K. MANICKCHAND & ORS. versus ELIAS SALEH MOHAMED SAIT & ANR.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 3 December 1968 | [1969] 2 S.C.R. 1061 | 1968 INSC 329
Key facts
- Decided
- 3 December 1968
- Bench
- J.M. SHELAT*, VISHISHTHA BHARGAVA
- Bench size
- 2
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 440/1965
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Citation
- [1969] 2 S.C.R. 1061
- Neutral citation
- 1968 INSC 329
Text of the judgment
A
K. MANICKCHAND & ORS.
v.
ELIAS SALEH MOHAMED SAIT & ANR.
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December 3, 1968
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[J. M. SHELAT AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.)
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Transfer of Property Act (4 of 1882), ss. 60, 76, 77 and 83-Scope
of-Proceeding under s. 83-If estops the filing of a suit for accountsSuit for redemption, what is.
Usurious Loans Act (10 of 1918), ss. 2(3) and 3(3)--Scope ofSuit to enforce agreement in respect of loan, what is-Commencement of
Act, meaning of-When Act became applicable in Cantonment area in
Bangalore.
General Clauses Act (10 of 1897), ss. 3(13) and 5(3)-Dif/erence
between 'commencement of Act' and 'an Act coming into operation'.
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On July 14, 1933, the respondents executed a usufructuary mortgage
deed in respect of their premises in the Cantonment Area of Bangalore
in the Mysore State, for a sum of Rs. 50,000, working out the consideration on the basis of the amounts due under the earlier loans and adding
to it the cash paid at the time df execution of the mortgage deed. The
deed laid down, (i) that the mortgagee was entitled only to a sum of
Rs. 700 per mensem, in lieu of interest on .the mortgage money and not
to the entire receipts from the mortgaged property; (ii) that the mortgagors were to pay to the mortgagee interest on the principal sum at
!!% per mensem which would work out at Rs. 750 per mensem during
the period the mortgaged property remained vacant, or during the period
the mortgagee was unable to realize the rents of the mortgaged premises,
showing thereby, that the mortgagee's right was not confined to the receipts from the mortgaged property being taken in lieu of interest; and
(iii) the mortgagee had the right to enhance the rent or to eject the
existing lessee and let out the premises at enhanced rent, but did not
have the right to appropriate the entire amount of enhanced rent but
Rs. 700 per mensem only.
On July 14, 1933, the respondents executed a usufructuary mortgage
under s. 83 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 to discharge the debt
due under the mortgage deed but the mortgagee did not accept the
money. Thereafter, the mortgagor sold the mortgaged property and the
purchaser deposited a sum of Rs. 66,463 and odd under s. 83 of the
Transfer of Property Act, to be paid over to the mortgagee. The mortgagee accepted the amount and delivered possession of the mortgaged
property and the necessary documents. The mortgagor then filed a suit
for directing the mortgagee to render an account of his administration df
the mortgaged p'fOperty from the date of mortgage and to pay the mortgagors the amount that may be found due. A preliminary decree for
taking accounts and ascertaining the sum due was passed by the trial
court. fo appeal to the High Court the mortgagee contended that (a)
in view cf the unconditional tender of the mortgage money o~ two
occasions under s. 83 of the Transfer of Property Act, the mortgagor
was estopped from instituting. the suit for accounts; and (b) the mortgage
fell within the scope of s. 77 of the Transfer of Property Act so that
accounting could not be claimed under s. 76 of the Transfer of Property
Act. The High Court held on the first contention that the mortgagor
wai not estopped an<l refrained from saying anything about the applica-
1062
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 2 S.C.R.
bility of s. 76 or s. 77 of the Transfer of Property Act as the trial court
had not gme into the question. The mortgagee applied for a certificate
for filing an appeal to this Court, but the High Court refu<ed it on the
ground that its judgment was not a final adjudication of the rights be.tween the parties. The mortgage did not pursue his remedy by filing
a petition for special leave in this Court, and the judgment of the High
Court became final.
The trial court then took up the case and held : fi) that s. 76 of
the Transfer of Property Act was applicable to the mortgage deed, and
(ii) that the mortgagor was not entitled to any relief under the Usurious
Loans Act, 1918. The trial court worked out the accounts and ascertained the sum payable by the mortgagee to the mortgagor. On appeal,
the High Court held that the mortgagor was entitled to the benefit 'of
the Usurious Loans Act and directed the payment df a larger sum to the
mortgagor on the basis of the applicability of that Act.
In appeal to this Court, on the questions : ( 1) whether the suit for
accounts was not maintainable in view of the proceedings under s. 83
of the Transfer of Property Act; (2) whether the mortgage deed was
governed by s. 77 of the Transfer o'f Property Act and consequently outside the purview of s. 76; (3) whether the mortgagor was entitled to
relief under s. 2(3) (b) and (c) of the Usurious Loans Act; and (4).
whether interest on the amount found due was payable only from the date
of the decree of the High Court and not from the date of suit,
HELD : ( 1) A preliminary decree in a suit for accounts cannot be
said to be a mere interlocutory order. Such a decree finally decides the
points which the court was required to decide at that stage.
In the
present case, the trial court decided in its preliminary decree that the
proceedings under s. 83 of the Transfer of Property Act did not debar
the mortgagor from filing the suit for accounts and the decree was confirmed by the High Court at the earlier stage. The High Court took an
incorrect view of its judgment in its order on the. application for certificate to file an appeal to this Court that its judgment was not a final
judgment but was a mere interlocutory order; but the remedy df the
appellant lay in seeking leave to appeal from this Court. Therefore,
the judgment of the High Court having become final, it was no longer
open to the appellants to raise the ground of non-maintainability of the
suit· on account of the proceedings under s. 83 of the Transfer of Property Act. [1069 D-E; 1070 A-E]
(2) "!be various tern1s df the mortgage deed show that it was not
of the character mentioned in s. 77 of the Transfer of Property Act.
Therefore, s. 77 did not apply and, as the mortgagee had taken possession of the mortgaged property and was liable to render accounts of his
administration, s. 76 of the Transfer o'f Property Act was applicable.
[1071 F-G]
(3) The Usu-rious Loans Act was not applicable to the suit transaction and the mortgagor was not entitled to any relief under the Act.
The applicability of the Act depends upon two conditions name!¥ :
(i) whether the present suit is a suit either for redemption of a secunty
· or for the enforcement of an agreement in respect df a loan made. either
before or after the commencement of the Act; and (ii) whether the
agreement for the enforcement of which the suit :vas filed was mad~, or
the security for the redemption of which the smt wrui filed was given,
after the commencement of the Act. [1074 E--F]
{i) The suit was not one for redemption of a security; [1076 0-Hl
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MANICKCHAND V. MOHD. SAIT
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(a) A suit for redemption is defined in s. 60 of the Transfer of ~o
perty Act as a suit for a right to redeem which consists df three reliefs,
namely: (A) to require the mortgagee to deliver to the mortgagor the
mortgage deed and all documents relating to the mortgaged property
which are in the posse;sion or power of the mortgagee; (Bl. where the
mortgagee is in possession of the mortgaged property, to deliver posses-
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sion thereof to the mortgagor; and (C) at the cost of the mortgagor
either to retransfer the mortgaged property to him or to such third
person as he may direct. Jn the present suit there was none of these
prayers as there was no occasion fo'r claiming them, because, those reliefs had already been obtained in the petition under s. 83 o'f the Transfer of Property Act even prior to the institution of the suit. [1075 D-E,
F-G; 1076 E, F-G]
(b) The taking of accounts and the passing of a decree in favour
of the mortgagor in respect of a surplus remaining in the hands df the
mort~agee are reliefs which could be granted in a suit for redemption.
But the circum..:;tance that, in a suit for redemption, apart from the
prayers which form pan of the enforcement df the right to rede~m,
certain other pravers can a1so be granted cannot lead to the concluston
that a suit, which is solely for those other incidental reliefs, must be a
suit for redemption. [1077 B-F]
( c) While the mortgagor's right to dispute the acco~nts and .to
claim a decree for surolus was not taken away, he has no right to claim
enforcement of the right Of redemption as the various reliefs constituting
the bundle of the right to redeem had alreadv been obtained under s. 83
of the Transfer of Property Act. [1078 A-Cl
Neither was the suit one for the enforcement of an agreement in
respect o'f a loan.
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A suit for accounting and for a decree for surplus in accordance with
the provisions of s. 76 of the Transfer of Property Act and 0.34, r. 9 of
the Civil Procedure Code cannot be said to be a suit claiming a right
to enforce an agreement. [1078 D-E]
(ii) The mortgage deed on the basis df which accounting and a
decree for surplus were claimed by the mortgagor was not executed after
the commencement of the Usurious Loans Act and therefore the Act
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could not be applied to the present suit.
(a) In the year 1933, when the mortgage was executed, the Usurious Loans Act was not applicable in the Cantonment Area. The fact
that the Act was passed in 1918 and was in operation in other areas will
not result in the Act having commenced in the area where it has not
Under s. 5 (3) of the Genecal Clauses Act there is a
distinction between 'an Act coming into operation' and 'the 'commence~
ment of the Act' and the date of corning into operation is not necessarily
the date of commencement. Jn interpreting s. 2(3)(b) and (c) df the
Usurious Loans Act, the relevant exoression is 'Commencement of the
yet been apolied.
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Act'.
Under s. 3 (13) df the General Clauses Act. an Act can only com-
mence in a particular area on the date on which that Act comes into
!orce in that area. In the present case, the Usurious Loans Act came
m.t~ force in. !he Bang~lore Civil and Military Station only under the
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C1v1! and M1\1tary Station of Bangalore (Application of Laws) Order.
1937, on Aortl L 1937 and not earlier. Therefore the Act was not
applicable. [1078 F-H; 1079 D-H]
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qaiamba/ Ramalin11am and Others v. Rukn-ul-Mulk Syed Abdul
Wa11d and 01hm. A.I.R. 1950 P.C. 64 and ln re: Hayes, I.L.R. 12
Mad. 39, referred to.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 2 $.C.R.
(b) The purpose df s. 3(3) of the Usurious Loans Act is to meet
the contingency that a suit, to which the provisions of the Act are sought
to be applied, may not 'be in the form of a suit for the recovery of a
loan, or for the enforcement of any agreement or security iri respect of a
loan or for the redemption of any such security; but if it is substantially
of that nature it has to be held that the requirements of s. 2(3) of the
Act are satisfied. The provision was not intended to take away the requirement that for the applicability of the Usurious Loans Act, the
loan mentioned ins. 2(3) (a) and the agreement mentioned ins. 2(3) (b)
must have been made after the commencement of the Act and the security mentioned ins. 2(3)(c) must have been given after the commencement of the Act. [I 080 C-H]
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Vaishnu Dass and Others v. Thaker Da..s, l.L.R. f.1954] 7 Punjab 1,
overruled.
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( 4) The amount for which the suit was decreed, applying s. 76 of
the Transfer of Property Act and ignoring the provisions of the Usurious
Loans Act, was payable by the mortgagee at the time when the suit was
instituted, and therefore interest was payable on that amount from the
date of the suit. [1081 C-DJ
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 440 of
1965.
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Appeal from the judgment and decree dated September 19,
1958 of the Mysore High Court in Regular Appeal No. 134 of
1953.
H. R . Gokhale, S. Govind Rao and K. Rajendra Chaudhuri,
for the appellants.
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C. B. Aggarwala and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Bhargava, J. This appeal arises out of Original Suit No, 19
of 1943 instituted in the Court of the District Judge, Civil Station, Bangalore, by four plaintiffs. The first two plaintiffs were
Elias Saleh Mohamed Sait (respondent No. 1) and Mohamed
Saleh Mohamed Sait (respondent No. 2), sons of Saleh Mohamed Sait who died in or about the year 1917 leaving behind
his widow, Rahamatbai, three minor sons, . and three daughters. The eldest of the minor sons was Ahmed Saleh Mohamed
Sait, who also died before the institution of tht: suit, the other
two being respondents 1 and 2. At the time when inheritance
opened on the death of Saleh Mohamed Sait, admittedly the
family was governed by Hindu Law in the matter of succession
and inheritance, so that the daughters did not acquire any right
in the property left by their father. The principal relief claimed
in the suit was for accounts under section 76 of the Transfer
of Property Act No. 4 of 1882 (hereinafter referred to as ''the
T. P. Act") in respect of a mortgage deed dated 14th July, 1933
(Ext. C) executed by Ahmed Saleh Mohamed Sait, the two
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MANICKCHAND V, MOHD. SAIT (Bhargava, J.)
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!065
respondents in this appeal, and their mother Rahamatbai, for a
sum of Rs. 50,000/. mortgaging premises No. 6, South Parade,
Civil & Military Station, Bangalore, in favour of Khanmull
who was defendant in the suit and who is now represented by the
appellants as his legal representatives. Before the institution
of the suit, the mortgagors' rights in the mortgaged property
had been transferred to .Khan Saheb Abdul Gani Saheb and
Khan Saheb Abdul Shakoor Saheb who also joined in the suit
as plaintiffs 3 and 4. The eldest son Ahmed Saleh Mohamed Sait
became a major in or about the year 1927 and, till that time,
Rahamatbai, was managing the property. Until the year 1930,
it appears that no debts were taken by the members of this family.
The first Joan that was taken on the basis of a simple mortgage
deed dated 20th May, 1930 executed by the eldest son Ahmed
Saleh Mohamed Sait as well as by Rahamatbai as guardian ot
respondents 1 and 2 who were minors at that time. Thereafter,
a number of Joans were taken, details of which need not be
mentioned. One of these Joans was cm the basis of a usufruc·
tuary mortgage executed in favour of one J. Krishnalal; but both
the Courts below have held that Krishnalal was a benamidar for
the defendant Khanmull, so that the various loans taken were
all from Khanmull. On 14th July, 1933, the three brothers and
their mother executed a mortgage deed Ext. C for a sum of
Rs. 50,000/ ·, working out the consideration on the basis of the
amounts due under earlier loans, and adding to it the amount of
cash paid at the time of execution of this mortgage deed. Ahmed
Saleh Mohamed Sait died in the year 1939 and his mother
Rahamatbai also died in the same year. On 21st January, 1943,
the two respondents and their 'sisters deposited a sum of Rs.
50,000/- under s. 83 of the T. P. Act to discharge the debt nnder
the mortgage deed Ext. C dated 14th July, 1933, but the defendant did not accept that money, with the result that the petition under s. 83 of the T. P. Act failed. It was on 22nd January, 1943 that the two respondents sold the mortgaged property
to plaintiffs 3 and 4 for a sum of Rs. 75,000/-. Thereafter,
plaintiff No. 3 filed Original Petition No. 11 of 1943 in the Court
of the District Judge, Civil Station, Bangalore, under s. 83 of
the T. P. Act and deposited a sum of Rs. 66,463-15-6 to be paid
over to the mortgagee. Khanmull, the mortgagee, accepted the
amount deposit as correct, delivered possession of the mortgaged
property and the necessary documents, and obtained payment
of the amount. A joint memo. dated 15th March 1943 was
filed evidencing this transaction and the Court pass~d an order
on the same date recording it. Thereafter, on 3rd November
1?43, t~e four plaintiffs, mentioned above, instituted the on'.
gmal Smt No. 19 of 1943 and, as mentioned earlier the main
pray~r was. t~at t~e defendant be directed to render ~n account
of his adm1mstrat10n of the mortgaged property from 14th July,
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1969) 2 S.C.R.
1933 to 12th March, 1943, and to pay to the plaintiffs the amount
that may be found due to the plaintiffs after adjusting interest
that may be found due to the defendant at a reasonable rate and
after deducting amoultts not paid and interest charged from out of
the principal of Rs. 50,000/- said, to be due on the mortgage of
14th July, 1933. The second and the third reliefs in the suit
related to matters which are not the subject-matter of this appeal
in this Court and, consequently, need not be mentioned. The
fourth and fifth reliefs were in respect of the claim for interest
@ 6 · per cent per annum on the amount found due under the
first relief, and for costs.
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A preliminary decree was passed by the trial Court on 4th
February, 1948, directing that -accounts be taken pursuant to
s. 76 of the T. P. Act on the foot of the mortgage deed Ext. C
dated 14th July, 1933, for the period beginning with the date
of that deed, and directing the defendant to file his full statement of accounts in that behalf in the manner of a verified pleading. It was further directed that, after the plaintiffs filed their
statement by way of a similar pleading, issues arising thereon
for determination between the parties will be settled and then
enquiries will be held by way of evidence, if necessary, or by
way of arguments of counsel, and the suit will b1i proceeded with
for the purposes of passing a final decree. The costs on and
incidental to this part of the decree were left to be adjudged
on the result of the enquiry. There was also a direction specifically reserving for consideration at the time of the final decree
proceedings all questions relating to accounting as well as reliefs
claimed under the Usurious Loans Act, No. 10 of 1918 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act").
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Both parties appealed against this preliminary decree in the
High Court of Mysore. The appeal of the plaintiffs was confined to reliefs Nos. 2 and 3 in the suit which had been refused
by the trial Court and, consequently, we are: not concerned
with the decision of the High Court in that appeal. The defendant in his appeal challenged the decree for accounting. The
validity of the decree was assailed mainly on two grounds. One
was that, in view of the unconditional tender of the mortgage
money on two occasions. under s. 83 of the T. P. Act, the plaintiffs were estopped from instituting the suit for accounting; and
the other was that the mortgage in question fell within the scope
of s. 77 of the T.P. Act, so that accounting could not be claimed under s. 76 of the T. P. Act. This appeal was decided by a
Full Bench of the High Court which held that the proceedings
undef" s. 83 of the T. P. Act did not operate so as to conclude
the rights of the mortgagors in all respects, and. that a mortgagor, who had applied to the Court and made a deposit under s. 83
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MANICKCHAND V. MOHD. SAIT (Bhargava, J.)
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of the T. P. Act, was not estopped, merely by reason of. the
deposit and payment to the mortgagee of the amount so deposited,
from demanding an account of the income of the mortgaged property under s. 76 of the T.P. Act by a separate suit. The Full
Bench noticed that the trial Court had directed an account to
be taken under s. 76 of the T.P. Act, but had not gone into the
question whether the mortgage deed fell within s. 77 of the T.P.
Act or not, so that the High Court refrained from saying anything further about the incidence of ss. 76 and 77 to the transactions in suit.
Thereafter,•the case was taken up by the trial Court which
held that s. 76 of the T.P. Act was applicable to the mortgage
c deed in question and that the mortgagee under the deed was
entitled to get interest @ Rs. 700 per month only and was
liable to account in respect of his collections from the mortgaged
property. Another issue raised was whether the mortgage deed
dated 14th July, 1933 was not supported by consideration. The
trial Court held that this question was no longer open for reconD sideration at the stage of the final decree and rejected the plea
of the plaintiffs in that behalf. The Court further rejected the
claim of the plaintiffs for relief under the Act, and the Mysore
Money Lenders Act 13 of 1939. A further finding recorded was
that the mortgage in question was not valid and binding against
respondent No. 2, who was plaintiff No. 2 in the suit. As a
E r~sult of these findings, the Court worked out the accounts and
d1Iected. the defendant to pay a sum of Rs. 33,447-5-10 with
cu~rent mterest @ 6 .Per cent per annum from the date of the
s~1t to the se~ond plamtJff, and to pay a sum of Rs. 13,342-1-6
with current mterest @ 6 per cent per annum to the first plainhff fro_:n the same date. It was f~rther held that plaintiffs 3 and
4 wer~. not entitled to any relief m the suit. Plaintiffs 1 and 2
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were d!Iected to make up the deficiency in court-fee on the
amounts aw~r~ed to them, and the defendant to pay proportionate
costs to plaintiffs 1 and 2.
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Against this final decree, the defendant filed an a
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the Mysore Hi&h Court impleading pl;;intiffs 1 and 2 ppet1 m
res~o~dents, while these two plaintiffs filed cross-ob ·~~tlon~s
PlamtJffs 3 and 4 were not impleaded as parties in th J
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6he appe~l and ~he cros1-objections were heard by ~h=p~a
ourt which partially modified the decree passed by the tr~ I
Court. The separate decre f
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plaintiff No. 2 was set asid~ a~~ ~h ar;fer am~unt in favour of
favour of plaintiff No 1 w
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made a joint decree in. favou~so;ar1e? ;n two respects. It was
variation was that plaintiff" 1 anJ'1~mtiffs ~nd 2. The second
the benefit of the Act and'' a d. f were e d to be entitled to
!fee IQn was made for accounting
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on the basi:; of the applicability of the Act. This order was A
made by the High Court on the 19th September,, . 1958. In
pursuance of the direction made in that order, parties gave an
agreed calculation indicating that the principal amount advanced
as the original loan under Ext. C was Rs. 36,750/. Interest due
@ 12 per cent per annum on the principal amount up to the
date of execution of the mortgage deed Ext. C was Rs. 5,919/-. B
The moneys spent by the mortgagee for taxes and repairs were
Rs. 9,178.34. The total rent collected by the mortgagee was
Rs. 1,00,342.09, and the amount received in Original Petition ·
No. 11 of 1943 under s. 83 of the T.P. Act was Rs. 66,463.97.
On the basis of· these figures and after deciding various points
disputed before it, the High Court passed a decree for a sum of
Rs. 99,603.61 P out of which Rs. 13,342.09 P was to carry in- c
terest @ 6 per cent per annum from 3rd November, 1943, the
date of the suit, and the balance of Rs. 86,261.51 P was to
carry interest at the same rate from 4th February, 1948, the
date of the preliminary decree passed by the trial Court, up to
the date of realisation. The plaintiffs were awarded costs against
the legal representatives of the defendant on the sum of D
Rs. 13,342.09 P in both the Courts. Time was · granted to the
appellants to make payment till 19th March, 1959. It was
further laid down that the appellants were liable under the decree
to the extent of the assets left by the deceased defendant Khanmull which might be in their hap.els and to the extent of the assets
of the joint family, because the original defendant had died. It E
is against this decree passed by the High Court that the appellants have come up to this Court in this appeal unde:r certificate
granted by the High Court.
Mr. Govinda Rao, counsel for the appellants in this appeal,
raised the following four points pefore us : (1) that the suit for accounts should be .held to be non-
maintainable in view of the proceedings under s. 83
of the T .P. Act which preceded the suit and under
which the mortgagee received the sum of
Rs. 66,463.97 P in discharge of the mortgage, delivered the necessary documents to the mortgagors
and also gave possession of the mortgaged property.
( 2) that the mortgage transaction evidenced by the deed
Ext. C dated 14th July, 1933 was governed bys. 77
of the T.P. Act and was, consequently, outside the
purview of s. 76 of the T.P. Act;
(3) that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the relief under
the Act which was not applicable to this mortgage
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which related to property situated in the Bangalore
Civil and Military Station and that, in any case,
even if the provisions of the Act be applied, the
transactions prior to the mortgage deed in suit could
not be reopened; and
(4) that the interest on the surplus amount found due
from the appellants to the respondents, if any, should
have been allowed only from the date of the decree
of the High Court, viz., 19th September, 1958 and
not from the date of the suit, viz., 3rd November,
1943.
So far as the first point is concerned, it does not arise out
of the appellate judgment passed by the High Court in the appeal
brought up before it against the final decree in the suit. The
question whether the proceedings under s. 83 of the T.P. Act
debarred the plaintiffs from filmg a suit for account; and payment of surplus was decided by the trial Court in the preliminary
decree when the trial Court held that, in spite of those proceedings, the suit was maintainable and proceeded to pass a prelinlinary decree for accounts. That decision of the trial Court was
confirmed by the High Court by its Full Bench judgment dated
13th February, 1951. That judgment has become final and
that decision, which finally decided the points arising in the preliminary decree, cannot now be challenged in this Court in an
appeal from the judgment at the stage of final decree. No doubt,
the appellants had sought certificate from the High Court against
that judgment dated 13th February, 1951, in order to file an
appeal in this Court, but that application for certificate was
rejected on two different grounds. The first ground was that
the appeal in the High Court had been valued for purposes of
court-fee and jurisdiction at Rs. 10,000/- only, so that there
was no right under Art. 13 3 of the Constitution to obtain a
certificate. The second ground was that the judgment of the
High Court could not be deemed to be a final adjudication of the
rights between the parties, because that Court had, in effect,
confirmed the decree of the trial Court to take accounts and ascertain the sums that will be found due from the defendant to
the plaintiffs. Thereafter, the appellants did not file any petition
for . special !eave in this Court seeking leave to appeal either
agamst the judgment dated 13th February, 1951 confirming the
preliminary decree in the suit, or against the order dated 7th
Se~tember, 19 51 by which the High Court dismissed the application for grant of certificate. The result is that the judgment
of the High Court became final. Learned counsel urged that
the order of the High Court dated 7th September, 1951 misled
the appellants inasmuch as the High Court in that order held
1070
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that its judgmeint dated 13th February, 1951 was not a final adjudication of rights between the parties, so that the appdlants were
under the impression that they would be entitled to challen~e
the judgment of the High Court dated 13th February, 1951 m
an appeal filed against the final adjudication envisaged by the
High Court at the stage of passing the final decree It may be
that the High Court was not right in taking the view that its
judgment dated 13th February, 1951 was not a final judgment
but a mere interlocutory order and mentioned this ground in·
correctly· as one of the grounds for rejecting the application for
certificate. Even if the High Court made such an incorrect order,
the remedy of the appellants lay in seeking leave to appeal from
this Court against that order itself. In fact, the judg;ment dated
13th February, 1951 was very clearly a final judgment in respect of all the points which were decided in the preliminary decree
passed by the trial Court and confirmed by this judgment by the
High Court. A preliminary decree in a suit for accounts cannot
be said to be a mere interlocutory order. Such a d':cree finally
decides the points which the court is required to decide at that
stage or chooses to decide at that stage. The judgment of the
High Court dated 13th February, 1951 having become final, it
is no longer open to the appellants to raise the ground of nonmaintainability of this suit because of the earlier proceedings
under s. 83 of the T.P. Act. The first point raised by learned
counsel has, thus, no force.
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As regards the second point relating to the applicability of
s. 77 of the T.P. Act, it appears to us that the preliminary decree
passed by the trial Court and confirmed by the High Court would
also stand in the way of the appellants' raising such a ground at
the stage of appeal from the final decree. The preliminary
decree definitely directed taking of accounts which could only be
on the basis that s. 76 of the T.P. Act applied to the mortgage in F
question. If it was held that s. 77 of the T.P. Act applied, there
could be no decree for accounts at all. However, it appears
that, in the preliminary decree itself, both the trial Court and
the High Court took the extraordinary step of including a direction that the question as to the applicability of s. 77 of the T.P.
Act would be considered at the stage of enquiry for purposes ' G
of passing the final decree. In these circumstances, we have
allowed learned counsel for the appellants to argue this point on
merits on the basis that the judgment of the High Court confirming the preliminary decree had specifically left this question open
for decision at the stage of final decree.
On merits, however, we think that the High Court was perfectly right in recording its finding that the mortgage in suit is
governed by s. 76 of the T.P. Act and does not fall within the
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scope of s. 77 of the T.P. Act. This is very clear from the
terms of the mortgage deed itself. The mortgage deed clearly
lays down that the mortgagee is entitled to a sum of Rs. 700~per mensem in lieu of interest on the mortgage money. This
term by itself indicates that the entire receipts from the mortgaged property we~e i;iot to be taken by the mortgagee in lie!! of
interest on the -prmc1pal money. The mortgagee was entitled
to appropriate a sum of Rs. 700/- per mensem only towards the
interest. Then there are other terms in the mortgage deed which
clarify this position. There is a condition that the mortgagors
were to pay interest on the principal sum of Rs. 50,000/- only
to the mortgagee @ 1t per cent per mensem during the period
the said mortgaged property remained vacant or during the period
the mortgagee was unable to realise the rents of the mortgaged
premises. This makes it clear .that, if there were no receipts
from the mortgaged property during any period either due to
vacancy or due to the inability of the mortgagee to realise the
rents, the mortgagee became entitled to interest @ 1t per cent
per mensem, which would work out at Rs. 750/- per mensem.
This right of the mortgagee to receive interest clarifies the fact
that, under the deed, the mortgagee's right was not confined
to receipts from the mortgaged property being taken in lieu of
interest on the principal money. The mortgagee was entitled
to interest in spite of there. being no receipts from the mortgaged
property. The mortgage deed further gave the right to the mort,
gagee to enhance the rent or to eject the existing lessee and let
out the premises on enhanced rent; but the deed did not confer
on the mortgagee the right to appropriate the entire amount of
enhanced rent towards the interest. The right to appropriate
rent towards interest was confined to the sum of Rs. 700/- per
mensem only. All these terms of the mortgage deed clearly
show that it was not of the character mentioned in s. 77 of the
T.P. Act and, cQI1Sequently, s. 77 did not apply. Section 76
was clearly applicable, as the mortgagee had taken possession
of the mortgaged property and was liable to render accounts of
administration of the property. The decision of the High Court
on this point must also, therefore, be upheld .
The third point raised on behalf of the appellants however, appears to us to have considerable force. In this connectio~, we may first indicate the position as to the applicability
of -:anous laws m. the Ban~alo~e Civil and Military Station at
vanous relevant tnnes which 1s necessary because this area was
con;.~rised in the State of Mysore and not in British India. The
pos1t1on was eicamined by the Privy Council in Gajambal Ramalingam and Others v. Rukn-ul-Mulk Syed Abdul Wajid and
Others, (1) when the Privy Council had to detennine the juris-
(1) A.I.R. 1950 P.C. &I.
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[1969] 2 S.C.R.
diction of the Court of the District Judge in this ~rea. It was
noied · that : '
"In the year 1881, the rendition of the state of
Mysore to its hereditary ruler was effected by the installation of the Maharaja under a Proclamation of the
Viceroy and Governor-Gene,al of India and at the same
time an Instrument of Transfer was executed whereby
it was (inter alia), by Art. 9, provided that the Maharaja would not object to the maintenance and establishment of British cantonments in the said territory
whenever and wherever the Governor-General :in Council might consider such cantonments necessary and
would grant free of all charge such land as
might be required for such cantonments and would renounce all jurisdiction within the lands so granted.
Shortly thereafter the Maharaja, pursuant to the said
9th article, assigned free of charge to the •exclusive
management of the British Government .for th•e purposes stated in that article the lands described therein
which were in effect the area forming. the Bangalore
Civil and Mililtary Station and renounced all jurisdiction in the lands so assigned. The Instrument of Transfer of 18 81 was superseded by a Treaty concluded between the British Government and the Maharaja on
26th November, 1913, but no material change was effected so far as the exercise of jurisdiction was concerned. The area comprised in the Civil and Military
Station of Bangalore remained part of the territory of
Mysore."
In this decision, their Lordships of the Privy Council held that
the area comprised in tht' Civil and Military Station of Bangalore
remained part of the territory of Mysore by approving the decision of the Madras High Court in Re Hayes('). As a consequence, the Bangalore Civil and Military Station came under
the administration of the British Government, but it did not
form part of British India. It remained a part of the territory
of Mysore.
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On the 11th June, 1902, the Governor-General in Council
in India, in exercise of the powers conferred on him, issued Indian (Foreign Jurisdiction) Order in Council, one of the clauses ·
of which laid down that the Governor-General in Council may
make such rules and orders as may seem expedient for carrying
the Order into effect, and, in particular, for determining the H
law and procedure to be observed, whether by applying with or
(1) l.L.R. I 2 Mad. 39.
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witjiout modifications all or any of the provisions of any enactment in force elsewhere, or otherwise. It is the admitted case
of the parties that the Act, when enacted, was not followed
by any order under the Order in Council dated 11th June, 1902
applying it with or without any modifications to the Bangalore
Civil and Military Station. The Act, therefore, did not apply
in this area when enacted. The Order in Council dated 11th
June, 1902 was amended by the Civil and Military Station of
Bangalore (Application of Laws) Order, 1937, and it was under
this Order that the provisions of the Act were applied to this
area with a very minor modification of omitting sub-section (2)
of sectiqn 1.
Then, on 18th July, 1947, the Indian Independence Act, 1947
received the Royal Assent. In pursuance of the provisions of
that Act, a notification was issued on 26th July, 1947 by the
Crown Representative under the authority of the Indian (Foreign
Jurisdiction) Order in Council, 1937. By this notification which
recited that the jurisdiction theretofore exercised by the Crown
Representative in the area known as the Civil and Military Station, Bangalore, would, with effect from 26th day of July, 1947,
be restored to His Highness the Maharaja of Mysore save for that
portion !hereinafter described as the Military and Railway areas
contained in the boundaries set out in Schedules thereto annexed,
the Crown Representative was pleased to direct that with effect
from the said 26th day of July, 1947, all notifications issued
under the Indian (Foreign Jurisdiction) Order in Council, 1902,
or under the Indian (Foreign Jurisdiction) Order in Counc.il, 193 7,
whereby specific provision was made for the said area whether for
the making of laws for or administration of laws or for the application of laws to the said area or for the administration of justice
therein or otherwise should be cancelled save in so far as the
said military and railway areas were CO\llcemed. The result of
this notification was that, with effect from 26th July, 1947,
the laws in force in British India, which had been applied to the
Bangalore Civil and Military Station which included the area
where the property now in suit is situated, ceased to operate.
The jurisdiction over this area having passed back to His High·
ness the Maharaja of Mysore, the Maharaja, on 4th August,
1947, promulgated the RetrocessiQ!l (Application of Laws) Act
No. 23 of 1947. Under section 3(a) of this Act, all laws which
were in force in the Civil and Military Station immediateiy prior
to the date of retrocession, were to continue from that date to
have. effect and be operative in the !etroceded area. It may be
mentmned that the date of retrocess1on in respect of the Bangalore Civil ~nd Military Station was the 26th July, 1947. The
result of this Act was that the laws previously applicable in this
area up to 26th July, 1947 were continued retrospectively in
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[1969] 2 S.C.R·
force, so that the Act also co~tinued in force. Thereafter, the
Maharaja of Mysore promulgated the Retroceded Area (Application of Laws) Act No. 57 of 1948 on the 5th day of A~gust,
1948. Under s. 3 of this Act, the laws, which were in force
in the Retroceded Area immediately before the 15th August,
1948, were to cease to be effective or operative in the Retroceded
Area, while all laws in force in the State of ~ysore were to
apply to the Retroceded Area. Consequently, wtth effect from
15th August, 1948, the Act ceased to be operative in this area
and, instead, the Usurious Loans Act, 1923 (Mysore Act 9 of
1923) became operative in it. Subsequently, howev,er, the State
of Mysore acceded to India after the Constitution and, from the
date of accession, the Act again became applicable, because this
area became a part of India. This was the legal position in this
area during the various p1!riods with which we may be concerned.
The question of the applicability of the provisions of the Act
to the present suit depends on the interpretation of s. 2(3) of the
Act which is as follows:-
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"Suit to which this Act applies" means any suit-(a) for the recovery of a loan made after the commencement of this Act; or
(b) for the enforcement of any security taken or 3111)'
agreemelit, whether by way of settlement of account
or otherwise, made, after the commencem<:nt of this
Act, in respect of any loan made either before or
after the commencement of this Act; or
(c) for the redemption of any security given after the commencement of this Act in respect of any loan made
either before or after the commencement of this
Act."
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The High Court has held that the Act applies in view of clause
(c) cited above and has, thus, accepted the submission made on
behalf of the respondents that the present suit is a suit for redemption of a security given after the commencement of thti Act in G
respect of a loan made after the commencement of the Act. This
decision of the High Court is challenged on two grounds on behalf
of the appellants. One is that the suit is not a suit for redemption of a security, and the second is that, even if it be held to be a
suit for redemption of a security, that security was not given after
the commencement of the Act, so that the High Court was in- H
correct in holding that the Act applies to the present suit. In .
view of this challenge, Mr. C. B. Aggarwala, counsel for the respondents, also relied, in the alternative, on clause (b) 'and
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urged that we should hold this suit to be one for the enforcement
of an agreement made after the commencement of the Act in
respect of a loan made either before or after the commencement
of the Act. The questions raised before us, therefore, resolve
themselves into two different points. The first point is whether the
present suit is a suit either for redemption of a security or for
enforcement of an agreement in respect of a loan made ei11!er
before or after the commencement of the Act. The second pomt
is whether if either of these two conditions is satisfied, it can
be held that the agreement, for the enforcement of which this
suit has been filed, was made after the commencement of the Act,
or the security, for the redemption of which the suit has been
1iled, was given after the commencement of the Act.
We first take up the question whether it is a suit for redemption of a security at all. The nature of a suit for redemption of
security in India is laid down in s. 60 of the T.P. Act. The
principal clause of this section recognises the right of a mortgaD gor, on payment or tender, at a proper time and place, of the
mortgage money, to require the mortgagee (a) to deliver to the
mortgagor the mortgage-deed and all documents relating to the
mortgaged property which are in the possession or power of the
mortgagee, (b) where the mortgagee is in possession of the mortgaged property, to deliver possession thereof to the mortgagor,
and ( c) at the cost of tlie mortgagor either to reE transfer the mortgaged property to him or to such third
person as he may direct, or to execute and (where the
mortgage has been effected by a registered instrument) to have
registered an acknowledgement in writing that any right in derogation of his interest transferred to the mortgagee has been extinguished. A subsequent clause in this section is to the effect that
F the right conferred by this section is called a right to redeem,
and a suit to enforce it is called a suit for redemption. A suit for
redemption is thus defined by this section as a suit for enforcement of a right to redeem, and that right to redeem consists of
the three reliefs which the mortgagor is entitled to under clauses
(a), (b) and (c) mentioned above, on payment or tender at a
Conseq~ently,
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a smt can be said to be a smt for redemption if the three rights
cn~mera~ed in th~s section as constituting the right to redeem are
clauned m the smt. It may even be possible to hold a suit to be
a suit for redemption if even one of those three rights is claimed
in .t~e s?it. This law in India is based primarily on the law prevailing m England and the nature of a suit for redemption in
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England has been held to be a very similar. Reference may be
made to Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol. 27, paragraph 834 at p. 424 which shows : -
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 2 s.c.R.
"The co=on form order for redemption directs an
account of what is due to the mortgagee und1!r and by
virtue of the mortgage, and for his taxed costs of the
redemption action, and directs that, upon th~ mortgagor paying to the mortgagee the amount certified to
be due within six months after the date of the master's
certificate, at a time and place to be appointed by such
ce.rtificate, the mortgagee shall surrender or g.ive a statutory receipt, and deliver up the title deeds; and it
further directs thai if the mortgagor makes default in
such payment his action is to stand dismissed with costs.
If one of the two mortgagees has disappeared, the costs
of obtaining a vesting order to get his interest must be
borne, in the absence of misconduct by the 0th.er mortgagee, by the mortgagor. If the mortgagee has been
in possession, the order directs as against the mortgagee
an account of the rents and profits of the mortgaged
property on the footing of wilful default; and if the
mortgagor alleges that nothing is due on the mortgage,
a direction is added for surrender within twenty-one days
after the date of the certificate, if on taking the accounts
it appears that nothing is in fact due."
In the present suit, none of the prayers envisaged as reliefs to
be granted in a suit for redemption finds a place. There is no
prayer that the mortgagee be required to deliver the mortgagedeed and other documents relating to the mortgaged property
and, though the mortgagee had been in possession under the
mortgage, there was no prayer for delivery of possession of the
property to the mortgagors, nor was there any request for retransfer of the mortgaged property to the mortgagors. The reason
why no such prayer was included in the suit is obvious. The
transferee of the original mortgagors had filed an application
under s. 83 of the T.P. Act after making a deposit. Tb.at deposit
had been accepted by the mortgagee, whereupon the necessary
documents had already bf:en delivered to the mortgagors together with the possession of the mortgaged property. The reliefs,
which could have been claimed in a suit for redemption envisaged
by s. 60 of the T.P. Act, had thus been obtained under s. 83
of that Act even prior to the institution of the suit. There was,
therefore, no occasion for claiming any of these reliefs. In
these circumstances, we must hold that the High Court> was not
right in proceeding on the basis that this suit was a suit for redemption of a security as mentioned in s. 2(3)(c) of the Act.
In this connection, Mr. Aggarwala drew our attention to the
fact that, in a suit for redemption, accounts have to be taken
from a usufructuary mortgagee in respect of a mortgage to which
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s. 76 of the T.P. Act applies as laid down in Order 34, r. 7 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. In fact, a preliminary decree has to
be passed for taking of accounts. This liability of a mortgagee
to render accounts is also recognised in England as is clear from
the passage from Halsbury's Laws of England cited by us above.
Further, under 0. 34, r. 9, C.P.C., the court is directed to pass a
decree directing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the amount
which may be found due to him if it appears, upon taking the
account referred to in r. 7, that the mortgagee has been overpaid. It was urged that, since the taking of accounts and the
passing of a decree in favour of the mortgagor in respect of a
surplus remaining in the hands of the mortgagee are reliefs which
can be granted in a suit for redemption, the present suit should
be held to be a suit for redemption, because, in the present suit,
these are precisely the two prayers sought by the respondents.
We are unable to accept the submission that a suit, which is
purely for accounting and a decree for surplus, is a suit for
redemption. The circumstance that, in a suit for redemption,
apart from the prayers which form part of the enforcement of
the right to redeem, certain other prayers can also be granted
cannot lead to the conclusion that a suit, which is solely for
those other incidental reliefs, must be a suit for redemption.
The right to redeem, in fact, had already been enforced in
respect of this mortgage of 1933 by the proceedings under s. 83
of the T.P. Act and this subsequent suit could not, therefore, be
for the enforcement of that right. The suit for the enforcement
of the incidental rights, which could have been claimed if a suit
for redemption had been brought under section 60 of the T.P.
Act instead of obtaining all those reliefs under s. 83, cannot,
therefore, be held io be a suit for redemption.
Learned counsel, while arguing this point, drew our attention
to the application filed under s. 8 3 of the T .P. ~ct, wherein,
while tendering the money, the mortgagor had specifically reserved to himself and to his purchasers-in-title the right to dispute
whether the mortgagee was entitled to the entire amount deposited
or not. Reference was made to a decision of the Court of Appeal
in Greenwood v. Sutcliffe('), where it was held that an unconditional tender of the money by the mortgagor is a good tender
even if the mortgagor did not admit the correctness of the mortgagee's accounts and indicated that he intended to take steps to
dispute them and to have the costs taxed. That case, in our opinion, is not at all relevant to the point with which we are concerned. In the present suit, there is no dispute that the tender of
the money by the mortgagor at the time of presentation of the
application under s. 83 of the T.P. Act was a valid tender. The
(I) [1892] I Ch1nccry Div. I.
1078
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 2 S.C.R.
question which we are called upon to decide is whether, after
such a valid tender had been made and the mortgagor had obtained all the reliefs which he could obtain when seeking redemption
of a mortgage, he could still institute a suit for nidemption. His
right, of course, to dispute thei accounts and to claim a decree
for surplus may not have been taken away; but it is clear that
(00 right could continut: to exist to claim enforcement of the right
of redemption as the various reliefs constituting the bundle of
the right to redeem had already been obtained under s. 83 of the
T.P. Act. We must, therefore, reject the submission made on
behalf of the respondents that this was a suit for redemption falling within section 2(3)(c) of the Act.
The alternative claim that it should be held to be a suit for
the enforcement of an agreement in respect of a loan also does
not appeal to us. The language of s. 2(3)(b) of the Act makes
it clear that it envisages the institution of a suit by a creditor
against his debtor on the basis of the agreement a:nd that is why
the nature of the agreement is indicated by saying that it should
be by way of settlement of account or otherwise. It does not
cover a suit for accounting brought by a mortgagor in exercise
of his right under s. 76 of the T.P. Act taken together with the
provisions of Order 34, r. 9, C.P.C. The right to claim a decree
for surplus in accordance with these provisions cannot be said
to be a right to enforce an agreement, so that the present suit
cannot be covered by s. 2(3)(b) of the Act either.
There is, further, the requirement under both clauses (b) and
(c) of s. 2(3) of the Act that the agreement should have been
made or the security given before the commencement of the Act.
We have already indicated earlier the position as t:o the applicability of the Act in the Bangalore Civil and Military Station at
various times. In the year 1933, when the mortgage was executed, the Act was not applicable in this area. It was made
applicable for the first time with effect from 1st April, 1937
by the Civil and Military Station of Bangalore (Application of
Laws) Order, 1937. The question is whether it can be said that
the mortgage of 1933, sought to be treated as the agreement
under clause (b) or security under clause ( c), was executed after
the commencement of the Act when, in fact, the Act was applied
to this area only subsequently with effect from 1st April,
1937.
The High Court has expressed the opinion that the mortgage
of 1933 must be held to have been executed after the commencement of the Act, because the Act was passed in 1918 when it
came into operation. This view, however, ignores the significance
of the expression "commencement of the Act" used in clauses (b)
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and (c) of sub-s. (3) of s. 2 of the Act. The Act, when originally
passed in 1918, extended to British India. At that time, the
Bangalore Civil and Military Station was not a part of British India.
This fact is clear from the decision of the Madras High CoUit in
re Hayes(') which was approved by the Privy Council in
the case of Gajambal Ramalingam & Ors.( 2 ) as already
mentioned by us earlier. The Bangalore Civil and Military Station
continued to be a part of the territory of Mysore and was foreign
territory and not a part of British India. The Act, when it came
into operation in 1918 under section 5 of the General Clauses Act,
did not therefore, become applicable in the Bangalore Civil and
MilitarY Station. In deciding the question of applicability of the
Act to the present suit, what we are concerned with is not when
the Act came into operation under s. 5 of the General Clauses
Act, but whether it can be held that the commencement of the
Act was earlier than the date of execution of the mortgage deed of
1933. "Commencement" is defined in s. 3(13) of the General
Clauses Act as follows : " 'Commencement', used with reference to an Act or
Regulation, shall mean the day on which the Act or Regulation comes into force."
Obviously, an Act can only commence in a particular area on the
date on which that Act comes into force in that area. The mere
fact that it was in operation in other areas will not result in the
Act having commenced in the area where it had not yet been
applied. In this connection, notice may be taken of the language
of sub-s. (3) of section 5 of the General Clauses Act where it is
laid down that "unless the contrary is expressed, a Central Act or
Regulation shall be construed as comiJ!lg into operation immediately
on the expiration of the day preceding its commencement." This
sub-section clearly indicates that there is a distinction between an
Act coming into operation, and the commencement of the Act.
The date of coming into operation is not necessarily the date of
commencement. In interpreting s. 2(3)(b) and (c) of the Act we
are concerned with the expression "commencement of the Act'; and
n?! with "coming into operation of the Act". In view of the defimuon o.f 'comm.enceme~t' given in s. 3(13) of the General Clauses
Act which apphes to this expression as used in the Act, it has to
be held th~t the commencement of the Act for the purposes of the
presen~ smt must be held to the date on which the Act came into
force m Ban¥alore Civil and Military Station and, consequently,
only 1st. April, 1937 and not earlier. The document of 1933
treated either as an agreement or a security for purposes of clause;
(b) & (c) of sub-s. (3) of section 2 of the Act, was made or given
before the commencement of the Act and, consequently, the pre(1) i.L.R. 12 Mad. 39.
(2) A.l.R.1950 P.C. 64.
1080
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 2 S.C.R,
sent suit is not a suit to which the Act can be held to be applicable
under either of those clauses.
Mr. Aggarwala on this point drew our attention !O t~e ,rro~i
sions of sub-s. (3) of section 3 of the Act under wluch 1t IS laid
down that "this section shall apply to any suit, whatever its form
may be, if such suit is substantially one for the recovery of a loan
or for the enforcement of any agreement or security in respect of a
loan or for the redemption of any such security." He relied on a
decision of the Punjab High Court in Vaishnu Dass and Others
v. Thakur Dass('), where the Court interpreted s. 3(3) of the
Act as laying down that the other provisions of section 3 will apply
to a suit for the recovery of a loan or for the enforc1:ment of any
agreement or security in respect of a Joan or for the redemption of
any such security, irrespective of the fact whether the loan or
the agreement was made before or after the commenc:ement of the
Act, or the security was given before or after the commencement
of the Act. We are unable to accept this interpretation. Sub-s.
(3) of section 3 is not intended to take away the limitations laid
down in s. 2(3)(a), (b) and (c) of the Act. Its only purpose is to
meet the contingency that a suit, to which the provisions of the
Act are sought to be applied, may not be in the form of a suit
for recovery of a Joan, or for the enforcement of any agreement
or security in respect of a Joan or for the redemption of any such
security. In such a case, these expressions used in section 2(3)
of the Act are to be held to be covered even if the suit is substantially of such a nature. This sub-s. (3) of s. 3 of the. Act is thus
intended to be in the nature of an explanation for the purpose of
interpreting what is a suit for recovery of a loan or for the enforcement of an agreement or security in respect of a Joan or for the
redemption of any such security used in sub-s. (3) of section 2 of the
Act in cases where the suit may not have been framed in such
form as to indicate plainly that it is a suit of such a nature. Even
!f the form be different, but the suit is substantially of that nature,
1t has to be held that the requirements of s. 2(3) of the Act are
satisfied. Consequently, it cannot be held that this provision was
intended to take away the requirement that, for the applicability
of the Act, the loan mentioned in clause (a) and the agreement
mentiqned in clause (b) of s. 2(3) must have been made after the
commencement of the Act and the security mentioned in clause
(c) must have been given after the commencement of the Act. In
the present case, the mortgage-deed, on the basis of which accounting and decree for surplus were claimed by the respondents,
was not executed after the commencement of the Act and clearly,
therefore, the Act cannot be applied to the present suit. The
(I) l.L.R. [19;4] 7 Pb. 1.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
•
•
MANICKCHAND V. MOHD. SAIT (Bhargava, ].)
A
B
c
D
E
108 1
decree of the High Court to the extent of relief granted to the
respondents on the basis of the applicability of the Act must be
set aside.
Learned counsel for parties were asked to indicate to us the
amount for which the suit would have to be decreed, applying section 76 of the T.P. Act and ignoring the provisions of the Act,
and they gave us the agreed figure that this amount will be
Rs. 13,342/09 P. This is the amount which has been found by
the High Court as due, if the provisions of the Act are not applicable. Consequently, the decree passed by the High Court has to
be reduced to this amount.
The High Court, when decreeing the suit, granted interest to
the respondents on this amount with effect from 3rd November,
1943, which was the date on which the suit was instituted. Learned counsel for the appellants desired that interest should be granted
only with effect from the date of ~he decree passed by the High
Court in the appeal against decree in the suit. We can see no basis
behind this submission. The amount, for which the suit is being
decreed, was clearly payable by the appellants at the time when
the suit was instituted and we cannot, therefore, hold that any
error was committed by the High Court in granting interest on this
amount from the date of the suit.
The appeal is partly allowed and the decree passed by the High
Court is set aside. The suit will be decreed for a sum of Rs.
13,342/09 P with interest @ 6 per cent per annum with effect
from 3rd November, 1943. In view of the partial success of the
appeal, we direct parties to 1bear their own costs.
V.P.S.
Appeal partly allowed.
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