TWYFORD TEA CO. LTD. AND ANOTHER versus THE STATE OF KERALA AND ANOTHER
Supreme Court of India | Decided 15 January 1970 | [1970] 3 S.C.R. 383 | 1970 INSC 2
Key facts
- Decided
- 15 January 1970
- Bench
- M. HIDAYATULLAH*, J.M. SHELAT, C.A. VAIDYIALINGAM, A.N. GROVER, A.N. RAY
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 135/1969
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1970] 3 S.C.R. 383
- Neutral citation
- 1970 INSC 2
Text of the judgment
383
A
TWYFORD TEA CO. LTD. AND ANOTHER
v.
THE STATE OF KERALA AND ANOTHER
January 15, 1970
B
[M. HIDAYATULLAH, C. J., J. M. SHELAT, C. A. VAIDIALINGAM,
A. N. GROVER AND A. N. RAY, JJ.]
c
D
Kerala Plantation (Additional Tax) Act, 1960 (Ac! 17 of 1960) and
the Kerala Plantation (Additional Tax) Amendment Act 1961 (Act 19 of
1967) ,s. 3-Con.rtitution aJ India, Art. 14--Charge of unlfotm tax from
plantauons alleged to be differently situated-Validity of tax-C~mpetency
<>f Kerala legislature to levy land tax in absence of enabling entries in
· S.venth Schedule, Constitution of India.
In the Kerala Plantation (Additional Tax) Act 1960 (Act 17 of
1960) there is a levy of additional tax on plantations. "Plantations" mean
land used for growing cocoanut, Arecanut, Rubber, Coffee, Tea, Cardamom and Pepper. Under s . 3 of the Act, for each financial year a
plantation tax additional to the basic tax charged on land tax under the
Land Tax Act 1955 is payable at the rate mentioned in Schedule I of
the Act, the said rate being Rs. 8 per acre. Plantations of 5 acres or
below held by a person do not attract tax. For the purpose of finding
oot the extent ot the plantation in acres held by a person a method of ,
calculation is laid down in Schedule II. Act 17 of 1960 was amended
by the Kerala Plantation (Additional Tax) Amendment Act 1967 (Act.
19 of 1%7). By the amending Act the word 'additional' is removed from
all places and it is declared that the tax is additional to land revenue or
any tax in lieu thereof, if any, payable in respect of such land. The
unit of assessment is charged from acre to hectare, and the rate of tax
in ·Schedule I is raised to Rs. 50/· per hectare. The tax is payable in respect of plantations of two hectares or· more with an exemption ior the
lirst hectare. According to the new Schedule II the extent of the planta-
tion for the purpose of tax in the case Of cocoanut, arecanut, rubber, coffee
and pepper plantations is arrived at by dividing the total number of trees,
plants or vines standing thereon by a number, specified in each
case. In the case of tea and cardamom the extent of the plantation is the
extent of lands on which these plants are grown and have begun to yield
crops.
The petitioner cOmpany was incorporated in India and the majority
of its share-holders were Indians. It owned a tea estate in the Kuttikenam
area .in the Peermade Hills in Kerala State. The company paid without
G protest the additional tax levied on plantation by Act 17 of 1960. When
the rate became heavier as a result of th'l amendments made by Act 19 of
1967 the company field the present petitions under Art 32 of the Const:tution. The challenge was based mainly on Art. 14 of the Constiut·
lion. It was urged that there were differences of 'fertility and rainfall
in the different areas where the plantations were situated. Fiqurcs compiled by the Tea Board. were submitted to show the difference in yield between different estates. Relying on Moopi/ Nair'•<:ase it was argued that the
H uniform tax ·on·unequals resulted in discrimination (a) as between the tea
plantations themselves and .(b) as between <lifferent kinds of plantations.
. The competence of the Kerala Legislature to Ievr a land tax was also
challenged.
F
384
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970) 3 S.C.Jt
HELD: Per Hidayatullah, G J., and Vaidialingam and Ray, IJ.-The
pe.titions must be dismissed.
·
·
( i) The legislature has ·a wide range of selection and freedom in
appraisal not only in the objects of taxation and the manner of taxation
but also in the determination of the rate or rates applicable. If productian were always to be taken into account there will have to. be a settlement for every year and the tax will become a kind of income-tax.
Tl~e burden of proving discrimination is· alwaYs heavy
A
B
and heavier
still when a taxing statute is under attack. The burden is on the person
compJainipg Of .discrimination. The burden i.s proving not possible 1inequality' 'but hostile 'unequal' treatment. This is more so when uniform
taxes are levied. The State cannot be asked to demonstrate equality.
Simply stated the law is this : Difference in treatment must be capable
0f being reasonably explained in the light of the object for which the
particular legislation is undertaken. This must be based on some reasonaple distinction between the cases differentially treated. When differential
treatment is not reasonably explained and justified the treatment is discriminatory. If different subjects are equally treated there must be some basis
on which the differences have been equalised, otherwise discrimination
will be found. To be able to succee.I in a charge of discrimination, a
person must establish conclusively that persons equally circumstanced
have been treated unequally and vice versa. [393 C-D, H; 394 E-0)
,
D
(ii) Applying the above principles the impugned law does not single
out any particular plantation for hostile or unequal treatment. The Legislature thinks that Rs. 50 per hectare in the case of cardamom and tea is
reasonable levy and this is equal to other plantations, where the crop
yielding plants and trees have to be converted into hectares aa:ording to
a formula, It is obvious that the legislature has made an attempt at
equalisation o'f tax burden for different plantations. [395 CJ
E
In Moopi/ Nair's case this Court considered the tax therein impugned
to be discriminatory because it paid no heed to quality or' productive
capacity of land and the tax was also held to be confiscatory since owners
of unproductive land were liable to be eliminated by slow degrees. The
present was however not a case where barren lands have been subjected
to equal tax with productive lands. The tax is only levied on crop yielding
land. In some cases where the crop may be scattered over a wide area,
there is an elaborate. mechahism to determine .the extent of the crop yielding plantation. [389 E-F, 391 Fj
c
F
As between different tea gardens it was not possible to say that the
difference in yield was entirely due to natural circumstances and no other
cause.
lt may be conceded that a uniform tax falls more heavily on some
plantations than on others because the profits are widely discrepent.
But that by itself cannot involve discrimination, for then hardly any tax
direct or indirect would escape the same sensure. The rich and the poor
pay the same taxes irrespective of their incomes in many instances such
as the sales-tax and profession tax etc. [389 H-390 BJ
.
Kunnathat Thathunni Moopil Nair v. The State of Kera/a, [1961) 3
S .C.R. 77, State of Andhra Pradesh v. Nal/a Raja Reddy, [1967) 3 S.Cll.
28, New Mank Chowk Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. Municipal
Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad, [1967) 2 S.C.R. 679 and The
State of Kera/a v. Haji K. Haji K. Kutty Naha A.LR. 1969 S.C. 378,
distinguished.
H
TWYFORD TEA CO. V. KBRALA
A
II
c
385
Shri Rilm Krishna Da/mia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendo/kar and Others,
[1959] S.C.R. 279, East Indian Tobacco Co. v. SDate of Andhra Pradesh,
[1963] I S.C.R. 404 and Khandige Sham Bhat and Others v. The Agricultural Income Tax Officer, [1963] 3 S.C.R. 809, applied.
Thuttampilra Planting Co. v. Tahsildar, Chittur, 1964 Kera/a LT. 47,
Essa Ismail and another v. State of Kerala and others, l.L.R. (1965)
Kerala 619 and States in Madden v. Kentucky, (1940) 309 U.S. 83; 84
L.Ed. 590, referred to.
(iii) Immediately after the Travancore-Cochin Land Tax Act, 1955 as
amended by the Travancore-Cochin Land Tax Act 10 of !957 was declared
invalid by this Court in Moopil Nair's case, the Kerala Land Tax Act
1961 was passed following an ordinance. That Act was included in the
9th Schedule (o the Constitution at No. 38 and received the protection
of Art. 31-B. The competency of the Kerala 'Legislature to imp.>se land
tax was therefore no longer open to dispute.
Per Shela! and Grover, JJ. (dissenting) .--The petitions must be allowed.
D
Like MOOPil Nair's case the present case also was one where inequality
emerged as a result of imposing an ad hoc tax uniformly levied without
making any rational or intelligible classification. There is no indication in
the Act and none was sought to be shown as to how and on what basis
the uniform rate of Rs. 50 per hectare was fixed and whether it had any
re!ference to the productive capacity of the lands. [406 D-FJ
. As regards tea plantations, the tax is uniformly levied merely on the
footing of the land being used for growing tea, witiJsut any regard to
its potentiality, situation, the kind of tea which can s,ititably be grown
E
at a particular place, its geographical and other features etc. No doubt,
the State in exercise. of the taxing power can select persons and objects
for taxation but if it is found that within the range" of that selection the
law operates unequally by reaJ;on either of classification or its absence,
such a provision would be hit by the equality clause of Art. 14. [408 DJ
Even among the selected plantations inequality a.s a result of uniformity of tax must result because it is possible that the user of the land
for one specified purpose may give a better and a more valuable yield
than the user of another land though situated in the same area for another
F
specified purpose. This had happened in the case of tea plantation with
which alone the present petitions were concerned.
Therefore to the ex.tent
that Act 17 of 1960 as amended by Act 19 of 1967 imposes the tax on
holdings of tea plantations, it is violative of Art. 14 and therefore void.
i408 D-F]
Moopil Nair's case applied.
G
Case-Jaw referred to.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION:
Writ Petitions
Nos. 135-137
of
196</.
Petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of the fundamental rights.
H
M. C. Seta/vad, Joy 1oseph, B. Datta, J. B. Dadachan;t,
0. C, Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the petitioriers.
Sarjoo Prasad and M. R. K. Pillai, for respondent No. 1.
386
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970] 3 S.C.R.
The Judgment of M. H!DAYATULLAH, C.J., C. A. VA!DIALINGAM
and A. N. RAY, JJ. was delivered by HIDAYATULLAH, C.J. Dissenting Opinion ·of J. M. SHEMT and A. N. GROVER, JJ, was
.delivered by SHELAT, J.
Hidayatullah, C.J. These are three petitions by Twyford Tea
Company and one of its directors under Art. 32 of the Constitution seeking appropriate writ, order or direction to declare the
Kerala Plantation (Additional Tax) Act, 1960 (Act XVII of
1960) and the Kerala Plantation (Additional Tax) Amendment
Act, 1967 (Act XIX of 1967) unconstitutional and void. In
addition the petitioners ask that the notices annexures B, C and D
demanding payment of the tax be also quashed and.a sum of
Rs. 1,02, 106.02 already paid as tax to the Kerala Government be
ordered to be re-funded. They further seek a mandamus restraining ·the State of Kerala and Tehsildar Peermade from using the
two Acts against the petitioners.
A
B
c
The petitioner company is incorporated in India and the majo-.
rity of its shareholders are Indians. It owns a tea estate in
Kuttikanam area in the Peermade hiils in Kerala State. The D
estate consists of 1006 hectares equal to 2486 acres of which 491
hectares equal to 1214 acres are tea plantations. According to
the petitioners Peermade hills are in the Western Ghats and are
divided into two main parts. Kuttikanam area roughly 33 sq.
miles is situated at an altitude of 3400 to 3700 ft. and receives
150 to 200 inches of rainfalJ annually. The Periyar valley afe1\ E
rouj!hly 60 sq. miles is situated at an altitude of 2800 to 3200 ft.
and receives 100 to 150 inches rainfall annually. The Periyar
valley ar.ea is more fertile than the Kuttikanam area. Accordin;;
to the petitioners' statement M/ s. Parkins Private Ltd., are the
Managing Agents of Twyford Tea Company and also the Hai!eyburia Tea Estate. The former is in Kuttikanam and the latter in
Periyar area. The extent of produce from these two areas is very F
different. Between the years 1963 to 1967 Twyford Tea Company produced 959 to 1211 kgs. per hectare while Haileyburia
produced 1461 to 184.5 kgs. per hectare. The other tea-estates
disclosed the same differences in production. -Examples are given
of Penshurat, Karimtharuvi·estates under the same management
and of Stagbrook and Cheenthalaar and other estates. The Twy- G
ford Tea Company's net profits have declined from Rs. 2.28,222
(1963) to Rs. 59,938 (1967). The net profits of Twyford Tea
Company after taxation per hectare rnnged from Rs. J 22.00
( 1967) to Rs. 465.00 (! 963) with loss in i 966, while the profits
of Heilcyburia ranged from Rs. 909.00 (1963) to Rs. 770.00
( 1967) with Rs. 245.00 in 1966: This difference is attributed to
the differences in fertility between the Kuttikanam and Pariyar H
areas. The petitioners state that similar differences exist in the
Vandiperiyar and Nelliampathy areas. The petitioners point ont
TWYFORD TEA co. v. KERALA
A
c
D
(Hidayatul/ah, C.J.)
38 7
that for purposes of excise duty these areas have been formed inio
different zones and different rates of excise duty are leviable in
these zones.
The two statutes which are impugned here imposed a 1ax on
plantations. In the Act XVII of 1960 there is a levy of "additional tax" on plantations. The Act came into force on April I.
1960. "Plantations" mean land used for growing seven kinds of
crops. They are ( 1) Cocoanut, (2) Arecanut, (3) Rubber, (4 l
Coffee, ( 5) Tea, (6) Cardamom and (7) Pepper. Section 3 of
Act XVII of 1960 is the charging section. Under that section for
each financial year a µlantation tax additional to the basic ta'
char~ed as land tax under the Land Tax Act, 1955 is payable 8i
the rate mentioned in Schedule I of the Act. This Schedule
,rates that no tax is payable if the aggregate extent of plantations
held by a person is below five acres. But if the plantations held by
a person is 5 acres or more, a tax of Rs. 8/- per acre is payable
with exemption for the first two acres. For purposes of finding
out the extent of the plantations in acres held by a person a method
of calculation is added in Schedule II. It is not necessary to quote
this schedule because it has been·amended by Act XIX of 1967
anil. that schedule will be quoted presently. By the Amended Act
the name of the tax is changed. The word "additional" is re. moved in all places and it is declared that the tax is additional to
land revenue or any tax in lieu thereof, if any, payable in respect
of such land. The rate of tax is altered in Schedule I to Rs. 50/per hectare which is payable in respect of plantations of two hectares or more with an exemption for the first hectare. The method
of calculation of the extent of plantation in hectares is restated in
Schedule IT as follows :
·
"Schedule II
For the purpose' of the assessment of plantation tax
payable by a person, the extent of plantatioris held by
him shall be deemed to be the aggregate of the following,
expressed in hectares. namely : (i) the quotient obtained by dividing the total number of bearing cocoanut trees standing on all lands held
by him by 200; ·
(ii) the quotient obtained by dividing the total number of bearing arecanut trees standing on all lands held
by him by 1500;
(iii) the quotient obtained by dividing the total
number of yield in rubber plants standing on all lands
held by him by 450:
(iv) the quotient obtained by dividing the total number of yielding coffee plants standing on all lands held
bv him bv 1500:
388
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970] 3 S.C.R.
( v) the quotient obtained by dividing the total number of yielding pepper vines standing on all lands held
by him by 1000;
A
(vi) the e)itent of lands on which tea plants . are
grown which have begun to yield crops;
(vii) the extent of lands on which cardamom plants
are grown which have begun to yield crops;
Provided that where the total extent of land· held by
a person, which is cultivated with the aforesaid crops, is
less than the aggregate calculated as above, the actual
extent alone shall be deemed tio be the extent of plantations held by him."
The petitioners paid tax under the old Act without objection.
They state that they did so without realising · their rights. Thev
were issued three demands for the assessments years 1960-61 to
1968. They had already paid between April 10, 1961 and October 18, 1968 a sum of Rs. 1,02,106.02. It is because of this
.additional demand arising from the increase in the rate of rnx
from.Rs. 8/- per acre or Rs. 20/- per hectare to Rs. 50/- per hectare that they have challenged the constitutionality of the two
Acts.
B
c
D
The contention of the petitioners is that there is no rational
classification of plantations; that unequals have been treated as
E
equal and that a flat rate imposed upon all the plantations irrespective of their yield is arbitrary. According to them some of the
plantations cannot make enough profit to be able to pay tax and
in their case the tax became confiscatory. They also complain of
discrimination and question the legislative competency of the
Kerala Legislature to impose plantation tax in the absence of a
specific entry in,the 7th Schedule to the Constitution either in List F
II or III enabling the State Legislature to impose it. · They also
say:,that the land tax imposed under the Land Tax Act was successfully challenged before this Court in Kunnathat Thathunni Moopi/
Nair v. The State of Kera/a and anolher( 1 ) and the change making
it additional land revenue impClS"..d an obligation upon the State
"Legislature to make assessment on the basis of the produce from G
the land in much the same way as land revenue is calculated after
taking into account the fertility of the soil, its yield and such other
factors.
Stated simply there are tliree CQ!ltentions. ·Tue first is that the
State Legislature lacks comoetence to imp<>se this tax and even if
it did have the competence it has followed a wrong method in im-posin11: .addiiional land revenue without effecting proper settle'(1) (1961) 3 S.C.R. 77.
H
TWYFORD TEA co. v. KERALA
A
B
c
D
E
F
(Hidayatul/ah, C.J.)
389
menL The next contention is that the Act is discriminatory in that
it takes no account of differences in situation, fertility and yield
between the plantations belonging to the same category. Lastly
it is contended that it is discriminatory inasmuch as it seeks to
treat plantations of different kinds as if they were equal in all respects by reducing them to a common measure of hectares when it
is not possible to do so regard being had to the different incomes
derived from th.~se plantations. We shall take up these questions
one by one.
The first question is of the competence of the State Legislature. There is no specific entry in the legislative Lists, Nos. 2 and
3 in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The Land Tax
Act 1955, as amended by the Travancore-Ccchin Land T;ix
(Amendment) Act, X of 1957, was declared unconstitutional in
its operative sections in K. T. Moopi/ Nair's( 1 ) case. Immediately
afterwards the Kerala Land Tax Act, 196 l was passed following
an Ordinance and that Act is now included in the 9th Schedule to
the Cc~titution at No. 38 and receives the protection of Art. 31-B.
The competency to impose land tax thus is no longer open to dispute. The present Act is challenged on the same lines as the
former Act and the argument is rested upon the principles accepted
in K. T. Moopil Nair's(') case. It is, therefore, necessary to recall
what was decided there. Under the Land Tax Act, 1955 all
lainds of whatever description and · held under whatever tenure
were to be charged and levied a uniform tax per acre. known
as· the basic tax. Section 7 of the Act, however, conferred a
power on Government to exempt wholly or in part any land.
This Court considered the tax to be discriminatory because
it paid no heed to quality or productive capacity of land
and the tax was also Jield to be confiscatory since owners of unproductive land were liable to be eliminated by slow stages. The
power of exemption was also considered unreasonable because it
enabled Government to pick and choose lands arbitrarily for grnnt
of exemption. The Jack of classification was considered to cr~at~
inequality. Sarkar, J. who dissented held that there was an attempt
at classification according to areas, and the tax was levied because
land in the State was held. and not because of its productivity.
G
H
In dealing with this case the arguments have been moulded
round the observations in that case. In support of his contention
that yield of tea varies from estate to estate and district to district
(of which figures are already quoted in the petition) The Tea Statistics (1967-68) compiled by the Tea Board of India were also
cited. It is hardly necessary to refer to the findings of the Tea
Board because it may be assumed without discu~sion that there are
differences. It may also be conceded that the uniform tax falls
(1) [t961! 3 S.C.R. 77.
L7Sup./70-t0
390
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970] 3 S.C.R.
more heavily on some plantations than on others because the profits are widely discrepant. But does that involve a discrimination?
If the answer be in the affirmative hardly. any tax direct or indirect
would ·escape the same censure for taxes touch purses of different
lengths and the very uniformity of the tax and its equal treatment
would become its undoing. The rich and the poor pay the same
taxes irrespective of their incomes in many i11stances such as the
sales-tax and the profession tax etc. It may be remembered that
in K. T. Moopil Nair's(') case the majority accepted the observations of S. R. Das C.J. in Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice
S. R. Tendolkar and others(') at page 299 to the following
effect :
"A statute may not make any classification of the
persons or things for the purpose of a]Jplying its provisions but may leave it to the discretion of the Government to select and classify persons or things to whom its
provisions ail! to apply. In determining the question of
the validity or otherwise of such a statute the Court will
not strike down the law out of hand only because no
classification appears on its face or because a discretion
is given to the Government to make the selection or
classification but will go on to examine and ascertain
if the statute has laid down any principle or policy for
the guidance of the exercise of discretion by the Government in the matter of the selection· or classification.
After such scrutiny the Court will strike down the
statute if it does not lay down any principle or policy for
~uiding the exercise of discretion by the Government in
the matter of selection or classification, on the ground
that the statute provides for the delegation of arbitrary
and uncontrolled power to the Government so as to enable it to discriminate between persons or things similarly situate and that; therefore, the discrimination is inherent in the statute itself."
B
c
D
It
F
We have always to see what the statute does to make for equality
of tr.~atment.
The contention here is that there is a uniform rate of tax per
hectare which every owner of a named plantation has to pay irrespective of the extent or value of the produce and, therefore, the
law imposes a uniform tax burden on unequals. In our opini<Jitl
this is a wrong way to look at the provisions of the Act.
The Act, no doubt, deals with seven different kinds of plantations and imposes a uniform rate of Rs. 50/- per hectare but it
Jays down principles on which equal treatment is ensured. In the
(1) [1961] 3 S.C.R. 77.
(21 [19591 S.C.R. 279.
G
Ill
'
TWYFORD TEA co.
A
B
c
D
r
G
H
v. KERALA (Hidayatullah, C.J.)
39 I
case cf cocoanut, arecanut, rubber, coffee and pepper plantations,
plants capable of yielding produce are to be counted and then the
hectares are determined by dividing the total number of plants by
a certain figure. This is intended to equalise the auferent plantations for puri::oses of taxability. In the remaining two cases the
extent cf land yielding crop is itself taken as the measure for the
tax because it is considered fair and just to treat one actual hectare
of crop yielding plantation as equal to the other areas converted
into hectares on the basis of the number of plants or trees. Differences in yield between one plantation and another having the same
crop, no doubt, arise from situation. altitude and rainfall but they
are not the only factors. Otherwise how is it that the same areas
give different yield in different years. The respondents have given
the figures of yield of Glemmari estate contiguous to Twyford
estate. The produce in that estate ranges from 1427 to 1571 kilograms per hectare which is almost equal to the estates in Periyar
area. The yield of Cardamom also varies similarly. ln the Highland Produce Co. Ltd. the per acre yield varied from 5770 lbs. in
1965 to 26,890 lbs. in 1962. In 1961 the per acre yield was
91 lbs. and in 1962, 254 lbs. It is obvious that there are circumstances other than situation, rainfall etc. which have made the yield
almost 2t times as much.
The legislature thinks that Rs. 50/- per hectare in the case of
Cardamom and Tea is reasonable levy and this is equal to other
plantations, where the crop yielding plants and trees have to be
converted into hectares according to a formula. It is obvious that
the legislature has made an attempt at equalisation of tax burden
for different plantations. This is not a case where barren lands
have been subjected to equal tax with productive lands. The tax
is only b·;ed on crop yielding land. In some cases where the crop
may be scattered over a wide area, there is an elaborate mechanism
to determine the extent of the crop yielding plantation. The differences which have been pointed out may be the result of some
fortuitous circumstance and even bad husbandry. The Court cannot regard the la,·; to be discriminatory on the evidence produced
in the case.
Before we state the principles on which we have proceeded we
may refer to a few cases which were also brought to our notice. In
State of Andhra Pradesh & Another v. Na/la Raja Reddv &
Ors. ( 1 ) the Andhra Pradesh Land Revenue (Additional Assessment) and Cess Revision Act (22 of 1962) was held to offend
Art. 14. That -Act was pa~sed to brin1r uniformity in assessment
of Land Revenue in the Telengana and Andhra areas of the State
of Andhra Pradesh. An additional as,essment at the rate of
75% of ·the yearly assessment was impcsed on dry land and the
-·
(I) 11967] 3 S.C.R. 2P.
392
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(l970J 3 S.C.R.
total assessment was not to be less than 50 n.p. per acre. On wet
lands the additional assessment was to b.e 100% for lands irrigated
from a Government source and 50% in the case of other wet lands
and a minimum total .rl.emand was also p1escribed. This Act was
considered to be discriminatory as the minimum )lad no relatiQn
to the fertility of land, there was no relationship between the Jami
and the ayacut to which it belonged and the procedure for determining the applicable rat~ was arbitra1y. This Court examined
the matter critically and came to the conclusion that the assessmelll
. was left to the arbitrary discretion of an officer without any oppm~
tunity to question his findings. This Court compared the procedure for assessment at proper settlements and found that 1(,hose
equitable and reasonable methods of assessment were a'baindohlid·
That case is peculia~ to itself and cannot b.~ called in aid sine~ in
this case there is a reasonable attempt to make the burden equal.
Two. other cases were referred to but they bear upon different
topic. Jn New Manek Chowk Spinning and Weaving Mills Co.
Ltd. and others v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and others(') and The. State of Kera/a v. Haji K. Haji' K.
Kutty Naha and others(') the question was one of rating. · The
proposition laid down was that taking only the floor area of · a
building as the basis for determination of the tax was an arbitrary
method when buildings must have different rental values depending upon the nature of the construction, the kind of buildings and
the purpose for which they can be used. These were held· vital
c.onsiderations in the rating of buildings and could not be ignored.
These cases were decided on different principles and no analogy
can be found merely because equal tax was · imposed in diverse
conditions.
As against these cases the otherside relies upon Thuttampara
Planting Co. v. Tehsiidar, Chittur(") and. E;rsa Ismail and .another v. State of Kera/a and others('),· '\l'he~ this tax was upheld.
in the second of these cases it was hela that the tax was aot related
to the productivity of the land but tO its user and the method of
·calculation was found to be fair and equitable.
··
We may now state the principles on .which the present .case
must be decided. These principles have been. stated earlier but
are often ignored when the question of the application of Art . .14
arises. One principle on which our Courts (as indeed the Supreme Court in the United States) have always acted, is nowhere
better stated then by Willis in his "Constitutional Law" page 587.
This is how he put it:
"A State does not have to tax everyihing in order to
tax something. It is allowed to pick and choose dis(l) [1967] 2 S.C.R. 679.
(3) [1964] l<erala L.T. 47.
(2) A.LR. 1969 S.C. 378.
(4) l.L.R. [1965] Kerala 619.
A
8
c
[[)
E
G
TWYFORD TEA co.
II,
v. KERALA (Hidayatullah, C.J.)
393
tricts. objects, persons, methods and even rates for taxation if it does so reasonably. . . . • . The Supreme Court
has been practical and has permitted a very wide latitude in classification for taxation."
B
c
D
This principle was approved by this Court in East Indian Tobacco
Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh(') at page 409. Applying it, the
Court cbserved :
"If a State can validly pick and chcose one commodity for taxation and that is not open to attack under
Art. 14, the same r~sult must follow when th~ St1•.e picks
out cne cateim1y of goods and sub.iects it to taxation."
This indicates a wide range of selection and freedcm in appraisal
not only in the objects of 1axation and the manner c.'. taxation but
also in the determination of the rate or rates applicable. If producticn must alwavs be taken into account there will have to be
a settlement for every year and the tax would become a kind of
income-tax.
The next principle. is that th.e burden of proving discrimination
is always heavy and heavier stili when a taxing statute is under
attack. This was also observed in the same case of this Court at
page 411 approving the dictum of the Supreme Court of the
United States in Madden v. Kentucky(') :
E
"In taxation even more than in other fields, Legislafures pmsess the greate>t fr.eedom in classification. The
burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivab_le basis which might
support it.''
F
As Rcttschaefer said in his Constitutional Law at p. 668 :
G
'"A statute providing for the assessment of one type
of intangible at its actual value while other intangibles
are assessed at their face value does not deny equal pro1ec1ion even when both are subject to the same rate of
tax. The decisions of the Supreme Court in this field
have permitted a State Legislature to exercise an exlremely wide discretion in classifying property for tax
purposes so long as ii refrained from clear and hostile
discrimination against particular persons or classes."
(Emphasis added).
H
The burden is on a person complaining of discrimination. The
burden is provinl! not possible 'inequality' but hostile "unequal"
treatment. This is more so when uniform taxes are levied. It is
(1) \19631 IS.C.R. 404.
(2) (1940) 309 U.S. 83;84 L.Ed. 590.
394
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970]"3 S.C.R
not proved to us how the different plantations can be said to be
'hostilely or unequally' treated. A uniform wheel tax on cars
does not take into account the value of the car, the mileage it
runs, or in the case of taxis, the profits it makes and the miles per
gallon it delivers. An Ambassador taxi and a Fiat taxi give dilierent outturns in terms of money and mileage. Cinemas pay the.
same show fee. We do not take a doctrinaire view of equality.
The Legislature has obviously thought of equalising the tax
through a method which is inherent in the tax scheme. Nothing
has been said to show that there is inequality much less 'hostile
treatment'. All that is said is that the state must demonstrate
equality. That is not the approach. At this rate nothing can ever
be proved to be equal to another.
There is no basis even for counting one tree as equal to another.
Even in a thirty years' settlement. the picture may change the very
next year for some reason but the tax as laid continues. Siwai
income is brought to land ievenue on the basis of number of tre.~s
but not on the basis of the produce. This is worked out on an
average income per tree and not on the basis of the yield of any
particular tree er trees.
What is meant by th.~ power to classify without unreasonably
discriminating between persons similarly situated, has been stated
in several other cases of this Court. The same applies when the
legislature reasonably applies a uniform rate after equalising
matters between diversely situated i>~rsons. Simply stated the
Jaw is this: Differences in treatment must be capable c~ being
reasonably explained in th.: iight of the object for ~hich the
particular legislation is undertaken. This must be based on some
reasonable distinction between the cases differentially treated.
When differential treatment is not reasonably explained and
justified the treatment is discriminatory. If different subjects are
equally treated there must be some basis on which the differences
have been equalised otherwise discrimination will be found. To
be able to succeed in the charge of discrimination. a person must
establish conclusively that persons equally circumstanced have
been treated unequally and vice versa. However. in Khandige
Sham Bhat and others v. The Agric11/t11ral Income Tax Officer.
at page 817 it was observed :
"If there is equality and uniformity within each
group. the Jaw will not be condemned as discriminative
though due to some fortuitous circumstance arising out
of a peculiar situation some included in a class get an advantage over others. so long as they are not singled out
for special treatment. Taxation Jaw is not an exception to this doctrine: vide Purshottam Govindji Ha/ai
---------
(I) [1963] J S.C.R. 800.
A
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D
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HI
TWYFORD TEA co.
B
v. KERALA (She/at, I.)
395
v. Shree B. N. Desai, Additional Collector of Bombay(')
and Kunnathat Thatunni Moopi/ Nair v. State of
Kera/a('). But in the application of the principles,
the courts, in view of the inherent complexity of fiscal
adjustment of diverse elements, permit a larger discretion to. the Legislature in the matter of classification, so
long it adheres to the fundamental principl.es underlying
the said doctrine. The power of the Legislature to
classify is of "wide range and flexibility" so that it can
adjust its system of taxation in all proper and reasonable
ways."
c
D
Taking these principles into consideration we are satisfied that
the law does not single out any particular plantation for hostile or
unequal treatment. In fact it is nowhere proved in this case that
tea has been discriminated against deliberately as between differ·
ent tea gardens, it is not possible to say that the differences in the
yield is entirely due to natural circumstances and no other cause.
It is, therefore, not possible to say that there is discrimination not·
withstanding the uniform rate for each plantation based on the
actual crop yielding area.
The petitions must therefore fail. . They will be
with costs.
E
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dismissed
Shelat, J. Petitioner No. l, a public limited company, of which
the second petitioner is a shareholder, owns the Twyford Estate
situate in Kuttikanam area in K.~rala State. The estate is a tea
plantation admeasuring 1006 hectares (248(J acres). out of
which 491 hectares (1214 acres) have tea plants. In these
petitions, the petitioners challenge the constitutional validity of the
Kerala Plantations (Additional Tax) Act, XVII of I 960, as
amended by the Kerala Plantations (Additional Tax) Amendment Act, XIX of 1967 (hereinafter reffered to as the Act).
The challenge is on the ground that the Act violates the petitioners'
guaranteed rights under Arts. 14. 19 (1 )( f) and I g) and 31 ( 1 ) .
Before we set out the facts and the cantention; based thereon,
it is necessary to recite briefly the hi!)lory of the legislation
penaining to land taxation in the State.
In 1955, the Legislature of the .ln State of Travancore·
Cochin passed the Travancore-Cochfu. Land Tax Act, XV of
\ 955 which by ss. 4 and 5 imposed in respect of all lands, of
whatever description and tenure, a uniform rate to be called the
basic tax at the rate of 3 pies per cent per amnum in lieu of any
existing tax in respect of the said land. With the formation of
the present State of Kerala under the reorganisation of States, the
(I) (1955] 2 S.C.R. 887.
(2) [1961] J S.C.R. 77.
396
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1970] 3 S.C.R.
State Legislature passed the Travancore-Cochin Land Tax
(Amendment) Act, X of 1957 by which the expressions ··the
State cf Kerala" and "the Land Tax Act'" were substituted for the
·words "the State of Travancore-Cochin" and "the TravancoreCochin Land Tax Act" respectively. The amendment Act also
addecl a new section, s. SA, which imer a/ia, provided for provisional assessment of the basic tax for lands so far not surveyed.
The constitutional validity of Act XV of I 955. as amended by
Acr X of I 957. was challenged in this Court in Moopil Nair v.
The Sta:e of Kera/a(1). The Act was struck down by this Court,
inter a/ia, on the ground of it> being violative of Arts. 1-l and
19 ( 1) (f). The judgment of this Court strikin~ down the \ct
was pronounced on December 9. 1960.
8
c
Befor.e the case of Moopil Nair(') was decided. the Kerala
Legi;lature passed the impugned Act. XVII of 1960. which on
receivin.g the Governor's assent. was published in the Gazette
Extraordinary of August 24. 1960. Section 2!6) of the Act defineJ
a "plantation" to mean land used for growing one or more of the
seven categories of trees or plants set out therein. categC'r~ 5
ther.eci being tea piants. Thus. the land used for growing a11y D
trees, pbnts or corps other than these seven categories is not suhject to the additional tax under the Act. Section 3 provides that
there ~hall be charged. in respeot of the lands comprisd in
plantations held by a person. an additional tax or plantation tax
at the rate specified in Sch. I and the person holding such plantation
shall te liab~e to pay the plantation tax. Sch. I to the Act lays E
down that the additional tax would not be payable if the agizregate
extent of the plantation held by a person is below 5 acres. But if
it is 5 acres or more. the first two acres thereof would be exempt
from· the tax. and the remainder would be chargeable at the rate
of Rs. 8 - per acre. Suh-s. 4 of s. 3 provides that for purposes
of the assessment of plantation tax payable by a person under F
this Act. the extent of plantation held by him shall be determined
in the manner specified in Sch. II. Section 3 ( 5) declares that the tax
char~ed under this section shall be in addition to the basic tax
payable under the Land Tax Act. 1955. Sections 4 and 5 deal with
the returns relating to the plantations. the determination of the
extent of plantation and the assessment of the tax. The rest of the
provisions of the Act provide for such subjects as the provisional G
assessn1ent. notice of den1and. appeal and revision against asscssmen! orders. recovery of the tax. refund etc. Sch. II provides
that the extent of plantation held bv a person shall be deemed to
be the aggregate of the following expressed in acres. namely : ( i) thf.! quotient obtained by dividing the total
number of bearin_g cocoanut trees standing on
all lands held by him by 85:
ft9611 J S.C.R. 77.
H
TWYFORD TEA co. I". KERALA
A
B
(She/at, J.)
397
(ii) the quotient obtained by dividing the total
·number of bearing arecanut trees standing on
all lands held by him by 600;
(iii) the quotient obtained by dividing the total number of yielding rubber plants standing on all
lands held by him by 180;
(iv J the quotient obtained by dividing the total number of yielding coffee plants standing on all lands
held by him by 600;
c
( v) the quotient obtaiw!d by dividini; the total number of yielding pepper vines standing on all lands
held by him by 400.
(vi J the ext em of lands ,_m which tea plants are
grown which have begun to yield crops; and
(vii) the extent of lands on which cardamom plants
are grown which have begun to yield crops.
D
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Provided that where the total extent of land heid by a person,
which is cultivated with the aforesaid crops, is less than the aggregate calculated as above, the actual extent alone shall be deemed
to be th.e extent of plantations held by him. Though the Schedule
lays down different quotients in respect of lands cultivated with
cccoanut and arecanu\ tree·;. rubber and coffee plants and pepper
vines, they cannot achieve equality of the burden of the tax as
yieids of even the same crop cannot be equal or approximately
equal by rea>ans of differences in the lands in one area from those
in ether areas depending on their soil, situation and a number of
other such factors. Furthermore, no explanation is forthcoming
about the principle, if any, on which the quotient for each of the
said categories was fixed and whether thev inter se work out
reasonable equality among the plantations cultivating the said
trees and plants. In the case of tea plants, the holder is liable to
pay tax on the extent of lands on which they are grown irrespective
of the number of tea olants which are or can be grown, their
quality or their possible yield.
The Act was amended. as· aforesaid, by Act XIX of 1967 by
which the expression 'additional tax' was substituted by the word
'tax'. and in s. 4 instead of the measure for changing the tax being 5 acre> or more, th.~ measure now adopted was 2 hectares and
mere. The two new Schedules.. which were substituted for those
in Act XVII of 1960 provided bv Sch. I that no tax would be payable if the aQQregate extent of plantation was below 2 hectares,
but where it is 2 hectares or more. there would be no tax on the
first one hectare but the rest of the land would be taxed at Rs. 50
per hectare. With the sub~titution of h.~ctare as the mea~ure in
398
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970) 3 S.C.R.
place of acre, the quotients were suitably modified in proportion of
a hectare being equal to 2..175 acres. Thus, under the Act, as
amended by Act XIX of 1967, a holder of land, whose land is
plantation, is now required to pay .Rs. 50 per hectare instead
of Rs. 20 per hectare, over and above the basic tax payable by him
und.~r the Land Tax Act, 1955, as amended in 1957. The petitioner-company thus is Hable to pay Rs. 24,500/- as additional tax
on its 491 hectares cultivate•d for tea plants over and above the
basic tax payable by it. It will be noticed that notwithstanding
the reasons on which in Moopi/ Nair's(1) decision the Land Tax
Act, XV of 1955 was struck down, no changes in the light of that
decision were made in Act XVII of 1960 even when it was amended in 1967.
In consequence of Act XV of 1955 having been struck down
as aforesaid, the Kerala Legislature passed a new Act, called the
Kerala Land Tax Act, XIII 0f 1961, giving it a re'.rospective cfkct
by s. I ( 3) thereof. The Act was obviously passed in the light
of, the observations made by this Court in Moopi/ Nair's case(1).
Section 5 provided that there shall be charged a tax called "basic
tax·· on all lands of whatever description and tenure. Sub-s. 3 of
that section provided that the basic tax so charged shall be deemed
to be public revenu.~ due on lands within the meaning of the Revenue Recovery Act. Section 6(1) laid down the rate of the bas'c tax.
The basic t3'<: was first fixed at Rs. 2/- per acre per annum. but
subsequently changed to Rs. 9.94 P. per hectare. Section 6(2) provided that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-s. I. where
a land-holder liable to pay basic tax proved to the satisfaction of
the prescribed authority that the gross income from any land was
less thar Rs. I 0 per acre per annum (now changed to Rs. 24. 70 P.
per hectare), the basic tax payable on such land shall be at a rate
fixed by the prescribed authority calculated at I/5th of the gross
income from such land. The second proviso to sub-s .. 2 laid down
that the Government may. having regard to the potential productivity of any land used principally for growing cocoanut, arecanut,
pepper, tea, coffee, rubber. cardamom. or cashew or any other
special crop, plant or tea that might be specified by the Government by notification, levy and collect basic tax at the rate of two
rupees per acre per annum on such land notwithstanding the fact
that such crops, plants or trees have not begun to yield or bear and
that for time being no income is made from the land or that the
income made is less than ten rupees per acre per annum. Explanation (1) to s. 6 laid down that for the purpose of s. 6 gross income shall mean the actual gross income or the gross income that
would be made from the land with due diligence, whichever was
higher. Thus, s. 6(2), the second proviso thereto and Explanatipns I and 3 to the section clearly disclose that this time the Legis(l) [19611 3 S.C.R. 77.
--
A
B
c
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G
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TWYFORD TEA CO. V. KERALA
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
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(She/at, J.)
399
lature taxed the land on the standard of potential productivity instead of the ad hoc levy originaily provided in the Act of 1955 and
also removed the obiection as to the absence of any remedy against
assessment by providing appeal and revision. The position, therefore, is that whereas under the Kerala Land Tax Act, XIII. of
1961, as amended in 1968 and 1969, the basic or land tax is
levied on th.~ basis of potential productivity and yield, the tax as
imposed by the impugned Act as a tax in addition to the basic tax
is a uniform tax at a flat rate without any regard to the productivity of the land, potential or actual.
According to the petitioners, , Pee rm ade Hills, where their
estate is situate, falls roughly into two areas, the Kuttikanam area
and the Periyar valley area. Though both these areas are situate
in high ranges, they differ in the extent of their productivity and
quality, the reason being that the Periyar valley area is the basin
of Periyar river. The difference in the fertility and the quality of
soil in these two areas is sought to be illustrated by showing that
Twyford estate situate in Kuttikanam area and Haileyburia estate
situate in P.~riyar valley area, though under common management,
give different average yields. The average yield in 1967 per hectare in Twyford estate was 959 Kgs. while that of Haileyburia
estate was 1542 Kgs. To show such differences also in other areas
in the State and elsewhere the petitioners have furnished variom
statistics. These statistics first show that the average annual yield
per hectare in the tea-growing areas in Madras. Mysore and Kerala
for the year 1967 was 1394, 1178 and 1076 Kgs. respectively.
The all India average yield according to these figures was 1100
Kgs. per hectare per year. The average of tea production per hectare in Kerala State thus compares favourably with that of the other
tea growing regions as also with the all India average. Therefore,
the tea planters in Kerala cannot \:'.~ said to be backward or less
forward-looking or less venturesome than those in the other regions.
Secondly, these figures also show that the average yield in the
different districts in Kerala itself varies from district to district
ranging from about 350 Kgs. for the district of Ernakulam to as
much as 1850 Kgs. for Trichur district. The production figure
for the whole of the Kerala Siate appears to have remained steady
throughout 1965 to 1967 as it varies from about 43000 Kgs. to
44000 Kgs. These figures indicate that different areas in the State
where tea is grown differ in a very large way in productivity and
fertility. These figures are taken from the Reports of the Tea
Board, and therefore, can be safely regarded as reliable.
0
In the counter-affidavit filed by the State these differences, no
doubt, are not admitted.' To show that such differences do not
exist only the example of one estate, Glenmari near Kuttikanam, is
taken. It is urged that that estate has a larger production per
hectare than the petitioners' estate though both happen to be situate
4.00
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970] 3 S.C.R.
in the same area.
The respondents, however, have frankly conceded that the fertility of the land and the differences in productivity of estates in differnt areas are not relevant, for, the impugned
tax is levied with reference to the specified user to which the land
is put and not to its productivity, potential or actual.
Counsel for the petitioners contended that the tax charged under
the Act is discriminatory and arbitrary, and therefore, violates Art.
14. The argument was that the tax, being an ad hoc levy uniformly imposed, merely on the basis of the use of the land. for any
one or more of the seven kinds of trees and plants selected by
s. 2 ( 6 J cf the Act, without any classification and without any consideration to th.e situation, the kind of land, its potential productivity, water-supply. natural or artificial, and geographical features,
falls unequally on the holders of the land. It was submitted that
this inequality arises as a result of the absence of any rational
classification, and the Act, for that reason, suffers from the same
infirmity for which in the Mcopil Nair's case(') this Court struck
down the Travancore-Cochin Land Tax Act, 1955, as amended by
Act X of 1957. The contention urged, on the other hand, on behalf of the State was that by selecting the seven kinds of plantations ins. 2(6), the Legislature has made an intelligible classification amongst holders of land, that that classification has a reasonable nexus with the object of the Act, namely. to obtain additionai
revenue by imposing tax in addition to the basic tax, that the
Legislature in the matter of taxation has a wide discretion in selecting persons and properties for imposing a tax, that in exercise of
its power to tax, it was entitled to levy the tax based on certain
kinds of user of land and was net bound to make a further classification of the land according to its potential productivity, its situation, its geographical feature;, income and other such considerations.
Before we examine these contentions we think it expedient to
consider first the principle: laid down by this Court in the matter
of the power to levy taxes of the kind we have before us. In
Moppii Nair's case('), this Court laid down the foliowing principJe.s : (I) that Art. 14 read with Art. 13(2) applies to a taxing
statute as much as to other statutes, and therefore, if he impugned
statute, even though a taxing one, violates Art. 14, it has· to be
struck down as unconstitutional; (2) that the statute there impugn.ed, namely, the Travancore-Cochin Land Tax Act, 1955, as
amended by Act X of 1957, imposed a uniform tax on all lands,
whether productive or not. and without any reference to their income, actual or potential; ( 3) that since the Act in terms claimed
by s. 3 thereof to be a general revenue settlement of the State, the
tax beine one on land or land revenue had to be asses>ed and
levied on the actual or potential productivity of the land sought
(1) [1961] J S.C.R. 77.
A
B
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D
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TWYFORD TEA co. v. KERALA
A
B
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(She/at, J.)
40 l
to be taxed ; in other words, such a tax has reference to the income
actually made or which could have been made with due regard to
its incidence, and ( 4) that the inequality writ large on the Act
arose by reason of the absence of any classification of the land on
which the tax was imposed. The argument which appears to have
appealed fo the learned dissenting Judge that the Act made a classification between holders of land according to the quantum of land
held by them und that that classification was rea.onab!y linked w1tt1
the object of the Act to raise revenue for the State, failed to receive the approval of the rest of the Court. The fact . that a
person holds a large area of land and i3 taxed according to the
~a he holds cannot by itself mean that in taxing him he is meted
out equal treatment as compared to a person who holds a lesser
quantity of land but of a better and more productive quality,
merely on the ground that both hold land and are taxed according
to th~ quantity each -of them holds. A uniform tax without consideration of its incidence, when actually implemented must result
in inequality of treatment amongst persons similarly situa•ed, and
therefore, would be violative of Art. 14.
D
In The State of Alidhra Pradesh v. Nal/a Raja Reddy(') the
relevant facts were as follows : Originally two differeint revenue
systems prevailed in Andhra and Telengana. In the former, th.~
priRciples of Ryotwari system prevailed which meant that lands
were classified under two principal heads, wet and dry. Lands of
similar grain values were bracketed together in orders called
"tarams", each with its own rate of assessment, which was further
adjusted in the case of dry lands with reference to the nature and
quality of water supply. This system prevailed since time; · immemorial and by reason of its being equitable had general apriroval. In Telengana. the relative scale of soils wa1 classified in
terms of annas. The existing or former rates used to be taken as
r the basis for the purpose of resettlements and were adjusted having
regard to altered conditions, such as the rise and fall of prices, increase in population etc. Besides, the settlement officers used to
fix the rates after ascertaining what profit would be left to the
cultivators.· Thus, under the system of a5sessment which prevailed
in both the areas, the land revenue fixed varied according to the
G classification of soil based upon productivity. Later, the Andhra
Pradesh Land Revenue Assessment (Standardisation) Act, 1952
and the Hyderabad Land Revenue (Special Assessment) Act, 1952
were passed to standardize the rates on the basis of price level.
These two Acts increased the rates by way of surcharge on the
existing rates. In 1958, the Staie Government appointed a Committee to examine the existing system of rates of assessment. The
H Committee inter alia suggesied that assessment should be based on
the quality and productivity of soils, the nature of water supply
(I) [19671 3 S.C.R. 28.
402
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970) 3 S.C.R.
and the prices. The State Legislature then µassed the impugned A
Act, Andhra Pradesh Land Revenue (Additional Assessment)
and Cess Revision Act, XXII of 1962, which was amended by
Act XXIII of 1962. Under ss. 3 and 4 of the Act, as amended, a
new scheme was laid down in accordance with which an additional
assessment at 7 5 % of the earlier assessment was charged. But
the proviso thereto laid down that the total assessment should not B
in any case be less than 50 nP. per acre per year, irrespective of
the quality and productivity of th.e soil. Every acre of dry land
had thus to bear a minimum asse5sment of 50 nP. per acre per
year. For wet lands also, a scheme was adoptect which took no
account of the quality and productivity of the soil. The Act was
challenged on the ground of di~rimination arisinr, from the absence of dassification as in the case of Moopil Nair('). In con- c
sidering the challenge the Court observed :
"A statutory provision may offend Art. 14 of the
Ccnstitution both by finding diff.erences where there arc
none and by making no difference where there is one.
Decided cases laid down two tests to ascertain whether a
D
classification is permissible or not, viz., ( i) the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia
which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped
together from others left out of the group; and (ii) that
the differential must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question.
The said principles have been applied by this Court to
E
taxing statutes. This Court in Kunnathat Thathunni
Moopil Nair v. The State of Kera/a [(1961 )3 S.C.R.
77] held that ·the Travancore-Cochin Land Tax Act,
1955, infringed Art. 14 of the Constitution, as it ;:ibliged
every person who held land to pay the tax at the fiat rate
prescribed, whether or not he made any income out of
F
the property, or whether or not the property was capable
of yielding any income. It was pointed out that that
was one of the cases where the lack of classification
created inequality."
The Court observed that in the case before it the whole scheme of
ryotwari system was given up so far as the minimum rate was
concerned. A fiat rate was fixed in the case of dry lands without anv reference to the quality or fertility of the soil, and in the
case of wet lands. a minimum rate was fixed and it was sought
to be justified by correlating it to the ayacut. The Court held that
that scheme of classification was adopted without any reasonable
relation to the objects sought to be achieved. namely. fixation and
rationalisation of rates. and therefore. clearly offemled the equal
protection clause.
(1) 119611 J S.C.R. 77.
G
H
•
TWYFORD TEA co. v. KERALA
(Shelat, J.)
403
In Khandige Sham Bhat v. The Agricultural Income Officer( 1 )
the Court reaffirmed the principles laid down in Moopil Nails
case(') and observed with regard to the provisions there
impugned :
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"In order to judge whether a law was discriminatory
what had primarily to be looked into was not its phraseology but its re'al effect. If there was equality and uniformity within each group, the law could not be discriminatory, though due to fortuitous circumstances in a peculiar situation some included in a class might get some
advantage over others, so long as they were not sought
out for special treatment. Although taxation laws could
be no exception to this rule, the courts would, in view of
the inherent complexity of fiscal adjustment of diveEe
elements permit a larger discretion to the Legislature in
the matter of classification so long as there was no transgression of the fundamental principles underlying the
doctrine of classification. The power of the Legislature
to classify must necessarily be wide and flexible so as
to enable it to adjust its system of taxation in all proper
and reasonable ways."
The principle emerging from these decisions is thus fairly wellsettled. While granting a fairly wide d!scretion to the legislature
in the matter of fiscal adjustment, the Court will at the same time
insist that the statute in question, like any other statute, should not
infringe Art. 14 either by introducing unreasonable or irrational
cla,sification between persons or properties similarly situated or
by a lack of classification. Further, in examining the objection
under Art. 14 the Court has not to go by the phraseology only of
the provision under challenge, but its real impact on persons or
properties.
The challenge urged on behalf of the p.~titioners may now be
examined in the light of these principles. s·oth the title and the
preamble of Act XVII of 1960 in clear terms call the tax one in
addition, as s. 3 ( 5) declares it, to the basic tax, payable on lands
falling under its purview, i.e .. plantations, as defined bys. 2(6).
A plantation, as defined by s. 2 ( 6), means the land used for any
one or more of the seven types of trees and plants set out therein.
The tax is thus chargeable in respect of lands which are plantations
and not the rest of the lands however much their income· may be.
Apart from that, as stated in the State's counter-affidavit, th~ tax
is imposed on the ground of the. particular use to which the land
is put and not on the basis of its productivity or income, actual or
potential. This is so, ·although it is a tax in addition to the basic
or land tax levied under the Kerala Land Tax Act, XIII of 1961,
(l) rt9631 3 S.C.R. 809. 817.
(2) [196lj 3 S.C.R. 77.
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[1970] 3 S.C.R.
and although that basic tax under s. 6 of tlulf Act dep.znds upon
the gross income yielded by the. particular land. It is true that
under the second proviso to that section, if the land is used for
growing any of the crops therein mentioned. the Government can
impose, having 1egard to its potential procbictivity, the ba>ic tax
at R>. 21- per-acre, even though the land has not y~t begun to
yield or bear the crop and no income has yet begun to be made
therefrom. By subsequent amendment the rate was changed to
Rs. 4.94 per hectare, but the principle of potential productivity
was maintained. The additional tax imposed by Act XVII of
1960, on the other hand, is on the same land provided it is used
for growing any one or more of the specified frees or plants, originally at the uniform rate of Rs. 8/- per acre but now enhanced
by Act XIX of 1967 to Rs. 50/- per hectare, i.e., Rs. 20 per acre.
As already stated, the Amendment Act deleted the -word 'additional' but the deletion makes no. difference as the tax is still in
addition to the basic or land tax and must, therefore, partake its
character, both taxes being taxes in respect of th0 same land, where
the land is plantation within s. 2 ( 6). Thus, so far as such lands
are concerned, the basic tax on them is assessed according to their
productivity or income. But the tax under Act XVII of 1960,
as amended by Act XIX of 1967, is imposed in respect of them as
an ad hoc uniform tax, irrespective of the kind of their soil or their
capacity etc. and only for the reason of their particular user,
Prima facie, the incidence of such a tax by reason of its uniformity
is bound to be unequal on persons similarly situated and would,
therefore, be hit by the equality clause. in Art. 14. Even assuming
that the basic tax is a revenue assessment and the additional tax
is not, it would still make no difference in its unequal incidence on
these whose lands by their particular user are plantations. In other
words, the burden of the tax on persons situated in similar circumstances, i.e., those whose lands are plantations, would be unequal,
depending upon the kind of soil, the geographical situation, water
supply, elevation and other relevant factors touching the lands they
hold. The additional tax· is by no means low as it is, after the
passing of the amendment Act XIX of 1967, Rs. 50 per hectare,
equivalent to Rs. 20 per acre. A person holding LOOO acres of
land of inferior soil would, by reason of such an ad hoc tax, be
bound to be hit harder than the one holding 1,000 acres of ;uperior land with higher fertility or productiviiv. Such a result would
not occur if the land is classified and the incidence of the tax is
_graded according_ to its productivity and other relevant factors.
In support of the Act it was argued that the impugned Act
not only makes a classification between those who hold lands
whkh are plantations and tho'se who hold lands which are not
plantations, .bui also makes a further classification within that
classification by the method provided for calculating the extent
of plantations in Sch. II. That argument does not appear to be
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correct. ·.·. The Schedule only provides the methods for calculating the extent of the plantations : (1 ) by means of quol!ents and
(2) where tea and cardamom plants are cultivated by tlie actual
extent of the land used for those purposes. But the Schedule
does not solve the dtfliculty. A piece of land in one a•ea may
have a certain number of trees or plants of one or mme of the
B specified categories to· make it a plantation. But the incidence
of the tax in respect of it would be unequal as compared to another land situate eisewhere by reason of the latter's better situation or fertility even if the number of plants or trees of the .specified kind are the same, depending upon the situation and the
capacity of the two lands. In such a case the very uniformity of
tax is bound to result in discrimination pn account of th.~ relac the
tive potentiality of the two lands not being taken into account,.
and the lands not being classified accordingly. It is, therefore,
difficult to say that the Schedule, intended only for calculating the
extent of the plantations, seeks to achieve equality of tr.~atment
between one kind of plantation and another or between planta;
tiom of the same kind, if the principle of their yield or income,
D actual or potential, is not taken into account. How is it possible
lo say that the uniform bur<fon of Rs. 50/- per hectare in the case,
say of cocoanut, tea, coffee or cardamom plantations, is reasonably equal, when the potential yield of each such plantatio:J is not
taken into consideration ? The same result must also follow
amongst holders of the same kind of plantations if the principle
E of -yield or income is discarded. Thus, Sch. II only provides the
two methods of calculating the extent of the plantation and does
not make a dassification within a classification as urged. The
only classification made is between those whose lands fall under
the definition of 'plantation' and those whose lands do not. All
those who held lands which are plantations are made liable to
pay the tax at the uniform rate of Rs. 50/- per hectare, no matter
F what kind of crop, out of the seven kinds mentioned in the Act.
is . cultivated by them, without regard to the fact that one kind
may be more valuable than the other and irrespective of their
situation, their income-yielding capacity and other factors.
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The result of such uniform imposition is that tea planters,
who hold lands in Ernakulam, Trichur and Kottayam districts,
would pay the same amount of tax per hectare although the average yield per hectare in these districts for the years 1965 to
1967 was about 350, 1825 and 1050 Kgs. respectively. The
difference in yield in these different districts must clearly .be due
to the difference in the soil, situation and such other factors, for,
it is nobody's case (at least not made out in the counter-affidavit
of the respondents) that the cultivators in Ernakulam district use·
inferior seed or are less venturesome than those in Kottayam and
Trichur districts. Such a difference iin the average yield per hec-L7Sup.C!(?'<'l')/70-l I
406
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1970] 3 S.C.R.
tare occurs also in other tea growing dfstricts, namely, Cannanore, Palghat, Kozhikode, Trivandrum and Quilon, whose average yield per hectare d!!ring the years 1965 to 1967 was 950,
1490, 1575, 975 and 650 Kgs. respectively. Since these figures
are from the statistics prepared by the Tea Board, they cannot be
disputed. That such differences in the· average yield occur. also
in the different districts of the States of Madras and Mysore is
also clear. Surely, they cannot arise because the cultivators of
one district are more adventurous or more. technology-minded
than those of the other districts. The differences in. the yield
must, then!fore, be attributed to the differences in the soil, situation, water supply, rainfall etc.
Imposing a uniform rate of tax in respect of lands where
tea is grown, without classifying them on the basis of their productivity, actual or potential, and without differentiating the inferior from the superior kind of soil or without taking into consideration the fact of some of these lands being situated in more
advantageous position than the rest, must, therefore, inevitably
result in unequal incidence of the tax on those who hold tliose
lands. Therefor.~. as in the case of Moopil Nair('), the present
case is also one where inequality emerges as a result of imposing
an ad hoc tax, uniformly levied without making any rational or
intelligible classification. There is no indication in the Act and
none was even sought to be shown as to how and on what basis
the uniform rate of Rs. 50/- per hectare was fixed and whether it
had any relatiQn to the capacity of those who hold lands with
different average yields tanging from 350 Kgs. per he.ctare in
Ernakulam to about 1850 Kgs. per hectare in Trichur, in addition to the basic tax also payable by them. Obviously, the tax
imposed in th.~ manner pointed out above must result in inequality
among the holders who use their landg for tea growing though
they are similarly situated. The principles laid down in Moopil
Nair's case(') approved and confirmed in subsequent decisions
and which are binding upon us, apply to the impugned statute.
But in Thuttampara Planting Co. v. Tahsi/dar(2) a learned
Single Judge of the Kerala High Court repelled the contention as
to the invalidity of Act XVII of 1960 and held that the decision
in Meopil Nair's case(') did not apply as by adopting the quotients in Sch. II the impost had been related to the potentiality of
the land and its possible yield. As already pointed out, even the
counter-affidavit filed by the State in the present petitions, does
not claim that the additional tax imposed under this Act takes into
account the potentiality of the land or is possible yield. It, on
the other hand, asserts in plain language that the tax is levied by
reason only of the particular use to which the land is"put and
(1) [1961] 3 S.C.R. 77.
(2) [1964] K.L.T. 47.
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TWYFORD TEA co. v. KERALA
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which makes it fall within s. 2 ( 6). If potentiality of the land and
its possible yield had been taken into consideration, the amount of
tax could not have been uniform as "its quantum would have depended on its quality, situation and other factors. Indeed, in
Essa Ismail v. State of Kera/a(') a Division Bench of that very
High Court held that what Act XVll of 1960 did was to tax lands
comprised in plantations, not on the basis of their productivity
but an the basis of their user. But the Division Bench held that
the Act was "just and equitable'', and therefore, was not hit by
Art. 14. At page 623 of the Report, the learned Judges observed
that the yield would vary from crop to crop and place to place,
but "it is not the productivity of the soil that forms the foundation
of the tax but its user in a specific way for a specific purpose".
Though these two decisions cited Moopi/ ,\"air's case('), neither
of them considered the result of the lands being uniformly taxed
without classifyinir them according to their potentiality so that
the incidence of the tax may be .iust and equitable. How a tax
imposed uniformly without regard to the potentiality of the property taxed and without any classification on any other just basis
works inequality is illustrated by the scrutiny by this Court of the
Kerala Building Tax· Act, XIX of 1961 in the State of Kera/a v.
Hajl K. Kutty( 8 ). After noting the uniform rate of the tax levied
according to the floor area C1f a building but without taking into
account its kind or its potential yield, th.e Court observed :
"For determining the quantum of tax the sole test
is the area of the floor of the building. The Act applies
. to the entire State of Kerala, and whether the building
is situate in a large industrial town or in an insignificant village, the rate of tax is determined by the floor
area; it does not depend upon the purpose for which th.e
building is used, the nature of the structure, the town
and locality in which the building is situate, the economic rent which may be .obtained from the building, the
cost of the building and other related circumstances
which may appropriately be taken into consideration in
any rational system of taxation of building."
At page 380 the Court further observed :
"But in enacting the Kerala Buildings Tax Acr no
attempt at any rational classification is made--As already observed, the Legislature has not taken into considaation in imposing the tax the class to which the
building belongs, the. nature of construction, the purpose for which it is used, its situation, its capacity for
profitable user and other relevant circumstances which
(I) I.L.R. (19651 2 Ker. 619.
(2) (19611 3 S.C.R. 77.
(3) A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 378.
408
SUPREME COURT REPORTS.
(1970] 3 S.C.R.
have a bearing on matters of taxation. They have
adopted merely the floor area of the building as the
basis of tax irrespective of all other considerations.
Where objects, persons or transactions essentially dissimilar are treated by the imposition of a uniform· tax,
discrimination may result. for, in our view, refusal to
make a rational classification may itself in some cases
cperate as denial of equality."'
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On this reasoninJ'! the charging section of the Act impugned in
that case was held violative of Art. 14 and therefore bad.
The same reasoning is, in our view, apposite so far as the
impugned tax is concerned, for. the tax is uniformly levied merely
on the footing of the land being used for growing tea, without
any regard to its potentiality. situation, the kind of tea which can
suitably he grown at a particular place, its geographical and
other features etc. No doubt. the State in exercise of the taxing
power can select persons and ·objects for taxation but if it is
found that within the range of that selection the Jaw operates unequaliy by reason either of classification or its absence, such a provision would be hit by the equality clause of Art. 14. (see East
India Tobacco Co. 1". State of Andhta Pradesh.(') Even amongst
the selected plantations inequality as a result of uniformity of tax
must result because it is possible that the user of the land for one
specified purpose may .~ive a better and a more valuable yield
than the user of another land though situated in the same area
for another specified purpose. This. in our view. has happened
in so far as the tax on tea plantations. with which only we are
concerned in these petitions. is concerned. and therefore, to the
extent that Act XVII of 1960. as amended by Act XIX of 1967,
imposes the tax on holders of tea plantations. it is violative of
Art. 14 and is. therefore. void.
Accordin.~ly. the petitions are allowed with costs.
ORDER
In accordance with the opinion of the majority, the petitions
are dismiS>ed with costs.
(I) [t963] l.S.C.R. 404.
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