ADI PHEROZSHAH GANDHI versus H. M. SEERVAI, ADVOCATE-GENERAL OF MAHARASHTRA, BOMBAY
Supreme Court of India | Decided 21 August 1970 | [1971] 1 S.C.R. 863 | 1970 INSC 167
Key facts
- Decided
- 21 August 1970
- Bench
- M. HIDAYATULLAH*, J.M. SHELAT*, G.K. MITTER*, C.A. VAIDYIALINGAM*, A.N. RAY*
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 2259/1969
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1971] 1 S.C.R. 863
- Neutral citation
- 1970 INSC 167
Text of the judgment
863
A
ADI PHEROZSHAH GANDHI
v.
H. M. SEERVAI, ADVOCATE-GENERAL OF
MAHARASHTRA,BOMBAY
August 21, 1970
B
[M.
c
HmAYATULLAH, C.J., J. M. SHELAT, G. .l(.
A. VAIDIALINGAM AND A. N. RAY, JJ.]
c.
MITTER,
A.dvocatts Act (25 of 1%1) s. 37--,:ferson aggrieved', meanmg OJAdvocate-General of State taking part in proceedings before Disciplinnry
Committee of Bar Council-If 'person aggrieved' with a right of appeal.
The appellant wa~ an advocate from Maharashtra. He was convicted
by a Summttry Court in London on a charg~ of pilfering from a Depart-
mental Store and was sentenced to pay a fine. The State Bar Council
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chlled upon him sou motu to show cause why he should not be held
guilty of misconduct. lie submitted his explanation and the Disciplinary
Committee of the Bar Council was satisfied that there was no reason for
holding him guilty of profession~ misconduct. The Advocate-Genen.l
of the State who was sent a noti~ of tile proceedings as required by
s. 35(2) of the Advocates Act, 1961, and had appeared before the Discip-.
Jinary Committee, tiled an appeal tp the Bar Council of India un~r
s. 37 of the Act, under which, any 'person aggrie\·ed by an order of the
Disciplinary Committe~: of the StatQ Bar Council mad~ under s. 35 of
the Act, may prefer an appeal to thl: Bar Council of India. The appel~
!ant objected that the Advocate-Gene~al had no locus standi to file the
appeal. The objection was overruled by the Disciplinary Committee of
tbe Bar Council of India and the appellant was found guilty of professional misconduct.
·
In appeal to this Court, on the question of the
Advocate-General to file the appeal under s. 37.
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compett:u~y of
the
HELD : (Per Jiidayatullah, C.J., Shelat and Mitter, JJ.) The
Advocate-General Was not 'a person aggrieved' within the meaning of
.s. 37 and therefore, the appeal filed by him was incompetent and hence,
the finding of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India
should be set aside. [887 H; 904 E)
(Per Hidayatullah C.J.) (1) The expression 'person aggrieved' must
be construed by reference to the context of the enactment in which it
appears and all the circumstances. Under the Act, disciplinary proceediags before a State Bar Council commence on a complaint to it or suo
mtJtu and are referred to its Disciplinarr. Committee. The Disciplinary
Committee can reject the matter summartly; but if it proceeds to hear it
further, notice thereof is sent to the 6oncemed advocate and to the
Advocate.{Jeneral of the State. The Advocate-General may appear
personally or by counsel. If the Disciplinary Committee after giving the
A,lh-ocate and the Advocate-General an opportunity to be heard holds
that the Advocate is not guilty of any misconduct it makes an order
::ither dismissing the complaint, or where the pro:eeding was started by
the Bar Council makes an order that the matter may be filed. If it
finds the advocate guilty it may either reprimand the advocate or suspend
864
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
A
thi advocate from practice for a specified period or remove his name from
the roll of Advocates. From the decision of the Disciplinary Committee
of the State Bar Council an appeal lies to the Bar Council of India at
the instance of 'a person aggrieved'. The appeal is heard by the DiscipHnary Committee of the Bar Council of India and from its decision an
app-:al lies to this Court. ([884 E-H; 885 A-B]
(a) In these proceedings before the disciplinary committee the
Ad\·ocate-General is not in the nature of a party having independent rights
which he can claim nor is ,be injured by the decision. The decision
doe5 not deny him 1>nything nor does it ask him to do anything, He
j; also not intended to be bound by the decision. He does not represent
the Bar nor has he a right to speak on behalf the body of the advocates.
Such a privilege is neither expressly conferred on him nor can it be
implied from the provisions of the Act. [885 C-D; 886 A-B]
(b) In the State Bar Councils (except in Delhi), the Advocate-General
o( the State is an e.x-offl.cio member, but his functions are not different
from those of other members. He has a right of pre-aud·ience, but the
Admcatcs Act does not confer any other right on him. W,hen the Comnittee considers in limini to decide whether the matter should be proc:;-ded with at all. the Advocate General's presence is not considered
necessary. Therefore, the Advocate-General is not a prosecutor on behalf
ot rhe Bar Council.· He is noticed and brought before the Committee because he is the Chief Counsel of the State and therefore his assistance
·at the hearing is useful. He is generally a lawyer of some standing hav. ing made a mark in the profession and his contribution to the deliberatic-ns of the Disciplinary Committee is welcome, because, thus the Disciplinary Committee is helped to reach a l?roper conclusion. The fact
th;;,t he can appear throug,h counsel shows that the intention is merely to
ha\'e his opinion as an amicus curiae who is neither siding with the
complaintant nor with the Advocate and w~o will thus have an unbiased
und impartial approach to the case. He must after he has done his duty
~~~ve the matter to the complainant and the advocate or the Bar Council
to take the matter further if they choose. [883 C, E-F; 885 E-H; 886 A]
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(c) If he is not a person summoned to be bound by the order but
a person who is ,beard in a &ispute between others merely to be of assist-
ance in reaching the right conclusion he can hardly have a grievance.
Am· person who feels disappointed with the result of a case is not 'a
perSon aggrieved'. He must be disappointed of a benefit which he would
ba\'e received if the order had gone the other way. The order must
cause him a legal grievance by wrongfully depriving him of something
or must have a tendency to inJure him. That the order is wrong or that
it acquits some one who he thinks ought to be ~onvicted does not by itself
r,i\'e rise to a legal grievance. [876 A-C]
F
Therefore it cannot be said that by reason of the provisions of the
Advocates A~t, the Advocate-General of the State enjoys such a position
that he must necessarily be treated as 'a person aggrieved' entitling him
tD file an appeal. f882 H; 886 G)
G
In re. Sidebotham Ex. Sidebotham, (1880) 14 Ch. D. 458(C.A.). In
n. Lamb Exp. Board of Trade, [1894] 2 O.B.D. 805, 812, In re. Kitson,
Ex;~. Sugderi·(Thomcs) & Sons, .Ltd. [19.11]2 K.B. 109, 112::.._114, Bl!'·- H
re · BI'Own E.xp. Debtor v. Offi.cwl Rece1ver (1943) Ch. D. 177. Ell1s
·E;p, Ellis (1876)2 Ch. D. 779, ln re. Words Exp. Dalton (1874)~
L.T. 297(C.A.). R. v. London Count,v Keepers of .Peace and Just1ce
[1890] 20 Q.B.D. 357, Jennings v. Kelly, (1940] A.C. 206, (H.L.). In
'
A. P, GANDHI v. H. M. SBBll.VAI
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ses
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re. Reviere (1884) 2 Ch. D. 48, Robinson v, Currey {1881] 7 Q.B.D.
465, 470. (C.A.}; Seven Oaks Urban District Council v. Twynham (1929)
2 K.B. 440, 443, Ealing Corporation v. Jones L. R. [1959] 1 Q.BD.
384, B. M. Madani v. Commissioner of Workmen's Com,ensation Bombay, C.A. 877 of 1968 decided on October 10, 1968 and Municipal Corporation oj the City of Bombay v. Chandukzl Sht.maldas Patel, C.A. 1716 of
1967 decided on August 1, 1970, referred to.
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( 2) It could not be said that in the present case there were several
points of general public interest which needed to be solved and there·
fore, if the decision of the Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar
Council was wrong, the Advocate-General, in public interellt, could take
the matter further. [886 G-H]
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Unlike the position of an Attorney General in a Crown Colony, the
Advocate-General of a State in India does not represent the Executive or
the Legislature or ~he Judiciary, or the Central Government in disciplinary proceedings before the Disciplinary Committee. . The magniloquent phrases such as Leader of the Bar, Keeper of the Conscience of
the Bar have no meaning neither under the Advocates Act nor under the
Bar Councils Act, 1926. They are just honorofic titles given by the
courtesy but are not grounded on law, the keepers of the conscience of
the Bar being the Bar Councils. [883 F-G; 886 C-D}
In the present case. the appellant was not precluded from questioning the charge in the disciplinary proceedings beca\lle of the decision of
the Criminal Court in London. His explanation was accepted by the
Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council. They were also satisfied that the summary proceedings in the criminal trial in EiJ.Jlano
offended against the principles of natural justice, and that thercfo~, the
conviction· of the appellant in· England did not show any moral turpitude
in the appellant. If the Advocate General's view on these matters were
not accepted by the Disciplinary Committee he • could not ha\'e any
8tcievance. He could not make it his own cause or a cause on behalf of
others whom he did not represent. He had done his duty and tl\e matter
should have rested there. rss7 C-F]
Attornt:J·Gtneral t1j Gambia v. Pierre StuJr N'Jie, [1961] A.C. 617
(P.C.) referred to.
F
(3) (a) The facts that in Advocate-General of Bombay v. Phlro1:
Rustam/1 Barucha 37 Born. L.R. 722 (P.C.) the staudina of the AdvocateGenCl'al to apply for special leave in a proceeding relatinf to profeuional
lnisconduct of an Advocate was questioned bellore the Pr'lVy Council, but
that the Privy Council refused SJ?tCial leave on a different ground cannot
import a rejection of the objection as to the standing of the .Advocate-
General. rsst E-FJ
(b) The observations in B. Nc.grshV:•ara Rao v. The Hon'ble Judges
uf the Madras High Court, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1055 that in an appeal arising
out of a proceeding under the Bar Councils Act, it was inappropriate to
make the Judges respondent, and that the appropriate parti~s should be the
con~erncd Advocate the complainant (if any), the Bar Council and the
Advocate-G.:neral of the State, do not advance the case of the AdvocateGeneral in this case. [882 E}
H
(Per Shelat and Mitter, JJ.) ( 1) A State Bar Council consists of a
·number oi 111embers including the Advocate-General of the State ex-afficio.
Under the provisions of the Advocates Act, subject to a Jight of appeal
to this Court under s. 38, inquiries into char~es of misconduct against
L169CI/71-ll
866
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(197 J] 1 S.C.R.
advocal~s arc to be in the exclusive jurh.diction of the Bar Councils. · If a
compla_int is received against an Advocate it is reft!rred to tbe Disciplinary
Cornrmttee of the Bar Council or the :aar Council c:tn take such a step
suo. motu. lt is however not obligatory to refer each and every coroplamt but only when the Bar Coun~il is satisfied that there is a prima facie
ca~e for investigation. If it is not so satisfied it can throw out the complaint as frivolous. And it is only when the Disciplinary Committee does
not s~arily reject the complaint that a date has to be fixed for its
hearing and notice thereof must be given to the advocate concerned and
the Advocate-General of the State but it is not incumbent
on the Advocate-General to appear in person; he can appca·r through
at~othcr i!dvocate and place his view-point before the Disciplinary Commtttee. The Advocate and a complainant who makes allegations against
an advoca.tc are persons aggrieved entitled to file an appeal under s. 37 if
an ::>rder Js made against the advocate, N the complaint is dismissed by
the Discivlinary Committee:. But the State Bar Council cannot be such
a person as the order is made by itself and acting through its Disciplinary
Committe':'. [889 B-C; 891 B-CJ
·
Generally speaking a person is said to be aggrieved by an order whkh
is to his detriment, pecuniary or otherwise or causes him some prejudice
in some form or other.
A person who is not a party to u litigation bas
no right of appeal merely because the juugmcnt or order contains som<>
adverse remarks against him. A person who is not a party to a suit may
prefer an appeal, with the leave of the' appellate court when the judgment would be binding on him. But because a person has been given
notice of some proceedings wherein he is gh·cn a right to appear ami
make his submissions, he docs not without more, have a right of appeal
from an order rejecting his contentions or submissions. To .place the
Advocate-General in the company of "persons aggrieved" one must be
able to say that t.he Disciplinary Committee committed an error which
it was his duty to attempt to set right because of some function attribut·
able to him as the Advocate Gene1 al or. some obligation cast upon him
by the Act or the general law of the land to safeguard and maintain
standards of conduct of Advocates laW down by the Bar Council of
India. [892 B-Fl
(a) The Advocate-General is entitled to a hearing if. the complaint
is not rejected summarily. But it is not obligatory on him to take .part
i~ the proceedings. It is only w,hen he feels that a case requires a care'ful investigation and proper elucidation of ,the facts or .the exposition of
the law on the subject that he is called upon to render a.~sistance. He hAs
to take a fair and impartial attitude and r.~n<icr all assi~tance to the Bar
CounCil to enable it to arrive at a proper decision. His role is not that
of a prosecutor nor is he a defence counsel on behalf of the advocate.
His duty is to put before the Disciplinary Comt~ittee the facts in their,
proper perspective and .to advance the proper mfercncc t~ be drawn.
Once he does so there tA an end of tbe matter so. ~ar as he 1s concerne~:
and he cannot have an" grievance ~ause the dects1on of the Bar Counc1l
is against his submission or not to his liking. [896 G-H; 897 A-C]
(b) Article 165(2) of the Constitution epitomizes the functi?Rs and
duties of the Advocate·General. It lays down that he h~s ~o discharge
the functions conferred upon him bv or under the Const1tutton or any
ttber law for the til'!}e being ·tn force. lt is n~t open to the A&vocat~
General to intervene In any mit or legal proceedmg apart from the provisions of the Codes of Civil and Criminal Procedure, ~er~ly because he
thinks public interest is involved in the matter. Constdermg the matter
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A. P. GANDHI v. H, M. IBBVAI
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historically, the Legislature, ·while passing the Bar Councils Act, 1926,
and the Ad\-ocates Act, 1961, thought that the Advocate-General tboWd
be. beard ·inasmu~h as h~ oceupied the posif:ion Of a general referee on
pomts of · professtonal etiquette very. much like the . Attomoy-Geocral in
Eogland. Onee he does this duty enjoined upon him by the statute, of
making such submissions as he thinks oroper at the hearin& his tunc- ·
tions qw the enquiry come to an end.· As a referee he has no furtber
·interest in the matter, and if the Disciplinary Committee makes an order
against the advocate which the Advocate-General considers hant . and
unreasonable he is not called upon to file an appeal. Neither is be interested in prosecuting the matter further if he takes the view that ~he
punishment meted out is not commensurate with the misconduct of the
<Advocate. [897 D-E, G-H; 900 C-FJ
.
.
Robinson v. Currey, 7 Q.B.D. 465, Ex parte Sidebothom. In re
Sidebotham, 14 Ch. D. 458, 465, Ex parte Oflic/Ql Receiver. In re Read,
.,Brown &: C.o. 19 Q.B.D. 174, 178, The Queen v. Keeptrs of the Pt4ce
and Justices of the County of London, 25 Q.B.D. 359, 361; Rex v. London Quarter Sessions, Exparte Westminster Corporation (1951) 2 Q.B.D.
5f)8, Snen Oaks Urban District Council v. Twynham, (1929) ' 2 (Nl.D.
444, Ea/ing Corporation v. Jones, (1954) 1 K.B. 384, 390, referreG
to,
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(2) The Ad\-ocate-General of a State in India is not a repre&en~tive
of the Government. Neither the Constitution nor the ' Advocates i Act
holds him so nor is he a person representing public interest, unliko6 the
Attorney-General in a Crown Colony, except as provided in statutes.
He may draw the attention of the Bar Council to any misconduct of an
advocate and appear at the bearing. Once the hearing is ove1 and a
finding is recorded he has done his du~y apd he cannQt ~ said to be
aggrieved within the meaning of s. 3 7. Every day courts of law are
called upon to decide questions of Jaw inter partes which may be of
general importance to the public. 1be Advocate-General cannot prefer
an appeal merely because the question is one of considerable. importance
to the public inasmuch as he is not a party to it; and be has LJ locus
standi to do so, even in a case ~bllfe the statute only gives him an
opportunity of appearing at a hearing ·and making his submission. ~
decision of the Dtsciplinarv Committee cannot necessarily be said to
raise a point of public interest merely because the Advocate General feels
that it is erroneous or that he himself would have arrived at a different
conclusion. It is at best his personal opinion. The Advocate-General
in India is not the guardian angel of tbe Bar. oor is he the champion of
puhlic interest in any matter save as speci.fted in a statute. [902 D-G;
904 B-El
Attornev General of Gambia v. Piem!
N' 1~, (1961) A.C. 617,
(P.C.), referred to.
s.,
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( 3 )(a) The decision of the Judi<.ial Committee in Advocate-Genera!.
Bombay v. Phlroz Barucha, 37 B.L.Jl. 722 (P.C.) does not help the
Advocate-General, because it did not decide the point u to the maintain
• ability of the appeal. [903 C-DJ
(b) It did not appear that anv lfiUitlent was advanced in 8.
Nageswara Rao v. The Hon'ble Judge, of the Madras High Court."
[1955]1 S.C.R. 1055, 1064 about the prpper parties to the appeal before
this Court arising from proceedings under the Bar Councils Act; and the
point as to whether the Advocate General was a person aggrieved Wa!>
neither raised nor argued.. Therefore, the observation in the case that
S68
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1971] 1 S.C.R.
the Advocate-General of the State is an appropriate party in the appeal
should not be accepted. [903 G-HJ
(Per Vaidialinaam and Ray, JJ. dissenting) : The appeal tiled by the
Advocate-General of Maharashtra was competent as be was 'a person
aggrieved' under s. 37 of the Advocates Act, 1961. [908 B-C; 920 G-H]
·(Per Vaidialiogam, J.) : (1} 'Ibe question whether the Advocate
General is a 'person aggrieved' under s. 37 of the Advocates Act will have
to be tackled with refero}nce to the scheme and provisions of the Act.
Under the Act, the State Bar Councils and the Bar Council of India have
been n;.ade autonomous units and various functions regarding the legal
pr~fesston have been entrusted to them including taking disciplinary
action against delinquent members and conducting inquiries. Barring a
right of appeal to this Court under s. 38 the ·c ourts are completely out of
the picture. Under ss. 3(2)(a), 23(4) and 35, the Advocate.General of
t.be State is given a very important and responsible position and the Act
has gi\'en due recognition to his status by virtu~ of his being the hi~est
law officer in the State, and as one who may be trusted to 'place ~ disinterested and dispassionate Yiew before the Disciplinary Committee to
enable it to come to a proper decision with respect to the advocate con~erned and the legal profession. Apart from being an ex of!lc:io member
of the State Bar Council, he bas also a right of pre-audience over other
advocates. [909 D-G; 911 G-H; 912 B-D; 916 A]
Under ss. 35 and 37, (i) the State Bar Council can suo motu or on
receipt of a complaint, OW1hen it has reason to believe that an advocate has
been guilty of professional or other misconduct, refer the case to its IJis.ciplinar!' Corlimittee (ii) If the Committee does not summarily reject the
complaint, it is bound to fix a elate fo•· its hearing ando al~o bound to give
n\ltice to the advocate and the Advocate General of the State; (iii) The
Committee is bound to give an opportunity of being heard to the Ad\'o·
·cate and the Advocate-General and there is no distinction in the opportu·nity so afforc.led to both of them; (iv) The Advocate-General may appear
4n person or through counsel: (v) the Committee can pass one or other
of the orders enumerated in s. 3S(a) to (d) and the orders have to be
communicated to the Ac.lvocate.Oeneral also, and under s. 37 'any
person aggrieved' i~ entitled to file an appeal to the Bar Council of Jndiu.
Unlike under · the Bar Com1cits Act. the Advocate-General is associated
with the disciplino.ry proceed ina~ right from the ~to.ge of the inquiry by·
the Committee. The notice to the Advocate.General cannot be a formal
· and empty notice, because he should be given nn opportunity of being
heard. Even though there may be no 'lis' and the Advocate-General may
not be a 'party' in the usual sense, he is also entitled. like the advocate
against whom the inquiry is being conducted. to place before the Committee all aspects of the matter in favour of and against the advocate.
He is allowed to appear bv counsel. because, he may not be able to appear
personalty and participate !n all the disc.iplinary p:oceedin.gs. He n~d
not be ,;ndictive or take stdes, but by vutue of h1s spectal and dispassionate role he will be able to place all releva.nt material to enable the
Committee to come to a proper and correct findmg. [912 D-H; 913 A-H :
•)14 A·Bl
(a} The fact that the Advocate General docs not allege an infrin~e
ment of any legal rights of his own is of no consequence. It may be that
a particular case the Ad\'"Ocate General may !eel !hat the fin~ing
arrived at either in favour of the advocate or agamst h1m or the pumshment imposed on the advooate. is not jus!ified bv the evidence. on record.
Under such and similar circumstances the Advocate General wJil be competent. as 'a person agg~iev~d', to ·bring up the matter before the Appellate Committee so that JUShce may be done. [914-G; 915 A-CJ
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A. P, GANl>lU v. H. M. SBERVAJ
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869
Sevenoaks Urhan District Council v. Twynham [1929] 2 K.B. 440.
Ecding Corporation v. Jones [1959] 1 Q.B. 584, Madani v. Commissioner
of Workme~r's Compensation, Bombc.y, C.A. 877 of 1968 decided on
October 10, I 968.
8
Re. Siclehotham 14 Ch. D. 458, The Queen v. The Keepers oj the
Peace and lltstice.1· of the County of London, 25 Q.B.D.. 357, Re. Reed,
Brow" & Co. 19 Q.B. 174, Rex v. London Quarter Sessions (1951) 2 K.B.
508 and Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay v, Chandulal
Shamaldas Patd. C.A. 1716 of 1967 decided on August 1, 1970, referred
to.
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(b) The fact that the Legislature provided that the Advocate-General
should be associated with the disciplinary proceedings from the very
beginning of the inquiry brings him undtt s. 37 as 'a person aggrieved'
and hence the fact that the Ccmmittee decided in favour of the Advocate has no bearing on the question. [914 G-Hl
(c) The fact that the Ad\-ocate General is not given notice before re-
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jecting a complaint summarily does not militate against the view that be
is 'a person aggrieved' because, probably, the Legislature felt that if
there was a wrongful summary reje,,:tioo of a complaint, it could be ~t
right by the Bar Ccuncil of India \lnder s. 48A by exercising its revlsional powers. [916 E-F]
(d) In thi.'l view it is unnecessary to mention the Advocate General
specifically 'a person aggrieved' in ~. 37. [918 A]
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(2.) The analogy of the Attorney-General in a Colony repre5enting
the Crown and being the guardian of public interest as stated in .AttorneyGtneral of Gambia v. Pelrre Sarr N' lie (1961) A.C. 617 cannot be
brought in for interpreting s.37 of the Advocates Act, and the observa- ·
tions therein must be related to the particular legal provisions which were
considered. But even that decision recognised that the words 'person
aggrieved' are very wide and should not be subjected to any restrictive
tnteqirctation. (912 A-B: 920 A·B, EJ
(3) The decisions in Advocate-General of Bom/Jay v. Pitambardas
Gokuldas, 62 I.A. 235 and Advocate-General of Bombay v.
Phiroz
Rustomji Barucha, 37 B.L.R. 722(P.C.) do not decide the quec;tion one
way or the other. [917 A-Bl
(Ptr Ray, J.) : (1) The purpose and the provisions of the Advocates
Act ;:!etermine whether the Advo;:ate-General is a person aggrie\·ed within
the meaning of s.37 of the Advocate~; Act. Under the Act. a State Bar
Council i,; empowered to con!ltitutc a Disciplinary Committee. Where on
receipt of a complaint or otherwise a State Bar Council ha~ reason to
hetieve that an advocate on it~ roll i!; guilty of profcs~ional mi~conduct
it shall refer the case for disposal to its Disciplinary Committee, l\nd if
the Committee does not summarily reject it, a date of hearing shall be
fixed. The provisions relating to inquirie'> into profes~ional misconduct
of an advocate. establish first that the Advocate General entitled to a notice
of the date of hearing, secondly. that no order can be made bv the Disciplinary Committee without givin~ him an opportunity, and thirdly that he may
appear in person or th·rough an advocate and that he has a right of preaudience. He may not choose to appear but if he docs appear, his right is ba~d
on statute: and he does not apnear as ·a mere friend of the court. He is
heard because he is the t1ead of the Bar in the State and the proceedings
affect the discipline and dignity of the Bar and touch the profe:o;sional
SUPR.EME COUilT REPORTS
~10
(1971] 1 S.C.R.
conduct of aa adl-ocate. Under Art. 165 of the Constitution the
AdV'ocatc Oeoeral has to discharge the functions conferred on him by
the Constitution or any other law in force. The Advocates Act concerns
.an advocate and it is in the fitness of things that the Advocate General of
the State is heard ~ a person representing the profession which assists the
Jitipnt public and : tbe courts in the administration of jurtice. He i~
liiUIIIy a penon of hilh standina and experience and will not adopt any
pctilan attitude in the proceedings. The purpose of the inquiry is not
&o .~ the gri,evance of an individual complainant-in fact ss. 35
and 36 do not contemplate any notice to the complainant-but to find
out whether there is any breach of professional standards and conduct.
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[926 C-H; 827 F-H; 928 A-C}
(a) It is not the intention of the statute that he would be merely a
<1eutral observer before the Disciplinary Committee and that he would
have no duty to perform. He would have to express his views, and if
in. a matter \of sufficient gravity a totally inadequate punishment is impoted or if the punishment is too severe the Advocate General would be
a 'per100 agrieved', to have. it corrected. The words 'person aggrieved'
MD be referable to the Advocate, complainant, and the Advocate General or Attorney General as the case may be. The Advocate-General and
the Attorney General will be persons aggrieved because they are in.terested in maiotain~ng professional rectitude. [929 C-G]
(b) Further if the proceedin~ were held without notice to the
Advocate General or without ginng him an · opportunity of being heard
he would be a· person aggrieved. . His participation in the proceedings
.data not ~ter the position. If he has a right to be heard, he may have
a grievance aa to the result of the hearing. [929 A-B]
Re. Exparte Sidebotham -14 Cb. D. 458; Exparte Official Receiver.
ln re. Reed Bowen, 19 Q. B. D. 174, Sevenoaks Urban British CounciL
· v. Twynhtm ( 1929) 2 K. B. 104, Queen v. Keepers of the Ptt;ee and
Justices of the County of London, 25 Q.. B. D. 351 and Madani ...
Commir.Jioner of Workmen's Compensation, Bombay, C.A. 811 of 196~
decided on October 10, 1968, referred to.
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(2) lD dilciplinary proceedings there is no party in the usual ·sense.
·n .. Ad\"OC&te-Geoeral is not a party to a 'lis' and has no personal
or
peamiary or proprietary interest in the matter. That is why the Act
F
. usa tbe words 'person aggrieved' and not 'party aggrieved'. But he is
heard, not beCause he is a party, but because he represents the interest
of tbe profession anct for the purpose of upholding its purity and t.be
p..ervation of correct atandards and norms. Prom this point of view
he will be an aagrieved peliOn wbco he find1. that the interests of the Bar.
Nbich is a matter of public interest, is not properly safeguarded by the
Dlaclp,Jinary Committee. In Attorney General of Gambia v. Pierre
G
Bllllr N' Jl~. (1961) A.C. 617 the JudJcial Committee construed tbe words
~penon agrieved" as not to be su~ected to a restrictive interpretation
but to include &\person who has a genuine grievance because an order
hu been made which prejudicialtv affected his interest, and that the .
worda~would ioclude the Attorney General of Gambia as representing the
public interest. ·1927 E-F; 928 C-D, G-H; 929 G·HJ
·
·(3) The decisions of the Judicial Committee in Advocate-General of
Bomhay v. Phiroz ,Bcruc'Jra, 62 I. A. 235 and of this Ccurt in B. Nagnhwara Rao v. The Hon'ble Jud!(eJ of the Madras High Court, rt955) l
.s,C.R. 1055 indicate that the Advocate General under the Bar Councils
.Act,· 1926 had locus standi to prefer an appeal. [925 D-E, G)
H
A. P. GANDHI v. .H. M. SEERVAI (Hidayatullah, C.J.)
A
871
CIVIL APPELLATE JuRlsmcnoN: Civil Appeal No. 2259 of
1969.
Appeal under s. 38 of the Advocate's Act, 1961 from the
order dated October 26, 1969 of the Discip1inary Committee of
.the Bar Council of India ia D.C. Appeal No. 18 of 1968.
C. K. Daphtary, A. S. R. Chari, J. B. Dadachanji, 0. C.
Mathur, Ravinder Narain and S. Swarup, for the appellant.
V. S. Desai and B. D. Sharma, for re~pondent No. 1.
M. C. Bhandare and S. B. Wad, for r~pondent No. 2.
c
V. A. Seyid Muhammad and S. P. Nayar, for Attorney~Gene·
raJ for India.
A. V. Rangam, for Advocate-General for the Tamil Nadu.
·M. C. Setalvad, Rameshwar Nath, for Bar Council of India.
D
0. P. Rana, for Advocate-General for the State of"U.P.
A. G. Pudissery, for Advocate-General for the State of Kerala.
K. Baldev Mehta, for Advocate-General for the Stote of
R<~_jasthan.
E
A. P. S. Chauhan, A. D. Mathur
and N. P. Jain, for Bar
Council U.P.
Sukumar Ghose and G. S. Chatterjee,
for
the· Advocate
General for the State of West Bengal.
F
P. Patmeswara Rao, for Advocate-General for the Andhra
Prade:;h,
I. N. Shroff, for Advocate-General for the State oE Madhya
Pradesh.
G
J. C. Medhi, Advocate-General for the State of Assam and
Naunit Lal, for the Advocate-General for the State of Assam.
.HIDAYATULLAH, C.J., and· MITTER J. on behalf of SHBLAT J.
·o.md himself delivered separate judgments. VAII>IALlNGAM and
RA'I' JJ. delivered separate dissenting opinions.
\
Hidayatullah, C.J.-1 agree with the judginent delivered by
my broth~r Mitter but in view of the importan~ ·of the question
and the dtfference between my brethren I have chosen to express
myself separately.
1
872
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1971] 1 S.C.R.
We he~rd this appeal on a preliminary point raised by th~;
appellant that the appeal of the Advocate-General of Maharashtra
filed before the Bar Council of India was incompetent as the
Advocat~neral did not fall within the expression a 'person aggrieved' to whom alone is given the right of appeal under s. 37
of the Advocates Act of 1961, against the orders of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of the State.
8
The facts necessary to bring out the controversy may be briefly
stated. The appellant is an advocate from Maharashtra. The
Bar Council of the State of Maharashtra had called. upon him
suo motu to show cause why he should not be held guilty of
misconduct. It appears that the appellant was convicted before
a Summary Court in London Qn a charge of pilfering some arti- c
cles from departmental stores and sentenced to a fine. The record
·of the proceedings in London was not before the Bar Council
of the State and action was taken on the basis of a brief report
of the incident in a newspaper. The appellant explained before
the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of the State that
he was the victim of a misunderstanding but as he had no means D
of defending himself effectively, he was found guility lWi received a light sentence of fine. He explained how he had fallen into
this unfortunate predicament and did not know llow to extricate
himself. The order of the Swnmary Court was not a speaking
order and the proceedings were summary. The disciplinary committee were satisfied .that there was no reason to hold him guilty E
of professional or other misconduct. They, therefore, ordered
that the proceedings be filed.
The Advocate-General of the State, who was sent a notice of
the proceedings, as is required by the second sub-section of s.
·! 35, and had appeared before the committee, purportin~ to act
:! . under s. 37 of the Act filed an appeal before the Bar Ciuncil of
India. It was heard by the disciplinary committee of the Bar
Council of India. The advocate objected that the Advocate, 1 i General had no locus standi to file the appeal.
The objection
.. r· was overruled and the appeal was accepted. The advocate was
held guility of misconduct .and suspended for a year from practice. The advocate now appeals under s. 38 of the Act to this
. Court. His appeal raises questions of merit but he contenqs at
the tbreshhold that the Advocate--General was not competent to
file the appeal under s. 37 of the Act.
F
II
Th point in controversy before the disciplinary committee of
'he Bar Council of India arid now before us, is a short one. It is :
whether the Advocate-Genex:al can be said to be a -person aggrieved' by the order of the disciplinary committee of the Bar Counci1
of the State
Having heard this poi·nt in detail we took time
to consider. I am of the opinion that it must be held in favonr
G
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A. P. GANDHI v. H. M. SEERVAI (Hidayatul/ah, C.J.)
A
873
of the advocate and the order of the disciplinary committee of
the Bar Council of India, now under appeal before us, must be
set aside on this short ground without going into the merits of the
case.
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Section 37 of the Advocates Act 1961 reads :
"37. Appeal to the Bar Council of India.
( 1). AID _a;woo~ggrieyed py an order of the disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council made
under section 35' may, within sixty days of the date of
the communication of the order to him, prefer an appeal to the Bar Council of India.
. ( 2) Every such appeal shall be heard by the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India which
may pass such order thereon as it deems fit."
The expression a 'person aggrieved' is not new, nor has it oc-·
curred for the first time in the Advocates Act. En fact it occurs
in several Indian Acts and in British Statutes for more than a
hundred years. In the latter a right of appeal to a 'person aggrived' is conferred in diverse contexts. It occurs in the Ale
House Act, the B8lllkruptcy Acts, Copyright Act, Highway
Act, Licensing Acts, Milk arul Dairies (Amendment) Act. Rating
and. Valuation Act, Summary Jurisdiction Act, Union Committee
Act, Local Acts, in certiorari proceedings and the Defence of
Realm Regulations to mention only a few. The list of Indian Acts
is equally long.
As a result of the frequent use of this rather vague phrase.
which practice, as Lord Parker pointed out in Ealing Corporation
v. JoMs(l), has not been avoided, in spite of the confusion it
causes, selections from the observations ot judges expounding the
phrase in the context of these varied statutes were cited before
us for our acceptance. The observations often conflict ~ince they
were made in different contexts and involved the special standing
of tbe party claiming the right of appeal. Yet these definitions
are not entirely without value for they disclose a certain unanimity on the essential features of this phrase, even in the diversity
c.f the contexts. The font and origo of the discussion is the
well~ known definition of the phrase by James L.J. in In Re Sidehotham Ex. j. Sidebotham(2). It was observed that the words
'person .aggrieved' in s. 71 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1869
meant:
"1not really a person who is disappointed of a benefit
which he might have received, if some order had been
(I) L R.
{1959] I Q. B. D. 3P4.
(:') mPO) 14 0. D. 4~8 C. A
874
[1971]1 S.C.lt
SUPREME COCRT REPORTS
a
made. A 'person aggrieved' must be man Wh(' had
suffered a legal g,rievMJCe, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which had wrongfully deprived him of so111ething or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something.''
·The important words in this definition are 'a benefit which h~
might have received' and 'a legal grievance' against the decision
which 'wrong!fully deprives him of somethmg' or affects 'his
title to something'.
The definition was held in later r.ases to be not exhaustive and
several other features of the phrase were pointed out. Thus Wlder the Bankruptcy Acts, where the Board of Trade summoned
to support the validity of the appointment of a trustee, went before
the judge, and failed, it was considered a 'person aggrieved' on
the prindple th<;tt a person who is brought before the Coun to
submit to its decision, but not a person who is heard in a dispute
between othe.rs must lJe treated as a ·person aggrieved' (see br
Re l.amb Ex., p. Board of Trade(!) per Lord Esher). Her~
again the words to notice are 'brought before the court to submit
to its decision', that is to say, a person who is in the nature of
a party as contra-distinguished from a person who is next described as 'a person who is heard ir. a dispute between other!'i.' To
distinguish between these two positions I may refer to a few more
decisions. In In Re Kitson, Ex. fJ. Sugden! (Thomas) & Sons
Ltd. e), it was further explained that.
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"the mere fact that an order is wrongly made does
not of itse1f give a grievance to a person not otherwise
aggrieved."
(per Phiilimore J.)
It was added that a person deprived of the fruit~ of litigation F
which he had instituted in the hope for them, is a 'person aggriev- .
ed'. Similarly, a creditor who did not wish an adjudication order
to be made was held not to be a 'person aggrieved'-Sce In Re
Brown Ex. p, Debtor v. Official Receiver( 8 ). The utmost that
this series of cases goes is to be found in the observations of
James L.J. in Ellis Ex. p. Ellis(') that even a rersor.. not bound G
by the order of adjudication must be treated as a 'person a~grieved' if the order embarrasse.<> him. In a later case ( Tn Re Woods
Ex. P. Ditton)(D) Cotton L.J. held that ev~1l so the person must
be aggrieved by the very ordl'r and not b-y any of the consequences that en:rue. This was clarified in R. v. London Countv Keeper.~ of the Peace and Justices( 6 ), by Lord Coleridge C.J: while . .H
(1) [1894} 2 Q. B. D. 805 at 812.
(3) P94~J Ch. D. D. 177.
,(S) [1879] ~0 L. T. 297 C.A. 79.
(2) [1911] 2 K. B. lOQ Rl 1!::·114.
(4) [l R76l :! Ch. D. 797.
(6) (l ~90] 20 Q. B. D. 357 at ~fi1.
A. P, GANDHI v. H. M. SBERVAI (Hidayatullah, C./.)
A
8
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875
dealing with the Highway Act, denying the right of appeal in
these words :
"Is a person who cannot succeed in getting a conviction against another a 'person aggrieved' ? He may
be annoyed at finding that what he thought was a breach
of the law is not a breach of law; but is he aggrieved
because some one is held not to have done wrong ?
It is difficult to see that the section meant anythi;ng of
the kind. The section does not give an appeal to anybody but a person who is by the direct act of the Ma. gistrate 'aggrieved'-that is who has had something
done or determined against him by the Magistrate."
These observations again show that the person must himself suffer
a grievance, or must be aggrieved by the very order because it
affects him.
Two cases which may usefully be seen in the same context may
next be mentioned. In Jennings v. Kelly( 1 ) in relation to the
Government of Ireland Act 1920, Lord Wright did say that if a
person was treated in certiorari proceedings as a competent party
3jll,d notice was served on him as being a proper party he would
be a 'person aggrieved.' The point to bear in mind is that the
person must be treated as a party. However the force of the
observation was considerably weakened because the party there
was or~red to pay coste; and the·.right of appeal was held to be
available on. that limited ground. . Further qualification is to be
found in In Re Riviere ( 1884) 26 Ch. D. 48 where Lord Setborne observed :
·
" .... it must be a leg·al grievance; 1t. must not be
a stet pro ratione voluntas,· the applicant must not
come merely saying 'I do not like this thing to be done',
it must be shown that it tends to his injury, or to his
damage, in the legal sense of the word.''
'lbe locus !Iandi of the person aggrieved must be found from his
position In th1 fj!st proce1dlng and his grievance must arit~e from
that standing taken with the effect of the order on him.
H
These cases are of course far removed from the one before me
and as Branwell L.J. observed in Robin.rcn v. Curreye) the
expression is nowhere defined and, therefye, must be construed
by reference to the context of the enactment in which it appears
8jlld all the circumstances, He pointed out that 'the words are
~rdinarily English words. which are to have the ordinary meanmg put upon them.'
O> rn4J A. c. 206.
(2) [1881] 7 Q. R D. 46~, 470. C. A.
876
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1971] 1 S.C.R. .
From these cases it is apparent that any person who feels disappointed. with tb.e result of. the case is not a 'person aggrieved.'
He must be disappointed of a benefit which he would have received if the or~r had gone the other way. The_order must cause
him a legal grievance by wrongfully deprhing him of something.
It is no doubt a legal grievance and not a grievance about material matters but his legal grievance must be a tendency to injure
him. That the order is wrong or that it acquits some one who
he thinks ought to be convicted does not by itself give rise to a
legal grievance. These principles are gathered from the cases cited
and do not, ·:1s I shaa show later, do violence to the context in
which the phrase occurs in the Advocates Act. Although I am
awE~re that in Seven Oaks Urban Dz'strict Council v. Twynham( 1 )
Lord Hewart C.J. uttered words of caution, again emphasised by
Lord Parker C.J. in Ealing Corporation v. Jones('l), in applying
too readily the definitions given in relation to other statutes but
I do not think I am going beyond what Lord Hewart C.J. said
and what Lord Parker C.J. did in the case. Lord Parker observed:
" .... As Lord Hewart C.J. poioted out in Seven Oak.;
Urban District Council v. Twynam: 'But as has been
said again and again there is often little utility in seek~
ing to interpret particular expressions in one statute by
reference to decisions given upon similar exprr.ssions
in different statutrs which have been enacted alio intuitu. The problem with which we are concemed is
not, what is the meaning of the expression 'aggrieved'
in any one of a dozen other statutes, but what i~ its
meaning in this part of this statute?' Accordingly, T
only look at the cases to which we have been referred
to see if there are general principles which can be extracted which will guide the court in approaching the
question as to what the words 'person aggrieved' mean
in any particular statute."
If I may say respectfully T fully endorse this approach. I am
now in a position to examine the Advocates' Act but before T do
so I must refer to a case near in pojnt to this case. than any
considered before.
·
The case is reported in A ttornev General of Gambia v.
was held guilty of
professional misconduct but was acquitted on apooal and ·an appeal
was taken to the Judicial Committee against the decision of the
West African Court of Appeal. This involved consideration of
A
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Pierri~ Saar N'jie( 8 ) . ' A legal practitioner
---·-·---------------(!)
[!92Q] 2 K. 1l .140, 443.
m 119611 A. c. 617.
(2) L. R. [1959] 1 Q. B. D. J!l~.
H
A. P, GANDHI v. H. M. SEERVAI (Hidayatullah, C.J,)
87']
}. whether the Attorney General 'could be said 1 b , .
!!rleved'. The facts IIleed to be stated a little ~ lie a person. ag-
~ely upon the observations of Lord Denning an~
explained carefully.
th as both Sides
ey need to be
A barrister (a ~eJ?ber of the English Bar) and also a Solicitor. (the. two pro!ess10ns appear to ut: united in the Gambia)
11 prachsl.ng m t~e Supreme Court of the Gambia was charged with
professional misconduct and a,n order was. ~ade, September 22,
1958, by the Deputy Judge (~bb?t J.) striking off his name from
the roll of that Court, · and d1rectmg that the matter be reported
to the Masters of the Bench of his Inn. · On June 5 1959 the
West African Court of Appeal (Bairamian, Ag.P, Hurley Ag.
C J.A. and Ames Ag. J.A.) set aside the order on the ground that
the Deputy Judge had no jurisdiction. The Attorney General
of the Gambia thereupon sought leave to appeal to Her Majesty
in Council but this was refused. Then a petition was made for
·special leave. Special leave was granted subject to the prel_iminary objection by the respondent that no appeal lay at the ms£D once of the Attorney General. The preliminary objection was
rejected.
Sectio,n 31. of the West African (Appeal to Privy Council)
· Order in Council 1949 under which special leave was asked
reads :
''Nothin" in this order contained. shall be deemed to
.
."' the ng
. ht of H 1'~ Ma1'estY upon. the" humble
mterfere.
w1th
ent of .
petition of any person aggneved by any Judgmh
the court to admit his appeal therefrom UJ?On sue c~>n
ditions ~ His Majesty in Co\~ncil shall tlunk fit to Impose."
li ·
F
. • · ·
barristers and so clIo the Gambia disciplinary JUriSdiction over C • rt 1928. Under
tors is embodied in Rules of the Supremend 0~ere is only one)
those rules the 'Supreme Court' J';!~ge (~ the Court, and Scheadmits and enrols barristers and s.ohcltors
.
·
du!e I Order 9 r. 7 says that : ,
,
for reasonab1e cause,
<;
"The Judge shall ~.:tve powe~iicitor front practi~ing
to suspend any hamster or ·S rt for an~· specified
within the jurisdic~ion of ilie b~o~truck off the roll .of
period, or order h1s name to
·
court."
· .
d •1 hears np·
.
C rt of Appeal. an I
In
Then there js the West Afnca~ . ouivil and crinunal matte~k off
1
l! Peals from the 'Supreme Court 1 '.:1 1cMr Macauley
~cau!ey
an earlier case in which a cer0 ~~~ierr:; Leone an~ .f· • ruled
the roll of the Supreme Court
of West Afnc:t tt wns
sought to appeal to the Full Court
II :
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878
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1971} 1 S.C.R.
by the Full Court that the decision of the Chief Justice was not a
decision of the 'Supreme' Court' and was, therefore, not appealw
able and that the only remedy was "to obtain special leave to appeal
to the Privy Coundl (see W. E. A. Macauley v. Judges. of the
Supreme Court of Sierra Leone and Anr. (1). The legtslature
then added s. 14 which provided :
A
"An appeal shall lie to the Court of Appeal from
any order of the judge suspending a barrister or soliciw
tor of the Supreme Cour-t· from practice or striking his
name off the roll, . and for the purposes_ of any such
appeal any such order shall be deemed to be an order
of the Supreme Court."
B
The words of the section show that the legislature did not regard
a decision in disciplinary· matters as a judgment of a court but
only deemed it to be so.
c
'' ., The Full Court on the appeal <>f N'Jie from the order of the•
Deputy Judge held that a Deputy Judge could not. deal with ~y
matter which was not a proceeding in the court ill the exerclSe D
of judicial power. The Judicial Committee held that this was
exercise of judicial power. Th~ the preliminary objection was
considered. The objection was that the Attorney General bad
no locus standi not being a 'person aggrieved'. This was overruled by the Judicial Committee. Lord Denning referred to the definition of James L.J. in In E
Re Sidebotham Ex. p. Sidebotham, (2) and said that i.f the defiw
nition were to be regarded a~ exhaustive and were held applicable, an 'aggrieved person' would be only a person who wa5 a
party to a lis, a controversy inter partes and had a decision given
• against him. The Attorney General would not come within this
r~st~ic~ed definition as there was iDO suit between two parties when F
disciplinary proceedings were started ex mero motu by the court
or at the instance of the Attorney General or some one auainst a
legal practitioner. But the definition of James L.J. \~as not
exhaustive and the words 'person a..-o-rieved' were of wide import
~nd should not be subjected to a r~~tricted interpretation. They
In~luded not a busy body but certa_inly one who had a genuine
gncvancc .bc~ause an orde~ had been made which prejudicially G
affected bts mtere~ts.. Po~mg the question 'did the Attorney
General have a sufficient mterest', the Judicial Committee ::l(nswered he had. The ~ttorney G~ne!al in a Colony represented the
C~own as the guardtan of pubhc mtcrest and it was his duty to
bnng before the .Judge a case of misconduct to warrant action.
Then Lo~d ~cnmng proceeded to distinguish two kinds of cases E
to detcrmmc 1f the Attorney General would be a 'person aggriev:
0) L. R. (1928] A. C. 344.
(2) [1880] 40 Ch. D. 458 (C. A.)
''
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A. P, GANDHI v. H. M. SEERVAl (HidayatuJ/izh, C./.)
A
B
879•
ed.' The first was a case where the judge acquitted the practitioner. In such a case no. appeal was open to the Attorney General under the Supreme Court Ordinance, and Lord Denning added "He has done his duty and ·is not aggrieved". In other words,
he did not come within the words of the 31st section of the Order
in Council. The Attorney General could not, therefore, ask for
!!pecialleaw as a 'person aggrieved', But the case was different
if the judge found the practitioner guilty and a Court of Appeal
reversed the decision on a ground which went to the roct of the
jurisdiction of the judge or was otherwise a point in which the
public interest was involved. ln that case the Attorney General
was a 'person aggrieved'.
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The observations of Lord Denning clearly meant that the
Attorney General could not pose as a ·person aggrieved' to seek
to bring a simple case of acquittal for reversal by the Judicial
Committee u~nder the 31st section of the Order in Council for he
could not be regarded as a 'person aggrieved'.
The remark was
made perhaps to repel an argament t~t every case of acquittal
would make the Attorney General an 'aggrieved person'. Lord
De1ming said that this was not the true position. The Attorney
General could only move the judge and there his duty ended.
The law gave him •no express right of appeal and he could not
daim to be a 'person aggrieved'. He could only invoke the
31st section if he could make out his grievance and it was found
to be as a person representing the Crown and the guardian of
public interest seeking to get reversed a decision which struck
at the root of the jurisdiction of the disciplinary judge, by de,ll'ymg
that the Deputy Judge was exercising judicial power under s. 7
of the Supreme Court Ordinance. The Crown was aggrieved by
this decision and the Attorney General representing the Crown
was an 'aggrieved person'.
The scheme of the law under which the disciplinary actio.n
was taken ·and the appeal to the Privy Council was brought ga.,~
the true connotation of the expression 'person aggrieved'. In
those cases in which no question of public interest -was involved
the Attorney General even if he had moved the judge and got
:111 adver!!e decision could not be regarded as a~grieved but in a
case in which, apart from the merits of the case against the
practitioner, some grave question of public importance was involved, the Attorney General representing the Crown could be
regarded as a 'person aggrieved'.
It was presumably after reading this case and un~erstanding
tt as I have done, that the Advocate~General set about making
:880
SUl'REME COURT REPORTS
[1971) 1 S.C.lt
.out a question of public importance. He did not seem only to
;get the decision overturned on facts. This is what he said :
"The appellant has filed this appeal as the Advocate
General of Maharashtra. Under the Advocates Act,
1961, (as under the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926),
the Advocate General represe,nts the public interest in
every disciplinary inquiry. Under sec. 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961, the Advocate General is entitled to
notice in respect of every disciplinary inquiry, is entitled to have an opportunity of being heard before the
disciplinary committee passes any order. This appeal
raises very important questions of principle as regards
the effect of a conviction of an Indian Advocate of an
offence recognised by all civilised countries as an offence
involving moral turpitude. The question raised also
related to the requirements of natural justice in a criminal court, and the effect of the judgments of the Supreme
Court on the subject. It raises the further question
whether an Indian Advocate convicted of an offence
involving moral turpitude by a Court outside India is
immune from disciplinary action because of minor differences of procedure in such countries where such trial
has been held in complete accord with principles of
natural justice. The profession of an advocate 1s. an
honourable pro.fession and the disciplinary provisions of
the Advocates Act are designed to secure that persons
12uilty of offences involving moral turpitude are subject
to appropriate disciplinary action."
It is obv1ous that the Advocate-General has attempted to
use the observations of Lord Denning in the Gambia case and
wishes to plead that he enjoys a special position in the Bar and
under the Advocates Act aJ11d therefore is entitled to appeal as a
'person aggrieved'. This was the line adopted by Mr. M. C.
Setalvad, counsel for the Bar Council' of India. On the other
hand, Mr. V. S: Desai appearing for the Advocate General argued
that the Advocate-General havin~ notice of disciplinary proceedings, in any event, must be treated as a 'person aggrieved' within ss. 35 and 38 of the Advocates Act. I shall consider the narrow question presented by Mr. Setalvad latter. I shall first take
up for consideration the larger question 'aDd the more general
application of the expression 'person aggrieved'.
In support of his contention Mr. V. S. Desai cited three cases
from this Court, one from the Judicial Committee and one from
the Bombay High Court. They all relate to disciplinary pro-ceedings and I may begin by considering them.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
A. P. GANDHI v. H. M. SEERVAl ( Hidayatullah, C.J.)
A
B
c
D
E
8 81
The case of the Privy CoWicil reported in Advocate General
of Bombay & Ors. v. Phiroz Rusto.mji Bharucha(l) was next cited.
It was an application for special leave by the Advocate Oeneral
of Bombay in a proceed~g relating to profess1onal misconduct
of an advocate. The standing of the Advocate Gt:ncral was
questioned. The repJrt in the Bombay Law Reporter Series (1 )
reproduces -more fully the arguments than the ufficial report and
we were referred to the arguments. The point was not debated
and there doe5 not appear to be a pronouncement on this point
either during the course of argument or in the judgmem since
special leave was refused on another ground. Mr. De~i nys
that if the Judicial Committee had found substa"ce in 1his obje:tion they wou:d have ruled out the Advocate General on this
ground alone. There is no reason to think that the obj~ti:>n was
considered at all. I cannot derive any ass~tance fr~m •b;s ruling
because the prerogative of the Crown to grant sp'!cial leave as
of grace in any case was always there irrespective of the standi,g
of the Advocate General. The Privy Council often granted special
leave and even heard apoeals on certificates wrone:lv gran~ed.
(See Sevak Jerancho'l Bh'l~i/al v. Dak~re Temple Commir•ee(~)
and the case~ co1lected in Halsbury Laws of England ( 3rd Edn.)
Vol. 9 p. 380 paragraph 886 note (h). Thi" p"er'1tzative the
Judicial Committee has exercised on behalf of the Crown particularly in cases of general interest see ibid o. 379 s. 8R5 note (:.). /
The provisions of the fonner s. 112 of the Code of Civil Pr"ce"'ure
show the extent of the prerogative. Therelore. becauc;e the Privy
Council refused soecial leave on one ground rath~r th~'l'l an0ther
ca~not imo"rt a rejection of the objection as to the standing or the
Advocate General.
·
Next we have all unreonrteti decic;ion of a Divi~ion Bf'nch of
· this Court reported in B. M. Madani v. Commi~s;,mer of WorkF men'~ ComoPnsatinn. Bombav( 8 ). Tn that case the aooeal was
taken bv the Commissioner for enhancement of ~naltiec; :nraim:t
the <ieFnquent arivnca•e an-1 the penalty wa~ in· fact incre1'\ed.
Th;s Court held that he w~ts entitled to cfo so as a 'perc;on a~2rieved'.
The particu1llr misconduct was c"Tnmitted in relation to a c'aim~nt bef'ore the Commiss;oner. The Ativ~cate ha-i P"Cketed the ·
G trave1Jlne allowance graY~tP.d by the Commissioner t"l •he w:dow of
a decelis~d workm~tn. There m~v be some doubt wl-!e1her the
Commic;sioner wac; a ·~non a22rieverf• by the nef'lfl1tv imoosed
in the first insta'1ce hut I do not nursue tltis matter The case can
be justified on the dictum in some cas"'s that a partv which mMe~
the c"~urt or a pe"S"n br"~Uf!h• bef,re th~ cnurt fo b~> b,u.,d bv its
H order m~v b~ a 'nerson aagrieved.' See for ex:~mol .. th~ c~se of
the O:fJHal Receiyer in Re Pa;vne Ex p, CtJSfle Mail Packets
(2) A. J R. '9"'5 P. C. ISS.
f3' C. A. 877 of 1968 decided on October 10, 1968.
L USSnp.Cf{P)'7l-12
(t) 37 Born. L. R. 722 (PC)
I'
8.82
SUPREI... E.. P~U~T RJ.lPORTS
[1971] l S.C.R.
Co. ( 1 ), and ln Re Lamb Ex. p.: Board of Trade already con.sidered by me. Madani's. c.ase ·doe.s not help to resolve the dispute
centring round the Advocate-General.
The next case is reported in Bhataraju Nageshwara Rao v. The
Hon'b/e Judges of tlie Madras High Court and others(2). That
case .qrose under the Bar Councils Act, 1926 when the Judges
exercised disciplinary power. In the case before the Supreme
Court the Judges of tl~e Madras High Court were shown as respondents. This Court observed at page 1064 as follows :
"Before parting with this appeal we desire to say that
it appears to us that it was wholly wrong and inappropriate for the appellant to have made the Ho.nourable
Judges of the Madras High Court respondents to this
appeal. It appears that in some cases involving contempt of Court the Honourable Judges have been made_
parties. It is not necessary for us to express any opinion •
on this occasion as to the propriety. of that procedure in
contempt cases but we are clearly of the opinion that in
an appeal arising out of a proceeding under the Bar •.
Councils Act the appropriate par_ties should be the advocate concerned, the complainant, if any, the Bar Council or the secretary thereof and the Advocate General
o.f the State concerned to whJm notice have to be issued
under sectiop; 12(3) of the Indian Bar Councils Act."
A
B
c
D
E
This does not advance the case of the Advocate General of Maharashtra any further.
The last case of this Court is Municipal Corporation of the City
of Bombay v. Chandulal Shamaldas Patel and Ors.( 8 ). In land
acquisition cases started ·for the benefit of the Municipal Corporation certain notifications issued under the Land Acquisition Act
were set aside by the High Court, and the Municipal Corporation sought to appeal. It was held not to be a 'person ag~rieved'.
This case, even if I were to accept it as correctly decided, does
not assist us in relation to our Act passed with a djfferent intent
and purpos~ and using the words in another context.
F
G
The last case is from Bombav but it did not discuss the point
and cannot be held to have laid down a precedent. It is useless to
refer to it.
I i>vw proceed to examine the larger question whether by reason of the provisions of the Advocates Act the AdvOcate General
of the State enjoys such position that he must necessarily be treat0) [1886] 18 Q. B. D. 154 C. A.
(2) [1955] 1 S. C. R. 1055.
(3) C. A. No. 1716 of 1967 decided on August 1, 1970.
H
A. P. GANDHl v. H. M. SEERVAI (Hidayatullah, C.J.)
. A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
883
t
ed as a 'ptrson aggrieved' entitling him to file an appeal. For
this purpose we have to examme critically the provislOns of the
Act to discover if the claim can be entertained.
The· Advocates Act wa~ passed to amend and consolidate the
law relatmg to legal practitioners and to provide for tne constitutiOn of ..tSar Coulficsls and an All India Bar. lt replaced the
car11er Acts governing the legal profession particularty the Indian
Bar Councils Act 1~26. Pnor to the passmg of the Advocates
Act, the enrolment and discipline o.f legal praclitioners was in
the hands of the courts and in the case ot the aavocates the High
Court enterta~d and deternuned cases of misconduct agamst
them. Now this jurisdiction is completely transferred to the Bar
Councils of the States and the Bar Council of India. In the Bar
Councils of the States {except Delhi) the Advocate-General of
the State is an ex officio member. In Delhi the Additional Solicitor.:cJeneral takes the place of the Advocate-General. Other
members are elected. In the Bar Council of India, the AttorneyGeneral and the Solicitor-General are ex officio members and
the other members are elected one each by· the State Bar Councils. In· the Union Territory o.f Delhi the Additional SolicitorGeneral is ex officio member. The functions of the AdvocateGeneral are not different from those of the other members in so
far as the affairs of the Bar Council are concerned. The only
matters where the Advocate-General, the Attorney-General and
the Solicitor-Geneml and the Additional Solicitor-Gen:cral are
mentioned are these. The Act gives a right of pre-audience over
other advocates to the Attor,ney-General, the Solicitor-General,
the Additional Solicitor-General and the Advocate-General. The
right of pre-audience gives them a standing for hearing of cases
but does not confer on them any other rights. The magniloquent phrases such as Leader of the Bar, Keeper of the Conscience of the Bat have no meaning neither now, nor before under
the Bar Councils Act of 1926. They are just honorific titles
given by courtesy but are not grounded on law. Indeed the
Keepers of the Conscience of the Bar are the Bar Councils and
the Leader of the Bar mav be someone who may even have refused to accept Advocate-Generalship.
The functions of the Bar Councils of the States and the Bar
Council of India throw some light on the remaining functions
of the Advocate-General and mav first be seen. Section 6 of
the Act Iavs down the functions of the State Bar Council and s. 7
thoc;e of the Bar Council of India. Apart from certain administrative functions which· these councils, which are bodies corporate, perform, tbeir functions in relation to the Bar are so~e·
what different. Both have their own rolls and they prepare a~,.
884
SUPREME COURT llBPORTS
(1971) 1 S.C.k.
maintain the rolls. ·The 'State Bar Cotmcil entertains and deter- A
ID..Ull!s cases of nlliconuuct of advoc4tes on iLs roil and saieguarJs
the ngats, pnvLeges and interests of a ...vocates on 1ts roll. The
I:sar council of .10-.lla iays oown Lhe s.andaras of pro~ess10nal conduct and eLiquetle of advocates, the procedure to be tol.owed
by its OlSCtpJlllary COillilllttee and the disc,plinary committee of
each of the State Bar Councils. The Bar Council of tndia al~o B
safeguards the. righ.s and privileges and interests of advJcates and
exercises general supervision and control over State .Bar Councils.
It also aeals with and disposes of any matter
arising l!,nder the Advocates Act which may be referred to it by a
State Bar Council. There are other fl.llUCtions which relate to the
ejucation etc. ofthose who wish. to join the legal profession. The
Bar Council. of India maintains a c~mmori roll of advocates. The c
Bar Councils also decide in relation to their rolls all questions of
sen~ority. The State Bar Councils and the Bar Council of India
constitute one or more disciplinary committees and under Chapter
V questions of the conduct of advocates on their respective rolls
are referred to them. The disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India exercises superi::>r powers inasmuch as it hears appeals D
from the orders of the disciplinary committee) of the State Bar
Counci's and may even of its own motion withdraw for inquiry
befo"e itself for disposal, any pro~eedin()'s for d'scip'inarv action
against an advocate oendi11g before the uisciplinary committee of
any State Bar Council.
E
The disciplinary proceedings commence both before the
State Bar Council and the Bar Council of India on a cotnp1aint
or otherwise made respective1y to the State Bar Council or the
Bar Council of India. The B·u Counci15 in either case re~er
them for disposal to their respective disciplinary committees. The
disciplinary committee in each cac;e can reject the compl'~int sum- F
marily, but if it proceeds to hear the matter ,further it causes a
notice thereof to be sent to the advocate conc-erned and to the
Advocate-General of the s·a•e or the Attorney.Qeneral of Tndia,
as the case mav be. The discio1ina'"V committee after giving the
advocate concerned and the A-ivocate-General or the AttorneyGeneral, as the c-.:tse may be, an opportunity to be heard, makes G
an order ei•hel' dismissinq the complaint or where the proceedi.,gs
are found to be not fit for consideration a,nd are started at the
instance of the Bar Council, orderin<t that they may be flied.
The ~mmittee may, if the advoca~e is found guilty, reorimand
h;m or suspend him frnm pr~c·ice for such period as it del!ms fit, ·
or mav remove him altogether from the roll of advocates. The H
Advocate-General or the Attomey.Qeneral, as the ca')e may be,
need not appear personally but may appear through an advocate.
·
A. P, GANDHI v. H. M. SEBlt'MJ (fHidayatullah, C./.)
A
B
885
From .the decision of the disciplinary committee of the State
Bar Couuc!l an appeal nes 10 tne .tSar Councu of maia wmch is
heard oy tne <l1SC1p11nary COIDllllttee of the .tlar Council 01 in~.ha
wmcn may pass sucn oroers thereon as it deems fit. .from tne
ctects1on or tnc ct1scip1mary commtLtee of the Har Council of mdia
an appeal 11es to tms Court. The appeals can be taken by a
'person aggnevect' by the oroer of the <hscip.iHary commirtee of
tne State oar Council or the Bar Cou,ncil of lndia, as the case
may be. It is in this context tnat we have to determine whether
the Advocate-General can be regarded as a 'persJn aggrieved'.
In view of the common roll maintained by the Ba.r Council
of
India
to me that if anybody represents the Bar it
c would be ittheappears
Bar Council of India and in the case of the States,
the Bar Council of the State. 'The Advacate-Genera1 has no
right to speak on behalf of the body of the advocales as if he
represented them and their interests, Neithe~ is this privilege
expressly conferred on him, nor can it be ·implied from any of
the provisions of the Act. The question, therefore, aflSes : in
D what capacity does the Advocate-General appear before a discip·
linary committee? It is obvious that he is not a prosecutor on
behalf ol the Bar Council because if he was one, his presence
would be more necessary at the stage at which the discip inary
committee considers in limini to decide whether the matter should
be proceeded with ·at all. The next question is : why he sum·
E maned at all ? In my opinion, the Advocate-General is not
noticed and brought before the court because he is a prosecutor
or is to be bound by the order of the disciplinary comm1ttee. He
represents no interest there and is heard merelv because h~ is the
chief counsel of the State and therefore his assistance at the hear.
in~r is use+'ul. The fact that he need not appear bv himself and
may ap!)ear throuv:h an advocate renders his position a little
F weaker In the matter of his grievance. Lf he 111 to be tre·,ted
as a •person aggrieved' he must a"gue the case himself. The fact
that he appears throug;h a counsel shows that the intention is
merely to have the opinlon of a person who iq neither sidinsz with
the comolain~nt nor with the advocate and who w:n thus have un·
biased anrJ impartial aoproach to the cal\e. The Advocate-GeneG ral is genera11v a Iawver of some standine: havi.,!! marie a mark
in the profession and his contribution to the deliberatinnc; of the
discin]inarv committee ic; welcnme becau~e thu~ the· disciplinary
committee is helped to reach a proper conclusion.
is
H
If he ic; not a person summoned to be bound by the order but a
person who is hearrl in a dic;nute b"tween others merelv to be of
assistance in reachiM the ril!ht conclusion he can hardlv have a
~rievanct. The Anvocqte-General must a.f•er he has done his
duty leave the matter to the ~omplainant and the advocate or the
886
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1971] 1 S.C.R.
Bar Council to take the matter further if they choose. In no event A
the AuvocaLe~General is in the nature of a pany having indepen~
dent nghts wh1ch he can c1aim are injured by the decision. The
decis'ion does not de)ly him anything nor does it ask him to do
anything. It is thus that Lord Denn.ng says that in these disr.ipli.nary proceedings the Attorney-General is not a party as in a lis
. and after the aecisio.n, hlli duty end£. Lord Denning points this B
out clearly by saying that the Attorney~General in that case could
not have been aggneved by the order of the Deputy Judge if he
had acquitted the delinquent advocate in. that case The AttorneyGeneral's interest was found by Lord Denning 1n relation to the
. Crown and the Colony and that too for the special reason that
appeal court had denied that the Deputy Judge possessed jurisdic-- c
- tion to hear the case. In our country the Aovocate-General do.!s
not represent the Exec\ltive or the Legislature or the Judiciary in
Aiiscip!Jnary proceedings before the disciplinary committee. His
function is advisory and more akin to an amicus curiae. He is
not to take sides except in so tar his arguments lend weight to the
case of the one side or that of the other. Beyond that he
is not interested in the dispute either in his personal capacity or D
in his capacity as an Advocate~General. He does not represent
the Government in these proceedings. If the Government was
interested the notice would have gone to it. Irr other statutes,
where .the Central Government is vitally i·n!terested, as for exam. ple, in the Chartered Accoimtants' Act, the notice does not go to
.the AdvocatewGeneral but to .Government and the government E
appears through the Advocate-General. The Advocate-General
under the Act finishes his duty whert the hearing is over and he
cannot be considered to be a party interested or a 'person aggriev~.d' . I do not find anything in the Act which indicates that the
· Advocate-General is to be treated as a person aggrieved' by · a
decision whether in favour o£ the advocate or against biro. Indeed F
it would have been the eas;est thing to give a ri~ht ot aopeal to the
Advocate-General eo nomine without including him in the comoen- ·
dious phrase a 'person ag~rieved'. If he is not noticed, the order
would be held to d~nv him something which the law entitled ,him
to. That is quite d=fferent. The lareer·propOsition contended for
by Mr. Desai is therefore not acceptable to me.
G
This brings me to the narrow ground on which Mr. Setalvad
very properly rested the case o.f the Bar Council of India. That
· narrow ground is that in this case there were several points of
general oub 1ic interest which needed to be solveci and therefore.
if the decision of the discirtinarv committee of the State Bar Counci1 wac; wrong, the Advocate-Gen~ral in the public i'nter-ec::t could H
take the matter further. I do riot think that I r~n subscribe to
this aonr11ach either in thi.,- c!lse. The Adv'"'c:lte-Gener~l nre~;ont
ed his views that a conviction in England showed moral turpitude ·
A. P. GANDHI v. H. M, SEERVAl ·(Hidayatullah, C.J.)
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
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887
in the advocate. I do not think that this .inference necessarily follows. The advocate explained that he was held guilty in a summary court and· received a small fine b~cause he was not in a
position to prove his innocence before the Magistrate.
Now in disciplinary proceedings the advocate was not estopped
from questioning the charge that he was guilty of corrupt practice.
. In a civil proceeding the decision of a criminal court is not res
judicata. To give an examplet ·if a person is involved in a traffic
offence in which some one is injured he inay in the criminal court
receive a light Stintence but if he is sued in a civil court for heavy
damages he can plead and prove that he was not negligent or
that accident was due to the contributory negligence of the defen-.
dant. The decision of the criminal court would not preclude him
ftom raisV1g this issue before the Civil court.
The advocate here explained .that he was held guilty. before
the Magistrate in the circumstances i.n which he was placed. The
fact of his conviction, as well as his full statement bearing on his
conduct were before the disciplinary committee of the State Bar
Council. They had to choose between the two, that is to say, the,
result of a summary trial without going into merits and proof of.'
the misconduct. Having examined the advocate and seen the r~
cord, the disciplinary committee. of the State Bar Council chose ·
to accept the plea of the advocate and held that he was not guilty.
They were also satisfied that the surimiaiy proceedings in the criminal trial in England offended against the principles of natutar
justice. They were entitled to this view on which much can be
said on both sides. If the Advocate-General's view of the case
was not accepted by the disciplim1ry committee he could not>bave
any grievance. He could not make this into his own cause or a
cause on behalf of· persons he did not represent. He had done
his duty and the matter shou1d have rested there. For this reason
I am of the view in this case the Advocate-General was not a
'person ag~rieved' within the meaninl! of s. 37 of the Advocates
Act even on the narrow ground and the appeal fi1ed by him before
the disciolinary committee of the Bar Council of India was
incompetent.
The conclusion which 1 have reached does not mea.n that I
have !!One into the merits of the advocate's plea. Nor does it
indicate that I, sittinq a5 a ju<ige, would have accented the plea
of the advocate, if I were to decide the ca<;e on facts. That is a
matter quite beside the point. I refer to the ple::~ ~r~u<;e it was
ra~"ed and was accepted by his peers on the disciplinary · committee.
T wnHH. therefore. 31lnw the aoMal ::~nl"l ~et ~r;:in~ the order
of the disciplinary comiJiltee of the· Bar Council of Inttia.
888
SUPR.EME. COURT ltEPORTS
[1971] 1 S.C,R.
Mi*r, J~ _ On t.be besis of a· news item in th,e 1,'imes ·of India
of August- 'P, 1966 the Bar Council of Maharashtra in exercise of
its powers under s. 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961 issued a :notice
to the appellant to face an inquiry into his conduct by its disciplinary committee. The said committee exonerated lh~ appellanr of
lhe charge levelled against him and held that he was not guilty of
any misconduct, professional or otherwise. Relying on the provisions of s. 37 of the said Act the _Advocate-General oi Maharashtra
who had appeared before the said- committee preferred an appeal
'to the Bar Council of India. The DiscipJinary Committee of the
Bar Council of India dis.a_greed with the finding of the disciplinary
committee of tbe Bar Cowlcil of Maharashtra observing that lhe
conduct of\ the
which was investigated into before the
State Bar ~il was quite undmerving of an advocate and
directed his suspension from practice for a per~od of q_ne year.
The appellant has come up in appeal to this Court and has urged
· a prelimmary point that tbe appeal by the Advocate-General to
the Bar Council of India was incompetent and the finding and
order of the disciplinary committee of the said body ought to be
&et aside on that ground alone without our going into the facts
of the case.
awe•••
Notice of this hearing was given to the A~vocates-General
and the Bar Councils of all the States as also the Attornej.'-General
of India and we have had the benefit of arguments advanced
before us not only on behalf of the Advocate-General for the
State ()f Mahara~htra but also on behalf of the Bar Council of
India, the Attornev-Genernt of India and some of the AdvocatesGeneral of the Stnte!i.
The determinntion of thill question depends on the interprets·
tion of 1 s. 37 of the Advocates Act. 1961 (hereinafter referred to
a~ the Act') :"( 1) Any per~on ngg1·ieved by un order of the disciplinary committee of n State Bar Council made under
section 35 may, within ~ixty days of the date of the
communication of the order to him. prefer an appeal to
the Bar Council of Indin.
(2) Every such appeal shall b~ heard by the discipli-
A
B
c
D
E
F
G.
nary committee of the Bar C.ouncil of India which may
pass such order thereon <ts it deems fit. ..
To put the matter in a nut-~hell the question is, "Is the AdvocateGeneral of a State who appears before the disciplinary committee .u
of a State Bar Council in pursu<mce of a notice given to him ,A
under s. 35(2) of the Act 'a person aggrieved' within the meaning
of the words used in 'i. 37 ?"
'"
·
A, P. GANDIU v. H. M. SBBRVAI (MiNer, 1.)
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
889
To decide this question we have to look into the Act to find
out the role of the Advocate-General of a State in proceedings of
thi~ kind. The object of the Act is to amend and consolidate
the law relating to legal practitioners and to provide for the
constitution · of Bar Councils and an All-India Bar. All the
States and the Union territories are to be under the jurisdiction of
named State Bar Councils and there is also to be a Bar Council
of India for the territories to which the Act is extended. Generally speaking a State Bar Council is to consist of a number of
members inc'uding the Advocate-General of the .State e." officio,
while the Attorney-General of India ex officio is to be a member
of the Bar Council of India. The other members of the Bar
Councils art: to he elected in terms of the Act. Under s. 6 the
functions of a State Bar Council are to be inter alia :(a) to admit persons as advocates on its roll:
(b) to prepare nnd maintain such roll;
(c) to entertain and determine cases of mis-conduct
against advocates on its roll.
S. 7 Jays down the functions of the Bar Council of India which
are to be Inter alia :
(a) to prepare ond maintain a common roll of advocates:
(b) to lay down standards of professional conduct
and etiquette for advocates; and
(c) to lay down the procedure to be followed by its
disciplinary committee and the disciplinary
committee of each State Bar Council.
.
Under s. 9 n Bnr Council hn~ to constitute one or more disciplinary committees each of which is to consist of three persons
of whom two are to be persons elected by the Council from
amonp;st its members nnd the third is to be a person co-ooted by
the Council from amon~st advocates possessing the qualifications
specified in the proviso to sub-s.(2) of s. 3 but is not a memher
of the council. S. 15 empowers Bar Counci~ to make rules
to carrv out the purposes of the Act. Chaoter III of the Act
containing ss. 16 to 28 provides for admission and enrolment
of advocates. the determination of their senioritv etc. The right
of an e1dvocate to practice is dealt with in Chaoter IV. Chapter
V which contains ss. 35 to 44 deals with conduct of advocates.
The relevant provisions thereof are set out as under• "35(1) Where on receipt of a comol<~int or otherwise a State Bar Council has reason to believe that any
advocate on its roll has been guilty of professional or
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
890
[1971] 1 S.C.R.
A
other misconduct, it shall refer the case for disposal to
its disciplinary committee.
(2) The disciplinary committee of a State Bar
Council, if it doe_s_ not summarily reject the complaint,
shall fix a date for the hearing of the case and shall
cause a notice thereof to be given to the advocate con~
cerned and to the Advocate-General of the State.
B
(3) The disciplinary cornmittee of a State Bar
Council after giving the advocate concerned and the
Advocate~General an opportunity of being heard, may
make any of the following orders, namely : -
c
(a) dismiss the complaint or, where the proceedings were_ initiated ai. the instance of the State
Bar Council, direct that the proceedings be
filed;
(b) reprimand the advocate;
(c) suspend the advocate from practice
period as it may deem fit;
for
such
D
(d) remove the name of the advocate from the State
ro11 of advocates.
(4)
(5) Where any notice is issued to the AdvocateGeneral under sub-section (2) the Advocate-General
may appear before the disciplinary committee of the
State Bar Council either in person or through any
advocate appearing on his behalf.
37. Supra.
38. Any person aggrieved by an order made by the
disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India
under section 36 or section 37 may, within sixty days
of the date on which the order is communicated to him,
prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court and the Supreme
Court may pass such order thereon as it deems fit."
S. 42 gives the disciplinary committee of a Bar Council the same
powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil
Procedure in respect of various matters including the summoning
and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him
on oath, requiring discovery and production of documents etc.
and under sub-s. (2) all proceedings before a disciplinary committee of a Bar Council are to be deemed judicial proceedings
within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of the !ndian Penal
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Code.. S. 43 empowers the disciplinary committee of a Bar
Council to make such order as to costs of any proceedings before
it as it may deem fit. S. 44 gives the disciplinary committee
power to review any order passed by it of its own motion or
otherwise.
The above provisions of the Act make it clear that subject to
a right of appeal to this Court under s. 3.8 the inquiry into charges
of misconduct against ap. advocate are to be in the exclusive
jurisdicrion of the Bar Councils. Any complaint against the cu_nduct
of an ~dvocate has to be preferred before a State Bar Cuunc1l and
when the council has reason to believe on the strength o.f such
complaint that an advocate on its roll has been guilty of professional or other misconduct, it has to refer the case for disposal
to its disciplinary committee. The council cari take such a step
of its own motion. Section 35(1) shows that it is not obligatory
on the State Bar Council to refer each and every complaint to
the disciplinary committee. It has to be satisfied that there is a
prima facie case for investigation. It can throw out a complaint
if the same appears (O be frivolous. Sub-s. (2) of s. 35 shows
that it is not incumbent on the disciplinary committee of a State
Bar Councii to proceed further with the matter if it takes the
view that the complaint is without substance. It is not obliged
to call upon the advocate concerned to explain his conduct or
to inform the Advocate-General that it has rejected the complaint
summarily. It is only when the disciplinary committee is satisfied that the complaint ought not. to be rejected out of hand
that it has to fix a date for the hearing of the case and give
notice thereof to the advocate concerned and to the AdvocateGeneral of the State. It is mandatory on the disciplinary committee to give such a notice to both. Sub-ss. (3) and (5) of
s. ~5 go to show that it is not incumbent on the Advocate-General
to appear at the hearing and that it is within his discretion to
appear either by himself or through another advocate of his
choice and place his viewpoint before the disciplinary committee.
He is not a party to the proceedings but he has a right to appear
and to make submissions ' both on questions of fact and questions of law.
·
S. 37 does not in terms lay down who can· prefer an appeal
from t_he order of the disciplinary committee of the State Bar
Counctl. There can be no doubt that the advocate agianst
whom an order is made would be a person aggrieved. The State
Bar. Council cannot be such a person as the order is mad~
by 1tsel~ acting through its disciplinary committee. A member
of ~he public may make a complaint to the State Bar Council
ag~mst an. adyocate on the ~round of loss or damage or any
senous oreJudtce caused to htm by the advocate, be it negligenc~
or fraud e.f?. collusion with the opponent or misappropriation of
SUPREMn COURT REPORTS
[1971] 1 S.C.R.
any moneys belonging to him and there does not seem to be
any justifying cau5e for holding that he is not a person aggrieved by
an order which dismisses his complaint.
A
The question arises as to whether the Advocate-General is
n person aggrieved because the disciplinary committee does not
take the snme view of the matter as himself, be it for or against
the advocr.te. To place the AdYocate-General in the category
of "person aggrieved" one must be able to say that the disciplinary committee committed an error which it was his duty to
attempt to set right because of some function attributable to him
as the Advocate-General or some obligation cast upon him by
the Act or the general Jaw of the land to safeguard and mamtain
standards of conduct of advocates laid down by the Bar Council
of India.
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Generally speak.rig, a person can be said to be aggrieved by
a11 order which is to his detrimentt pecuniary ·or otherwise or
r.auses him some prejudice in some form or other. A person
who is not a party to a litigation has no right to appeal merely
berausc the judgment or order contains some adverse remarks
against him. But it has been held in a number of cases that a
person who is not a party to suit may prefer an appeal with the
leave of the appellate court and such leave would not be refused
where the jud~ment would be binding on him under Explanation 6 to ~ect1on 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We .find
ourselves unable to take the view that because a person has been
given notice of some proceedings wherein he is given a right to
appear and make his submissions, he should without more have
a right of appeal from an order rejecting his contentions or
submissions. An appeal is a creature of statute and if a statute
exoresslv ~ives a person a right to appeal, the matter rests
there.
Innumerable statutes both in England and in India give the
right of appeal to ua person aggrieved" by an order made and
the provisions of such statutes have to be construed in each case
to find out whether the person !ll'eferrine an appeal falls within
that expression. As was observed in R"bimon v. Currey( 1 ) the
words "person aggrieved" are 'ordinary English words which are
to have the ordinary meaning nut uoon them'. According to
Halsbury's Laws of England (Third Edition, Vol. 25) page 293
foot-note "h" :
"The expression is nowhere defined ·and must be
construed by reference to the context .of the enactment
in which it appears and all the circumstances :"
(I) 7 Q. B D. 465.
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Attempts have however from time to time been made to define
the expression in various cases. In Ex parte Sidebotham In re
Sidebotham(l) it was observed by James, L.J.
·
"But the words 'person aggrieved~ do · not really
mean a man who is disappointed of a benefit which he
might have received if some other order had been
B
made. A 'pen;on aggrieved;----must be a man who has
suffered a legal grievance. a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something, or wrongfully refused him samething, or wrongfully affected his title to something.''
c
The above definition of James, L.J. was described by Esher,
. M.R. in Ex Parte Official Receiver ln Re Reed, Bowen & Co.(2)
as not "an exhaustive definition". His Lordship added :
"It is an affirmative definition of a person who may
appeal, and at all events it includes a person who has
asked for a decision for which he had a right to ask.
and has been wrongfully refused."
D
The Queen. v. The Keepers of the Peace and Justices of the
County of London(3) was a case of an appeal by an informant
against the judgment of a justice of lhe peace upon the he~ring
of an information or complaint by the vestry of the parish against
a person for unlawfully and wilfufly obstructing the free passage
E of a certain highway. The relevant section provided:
"If any person shall think himself aggrieved by ...
any order, conviction, judgment, or determination made, or by any matter or thing done by any
justice or other person in pursuance of this Act ....
such person may appeal to quarter sessions:·
F
In holding that an informant had no right of appeal Lord
· Coleridge C.J. said:
G
. ."Is a ~rson who cannot. su~ceed in getting a conVIction agamst another a 'person . aggrieved ?'
He
may be annoyed. at finding that what he thought was
a breach of law 1s not a breach of law; but is he
'aggrieved' because some one is held not to have done
wrong ? It is difficult to see that the section meant
anything of that kind."
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In Rex v. London Quarter Sessions Ex parte Westminster Corporation( 4 ) a borough council whose cance.lation of the registration of a street trader had been reversed by a magiStrate on
'
(1) 14 Ch. D. 458 at 465.
(3) 25 Q. B. D. 357, 361.
(2) 19 Q. B. D. 174 at 178.
(4) 512 K. B. 508
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[19 7! 11 S.C.R.
appeal by the trader concerned under s. 25 of the London County A
Council (General Powers) Act, 1947 · was held not to be a
person aggrieved by an order of a court of summary jurh,diction
within the meaning of s. 64 of the Act. The argument advanced
on behalf of the corporation was that it had a public administrative duty to perform in the regulation of the streets and rtaving
been interfered with in the execution of that duty by the deci- 8
sion of ·the magistrate, they were persons aggrieved by his order.
One of the grounds for refusal of the app~ication by Lord
Goddard, C.J. was that the order made did not directly affect
the borough council in such a way as to make them "a p~r~on
aggrieved" within the meaning of the section. According to the
learned Chief Justice what the statute did was "to substitute th~ c
opinion of the magistrate for the opinion of a borough council".
It was said that the court of summary jurisdiction had to take .
into account the same :matters as the borough council had to
take into account, and if the court thinks that the cancellation
of the licence is not justified, it can restore the licence to the
street trader. If the court of summary jurisdiction refuses to
D
grant a licence, then the street trnder is a person aggrieved, be~ause his livelihood is affected, or an order is made dlrectlv
affecting him.
The case of Sevenoaks Urban District Council v. Twynam(l)
was relied upon by counsel appear1ng for the Advocate-General
of Maharashtra to support his argument that even a person ..;ho
had no proprietary or pecuniary interest in the subject matter of
the litigation might be a person aggrieved so ·as to give him a
right to appeal. The statute in this case was however worded
very differently from the statutes which came up for consideration in the cases noted ea'rlier. S. 68(1') of the Pubiic Health Act.
1925 laid down that:
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"Where for the purpose of relieving or· preventing
congestion of traffic it appears to the local authority to
be necessary to provide within their district suitable
parking places for vehicles"
then that authority may, subject to certain conditions, provide
those parking places and might acquire land suitable for use as G
a parking place. The proviso to the section however laid down.
that no such order shall authorise the usc of any part of a street
so as unreasonably to prevent access to any pr~miscs adioining the street, or the use of the street by any person entitled •
to the use thereof, or so as to be a nuisance, or be
mad~
in respect of any part of -a street without the H
consent c;f the authority or persQn responsible for the
([) f19:!9] 2 K. B. 440 at 444.
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maintenance of the street. Sub-s. ( 2) of the section provided
that where a lccal authority proposes to acquire 1and for the
purpo~c of using it as a parkillg place th~y are to give notice of
the proposal specifying the land and notify the date within which
any objection is to be sent to them and the notice is to state
that a right of -appeal was conferred by the section. Sub-s. (3)
provided that before carry1ng into effect any proposal of which
notice was required to be given the local authority shall consider
any objection which was sent to them in writing. There was no
limit there as to the kind of person making the objection or the
kind of objection which might be raised. The respondent, a
rate payer, duly gave notice under sub-s. ( 3) on various grounds
but he did not allege the infringement of any personal legal right
and he objected in his capacity as a ratepayer and as a member
of the public on grounds common to them all. The urban council considered the objection and informed him of their decision
to proceed with the scheme. The respondent appealed to petty
sessions which allowed his objection. The appellant appealed to
quarter sessions and took the'_preliminary objection that the respondent was not a person aggrieved because he ·had alleged no
infr~ngement of any legal right\ personal to him.
Referring to the dicta of Jalues L.l., Esher M~R. and Lopes
L.J. in the above cases Lord Hewart C.J. observed:
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"I think this respondent did ask for a decision for
which he had a right to ask. He did give notice of an
objection of which he was entitled to give notice, ...
but the person making the objection is not to have an
appeal u\llless he satisfies two conditions : (1) that he
is the author of the objection, and (2) that he is aggrieved by the refusal in the sense that he has a
special and individual right infringed. . It seems to me
that upon the fair construction of this sub-section, which
is by no means a common kind of statutory provision,
what is meant is that a person .may make an .objection
~nd is entitled to a decision upon it, and .if the decision
1s adverse to him, he may, if he thinks fit and subject
to .~he usual consequences, a~peal from it to a petty
sessional court, and so appeahntz, may, in consequence
of other statutory provisions. appeal. if need be. to the
court of quarter sessions.''
According to Avary J. :
''There is no limit there [in sub.s. (3)] of the kind of
person or the kind of objection which mav be made.
1t proceeds that after so considering the objection, they
896
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1971] J S.C.R.
are to give notice of their decision to the person by
whom the objection was made, and any person who is
aggrieved by such decision may appeal. I cannot
he.p thinking that on the plain words of that statute it
was intended to give a right of appeal to any person
who has made an objection to the proposal and has
received ~otice that that objection has been overruled."
In Ealing Corporation v. Jones( 1) Lord Parker C.J. remarked that it was easier to say what will not constitute a per~on
aggrieved than it was to say what "person aggrieved'' included.
He observed that a person was not aggrieved wh~n being a public
body it had been frustrated in the· performance of one of its public duties. He amplified this by saying that ~
''I( costs have been awarded in a case against a
local authority, it is clear on the authorities that the
local authority would be an aggrieved· person. Equal y,
if the result of the decision has been to put some legal
burden on the public body concerned, that has been
held to make it a person aggrieved."
According to D~novan J. in the same case"The word 'aggrieved' connotes some legal grievances, for examp!e, a deprivation of something, an
adverse effect on the title to something, and so on,
and I cannot see that this is so here. The local p1anning authority has simply been told that it cannot enforce the discontinuance of the prese11t use of this land
by the appe'lant by means of an enforcement notice
under s. 23."
If one is to be guided merely l;>y the provisions of .the Advocates Act it is difficult to see how· the Advocate-General can be
a person aggrieved because the State Bar Council takes the view,
whatever be its reasoning. that an advocate on its roll h1s not
been guilty of anv misconduct. The entertaining of C"mplaints,
the inquirv into them and the punishment to be meted out to
the advocate are a]] co11cerns cl the Bar Council. The ArlvocateGeneral no doubt is entitled to a hearing if the complaint is not
rejecteti summarily. The statute exoects him to take a fair ~nd
impartial attitude. He has to render all assistance to the Bar
Counci1 so that a proper decision mw be arriverJ at. Rio:; ro 1e
is not that of a prosecutor: nor is he a defellce counsel on
behalf of the advoc~te. He is not interested in 1!etting the advocate nunished any more than he is interested
in seeing that the charac+er of a fe11~"~w member of the Bar
is cleared even if his conduct be unworthy of an advocate.
(1) [1959] 1 Q. B. 384 at 390.
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The Act does not make it obligatory on him to take part in the
proceedings where he thinks that the facts of the case are so plain
that his assistance is not called for. It is only when he feels that
a case requires ·a careful investigation and proper elucidation of
the facts or the exposition of the law on the subject that he is
cc.tlled upon to render all assistance in the proceedings. When he
chooses to do so he does his duty by appearing at the hea~·ing and
putting before the disciplinJry committee the fJcts in tl1eir proper
perspective and advancing the proper inference to be drawn therefrom. Once he does so there is an end of the matter so far as
he ;~ concerned. He cannot have any grievance because the decision cf tJie Bar Council is against his submission or not to his
likmg.
The yuestion then arises as to wh~ther any duty is cast on
the Advocate-General by reason of his position to question the
decision of the Bar Council if he feels it in the general interest of
the mem bcrs of the Bar or a wider public to do so. Art. 165(2)
of the Comtitution epito~nizcs the functil;ns and duties of ,the
Advocate-General in the following words : -
"!: shalt be the duty of the Advocate-General to give
.:1dvi-..c to the Government of the State upon ~uch legal
matters and to perform such other duties of a leg<~l
c!1aracter, as may from time to tim.; he referred or assigned to him by the Governor and to discharge the
functions conferred upon him by or under the Constitution or any other law for the time being in force."
A notable instance of his statutory duties is furnished by Order
XXVII-A of the Code of Civil Procedure. By the provisions of
s. 91 of the CoQe of Civil Procedure no suit for a declaration and
injunctiol) in tht: case of a public nuisance can be instituted
except by him or with his consent. Similar powers are given and
duties cast on him by s. 92 C.P.C. in the case of trusts created for
public purposes. Section 526-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure gives an Advocate-General power to apply to the court for
the committal or transfer of a case to the High Court where any
person subject to the Naval Discipline Act or to the Army Act
or to the Air Force Act is accused of any of the offences specified
therein. It is not open to the Advocate-General to intervene in
any suit or legal proceeding apart from the provisions of the Code
of Civil Procedure because he thinks pubiic interest is involved in
the matter.
Treating the matter historically, it may be said that in many
respects t3e position of an Advocate-General before 1950 was
very similar to that of the Attorney-General in England. Sections 100 and 111 of a statute of 1813, 53 George III, C. 155,
L169Sup.CI(P)/71-13
898
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1971] 1 S.C.R.
enabled the Advocates-General to exhibit to the respective Supreme A
Courts of Judicature at any of the Presidencies or to the Recorder's
Court at Bombay any information or informations for breaches of
Revenue laws etc. as might be taken by the Attorney-General in
the court of Exchequer in England or in the nature of action or
actions at law or of a bill or biBs in equity as occasion might
require against any person or persons residing within such juris- B
diction as His Majesty's Attorney-General for the time being was
by law authorised to exhibit. The wording of s. 111 shows that
itf object was to dispel doubts which had arisen about the competency of the Advocate-General or Principal Law Officer of the
E2-,t India Company to take such action. S. 114 of the Governmeat of India Act, 1915 empowered the Advocate-General for any.
Presider~cy to take on behalf of His Majesty such proceedings as C
might be taken by His Majesty's Attorney-General in England.
S. 65(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935 laid down that it
was the duty of the Advocate-General to give advice to the Provincial Government upon such legal matters and to perform such
other dutie" of a leg~l character as may from time to time be
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referred or assigned to him by the Governor.
The position of the Attorney-General in England is stated by
Hood Phillips on Constitutional and Administrative Law (Fourth
. Edition) at p. 316 to be as follows :
"The Law Officers consist of the Attorney-General
and Solicitor-General for England, and the Lord Advocate and Solicitor-General for Scotland. They are regarded as the heads of the Bar in their respective countries, and as such are referees on points of professional
etiquette."
The learned author goes on to note at p. 317 :
"The Attorney-General represents the Crown in
civil proceedings in which it is specially concerned. His
consent is necessary for the prosecution of certain offences, e.g. under the Official Secrets Acts. In criminal
proceedings he. or. the Solicitor-General. or their deputies, prosecute m Important cases. It is the practice
for the At_tor~ey-General to lead in treason and important ~onstitutional cases. He may also file ex officio
criminal informations, though this procedure is now
rarel¥ used. He may stop the trial of an indictment by
entenng a nolle prosequi. He may also take over certain
proceedings on the relation of private individuals (relator
actions) e.g. public nuisance etc....... The At10rneyGeneral's procedural privileges include the right to
demand a trial at Bar (i.e. now, before a Divisio,nlal
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Court), and the right to choose the venue for any civil
or criminal proceedings in which the Crow!l is concerned.'
Anson in his treatise on Law and Custom of the Constitution
Volume II, Part I (4th Edition, 1935) describes the AttorneyGeneral, the Solicitor-General and the Lord Advocate and the
Solicitor-General for Scotland as the chiefs of the legal profession
in their respective countries and states that in England and Northern Ireland they represent the Bar when the Bar takes collective
action. So far as England is concerned neither the AttorneyGeneral nor the Solicitor-General appears to have had for a very
long time any function to discharge or any duty to perform when
the conduct of a barrister or a solicitor was called in question.
The power of inquiry was delegated by the Judges to the Inns ofCourt so far as barristers were concerned and as regards solicitors
the matter has for some time been delegated to the Law Society.
It may not alsb be out of place to note the history of
the legislation in India with regard to enquiries against members
of the legal profession prior to the Act of 1961. Under clause 10
of the Letters Patent Qf the High Court of Calcutta of the year·
1865 the High Court was to have power to make rules for the
qualification and admissipn of proper persons to be advocates,
vakils and attorneys at law and was to be empowered to remove
or suspend them from practice on reasonable cause. The Letters
Patents of other High Court contained provisions. The Legal
Practitioners Act 1879 appears to have been the earliest Indian
statute on the subject. Under s. 13 of this Act the High Court
was empowered after su~h enquiry as it though fit, to suspend or
dismiss any pleader or muktyar who was guilty of fraudulent or
grossly improper conduct in the discharge of his professional duty.
The Bar Councils came into existence for the first time under the
Bar Councils Act, 1926. But even under this Act the power to
reprimand, suspend or remove from pra&tice any advocate of the
High Court charged with professional or other misconduct was
left with the High Court under s. I 0(1 ). S. 10(2) laid down the
procedure to be adopted by the High Court when a complaint was
made to it by any Court or by the Bar Council or by any other
person that an advocate had been guilty of misconduct. The·
High Court could summarily reject the complaint or refer the· case
for enquiry to the Bar Council or after consultation with the Bar
Co~ncil refer it _to the Court of a District !udge and it also might
of 1ts own motiOn refer any case where 1t had reason to believe
that any advocate had been sv g~i l ty. Under s. 11 it was the
duty of a committee of the Bar Council to inquire into a complaint
made under s. 10. Under s. 12(2) of the Ar.t the finding of a
Tribunal on an inquiry referred to the Bar Council was to be
forwarded to the High Court through the Bar Council and the
finding of a District Court on such inquiry was to be forwarded
900
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( 1971] I S.C.R.
to the Hioh Court direct with a copy to the Bar Council. S. 12(3)
of the A~t contained a provision somewhat similar to s. 35(3 ). of
the Act of 1961. The hearing was however to take place before
the High Court, which had to give notice of the date ~xed for
the purpose to the advocate concerned, to the Bar Council and to
the Advocate-General and to afford them an opportunity of being
heard before orders were passed in the case. Under the Act of
1926 the Advocate-General appeared on the scene only after the
Bar Council had recorded its finding. The significant departure
in the Act of 1961 from the analogous provision of the Act of
1926 is that the Advocate-General is given notice of hearing of
the cas~. By itself this cannot affect any ch.:nge in his position
as regards an inq:..tiry into the conduct of an advocate. It would
be reasonable to hold that while passing the statutes of 1926 and
1961 the Legislature thought that the Advocate-General should be
heard inasmuch as he occupied the position of a general referee
on points of professional etiquette very much like the AttorneyGeneral in England.
However that may be, once he does the duty enjoined upon
·him by the statute of making such submissions as he thinks proper
at the hearing his functions qua the inquiry come to an end. As
a referee he has no further interest in the matter. If the discipiinary committee of the Bar Council makes an order against the
advocate which the Advocate-General considers harsh and un~
reasonable in the circumstances of the case, he is not called upon
to file an appeal to protect the interests 0f the advocate. Neither
js he interested in prosecuting the matter further if he takes the
view that the pu11ishment meted is not commensurate with the
misconduct of the advocate.
Elaborate reference was made at the Bar to the decision· of
the Privy Council in Attorney-General of the Gambia v. Pierre
Sarr N'Jie ( 1). In that case the conduct of the respondent, a member of the English Bar admitted to practice as a barrister and
solicitor of the Supreme Court of the Gambia was found to be
dishonourable and as such an order striking his name off the roll
of the court was made by the deputy Judge with a direction that
it should be reported to the Masters of the Bench of the Inn to
which he belonged. The Chie.f Justice of the Supreme Court of
the Gambia had criticised the conduct of the barrister severely in
the course of a trial held before him and had sent a copy of his
judgment to the Attorney-General of the Gambia. The Attorney~
General served a notice of motion on the barrister for an enquiry
to be made by the Chief Justice but as the Chief Justice was the
only Judge of that Court he recommended that some one other
than himse1f should be appointed as a deputy Judge to hold the
{I) [1961] A. C. 617, 630.
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inquiry. The Deputy Judge ordered his name to be struck off
the roll. His order was however set aside by the West African
Court of Appeal not on merits but on the ground that a Deputy
Judge had only jurisdiction to represent the Chief Justice in the
exercise of his judicial pQ\".'ers and according to the Court of
Appeal the power to strike the name of a legal practitioner off
the roll was not a j1.1dicial power. The Attorney-General of the
Gambia appealed to Her MajesLy in Council. The question of
the maint: · ;bility of the appeal was also canvassed before the
Board. \-, ,u, regard to inquiries into the conduct of barristers
and solicitors in the Crown colonies Lord Denning, who delivered
the judgment of the Privy Council, said"hv the common law of England the Judges have
the right to determine who shall be admitted to practice
as barristers and solicitors, and as incidental thereto the
judges have the right to suspend or prohibit from practice. In England this power has for a very long time
been delegated, so far as barristers are concerned, t6 the
Inns of Court; and, for a much shorter time, so far as
solicitors are concerned, to the Law Society. In the
colonies the Judges have retained the power in their
own hands, .. .''
His Lordship went on to remark at p. 631 :
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"When the judges exercise this power to suspend or
expel, they do not decide a suit between the parties.
There is no prosecutor as in a criminal case, nor any
plaintiff as in a civil suit. The judges usually act on
their own initiative, ex mero motu, on i,nformation which
has come to their notice, or to the notice of one or other
of them in the course of their duties."
Further,
"When a legal practitioner is suspended or struck
off by the judges of a colony, he has always been at
liberty to petition Her Ma~~sty in Council to restore
him."
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Rejecting the argument that the Attorney-General had no locus
standi to petition for special leave to appeal as· he was not a
person aggrieved, the Board n:krred to s. 31 of the Order in
Council. 1949 which gave very wide powers to His Majesty in
Council to entertain the petition of any person aggrieved by any
judgment of the court and to, admit his appeal upon such conditions as His Majesty in Council would think fit to impose. On
the facts of the case the Board held that the Attorney-General had
a sufficient interest in the matter because the order made by the
902
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1971J 1 S.C.R.
.West African Court of Appeal prejudicially affected his interests.
The reasoning of the Board was a~ follows : "The Attorney-General in a c?lo_ny represent~ t~e
Crown as the guardian o( the pubhc mterest. It IS hts
duty to bring before the Judge any misconduct . of a
barrister or solicitor which is of sufficient grav1ty to
warrant disciplinary action. True it is that if the judge
acquits the petitioner of misconduct, no appeal is open
to the Attorney-General. He has done his duty and is
not aggrieved. But if the Judge finds the pra~titioner
guilty of professional misconduct and a Court of App~al
reverses the d_ccision on a ground which goes to the JUriSdiction of the judg~, or 1s otherw1se a point in which the
public interest is (;Oncerm:d, the Attorney-General is a
'person aggrieved' by the decisio,n and can properly
petition Her Majesty for special leave to appeal."
lt is clear that Lord Denning consider~d the denial of jurisdiction
of the deputy Judge to be a matter of.public interest and therefore
held the Attorney-General, as the Crown's representative, to be a
person sufficiently inte1e5ted as to be a person aggrieved. That
surely is not the positoin here, nor is an Advocate-General
the representative of the Government. Neither the Constitution
nor the Advocates Act 1961 holds him as the repr~5entative
of the Government or as a person representing the public interest.
Whate,:er may be the position of the Attorney-General in a colony
as a representative of the Crown, he is not the guardian of the
public interest in India in any matter except as provided for in
the statutes. He like any other person may draw the attention of
the Bar Council to any mis-conduct of an advocate which according to him merits disciplinary action. The Act of 1961 provides
for notice to be given to him of all such proceedings and gives
him a right to appear at the hearing but once the hearing is over
and a finding recorded he has done his duty and cannot be said
to be aggrieved within the meaning of the expression used in s. 37.
It is only because the Attorney-General for the Gambia had an
interest in seeing that the Court of Appeal did not reverse the decision of the Deputy Judge on a ground which went to the jurisdiction of the Judge or was otherwise a point in which the public
interest was concerned that the Board held that he was a person
aggrieved.
Our attention was drawn to a decision of the Judicial Committee in Advocate-General Bombay v. Phiroz Barucha(l) where
the Privy Council entertained an appeal by the Advocate-General
(l) 37 B.L.R. 722.
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A. P. GANDHI v. H. M. SEERVAI (Mitter, J.)
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of Bombay against an advocate who h.~d been found by the High
Court of Bombay to have been guilty of misconduct but against
whom no disciplinary action had be.eo taken by the Judges.
Although there was a good deal of discussi.on at the Bar about the
maintainability of the appeal which was sought for by special
leave, the Board remarked that the circumstances were not such
as to justify it in advising His Majesty to grant such special leave
principally on the ground that the qu~stion was one of the exercise
of statutory discretion by the Judges as to whether the circumstances of the case as established before the High Court called for.
any disciplinary action and the Board felt that the action of the
High Court in exercising their discretion in the way they had done
was not such as His Majesty would be advised further to consider.
This decision does not help the Advocate-General of Maharashtra because it did not decide the point as to the maintainability
of the appeal. It is well known that the Judicial Conimittec was
never chary in granting special leave to appeal when it felt that
the justice of th€? case demanded a further hearing.
D
:Mr. Daphtary appearing for the appellant very fairly drew
our attention to an observation of this Court in Bhataraju Nage-
slmra Rao v. The Hon'ble Judges of the Madras High Court(~)
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which was a case of an appeal by spccia~ leave from an order of
the Hi!!h Court at Madras under s. 12 of the Indian Bar Councils
Act debarring the advocate for a period of five years on charges
of misconduct which were held by the High Court as proved. In
the ultimate paragraph of the judgment this Court recorded its
strong disapproval of the frame of the appeal in that the Judges
of the High Court had been made respondents to it. They however went on to observe that :
"in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under the
Bar Councils Act the appropriate parties should be the
advocate concerned, the complainant, if any, the Bar
Council or the secretary thereof and the Advocate-Ge;neral of the State concerned to whom notices have to be
issued under section 12(3) of the Indian Bar Councils
Acl."
G
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With great respect, we find ourselves unable to concur in the above
so far as the Advocate-General is concerned. It does not appear
that any argument was advanced about the proper parties to the
appeal before this Court and the point as to whether the AdvocateGeneral was a per:son aggrieved was neither raised nor argued.
The only party to appear before this Court was "the Judges of
the High Court."
(1) {1955] J.S.C.R. 1055, 1064
904
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(1971] 1 S.C.R.
It appears that the Advo.ca~e-9eneral of . Maharashtra
felt in this case that the dJ~c1plmary committee of the
Maharashtra Bar Council had gone wrong and that there ~·a~ a
question of principle involved as regards the. effect of :1 con.vt~~IOn
of an Indian advocate of an offence recogmsed by all ClVIlised
countries as an offence involving moral turpitude and ~hat the
question also related to the requirements of natural justice in a
criminal court. Every day courts of law are called upon to
decide questions of law inter-partes which may be of general
importance to the public. The Advocate-General cannot prefer
an appeal merely because the question is one of considerable
importance to the public inasmuch as he is not a party to it and
he has no locus standi to do so even in a case where the statute
only gives him an or.portunity of appearing at a hearing ~md
making his submissions.
A decision by the 9isciplinary committee cmmot necessarily
be said to raise a point of public interest merely because the
Advocate-General fe~ls that it is erroneous or that he himself
would have arrived at a different concbsion. That at best is his
personal opinion as regards the conduct of an advocate who has
to deal with the public and the non-acceptance thereof does not
make him a person aggrieved. An Advocate-General in India
is not the guardian angel f the Bar, nor is he the champion of
public interest in any matter save as specified in a statute.
In conclusion we hold that the appeal by the Advocate-General
of Maharashtra to the Bar Council of India was incompetent and
this appeal should be allQwed and the finding of the Bar Council
of India set aside.
Vaidi~lingam, J. With respect, I am not able to a()'ree
. with the views expressed by My Lord, and Mr. Justice Mitter that
the appeal filed by the Advocate-General of Maharashtra before
the Bar Council of India was incompetent.
The preliminary point that has been argued before us in this
appeal relates to the maintainability of the appeal by the -AdvocateGeneral of Maharashtra before the Bar Council of India under
s. 37 (1) of the Advocates Act 1961-Act 25 of 1961 (hereinafter
referred to as the Act) against the order of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of Maharashtra (hereinafter referred as
the Committee) dated October 19, 1968 holding the appellant not
guilty of any professional misconduct. It is not necessary to refer
to the allegations of professional misconduct made against the
appellant as this appeal has yet to be heard on merits.
Against the order of the Committee, acquitting the appellant,
the Advocate-General of Maharashtra Sri H. N. Seervai, filed
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A. P. GANDHI v. H. M. SEER VAl (Vaidialingam, ], )
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under s. 37 ( 1) D.C. Appeal No. 18 of 1968 before the Bar Council of India. The said appeal was heard by the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India (hereinafter referred to as the
Appellate Committee) as required by s. 37 ( 2) of the Act. A
preliminary objection was raised on behal.f of the appellant that
the Advocate-General was not competent to prefer the appeal as
he was not the complainant nor were the proceedings for taking
disciplinary action initiated at his instance and he is not "any person aggrieved'' ·under s. 37 ( 1 ) . The State Bar Council, which
iuitiated the proceedings was apparently satisfied with the decision
of its Committee and did not take any further action. In short,
according to the appellant, the Advocate-General was not '·any
person aggrieved", under s. 37 (1) of the Act. The appeal was
also contested by the appellant on merits. The Appellate Committee bv its order dated October 26, J 969 overruled the preliminary objection and held that the Advocate-General was competent to maintain the appeal under s. 37 ( l). By the same order
the Appellate Committee disagreed with the findings of the Committee and found tho,;: appellant guilty of professional misconduct
and ordered his suspension from practice for a period of one year.
The appellant was also directed to pay the costs of the proceedings. It is this order of the Appellate Committee that is the subject of the appeal before us.
•
As stated earlier, we have heard arguments only on the quesE · tion of the maintainability of the appeal at the instance of the
Advocate-General of Maharashtra before the Bar Council of India.
As the question raised was a fairty important one. notice had been
issued to the Attorney-General of. India, the Bar Council of India,
the Advocates-General and the Bar-Councils of the States. Advo~
cates-General of most of the States were represented by counsel.
The Attorney-General of India, the Bar Council of India as well as
F :he Bar Council of Maharashtra were also represented by counsel
before us.
The question posed for our consideration is whether the
Advocate-General of a State comes within the expression "any
person aggrieved" in s. 37 ( 1) of the Act.
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Mr. Daphtary. learned counsel for the appellant. drew our
attention to the various provisions of the Act and pointed out that
matters concerning the legal profession have now been entrusted
to the State Bar Councils and the Bar Council of India and the
powers to take disciplinary action have also been vested in them.
W~atever may have been the position once occupied by the
Aavocate-General vis-a-vis the legal profession, that has now been
changed by the Act. His appearance in disciplinary matters is
only to assist the Committee and he has no further interest in
::J06
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1971] 1 S.C.R.
those proceedings. Whether an Advocate is acquitted or convict- A
·ed is no concern of the Advocate-Ge,neral, because he is not
interested in the actual decision of the Committee. Hence the
Advocate-General cannot be considered to be "any person aggrieved by any order of the Committee so as to be eligible to file an
appeal under s. 37 of the Act. In this connection Mr. Daphtary
.referred us to several English decisions where the expression 'per- B
son aggrieved' has been considered and interpreted with references
to the statutes in which those expressions occur. Relying on the
principles laid down in those decisions, to which reference will be
made later, Mr. Daphtary pointed out that the expression 'person
aggrieved' should not be interpreted as covering every person who
is disappointed or dissatisfied with a uecision rendered by a Com- .
mittee. On the other hand, the counsel urged, that in order to be C
considered as a 'person aggrieved' that person must be one who
has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has
been pronounced and which has wrongfully deprived him of some. thing or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected
his title to something. An appeal must be by the party who has
endeavoured to maintain the contrary of that which has taken D
place. The counsel further pointed out that the Advocate-General
is a public officer and ca~not be considered to be a party to the
proceedings before the Committee. The Advocate-General may
be even annoyed \vith the decision of the Committee acquitting an
Advocate, but that will not make him a 'person aggrieved'.
E
Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. Daphtary on the
observations of Lord Denning in Attorney-General of the Gambia
v. Pierre Sarr N'lie( 1 ) to the effect that the Attorney-General in a
colony represents the Crown as the guardian of the public interest
and that it is his duty to bring before the Judge any misconduct
of a barrister or solicitor which is ·of sufficient gravity to warrant F
disciplinary action and that if the Judge acquits the practitioner
of misconduct, no appeal is open to the Attorney-General, who has
done his duty and is not aggrieved. But if, on the other hand, a ·
Court of Appeal reverses the decision holding a practitioner guilty
of professional misconduct, o.n a ground which goes to the jurisdiction of the Judge or is otherwise a point in which the public G
interest is concerned , the Attorney-General is a 'person aggrieved'
by the decision and can properly petition Her Majesty for special
leave to appeaL Drawing support from these observations Mr.
Daphtary urged that in this case, the Committee had acquitted the
appellant and the Advocate-General having appeared through
counsel before the Committee has done his duty, and as such he
H
cannot be considered to be aggrieved. No question of jurisdiclion of the Committee or any point in which the public interest is
(]) 11961} Appeal Cases 617
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A. P. GANDHI V. H. M. SEERVAI (Vaidialingam, J.)
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concerned arose for decision in the appeal filed by the AdvocateGeneral, so as to make the appeal competent even within the
limited rule laid down by Lord Denning.
Mr. V. S. Desai, learned counsel appearing for the AdvocateGeneral of Maharashtra and Mr. M. C. Setalvad, learned counsel
appearing for the Bar Council of India have supported the decision
of the Appellate Committee holding in favour of the competency
of the appeal filed by the Advocate-General as "any person aggrieved" under s. 37 of the Act. The counsel appearing for the
Attorney-Gentral, the Bar Council of Maharashtra and the Advocates-General represented before us have supported this view.
Mr. V. S. Desai pointed out that the Act is a self-contained
Code, and that the various decisions where the expression 'person
aggrieved' has been interpreted must be appreciated in the particular context in which those expressions occur in the statutes
which were before the Courts. The reasoning in those decisions
may furnish a guide but cannot be applied ipso facto when interpreting s. 37 of the Act. The expression "any person aggrieved"
in s. 37 of the Act will have to be understood and interpreted in
the context in which it appears, having due regard to the scheme
of the Act. The counsel also referred us to certain decisions bearing on this matter, to which we shall refer in due course.
Mr. M. C. S~tal~'ad, learned counsel, appearing for the Bar
Council of India urged in particular that the Advocate-General is
a responsible person and is the highest Law Officer of the State.
The legal profession is very closely associated with the administration of justice by the Courts. The Bar, in that context has to
come into contact with the public to assist them in legal matters.
This responsible position occupied by the legal profession has to
be properly safeguarded and that could be done only by insisting
that its members are persons of high character and integrity and
who observe rules of professional etiquette. The Act has made it
obligatory to give notice in the disciplinary proceedings· to the
Advocate-General and give him an opportunity of being heard.
The purpose for which the highest Law Officer of the State, the
Advocate-General, is brought in not only in the Act, but also in
the Indian Bar Councils Act of 1926 (Act 38 of 1926) (hereinafter referred to as the Bar Councils Act) is to subserve the public
interest, namely, of seeing that the integrity and honesty of the
legal profession are maintained and that proper decisions are given
in disciplinary proceedings. There may be cases of inadequate
punishment or even harsh punishment being awarded by the Committee. The Advocate-General in proper cases can bring up such
matters before the Bar Council of India. Mr. Setalvad further
pointed out that there is no restriction placed in s. 37 denying the
right of the Advocate-General to file an appeal against the orders
of the Committee. Having due regard to the scheme of the Act
908
SUPREME
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I
[1971] 1 S.C.R.
and particularly of ss. 35 and 37, the Advocate-General comes
within "any person aggrieved" and hence he was competent to file
the appeal.
....
I have given careful consideration to the various aspects placed
before us by all the learned counsel and I am of the view that the
decision of the Appellate Committee holding that the appeal filed
by the Advocate-General of Maharashtra was compete;nt is cor- B
rect. I am further of the view that the expression "any person
aggrieYed" in s. 37 will have to be interp;eted in Ute context in.
which it appears, having due regard to the provisions of the Act
and its scheme. Considered in this manner, it has to be held that
the Advocate-General comP.S within "any person aggrieved'' in
s. 37. The decisions relied on by Mr. Daphtary have, no doubt, c
interpreted the expression 'person aggrieved' occurring in the particular statute:i which came up for consideration in those decisions,
. but in my opinion it \Viii not be safe to adopt in toto the interpretation so placed. no doubt on the identical expression uccurring in
different statutes when construing the said expression in the Act
before us. As pointed out by Lord Parker C.J. in Eating Corpo- D
ration \'. Jones( 1 ) cases which have interpreted similar expressions,
can be looked into "to see if there are general principles which
can be extracted which will guide the court in approaching the
question as to \\·hat the words ·person aggrieved' mean in any particular statute." I will make a brief reference to the decisions
cited for the appellant later. But before doing so, it is desirable
to refer to some of the provisions of the Act itself, so that the E
scheme of the Act will become evident, and that will throw considerable light on the interpretation of s. 3'/.
Before I refer to the Act. I think it desirable 'to advert to some
of the provisions of the Bar Councils Act. Even at the outset [
may point out that the scheme of the Bar Councils Act was different. In the Bar Councils Act. the disciplinary jurisdiction over
Advocates was vested in the High Court [vide s. 10(1)]. Under
s. 10(2) the High Court, if the compbint is not summarily
rejected by it. had to refer the case for inquiry either to the Bar
Council or after consultation with the Bar Council, to the Court
of a District Judge. When a case is referred for inquiry to · the
Bar Council under s. 1 I, the case was to be inquired into by the
Committee of the Bar Council. referred to as the Tribunal. and
th:lt Tribunal consisted of the particular number of person mentioned in s. 11 (2) appointed for the purpose. by the Chief Justice.
The High Court had power to make rules under s. 12 ( 1 ) prescribing the procedure to be followed in the conduct of inquiries. The
findin_!! of the inquiry by the Tribunal had to be forwarded to the
High Court. On receipt of the finding. the High Court had to fix
(I) [1959) I Q.B.D. 384.
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909
a date for heariug of the case. under s. 12 ( 3) it was obligatory
to give notice, amongst other persons, to the Advocate-General of
the day fixed for hearing; and it was also further obligatory to give
the Advocate-General an opportunity of being heard before orders
were passed. Under s. 12( 4) the High Court could pass final
orders or refer the case back for further inquiry. Under sub-s.
( 5) the High Court had also power, -when passing final orders to
give directions regarding payment of costs. I am only referring
to the materi<il provisions of the Bar Councils Act to show that the
High Court was then the disciplinary authority and the function
of the Committee of the Bar Council was only to submit a finding
after conducting an inquiry as directed by the High Court. It is
however to be noted that the Advocate-General then was not
associated in the inquiry proceedings before the Tribunal of the
Bar Council ; but he was entitled to be given notice of the date
fixed for hearing and also to be heard in the proceedings before
the High Co'urt after receipt of the finding submitted by the Committee of the Bar Council. Those provisions clearly establish the
important position occupied by the Advocate-General and rocognised by the Bar Councils Act.
The scheme is slightly different when we come to the Act.
The State Bar Councils and the Bar Council of India have been
made autonomous units and various functions regarding the legal
profession have been entrusted to them. Taking disciplinary
E
action against the delinquent members of the Bar and conducting
inquiries are all part of their functions. Barring a provision of a
right to appeal to the Supreme Court under s. 38 of the Act, the
Courts are completely out of picture so far as the legal profession
is conceflled. The Act was one to amend and consolidate the law
relating to legal practitioners and to provide for the constitution
F of the Bar Councils of the States and the Bar Council of India.
Section 3 makes provisions for the State Bar Councils. Un.der
sub-section ( 2) the Advocate-General of the State is an ex-officiO
member. Similarly the Additional Solicitor General of India is
an ex-officio member of the State Bar Council of Delhi. Section
6 ( I ) enumerates the functions of the State Bar Coun~ils. One of
the functions under cl. (c) relates to entertaining and determining
G cases of misconduct against advocates on the roll of the State Bar
Council. Section 7 similarly enumerates the functions of the Bar
Council of India. Under cl. (c), the Bar Council of India has
got the power to Jay down the procedure to be followed by its
Disciplinary Comm;ttee and the Disciplinary Committees of each
State Bar Councils. Section 9 deals with the Bar Council constiH
tuting one or more Disciplinary Committees in the manner indicat·
ed therein. Section 23 gives a right of pre-audience to the Attorney-Genera] of India, the Solicitor General of India, the Additional-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
910
[1971}1 S.C.R.
A
Solicitor General of India and the Advocate-Generals of the States,
as mentioned in sub-sections 1 to 4 respectively.
Chapter V deals with the "conduct of Advocates" and contains
the group of sections 35 to 44. Section 35 deals with the punishment of Advocates for misconduct and is as follows :
B
"Section 35 : Punishment c.f advocates for misconduct :
( 1 ) Where on receipt of a complaint or otherwise a
State Bar Council has reason to believe that any advocate on its roll has been guilty of professional or other
misconduct, it shall refer the case for disposal to its disciplinary committee.
c
( 2) The disciplinary committee of a State Bar
Council, if it does not summarily reject the complaint,
shall fix a date for the hearing of the case and shall cause
a notice thereof to be given to the advocate concerned
and to the Advocate-General of the State.
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( 3) The disciplinary committee of a State Bar CoWlcil after giving the advocate concerned and the Advocate-General an opportunity of being heard, may make
.
any of the following orders, namely:(a) dismiss the complaint or~ where the proceedings
were initiated at the inrstance of the State Bar
Council, direct that the proceedings be tiled;
I
(b) reprimand the advocate;
~c)
suspend the advocate from
period as it may deem fit;
practice for such
F
(d) remove the name of the
State roll of advocates.
advocate
from
the
( 4) Where an advocate is suspended from practice
under clause (c) of sub-section ( 3)~ he shall, during
the period of suspension, be debarred from practising in
any court or before any authority or person in India.
G
( 5) Where any notice is issued to the AdvocateGeneral under sub-section (2), the Advocate-General
·may appear before the disciplinary committee of the
State Bar Council either in person or through any advocate appearing on his behalf."
u
Similarly s. 36(1) deals with the disciplinary pow,rs of the
Bar Council of India. Sub-section (2) confers powers on the
A. P. Gi\NDHI v. H, M. SEERVAI (Vaidialingam, /.)
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Appellate Committee of its own motion to withdraw for inquiry
for itself any disciplinary action against an advocate pending
before the Committee and dispose of the same. Sub~section (3)
provides for the Appellate Committee when disposing of a ~ase
under s. 36 observing, so far as may be, the procedure laid down
in s. 35. It further provides that references to the Advocate~
General in s. 35 are to be construed as references to the AttorneyGeneral of India.
Sections 37 and 38 which provide for an appeal to the Bar
Council of India and to the Supreme Court respectively run as.
follows:
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"Section 37 : Appeal to the Bar Council of India.
( 1 ) Any person aggrieved by an order of the disciplinary committee Qf a State Bar Council
(under section 35) ill.ay, within sixty days of the
date of the communication of the order to him,
prefer an appeal to the Bar Council of India.
(2) Every such appeal shall be heard by the dis-·
ciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India
which may pass such order thereon as it deems
fit."
"Section 38.
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Appeal to the Supreme Court :
Any person aggrieved by an order made by the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India under
section 36 or section 37 may, within sixty days of the
date on which the order is communicated to him, prefer
an appeal to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court
may pass such order thereon as it deems fit."
Section 42 ( 1 ) deals with powers of the disciplinary committee
of a Bar Council with regard to the various matters provided for·
in cis. (a) to (f). Section 43 provides for making of orders as
to costs by the disciplinary committee of a Bar Council. Section
44 gives powers of review to the disciplinary committee of a Bar
Council. Section 48A. in Chapter VI, deals with the revisional
powers of the Bar Council of India.
It will be seen from ss. 3 (2 )(a), 23 ( 4) and 35 that the
Advocate-General of the State is given by the Act a very important and responsible position. Some discussion took place before
us whether the Advocate·General can be considered to be the
person who is charged with the duty of safeguarding the profes-sional integrity of the members of the Bar. when powers and
duties in that regard have been conferred under the Act on the
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
·912
''[1971j l S.C.R.
State Bar Councils. I do not think it necessary to go into that
.aspect as I think a;n' inquiry in that regard is not relevant tor the
present purpose of construing s. 37. Nor can the analogy of the
Att~ney-General in a colony representing the Crown, being the
guardian of public interest, as stated by Lord Denning in AttorneyGeneral of the Gambia v. Pierl'ee Sarr N'Jie(l) be brought in for
interpreting ·s. 37 of the Act, as we are only concerned to find out
the right given to the Advocate-General by t~e Act. So far as
that is concerned, I am satisfied that the Act has given due recognition to his status by virtue of1 his being the highest Law
Officer in the State, as the Advocate-Ge;rf,;:ral and who may
be trusted to place a disinterested and dispassionate view before
the Committee to enable it to come to a proper decision having
due regard to the Advocate concerned, as well as the entire legal
profession to which he belongs. Apart from his being under
s. 3 (2) (a) an ex-officio member of the State Bar Council, s. 23 ( 4)
gives him a right of pre-audience over all other advocates.
Coming to s. 35, read with s. 37, which has been extracted
earlier, the main features that emerge therefrom are as follows :
The State Bar Council can suo moto or on
receipt of a complaint, when it has reason to
believe that an advocate has been guilty of professional or other misconduct refer the case to
its committee.
( 2) If the Committee does n,ot summarily reject the
complaint, it is bound to fix a date for hearing
of the case, and it is also further bound to give
notice of the date of hearing, apart from the
advocate concerned, to the Advocate-General of
the State.
( 3) The Committee is bound in the inquiry to give
an opportunity of being heard both to the advocate ~oncerned and the Advocate-General. After
such an inquiry the Committee can pass one or
other of the order~ enumerated in clauses (a) to
(d) of s. 35.
( 4) The Advocate-General may appear before the
Committee in person or through an advncate
appearing on his behalf.
( 5) The orders of the Committee have to be communicated to the Advocate-General and the
advocate concerned.
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(I) [1961} 1 A. C. 617.
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( 6) Against the orders passed under s. 35, any
person aggrieved is entitled to file an appeal
under s. 37, to the Bar Council of India.
While under the Bar Councils Act, the Advocate-General was
associated with the disciplinary proceedings only when the matter
8 was being decided by the High Court, after receipt of tte findings
submitted by the Tribunal of the Bar Council, it is significant to
note that under the Act, the Advocate-General is associated with
the disciplinary proceedings right from the stage of inquiry by the
Committee. Under sub-section (2) of s. 35 the Committee is
bound to give notice of the date of hearing not only to the Advocate concerned but also to the Advocate-General of the State. It
C will be noted that disciplinary proceedings may have been· occasioned because of a complaint made by a third party or may have
been initiated suo mota by the State Bar Council. In whatever
manner the proceedings may have been initiated, the Advocate..
General is entitled to be given notice of the date of hearing. It
cannot be a formal and empty notice_ to the Advocate-General,
D because sub-section ( 3) clearly indicates that the Advocate~
General should be given an opportunity of being heard. It is
significant to note that sub-section ( 3) of s. 35 which deals with
the giving of a:n opportunity of being heard both to the advocate
concerned and the Advocate-General does not make any distinction in the opportunity so afforded to both of them. The same
E opportunity that the Advocate concerned has under sub-s. (3) is
also afforded to the Advocate-General. It is not necessary to go
to the extent of holding that there is a "lis" before the Committee
and that the Advocate-General is a "party" in the sense that expres~
sion is ordinarily understood in law. The advocate concerned will
be interested in disputing the allegations made or charges levelled
against him and he will be entitled to lead evidence in support of
F his plea. If' there is a complainant, he ·.viii of course lead evi~
dence to support his case. The Advocate~General, on the other
hand, is also entitled to place before the Committee all arper.ts of
the matter including facts that may be in favour of the advocate
whose conduct is under inquiry. This is because of the impor·
tant positivn occupied by him. It may be that the AdvocateG General may not be able to appear personally and participate in
all the disciplinary proceedings and that is why provision has been
made in s. 35(3) enabling the Advo~ate-General to appear either
in person or through any advocate appearing on his behalf. Just
as the Advocate concerned will have an opportunity of examining
his witnesses and cross-examining the witnesses produced against
H nim, the Advocate-General or the counsel appearing on his behalf
will also have a right of cross-examining the witnesses produced
in the case so as to elicit information abcut the charge of professional misconduct 1 . ·. ' ~ .tgainst the advocate concerned. '!'he
1169 SupCI/71-14
,.,t
I
I
914
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1971] 1 S.C.R.
Advocate-General need not be vindictive and take sides as a party
to a litigation and see .that the advocate is found guilty. On the
other hand, by virtue of the special and dispassionate role occupied by him, he will be able during the inquiry to place such materials or evid~nce which will enable the Commi~tee to come to a
proper and correct finding, in the interest of both the legal practitioner and legal profession to which he belongs.
It is in this context of the close association of the AdvocateGeneral with the disciplinary proceedings that the expression 'person aggrieved' in s. 37 has to be interpreted. There can be no
controversy that an appeal will lie against the various orders that
the Committee may pass as enumerated in cls. (a) to (d) of
s. 35 ( 3). The question is at whose instance the appeal will lie.
If the complaint is dismissed, the complainant will be a 'person
aggrieved' who can file an appeal under s. 37. In fact it has been
held by this Court ir. B. M. Madani v. Commissioner of Workmen's Compensation, Bombay(!) that when proceedings are
initiated on a complaint by a party and the Committee after finding the advocate guilty of the charges, passed an order reprimanding with a warning, an appeal filed by such a complainant before
the Appellate Committee only on .the question of sentence imposed, was competent as the complainant was a 'person aggrieved'.
Similarly, an order adverse to the advocate, concerned, can be the
·subject of appeal a't his instance.
,.
.:
There is ·no controversy that t!!e order passe'd by the Committee was communicated to the Advocate-General. As already
pointed Qut a series of steps is contemplated und~r s. 35; reference
to the. Committee, of a case of professional misconduct; notice of
.the date of hearing to be given to the Advocate-General; AdvocateGeneral being given an opportunity of being heard at the hearing;
the. Advocate-General being entitled to appear before the Committee either in person or through an Advocate; his being entitled
to· be communicated with a copy of the order passed by the Committee. It is in that context and for these purposes that I have
considered the meaning of the expression "any person aggrieved"
in s. 37 ( 1). The fact that the Advocate-General does not allege
an infringement of any legal rights of his own is of no consequence. The particular proceeding in which the AdvocateGeneral is given a right to participate relates to an inquiry into ihe
allegations of misconduct against an advocate. Upon a fair construction of s. 37 read with s. 35 of the Act, the Advocate-General.
in my opinion is ''any person aggrieved'' and as such was entitled
to file the appeal under s. 37 (1) against the order passed by the
Committee. The same reasoning will apply to the AttorneyGenetal of India under s. 38.
(I) (Civil Af!peal No. 877 of -1968 decided on 8-10-1968).
B
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G
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A. P. GANDHI V. H. M. SEERVAI (Vaidialingam, J.)
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915
It may be that in a particular case the Advocate-General may
feel that the findings arrived at in favour of the advocate by the
Committee is not justified by the evidence and that decision will
have to be reconsidered by the Appellate Committee; or it may
even be that in a particular case the sentence imposed by the Committee may not be commensurate with the guilt of the advocate;
or it may also be that the sentence imposed on an advocate by the
Committee is very harsh or the fi.'llding of guilt is not correct.
Under such and similar circumstances in the interests of the
Advocate and the legal profession, the Advocate-General will be
competent to bring up the matter before the Appellate Committee
so that justice may be done.
In this context the observations of Lord Hewart C.J. in
Sevenoaks Urban District Council v. Twynam(l) are apposite.
_The question before the Court in that decision was whether an
objector to a proposal made by a local authority to acquire land
in order to provide parking place for vehicles and whose objections were overruled was a 'person aggrieved' under s. 68 ( 3) of
the Public Health Act 1925 and as $Uch entitled to appeaJ. It
was found that the objector alleged· no ground of objections personally to himself. Nevertheless it was held that such an objector was a 'person aggrieved' and entitled to appeal. Lord Hew.art
,C .J. at page 443 states :
"The question therefore is : Is it true to say that in
these circumstances anawithin the ·meaning of tl;lis part
of this statute this -respondent was a 'person . : . . aggrie\:.~
ed' ? Now undoubtedly those words, 'a person aggriev
ed', have very often been considered, and, if one looked
at the mere terms apart from their context and apart
from the particular circumstances, it would have been
quite easy to marshal decisions of contrad-ictory import.
But as has been said again and again ther~ is often
little utility in seeking to interpret particular expressions in one statute by reference to decisions given upon
similar expressions in different statutes which have been
enacted alio intuitu. The problem with which we are
concerned js not, what is. the meaning of the expression
'aggrieved' in any one of a dozen other statutes, but
what is its~.meaning in this part of this statute ? It is a
little important to see what this part of this statute i'5
dealing with.,
4
,
The above extract has been quoted with approval by Lord
Parker C.J. in Ealing Corporation v. Jones( 2 ).
II
I have already indicated earlier that the problem before us
whether the Advocate-General is a 'person aggrieved' under s. 37
(I) [19291-2 !~. B. 440. _.
(2) [1959] 1. Q: B. 384.
916
SUPREME COURT REFORTS
[1971] 1 S.C.R.
of the Act will have to be tackled with reference to the scheme
and provisions of the Act and that is exactly what I have done
and arrived at the conclusion that he is a perso:1 aggrieved.
Mr. Daphtary argued that when the Committee consisting of
members of the legal profession, has decided in favour of the
Advocate, the Advocate-General can have no grievance. This,
i!l my view, is really begging the question. Why did the Legislature then bring in the Advocate-General at all and why has it
associated him in disciplinary proceedings from the very beginning
of the inquiry. ? ~at and other circumstances, already pointed
out oy me, bnng htm under s. 37 as "any person aggrieved."
B
Mr. Daphtary then urged that if the Advocate-General was c
expected to safeguard the interest of the Advocate and. the legal
profession by seeing that proper deci~ons are given by the Committee, that purpose is not served when powers have been given to
the Committee under s. 35(2) to summarily reject a complaint
and the Advocate-General will have no remedy against such
rejection. The short answer to this contention is that a right of D
appeal must be specifically conferred by statute. Section 37 ( 1)
gives a right of appeal against an order passed under s. 35. The
orders which could be passed after hearing the case are enumerated in clauses (a) to (d) of s. 35 ( 3). It is not pecessary for me
to express any opinion whether an order summarily rejecting a
complaint can also be the subject of an appeal under s. 37 ( 1) as
that section is in very wide terms. In any event, Mr. Daphtary's .E
contention will only amount to this viz., that the Advocate-General is not associated at the stage of summary rejection of a complaint. That circumstance does not militate against the view
already ewressed by me. Probably the Legislature may !].ave felt
that if there is any wrongful summary rejection of a complaint it
could be setright by the Bar Council of India under s. 48A. But
once the Committee decides to hear the cases and passes an order
under s. 35, the Advocate-General gets a right of appeal under
s. 37(1).
Mr. V. S. Desai referred us to the decision of the Judicial
Committee in Advocate General of Bombay and others v.
Pitamberdas Gokuldas Mehta and others(!) wherein, according to
him, an appeal by the Advocate-General of Bombay against the
decision of the High Court of Bombay Pleaders Act was entertained by the Judicial Committee. He has .also referr.ed us tC? ~he
discussion between the Court and counsel Ill the satd decision
reported in Advocate-General of Bombay v. Phiroz Rustomji
Bharucha(2) which, according to him, will show that though an
objection about the locus standi of the Advocate-General to file an
(l) 62 Indian Appeals 235.
(2) 37 Bombay, Law Reporter 722.
G
H
A. P. GANDHI v, H. M. SEERVAI (Vaidia/ingam, J.)
917
A
appeal under such circumstances was raised, but was not accepted
by the Judicial Committee. I have gone through both the reports
and there is no indication that the question of maintainability of
an appeal by the Advocate-General was decided one way or the
other by the Judicial Committee
B
Mr. Daphtary has referred us to the decisions in Re. Sidebotham(l ), in re. Reed, Bowen & Co.,( 2 ), The Queen v. The
Keepers of the Peace and Justices of the County of London( 8 ),
Rex. v. London Quarter Sessions(•) ~ Ealing Corporation v.
Jones ( ~), wherein the expression 'person aggrieved' occurring in
different statutes came up for interpretation. The principles
that emerge from those decisions appear to be that a 'person
C aggrieved' must be a person who has suffered a legal grievance
'or who has olaimed a title to something ~rld his claim has
been negatived or who has maintained to the contrary in the
proceedings or litigation. It has been further held in some of
those decisions that the said expression does not take in any person
who may be affected by the order or who may feel disappointed or
D even annoyed at the decision. In the view that I take that the
expression 'person aggrieved' in s. 37 of the Act has to be interpreted in the light of the provisions of and scheme of the Act as
well as the context in which those expressions appear. I do not
think it necessary to consider in great detail those decisions \vhich
have been rendered on different statutes.
E
The decision in The Municipal Corporation of the City of
Ahmedabad v. Chandulal Shamaldas Patel and others( 6 ) referred
· to by Mr. Daphtary, in my opinion, does not assist the appellant.
In that decision it was held th~t when certain notifications issued
under the Land Acquisition Act were set aside by the High Court,
the Municipal Corporation, on whose behalf the· acquisition was
being made by the Government, cannot be considerd to be a 'person aggrieved' entitled to challenge the order of the High Court.
An additional reason has also been given against the competency
of the appeal that even an order for costs has not been passed
against the Municipal Corporation. That decision was rendered
on the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act, and so does not help
G
the appellant.
It was urged on behalf of the appellant that if the AdYocateGeneral was really intended to be given a right of appea1 under
s. 37 ( 1), the Legislat~re should have used the expression 'any
person including the Advocate-General aggrieved by an order .... •
H
(2) 19 Q. B. 174.
(3) 25 Q. B. D. 357.
(4) [1951] 2 K. B. D. 508.
(5) [1959] I Q. D. 384.
(6) (Civil Appeal No. l'il6 of 1967 decided on 1-8·1970)
(I) 14 Chancery Divison 458.
918
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1971] 1 S.C.R.
I am of the view that it was unnecessary to make any such provision because the expression as it stands clearly takes . within its
fold the Advocate-General also.
This leaves me with the decision in Attorney-General of the
Gambia v. Pierre Sarr N.'Jie(:) which has been very strongly
relied on by Mr. Daphtary. One Mr. X a member of the
English Bar was admitted to practice as a barrister and solicitor of
the Supreme Court of Gambia. The Deputy Judge made an order
striking his name off the roll of that Court. This decision was
reversed by the West African Court of Appeal on the ground that
the Deputy Judge had no jurisdiction in the matter. The Attorney-General of Gambia sought leave to appeal to Her Majesty
in Council; but the West African Court of Appeal declined to
grant him leave on the _ground that notice had not been given in
due time tO Mr. X. The Attorney-General then made a petition
to Her Majesty fu~ special leave to appeal from: the judgment of
the West African Court of Appeal, setting aside the order of the
Deputy Judge-as· well as refusing to grant leave to appeal. The
Attorney-General's petition was granted; but liberty was reserved
to Mr. X to raise the preliminary point that no appeal lay at the
instance of the ~ttomey-General. During the course of arguments the Judicial Committee rejected the preltminary objection.
It is to be noticed that against the decision of the Deputy
Judge striking his name off the roll, Mr. X filed an appeal to the
West African Court of Appeal under s. 14 which was as follows ;
B
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"An appeal shall lie to the Court of Appeal from
any order of the Judge suspending a barrister or solicitQr of the Supreme Court from practice or striking his
name off the Roll and for the purposes of any such
appeal any such order shall be deemed to be an order
of the Supreme Court.,,
I am particularly referring to this decision because certa~n
observations of Lord Denning on which reliance has been placed
by Mr. Daphtary .will have, to be understood with reference to this
provision. of law. Exercising juris~ic.tion under this section, the
West Afncan Court of Appeal s~t as1de the order of the Deputy
Judge. In the first instance the Attorney-General sought leave to
appeal to Her Majesty in Council from the West African Court of
Appeal under s. 5 of the West African (Appeal to the Privy Council) Order in Council, 1949, which is as follows:
G
"Applications to the court for leave to appeal shan·
be made,.by motion or petition within 21 days from the
date of the judgment to be appealed from, and the
H
(1) [1961] A. C. 617.
..
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A. P. GANDHI v. H. M. SEERVAI (Vaidiafingam, J.)
A
B
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F
G
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919
applicant shall give the opposite party notice of his intended application."
The West African Court of Appeal declined to grant leave to
appeal to the Attorney-General on the ground that notice had not
given within the time mentioned in the above order to Mr. X.
The Attorney-General made an application to the Judicial ~om
mittee for special leave to appeal from the two orders mentioned
above of the West African Court of Appeal. That petition was
filed under s. 31 of the West African (Appeal to Privy Councll)
Order in Council, 1949, which runs as follows:
"Nothing in this order contained shall be deemed to
interfere with the right of His Majesty upon the humble
petition of any pen;on aggrieved by any judgment of the
Court to admit his appeal therefrom upon such conditions as His Majest~· in Council shall think fit to impose."
The question that arose before their Lordships was whether
the Attorney-General W< s a 'person aggrieved' under the above
order.
In discussing this question Lord Denning at page 634
observes :
·• ...... The words 'person aggrieved' are of wide .
import and should not be subjected to a restrictive interpretation. They do not include, of course, a mere
busy body who is interfering in things which do not
concern him : but they do include a person who has a
genuine grievance because an o.rder has been made
which prejudicially affects his interests. Has · the
Attorney-General a sufficient interest for this purpose'!
Their Lordships think that he has. The AttorneyGeneral in a colony represents the Crown as the guardian of the public interest. It is his duty to bring before
the judge ahy misconduct of a barrister or solicitor
which is of sufficient gravity to warrant discriplinary
action. True it is that if the judge acquits the practitioner of miscon-duct. no appeal is open to the AttorneyGeneraL He has done his duty and is not aggrieved. ·
But if the judge finds the practitioner guilty of professional misconduct, and a Court of Appeal reverses the
decision on a ground which goes to the jurisdiction of
!he judg~, or is otherwise a point in which the public.
mterest IS concerned, the Attorney-General is a 'person
aggrieved' by the decision and can properly petition Her
Majesty for special leave to appeal. It was for these
· reasons that their Lordships rejected the preliminary
objection and held that the Attorney-General was a
920
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1971] 1 S.C.R.
'person agg!ieved' by the decision of the West African
Court of Appeal."
The observations made in the above extract, in my opinion,
have to be related to the particular provision of the order in Coun·
cil which the Judicial Committee was considering. In the ca.;;e
before the Judicial Committee, the Attorney-General had imtiated
the disciplinary proceedings against the Barrister. _Under s. 14,
there was only a very limited right of appeal and that too in favour
of the barrister or solicitor in respect of the orders mentioned
therein. The Attorney-General, though he may have been the
complainant under s. 14 had no right of appeal if the barrister
was acquitted. That is why Lord Denning states that it is true
that if the Judge acquits the practitioner of misconduct no appeal
is open to the Attorney·General. This view, with respect, is correct because s. 14 does not give a right of appeal to the Attorney·
Gen~ral. Lord Denning, no doubt, has further stated that the
Judicial Committe~ has rejected the preliminary objection in view
of the fact that it was of the opinion that in the case before it a
question of jurisdiction. or a point of public interest is involved
and therefore, the Attorney·General is a 'person aggrieved'.
A
B
c
D
I have already indicated that there are no restrictions or limit~
tions imposed in s. 37 of the Act giving a right of appeal only to
the advocate who may have been found guilty. On the other
hand, the words "any person aggrieved'' in s. 37 are vr:ry ·wide, and
as ohserved by Lord Denning in the opening part 0f the above E
extract these words should not be subjected to a restrictive interpretation. In the view that I take that the Advocate-General has·
an unqualified right of appeal under s. 37 ( 1) I do not think "it
necessary either to refer to Art. 165 of the Constitution nor do I
think it necessary to consider the further question whether the
appeal tiled by the Advocate-General before the Bar Council of F
India relates to any question of jurisdiction or zt point of public
interest.
To conclude, the appeal filed by the Advocate-General of
Maharashtra before the Appellate Committee was competent and
this point has to be held against the appellant. The result will be
that the app~al before us will have to be heard on merits.
G
RAY, J. I agree with Vaidialingam, J. I desire to express
my separate opinion in view of the importance of the question
raised in this appeal.
This is an appeal from the order dated 26 October, 1969 of
the Disciplinary Committee oi the Bar Council of India suspend·
ing the appellant from practice for a period of one year.
H
A. P. GANDHI V. H. M . SEERVAI (Ray, J.)
921
A
An appeal to the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council
of India was preferred by Shri H. M. Seervai, Advocate General
of Maharashtra against the order dated 17 October, 1968 of the
Bar Council of Maharashtra holding that the appellant was not
guilty of professional misconduct or otherwise.
B
a preliminary objection was taken by Adi Pheroz Shah Gandhi as
c
The appellant pressed the same preliminary objection in this
Court, namely, that the Advocate General of the State of Maharashtra could not prefer an appeal against an order of the Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council.
Before the Disciplinary Committee ot the Bar Council of India
D
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F
G
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to the maintainability of the appeal preferred by
Gent:ral of Maharashtra.
the
Advocate
The relevant provision for appeal to the Bar Council of India
is to be found in section 37 of the Advocates Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). There are two sub-sections of
section 37. The first sub-section enacts that any person aggrieved
by an order of the Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council made under section 35 may, within sixty days of the date of
the communication of the order to him, prefer an appeal to the
Bar Council of India. Sub-section (2) of section 37 states that
every such appeal shall be heard by the Disciplinary Committee
of the Bar Council of India.
The pres~nt appeal is under section 3 8 of the Act which confers right of appeal to the Supreme Court by any person aggrieved
by an order made by the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India.
The entire controversy in this appeal centres on the meaning
of the words 'any person aggrieved by an order of the Disciplinary
Committee of the State Bar Council' occurring in sub-section ( i l
of section 37 of the Act. The same words also occur in section
38 of the Act.
Mr. Daphtary on behalf of the appellant contended first that
the Advocate General did not represent public interest and could
not therefore be said to be a person aggrieved by an order of the
Disciplinary Committee. Secondly, that the provisions in section
35 of the Act that the Advocate General was entitled to a notice
from. !he Disciplinary Committee of the date of hearing and the
prov1s~o~ t~at the Adv~cate General was entitled to be heard by
the Dtsciphn:uy Committee could not have the effect of making
the Advocate General a party, and, thirdly, the Advocate General
w~s an impartial person and his duty would end by making submissions, if any, before the Disciplinary Committee and he would
~22
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1971] 1 S.C.R.
not be a person aggrieved either by an order of dismissal of a complaint against the Advocate or by any order passed against the
Advocate.
Notices were given to the Attorney General and the Advocates
General of different States in view of the importance of the question involved in this appeal. Mr. V. S. Desai on behalf of the .
Advocate Gener.al of Maharashtra, Mr. Setalvad on behalf of the
Bar Council of India, Dr. Seyied Muhammad on behalf of the
AttorneY General, Mr. Datar counsel for the Maharashtra State
Bar Cotmcil of India, Dr. Seyied Muhammad on behalf of the
of other States all contended that the Advocate General would
have the right under the Act to prefer an appeal . as a person
aggrieved by an order of the Disciplinary Committee of a State
·
Bar Council.
A
s.
Various decisions were cited at the Bar to illustrate the meaning of the words 'person aggrieved'. Qne group of decisions is
based on the locus classicus in Re. E.~-parte Sidebotham (lt). The ·
other line of decisions is to be found in Ex-parte Official Receiver, · J)
Tn Re. Reed. Bowen & Co. (2) .and Sevenoaks Urban District
Council v. Twynam( 3 ). James, J. in the case of Ex-parte Sidebotham said that "a 'person aggrived' must be a man who has
suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has
been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something. or \HOngfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected
his title to something." Lord Esh~r. M. R. on the other hand in E.
Ex-parte Official Receiver In Re. Reed, Bowen & Co.(2) said that
the meaning given by James, L.J. to the words 'person aggrieved'
would not be an exhaustive definition and the words would include
a person \\·ho has asked for a decision for which he had a right to
ask, and has been wrongfully refused. In the Sevenoaks( 3 ) . case
Lord Hewart, C.J. said "that when a person might make an.obje·c- F
tion and was entitled to a decision upon it he would, if the·decision was adverse to him be able to appeal".
· These decisions indicate that the words 'person aggrieved'
would have different shades of meaning in accordance with the
tenor of the relevant statute. The observations of James, L.J. in
the case of Ex-par_te Sidebotham turn on the meaning of the words
'person aggrieved' occurring in the English Bankruptcy Act, 1914
which. inter alia, provided that the orders of the Court in bankruptcy matters exc.ept in cases specially excluded were subject to
appeal at the instance of any person aggrieved even if he had not
appeared in the court below. It is in the context of the English
Bankruptcy Act that creditors, trustees, administrators of a debtor
(I) 14 Ch. D. 458
(2) 19 Q.B.D. 174.
0) [1929] 2 K..B. 404.
G
H
A. P. GANDHI V. H. M, SEERVAI (Ray, /.)
A
923
or bankrupt would have a legal grievance against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of
something, or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully
affected his title to something.
Lord Hewart, C.J., in Seven.oaks cas~(!) said "the problem is
not
what is the meaning of the expression person aggrieved' in one
B
or dozen statutes but what is its meanh!llg in this part of the Statute". In that case the relevant provision of the Public Health Act
conferred a power on a local authority to provide with~ that district suitable parking place for vehicles. The statute further in that
case contemplated a notice of the proposal to acquire land for
using it as a parking place and objections, if any, to such proposal.
c When
objections were made, the local authority would have to
consider them. In the Sevenoaks case the Urban Council consi·
dered the objection of a ratepayer and thereafter proceeded with
the scheme of the parking place. Lord Hewart, C.J. in giving
· meaning to the words 'person aggrieved' in that case said that first
a person was an author of art objection, and, secondly, he was
D aggrieved by the refusal of his· objection. It was held that a spe·
cial individual right was infringed. In the Sevenoaks(l) case
there was neither a pecuniary nor a proprietary grievance. The
action of the local authority in providing a parking place invited
objections. It is the refusal of that objection which constituted a
grievance and it was a grievance sustainable in law.
E
~lr. Daphtary relied on the observations of James, L.J. in Re.
Sidebothame) that 'a disappointed person would not be a person
aggrieved' and also on the observations of Lord Coleridge in
Queen v. Keepers of the Peace and ]J-tstices of the County of
that one would not be an aggrieved person because
. London
someone
was
held not to have done wrong. In other words, it
F
W<l5 said that the Advocate General would make submissions or
adYance contentions and the non-acceptance by the Disciplinary
Committee of such submissions would not constitute either a legal
grievance or rejection of a remedy asked for.
e)
G
•i
H
Mr. Daphtary also leaned heavily on the decision of the Judi·
ck:!l Committee in Attorney General of Gambia v. Pierre Sarr
N' .ffe( 4 ) in support of two propositions. First, that the Judicial
Committee found in the Gambian case that in the colonies the
Attorney General represented the Crown and was therefore the
guardian of the public interest. Mr. Daphtary submitted that the
Advocate General did nqt represent public interest in our country
and therefore could not be said to be a guardian of public interest.
Secondly. the Judicial Committee in the Gambian case said that in
0) [1929] 2 K.B. 404.
0.) 25 Q.1J.D. 357.
(2) 14 Ch. D. 458.
(4) [1961] A. C. 617.
-924
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1971] 1 S.C.R.
.relation to disciplinary proceedings if a legal practitioner was
acquitted of misconduct no appeal was open to the Attorney General because he had done his duty and was not aggrieved. Extract·
ing that proposition from the Gambian case Mr. Daphtary sub·
mitted that similarly the Advocate General could not have any
grievance where an Advocate was acquitted.
The purpose and the provisions of the Advocates Act, 1961
will determine whether the Advocate General is a person aggriev·
ed within the meaning of the relevant sections in the Act. It may
not be out of place to refer to the Bar Councils Act, 1926 which
dealt with disciplinary c~nduct of practit;oners. Prior to the
Advocates Act the High Court under the Bar Councils Act, 1926
had power to suspend any advocate from practice whom it found
guilty of professional or other misconduct. Under the said 1926
Act upon receipt of a complaint made tu it by any court Qr by
Bar Council or by any other person that any Advocate had been
guilty of misconduct, the High Court if ~t did not summarily reject
the complaint referred the case for enquiry to the Bar Council or
after consultation with the Bar Council to the Court of a District
Judge and the High Court might of its own motion refer any case
in which it had reason to believe that any such Advocate had been
so guilty. If any case was referred under the Bar Councils Act,
1926 for enquiry, the case was to be enquired into by the Committee of the Bar Council which was called the TribunaL The
Tribunal consisted of not less than three and not more than five
members of the Bar Council appointed for that purpose by the
Chief Justice or Chief Judge of the High Court, and one of the
members so appointed was the President of the Tribunal. The
finding of a Tribunal was forwarded to the High Court through the
Bar Council and the findinQ: of a District Court was to be forwarded direct to the High .Court with a copy to the Bar Council. On
receipt of the finding the High Court was to fix a date for the
hearing of the case and notice of the date so fixed was to b~ given
to the Advocate concerned and to the Bar Counc;l and to the
.Advocate General. The High Court was also required under the
statute to afford the Advocate concerned and the Bar Council and
tile Advocate General an opportunity of being heard before orders
were passed in that case.
Mr. Desai relied on the provisions of the Bar Councils Act,
1926 to show that under the said Act notice was to be given to the
Advocate General and that the Advocate General was entitled to
be heard and he relied on a decision of the Judicial Committee in
Advocate General of Bombay v. Phiroz BharuchaC) and the decision of this Court in Bhataraju Nageshwara Rao v. The Hon'ble
Judges of the Madras High Court & Ors.(2) in support of two
{1) 62 1. A. 235: 37 Born. L·. R . 722.
(2) [!9551 1. s.c.R. 1055.
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propositions, namP-ly, that the Advocate General could prefer aru
appeal and in an appeal preferred by the Advocate concerned, the
Advocate General would be a respondent to such an appeal. In
Bharucha's case (I) certain Advocates were members of Associa·
tions declared unlawful by Government and they were convicted
of offences punishable under section .17 (i) of the Criminal Law
Amendment Act, 1908. The High Court did not take any steps
against the Advocates on the ground that it did not consider that
membership of an unlawful Association would render the Advocates unfit for the exercise of the profession. The Advocate
General of Bombay made applications for special leave before
the Judicial Committee to appeal agaim.t the decision of the High
Court. The Judicial Committee did not grant any special leave
and agreed with the view of the High Court. No question was
raised in the applications before the Judicial Committee as to the
maintainability of the aplications for special leave. It should be
noticed that under the Bar Councils Act there was no provision
for any appeal. Mr. Desai rightly relied on the decision of the
Judicial Committee not for an actual decision that the Advocate
General had a right of appeal but for the purpose of showing that
the Advocate General had not only locus standi to make an application for leave but also could be said to have been aggrieved by au
order in relation to professional misconduct of an Advocate. The
Judicial Committee would not have entered into the merits of the
case if tl•e Advocate General had no right to apply for leave to
appeal.
The decision of this Court in Bhataraju's case( 2 ) was to the·
effect that in an appeal preferred to tlie Supreme Coun by an
Advocate against whom an order of suspensio,n, was passed by the
High Court under section 12 of the Bar Councils Act, the proper
respondents would be the complainant, if any, the Bar Council and
the Advocate General of the State concerned and not the High
Court. The appeal to this Court ln Bhataraju's case( 2 ) was by
special leave. This Court held that the Advocate General, the Bar
Council and the complainant would be parties tO- the appeal on the
ground that notices under the Bar Councils Act had been issued to
those persons. The decisions of this Court and the Judicial Committee both indicate that the Advocate General under the Bar
Councils Act had locus standi in making an application for leave
to appeal and being a respondent to an app~al preferred by the
Advocate.
The position held by the High Court under the Bar Councils
Act 1926 is now occupied by the Bar Council under the Advocates Act. There are State Bar Councils and there is also a Bar
Council of India. Every Bar CounCil is a body corporate. The
(1) 62 I.A. 2350
(2) [1955] l S.C.R. 1055.
·926
SUPJEME COURT REPORTS
[1971) 1 S.C.R.
I
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:functions of the St~~e Bar Council are inter alia to admit persons A
as advocates on its roll; to prepare and maintain such roll; to entertain and determine icases of misconduct against advocates on its
roll; to safeguard th.~ rights, privileges and interest of advocates on
its roll. The functions of the Bar Council of India are to lay
down standards of professional conduct and etiquette for advocat.es, to lay down the procedure to be followed by the Discipli- · B
nary Committee of the Bar Council of India and the Disciplinary
· Committees of the State Bar Councils, to safeguard the rights,
privileges and interests of advocates. A Bar Council is empowered
under the Act to constitute one or more Disciplinary Committees.
Sections 35 to 44 deal with conduct of Advocates and powers
of the Disciplinary Committees of the State Bar Councils as also c
of the Bar Council of India. Under section 35 of the Act where
on receipt of a complaint or otherwise a State Bar. Council has
reason to believe that any advocate on its roll has been guilty of
professional or other misconduct, it shall refer the case for disposal
to its Disciplinary Committee. The Disciplinary Committee ·of a
State Bar Council, if it does not summarily-reject the complaint, D
shall fix a date for the hearing of the case and shall cause a notice
thereof to be given to the advocate concerned and to the Advocate
· Gen~ral of the State. The Disciplinary Committee of a State Bar
Council after giving the advocate concerned and the Advocate
General an opportunity of being heard, may dismiss the complaint
0r reprimand the advocate, suspend the advocate from practice for
.such period as it may deem fit, or remove the name of the advocate E
from the State ron of advocates. Where any notice is issued to
the Advocate General, the Advocate General may appear before
the Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council either in
person or through any advocate appearing on his behalf. These
provisions establish first that the Advocate General is entitled to
a notice of the date of hearing, secondly, that no order can be F
made by the Disciplinary Committee without giving an opportunity to the Advocate General of being heard, and, thirdly, that the
Advocate General may appear in person or through any advocate. It cannot be said that the Advocate General is appearing as
a friend of the Court The right of the Advocate General to
appear is based on statute. The word 'may' is used to indicate G
the choice of the Advocate General to appear in person or through
any advocate. He may choose not to appear at all. But when
the Advocate General does appear, he does so by virtue of the
statutory rights and powers conf7rred on him. It .is, . therefore,
necessary to know as to why notice under the Act 1s g1ven to the
Advocate General and why he is to be heard before an order is
H
made by the Disciplinary Committee.
The Judicial Committee in the Gambian case found that the
-name of N'Jie was struck off the roll of barristers and solic;ters of
A, P. GANDHI V, H. M. SEERVAI (Ray, J.)
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the Supreme Couri: of Gambia by
order of Abbott, J., Deputy
Judge of the Supreme Court in th~ Colony of· Gambia~ The
Deputy Judge had jurisdiction to represent the Chief Justice in the
exercise of his judicial powers. The power to strike the name of
the legal practitioner off the roll was held by the Judicial Committee not to be a judicial power but an administrative one of the
B Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Gambia. Therefore, the
order of Abbott, J. was without jurisdiction. The West African
Court of Appeal undet those Circumstances set aside the ord~r of
Abbott, J. The Attorney General of Gambia thereupon preferred
an appeal to the JudiciaL Committee. An appeal to the Privy
Council lay under section 31 of the West African (Appeal to
Council) Order in Council, 1949. Broadly stated. the proc Priv¥
vision was to the effect that any person aggrieved by any judgmeqt of the Court could prefer an appeal to His Majesty. The
Judicial Commlttee construed the words 'person aggrieved' occurring in ·section 31 of the West African Order in Council. 1949
•,
not to be subjected to a restrictive interpretation but to include a
person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been
D· made which prejudicially affected his interest. The Attorney Gene-'
ral of Gambia was found to have sufficient interest for the purpose
and the interest was held to be a public one which the Attorney
General represented. The Judicial Committee also said that ]f
the Judge found the practitioner guilty of misconduct and the
West African Court of Appeal of Gambia reversed the decision
which
went to the jurisdiction of the Judge. or was otherwise ~l
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point in which public interest was concerned, the Attorney General would be a person aggrieved by the decision. The Judicial
Committee construed the words 'person aggrieved' to include the
Attorney General of Gambia as representing the public interest.
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The 111ost sigrificant feature in sections 35 and 36 of the Act
is that the Disciplinary Committee does not either give any notice
to o.r hear the complainant. On the contrary notice is given under
sectton 36 to the Attorney General and under section 35 to the
Adovcate General. The Disciplinary Committee without giving
the Attorney General in one case and the Advocate General in
another case an opportunity of being heard cannot pass any order
against the Advocate concerned.. The Attorney General under
Article 76 of the Co.nstitution and the Advocate General under
Arti.;le 165 of the Constitution have to discharge the functions
conferred on them by or under the Constitution or any 0ther law
for the time being in force. The Advocates Act concerns the
Advocate and it is in the fitness of things that the Attorney General
and the Advocate General uf a State are heard as persons representing the profession which assists the litigant public and the
courts in the administration of justice. The Attorney General
and the Advocates General of States are persons of high standing
928
SUPREME. COURT REPORTS
[1971] 1 S.C.R.
and with long experience in the profession and it is indisputable
that they will ever adopt any partisan attitude in proceedings
before the Disciplinary Committee. The Advocates Act gives
special pre-eminence to the Attorney General and the Advocate
General in disciplinary proceedings because it is not an attempt
of the Disciplinary Committee to redress the grievance of an individual complainant but to find out whether there is any breach of
professional standard and conduct. The high tradition, dignity
and purity of the Bar is to be maintained. The Attorney General
and the Advocate General are heard because they are heads of
their respective Bar and the proceedings affect discipline and dignity of the Bar and touch the professional conduct of an Advocate.
They are not parties to a 'lis'. They have no personal or pecuniary or proprietary interest in the matter. It is manifest that their
locus standi and interest is based on professional code of conduct
and for the purpose of upholding the purity of the Bar and preservation of correct standards and norms in the profession. The
Attorney General and the Advocates General will uphold the professional discipline, dignity and decorum and that is why no order
is made by the Disciplinary Committee without giving them an
opportunity of being heard.
The issue before the Disciplinary Committee is whether there
has been professional misconduct and the question has to be looked
at purely from the point of view of profession. The profession
touches the public on the one hand and the courts on the other.
On no other basis could the presence of the Advocate Gen~ral be
explained.
In a recent decision of this Court in B. M. Madnani v. Commissioner of Workmen's Compensation, Bombay(!) the Commissioner of Workmen's Compensation preferred an appeal for enhancement of penalties against the Advocate concerned. This
Court held that the Coniinissioner was entitled to maintain the
appeal as a person aggrieved. Mr. Daphtary at one stage contended that a complainant would not be a person aggrieved within
the meaning of the relevant section ot the Advocates Act to prefer
an appeal. The decision of this Court repels that submission.
It may not be out of place to notice that the Act uses the
words 'person aggrieved' and not the words 'party aggrieved'.
First in disciplinary proceedings there is no party. It is a matter
touching the professional conduct of the Advocate. The enquiry
is by the Disciplinary Committee. The Advocate is heard. The
Attorney General in one case and the Advor:ates General in other
cases are heard. They are heard not because they are parties but
hecause they represent the interest of the profession. They represent the standards to be maintained in the profession. Suppos,e.
(1) C.A. No. 877 of 1968 dec'ded on October 10, !96R.
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_the Disciplinary-Committee held proceedings without giviug notice
to the A~vocate General or made an order without giving the:
Advocate General an opportunity of being heard. In either casethe Advocate General would be a person aggrieved. Would theparticipation by the Advocate General in the proceedings before _
the DiscipJinary Committee alter the position ? Neither on logic8 nor on principle could it be said that the Attorney General and
the Advocates General who have the right to be heard could bot
be persons aggrieved by the decision. If they have the rifbt to be-heard they may l~ave grievance as to the result of the heanng.
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The Attorney General and the Advocates General rer.eivenotice and are entitled to be heard by virtue of the provisions in
the statute. They are perlonmng statutory duties. They are not
contemplated in the statute as ordinary counsel. It was not the:
intention of the statute that they would be merely neutral observers before the Di~cipJinacy Committee a'nd they would have n()
duty to perform. They would have to express their views one
way or the other. It is true that they would be completely free
from personal favour or disfavour in these matters 1ouching theprofessional conduct. Their presence before the Disciplinary
Committee is explicable only on the ground of adherinz. to
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correct professional code. It would therefore be open to the
Attorney General and the Advocate General to take the view -that
in a matter of sufficient gravity a completely inadequate punishment would not be in public interest of the profession. Similarly,
if the punishment is severe in a case which did not merit such:
action, the Attorney General and the Advocate General would be
persons aggrieved to have it ~orrected.
To accede to the contention of Mr. Daphtary that the words:
'person aggrieved' refer only to Advocates would be misreading
the provisions. The words 'person aggrieved' will be referable f(}
the Advocate ·concerr.ed, the complainant and the Attorney General or the Advocate General as the case may be. The Attorney
General and the Advocate General will be persons aigrieved'
because they are interested in maintaining the professional rectitude. The Attorney General and the Advocate General have the
right of pre·audience. Such right determines that they are leaders of the profession in their respective fields. They will ask for
maintaining the proper standards of professional ethics. It is
from that point of view that the Actornev General and the Advo·cate General will be aggrieved persons when they will fin<Pthat theinterest of the Bar, the public interest have not been properly
safeguarded by decisions of the Disciplinary Committee of the· Bar
Council.
·
169 Su'p CI/{P)·71-15
930
StJPREME COURT REPORTS
[1971 j 1 S.C.R.
For these reasons I am ·of opinion that the Advocate General
of the State of Maharashtra is competent to appeal as a person
aggrieved under section 37 of the Advocates Act, 1961.
A
ORDER
In accordance with the opinion of the majority, the appeal is
allowed and the order of the Bar Council of India is set aside.
There shall be no order as to costs.
V.P.S. ·
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