred to have the
operation originally fixed for October 16, 1967, postponed. By
so manoeuvring, the first respondent was able to be in the village
on October 16, 1967 and, after committing the murder, he went
back to the hospital. In this view, the respondents cme and two
were convicted under s~ction 302 and sentenced to death. The
respondents three and four were also found guilty of murder under
section 302, read with section 34 on the finding that they had
associated themselves with the other two accuse.d with the common
intention of committing the murder of Sikander Khan. However,
they were sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life.
A
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E
All the four respondents appealed to the High Court challenging their conviction and sentence. There was also the reference
for confirmation of the sentence of death of respondents one and
two. The main findings of the High Court were as follows :
"It is not necessary to give details of enmity that existed bet·
ween the deceased and the accused. Murders appear to be quite
common in the area where the parties live and they resort to such
crimes. The two eye witnesses, P.Ws 1 and 2, being the brothers
of the deceased are partisan witnesses. These two witnesses have
not given proper answers when cross-examined on the point whether
the first respondent was in the village from 14th October, 1967.
Though there can be some argument whether the first reipondenr
was or was not actually in the hospital from the afternoon of
October 16, 196-7 till the morning of the next day, yet the evidence
shows that he was admitted in the Bareilly hospital on the 14th
October and was there on the next day also. He was operated
on October 18 1967. In view of these facts be could not be in
the village on the 14th and 15th October, 1967. Hence the evidence of P.W. 2 to the contrary is false. As P.W. 2 has made a
false statement with regard to the presence of the first respondent
F
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tt
U.P. STATE
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F
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v. !FTIKHAR KHAN (Vaidialingam, J.)
333
in the village on 14th and 15•,h Oc:ober, 1967, his brother, P.W. 1,
should also be put in the same category, as it is not proper to
believe one brother and disb~lieve the other. If the ty;o partisan
eye wrtnesies, P.Ws 1 and 2, had made a satisfactory statement,
the plea of alibi set up by the first respondent has to be viewed
with considerable doubt and respondents two and four may not
be entitled to the benefit of the said doullt. As only two shots
had been fired, it was possible for the assailants to escape quickly
and the theory of the witnesses making a mistake cannot be excluded. It cannot be stated that respondents three and four had
the common intention to commit the murder, as villagers in good
faith pass on the road in the mid-night carrying lathi:;. Both respondents two and three Ill.llY have had lathis and it is also likely
that they may have accompanied the other two respondents, but
they may have done so without any knowledge that fire-arms were
being carried to commit the murder of Sikander Khan. If the incident has taken place at night making it clear that all persons
must have been acting together, it may be held that common
inte11'1ion of all was to commit the murder. Though it may be
that the party of the accused was responsible for the murder, the
evidence of the partisan witnesses is not satir.factory and as such
all the accused are enti'tled to the benefit of doubt".
On behalf of the appellant State, Mr. 0. P. Rana, learned
counsel, attacked the judgment of the High Court on the ground
that before reversing the conviction and sentence passed on the
respondents, and acquitting them, the learned Judges h_ave not
adverted to the main evidence relied on by the prosecution and,
without recording any finding, have accepted the plea of alibi set
up by the first respondent. The order of acquittal has been passed
b!y the High Court, according to the learned counsel, on mere
conjectures and without any reference to the materials on record.
Quite naturally, he pressed before us the various items of evidence
relied on by the learned Sessions Judge for convicting the respondents and which .have not been taken into account by the High
Court.
Mr. D. Mookerjee, learned counsel for the reipondents one
and three, pointed out, what according to him were serious discrepancies in the evidence adduced by the prosecution. The
counsel urged that though the judgment of the High Court has not
elaborately considered and dealt with al! those matters. nevertheless
thev must have been in the minds of the learned Judges of the High
Court when thev gave the benefit of doubt to the accused and
acquitted them. ·It-was further stressed that the State has not madJ
out a case for this Court, in exercise of its powers under Article
136. to interfere with the decision of the High Court acquitting
:the accused.
33~
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 3 S.C.R.
Mr. B. R. Aggarwala, learned counsel appearin,11; for the 4th A
Respondent, adopted most oi. the general arguments that have
been advanced by Mr. Mookerjee. He particularly stressed that
the conviction of the 4th Respondent for an offence under section
302 IPC, with the aid of section 34, is not justified, as there is
nothing in the evidence to show that, even if the shooting by Respondents 1 and 2 is accepted, the said criminal act was done qy B
the said accused in furtherance of the common intention of all ~
four accused. According to him there is no evidence to establish
that the criminal act was done in concert or pursuant to a pre'
arranged plan. The counsel drew our attention to the evidence
of P. Ws 1 and 2, which at the most, according to him, only establishes that all the accused came together and that they left the c
place at the same time after the shooting waS done by Re>pondents
1 and 2. Those witnesses do not speak of any overt act done by
Respondent 4. He further pointed out that in the first information
report given by P.W. 1, there is no reference to the 4th Respondent
being armed wrth a lathi. Both P.Ws 1 and 2 have improved
upon this version in the F.l.R. Before the court, they have stated
D
that Respondents 3 and 4 came armed with lathis. But even
then, he pointed out, those wrtnesses did not speak of ariy further
part played by Respondent 4 except that he was in the company
of the other accused. The counsel drew our attei;ition to the decision of the Judicial Committee in Mahbub Shah v. KingEmperor(') as well as the decision of this Court in Pandurang, ll
Tukia and Bhil/ia v. The State of Hyderabad(') wherein the
ingradients necessary for the application of section 34 of the Indian
Penal Code have been laid down. In view of the total lack of
evidence to establish that the act was done in furtherance of the
common intention of all, the counsel urged that the order of acquittal passed by the High Court in favour of the 4th Respondent F
does not require interference.
We may at this stage mention that the evidence regarding the
participation of Respondents 3 and 4, who are tloth stated to have
come with Jathis, is the same. Therefore, we will have due regard
to the contentions of Mr. Aggarwala, even when the case of the
3rd Respondent is being dealt with by us.
G
We will later refer to the various aspects that were pressed
before us by the learned counsel for the accused.
It must be stated that in view of the approach made by the
High Court, by not considering the various items of evidence and
recording suitable findings, both the learned counsel found considerable difficulty in supporting the judgment of the High Court,
(I) [1945] L.R. 721.A. 148.
• ,_,
1
(2) [J955J S.C.R .. t083 ..
H
U.P. STATE v. IFTIKHAR KHAN
A
(Vaidialingam, !.)
335
though it must be stated in fairness to them that they tried their
very best to do so.
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ff
We have earlier broadly indicated the views expressed bi}' the
High Court. It must be remembered that the High Court was
dealing, apart trom an appeal by the convicted accused, also with
a reference made by the learned Sessions Judge under section 3-7 4,
Criminal Procedure Code, for confirmation of the sentence of
death passed on respondents one and two for an offence of murder.
As pointed out by this court in Masalti v. State of U.P., (')
under such circumstances there was a duty on the High Court to
independently consider the matter carefully and to examine all
relevant and material circumstances. A perusal of the judgment
of the High Court gives the unfortunate impression that this principle has not teen borne in mind.
Before we reler to the evidence on record as well as the con·
tentions of Mr. Mookerjee, it is desirable to clear the ground regarding the powers. of this Court under article 136 to interfere
with the orders of acquil'lal passed by the High Court. It has been
strenuously pressed before us by Mr. Mookerjee that unless the
conclusion reached by the High Court is such that no Tribunal
will come to, this Court will not interfere with the order of acquittal. while exercising power under Article 136. It is true that this
Court will interfere in the circumstances mentioned by Mr.
Mookerjee. but that is not the only circumstance under which
interference will be warranted. There are several other circumstances under which interference may and has been made by this
Court. We will refer to some of those circumstances presently.
It is now well established !hat in appeals against acquittal by
special leave under Article 136, this Court has no doubt powers
to interfe•e with findings of fact, no distinction being made bet·
ween judgments of acquittal and conviction. It has also been
held that this. Court will not ordinarily interfere with the appreciation of evidence or on findings of fact unless the High Court has
acted perversely or otherwise improperly or there has been a· grave
miscarriage of justice. It has been further held that where this
Court found that grave injustice has been done by the High Court
on grounds which are plainly untenable and the view taken by the
High Court is clearly unreasonable on the evidence on record. a
case for interference is made out. The recent decisions of this
Court on this aspect laying down the above principles are to be
found in Him11chal Pmdrsh Administration v. Om Prakas/1(')
and State of Uttar Pradesh v. Samman Dass.(')
(1) (1964] fA) S.C.R. 1)3,
(2) A.J.R.1972 S.C. 975.
(3) Crim•nal Appeal No. 17of1971 decided on'll·1·1972.
\
336
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1973} 3 S.C.R.
Bearing in mind the above principles, we will now refer to the
material evidence on record. The evidence· of P .W. 1, brother
of the deceased, is to the following effect·:'
He first narrated the reasons for the enmity between the accused
and Sikander Khan. At about 8.30 P.M. on October 16, 1967,
his brother, the deceased Sikander Khan, was sitting opposite to
his shop and reading 'Jang Nama'. P.W. 1 and his brother, P.W.
2, were also wrth the deceased listening to the reading of the epic.
Suddenly the four accused came together to the place where
Sikander Khan was sitting. The respondents one and two, who
were armed with pistols, fired a shot each at Sikander Khan. The
.shots hit Sikander Khan in the chest and in the neck· and he fell
down dead.. On his raising an alarm, his neighbours, Laddan
Khan, Babban Khan, Munnan Khan and lbne Hasan and others
came there and found Sikander Khan dead. When respondents
three and four came with the other accused, they had lathis with
them. After the shooting, all the accused ran away. He gave
the first information report at about 11.35 P.M. which was record·
ed by P.W. 7 .. The evidence of P.W. 2 is also substantially to
the same effect. Surprisingly, P .Ws 1 and 2 have not been crossexamined, when they spoke of enmity between Sikander Khan and
·
the accused.
In the first. information· report, after referring to the murder
of Aqil Khan and other matters, P .W. 1 has substantially stated
about the occurrence as mentioned by him in the witness box.
He referred to the presence of his brother, P.W. 2, as also the
villagers referred to in his evidence as having come to the scene
immediately after the. shots were fired.
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It is no doubt true that both P.Ws 1 and 2 are the brothers of F
the deceased. ·This aspect has been taken into account by the
learned Sessions Judge and he has considered their evidence to
be truthful.· But whrn we come to the High Court, there is neither
an analysis nor proper consideration of the evidence of these two
eye witnesses. The. learned judges of the ffigh Court stated that
they are partisan witnesses. True it is that they are partisan wit· G
nesses being the brothers of the deceased. The reason given by the
High Court for rejecting the evidence of those witil;:sses is that'
P.W 2 has made a false statement with regard to the presence or .
absence of Iftikhar Khan in the village on the 14th and 15th
October, 1967. It is the further view of the High Court that when
the evidence of P.W. 2 is not being accepted, the evidence of
P. W. 1 also cannot be accepted, as both brothers must be placed H
in the same category. This line of ~easoning, in our opinion, is
erroneous.
•
•
U.P. STATE v. !FTlKHAR KHAN
(Vaidialingam, J.)
337
A
The plea of alibi set up by the first respondent will be considered by us later. But it is necessary to refer to 'the answers given
m the cross-exarnmauon of P.Ws l and 2 to consider whether the
approach made by the High Court for rejecting their evidence is
juscified. We find tha't the cross-examination of these two witnesses is very scanty. The only suggestion made to P. W. l was
B whether Ittikhar Khan had been aamitted to some hospital at
Bareilly on the day of occurrence, namely, Octobier 16, 1967.
His answer was th.at the suggestion is not correct. There is no
further question put to this witness regarding the respondent one
having been admitted in the hospital, the duration of his stay in the
hospital or his discharge from the hospital. P.W. 2 in crossc examination has stated that he had seen lftikhar Khan all along
in the village on the day of occurrence and for three or four oays
before the occurrence. This must be the answer obviously to a
question whether the witness had seen Iftikhar Khan in the village
on the day of the occurrence and also during the three or four
days before October 16, 1967. No further questions have been
D put to this witness. It is on the basis of the answer given by,P.W.
2 that the High Court has rejected, not only his evidence but
also the evidence of P.W. 1. In our opinion, the approach made
by the High Court is erroneous, especially when we do not find
any positive finding by !he court that the first respondent was in
the hospital on October 16, 1967. The High Court's rejection
E of their evidence has been substantially on the ground that, they
being the brothers of the deceased, were partisan witnesses and,
therefore, their evidence is unworthy of credence. Here again,
the learned Judges have committed an error. It is no doubt true
that when the court has to appreciate the evidence given by witnesses who are partisan or interested, it has to be very careful in
weighing
their evidence. Some of the points to be taken into
F
account will be whether or not there are discrepancies in the evidence; whether or not the evidence strikes the court as genuine;
whether or not the story disclosed by the evidence is true. In our
opinion, it is unreasonable to reject the evidence given by the
witnesses merelv on the ground that they are partisan or interested
witnesses.
Judicial approach has to be very cautious in dealing
G
with such evidence. The Hi~h Court has not given due c~~si<tera
tion to these aspects also when rejecting fhe evidence of P.Ws 1
and 2: This also answers the contentions of Mr. Mookerjee that
the evidence of P.Ws I and ?.. who are partisan wf!nesses, bas
been rightly rejected h'y the High Court.
H
Mr. Mooketjee next pointed out that the non-exami11ation bv
the prosecution of the nerson~ mentioned in the first information
report and who. according to the prosecution, have seen the occur-
338
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973) 3 S.C.R.
rence, must have weighed with the High Court in rejecting the
interested testimony of P.Ws 1 and 2. He further stressed "that
there was a duty on the part of the prosecution to have examined
those persons who have witnossed the occurrence irrespective of
the nll!ture of the evidence that they may give before the court.
On the other hand, he pointed out that those persons, who can be
called independent witnesses, have been kept back and only the
brothers of the deceased have been examined and the prosecution
must bear the consequences of such evidence not having been
accepted by the court.
The counsel further ·urged that the non-examination of those
per5ons, mentioned in the first information report, who have seen
the occurrence, has prejudiced the accused and, therefore, theit
conviction, by the trial court, based merely on the testimony of
P. Ws 1 and 2, who are none else than the Qi-others of. the dei;eased,
cannot be considered to have been arrived at after a fair trial.
It is no doubt true that, as pointed out by this Court in Habeeb
Mohammad v. The State of Hyderabad(!), it is the duty oE the
prosecution to
examine all material witnesses essential
to the unfolding of the narrative on which the prosecution is based,
whether in the result the effect of that testimony is for or against
the case of the prosecution. In the said decision, the observations
made to the same effect by the Judicial Commilltee in Stephen
Seneviratne v. The /(ing( 2 ) have been quoted with approval.
To a similar effect is also the recent decision in Sahaj Ram &
Others v. The State of U.P.( 8 ).
After giving due consideration to the above contentions of
Mr. Mookerjee, we are of the opinion that, in the particular circumstances of this case, there was justification for the non-examination of Laddan Khan, Baboon Khan, Ibne Hasan and Munnan
Khan. • From the evidence of the investigating officer, P.W. 8,
it is seen that the statements were recorded by the police from the
above persons on the morning of October 17. 1967. P.W. 1 in
his chiel examination had stated that Laddan Khan, Babban Khan
and Ibne Hasan had seen the murder of his brother, Sikander
Khan. It is his further evidence that though they had seen the
murder, yet due to fear of the accused persons they had filed a
false affidavit on April 16, 1968, before the Committing Magi.~
ttate that they had seen nothing. So far as we could see, there is
no cross-examination of P.W. 1 on this point. When these three
persons had filed affidavits before the Committing MagiStrate that
they bad seen nothing, it serves no purpose to insist on the prose-mi·t9"4J S.C.R. 4,5.
(2) A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 289.
(3l Criminal ~No. 131 of 1969 decided on 17·11·1972.
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U.P. STATE v. IFTIKHAR KHAN
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(Vaidialingam, J.)
339
cution examining them as witnesses. So far as Munnan Khan
is concerned, he is the uncle of P.Ws I and 2 and the deceased
and the evidence of P.Ws I and 2 is that he came running to the
scene when an alarm was raised. His evidence would not have
carried the matters further because he had come only after the
actual shooting had taken place. His evidence is not essential to
the unfolding of the prosecution case; and as much he was not a
material witness. Therefore, this criticism regarding the non-·
examination of the said four persons has to be rejected.
The main plea of the first respondent was that on the date of
the occurrence he was in the Bareilly hospital and, therefore, the
evidence of the prosecution witnesses regarding his participation
in the murder is false. All the four accused surrendered b,efore
the Magistrate on November 4, 1967. On the said date, the first
respondent filed a statement before the Magistrate to the effect
tha<t on the date, when the murder is alleged to have taken pface,
namely, October 16, 1967, he was already in the District hospital,
Bareilly from October 14, 1967 to Oc'lober 31, 1967, and that he
was also operated upon for hydrocele in the meanwhile. According
to him, he was in the hospital durin11: the entire period from
October 14, 1967 to October 31, 1967. If 'this is established.
there can be no doubt that his acquittal by the High Court will be
justified. Again if he was in the hospital on October 16, 1967.
the evidence given by the witnesses regarding the participation in
the crime of nat only the fi.rst resvondent but also of the other
respondents. will have to be viewed with greater care and caution
i.e. whether their evidence can be considered to be true even· re~arcling the participation of resnondents two to four.
But the
question is whether on the evidence it can he helri that the first
respondent was in the hospital on October 16. 1967.
In support of his plea of alibi, the first respondent had
examined the Medical Officer, D.W. 1, and two nurses, D. Ws 2
and 3 working in the said hospital. As the name of another
person was also mentioned by D.Ws 2 and 3, as having been working in the hospital in the particular ward on the relevant date. the
learned Sessions Judge has examined the said person as C.W. 1.
D.W. 1 no doubt refers to the first respondent havin!l' been admitted as an indoor patient in the district hospital, Bareilly. on
October 14, 1967. But he has stated that the operation of the
~aid accused for hydrocele. which had been fixed originally on
October 16. 1967. did not tal.;e rtace and that he was actl'allv
operated on October 18, 1967. But the point to be noted from
the evidence of this witness is that he can~ot say on oath that on
340
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1973] 3 S.C.R.
October 16, 1967, the fifS't respondent was present in the hosphal
all along. He has also stated mat on Octooer 16, 1967, the first
respondent might have been in a frt pos111on to move about and
that there is no signature of the said accused in the, records of the
hospital on October 16, 1967. D.W. 2 claims to be the sister-incharge of the hospital on October 16, 1967. She has stated that
she was on duty from 7.00 A.M. to 12.00 A.M. and again from
4.00 P.M. to 8.00 P.M. on October 16, 1967. It ls her further
evidence that she can say from memory that on October 16, 1967,
the first respondent, Iftik:har Khan, whom she is able to recognise
by sight, was in the hospital. 111 view of this statement, quite
naturally, she was very severely cross-examined 1fy the prosecution. She had admitted in cross-examination that there is n0record to say that she was on duty in the hospital on October 16,
1967 and that there is also no record to show that she counted the
patients and satisfi,!Od herself that the first respondent was in the
hospital. Even in cross-examination she has stated that she counted the number of patients at 4.00 P.M. on October 16, 1967, in
the presence of CW 1. But she is prepared to admit that the
operation, which was scheduled to take place on October 16, 1967,
was postponed because the operation fee was not paid by the first
respondent. She has wound up her evidence by stating that all
the answers given by her on December 18, 1968, regarding the
presence of the first respondent in the hospital on October 16,
1967, were from her memory. To a specific question by the Court,
this witness bas further stated that it is only on the basis of
memory that she was saying that she took charge of the patients
on October 16, 1967, at 4.00 P.M. along with the student nurse,
Sharma, CW I. She bas admitted that in the 'Da)' and Night'
register, which appears to have teen produced before the court,
it has not been noted that CW 1 came on duty at 4.00 P.M. on
October 16, 1967. DW 3, another staff nurse, working in the
hospital, has stated that she may have been on duty on October
16, 1967, from 7.00 A.M. to 4.00 P.M. But on seeing the first
respondent in the dock. she has stated that she is not sure if the
same person was admitted for operation of bydrocele in the hosoital. In fact. in an answer to a auestion out bv tbP. court. she
has admitted that she cannot say if the first respondent was in
her' ward at any time, even between 7.00 A.M. and 4.00 P.M.
on October 16, 1967.
Cominq to CW 1, she has categoricallv denied that she was
ever out in-cba•ge of the ward on October 16. 1967. and she
bas also denied having made anv countinJ! of patients and that at
4.00 P.M. and in the comoanv of DW 2. She has also stated
that she cannot say il the first respondent was an indcor patient
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U.P. STATE v. IFTIKHAR KHAN
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34 I
in the hospital on October 16, 1967. From the above evidence,
it is evident that it is onlv DW 2 who has stated that the 1st Respondent-accused was in "the hospital on October_ 16, 1967, from
morning till 8.00 P.M. If he was in the hospital at 8.00 P.M .•
it is evident that he could not have been present at the scene of
occurrence at 8.30 P.M. That much is accepted by the prosecuB tion .. But the learned Sessions Judge has dis-l~lieved the evidence
of DW 2. Her evidence, as mentioned earlier, is purely a guess
work and from memory. There are no records produced from·
the hospital to corroborate her evidence that the first respondent
was in the hospital on October 16, 1967. In fact, CW 1, in whose
company the counting of patients is stated to have been done by
c DW 2, finally contradicts the latter. _ DW 3 does not support
DW 2. The High Court, while considering the evidence of the- .
Medical Officer, DW 1, does not express _its opinion as to the·
truthfulness or otherwise of DW 2 except saying that nurses haveto work at very great speed in the hospitals and that they can also
make mistakes. It is a bit difficult to appreciate in what context
D
this observation has been made by the High Court. It is no doubt
true that from the evidence of DW 1, the Medical Officer, it is
evident that the first respondent was admitt~d in the hospital on·
October 14, 1967. Though there is no clear' evidence, one way orthe other, it is very likely that he was in the hospital ,also on Octo-ber 15, 1967. But the evidence of DW 1 is clear to the elfect that
E he cannot speak of the first respondent having been in the hospital"
on October 16, 1967. DW 3 and CW t did not state that thefirst respondent was in the hospital on Octot,.r 16, 1967. DW 1
is also positive when he says that the operation, which was scheduled to take place on October 16, 1967, was postponed to
October 18, 1967. and that the first respondent was in a positiow.
F to move about on the foriner _date. These circumstances clearly
show that it was possible for the first respondent to be absent from·
the hospital on October 16,-1967.- None of the witnesses examined by the defence have stated that once a person has been admitted"
to the hospital, he cannot leave the hospital under any circums-tances till he is discharged. Nor do they say that any particular
G patient can leave the hospital only with their perrnissicn. Admrl'tedly, none of the witnesses spoke about any permission having·
been asked for on given to the first respondent to be at 1-ent from
the hospital. In view of these facts, it is reasonable to infer that
because of 1he very minor ailment that the first respondent had, itwas possible for him to leave tlie hospital on October 16, 1967,
H and to _be absent throughout the day or, at any rate, in the evening.. To conclude on this aspect, the evidence of the defence witn~sses;
does not rule out the possit~lity of the first respondent being ab-
342
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 3 S.C.ll.
sent from the hospital and his being found at the scene of occurrence as spoken to by the eye witnesses.
Mr. Mookerjee no doubt urged that the High Court might
have been influenced by the fact that the evidence of the defence
witnesses creates a lot Q_f doubt about the participation of the first
respondent in the crime. We are prepared to agree that if the said
evidence really raises a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court
regarding the participation in the crime by the first respondent.
that doubt must be resolved in his favour. In this context, it is
pertinent to quote the followiag observations in the decisioe in
Himachal Pradesh Administration Vs. Om Prakash(') :
"The benefit of doubt to which the accused is entitled is reasonable dou~t--'the doubt which rational
thinking men will reasonably, honestly and conscientiously entertain and not the doubt of a timid mind .which
fights shy-though unwillingly it may be--or is afraid
o.'. the logical consequences, if that benefit was not given;
or as one great .Judge said it is 'not the doubt of a vacillating mind that has not the moral courage to decide but
shelters itself in a vain and idle scepticism".
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In our opinion, the evidence of the defence witnesses does not
create any reasonable doubt, even in favour of the first respondent.
In the case before us, the learned Sessions Judge has convicted
the first respondent for an offence under section 302. The 3rd
and 4th respondents were convicted under section 302 read with
section 34 of the Indian Penal Code for having associated themselves, armed wi'th lathis, wi'th the other accused with the ccmmon
intention of committing the murder of Sikander Khan.
This is the convenient stage to deal with the contention of
Mr. Aggarwala, learned counsel for the 4th Respondent, that even
if the presence of his client at the time ot the occurrence is proved
the evidence has not established that the criminal act was done by
Respondents I and 2 in furtherance of the common intention of
all the four accused. As this relates also to the 3rd Respondent,
the question is whether section 34 can be applied in the case of
the said two Respondents. As we have already indicated, the
evidence regarding the participation of Resoondents 3 and 4
is common. Hence, if the contention of Mr. Aggarwala regarding
the non-applicabilitv of section 34 with respect to the 4th Respondent is accepted. the same will apply to the 3rd Respondent
also.
(IJ A.J.R.1972 S.C.97l.
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U.P. STATE
v. IFTIKHAR KHAN (Vaidialingam, J.)
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As pointed out by the Judicial Committee in Mahbub Shah
v. King-Emperor("), to invoke the aid of section 34 IPC it
must be shown that the criminal act complained against, was
dcne by any one of the accused persons in the furtherance of the
common intention of all. If this is shown, anyone of the accused
persons may be made liable for the crime, in the same manner
B as if the act were done b!y him alone. To convict an accused of
an offence, applying section 34, it is necessary to establish that
the criminal act was done in concert pursuant to a pre-arranged
plan. It is also to be borne in mind that it is difficult, if not impcssible, to procure direct evidence to prove 'the intention of a
person. Therefore courts, in most cases, have to infer the intention
c from the Act or the conduct of a particular person or from the
other relevant circumstances of the case. It is also to be remembered, as emphasised by the Judicial Committee, that 'the inference·
of common intention, within the meaning of the term in section 34,
should never be reached unless it is a necessary inference deducible
from the circumstances of the case'.
D
The above principles have been reiterated by this Court in
Pandurang, Tukia and Bhillia v. The State of Hy(ierabad('). It
has also been stated in the said decision that there is no special
rule of evidence for applying section 34 and "at bottom, it is
a question of fact in every case and however similar the circumstances. facts in one case cannot be used as a precedent to deterE mine the conclusion on the facts in another. All 'that is ·necessl!ry
is either to have direct proof of prior concert, or proof of circumstances which necessarily lead to that inference, or, as we prefer to
put it in the time-honoured way, the incriminating facts must be
incompatible with the innocence of the accused and incapable of
explanation on any other reasonable hypothesis".
F
In Krishna Govind Patil v. State of Maharashtra('), the
principle has again been reiterated that before a court convicts a
Person under section 302 read with section 34, it has to record a
definite finding that the said person had prior concert with one
or more other persons, armed or unarmed, for committing the said
G offence. In Jaikrishnadas Manohardas Desai and Another v.
The State of Bombay(') it has been held that "the essence of
liability under section 34 is to be found in the existen~ of a common intention animating the offenders leadinJ! to the doing of a
criminal act in furtherance of the common intention and presence
of the offender sought to be rendered liable under section 34 is
not,
on the words of the statute, one of the conditions of its appliH
{1945] L.R. 72 I.A. 148.
(3) {1964] I S.C.R. 678.
(I)
(2) 11955] S C.R. 1083.
(4) [1960] S.C.R. 309.
344
liUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 3 S.C.R,
i:ability." As explained by Lord Sumner in Bilrendra Kumar
Ghose v. The King Emperor,\') ''!he ieadmg feature· ol sei:\ton
.34 of the Indian Penal Code 1s ·participation' m action. To establish joint resp!>ns1b11ity tor an. olfence, it must of course be esta.blished that a crimmal act was done by several persons; the participation must be 1n doing the act, not merely in its planning. A
.common intention-a meeung of minds-to commit an oil'ence
.and participation in the commission of the offence in furtherance
of iliat common intention mvite the application of section 34.
But this participation need not in a.11 cases be by physical presence.
In offences involving physical violence, normally presence at the
scene of offence of the offenders sought to be rendered liable on
the principle of joint liaWlity may be necessary, but such is not
'1he case in respect of, other offences where the offence consists of
diverse acts which may be done at different times and places".
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Having due regard to the various decisions referred to above,
the question is whether the evidence in the case before us establishes that the shooting of Sikander Khan by Respondents 1 and
2 was done in furtherance of the common intention of all the four D
accused. The evidence of PW s 1 and 2 is to the effect that all
the four Respondents are residents of the same village and Respondents 1 and 3, who are brothers, are bitterly inimical to
Sikander Khan, the deceased. Respondents 2 and 4 are their close
friends. There is evidence regarding murder of a brother of Respondent 1 and the acquittal of the deceased after trial in connection E
with that murder. The evidence is also to the effect that Respon·
<lents 1 and 2 were on bail at the material time, having been con'Victed by the Trial Court in connection with an attempt to murder
-one, Ilyas Khan, who was a close associate of the deceased. These
facts have not been challenged by the accused in the cross-exami-n·ation of PWs 1 and 2. Respondents 1 and 2 armed with pistols F
and Respondents 3 and 4 armed with latbis, suddenly came in a
'body through a lane to the place where Sikander Khan was sitting
'and reciting 'Jang Nama'. Respondents 1 and 2 fired shots in
<1uick succession at Sikander Khan who fell down dead. Respon·
dents 1 and 2 again re-loaded their pistols, but, on PWs 1 alld 2
who were with the deceased, raising an alarm, they ran away firing G
lihots. All the four accused ran away together.
When Resoondents 3 and 4 were examined by the court under
·section 342. their only answer was that they had been implicated
due to enmitv of the witnesses. There is no suggestion to PWs 1
and 2 bv either Respondent 3 or 4 re1?arding any reason or justification for their presence near the deceased at the material time.
Yf once the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 i~ accepted, as we are inclined
(I) (t924)"I..R. S2 I.~. '40, S2.
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U.P. STATE v. IFTIKHAR KHAN
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to do, the presence of the four accused together at the time of the
occurrence stands clearly established. It is true that for invoking
section 34 against the accused, prior concert or a pre-arranged
plan has to be established. But as it is difficult to prove the intention of an individual, it has to be inferred from his act, or conduct and other relevant cic'cumstances. It is in evidence that Respondents 1 and 3 are bitterly inimical to Sikander Khan and that
Respondents 2 and 4 are their close associate;. There is also
evidence ab~ut the murder of the brother of the 1st Respondent
and the deceased, llyas Khan and certain others being tried for
that offence as also their acquirtal in the said case. The evidence
is also furtb.er to the effec.t that the 1st and 2nd Respondents made
an attempt to murder Ilyas Khan by shooting him with a pistol
some months before the incident. The said two accused were
prosecuted and convicted biy the Sessions Court. But about twenty
days before the murder of Sikander Khan, bCJth Respondents 1 and
2 had been released on bail pending their appeal. It was at that
time that this murder took place. These statements made by PWs
1 and 2 have not been challenged by the 3rd _and 4th Respondents.
There is also no suggestion to the .witnesses that Respondents 1
and 2 had hidden their pistols and they drew them out suddenly
when they shot at the deceased. It is no doubt true that there is
no evidence regarding any over tact having been done by Respondents 3 and 4 at the time when Sikander Khan was shot at. It
is not necessary, to attract section 34, that any oven act mur.t be
done by the panicular accused. The section will l1e attracted
if it is established that the criminal act has been done by anyone
of the accused persons in furtherance of the common intention .
If this is shown-and in this case we are satisfied that it has been
so shown-'the liability for the crime may be imposed on anyone oi.
the persons in the same manner as if the act were done by him
alone. Their accompanying Respondents 1 and 2, who were
armed with pistols, in the background spoken to by PWs 1 and 2,
they themselves being armed with lathis and all the four coming
together in a body and running away together in a 1:1ody after the
shooting was over, coupled with nq explanation being given for
their presence at the scene, lead to the necessary inference of a
prior concert and pre-arrangement and that the criminal act was
done by Respondents I and 2 in furtherance of the common intention of all. Therefore, Respondents 3 and 4 will have to be
held liable for the crime in the same manner as if the [<Ct were
done by any one of them alone. In view of the circumstances
mentioned above, in our opinion, Respondents 3 and 4 have to be
held guilty under section 302 read with section 34.
346
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 3 S.C.R.
The High Court has reversed the finding of conviction on
grounds, wn1ch are wholly untenable, The view of the High Court
lLlat the accused must be given the benefit of doubt, is wholly unrea~onabile and is not warr!lnted by the materials on record. __The
High Court, without a proper consideration of the evidence of
PWs 1 and 2, has acquitted the accused. The said evidence clearly
shows that the first respondent committed the murder of Sikander
Khan by shooting him with a pistol. That evidence also establishes,
as held by us, the participation oi Respondents 3 and 4 so as to
make them liable under section 302 read with section 34. The
High Court has stated that the villagers pass on the road at 8.30
PM with lathis and, therefore, there was nothing unusual in the
3rd and 4th Respondents being found with lathis. This is an
observation made by the High Court without any reference to the
evidence on record. There is a further observation that the said
Respondents may have accompanied Respondents Nos. 1 and 2
without any knowledge that they were carrying fire-arms with a
view to commit the murder of Sikander Khan. This observation
clearly shows that the High Court has not given any consideration
to the evidence on record. We have earlier held thqt Respondents
3 and 4 are guilty under section 302 read with section 34 and,
therefore, the a.cquittal by the High Court of these Respondents
is absolutely unjustified.
The fact thM the High Court was also dealing with a reference
under section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, particularly
regarding Respondents 1 and 2, and as such had a duty to appraise
the evidence for itself for arriving at its own independent conclusion, does not stand in the way of this Court interfering with the
order of the High Court when it reverses the decision of the Trial
Court on grounds, which are plainly fallacious and untenable.
Though this Court does not, in an appeal under Article 136.
normally reappraise the evidence and interferes with the assessment of that evidence by the High Court, in the case on hand,
grave injustice has been done by the High Court interferin~ with
the decision of the Trial Court on grounds, which are plainly untenable. The view taken by the High Court is clearly unreasonable
on the evidence on hand. Therefore, there is ample justification
for this Court interfering with the decision of the High Court.
In our view, the evidence in this case was sufficient to justify
the conviction of the first Respondent for the offence of murder
under section 302 and of the 3rd and 4th Respondents for an
offence under section ~02 read with section 34.
Then the question is regarding the sentence. The 3rd and 4th
Respondents were sentenced to imprisonment for life by the
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Sessions Judge. That sentence will be allowed to stand. The first
Respondent, Iftikhar Khan, son of Mohammad Hasan, was sentenced to death by the learned Sessions Judge. Though this is a
pre-eminently fit case for the imposition of the sentence of death,
the question is whether this Court should impose the said sentence
on him now. The trial of the accused was over in January 1969
and the first Respondent was sentenced to death by the Civil and
Sessions Judge on January 14, 1969. We are now in 1973. In
between, the High Court had acquitted him and set him free.
Under those circumstances, we are of the view th~t the interest
of justice would. be adequately met by sentencing him to imprisonment for life for the offence under section 302 l.P.C.
In the result, we set aside the judgment and order of the High
Court acquitting Respondents Nos. l, 3 and 4 and the appeal is
allowed. We convict the lst Respondent for the offence under
section 302 and sentence him to undergo imprisonment for life.
We further convict the 3rd and 4th Respondents for the offence
under section 302 read with section 34 and sentence them to
undergo imprisonment for life.
There will bie no order on the appeal so far as the 2nd Respondent, Ishitaq Khan, son of Mukhtar Khan, is concerned, as it has
become infructuous due to his having been murdered during the
pendeilcy of the appeal.
V.P.S.
7--L 796Sup.C . I. /7 3
Appeal allowed.
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