RAJAH VELUGOTI KUMARA KRISHNA YACHENDRA VARU & ORS. versus RAJAH VELUGOTI SARVAGNA KUMARA KRISHNA YACHENDRA VARU & ORS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 28 October 1969 | [1970] 3 S.C.R. 88 | 1969 INSC 311
Key facts
- Decided
- 28 October 1969
- Bench
- J.C. SHAH*, V. RAMASWAMI, A.N. GROVER
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 2113/1966
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1970] 3 S.C.R. 88
- Neutral citation
- 1969 INSC 311
Text of the judgment
SS
RAJAH VELUGOTI KUMARA KRISHNA YACHENDRA
VARU & ORS.
A
v.
RAJAH
VELUGOTI SARVAGNA KUMARA
Y~CHENDRA VARU & ORS.
KRISHNA
October 28, 1969
B
(J. C. SHAH, Y. RAMASWAMI AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.]
lntpartible Estate-Ve11ka1agiri Eslate-llnpartible by cus101n-!11zpartl-
ble Esta~s Act, 1904 including estate in Schedule-Madras Es!ates (Al·olition and Coni·.ersion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 vesting tstate in Go1ern1nent-Jt'he1her impartibility continues in 1c!!.pert of properties no1 ~o
1•ested-Jn1partible estate, incidents of.
The appellants filed a suit for partition claiming their share in certain
properties of the Venkatagiri Estate which did not vest in the State by
virtue of the Madras E~tates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryot\\'ari)
Act, ! 948 and in the alternative for maintenance in terms of an agreement
entered into in 1899. Their contention was that the Venkatagiri Estate
became an impartible estate ·only under the agreement entered into in
1889 and became a statutory impartible estate by virtue of its incluo;.ion
in the schedule to tHe Jmpartible Estates Act, 1904 and on the repeal ol
that enactment by the Abolition Act, 1948. the estate became partible;
that the properties claimed in t.he suit. though outside the territorial limits
of the ZaminJari. were held impartible only as appurtenant to the main
estate and after the impartible character of the main estate \Vas Jost those
properties became partible. The High Court held that the estate was
impartihle by custom and was not made impartible for the first time under
the. agreement of 1889 or by the Acts of 1902 or 1904 and the claim
for partition was negatived. As regards the claim for maintenance the
court held that a similar claim had been rejected by the judicial committee as not tenable either under the agreement of 1889 or under Hindu
law or on the basis of custom. In appeal to this Court,
HELD : ( i) There is no reason to differ from the finding of the High
Court that the estate of Venkatagiri was an ancient impartib]e estate by
custom and was not made impartible for the first time under the agreement of 1889 or by Madras Acts of 1902 or 1904. [100 A]
Gopala Krishna v. Sarvarna Krishna, 1955 A.W.R. 590, Nargunt_v
Lutchmeedavanah v. Venganza Naidoo, 9 M.I.A. 66, Raja Ras Venkata
Mahipathy Ran1krishna v. Court of Wards I.L.R. 2 Mad. 283 .and Pushavatlii Viziram Gajapathy Raj Manna v. Pushavathi Vise.nvar, [1964J :!
S.C.R. 403.
(ii) In relation to Venkatagiri Zamindari the Madras Impartihle
Estates Act has been repealed so 'far as the Act applied to the Estate
which by opc""tion of s. 3 (b) of the Abolition Act got transferred and
became vested in the State Government. In relation to properties which
have not become so vesfed in the Government the Madras Impartiole
Estates Act, 1904 continues to be in force. Since the Abolition Act did
not affect the plaint properties these have continued to be what they were
at the time of incorporation with the Zamindari. namely. the properties
retain their impartible character. The principle cossante rat.ione legi.'i
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VELUGOTI VT VELUGOTI (Ramaswami, I.)
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89
-..•essat ipsa lex has no application in the present case for many times
custom outlives the condition of things which give it birth. The iunior
members of a joint family in the case of ancient impartible joint family
estate, take no right in the property by birth and, therefore, have no right
of partition having regard to the nature. of the estate which is impartible.
[102 D-H, 103 H, 104 E-Fl
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Rai Kishore Singh v. Mst. Gahanabai, A.LR. 1919 P.C. 100, C. /. T.
J>unjab v. Dewan Krishna Kishore, 68 I.A. 155 and Raja Velugoti v.
Raja Rajeshwara Rao, 68 I.A. 181,
c
D
(iii) The agreement of 1889 in so far as it relates to payment of main·
tenance continues to be in force in spite of the. coming into operation
of the Abolition Act. In the absence Of express words_ to the effect, it
would not be right to attribute to the legislature an intention to free the
properties not transferred to the Government by the operation of s. 3(b)
of the Act from liability to contribute towards the maintenance of the
junior members under such a contract or family arrangement. and while
leaving the land-holder in possession of those other properties, Jimit the
maintenance holders to a share of a fifth of the compensation amount.
[109 CJ
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2113 of
1966.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated August 13, 1965
of the Madras High Court in 0.S.A. Nos. 40 and 53 of 1961.
C. R. Pattabhiraman, V. Suresham and S. Balakrishnan, for
the appellants.
E
V. Vedantachari and K. Jayaram, for respondent No. I,
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
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Ramaswami, J, This appeal arises out of a suit O.S. 351 of
1952 filed for partition by 7 plaintiffs viz. : ( 1) Sri Raja Venkata
Kumara Krishna Yachendra, (2) Sri Rajah V. V. Ramakrishna,
(3) Sri Raja V. V. Rajagopala Krishna, ( 4) Sri Raja V. V. Muvva
Gopala Krishna, (5) Sri Raja V. Rajeswara Rao, (6) Sri Rajah
V. Maheswara Rao and (7) Sri Raja V. Madana Gopala Krishna,
minor by next friend and mother Smt. Sridevamma in respect of
the Venkatagiri Estate and other properties as accretions to this
estate. The first defendant in the suit was the holder of the zamin,
dari until it was notified and taken over by the State on September
7, 1949. The 3rd and 4th defendants are brothers of the first
defendant. The third defendant died during the pendency of the
suit and defendants 7 and 8 are his sons. Defendants 4, 5 and 6
are the sons of the 4th defendant. The 9th and 10th defendants
are the sons of the 1st defendant. The 4th plaintiff Shri Raja V.
V. Muvva Gopala Krishna died during the pendency of the appeals
against the suit in the High Court of Madras. After the filing of
the petition of appeal in this Court Sri Raja V. Maheswara Rao,
L6Sup. C.1./70-7
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
the 6th plaintiff also died. The relationship of the parties will
appear from the following pedigree :
A
Sri Raj,1h Velugoti Kum1ra yachendra Nayudu Bahadur
.
Raj Raj"l~
gop1l1krishna
(died in 1916)
.
Muddu Venkatl Venu Ra~a Sesha~ha}a.
Venkata
Krishn3. Gopal Krishna pathi Ranga Lakshmana
(died
:
:
Rao
Rao
Rao
issue(adopted (adopted
(adopted
less in
to
to
away)
1921)
Pithapur) Bobbili)
B
Krishna
Raja Govinda
Krishna
(died in 1937)
c
Krishna - - - - - Bahadur :
(plff. 1) :
Rajeswara Rao
Maheswara Rao
(Plff. 5)
(pJff. 6)
M.idana Gopala (Minor)
by next friend and
mother Sreedevi
D
(Plff. 7)
E
V. V.Rama
V. V. Raja
Krishna
GopaJakrishna
(plff. 2)
(plff. No. 3)
Raj1 V
Second
Sarva-sn•
Kdo:hna
(deft.)
Prine-~
Third
Prince
V. V. Morva
Gopalakri<ihna
(plff. 4)
F
..
D-7
D·9
..
..
D-8 D-4 D-5 D-6
G
D-10
The Venkatagiri Estate is an ancient impartible estate in
Nellore District included in the Schedule under the Madras lmpartibte Estates Act (Act II of 1904). In the year 1878, 'Raja
Vetugoti Kumara Yachema, who heads the above pedigree, was
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VELUGOTI v. VELUGOTI (Ramaswami, J.)
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the Zamindar. He had seven sons of whom three had been given
away in adoption. The eldest of the sons was Rajagopala
Krishna to whom Raja Velugoti Kumara Yachama handed over the
entire estate and certain other properties with a view to spend the
rest of his life in piety and meditation. In 1889, Muddukrishna
and Venkata Krishna, two of the sons, claimed a share in the
estate contending that the estate was partible and the four sons
were each entitled to a fourth share in the family properties.
Rajagopalakrishna, however, asserted its impartible character.
Ultimately there was a settlement between the parties wherein
Muddu Krishna and Venkata Krishna withdrew their claim to
partition and recognised the impartible character o4' the Zamindari. The settlement involved the payment of large sums of
money by Rajagopala Krishna to his three younger brothers
Muddu Krishna, Venkata Krishna and Venugopal. Venugopal
was then a minor and was represented by the father Raja Velugoti
Kumara Yachama himself. The terms of the settlement were
embodied in a stamped document bearing the date April 8, 1889.
Its terms may be summarised as follows : (a) recognition by all
the brothers that the Venkatagiri estate was impartible with descent along the eldest line, that is, by Rajagopala Krishna the
then Zamindar and after him by his son, son's son and so on
in the eldest male line; (b) the three brothers of the then Rajah.
Muddukrishna,. Venkata Krishna and Venugopal, should each
receive a sum of Rs. 5,81,252-11-10; (c) Muddu Krishna,
Venkata Krishna and Venugopal should also receive a sum of
Rs. 40,000 each for providing themselves with residence; ( d) a
provision for the marriage expenses of Venkata Krishna and
Venugopal and ( e) provision that Rajagopala Krishna and his
successors to the estate should pay to Muddukrishna, Venkata
Krishna and Venugopal a sum of Rs. 1,000/- each per mensem
for life and on their death a similar amount to their male descendants ( PurlJ.fha Santhathi) by way of allowance, the amount
payable to each branch being Rs. 1,000/- irrespective of the
number of descendants.
Venugopal, the last of the four brothers, never married and
plaintiffs 5 and 6 to the suit are his illegitimate sons. In 1932
plaintiffs 5 and 6 instituted a suit against the Estate (O.S. No. 30
of 1932) claiming maintenance allowance and relying upon the
agreement of 1889 and in the alternative on custom and Hindu
law. The Subordinate Judge found that custom was not proved
and that they were not entitled to maintenance under the Hindu
law. Bui he found that the claimants were entitled to the maintenance under the deed as Purusha Santhathi. On appeal the
High Court agreed with the finding of the trial Court as regards
the absence of any custom but differed from the interpretation
of Purusha Santhathi and held that the term was applicable only
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1970] 3 S.C.R.
to legitimate sons and not ti> illegitimate sons. 'i:he High Court,
however, took the view that the plaintiffs 5 and 6 were entiled
to maintenance under the Hindu Law. The judgment of the High
Court is reported i11 Maharaja of Venkatagiri v. Raja Rajeswara
Rao('). The matter was taken in appeal to the Judicial Committee and the Judicial Committee allowed the appeal of the
Rajah holding that the illegitimate sons of Venugopal were not
entitled to maintenance either under the agreement of 18 89 or
under the Hindu law. The decision of the Judicial Committee is
reported in Raja Krishna Yachendra v. Raja Rajeswara Rao(').
A
B
At the time of the notification of the estate under the Madras
Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 c
(Act 26 of 1948) (hereinafter called the Abolition Act), the
first defendant in the suit held! the estate and was the principal
landholder under the Act. Under s. 66 of the Abolition Act, on
and from the tilOtified date, the Madras lmpartible Estates Act,
1904 (Act 2 of 1904) shall be deemed to have been repealed in
its application to the estate. Out of the advance compensation D
first deposited, plaintiffs 1 to 4 had been paid a sum of Rs. 75,000/ •
as maintenance holders under s. 45 of the Abolition Act. They
were entitled under the Act to a further sum of Rs. 75,000/- in
the second instalment of compensation and a share in such additional compensation that may be given. They were also given
interim payments at Rs. 9,000/. per year under s. 50 of the Abolition Act. Under s. 47 of the Act they were also entitled to E
ryotwari patta.
The case of the plaintiff was that the Venkatagiri Estate
became an il)lpartible estate only under the agreement of 1889
between the parties and became a statutory impartible estate by
virtue of its .inclusion in the Schedule to the Madras Impartible
Estate Act, 1904 and that on the repeal of that enactment by
s. 66 of the Abolition Act the Estate became partible. The contention of the plaintiffs was that as junior members of a joint
family they were entitled to a share in the compensation amount
and also to a share in Schedule B properties which were not vested
in the. State Government. So far as the claim to a share in the
compensation amount is concerned, there were proceedings under
the Abolition Act itself. The suit was principally confined to the
claim for a share in the B Schedule properties and for an alternative claim for maintenance at Rs. 1,000/. p.m. So far as the
B Schedule properties are concerned, the claim was conifined to
shares in three items of immovable properties namely ( 1) Motimahal No. 187, Mount Road, Madras, (2) Venkatagiri Rajah's
Bungalow at Nellore and (3) Venkatagiri Rajah's bun'galow at
(1) l.L.R. [1939] Mad.
622~
(2) l.L.R. [1942] Mad. 419.
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VELUGOTI v. VELUGOTI (Ramaswami, J.)
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Kalahasti. Out of the movable properties the claim was confined
to sub-item 8 of item 8 of the B Schedule, that is, a golden
howdah. It is ·the case of the plaintiffs that the repeal of the impartible Estates Act by virtue of the notification will have the
effect of changing the character of the properti.es in the B Schedule and making them partible. It was contended ·that even if
for any reason the plaintiffs are not granted a share in the properties of the estate, they must be paid a sum of Rs, 1,000/- per
mensem in terms of the original agreement of April 8, 1889.
The trial Judge, Subramaniam J., held that the Venkatagiri
Zamindari was impartible by custom even apart from the agreement of 1889 and the Impartible Estates Act of 1902 a[lld 1904.
Even after the abolition of the Venkatagiri Estate the character
of impartiability was found to continue in respect of B Schedule
properties which formed part of the Zamindari. The learned
Judge held that the plaintiffs 1 to 4 were not entitled to a share
in the immovable properties of B schedule but were entitled to
recover such sum as may be needed to make up the monthly
allowance for their branch at Rs. 1,000/- p.m. after taking into
consideration the amount which plaintiffs 1 to 4 were given under
the Abolition Act. They were granted a charge for the amount
on items 1, 14 and 16 of Plaint B Schedule. Plaintiffs 1 to 4
were also given a decree for one-third share sub-item 8 of item 8
of Schedule B properties, namely, the golden howdah. So far as
plaintiffs 5 to 7 were concerned, they were held not entitled to any
relief. The plaintiffs 1 to 7 preferred appeal, O.S.A. 53 of 1961
against the judgment of the trial Judge in O.S. 351 of 1952. The
first defendant also filed OSA 40/61 against that portion of the
judgment in 0.S. 351 of 1952 whereby the trial judge held that
even after the notificatio,n of the Venkatagiri Estate under the
Abolition Act and the payment of the compensation under that
Act to plaintiffs 1 to 4 their claim for maintenance under the
agreement of April 8, 1889 continued in force and that plaintiffs
1 to 4 were entitled to a payment of Rs. 1,000/- p.m. each after
giving credit for payments made under the Abolition Act. Both
the appeals O.S.A. 53 of 191 and O.S.A. 40 of 1961 were heard
together and disposed of by a Division Bench consisting of
Chandra Reddy, C.J. and Natesan, J., by a common judgment
dated August 13, 1965. The Division Bench held that plaintiffs
1 to 4 having enjoyed the benefit of payment under s. 45 ( 5) of
the Abolition Act and got capitalised by the Tribunal of their
maintenance rights on the basis of the extinction of the Estate
cannot mak~ a further claim as if the agreement of 1889 was a
subsisting one and call upon the 1st defendant to make up for any
deficiency from the properties that had 1oot vested in the Goyernment. The Division Bench also disallowed the olaim of plaintiffs
1 to 4 for a share ·in the value of the golden howdahs. It was
94
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970] 3 S.C.R.
pointed out that silver, and the golden howdah were not treated A
as an impartible but were actually divided among the family members. Accordingly the Division Bench allowed the appeal O.S.A.
40 of 1961 filed by the 1st defend·?nt. In regard to C.S.A. 53
of 1961 the Division Bench held the claim that the Venkatagiri
Estate was not an impartible estate by custom was devoid of
merit. It was pointed out that before the Special Tribunal under B
the Abolition Act the plaintiffs had advanced the same contention
but it was rejected. Plaintiffs 1 to 4 filed an appeal to this Court
against the decision of the Special Tribunal. The decision of
this Court is reported in Raja Muvva Gopalakrishna Yachendra
and others v. Raja V. V. Sarvagana Krishna Y achendra and
others('). Before this Court plaintiff I to 4 did not question c
the finding of the Special Tribunal that Venkatagiri Estate was
an impartible Estate. On the other hand the contention advanced
by the plaintiffs was that the Venkatagiri Estate was impartible
by custom and that the impartibility continued under the Madras
Impartible Estates Act but ceased when the estate vested in the
St!tte Government. The Division Bench upon an examination of
the evidence held that Venkatagiri Estate was an impartible D
estate by custom and was not made impartible for the first time
under the agreement of 1889 or by Acts of 1902 or 1904. The
claim for partition made by plaintiffs in respect of the B Schedule
immovable properties was negatived. As regards the claim to
maintenance made by plaintiffs 5 to 7 the Division Bench held
that a similar claim had been rejected previously by the Judicial E
Committee as not tenable either under the Agreement of 1889 or
under Hindu Law or on the basis of custom. In the result OSA
53 of 1961 filed by the plaintiffs was dismissed. OSA 40 of
1961 preferred by the !st de.fendant was allowed and·the suit was
dismissed in its entirety.
The first question to be considered in this appeal is whether F
the plaintiffs are entitled to claim a share in the three items of
immovable properties of B Schedule already referred to. The
argument on their behalf may be summarised as follows : Venkatagiri Estate admittedly an ancestral estate was not impartible by
custom but for the first time by the agreement of 1889 the parties
thereto agreed to hold it as an impartible estate. succession being G
governed by the law of primogeniture. The arrangement was
brought about to preserve the integrity of the Estate and to preserve its past glory. By reason of the notification ot. the Estate
under the Abolition Act and the vesting of the Estate in the Government the purpose for which the agreement was entered into
was frustrated. The agreement of 1889 could therefore be no
longer relied upon for preserving the impartible character of the
Estate or what was left of it. The three items of immovable
(l) [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 280.
VllLUGOTI V. VELUGOT! (Ramaswami, J.)
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properties though outside the territorial limits of_ the Zamindari
were held impartible only as appurtenant to the main Estate and,
after the impartible character of the main estate was lost, these
properties became partible. Even though the estate was treated
as an impartible estate, it was an ancestral estate as there
was joint ownership of the Estate in the family members. Plaintiffs 1 to 4, therefore, were entitled to one-third share of the properties of B Schedule which are not vested in the Government and
plaintiffs 5 to 7 were entitled similarly to another one-third share.
In {1ur opinion the contention of the plaintiffs 'that Venkatagiri
Estate was not impartible by custom is untenable. The early
history of the Zamindari is summarised in Gopa/krishna v.
Sarvagna Krishna(') as follows :
The estate of Venkatagiri has been in existence
since Muhamadan times. . On the disruption of the
Moghal Empire, it owed allegiance to the Nawabs
of Arcot. In addition to the payment of peshkush
they had to maintain an armed force for the assistance
of Government in times of disorder or rebellion.
As a result of the treaty between the East India Company
on the one side and the Nawab of Arcot on the 0ther
the Administration of that part of the country under the
suzerainty of the latter was made over to the Brifoh.
Under this treaty the Zamindary of Venkatagiri was
recognised and the Rajah had to pay to the East India
Company what he was paying before to the Muhammadan rulers. Sometime later, in accordance with the
arrangement entered into between the Zamindars in
Western Arcot and Lord Clive, the East India Company
took over the responsibility for the preservation of law
and order and the Zamindars were relieved of the task
of maintaining armed forces and in its stead they
undertook to pay an additional revenue on their
estate, which was added to the peshkush. It was
assured that the fixed peshkush would remain unalterable. In pursuance of this agreement, a sanad was
granted in 1802 to the Zamindar of Venkatagiri and
other Zamindars embodying the terms agreed upon.
Ever since, successive Zamindars held the estate paying
peshkush which has been invariable."
The Estate is described in the official documents in the year 180 l
as one of the Western palayama. It was observed by the Privy
Council in Naragun) Lutchmeedavamah v.Vengama Naidoo('):
(I) (1955)
A.W.R.
590.
(21 9 M.l.A. 66.
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[1970] 3 S.C.R.
A
A Polliam is explained in Wilson's Glossary to be
"a tract of country subject· to a petty Chieftain." In
•speaking of Polligars, he describes them as having been
originally petty Chieftains occupying usuaJly tracts of
hill or forest, subject to pay tribute and service to "the
paramount State, but seldom paying either, and more or
less independent, but as having, at present, since the
B
subjugation of the country by the East India Company,
subsidecl into peaceable landholders. This corresponds
with the account read at the Bar from the Report of
the Select tommittee on the affairs of India, in 1812.
A Polliam is in the nature of a Raj; it may belong to
an undivided family, but it is not the subject of partic
tion; it can be held by only one member of the family
at a time, who is styled the Polligar, the other members
of 'the family being entitled to a maintenance or allowance out of the estate.
The document of 1889 also negatives the case of the plaintiffs
that the Estate was made impar\ible for the first time by that D
do.cument. The language of the document clearly shows that it
only recognised the then subsisting impartible character of the
Estate. In other words the document proceeds on the assumption that the Zamindari was made impartible by custom from
the very beginning. The relevant portion of the Agreement of
1889 Ex, A-1 is to the foJlowing effect:
"On the 18th April 1889, the Contract entered in
writing by Raja Velugoti Rajagopala Krishna Yachandra Bahadur, Rajah of Venkatagiri, eldest son of Sri
R:aja Velugoti Kumara Yachama Naidu and his three
uterine brothers (1) Muddu Krishna, (2) Venkatakrishna. and ( 3) Minor Venugopala by his father and
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guardian Raja Velugoti Kumara Yachama Naidu is as
follows : Out of the sons of the said Sri Raja Velugoti
Kumara Yachama Naidu, excluding the three .... who,
have been given in adoption .... while we remaining
fpur brothers comprising the parties to this document
are sons oi the said Raja V. Kumara Yachama Naidu
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and members of an undivided family; because the
Venkatagiri Estate is impartible and subject to the law
of Primogeniture our father Sri Raja V. Kumara
Yachama Naidu, with the intention of his seeing, and
approving of, the ruling of the estate by his eldest son
the Raja Rajagopala Krishna, and with the intention of
passing his time thereafter in future in the meditation
H
of God, as means to attain to the world beyond, transferred qn the 28th October, 1878 to the eldest of us
four ~\~ heir apparent to the estate, namely, the
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Raja Rajagopala Krishna, Raja of Venkatagiri, the
Venkatagiri Zamindari, the immovable Properties
relating thereto, the other immovable properties which
were acquired by means of the income of the said
Zamindari and all his ancestral and his, self acquired
movable properties, excepting the nine lakhs and odd
rupees and all the properties connected therewith
including its accretions which he retained for his charitable expenses. Since, then, the aforesaid Raja Rajagopala Krishna Yachandra, Raja of Venkatagiri, has
been ruling the estate ...... When the matters stood
thus, on account of ill-feeling that arose between some
of us, two of· us, namely Muddukrishna Yachendrulu
and Venkata Krishna Yachendrulu, expressed the.desire
that the said Venkatagiri Zamindari, the immovable
properties connected therewith, the other immovable
properties acquired by means of the income of the said
Venkatagiri Zamindari and all the movable properties
should be divided into four shares and their respective
shares should be given to them. The Raja Rajagopalakrishna, Raja of Venkatagjri, becoming aware of this
fact, contendect that the Venkatagiri Zamindari, the
other immovable properties connected therewith, the
other immovable properties which were acquired by his
father out of the income of that Zamindari and transferred by him to him alongwith the estate and ancestral
and sell acquired movable properties of his father which
the latter transferred to him alongwith the estate, were
impartible. "Thereupon, all of us brothers consulted
about the afore-mentioned points of dispute, our father
who is all-knowing and who has considerable experience. He considered it well and positively expressed
his opinion that, regard to immovable property the
Venkatagiri Zamindari was originally earned by our
ancestors by rebson of valour in war, that it was an
ancient Zamindari, that it was an impartible estate
devolving along the eldest line of descendants, that it
was permanently settled, that, whem Sannad Milikiyat
Istimirar was granted to the ancestors, who was then the
Zamindar of Venkatagiri, the peshkush for this Venkatagiri Estate was fixed with reference to the amount of
expenses of the military troops and servants which ~e
(our ancestor) was supplying and with reference to
the money paid as tribute to the former Government,
namely, Nawab, that therefore this Venkatagiri estate
was not partible, that the immovable properties connected therewith, ·and other immovable properties acquired
by means of the income of the said estate were also, of
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(1970] 3 S.C.R.
course, impartible--that, in regard to movable property,
hfa ancestral and self-acquired money in cash, the
money consisting of deposits kept in the firms
of Arbuthnot & Co., and Binny & Co., all the silver,
gold and precious stones, jewels, which were on the
26th October, 1878 transferred along with the said
Venkatagiri Estate to this eldest son, the Raja Rajagopala Krishna, Raja of Venkatagiri, together with the
accretions thereto upto now should be divided equally
among his four sons who are among the parties to this
document-that such would be a just arrangement. In
regard to our father's opinion about the immovable
property, the three youngest of us brothers consulted
their proper friends and in regard to our father's opinion
about the aforementioned movable properties which
were acquired by Raja Velugoti Kumara Yachama and
transferred along with the Venkatagiri Estate, the eldest
of these four brothers, .... consulted his proper friends.
On account of the cogent reasons urged by the respective friends of these both parties, and for the reasons
urged by the respective friends of these both parties,
and for the reason that all family feuds would (thereby)
end and compromise:! the opinions of one of the
parties to this document, namely, Raja Velugoti Kumara
Yachama Naidu. on the two points referred to above
have been agreed in, as certainly correct and accepted,
by the remaining parties, namely, we four brothers.
Therefore, the parties to this document, namely, we four
brothers, and our .father Raja Velugoti Kumara
Y achama do now jointly and severally hereby determine, agree and affirm as follows :
A
B
c
D
E
F
"All this Venkatagiri Estate is impartible descendible along the eldest line (of descent) ,of the said
Estate, the immovab!e properties· connected therewith
and the other immovable properties acquired by means
of the income of the said estate silollld be enjoyed by
the eldest of us four brothers and the heir of the aforesaid Raja Velugoti Kumara Yachama namely the
aforesaid Velugoti Rajagopala Krishna and after him
by his son. soi!l's son and so on in the eldest male line
of descelll . ..... subject to the condition of paying
allowances to other members of our family, suitably to
their respective status out of the income from the estate
and the properties. And so we divide in the manner
shown below all the money, silver, gold and precious
stones, jewels and the accretions resulti!11g thereto upto
G
H
VELUGOTI v. VELUGOTI
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
(Ramaswami, !.)
99
this day which formed ancestral and self acquisition of
our father. . . . . . along with the said estate ...... "
Counsel for the plaintiffs has been unable to show any tenn
in this Agreement to support his contention that it was only by
virtue of that document that the parties agreed to call the Estate
impartible. On the contrary the document indicates that there
was clear recognition by the executants of the then character of
the Estate as an impartible zamindari.
We shall then deal with the inclusion of the Venkatagiri
Zamindari in the lmpartible Estates Act passed by the Madras
Legislature in 1902 and 1904. These Acts became necessary
as a result of the ruling of the Privy Council in Sri Raja Rao
Venkata Mahipati Rama Krishna Rao Bahadur v. The Court of
Wards('). The decision of the Judicial Committee was given in
1889 and the Impartible Estates Act was passed in Madras in
1902 with a view to preserve the ancient zamindaris of the Madras
Presidency. Referring to the Schedule to the Act the statement
of objects and reasons explained that the schedule contained only
Permanent Settlement E>tates in existence before the date of
Permanent Settlement Regulations and which have been declared
by the judicial decisions to be impartible or local!y considered by
ancient custom to be so impartible and had in fact descended
without partition since that date. The Impartible Estates Act,
1904 finally took the place of 1902 Act. The Estate of Venkatagiri has been included in the schedule annexed to both the Impartible Estates Acts. The obvious inference is that the Government
had made enquiries and were satisfied that the Estates
included in the schedule to Act 2 of 1904 were impartible and the
inclusion of the Estates therein is a legislative determination that
they were impartible. In Pushavathi Viziaram Gajapalhi Raj
Manne v. Pushpavathi Visweswar Gajapathi Rai(') this Court
observed:
"Soon after these decisions were pronounced by the
Privy Council, the Madras Legislature stepped in
because those decisions very rudely disturbed the view
held in Madras about the imitations on the powers of
holders of impartible estates in the matter of making
alienations of the said estates. That led to the passing
of the Madras lmpartible- Estates Acts 1111902,
II/ 1903 and Il/1904. The Legislature took the precaution of making necessary enquiries in regard to
impartible estates within the State and made what the
legislature thought were necessary provisions in respect
of the terms and conditions on which the said estates
were held."
(I) I.LR. 22 Mad, 383,
(2) [1964] 2 S.C.R. 'OJ.
100
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1970] 3 s.c.a.
In these circumstances we see no reason to differ from the
finding of the High Court that the Estate of Venkatagiri was an
ancient impartible Estate by custom and was not made impartible
for the first time under the agreement of 18ls9 or by the Madras
Acts_of 1902 and 1904.
The next question for determination is what is the effect of
the Abolition Act on the rights and obligations of the members
of the family in relation to the Venkatagiri Zamindari. According to the plaintiffs the property described in the B Schedule
appended to the plaint did not vest under s. 3 ( b) of the Abolition
Act. The properties in the B Schedule include a building in
Mount Road, Madras a bungalow at Kalahasti and the District
Judge's bungalow at Nellore Town. These buildings are si(uatea
outside the territorial limits of the Venkatagiri Estate. Section
3(a) and (b) of the Abolition Act states :
"3. With effect on and .from the notified date and save
as otherwise expressly provided in this Act1 (a) [the Madras Estates] Land (Reduction of
Rent) Act, 1947 (Madras Act XXX of 1947) 3 [in
so far as it relates] to matters other than the reduction
of rents and the collection of arrears of rent and the
Madras Permanent Settlement Regulation, 1802
(Madras Regulation XXV of 1802), the Madras
Estates Land Act, 1908 (Madras Act I of 1908), and
all other enactments applicable to the estate as such
shall be deemed to have been repealed in their application to the estate.]
( b) the entire estate (including all communal
lands; porambokes; other non-ryoti lands; waste lands;
pasture lands; Janka lands; forests; mines and minerals;
quarries; rivers and streams; tanks and irrigation works;
fisheries and ferries), shall stand transferred to the
Government and vest in them, free of all encumbrances
and the Madras Revenue Recovery Act, 1864, the
Madras Irrig.ation Cess Act, 1865, and all other enactments applicable to ryotwari areas shall apply to the
es'tate;
,
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
Section I ( 3), state :
H
(3) It applies to all estates as defined in section 3,
clause ( 2), of the Madras Estates Land Act, . 1908,
VELUGOTI v. VELUGOTI (Ramaswami, J.)
A
101
except inam villages which became estates by virtue of
the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act,
i936.
Section 2 ( 3) defines "estate" to mean ....
B
( 3) "estate" means a Zamindari on an undertenure
or an inam estate;
c
Section 2 (16) defines "Zamindari" as follow> :
( 16) "zamindari estate" means-
D
( i) an estate within the meaning of section 3, clause
( 2) (a), of the Estates Land Act, after excluding therefrom every portion which is itself an estate under
section 3, clause (2) (b) or (2)(e), of that Act; or
(ii) an estate within the meaning of section 3, clause
2(b) or 2(c), of the Estates l.Jand Act, after excluding therefrom every portion which is itself an estate
under section 3, clause (2 )( e), of that Act.
E
F
G
H
Section 3 (2) of Estate Land Act (Madras Act I
1908) defined an "estate" to mean.:
(a) any permanently-settled estate or temporarilysettled zamindari;
(b) any portion of such permanently-settled estate
or temporarily-settled zamindari which is separately registered in the office of the Collector;
( c) any unsettled palaiyan o: jagir;
x
x
x
x
Section 2 ( 2) of the Madras lmpartible Estates Act, 1904
(Madras Act 2 of 1904) defines an "impartible estate" as an
estate descendible to a single heir and subject to the other incidents of impartible estates in Southern India. In relation to the
Venkatagiri Zarnindari the expression Estate in s: 3 (a) of the
Abolition Act refers obviously to the Venkatagiri Estate which till
then was subject to the operation of the Madras Pennanent Set!lement Regulation and the Madras Estates Lands ~~t. In relation
to the Venkatagiri Zamindari s. 66 of the Aboht1on Act enacts
102
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970]3 S.C.R.
that with effect from the notified date the Madras Impartible
Estates Act, 1904 shall be deemed to have been repealed in its
application to the Estate. The question arises whether the word
"estate" in s. 66 of the Abolition Act denotes the zamindari consisting of properties which stood transferred to the Government
under the Abolition Act and properties which are not so transferred, or whether the expression 'estate' refers to only the Venkatagiri Estate which until the notification issued under the Abolition Act took effect was the subject of the Permanent Settlement
Regulation and the Madras Estates Land Act. The High Court
has given sufficient reasons in suppo~t of its view that the word
"estate" in s. 65 of the Abolition Act denotes only the estate
Governed by the Permanent Settlement Regulation and the Estates
Land Act and not any other part of the impartible zamindari.
In other words the Abolition Act has no application to properties
which are outside the territorial limits of the Venkatagiri Estate.
The result, therefore, is that in relation to Venkatagiri ZaminJari
the Madras Impartible Estates Act has been repealed so far as
the Act applied to the Estate which by operation of s. 3 (b) of the
Abolition Act has got transferred and became vested in the State
Government. In relation to other properties which have not become so vested in the Govemment the Madras Imartible Estates
Act ( 1904) continues to be in force. lt is the case of the plaintiffs that items 14, 15 and 16 of Schedule B did not vest in the
Government under s. 3(b) of the Act. Item 14, 15 and 16 are
Motimahal, Mount Rold Madras, the District Judge's Bungalr
Nellore and Vengatagiri Raja's bungalow, Kalahasti. It is conceded on behalf of defendant No. l that items 14, 15 and 16 did
not vest in the Government under s. 3 (b) o.f the Abolition Act.
It is further claimed on behalf of the plaintiffs that items 14, 15
and 16 have become partible properties after the coming into force
of the Abolition Act and plaintiffs should be granted their shares
of these properties. The contention of the plaintiffs is that the
Zamindari was made impartible by the agreement entered into by
the brothers in 1889 and the properties which have not been taken
over by the Government should be divided among the family
members. We have already given reasons for the view that the
Zamindari was impartible independently of the agreement c.f 1889
and that the agreement was no more than a conscious affirmation by the parties of what the position was previously in fact
and in law. To put it differently the agreement of 1889 mer·~ly
acknowledged and defined antecedent rights and antecedent obligations. It is therefore difficult to accept the contention of the
plaintiffs that the three items of property in Schedule B have become partible properties. Since the Abolition Act did not affect
these items the properties have continued to be whnt they were
at the time of mcorporation with the zamindari, namely the properties retain their impartible character.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
VELUGOTI V. VELUGOTI
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
(Ramaswami, J.)
103
We are also not impressed with the argument that as there was
incorporation of the buildings with the original impartible estate the
building ceased to have any impartible character when the impartibility of the parent estate was gone. It is trYe that the buildings
which are outside the geographical limits of the Venkatagiri
Zamindari cannot be brought within the definition of the Estate
as defined in the Estates Lands Act and the Abolition Act cannot
therefore be made applicable to such buildings. But the buildings have acquired the character of impartibility as a result of
incorporation with the parent estate and that character cannot be
lost unless the statute intervenes. Section 4 of the Impartible
Estates Act itself contemplates parts of an Estate being impartible.
In Pushavathi Viziaram Gajapathi Raj Manne v. Pushavathi
Visweswar Gajapathi Raj(') the effect of integration is described
as follows :
"In all such cases, the crucial test is one of intention. It would be noticed that the effect of incorporation in such cases is the reverse of the effect of blending
self-acquired property with the joint family property.
In the latter category of cases where a person acquires
separate property and blendG it with the property of the
joint family of which he is a co-parcener, the separate
property loses its character as a separate acquisition and
merges in the joint family property, with the result that
devolution in respect of that property is then governed
by survivorship and not by succession. On the other
hand, if the holder of an impartible estate acquires property and incorporates it with the impartible estate he
makes it a part of the impartible estate with the result.
that the acquisition ceases to be partible and becomes
impartible. In both cases, however, the essential test is
one of intention and so, wherever intention is proved,
either by conduct or otherwise, an inference as to blending or incorporation would be drawn."
It was urged on behalf of the plaintiffs that the effect of the
Abolition Act in regard to Venkatagiri Estate was to take away
the character of impartibility in relation to property both inside
and outside the territorial limits of the Estate. It was also contended that the object of the Abolition Act was threefold : ( 1) to
eliminate the class of middlemen ( 2) to abolish pernianent settlement and ( 3) to ~traduce ryotwari system. The argument was
that in the face of. the avowec) objects of the legisbtion it was
futile to contend that the character of impartibility still continued
in a trun~ated form. It was said Cessante ratione legis, cassµt et
ipsa lex (reason is the soul of the law and when the reason for
(I) [1964] 2
~.C.R.
403.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970] 3 S.C.R.
any particular law ceases, so does the law itself). It is not possible to accept this principle in the present case. For, many times
custom outlives the condition of things which give it birth. As
observed by Lord Atkinson in Rai Kishore Singh v. Mst. Gahenabai(')
It is difficult to see why a family should not similarly
agree expressly or impliedly to continue to observe a
custom necessitated by the condition of things existing in
primitive times after that condition had completely altered. Therefore, the principle embodied in the expression 'cessat ratio cessat lex' does not apply where the
custom outlives the condition of things which gave it
birth."
A
B
c
We accordingly reject the contention of the plaintiff on this aspect
of the case.
We are also Ult'lable to accept the contention of the plaintiffs
that the property of the impartible estate was held in coparcenary as joint family property and became partible amongst the
members once it Jost its .character of impartibi!ity. Jn other
words the contention was that junior members had a present
interest in the impartible estate and were entitled to a share in
the estate once impartibility was removed. In our opinion there
is no justification for this argument. The law regarding the
nature and incidents of impartible estate is now well settled.
Jmpartibility is essentially a creature of custom. The junior members of a joint ;family in the case of ancient impartible joint family
estate take no right in the property by birth, and therefore, have
no right of partition havill!g regard to the very nature of the
estate that it is impartible. secondly, they have no right to interdict alienations by the head of the family either for necessity or
otherwise. This, of course, is subject to s. 4 of the Madras
lmpartible Estates 9\ct in the case of impartible estates governed
by the Act. The right of junior members of the family for
inainte,nance is governed by custom and is nbt based upon any
joint right or interest in the property as co-owners. This is now
made clear by the judicial committee in C.l.T. Punjab v. Dewan
Krishna Kishore(') and Raja Velugoti Sarvagna Kumara
Krishna Yachendra Bahadur Varu v. Raja Rajeswara Rao(')
The in,come of the impartible estate is· the individual income of
the holder of the estate and is not the income of the joint family.
In the former case Sir George Rankin observed :
'
"But they find it necessary to say that the law as declared iµ the cases of Baijnath (2) and Shiba Prasad
(I) A.T.R. 1919 P.C. 100.
(2) 68 1.A. 155.
(31 6' 1.A. 181.
D
E
F
G
H
VELUGOTI v. VELUGOTI (Ramaswami, I.)
A
B
c
D
E
105
Singh ( 3) has not been unsettled by the Gorakhpur
case ( l). The observation itself and its context.show
that the reference to the other judgments of the Board
is controlled by the reference to Baijnath's case (2) as
having negatived the view that an impartible estate
could ~t be iii any sense joint family property. The
issue in the Gorakhpur case ( l) was Indal']it's right to
succeed, and the passage cited was addressed to that.
It appears to waive aside, as no longer an obstacle, the
extreme logic that as there is no right to a partition the
junior branch could have no right, actual or prospective, which the enjoyment of maintenance could evidence. It need not be taken as swinging to the opposite
extreme, indeed, it would be in a high degree unreasonable, havin~ regard to the line of decisions, to imerpret
it as meamng that there is no reason why holders of
impartible estates should not now be told that, unless
they can prove a custom to the contrary, ail junior
male members of the family have a claim for maintenance that is, all who have not relinquished their right
of succession. ·The point made is only this, that rights
of maintenance out of an impartible family estatehowever little they may be, and to whichever member
they be extended-would not be enjoyed or enjoyable by
anyone who had ceased to be jomt in respect of the
estate. In their Lordships' opinion, this should not be
taken to affirm a.ny disputable doctrine as to the origin
of the right of maintenance, or any other doctrine which
would make junior members "actual co-owners" or the
right a "real right" in the sense negative by the Board
in Baijnath's case (2)."
To this extent the general law of Mitakshara applicable to joint
family property has been modified by custom and an impartible
estate, though it may be an ancestra1 joint family estate, is
clothed with the incidents of self-acquired and separate property
to that extent. The only vestige of the incidents of joint fami\y
property, which still attaches to the joint family impartible estate
G is the right of survivorship which, of course, is not inconsistent
with the custom of impartibility.- For the purpose of devolution
of the property, the property is assumed to be joint family property and the only right which a member of the joint family
acquires by birth is to take the property by survivorship but he
does not acquire any interest in the property itself. The right
It to take by survivorship continues only so Jong as the joint family
does not cease to exist and the only manner by which this ri!rht
of survivorship could be put an end to is by estabhshing that the
estate ceased to be 'joint family property for the purpose of sucL6 Sup. c.1.n0-s
F
106
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970] 3 S.CR.
cession by proving an intention, express or implied, on behalf of
the junior members of the family to renounce or surrender the
right to succeed to the estate. In the latest case Anant Bhikappa
v. Shankar Ramchandra(') the judicial committee clearly affirmed
the principle that the proper!y w·as not held in coparcenary.
"Now an impartible estate is not held in coparcenary (Rani Sartaj Kauri v. Rani Deoraj Kuari) though
it may be joint family property. It may doolve as
joint family property or as separate property of the last
male owner. In the former case, it goes by survivorship to that individual, among those male members who
in fact and in law are undivided in respect of the estate,
who is singled out by the special custom, e.g., lineal
male primogeniture. In the latter case jointness and
survivorship are not as such in point; the estate devolves
by inheritance from the last male owner in the order
prescribed by the special custom or according to the
ordinary law of inheritance as modified by custom."
We proceed to consider the next question arising in this appeal
namely whether the agreement of 1889 in so far as it related to
payment of maintenance allowance of Rs. 1,000 p.m. to plaintiffs
1 to 4 continues to be in force even after the abolition of the
Estate and the vesting of the Zamindari estate in the Government
under the Abolition Act. It was argued on behalf of defendant
No. 1 that plaintiffs have enjoyed the benefit of payment under
s. 45 ( 5) of the Abolition Act and got capitalised bv the Tribunal
the maintenance rights on the basis of the extinction of the Estate.
Section 45(1), (4) and (5) of the Abolition Act states:
"45. (1) In the case of an irnpartible estate which
had to be regarded as the property ol' a joint Hindu
family for the purpose of ascertaining the succession
thereto immediately before the notified date, the
following provisions shall apply."
( 4) The portion of the aggregate compensation
aforesaid payable to the maintenance-holders sha!J be
determined by the Tribunal and notwithstanding any .
arrangement already made in respect of maintenance
whether by a decree or order of a Court, award or other
instrument in writing or contract or family arrangement,
such portion shall not exceed one-fifth of the remain<!er
referred to in sub-section (3), except in the case referred
to in the second proviso to section 47, sub-section (2).
(I) 70 1..A. 232.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
VELUGOTI v. VELUGOTJ
A
B
c
(Ramaswami, J.)
107
( 5) (a) The Tribunal shall, in detennining the
amount of the compensation payable to the maintenanceholders and apportioning the same among them, have
regard, as far as possible, to the following considerations, namely : (i) the compensation payable in respect of the
estate;
(ii) the number of persons to be maintained out of
the estate;
(iii) the nearness of relationship of the person claiming to be maintained;
(iv) the other sources Di income of the claimant; and
( v) the circumstances of the family of the claimant.
D
E
F
G
(b) For the purpose of securing (i) that the amount
of compensation payable to the maintenance-holders
does :not exceed the limit specified in sub-section ( 4) and
(ii) that the same is apportioned among them on an
equitable basis, the Tribunal shall have power. wherever
necessary, to re-open any arrangement already made in
respect of maintenance, whether by a decree or order of
a Court, award, or other instrument in writing, or contract or family arrangement."
Under the Agreement of 1889 plaintiffs 1 to 4 are entitled to an
allowance Di Rs. 1,000/ - if paid out of the income of the Zamindari, that is to say, the income of the Venkatagiri Estate strictly
so called and the income of the properties which did not get transferred to the Government under the' Abolition Act. The Madras
Impartible Estates Act, 1904 provides by section 9 for the payment
of maintenance of junior members of an impartible Zamindari
family.
"9. Where for the purpose of ascertaining the succession to an impartible estate, the estate has to be regarded
as the property of a joint Hindu family, the following
persons shall have a right of maintenance out of the
impartible estate and its income, namely : (a) the son, grandson, or great-grandson, in the
male line, born in lawful wedlock or adopted, of the
proprietor of the impartible estate or of. any previous
proprietor thereof.
H
Provided that where maintenance is payable to a son
or grandson, by or under any decree or order of court.
award, contract, family arrangement or other instrument
'
- ...... ·>~--·,'-·~'---\·-:--. _,
.---. -
: t
~
108 \ ' ,\ ·
._
,/
·.' ,·',' ~ '-.
.. /'
',·.,. f
. -----;
I
... 1,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
',,
-
.--
'
,1_'
[1970] 3 s.c.R.
~-----~-·-- -- .
·-c_
·-
'
· ,-in writing, ' and :_such instrument,- - express!)'. . or . by
-. necessary implication, makes it clear that the maintenance
is payable to Such son or grandson ~as representing his
branch of the family, it shall not· be open to a soo or
'grandson of such son, or to a son of such grandson, as
_the case may be, during the period for which such maintenance is payable, to claim maintenance either in his
indiV:idual right or as representing his branch of the
·
family;
(b) the widow -of any previous proprietor of the
impartible estate so long as she does not remarry.
"(c) the widow of the son, grandson or greatgrandson of· the proprietor of the impartible estate or
of any previous proprietor thereof, so long as she does
not remarry, provided she has no son · or grandson
living; _
( d) the unmarried daughter born in lawful wedlock
of the proprietor of the impartib!e estate or any previom
proprietor thereof; and ·'
(e) the unmarried daughter, born in lawful wedlock, of a son or grandson of the proprietor of the
impartible estate or of any, previous proprietor thereof,
provided she has neither father nor mother nor a brother
living.
Explanation.-Maintenance shall, where necessary,
- include a provision for residence and in the case of an
unmarried daughter of the proprietor or any· previous
proprietor, a provision for the expenses of her marriage
.in accordance with the scale customary in the family."
Where there is in force an agreement relating to payment of 'maintenance the Act does not authorise reduction of the quantum of
maintenance provided by such agreement except in the circumstances stated ins. 14(2)-circumstances which are not applicable
to the present case.. It is admitted that junior members of the
Venkatagiri family were receiving maintenance, under the Agreement of 1889 until the coming into force of the Abolition Act.
- Section 45(2) of the Abolition Act provides for the ascertainment of the ainount of maintenance payable to persons who, before
the notified ·date, were entitled to maintenance out of the estate
and its income either under s. 9 or s. 12 of the Madras lmpartible
Estates Act or under any contract or family arrangement. The
total sum payable to the maintena:nce holders out of the compen-sation should not under s. 45 ( 4) exceed one-fifth of the remainder
of the compensation afMr the claims of creditors are satisfied. It
is not possible to accept the argument of defendant No. 1 that s. 45
A
I'
B
...
_
c
D
{
E
F
G
--
),
!
H
•
VELUGOTI v. VELUGOTI (Ramaswami, /.)
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
109
should be construed as extinguishing the right secured to junior
members under the provisions of contract or famliy arrangement
granting a new right limited to the measure stated in the section.
It is manifest that s. 45 is concerned only with the apportionment
of compensation amount. The section is concerned with the rights
and liabilities in relation to properties which are represented by the
compensation. There may be a case of an impartible Zamindari
where the properties not transferred under s. 3 (b) are quite as
valuable as the properties transferred. If, in such a case, there is
a contract or family arrangement for the payment of maintenance,
such contract or family arra;ngement would as regards the quantum
of the allowance, have some relation to the total income of the
properties of the Zamindari. In the absence of express words to
that effect, it would not be right in our opinion to attribute to the
Legislature an intention to free the properties not trainsferred to
the Government by the operation of s. 3 (b) of the Act from liability to contribute towards the maintenance of the junior members
under such a contract or family arrangement, and, while leaving
the landholder in possession of those other properties, limit the
maintenance holders to a share of a fifth of the compensation
amount. We are therefore unable to accept the argument that
ss. 45 to 47 of the Abolition Act have the effect of extinguishing
any rights which the junior members of the zamindari family may
have had before the notified date to receive maintenance out of the
entire income of the zamindari under the contract or family
arrangement. It follows that the agreemem of 1889 in so far as
it relates to payment of maintenance of Rs. 1,000/- p.m. to plaintiffs l to 4 continues to 'be in force in spite of the coming into
operation of the Abolition Act.
Under the Agreeme,nt of 1889 plaintiffs l to 4 are entitled to
payment of Rs. 1,000/- per month from the income of the Venkatagiri Zamindari. That part of the zamindari which consisted of the
Venkatagiri Estate has been converted into compensation deposited
and to be deposited in the office oi the Tribunal. The first defendant and plaintiffs 1 to 4 would also be entitled to ryotwari pattas
under ss. 12 and 47 of the Abolition Act. It is not disputed that
plaintiffs l to 4 have been paid Rs. 75,000/- when the second
instalment of compensation is deposited by the Government. If
additional compensation is allowed under s. 543 of the Abolition
Act plaintiffs l to 4 would get a part of such additional compensation, The trial Judge calculated that plaintiffs 1 to 4 have been
paid total amount of compensation to the extent of Rs. J,37,000/-.
Interest on this amount at 3!% p.a. works out to Rs. 4,7951. p.a.
The trial Judge directed that plaintiffs l to 4 would be entitled to
payment of such additional sums which together with interest would
add up· to Rs. 1,000/- p.rn. In other words the plaintiffs .1 to 4
were held entitled to recover from defendant No. 1 the difference
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between the interest payable on the compensation and the sum of
Rs. 1,000/ · p.m. and the difference was made a charge on items
1, 14 and 16 oi Schedule B properties. The trial Judge directed
that interest should be calculated at 3t % p.a. on the compensation
amount. In our opinion the proper rate of interest should be
5!% p.a. Subject to the modification we consider that the decree
granted by the trial Judge should be restored if during any part of
the period subsequent to September 7, 1949 plaintiffs 1 to 4 have
not been in receipt of the amount of Rs. 1,000/· per month calcu~
lated in the above manner they would be at liberty to file an application for the recovery of such sums as may be nee.ded to make up
the allowance to Rs. 1,000/- per month for that period. For such
decree as may be passed on such application a charge is created on
items 1, 14 and 16 of plaint Schedule B properties.
We pass on to consider the question whether plaintiff& 5 to 7
are also entitled to maintenance at the rate of Rs. 1,000/. p.m.
according to the agreement of 1889. Plaintiffs 5 and 6 are illegitimate sons oi Raja Venugopal, the youngest of the four brothers who
entered into the Agreement. The seventh plaintiff is the son of the
5th plaintiff. The material part of the document states :
"After the life of the said Sri Venugopala Krishna
Y achendrulu, his purusha santhathi, sha!l, in peq>etuity,
be paid the same allowance amount, that is, at the rate
of rupees one thousand (Rs. 1,000) per month, in the
aforesaid ma;nner. But, if, at any time, in any one of the
eranches of the said Sri Muttukrishna Yachendrulu, Sri
Venkatakrishna Yachendrulu and Sri Venugopala
Krishna Yachendrulu, there be more than one male
member, much males, and their purusha santhathi shall
take the said allowance amount of rupees one thousand
in proportion to their respective shares, in the same
manner as they would respectively take their other properties separately by way oi inheritance according to the
Hindu Law."
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The Subordinate Judge, Nellore held in O.S. No. 30 of 1932 that
plaintiffs 5 and 6 were not the Purusha Santhath/ of. Venugopal.
The decision was affirmed by the High Court in Maharajah of
Venkatagiri v. Raja Rajeswara Rao(') and on appeal against the
judgment of the High Court was dismissed by the Judicial Committee. That decision is binding upon the plaintiffs 5 and 6 on
the ground of res judicata. The seventh plaintiff as the son oi the
5th plaintiff can claim no higher rights than the 5th plaint1ff. It
was contended that plaintiffs 5 to 7 were entitled to claim that
(i) I LR. 1933 Mad. 622.
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VELUGOTI v. VELUGOTJ
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(Ramaswami, J.)
11 l
allowance under certain other clauses of the agreement of 1889
Reference was made to the following clause :
"Moreover, if in any of the aforesaid three branches
of our family, viz., the branch of Sri Muttukrishna
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Yachendrulu, the branch of Venkatakrishna Yachendrulu, and the branch of the minor Sri Venugopala
Krishna Yachendrulu, any male should die without
purusha Santhathi either by way of aurasa or by way of
adoption, the allowance amount that was being rece1Ved
by the person who so died without purusha Santhathi
shall go to the gnatis (agnates) who are nearest to him
in his own branch according to Hindu Law. Should the
aforesaid person who dies without purusha santhathi
ltave any widow or widows and maintenance has to be
paid .to them, only the nearest gnatis who get the allowance of such deceased person in the manner mentioned
above shall be liable therefor. Further should any of the
said three branches of our family become extinct by the
total absence of purusha santhathi either by way of
aurasa or by way of adoption, the allowance being paid
to that branch shall be stopped subject to the condition
that, if there be then a widow or widows left of the last
male who died in that branch, one-half of the allowance
of. rupees one thousand (Rs. 1,000) that was being paid
to that male, namely, Rupees five hundred (Rs. 500),
shall be paid to the widow or widows of the person who
so died without purusha santhathi as maintenance for
life".
This clause provides that on the death of 3!IlY male member entitled
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to maitenance allowance under the deed without leaving any male
issue either by birth or adoption the allowance which was received
by that person should go according to Hindu Law to the Gnatis
who in the same line as the deceased are nearest to such deceased
member. Plaintiffs 5 to 7 alternatively claimed to be the Gnatis
of Venugopal. In our opinion it is not open to pfaintiffs 5 to 7
to re-agitate the matter which shoulct have been pressed as a ground
of claim in the previous suit. In any case the argument is without
substance. It is true that the word Gnati in Sanskrit literally interpreted includes a brother also. But in the context of the particular
passage iin the agreement it could not have been the intention of the
parties that wJ!en there was a failure of legitimate or adopted son,
gnatis includin1t illegitimate sons would take the allowance. The
question in reality is not whether an illegitimate brother is a gnati
or not for purposes of suct:ession, but whether the word is used in
that unusual se111se in the Agreement. As pointed out in the previous case this clause has no application and the case is really
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[1970] 3 S.C.R.
governed by the earlier clause already referred to. We accordingly
reject the argument of plaintiffs 5 to 7 on this aspect of the case.
Lastly was .contended on behalf of plaintiffs 1 to 4 that they
were entitled to one-third share of the golden howdah sub-item 8
ofl item No. 8 of B schedule. The only evidence upon which
plaintiffs relied was clauses 5 and 6 in the will of Rajagopalakrishna dated 22nd September, 1910 which states :
"Our Venkatagiri Samasthanam is an ancient and
impartible estate. It has also been established by the
Madras Act II of 1902 that it is an impartible Zamindari. The Village and other landed properties in the
ta!ukas ol' the aforesaid 31llcient Venkatagiri Zamindari
acquired by my ancestors, and myself, as wel! as the
houses, bungalows, forts, gardens, places, etc. possessed
by us in the four places, viz., Nellore, Kalahasthi,
Madras and Banaras those within and around Venkatagiri, and those in other taluks-all these have been included in· the impartible estate. All these, as well as
elephants, horses, carriages, ambaris (Howdahs, Honzas
(seat) and furniture exclusive of those made of silver
and gold were treated as such ( impartible even in the
partition between me and my youngest brother. They
shall hereafter also remain as such."
It is evident from this clause that what was treated as impartible
were Ambaris Henzas and furniture exclusive of those made of
silver and gold. In other words silver and gold howdas were not
treated as impartible. Counsel on behalf of defendant No. I
referred to paragraphs 5 and 6 of the will which are to the following effect : .
"Further, .as many matters under dispute between
myself and my brothers have to be settled, the value of
some goldware, silver were jewel of precious stones etc.
belonging to the Estate Regalia was paid to-my brothers
from out of myself acquired money llllld I have taken
possession of these items at the time of partition. Besides
these, some more jewels ol' precious stones, etc., which
were acquired, were paid for from my self-acquired
money and have been received by me."
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Clause 6 runs thus :
"The jewels made of precious stones as well as gold
and silverware which fell to my share from out of the
aforesaid share inclusive of those which have been improved and converted and mentioned in detail in Schedule 'A' appended hereto. The jewels set with precious
stones and gold and silver were got by me from my
H
VELUGOTl v. VELUGOTI (Ramaswami, /.)
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113
brothers at the time of partition of paying their value to
them (brothers) from out of self acquired money .... "
These clauses make it clear that the golden howdah had beeL
divided and nothing was left for further divisiOJI. In our opinion
the Division Bench was right in taking the view that the phlinillfs
1 to 4 are not entitled to division of the golden howdah.
For the reasons expressed we hold that the judgment of the
Division Bench dated August 13, 1965 should be. set aside.· It
is declared that p~tilfs 1 to 4 are entitled under the Agreement
of 1889 to be paid Rs. 1,000/- p.m. oui of the income of the
Venkatagirj bmindari. Out of the compensation amounts so paid
to plainillfs 1 to 4 interest shall be calculated at St% per annum.
If the interest so calculated falls short of Rs. 1,000/- per month,
plaintiffs 1 to 4 are entitled to the payment of such additional sums
as would einable them to be in receipt of a total income of
Rs. 1,()()0/- per month. If for any period subsequent to 7th
September, 1949 plaintiffs 1 to 4 have not received allowance of
Rs. 1,000/- p.m. they are granted liberty to file an application for
the recovery of such sums as may be needed to make up the allowance to Rs. 1,000/- for that period. For such decree as may be
passed on such application a charge would be created on items l,
14 and 16 of plaint B Schedule properties. The suit is dismissed
so far as plaintiffs 5 to 9 are concerned. The appeal is allowed
to the extent indicated above with proportionate costs.
R.K.P.S.
Appeal allowed.
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