GUMAN SINGH versus STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 26 July 1971 | [1971] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 900 | 1971 INSC 164
Key facts
- Decided
- 26 July 1971
- Bench
- S.M. SIKRI*, G.K. MITTER, C.A. VAIDYIALINGAM, P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, I.D. DUA
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 1815/1970
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Citation
- [1971] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 900
- Neutral citation
- 1971 INSC 164
Text of the judgment
A
GUMAN SINGH
v.
STATE OF RAJASl'HAN & ORS.
11'/y 26, 1'171
B
c
[S, M. S!KRI, C. J., G. K. MIT'rER, C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, P. JAGAN·
MOHAN REDDY AND I. D. DUA, JJ.J
/laja>thu11 Adtn/11/stratl\'t' Sr•,.vi<',• Ru!ds, 1954, rr. 288(2) a11d 32Va/idity of-Wli•thtr violativr of Arts. 14 & 16 of Constitution b.ca11,. of
abHnce of 1uidtlln•s In the matter of ,,,Im/on of <'and/dates by mtrltCirc11lnr dated August 27, 1966 ll'lirt/ir1· Invalid on th• ground 1/1at the
nuirkln11 .vy.~ft111 laid down i11 /1 went ag1.1in~t the Rules 111 regard to seltc•
tion by mcrit-Dcpartm•11ta/ Promorlon Committee taking advtr11 remarks
in confidtntial report into actount wlthnur tht.fe havfn1f hc•e1t rtJmmurricat-
''" ro the officrr co11cerned-Et1ect.
D
E
F
G
H
The appellant G was a member of I.he Rajasthan Administrative Service. Aggrieved by the order allotting seniority to him under the Raja,.
than Administrative Service H..ules, 1954, he filed a writ petition under Art.
226 in the High Court. A single Judge of the court allowed the petition.
However in appeal by the State the Division Bench decided a11ainst the
appellant who by special leave appealed to this Court. Two other mem·
bers of the Rajasthan Administrative Senice, similarly ag11rieved filed writ
petitions under Art. 32 before this Court. The common questioilS that
fell for consideration in the appeal and writ petitions were; (i) whether
rr. 28B(2) and 32 of the Raja.than Administrative Service Rules w.re
violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution because they did not
contain any 11uidelines in the matter of deteriminina the merit of candidates; (ii) whether the circular dated Au11ust 27, 1966 issued by the State
Government laying down a sysiem of marking for the purpose of determining the merit of candidates was invalid because it was contrary to the
relevant Rules in this regard. The appellant G also complained that ad·
verse remarks in his confidential report which had not been communicat..
ed to him had been taken into account against him by the Departmental
Promotion Committee.
HELD: (i) Rule 32 in essence adopts what is stated in r. 28B. T''°
latter rule provides for two methods of selection one based on merit nnd
the other based on seniority-cum-merit. In other words, the rule provides
that the promotion based on merit in co11tradiction to that based on seniority-cum-merit shall strictly be on the basis of merit. The Selection Committee and the Promotion Committee consist of very responsible and
senior officers of the State and being persons of experience they can be
trusted to evaluate the merits of a partic:utar officer. No doubt the word
'merit' is not capable of easy definition, but it can be safely said that
merit is a sum total of various question!: and attributes of an "mployee
such as his academic qualifications, his distinction in the University, his
character, integrity, devotion to duty and the manner in which he discharges bis official duties. Allied to this may be various other matters
or factors such as his punctuality in work, the quality and out-turn of
work done by him and the manner of ois dealing with his superiors and
subordinate officers and the general public and his rank In the service.
Tbe various particulars in the annual confidential reports of an officer is
OUMAN SINGH v.1\1\IASTHAN (Vaidiallngam, J.)
carefully and properly noted, will aiso give a very broad and general indi·
cation regarding the merit of an officer. Therefore it cannot he stated
that rr. 288 and 32 are in any manner vasue or do not give any guidelines for assegsing the merit ofan officer. [921B-F]
9 (1
A
(ii) (a) The restriction contained in the proviso to sub-r. (2) of r. 288
is quite reasonable. Before an officer in the junior scale can be considered as fit for promotion to the senior scale it ls necessary that be should
have worked on a post in the service at least for some period of time. As
to what the quantum of that period must be is not for this Court to lay
down. Tho Oovernfnent hu fixed this period as six years. It cannot
be said that It Is an Improper restriction. [922A·BJ
n
(b) The provisions contained in sub-r. (2) conftnina tho selection to
senior-most officers not oxceedina 10 tlmes tho number of total vacancle&
is also reasonable. Such a provision will encourage the members of the
service to aspire for promotion for making themselves eligible by increasing their efficiencies In the discharge of their duties. [922B·C]
c
(iii) The object of the impugned circular may be to bring about uniformity in the award of marks. But the directions contained therein do
offend the rules. This is not a case of the Government filling up the gaps
or of aiving executive instructions not provided for by or not inconsistent
with the rules. No discretion is given to the selection or promotion com·
inittee to adopt any method other than that indicated in the circular. Aocording to the principle laid down by this Court in Sant Ram Sharma'&
cue, If the circular dated August 27, 1966 or any part of it gives instructions contrary to or opposed to any of the rules, tho circular or tho!
part of tho circular to that extent would be invalid. By this test the circular
in question was Invalid and must be struck down. [928F-929F]
Sa11t Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasrhmi & A.nr., (1968] l S.C.R. 111,
D
E
nrplied.
(iv) Appellant 0 bd inade a specific grievance in his writ petition
before the High Court about the uncommunicated adverse remarks having been taken 'into account bi' the Departmental Promotion Committee.
Tho Division Bench of the High Court was wrong in holding that since
the Committee had not been made a party to the proceedings this question
could not be gone into. The Government which was the appointing authority was a party before the High Court. It was the duty of the State
Government to place before the High Court all the materials available
before it to enable the Court to consider whether the grievanct of the
appellant was justified or not. The appellant's case must therefore be re:I
considered in the light of the Rules. [932C-H]
F
Civil Appeal No. 1815 of
G
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
January 20, 1970 of the Rajasthan High Court in D. B. Special
Appeals Nos. SS and S7 of 1968 and Writ Petitions Nos. 76 and
139 of 1970.
H
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION :
1970.
Petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for en·
rights.
forc~ment of fundamental
902
A
~UPRBM'B COURT REiPORTS
[1971) SUPP. s.c.R.
R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwa/a, D. P. Singh and R. K. Jain, for
the appellant (in C. A. No. 1815/1970) and the petitioners On both
the petitions.).
Jagadish Swarup, Solicitor-General and K. Ba/dev, Mehta, for
respondent No. 1 (in C. A. No. 1815 of 1970).
B
S. M. Jain, for respondent No. 3 (in C. A. No. 1815 of 1970).
B. Sen and K. Baldev Mehta, for respondent No. 1 (in W. P.
No. 76 of 1970).
c
D
E
F
H
K. Baldev Mehta, for respondent Nos. I, 32 and 33 (in W. P.
No. 139 /1970.).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Vaidialingam, J.-In both the writ petitions under Art. 32
and the civil appea•I, by special leave, common questions that
arise for consideration relate to the validity of rr. 28B and 32 of
the Rajasthan Administrative Service Rules, 1954 (hereinafter to
be referred as the Rules) and the Circular No. F. 1. (6) Apptts.
D/50 dated August 27, 1966 issued by the Chief Secretary to the
Government of Rajasthan as well as the Order of the Government
of Rajasthan No. F. 2(24) Apptts. (A-IV)/ 66 dated January 4, ·
1967. In the two writ petitions the Order No. F. 2(24) Apptts.
(A-IVl /66 dated January 22, 1970 and in Writ Petition No. 139
of 1970 ai further Order of the State Government No. F. 27(24)A
(A-4) /66 dated February 21, 1970 are also challenged. The
nature of the various Orders as well as the Rules and the Circular
that are challenged will be referred to later !lit the appropriate stage.
Civil Appeal No. 1815 of 1970 arises out of the Division
Bench Judgment of the Rajasthan H'igh Court dated January 20.
1970 in D. B. Special Appeal No. 57 of 1968. The facts leading
up to the Civil Appeal may be stated : The appellant is an Arts
Graduate having taken his degree in 1947. He took his Law
Degree in the year 1961 hiwing been placed in the First Division.
He joined the service of the former Jaipur State as Inspector, Customs and Excise, in 1948. On the formation of
the United State of Rajasthan, he was appointed in the service
of the State C1f Rajt!sthan as Inspector, Customs and Excise. In
1950 the Rajasthan Administrative Service was constituted for
Rules governing
the
the State of Rajasthan and the
'conditions of service of
the members therein were
framed in f954 by the Rajpramukh under the proviso
to Art. 309 of the Constitution. Under the Rules the
Adminisrative Service Cadre has three cadres of pay, namely.
Ordina,ry Time Scale, Senior Scale and Selection Grade. The
iippointment to the service cadre was by direct recruitment as well
GuMAN SINGH?. RAJASTHAN (Vaidialingam, J.)
as by promotion from other subordinate services in the State of
Rajasthan. The appointment to the Senior Scale and Selection
Grade was by promotion from amongst the members of the service.
According to the appellant rr. 27 and 32 of the Rules, as they stood
originally provided for promotion to be made only on the basis
of seniority-cum-merit and that sub-rule(2) of r. 27 laid down
various criteria to be taken into account in the matter of selection
of candidates for promotion. It was his further case that r. 28, as
it originally stood, laid down the procedure for recruitment by
promotion to the service on the basis of seniority-cum-merit. The
appellamt was appointed in the year 1957 as member of the Rajasthan Administrative Service as a result of the open competitive
examination held by the State Public Service Commission under
the provisions of the Rajasthan Administrative Service (Emergency)
Rules, 1956. The appellant claimed tha.t his seniority was higher
than that of respondents 2 to 5 as is evident from the seniority list
published on July I, 1964. At this stage it may be mentioned that
though under the Order dated January 4, 1967 of the State Government fifteen officers in the junior scale were promoted and a.ppointed on an officiating basis to the senior scale of the service, the
appellant has made only four of them respondents 2 to
S as parties in these procedings on the ground that
though they were juniors to him, promotion has been
given to them superseding his claims. The other officers
so promoted, even a.ccording to the appellant were
senior to him in service. We may also mention that respon·
dent No. 5 is since dead, but for convenience he will be referred
to by the rank occupied by him as respondent.
In 1965 the State decided to introduce the system of making
promotions to the service on the basis of merit alone in addition
to the existing system of making promotions on the basis of
seniority-cum-merit. With this end in view there were various
amendments made to the Rules by which certain additions were
made and certain other provisions deleted. On December 14,
I 965, r. 28B was incorporated providing for appointment by
promotion to posts in the service on the basis of merit a.nd on
the basis of seniority-cum-merit in the proportion of 50:50 and
the number of eligible candidates to be considered for promotion
is to be 10 times the total number of vacancies to be filled up on
the basis of merit as well as seniority-cum-merit. On the same
date when r. 28B was incorporated sub-rule (2) of r. 27 was
deleted. On January 7, 1966 sub-rules(2) to (6) of r. 28 were
also deleted. On December 14, 1965 a Circular was issued by
the Chief Secretary to the Government of Rajasthan. According
to the appellant the sa·id Circular was a secret one issued without
any authority directing the Selection and Promotion Committees
and the Appointing authorities to follow the instructions given
903
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
904
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPRE!dB COURT RllPORTS
[1971] SUPP. s.c.R.
therein when ma.king selection, promotion or appointment in
\the service. The said ~ircular p1rescribed "merit formula for
making selection of persons to be appointed on the basis of merit
clone and the seniority-cum-merit formula for making selection
of persons to be appointed on the basis of seniority-cum-merit."
The basis for both the types of promotions was the marking
system indicated in the circular. We do not think it necessary
to go more elaborately into the details of this circular or the
authority under which it was issued because it is seen tha.t this
circular was superseded by the circular dated August 27, 1966.
which ls under severe attack in all these proceedings. The contents of the latter Orcular as well as the authority under which it
is purpora.ted to have been issued will be dealt with by us in
due course in the latter part of the judgment. On August 26,
1966 r. 28B was further amended by providing that the proportion of promotion to be made by sdection on the basis of merit
and seniority-cum-merit is to be 1:2 instead of 50:50. On the
same day a proviso was also added to sub-rule (2) of r. 28B providing tha.t only officers who have been in service for not less
than six years in the lower grade of the cadre will be eligible for
being considered for the first promotion in the cadre. On August
27, 1966 the impugned circular was issued by the Chief Secretary
to the State Government. It is the case of the appellant that this
circular was issued without any 111uth1irity and it was again a secret
circular giving directions in the matter of selection, promotion and
appointment to the service to the Committees or the Authorities
incharge of the same. The circular again dealt with the merit
formula and the seniority-cum-merit formul111 on the basis of
marking system indicated therln. 011 September 8, 1966 the State
decided to extend the principles of rnaking selections on the basis
of merit alone to appointments to senior posts also. For this
purpose the original r. 32 was substituted by a new rule providing
for appointments to senior scale 111nCI selection grade posts on the
basis of merit and seniority-cum-merit in the ratio of I : 2 on the
recommendation of the Committee: constituted under the said
rule.
It is the case of the appellant that prior to the notification
dated September 8, 1966 though many posts in the senior scale
of service had fallen vacant even d'uring the years 1963-64 and
1964-65, those post· were not filled up by making promotion on
the basis of the principle of seniority-cum-merit which was in
force at the relevant time. By the Order dated January, 1966,
the State Government created 26 new posts in the Senior Scale of
Service and 14 posts in the Selectio:~ Grade with effect from the
date of the order. As a result of this creation of new posts, about 44
vacancies became available for being filled up by promotion to the
Senior Scale of Service in 1965-66. Nevertheless the vacancies
-
GUMAN SINGH'· RAJASTilAN (Valdfa/i11gam. J.)
were not filled up by the State. After the new r. 32 was incorporated on September 8. 1966 the Government took steps to fill up
the 44 vacnmcies in the Senior Scale of Service and for this purpose a Departmental Promotion Committee was constituted and
the Committee met in the end of September, 1966 for considering
the claims of the officers for purnoses of promotion. On the
basis of the recommendations made by the said Committee, the
Government by the Order dated December 7, 1966 promoted 29
officers to the Senior Scale on the basis of seniority-cum-merit.
Again by the order dated January 4. 1967, which Is another order
under attack in these proceedings, IS officers Including the respont'ents Nos. 2 to S were promoted to the Senior Scale of Service on
the basis of merit alone.
J
According to the appellant by the Orders dated December 7,
1965 and January 4, 1967 promolions had been made quite contrn.ry to rr. 28B and 32 of the Rules. It is the grievance
of the appellant that under the Order dated January 4, 1967 a
lar~e number of officers who had qualified for promotion on the
bn.sis of merit under the merit formula were superseded by the
officers junior to t~m. Though Rules 28B and 32 provided for
selection on the basis of merit gave no indication or guidance
us to what are the factors to be taken into account in assessing
the merit of an officer. The promotions had also been ma<le by
the Committee adopting the principle of awarding marks as direc·
ted by the Circular dated August 27, 1966 which had been issued
without any authority of law. The appella.nt filed S. B. Writ
Petition No. 79 of 1967 in the High Court challenging the vires
of rr. 28B and 32 as violative of Arts. 14 and 16. The appellant
also challeneed the validity and legality of the Circular dated August 27, 1966 as well as the order dated January 4, 1967 giving
oromotions to the respondents Nos. 2 to S to the senior Posts. In
the writ petition the appellant had alleged that the various amendments made to the rules from 'time to time and the delay in making promotions to Senior Posts were all with a view to show favourtism to the third· respondent who was the son-in-law of the Chief
Minister of Rajasthan and to the other respondents who are all
near relations of persons who were the favourites of the Chief Mini~ter of the State. According to the appellant, the Circular dated
August 27, 1966 was issued without any authority and 'in any event
the Government by execution instructions had no power to fetter
the powets of the Selection Committees wh.ich were functioning
under the statutory rules. Even the principles laid down in the Circular regarding the award of marks for assessing the merit were
arbitrary and vague. Rules 28B and 32 were challenged as violative of Arts. 14 and 1.6 inasmuch as the basis of merit had not been
defined anywhere in the rules and no principle~ or guidelines had
hecn laid down in the niles for assessing the merit of an officer.
90 5
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
906
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT RllPORTS
[1971) SUPP. S.C.R.
The provisions laying down the criteria for judging the merit of
an officer contained in sub-rule (2) of r. 27 as well as the procedure for assessing the sa.id merit contained in els. 2 to 6 of r. 28
having disappeared by the deletion of those provisions, according
to the appellant, arbitrary powers haid been conferred by the rules
on the Committees to select any person they liked on the ground
of merit. Apart from the' attack levelled aga-inst rr. 28B and 32
that there were no principles laid down for judging the merits
of an officer, the appellant also attacked as discriminatory and
viola.tive of ·Arts. 14 and 16, the provisions of r. 28B providing
that the number of eligible candidates to be considered was to be
IO times the total number of vacanciies to be filled up and that six
years service was essential for an officer to be eligible for being
considered for first promotion.
The Order dated January 4, 1967 was attacked on the ground
that the promotions had been made: on the basis of illegal rules
as well as the directions contained in the inva.lid Circular dated
August 27, 1966. In particular tl1e appellant contended that
though his service record for the yc:ar 1965-66 was quite good,
nevertheless certain adverse remarks contained in the confidentia.l
rolls which were not communicated to him, had been taken into
account by the Departmental Promotion Committee, which met
in the last week of September, 1966 and hence there has been no
proper consideration of his cla.ims for being promoted to the
Senior post. On a.11 these grounds the appellant attacked rules
28B and 32, the Circular dated August 27, 1966 and the Order
dated January 4, 1967. He also alleged mala fide against the State.
The respondents Nos. 2 to 5 do not appear to have filed any
counter-affidavit. But the State contended that rr. 28B and 32
were not invalid and did not violate the provisions either of Art.
14 or Art. 16. The requirement in the rules regarding promotion
to be based on merit was justified as such selection was necessary
to achieve efficiency in service. The State controverted the allegations of mala fides made by the appellant. Though it was admitted
that the third respondent was the son-in-la.w of the Chief Minister
of the State, it was denied that any favouritism was shown by
the State either to that respondent or to the other respondents
in the matter giving promotions to them. On the other hand, the
Departmental Promotion Committee: considered the claims of
the appellant and other officers and on assessment of the various
claims of the officers promotions were given to the officers mentioned in the Order dated Janua.ry 4, 1967 by the State Government on the basis of the recommendation of the Departmental
Promotion Committee which has also recommended respondents
2 to 5. The State further contended that though promotions
GUMAN SINGH v. RAJASTHAN (Vaidialingam, J.)
had not been made to the Senior Scale in the yeair 1963-64 and
· 1964-65, it was not with a view to favour any particular officer.
Apart from the fact that the State Government boo the power
either to fill up the posts or keep them vacant, in this particular
case the vacancies were not tilled up as an aimendment of the rules
was in contemplation of the State Government. It was urged thait
the rules contained various principles for assessment of merit of
an officer.
Regarding the Circular daited August 27, 1966, the State
contended that the marking system laid down in the Circular
for assessment of ment of an officer was calculated to ensure
objectivity of approach on the p&rt of the Selection Committee.
As there were as many as 35 sets of service rules governing various
services, the Circular was issued to bring about uniformity in
the procedure for assessment of merit and for making selections
on the basis of seniority-cum-merit. The Staite claimed that it
has ·ample powers to issue such a Circular. Regarding the
validity of the Circular the State contended that the Circular
dated August 27, 1966 was issued by the Chief Secretairy in his
administrative capacity being the Head of the Service in
the State. It is within his competence to give guidance
for the proper working of any governmental machinery. The circular is not intended to be a piece of legislation nor is it an order
of the Government.
Regarding the confidentiail reports of the appellant the plea
of the State Government was that the confidential reports of all
the officers including that of the appellant were before the Departmental Promotion Committee when it met for making selection
in September, 1966 and tha·t there was nothing illegal in the said
Committee considering the adverse remarks, if any, made in
those reports. The State finally prayed for dismissal of the writ
petition.
The learned Single Judge who dealt with the writ petition
held that rr. 28B and 32 were not violative of either Arts. 14 or
16. The principle of merit embodied in the rules was valid an?
the Committee charged with the duty under the rules of const·
dering the claims of various officers for promotion was quite
competent to take all the relevant factors when a;;sessing the
merits of an officer regarding his suitability for promotion. The
learned Judge further held that the principle of merit of an officer
being considered for promotion embodied in t~~ rule.s, was really
based on the recommenda.tion of the Admm1strat1ve Ref?~ms
Committee. However, the learned Judge held that ~e. provmo~
in sub-rule (2) of r. 28B restricting the number of eligible candt·
daites to be considered for promotion to ten times the. total num~er
of vacancies, was violative of Art. .16 inasumuch as the claims
907
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
908
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPRBMI COUl!.T l!.llPORT5
[1971] SUPP. S.C.R.
-of various other eligible officers for being considered for promotion
wa~ barred. The learned Judge further held that this portion
of sub-rule (2) of r. 28B is not easily severable from the remaining portion of sub-rule(2) of r. 28B and in consequence be held
that the whole of sub-rule(2) of r. 28B was bad. After considering
the relevant portions of the Circular dated August 27, 1966, the
learned Judge held that the administrative instructions contained
therein had to be adopted and followed by these Committees.
The directions contained therein did! not leave any choice to the
Committees to ignore the same. The administrative directions
contained in the said Circular. acc1)rding to the learned Judge,
provided a rigid formula for being adopted in the matter of
selection fqr promotion and the directions contained therein
restricted the powers and functions e>f the Committees functioning
under the statutory rules. According to the learned Judge, even
on merits, cannot be considered to be reasonable. In this view
the circular was held to be bad as !being repugna.nt to the rules.
Regarding the promotions made under order dated January 4,
1967, the learned Judge held that the directions contained in
the Circular must have been taken into account by the Selection
Committee and hence the promotions were not valid. On this '
reasoning, the learned Judge, by his judgment and order dated
November 7, 1968 held that sub-rule (I) of r. 28B and r. 32
were valid and that sub-rule (2:) of r. 28B was violative .
of Art. 16 and hence that sub-rule vvas bad. The circulair dated
August 27. 1966 was struck down and the promotions of respon·
dents made under the order dated January 4, 1967 were also
struck down.
Aggrieved by the judgment and order of the learned Single
Judge, the first respondent, the State, filed D. B. Speciaol Appeal
No. 57 of 1968 and the respondenti Nos. 2 and 3 filed D. B.
Special Appeal No. 55 of 1968. The: appellant herein filed crossobjections, in the appeal filed ·by the: State challenging the decision of the learned Single Judge upholding the validity of sub-rule
(!) or r. 28B and r. 32. The Division Bench by its order and
judgment dated January 20, 1970 allowed the two appeals Nos.
55 and 57 of 1968 and dismissed the cross-objections filed by the
appellant. The Division Bench held tha.t the view of learned Single
Judge that r. 28B(2) was bad was erreneous. On the other hand,
the Division Bench held that restricting the eligibility of officers
who have put in at least six years of service was quite reasonable
and the further provision in r. 28B(2) regarding the field of selection being confined to senior most officers in the Junior Scale
not exceeding 10 times the total number of vacancies was also
GUMAN SINGH v. RAJASTHAN (Vaidialingam.J.)
reasonable. Differing from the learned Single Judge, the Division Bench held that no part of r. 28B(2) was invalid. The Division Bench agreed with the views of the learned Single Judge
regarding the validity of sub-rule (!) of r. 28B and r. 32. Regarding
the Circular dated August 27, 1966, the learned Judges held that
the marking system indicated therein was rea.Jly based upon the
previous Circular dated August 31, 1960 under which merit was
to be evaluated h'y allotting marks on the previous record of an
officer. The said Circular of 1960 had been in operation in respect
of the said services except the Rajasthain Judicial Service or the
Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service, which were under the control of the High Court. It is the view of the Division Bench that
the Circular of 1966 was very elastic and gave wide discretion to
the Committees to assess the merit of an officer. The Circular
has done nothing except to lay' down broad guidelines for the
excercise of discretion by the Promotion Committee. The system
of marking indicated in the Circular was quite good as it brought
about uniformity in the procedure for assessment of merit. On
this reasoning the learned Judges held that the Circula.r of 1966
was valid and it was in no way repugnant to the rules.
Rega.rding the authority for the Circular, the learned Judges
noted that there has been some confusion in the stand taken by
the State from time to time even when they made a.pplications for
amending their counter-affidavit for making it clear that the Circular h~ been issued not by the Chief Secretary in his individual
capacity but by the State Government. Ultimately, the Division
Bench held that they had examined the cabinet file produced
before them along with the note sheets and that the Court was
satisfied that the Circular of 1966, has been issued with the approval of the State Government. The learned Judges rejected the
plea of ma/a fides raised by the appellant herein. Regarding the
allegation made by the appellant that the adverse remarks which
had not been communicated to him had been taken into account
by the Promotion Committee in September, 1966, the learned
Judges held that as the Departmental Promotion Committee had
not been impleaded as a party, .the question whether the adverse
remarks made against the appellant had been taken into account
by the said Committee cannot be gone into in these proceedings.
Regarding the promotions maide under the Order dated January
14, 1967, the· Division Bench upheld the same as it had already
held that rules 28B and 32 as well as the Circular of 1966 were
all valid. Civil Appeal No. 1815 of 1970 is against the decision
of the Division Bench, reiterating the objections regarding the
validity of the rules, the Circular, as well as the promotions made.
Writ Petition No. 76 of 1970 is filed by Motilal Kakkar,
Apart from challenging rr. 28B and 32 and the Circular of 1966
909
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
~11
u
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1971] SUPP. s.c.R.
A
and the promotions made under the' order dated January 4, 1967,
the writ petitioner challenges also the order dated January 22,
19 70 cc,ntirming the promotions of respondents 2 to 16 in the
Senior Scale. The facts leading up to the writ petition are a.s
follows :
B
The petitioner after obtaining his M. A. Degree in History
and the Law Degree from the Luknow University joined service
in the erstwhile State of Jodhpur on August 1, 1943 as a Special
Officer (Settlement). He entered the Jodhpur State Civil Service
on March 13, 1946 as a· result of the competitive examination
held by the Public Service Commission of that State. At the
time of the formation of the Rajasthan Union, the petitioner was
working as Assistant Director, Civil Supplies, Jodhpur. Ultir
mately the petitioner was appointed to the Raja.sthan Adminis·
trative Service with effect from January 6, 1950. He bas been
serving in various capacities and he was also sent for higher
training to the United St3tes of America by the Government of
India during the period March 23, 1958 to September 27, 1958.
The petitioner thereafter was sent on deputation to the Municipal
Corporation of Delhi as an Assistant Commissioner during the
period June 17, 1963 to April 21, 1964. Later on he was on
depumtion as Principal, Tribal Orientation and Study Centre
during the period May 22, 1964 to March 31, 1967. He became
the District Manager of Food Corporation of India and was
holding that post since July 1, 1968. After giving the history
sheet of respondents Nos. 2 to 16, the petitioner claims that he
wa~ the senior most amongst them and that his seniority has been
so stated in the relevant seniority list. After referring to the
rules as originally framed and the amendments made from time
to time. the petitioner attacks the yalidity of rr. 28B and 32 and
the Circular dMed August 27, 1966 on the same grounds as those
mentioned in Civil Appeal No. 18115 of 1970. According to the
petitioner respondent Nos. 2 to 16 were all his juniors and on the
basis of the illegal rules and the directions given in the Circular,
officiating promotions have been given to those respondents to
the Senior Scale under the Order dialed January 4. 1967.
c
D
E
F
G
H
The petitioner further st3tes that after the judgment of the
•Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court, which is under attack
in the Civil Appeal, the State Government. passed an order on
January 22, 1970 confirming the promotions of respondents Nos.
2 to 16 in the Senior Scale. According to the petitioner as the
officia.ting promotions given to those respondents under the Order
dated January 4, 1967 were invalid, the order of confirmation is
also equally bad. Therefore. he seeks to get that order also
quashed.
le--
GUMAN SINGH I'. RA.IASTHAN (Vaidialingam.J.)
B 11
The St&te Government has filed a very elaborate counteraffidavit. The stand taken by the State in respect of rr. 28B and
and 32 as well as the Circular of 1966 and the Order dated
January 4, 1967 is the sa.me as in the Civil Appeal. The State
has further contended that as the rules are valid and the circular
is also valid, the officiating promotions given under the Order
dated Janua-ry 4, 1967 are also valid. In consequence the State
points out that the order of confirmation dated January 22, 1970
is also valid. The State disputes the allegation of ma/a {ides and
has also pointed out that the Departmental Promotion Committee
considered the claims of all the respondents including tha,t of the
petitioner for promotion. Promotions were made by the Govem
ment on the basis of the recommendation of the said Committee.
The State finally prays for the dismissal of the writ petition.
Coming to Writ Petition No. 139 of 1970, the petitioner
challenges the validity of the rr. 28B and 32, the Circular da.ted
August 27, 1966 and the Orders dated January 4, 1967 and January 22, 1970. The officers covered by those orders are respondents Nos. 3 to 17. The petitioner further challenges the order
dated Februa,ry 21, 1970 passed by the State Government promoting and confirming in the Senior Scale the respondents Nos. 18
to 33. The facts leading up to this writ petition may be stated:
The petitioner after obtaining the B. Sc. (Hons.) Agricultural
Degree in the First Division from the Delhi University and the
LL. B. Degree from the Agra University joined service in the
Delhi Administration on February 6, 1954 a~ Extension Officer,
Agriculture. On January 12, 1959 he was promoted a;; Block
Development Officer in the Delhi Administration, in which capacity he continued till September 30, 1960. The petitioner joined
the Rajasthan Administrative Service on October 1, 1960 after
ha.ving passed the competitive examination held by the State
Public Service Commission. After the probationary period of one
year, he was confirmed in the service with effect from October 1,
1961. His rank has been given as Nos. 332 in the Seniority List
of the Rajasthan Administrative Officers issued in 1964. The
petitioner gives the rank of some of the respondents. After referring to the rules as well as the amendments ma.de from time to
rime and the Circular of 1966, the petitioner levels the same attack
as against them similar to those in the civil appeal. The petitioner
then refers to the officiating promotions to the Senior Sea.le given
to the respondents Nos. 3 to 17 by the Order dated January 4,
1967 as well as to the Order dated January 22, 1970, confirming
their promotions. According to the petitioner these orders are
illegal and invalid for the same reasons urged in the civil a.pJll:lll.
The petitioner further says that several officers were sele.i;ted on
probationary basis and giv~n promotions. but only respolidents
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
912
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
SUPRBME COURT REPORTS
[1971] SUPP. s.c.R.
Nos. 18 to 33 were confirmed by the order dated February 21,
1970. These orders. according to the petitioner, aire illegal and
the petitioner's claim for promotion has not been properly con>idered.
The stand taken by the State Government in this writ petition is also similar to the stand taken in Writ Petition No. 76 of 1970, which, we have already pointed out, agam
is similar to the stand taken in the civil appea.l. According to
the State Government the claim of the petitioner is not sustainable
as he was ineligible for consideration for promotion under the
rules. The State further contends that the petitioner has not
put in the minimum period of six years of service which is a. condition precedent for consideration for promotion to the Semor
Scale under r. 32 read with r. 28(2) of the Rules. The State
further contends that the respondents Nos. 18 to 33 were selected
by the Promotion Committee for likely vacancies and their selecuons were in accordance with the Rules. Their promotions were
delayed beca.use of the orders of stay granted by the Rajasthan
High Court in certain writ petitions filed before it. As soon as
stay was vacated, the State Government decided to promote those
officers, who had been duly selected. Therefore, according to the
State Government the orders dated January 22, and 21st February, 1970 are legal and valid.
From the statement of facts mentioned above, it will be seen
that the main questions that arises for consideration relate to the
validity of rr. 28B and 32 and the Circular dated August 27, 1966.
The decision regarding the orders da.ted January 4, 1967, January
22, 1970 and February 21, 1970 will largely depend upon the
opinion expressed on the validity of the Rules and the Circular.
We will first take up for consideration the attack levelled
against rr. 28B and 32 as being viola.live of Arts. 14 and 16.
We have already referred to the fact that this attack is made on
these rules on the ground that there is no criteria laid down in
the rules for assessing the merit of the ofhcers concerned
when their claims are being considered for promotion to
the Senior Scale. The further ground on which this attack is
made is that the Rules give arbitrary powers to the Promotion
Committees in the matter of assessing the merits of an officer.
According to the State, on the other hand, the Rules are
valid and the promotions on the ha.sis of merit are also valid.
H
It is now necessary to refer to the relevant rules as they
originally stood as well as to the amendments made thereto from
time to time. In 1954 the rules were framed by the Rajpramukh
OURMAN SINGH v. RAIASTHAN (Vaidialingam,J.)
under the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution to regulate
conditions of service of the officers in the Ra.jasthan Administrative Service. We have already referred to the fact that the Rajasthan Administrative Service was formed in the year 1950. There
were three Grades in the Service :
(i) Ordinary Time Scale Rs. 285-800 (herein after
:o be referred 116 the Junior Scale);
913
A
B
(ii) Senior Scale Rs. 500-1150;
(iii) Selection Grade Rs. 900-1500.
In the Civil Appeal and the two writ petitions we are concerned with the. promotions from junior scale to the senior scale.
Rule 7 relates to the sources of recruitment to the Service. They
are, (a) by competitive examination; (b) by promotion of administrative subordinate service; (c) by selection from amongst the
prescribed categories of Extension Officers and (d) by special
selection from amongst the persons other than the administrative
subordinate service in connection with the affairs of the State.
c
p
Part lV of the Rules deals with the procedure for direct
recruitment. The procedure for recruitment by promotion is deaAt
with in Part V, Rule 27, as originally framed dealing with the
criterion for selection was as follows :
"Rules 27. Criterion for selection : (!) For purposes
of recruitment by promotion I selection I special selection,
selection shall be made on the basis of 'seniority-cummerit' from among all the administrative subordina.tes I
Extension officers and others who are eligible for promotion, selection and special selection respectively under
the provisions of the Rules
E
F
(2) In selecting the candidates for promotion,
regard shall be had to their;
(a.) personality and ch~racter;
(b) tact and energy (including ability to undertake
extensive tours);
(c) intelligence and ability to express themselves in
English and Hindi clearly;
(d) court and other work;
(e) integrity; and
(f) previous record of service."
58-1 S, C. lndia/71
G
114
A
B
c
D
SUPRElllE COUltT REPORTS
[1971] SUPP. S.C.R.
The procedure for promotion was laid down in r. 28 as it ongimlly stood. Under sub-rule(!) when a decision is taken that a
certain number of vacancies in the service are to be filled up by
promotion, the Appointment Department has to inform the Board
and the latter has to call upon all Collectors to submit their recommendations by a prescribed date. It woo further provided that
the Appointment Department should also call upon the Heads
of the Department concerned to submit their recommendations
through their respective Administrative Secretaries by a prescribed
date. Sub-rules (2) to (6) dealt with the various detMls regarding
the submission of the list by the District Collector, the various
particulars to be mentioned by the Collector, to the Board,
scrutinising the list furnished by the Collector and preparing a
list in the order of seniority of candidates considered suitable for
promotion. Those sub-rules also dealt with the Head of the Department preparing a list of candidates eligible for promotion in
the order of seniority and recording this remarks in respect of
those officers. Sub-rule (7) provided for the Committee consis·
ting of the officers mentioned therein considering the cases of all
the candidaites recommended by the Board and the Administrative
Secretaries and interviewing them, if necessary. It also provided
for the Committee selecting the requisite number of candidates
equal to the number of vacancies likely to occur in the Service
and to be filled up by promotion and to the list being prepared
in the order of s"eniority. The Committee hoo also to make
another supplementary list in the manner mentioned therein in
the said sub-rule. Under sub-rule (8) both the lists prepared by
the Committee are to be submitted to the Government, who after
scrutinising the same have to forward them to the Public Service
Commission along with the character rolls, personal files and
other particulars relating to the officers mentioned therein. Under
sub-rule (9) the names of the candidates considered to be suitable
by the Commission are to be reported to the Government for final
selection. Under sub-rule (10) it is provided that the final selection is to be made by the Government and a. list of candidates
considered suitable for promotion is to be arranged in the order
of their seniority.
G
Rule 32 of the Rules as it originally stood made provision
for appointment to the Senior scale in the Cadre and it was as
follows :
l:I
"Rule 32, Appointments to Senior Posts : Appointments (including in an officiating/temporary capacity)
to senior posts shaJI be made by the Government from
amongst members of the Service on the basis of seniority·
-
GURMAN SINGH •. RAJASTHAN (Vaidialingam, J.)
cum-merit on the recommendations of a Committee
which shall consist of the following officers : (I) Chairman, Rajasthan Public service
Commission or a Member nomi·
nated by him.
Chairman
(2) Chairman, Board of Revenue
Member
(3) Commissioner, Development Depart·
ment
Member
(4} Special Secretary to the Government
in the Appointments Department
Member
Secretary
The Committee shall consider the cases of the persons eligible for promotion by examining their confidential rolls and personal files interviewing such of them as they deem necessary Mid
shall select a number of candidates equal to the number of vacancies likely to be filled by promotion.
Provided that Government may fill a vacancy in the senior
grade temporarily by a.ppointing thereto for a period not exceeding
six months in an officiating capacity, any member of the Service
who is eligible for such appointment under these Rules."
It will be seen by a reference to the rules extracted above
that promotion was to be on the basis of seniority-cum-merit.
Under sub-rule (7) of r. 28 and r. 32 a committee has been constituted a.nd it is on the basis of the recommendation made by the
said Committee that the promotion is ultimately made by tho
Government.
In 1965 the State Government took a decision to introduce
the system of recruitment to the service by promotion on the
basis of merit alone. On December 14, 1965 a notification was
issued amending the Rules. A new rule 28B dealing with the
promotion by selection on the basis of merit was incorpora.ted,
The said rule as originally framed was as follows :
915
A
B
c
D
E
p
"28-B Promotion by selection on basis of merit"
(!) Appointment by promotion to posts in the
Service shall be made by selection strictly on the basis
Qf merit and on the basis of seniority-cum-merit in proportion of 50:50.
Provided that if the a.ppointing authority is satisfied that suitable persons are not available for appointment by promotion strictly on the basis of merit in a particular year appointment by promotion on the basis of
seniority-cum-merit ma.y be made in the same manner
as specified in these rules.
G
H
916
A
B
c
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1971] SUPP. S .C. R
(2) Selection strictly on the basis of merit shall be
made from amongst persons who are otherwise eligible
for promotion under these rules; the number of eligible
candidates to be considered for the purpose shall be ten
times the total number of vacancies to be filled in on the
basis of merit and seniority-j;u;m-merit provided such
number is avaiilable; where the number of eligible candidates exceeds ten times the number of vacancies, the requisite number of senior-most persons shall be considered for the purpose.
(3) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this
rule the procedure prescribed for selection to the post
on the basis of seniority-cum-merit shall, so far as may
be. be followed in making selection strictly on the basis
of merit.
(4) The Committee shall prepare a. separate list of
candidates selected by it on the basis of merit and shall
arrange their names in order of preference.
D
E
F
G
H
(5) Where consultation with the Commission is necessary the list prepared by the Committee shall be forwa.rded to the Commission by the appointing authority
along with the personal files and confidential rolls of ail!
persons whose names have been considered by the Committee.
(6) The Commission shall consider the lists prepared by the Committee along with other documents
received from the appointing authority and unless any
change is considered necessary, shaU approve the lists
and if the Commission considers it necessary to make any
change in the lists received from the appointing authority the Commission shall inform the appointing authority of the changes proposed and the appointing authority, after taking into account the commences, if, any,
may approve the lists finally with such modifications,
as may in his opinion, be jnst and proper.
(7) Appointment shall be made by the appointing
authority taking persons out of the list finally approved
under the proceeding sub-rule in the order in which
they haive been placed in the list.
(8) Among persons appointed in the same class,
category or crade of posts during the same year, persons
appointed on the ba~is of seniority-c1;1m-merit shall ~ank
senior to those appomted by promotion on the ba.s1s of
merit; the seniority inter se of persons appointed in the
•
OllllMAN SINGH y. l\AJASTHAN ( Vaidialingam' J.)
917
same class, category or grade of posts by promotion
strictly on merit, shall, without regard to the order of
preference, be determined as if such persons had been
appointed by promotion on the seniority-cum-merit.
(9) The provisions of this rule shall have effect
notwithstanding anything to the contr&ry contained in
any other provisions of these rules.
Explanation :-For the purpose of determining
the number of vacancies to be filled on either basis
under sub-rule (!), the following cyclic order shall
be followed from year to year.
A
B
c
"The first by merit.
The next by seniority-cum-merit.
The next by merit.
D
The next by one by Seniority-cum-Merit
Tne cycle to be repeated."
By the same notification of December 14, 1965 sub-rule (2)
of r. 27 was deleted. On fanuary 7, 1966. a further amendment was made to the rules by deleting sub-rules (2) to (6)
of r. 28. It will be seen that under the new r. 28B,
promotion to posts in the service is to be made by selection on
the basis of merit and on the basis of seniority-cum-merit in the
proportion of 50:50. Sub-rule (2) provided for the manner of
selection on the basis of merit. Under sub-rule (3) procedure
prescribed for selection to the posts on the basis of seniority-cummerit has to be followed as far as possible in maiking selection
strictly on the basis of merit. On August 26, 1966 by a notification certain amendments were made in r. 28B. Under sub·
rule (!) of r. 28B, the original proportion of selection on the
basis of merit and on the basis of seniority-cum-merit was aJtered
and the proportion was fixed as 1:2. A proviso was also added
to sub-rule (2) of r. 28B, which is as follows :
"Provided that for the first Promotion in the same
cadre (from a lower grade to higher grade) against the
merit only such of the persons shall unless a higher period
is prescribed elsewhere in these rules be eligible who
have put in not less than six years of service in the lower
grade of the cadre."
E
p
G
H
918
A
SUPREME CoURT REPORTS
[1971] SUPP. s.c.R.
On September 8, 1966, the old r. 32 was substituted by a.
new rule dealing with the appointment to Senior Posts. The
said new rule 32 runs as follows :
"32(1) Appointment to senior posts :
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
Appointment to Senior scale and s~ection grade
posts shall be made by Government from amongst the
members of the service on the basis of merit and seniority-cum-merit in the ratio of 1:2 on the recommendations of a Committee which shall consists of the following:"(!) Chairman, Rajasthan Public Service Commission, or a Member
nominated by him.
Chairman.
(2) Chairman, Board of Revenue
Member.
(3) Commissioner, Development Department.
Member.
(4) Special Secretary ,to Government
in the Appointments Department.
Member.
Secretary.
(2) Except as provided in this rule, the procedure
and the principles for selection by merit, shall, in so
far as it may apply, be the same 36 provided in rule
28B. For selection by seniority.cum-merit, the Com;.
mittee shall consider the cases of all the persons eligible
for promotion by examining their confidential Rolls and
Persona,! files and interviewing such of them as may deem
necessary. and shall select a number of candidates equal
to the number of vacancies likely to be filled by promotion by seniority-cum-merit :
Provided that Government may fill a vacancy in the
Senior scale or ~election gr81de posts temporarily by appointment thereto for a period not exceeding six months
in an officiating capacity, any member of the service
who is eligible for such appointment under the rules."
This new rule was also incorporated to give effect to the
Government's decision taken in 1965 to introduce the system of
recruitment to the service by promotion on the basis of merit, as
a result of which r. 28B was earlier incorporated. Rule 32 really
deals with appointments to Senior Posts; and under the old rule
the promotion was to be on the basis of seniority-cum-merit. That
is altered under the new rule to promotion on the basis of merit
and seniority-cum-merit and the proportion is also 1:2 as already
la.id down by the amendment made on August 26, 1966. Sub-rule
(2) of new r. 32, as will be seen, provides for the procedure and
GURMAN SINGH v. RAJASmAN (Vaidialingam, J.)
the principles for selection by merit being the same as provided
in r. 28B. Therefore, it will be seen that the position as it stood
at the time when promotions of the various respondents in the
appeal and in the writ petitions were made was :
(!) the promotions had to be made on the bai;is ot
merit and seniority-cum-merit in the ratio of 1:2 as provided by Rule 32 read with r. 28B;
(2) under the proviso to sub-rule 2 of r. 28B the
minimum period of eligibility for being considered for
the first promotion is six years of service in the lower
grade of the cadre;
(3) under sub-rule 2 of r. 28B the selection for promotion is restricted only to officers eligible for promotion
under the rules coming within ten times the total number
of vacancies to be filled up on the basis of merit and seniority-cum-merit;
)
)
(4) under r. 32 appointments to Senior scale and
Selection cadre posts are also on the basis of merit and
seniority-cum-merit in the ratio of 1:2, and ·
919
A
B
c
D
(S) recommendations for appointments and promotions are to be made by the Committees concerned.
It is the grievance of the appellant aind the writ petitioners
that the combined effect of the addition of r. 28B and the deletion
of sub-rule (2) of r. 27 and sub-rules (2) to (6) of r. 2B is that
although a provision has been made for recruitment to the service
by promotion on the basis of "merit alone", no criteria. for assessing the merit and suitability of the candidates have been provided
in the rules as they stand. In fact their further contention is that
sub-rule (2) of r. 27 ·bad laid down the various criteria for considering the suitability of a candidate and sub-.rules (2) to (6) of r. 28
had dealt with the procedure for selection of such cll!ndidates. When
once these sub-rules have been deleted there is no guidance whatsoever furnished by the rules, as they now Stand, for assessing the merit. Further, the restriction placed under r. 28B that only candidates
coming within 10 times the number of vacancies that have to be
filled up will be considered for selection and the further restriction therein that for the fir.st promotion six years' service is essential, are violative of Arts. 14 and 16. Rule 32, according to Mr.
Garg, does not also lay down any guidance or principle for assessing the merit of candidates for promotion to Senior posts.
" e are not inclined to accept these contentions of Mr. Garg.
We have already referred to the fact that the learned Single Judge,
in the writ petition leading up to the civil appeal, is of the view
that rr. 28B and 32 do not offend either Art. 14 or 16. But the
E
F
G
H
tl20
.A
B
c
D
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1971] SUPP. S.C.R.
learned Judge is of the view that as there is a restriction placed
upon the number of officers whose claims could be considered, ,
under sub-rule (2) of r. 28B. that part of the sub-rule Wllil invalid
as offending Art. 16. As the said part cannot be separated, according to the learned Judge, from the other parts of the sub-rule,
the whole of sub-rule (2) of r. 28B was struck: down. The Division
Bench, on the other hand, has disa.greed with this view of the
learned Single Judge and has upheld the validity of the entire subrule (2) of r. 28B. We are in agreement with the views expressed
by the Division Bench that rr. 28B and 32 do not offend either
Art. 14 or 16.
Nor are we impressed with the contention of Mr. Garg that
there is no principle laid down in the rules for assessing the merit
of ain officer especially after the deletion of sub-rule (2) of r. 27
and sub-rules (2) to (6) of r. 28. No doubt sub-rule (2) of r. 27
enumerated certain factors or matters to be taken into account in
selecting candidates for promotion. Sub-rules (2) to (6) of r. 28,
no doubt also dealt with certain aspects of procedure to be adopted for promotion. The deletion of those ~ub-rules, in our opinion,
does not make the rules 28B a.nd 32 in any manner invalid. We
have already extracted the relevant rules and also pointed out that
the selection or promotion is to be considered by the Committees
referred to therein._ It is no doubt argued by Mr. Garg that introduction of the idea of merit in the procedure of promotion brings
in an element of personal evailuation and such personal evaluation
opens the door to the abuse of nepotism and favouritism. Hence
it is argued that there is a violation of the constitutional guarantee under Arts. 14 and 16.
We are unable to accept this contention. The State Government has taken a decision in 1965 that selection to the service
and promotion have to be on the basis of merit and senioritycum-merit. There can be no controversy that the main object
in such matters is to serve public interest and not the personal
interest of the members o( the oaicial ~oup concerned. As
stated by Leonard D. White in his Introduction to the Study of
Public Administration, 4th Edition p. 380 : "The Public
interest is best secured when reasonable opportunities for
promotion exist for all qualified employees, when really superior
civil servants, are enabled to move as ra.pidly up the promotion
ladder as their merits deserve and as vacancies occur, and when
selection for promotion is made on the sole basis of merit. For
the merit iystem ouglit to apply as specifically in making promotions as in original recruitment."
The above statement has been quoted with approval by this
Court in Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan and Another(')
We may also point out that the Administrative Reforms
(I) [1%8] l S. C.R. 111.
OURMAN SINGH v. RAJASTHAN (Vaidialingam, J.)
Committee has also emphasised that merit should be given adeequate weighta•ge in the matter of promotion especially for senior
appointments to ensure greater efficiency in government functioning
and also to provide adequate incentive to government servants to
-give their best.
./
Rule 32 in essence adopts what is stated in rule 28B. The
latter rule provides for two methods of selection : one based on
merit and the other based on seniority-cum-merit. In other words,
the rule provides that .the promotion based on merit in contradistinction to that based on seniority-cum-merit shall strictly be on
the basis of merit. The Selection Committee and the Promotion
Committee consist of very responsible and .senior officers of the
State and being persons of experience they can be trusted to eva•
luate the merits of a particula,r officer. No doubt the term 'merit'
is not capable of an easy definition·, but it can be safely said that
merit is a sum total of various qua,lities and attributes of an
employee such as his academic qualifications, his distinction in
the University, his Character, integrity, devotion to duty and the
manner in which he discharges his official duties. Allied to this
-may be various other matters, or factors such as his punctuality in work, the quality and outturn of work done by
him and the manner of his dealings with his superiors and
subordinate officers and the general public and his rank in
1he. service. We are only indicating some of the broad aspects
thM may be taken into account in assessing the merits of an
officer. In this connection it may be stated that the various
particulars in the annual confidential reports of an officer, if
<:arefully and properly noted, will also _give a very broad and
general indication regarding the merit of an officer. Therefore,
it cannot be stated that rr. 28B and 32 are in any manner vague
or do not give any guide line for assessing the merit of an officer.
No doubt iub-rule (2) of r. 27 dealt with certain factors which
are to be taken into account for considering the claims for promotion, but when it comes to a• question of merit, not only those
factors but also certain additional factors and circumstances will
have to be taken into account and such an evaluation of merit
has been left under the rules to a Committee consisting of responsible, senior and experienced officers of the State.
We are also not impressed with the contention that Rule
28B(2) and its proviso confining the selection to senior-most
officers not exceeding ten times the number of total vacancies
·to be filled up and the further restriction regarding the eligibility of officers who have put in 8!t least six years of service
for first promotion offend Art. 16 of the Constitution.
fn this respect also we agree with the views expressed by the Division Bench of the Ra jasthan High Court in D. B. Special Appeal
921
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
922
B
c
D
SUPREME COURT REPORTI>
[1971] SUPP. s.c.R.
No. 57 of 1968, The restriction contained in the proviso to subrule (2) of r. 28B in our opinion, is quite reasonable. Before
an officer in the Junior scale can be considered aB fit for promotion to the Senior scale, it is necessary that he should have worked
on a post in the Service at least for some period of time. As to
what quantum of that peiiod must be is not for this Court to
lay down. The Government ha.s fixed this period as six years.
We are not in a position to say that it is an improper restriction.
The provisions contained in sub-rule (2) confining the selection to
senior-most officers not exceeding 10 times the number of total
vacancies is also, in our opinion, reasonable. Such a provision
will encourage the members of the service to aspire for promotion
for making themselves eligible by increasing their efficiency in the
discharge of their duties. We are of the view that rr. 28B and
32 do not offend either Art. 14 or 16 of the Constitution.
Now coming to the Circular dated August 27, 1966, we find
it difficult to agree with the view of the Division Bench of the
Ra jasthan High Court. On the other band, we ace inclined to
agree with the decision of the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 79 of 67. The contention of Mr. Garg is that the Orcular by executive instructions has abridged or curtaiiled drastically the exercise of discretion by the Departmental Promotion Committee constituted under the mies. In fact
his plea is that the circular has superseded the statutory
framed under the proviso to Art. 309. On the other hand, it is
the contention of the learned Solicitor-General, appearing for the
State and of Mr. B. Sen, leairned counsel: appearing for some of
the respondents, that the Circular has not in any manner interfered with the powers of the Committees constituted under the
Rules. On the other hand, in order to bring about uniformity
in the application of the principles for assessing the merit the
marking system which bas been in vague from 1960 has been
adopted with slight modifications in the Circular of 1966. The
instructions contained in the Circular only provide guidance ta
the Committees concerned and those instructions do not in any
way contravene any of the rules.
rules
I'
G
H
Before we deal with 1hls aspect, we can dispose of a subsidiary contention that has been raised by Mr. Garg. According
to him the circular has been issued by the Chief Secretary as the
Head of the Service and it is not an order of the Government.
This has been accepted by the Strte Government. If so, it fol
lows that the Circular is illegal amd void. We have already refer
red to the stand taken by the State Government in this regard.
They have specifically taken the stand that the circular has been
issued by the Chief Secretary as l1:!e ~d of tile Serviu. Before
the Divisixm Dench in the High Com1i when this imtter was api;D.
GURMAN SINGH '. RAJASmAN ( Vaidia/ingam, J.)
raised by the appellant, it is seen that an application for amending
their counter-affidavit was made by the State to make the position
cleair that the Circular was issued with the approval of the Government. As pointed out by the Division Bench there is some
confusion in this regard. But ultimately the Division Bench bas
stated that they themselves hiwe gone through the Cabinet file and
the notes and satisfied themselves that the Circular has been issued
with the approval of the Government. Therefore it follows tha.t
the Circular is an order of the Government and not of the Chief
Secretary alone.
Then the question is whether the Government is competent
to issue the said Circular and whether the Circular in any manner
effects the discretion and powers of the Committee functioning
under the statutory rules. The position is clear, as laid down by
this Cdllrt in Sant Ram Sharma v. StoJe of Rajasthan and another
9u
A
u.
C
('):
"It is true that the Government cannot amend or
supersede statutory rules by administrative instructions,
but if the rules are silent on any particular point Government can fill up the gaps and supplement the rules
and issue instructions not inconsistent with the rules already framed."
)
\
/
Having due regard to the principles stated above, we will
now examine the scope and contents of the Circular. The Circular contains administrative instructions and it does not profess
to lay down anything else. The Government have issued those
instructions "for the guidance of a.11 selection I promotion committee and appointing authorities mentioned in the statutory service Rules. These administrative instructions and the statutory
service Rules should together be taken a.s a complete code on the
subject."
From the above extract it is clear that in the matter of selection or promotion the Committees concerned are enjoined not
only to have regard to the statutory rules under which they function, but also to the administrative instructions given in the Circular. This makes it very clear that it is not open to the Committee concerned to ignore the instructions contained in the Circular or to act contrary to the directions contained therein.
Therefore, it will be seen that if the Circular or any part of it
gives instructions contrary to or opposed to any of the rules, the
Circular or that part of the Circular to that extent will be invalid. In particular we may refer to paragraphs 3 and 5 of the
Circular. Paragraph 3 deals with the merit formula and is as
follows :
(1) [1968) 1 S. C.R. 111
D·
E
F.
G:
e.
924
A
B
c
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
3(a) "Merit formula" means that out of 75 marks
(marking system has been defined in paragraph 5), a person should get a minimum of 65 mairks for consideration
of his case for promotion among those who have secured
65 or more marks, the person who gets highest marks
will be the first to be promoted, and the person who
comes next in the range of marks will be the second to
be promoted, and so on. The inter-se seniority of persons had been appointed in the same class, category or
grade of posts by promotion strictly on merit shall
without regard to the order of pre{erence, be determined
as if such persons had been appointed by promotion on
the basis of seniority-cum-merit. This is illustrated by
the following example :
Name of the
No. of
Marks.
Seniority in the
next below grade.
A
75
73
8
9
4
3
I
Officer
B
D
E
F
G
H
[1971] SUPP. s.c.R.
c
D
E
70
69
65
That if there are 5 vacant posts to be filled by promotion on the basis of 'merit' formula the inter-se seniority of these 5 selected persons will be the same as in
next below grade, but if only 3 posts are to be filled
then those who have secured 75, 73 81Ild 70 marks respectively will be selected and the remaining left out. The
inter-se seniority amongst these selected shall be the same
as the next below grade.
(b) The eligible candidates for promotion on the
basis of 'merit' formula shall be I 0 times the total number. of vacancies to be filled by way of promotion provided such number is available and they should be holding the post in the next below cadre in substantive capacity. As for example, if there are twelve posts to be
filled by waiy of promotion on the basis of both the
formula (viz. four posts for merit and eight for seniority-cum-merit) the total number of eligible candidates
for promotion on the basis of merit formula shall be 120.
If available, if an officer could not secure 65 marks continuously for 5 years he will not be included in this list
of eligible candidates.
(c) Notwithstainding anything contained in sub-para
(b) above, for first promotion by merit, only such of the
candidates shall be eligible who have put in six years
service in the cadre on the date of selection."
GURMAN SINGH v. RAJASillAN (Vaidia/ingam, J.)
925
Paragraph 4 of the Circular lays down what is "seniority·
cum-merit" formula. The ma.rking system which is applicable
both to the selection based on 'merit' as well as to the 11election
based on "seniority-cum-merit" is contained in paragraph 5.
.That paragraph reads as follows :
·
A
"Para-5 The marking system will be as follows :
B
(a) Confidential Rolls for the 5 calendar years im·
mediately 'preceding the date of selection will be exa·
mined. 5 marks will be ear-niarked for each year's confidential Roll, and the marking will be :-Excellent re·
port-5 marks; Very good report-4 marks; Good report
,,,..3 marks; Satisfactory report-2! marks; Unsatisfactory
report-2 marks; Adverse report-I! marks; Ad·
verse report with punishment I mark. If a per- .
son has been awarded either 'Merit Pay' or 'Cash
award' by the Government, then the Committee
may award him upto 5 more marks in addition ·to the
marks already obtained by him. These additional marks
will not be taken into consideration at the time of the
next selection.
(b) The record of service, which means service
book, personal file, and Confidential Rolls other than
the Confidential Rolls of the 5 yea.rs immediately preceding the selection maintained after the formation of
Rajasthan, will be allotted 50 marks, and the marking
will be (a) average or sMisfactory record -50 marks,
and (b) deduction upto 2 marks for each punishment
according to gravity may be made (no deduction will be
made for mere warning, but where warning has been re·
corded in Confidential Roll, it should be considered as
punishment and marks should be deducted). 'Recorded
warning' means censure given by way of punishment
under the C.C.A. Rules. If some marks have been deduct·
ed for any punishment out of 50 marks in any year of
selection, then that deduction should not be repeated or
counted in the next selection. Also if some marks have
been deducted from the Confidential Roll of a particular
year, then that deduction should not be repeated or coun·
ted next time. That Confidential Roll should be consi·
dered satisfactory, and marks awarded accordingly, with
a view to ensure implementation of this, it would be
necessary for tbl: promotion Committee to keep a record
or such deductions and additional marks as the case ma,y
be.
c
D
E
F
G
H
926
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1971] SUPP. S.C.R.
(c) On the basis of above marking, only such persons who have secured a minimum of 6t marks out of
the total of 75 marks will be considered for promotion
on the basis of 'Seniority-cum-merit' formula.. Thus, as
has been mentioned earlier, even if a junior person secures more than 62! marks, the senior will not be superseded if he has secured 62! marks. Under the 'merit'
formula those who have secured 65 marks or more will
only be considered for promotion."
Paragraph 6 dealing with officers, who ca.n be called for
interview provides that a person who has secured less than 62!
marks shall be called for interview. But persons who get less
than 61 marks, should not be called for interview. It further
provides that those persons whose confidentia.1 Rolls were missing
or whose confidential Rolls could not be prepared in their absence
for study or training outside India should also be called for interview.
Para 7 of the circular lays down that adverse remarks recorded in the Confidentia.I Rolls should be communicated to the
person concerned in time, so that he may get an opportunity to
represent his case to the authority concerned. However, if by
chance, adverse remarks have not been communicated to him,
or if the adverse remarks have been communicated but his representation ha.d not been decided by the appropnate authority,
then in that event the person concerned should be called for
interview by the selection or the promotion committee and before
he is asked to appear for interview adverse remark sho11ld be
communicated to him so that he could come prepared with what
he has to say in the ma.tter. It was left open to the selection or
promotion committee to treat the adverse remarks as expugned
and then award marks if it felt that the adverse remarks were
not justified. It was clearly emphooised that normally efforts
should be made to communicate the adverse remarks and to decide the representations before the selection committee meetl!.
In para 9 of the circular it was pointed out to all selection
committees and appointing a.uthorities that the assessment of confidential rolls and the awarding of remarks thereon should be
rational, judiciously liberal and objective, the reason being that
at time8 a confidentia.l roll may have been written with a greater
sense of responsibility and at other times it ma.y not have been
given due care. It was also observed by way of illustration that
one officer might be liberal ill' the assessment of his subordinates
while another may be a bit miserly or sometimes vindicative.
It was, in order to have a balanced approach in the matter it
might at time be worthwhile for the selection committee as also
GUllKAN SINGJi-,;ltAJASTllAN (Vaidfalingam, J.)
for the appointing authority to consider whether the reporting offi·
cers themselves enjoyed reputation for efficiency, impartiality and
integrity.
Finally the circular pointed out that the instructions contained therein should be strictly kept in view while persons are being
considered.for promotion, the reason bemg that evaluation and assessment of confidentia.l rolls make or mar the service prospects of
government employees.
One gets a fairly good picture of the nature of the instructions contained in the circular issued by the Government. No
doubt a properly evaluated marking system may be helpful for
.assessing the merit of persons who are already in service. But
the instructions given in the circular are so rigid that they ace
opposed to the selection to be made strictly on merit as provided
under rr. 28B and 32.
For instance the marking system provides 50 marks for the
record prior to 5 years and for the five years preceding the selection the marking of 25 is to be on the basis of confidential rolls.
From this it is clear that an officer who has rendered less than
five years of service will not be eligible to get a single mark
•Out of 50 which is provided for the record for the period preceding five years for the simple reason that he will have no such
record. The officer who has put in less than five years of service
has been straightaway denied 50 marks out of 75 macks and he
has to establish his worth within the small range of 25 marks on
.the basis of his confidential rolls which will be available for 81
period of less than five years. This formula of marking is certainly opposed tor. 28B and r. 32, the object of which is to ensure
that merit and merit alone is to form the basis for promotion,
as against the quota fixed for merit, In contra-d1stinction to
seniority-cum-merit.
Similarly, when one considers the question of first selection,
the position is still more anamolous. An officer who has put in
just six years of service will get 50 marks for his record of provious service which just exceeds five years by one year. Another
officer will have to face the situation with a longer period of
service. There can be no comparison of the claims of the two
officers on merits. While the rules give 81 wide discretion to the
Committee for judging merit, paragraphs 3 and 5 of the circular
place undue restrictions and limitations on the exercise of discretiQn and thus fetter the powers of the Committee. That is
opposed to rr. 28B and 32.
927
A
B
c
D.
E
F
G
H
,.
928
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1971] SUPP. s.c.R ..
Similarly, in the matter of giving ma.rks for excellent report.
very good report, good report, satisfactory report, unsatisfactory report, adverse report and adverse report w\th punishment, the circular is arbitrary. It will be seen that an officer
who has satisfactory report gets 2! marks, and another officer
with an unsatisfactory report gets 2 marks. The officer with an.
adverse report gets 1t marks. We fail to see any rhyme or
reason in this ma~king system.
Again, under the Rules the Committee concerned, has a
discretiCWI if it deems necessary to call for interview any person,
whose claims are being considered by it. But this exercise of
discretion is drastically curtailed by paragra,ph 6 of the circular
laying down the circumstances under which a person, should or
should not be called for interview. The Committee under the
said paragraph has only to mecha·nically apply the directions contained therein. This provision ·is again a serious inroad on the
powers conferred on the Committees by the Rules.
We are not inclined to accept the view of the learned Judges
of the Division Bench that the circular merely gives a broad guidance to the Committees concerned and that the inS'lrllcti<Ylls
contained therein are elastic. Nor are we inclined to accept
their reasoning that the Committees have still got discretion to
ignore the directions contained in the circular and assess the merit
of an officer by independent evaluation. No such indica.tion is
available, so far as we could see, in the circular. On the other
hand, the indications a.re to the contrary. The circular enjoins
the Committees to treat the administrative instructions and the
statutory Service Rules together as a complete Code.
The object of the circula,r may be to bring about uniforrnit}
in the awa.rd of marks. But the directions contained therein do
offend the rules. This is not a case of the government filling
up the gaps or of giving executive instructions on matters not
provided for by or not inconsistent with the rules. The learned
Judges of the Division Bench of the High Court, have by and
large, upheld the validity of the marking system as weJI as the
other instructions contained in the circular of 1966 on the ground
that the marking system as pointed out by the State has been in
vogue from 1960, on the basis of a previous circular, dated August
31, 1960 issued by the State Government. Reliance placed upon
this circular of 1960 by the High Court, in our opinion, is not
justified. We have gone through the circular of 1960 which is
No. F. 1(6) Apptts. (D)/60 dated 31-8-1960. That circular was
issued by the State to clarify the mis-apprehension that appears
to have been caused in the application, for promotion of the
principle of merit-cum-seniority or seniority-cum-merit. For the
OUMAN SINGH v. RAJASTHAN (Vaidialingam, J.)
929
A
purpose of having uniformity, the State Government had laid
down certain principles in the said circular to be borne in mind
by the Promotion Committees. No doubt there is a macking
system indicated therein. But there are two features which dis·
tinguish the circular of 1960 from that of the !966 circular. In
paragraph 3 of the former circular, it is specifically laid down
that the principles mentioned therein are only in the nature of
B
executive instructions to be kept in view by the Committees when
making promotions. It is made clear that those Committees
.. should, however, exercise their own discretion while applying
the above principles in view of the fact that occasionally the
Confidential Rolls may not haive been written with full sense of
responsibility. Moreover, some of the rules permit interview
1-efore selection and in such cases the Selection Committee will c
have to assess suitability of the officer as a result of the interview
also." Under the circular of 1966, we have alreaidy indicated,
no such discretion is left to the Selection or Promotion Committees to adopt any method other than that indicated in the
circular. In fact it is emphasised that the statutory service rules
and the instructions contained in the circular are to be treated as D
a complete code by the Committees. Another point to be noted
is that in 1960 the question of promotion on the basis of merit
alone haid no place. That principle was ailopted only, as pointed
out by us earlier, in 1965 which led to the amendment of the rules.
Therefore, the principles mentioned in the circular of 1960 cainnot
be relied on when considering the validity of the present circular,
E
when promotion by merit alone has been recognised by the rules
from 1965. We have already indicated that the instructions
in the 1966 circular contravene the Rules. Therefore, we
are of the opinion that the ,circular dated 27-8-1966 is
bad and accordingly it is struck down. We make it clear that
we exp;ess no opinion on the validity or otherwise of the cir· F
C'.l 11r of 31-8-1960. We have only referred to that circular to show
that the High Court has committed an error in placing reliance
on the same.
Now, coming to the promotions and confirmations made
under the orders. dated January 4, 1967, January 22, 1970 and
February 21, 1970, we are not inclined to disturb those orders G
except to the extent indicaited below in respect of the promotions
of respondents Nos. 2 to 4 in Civil Appeal No. 1815 of 1970 under
the first order dated January 4, 1967 and their confirmation, by
the second order dated January 22, 1970.
Writ Petitions Nos. 76 and 139 of 1970 have been filed in
this Court only after the judgment dated January 20, 1970 of H
the High Court in D. B. Special Appeal No. 57 of 1968. The
petitioners must have been aware that the appellant was chal·
lenging only the promotions of four officers in his writ petition
59-1 S.C. India/71
930
A
B
c
D
SUPllEM:E COUllT llEPORTS
[1971] SUPP .s.c.R
in the High Court. Nevertheless, they kept quite and allowed the
officiating promotions of all the officers to stand from 1967 and
even kept quiet till the government confirmed the promotion of
those officers on January 22, 1970. So far as the writ petitioners
are concerned, the State must be considered to be justified in
passing the order dated Ia.nuary 22', 1970, on which date the High
Court's judgment was in its favour. We are entitled to take
this circumstance into account for denying the larger reliefs
claimed by the writ petitioners when they attack the orders da.ted
January 4, 1970 and January 22, 1970.
We have referred earlier to the various orders that nee being
challenged in these writ petitions, apart from the attack on IT. 28B
and 32. Under the order dated Januacy 22, 1970, the officers
who had been promoted to officiating posts in the senior scale
in January 4, 1967 have been confirmed. We have held
earlier that these orders cannot be reopened at the instance
of these writ petitions. Another set of officers, who had been
selected eadier, were appointed by promotion to the senior scale
post by the order dated February 21, 1970. We ace holding later
that no relief can be granted to the concerned writ petitioner even
regarding this order.
So far as respondents Nos. 2 to 4 in the Civil Appeal No.
1815 of 1970 M"e concerned, we are giving separate directions,
E
F
G
H
regarding the reconsideration of their promotion and confirmation, along with the appellant in the appeal. The fact that
the respondents Nos. 2 to 4 in the civil appeal have been
confirmed on January 22, 1970 after the decision of the High
Court in favour of the State and those officers is of no consequence, so far 116 the appellant is concerned, if their original officiating promotion on January 4, 1967 requires reconsideration
by the Government. Their confirmation will stand or fall depending on the final decision of this Court regarding the order da,ted
January 4, 1967.
The a.ppellant in the civil appeal is not challenging the officiating promotions or confirmation made of the officers other
than respondents Nos. 2 to 4 in the appeal. Hence the promotions
given and confirmations made of the other officers under orders
dated January 4, 1967 and January 22, 1970 respectively should
be aJlowed to stand. It is also seen that the order dated February 21, 1970 was passed by the State Government, after the order
of stay was vacated by_ the High Court. The State Government,
as pointed out earlier, was justified in passing the order dated
fanuary 22, 1970 except regarding respondents Nos. 2 to 4 in
the appeal, on the basis of the Division Bench judgment of the
GUM AN SINGH v. RAJASTIIAN ( Vaidialingam, J.)
High Court which had upheld the validity of the rules and the
circular. Tile same reasoning will apply to !he order of February 21, 1970 also. Therefore, the petitioner in writ petition No.
139 of 1970, who alone is challenging this order, will not be
entitled to have tha.t order reopened. Thus both the writ petitioners will be only entitled to have a declaration that the circular dated August 27, 1966 is invalid and that it is struck down.
They are not entitled to any further reliefs in the writ petitions.
In the civil appeal Gurnalll Singh, the appellant has raised
a contention that promotions of respondents Nos. 2 to 4 were
made on January 4, 1967 on the basis of illegal rules and invaliq
circular. He has .further contended that the Promotion Committee which met in September, 1966 has taken into account the
adverse remarks made against him which were not justified and
which were not communicated to him. We have already expressed our views upholding the validity of the rules and the invalidity of the circular. In support of the contention tha.t adverse
reinarks were taken into consideration by the Committee, he
relied upon the following circumstances : The Deputy Commis'ioner has written a Jetter dated April 28, 1966 strongly appreciating his services as an officer. While so, it is a. matter of surprise that adverse remarks came to be made in September, 1966.
The nature of the adverse remarks has been referred to by the
Division Bench. It is admitted by the State that the Promotion
Committee had met in the end of September, 1966 and made
recommendations regarding the officers who are to be promoted.
It is also admitted by the State Government that the confidential.
rolls of all the officers were 'blifore the Selection ~ommittee.
They have not denied that the circular was not taking into account
by the Committee. .On the other hand, they ha.ve impliedly
accepted that the circular was before the Committee at the time
of considering the promotions. According to the appellant
adverse remarks were communicated to him only on Ma.y 11,
1967, long after the decision of the Promotion Committee. Hence
the Committee has illegally taken into consideration the adverse
remarks made against him and has denied him promotion on
tha.t account. His contention is that after the adverse remarks
were communicated to him, long afterwards he made representations and the adverse remarks were directed to be expunged.
In this connection, learned counsel relied uoon the counter-affidavit filed in this Court on behalf of the State in writ petition
No. 76 of 1970 to the effect that the adverse entries in tlie confidential rolls of Shri Gurna·n Singh, the appellant, were expunged
on his representations. Therefore, according to the appellant,
his claims for promotion have not been properly dealt with by
the promotion Committee.
931
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
932
A
B
SUPREME .COURT REPORTS
[1971] SUPP. s.c.R.
The allegation of the appellant in his writ petition that the
promotion Committee had taken into consideraition the adverse
remarks, when it met in September, 1966, does not appear to be
unfounded, however, as we are giving directions for reconsidera·
tion of the appellant's claims for promotion, if otherwise he is
eligible under the Rules, we do not express any opinion on this
aspect as facts ha.ve to be investigated.
The learned Judges of the Division Bench have brushed
aside the grievance of the appellant regarding !this matter by
observing that as the Departmental Promotion Committee is not
a- party to the proceedings, the question whether the Committee
c took into account the adverse remarks said to have been made
against the appellant, cannot be gone into in these proceedings.
This approach made by the learned Judges does not appeal to
us. The Government. which is the ap!lOinting authority, was a
party before the High Court. It must have had before it, when
it passed the orders on January 4, 1967, all the records regacding
promotion. It was the duty of the State Government to place
D. before the High Court all the materials available before it to
enable the Court to consider whether the grievance ol the appellant was justified or not. The appellant had made a specific
grievance in his writ petition about the uncommunica.ted adverse
remarks h1wing been taken into account by the Committee. The
Government could have obtained a report or an affidavit regar·
E
ding the true facts from a responsible officer of the Committee
and placed it before the High Court. Anyhow, as mentioned
earlier, it is not necessary for us to persue this aspect further
except to point out that we do not agree with the reasoning of
the High Court in this regard. The High Court has also declined
to interfere with the order. dated January 4, 1967 as it upheld
the validity of rr. 28B and 32 as well &S the circular of August
F
27, 1966. Though we are upholding the validity'of the two rules,
we disagree from the High Court's view regarding the validity of
the circular. We are also giving separate directions regarding the
order dated Jainuary 4, 1967.
G
H
We are, accordingly of the 012,inion that so far as the appellant (in the civil appeal) and respondents Nos. 2 to 4 are concerned, the officiating promotions made of the latter officers on
Jainuary 4, 1967 as well as their confirmation by order dated
January 22, 1970 will have to be reviewed and reconsidered by
the Departmental Promotion Colil!llittee and the Government.
It is needless to state that the circular dated August 27, 1966
should not be taken into consideration. The claims of the appellamt and respondents Nos. 2 to 4 in the appeal will have to be
considered only on the basis of the Rules. We also make it cleac
OUMAN SINGH v. RAIASTHAN (Vaidialingam, J.)
that a reconsideration of the claims of the appellant and respondents Nos. 2 to 4 will be necessary, only if the appellant, is found,
in the first instance, to be eligible as per the Rules for being con·
sidered for promotion. His eligibility is to be decided with reference to the date when the Departmental promotion Committee
met in September, 1966 for considering promotion. This direc-,
tion becomes necessary as we are upholding the validity of Rules
28B and 32. If ultimately, respondents Nos. 2 to 4 are found
eligible for promotion under the rules, they will retain their rank
on the basis of promotion given to them on January 4, 1967.
If not, suitable alterations will have to be made both in this order
as well as in the order of January 22, 1970. Once again we are
emphasising that the fact that the respondents Nos. 2 .to 4 have
been confirmed on January 22, 1970, is of no consequence because
if their original promotion on January 4, 1967 is not valid, their
confirmation on January 22, 1970 will not have any greater sanctity. Of course, if on reconsideration they are found eligible for
promotion, their confirmation and rank given to thein will stand.
933
A
B
c
D
The allegations of ma/a {ides made by the appellant against
the State have been, in QUf opinion, rightly rejected by the Division Bench. Mala {ides were alleged against the State in amending
the Service Rules from time to time and the delay in making
promotions on the ground that they were ad! done with a view to
help the son-in-law of the Chief Minister and the other officers
who were relations of persons in the good books of the Chief
Minister. The same allegations have been repeated in the two
writ petitions also. Those allegations have· been denied by the
State. For the reasons given by the Division Bench, with which
we agree, we have no hesitation in rejecting the allegations of
ma/a {ides made by tile appellant in the appeal and in the writ
petitions.
In the appeal and the writ petitions we hold that rr. 28B and
32 are valid and that the circular datea August 27, 1966 is
struck down as illegal and invalid. In the writ petitions there
will be only a declaration that the circular dated August 27, 1966
is invalid and that it is struck down. In other respect both the
writ petitions will stand dismissed. There will be no order as to
costs.
So far as the appeal is concerned there will be a further order
at subject to the observations contained in this judgment a direction will issue to the first respondent, the State to instruct the Departmental Promotion Committee to review and reconsider
the promotions already given to respondents Nos. 2 to 4
in the appeal under the order dated January 4, 1967 and
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT RBPOR TS
934
A
B
c
D
E
(1971] SUPP. S.C.R.
to decide their claims afresh only on the basis of the Rules.
If the appellant is found eligible for being considered for promotion under the Rules, his claim also will have to be considered along with that of the respondents Nos. 2 to 4. No directions are necessary regarding respondent No. 5 as he is already
dead. Depending on the fresh recommendations, any, made by
the Departmental Promotion Committee, the first respondent, will
also make any modifications that may be found necessary in the
orders dated January 4, 1967 and January 21, 1970. The modifications, if any, will be confirmed only to the appella.nt and the
respondents Nos. 2 to 4 as the appellant is not challenging the
promotions given to other officers under the said two orders. If
ultimately respondents Nos. 2 to 4 are found eligible for promotion and the appellant is not found eligible, the rank given to
those respondents wiJJ remain the same as is now due to them
as per the orders dated January 4, 1967 and January 21, 1970.
Otherwise, suitable alterations will have to be made.
Pending the review and reconsideration, ordered all above,
and which must be done as expeditiously as possible, and depen·
ding upon the result of the same, the promotion already given to
respondents Nos. 2 to 4 to the senior scale wiIJ continue to be
in force.
In the result the order and judgment of the Division Bench
of the High Court upholding the validity of the circular dated
August 27, 1966 and declining to interfere with the order da.ted
January 4, 1967 so far as the appellant and respondents Nos. 2
to 4 are concerned are hereby set aside and the appeal allowed
to tha.t extent.
Parties will bear their own costs throughout.
11
G. C.
Appeal allowed in part.
Report an error or ask for masking: grievance@lawgrids.org