LAKSHMIRATTAN COTTON MILLS versus COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U.P.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 3 September 1968 | [1969] 1 S.C.R. 951 | 1968 INSC 220
Key facts
- Decided
- 3 September 1968
- Bench
- J.C. SHAH*, V. RAMASWAMI, A.N. GROVER
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 2139/1966
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1969] 1 S.C.R. 951
- Neutral citation
- 1968 INSC 220
Text of the judgment
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LAKSHMIRATIAN COTION MILIS
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U.P.
September 3, 1968
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(J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.]
Income-tax Act (11 of 1922), ss. !0(2)(xv), 66(1), (2) and (4)T ermination of managinJ? agency-No evidence of services don~ by
managing agent-Payment of compensation fvr termination-If permissible deduction under s. 10(2) (xv).
Questions not raised in application under s. 6Gf 1) and (2)-:-lurisdic-
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tion of High Court to direct Tribunal to state case on such question under
s. 66(4).
The shares in the a·ssessee-company were held in equal moieties by nvo
families. Four members of each family, together, formed a partnership
firm and by a managing agency agreement the ao;~ss<e appointed the fir!"
as· its managing agent. In 1943, one of the fatnll!es was represented m
tb.e firm by two women and two minors. The management o~ the asses.see
was carried on by two df the four members of the other farruly who were
the partners in the fi'rm. Those two members were also directors of the
assessee-company. Disputes arose between the two families and the
assessee terminated the managing agency with effect from September 30,
1944. Thereupon the members of the two families asserting that they,
as partners of the firm we're interested in the mdD.agiug agency, claimed
compensation from the assessee for wrongful ts1niuation of the agency.
The dispute between the firm and the assessee was referred to arbitration,
and in pursuance of the award the assessee paid Rs. 18,90,000 to the
firm and Rs. 13,300 were disbW:sed as expenses of arbitration.
The assessee claimed the payment of Rs. 19,03,300 as a permissible
allowance under s. 10(2) (xv) of the Income-ta>. Act, 1922, but the
Income-tax Offioer, Appellate Assistant Comm '.ssioner and the Appellate
Tribunal disallowed the claim. The assessee thcu filed an application
under s. 66(1) for stating a case for the opinion ot tile High Court, but
the Tribunal rejected the apolication. The assessee then moved the High
Court under s. 66(2) for directing the Tribunal to state a case in respect
of two questions. On the direction of the High Court, the Tribunal
referred to the High Court the question : Whether there was material
on which the Tribunal could haye come to the conclusion that
Rs. 19,03,300 were not spent by the assessee wholly and exclusively for
the purpose of its business. The assessee, thereafter, filed another appli·
cation before the High Court for referring additional questions which
were not incorporatqj. in ~he applications under s. 66(1) or (2); and the
High Court, in purported exercise of the power under s. 66( 4) directed
the Tribunal to submit another statement with respect to the additional
questions and the Tribunal complied with the order.
At the hearing of the reference, the High Court was of the view that
it had no jurisdiction under s. 66( 4) to direct the Tribunal to submit the
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second st-atement and declined to record format answers on the additional
questions. On the original question, the Hip;h Court held that there was
material on which the Tribunal could hold that the allowance claimed
\ras not spent wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the asS>essee's
businesil and confirmed the Tribunal's order.
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952
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1969] J S.C.R .
, In appeal ~o this. C"-?ui: •. on !he qu_estions : \I) \V'hcthcr th!! High
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acted vtnhout 1un'id1cllon, 1n calling for 1he second statement of
'?s7; .and (2) ~hether there was material before the Ttihunal h· justify
C~oun
11 1n 1ls conclu\1on.
HELD : (I) In an application under s. 66(2). the High C.ourl cannot
cft<lcr rhat a case he stated on auestion<; which \\.·ere not inclu<.!i.!<l ia the
application under s. 66(1). Po"·er under s. 66(-1l. n1;1y he cxcr~ised lo
call for a supplementary statement only when the t:ourt is :,Jlisl~-:d that
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the !itatcmcnt in 1he cac;e referred under s. 66( 1) or (2) is not '.:1.,;ffic:cnt
to enable it to determine the question raised by that stalcmrnr. The
power cannot he exercised for calling for anoth\.T ~1:1:..:1n~nt on "-!Uestion~
not referred hy lh·;! ·rribunal. Therefore, the t1(ocedurc rollov;c~ by the
l·ligh Court. in exercise of the power under s. 66( 4), ~3iiin2 for ::n additional statement of case on questions which \Vere not 111cor?orat-:d in the
applications umkr s. 66(1) and (2) was irregular. (963 G-H; 964 D.
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New f<./wngir Vakil Mil/; Ltd. v. C.l.T. (1960] I S.C.R. 249; 37
1.T.R. 11 (S.C.) and c:.1.r. V, Scindia SU!l/11l /\i(lvi;:~tlvfl Co., ·+2 1.·r.R.
589, 609 <S.C.,l followed.
l'hc 1-Jigh Court, at the hearing: of the reference. wa.; jusdli'!d in refu~;
ing to ans.,..'Cr the addit!onal qucs~ions. since, !t may decline to ;1nswc-r a
question referred pu·rsuant to the direction of the Hil!.h C..ourt if the qucstion could not have hecn r:iised because it 'A':t" not inco'rporalcd in the
application under s. 66( I). J965 Il-CJ
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CJ.T. v. Smr. A111m1ya Dr•vi, 68 I.TR. 750 (S.C). followed.
(2) (a) The burden of proof 101y upon the ao;scs....;ee to prove that the
expenditure \Vas incurred \i.·holly and exclusivelv for its t1us1nes":>. In the
present case, the remuneration payable under the manJgi.:H? .l!!Ct~cy agret:n1cnt was for a t\VO-fold consideration (i) tor the service rendered in
promoting the a-;sc'iscc:- and (ii) for rendering scrvict!s to the .1s:-.esse~ as
n1anaging agent. But thcr-.: \Vas no evidence th.'.lt anr spccdic functions
\\·ere entrusted to 1hc m:inaging agent. A 'recital in tlie n1anaginf ag~ney
agreement authorising the ;lgcnt to do certain actc; woulJ not b-~ :1 .suhstitute for cvicJcncc th~1t those ;1cl-. \\'ere done. ·fhc 1n;lnacen1cnt of the
asses.sec 'A'as in fact carried on hy (\l,'O membcr'i of one o.f the farnilics,
hoth hcforc :ind after the termination of the m:in,1~ing agcr.cy; anJ the
mcmh-~rs of the olhcr famih· I \\·omen and niinors) had 110 r.;:!lcclivc voice
in the managc1ncnt.
Even :.he t.,..·o men1hcrs \;:110 \\'Crc 1;1,1na(dn.g lhc
affairs of 1hC ;L'>\Csscc "''ere doing so not as oartncr:; of !hi.! llrn1 hut in
their eapacitv as directors of the asscssec·company l'hcrc \\1<lS no reliable
evidence bcfOrc the ·rribun:il. ;ind the Trihun;1l was justified in reaching the
conclusion thaL the firm did not render any scrv;cc to tile a'>~.t.:~:>~c :~s its
n1anaging agent. Jf no service w;1s in fact ren~crcd by the n1:1naging a<!c.nt
the remuneration mu5t he regarded :i.s cxcl11s1vely pavahle for the service
rendered in pron1oting Iii·: ~1sr,cssce. But expcn~1;~uf'e in..:urn.:d for rcmu·Jlcratin_g per~ons .,..·ho- had t>rornotcd ~1 companv i" not in L:"' a revc~uc
cxpendilurc admis\ihle under s. I0(2)(xv). Therefore. compensation
r.avablc to the n1anaging a!.!Cllt for tcrn1in<1tion c:I !he m.1n<:gir~ "·!!COL')'
could not he s.aicl to he expenditure incu'rrc<l \vhollv .and c:xdu~:;v~h· i:1 the
interest of the hnsincs<o of 'the ;:sses<>ee. r965 I), f-G: 966 r-G: 967 B-J):
%8 lHlJ
{ h) ·rherc \~·as no evidence ;ind not even an ::ittcmpt v.·~is rnade lo
c'<olain hn"- the affairs o; .thl' cn~l~pany \i.·ouhl. have !1~:.=n 11rcjudiccd 1~1
fhc clisrn1tcs hct\vccn the t\vo fan11hes. The Tribunal found: on .t~e C\rd~n1.:c llCforc ii. that lhc di-;putcs \\'Crc personal 1-0 the i\\10 fa:nihes and
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L. C. MILLS V. C. I. T. (Shah,/.)
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did not and could not prejudicially affect the business of the assessee or
put any hindrance in its normal day to day working? and that the~e was
no necessity for t'erminating the agency and fdr paying wmpensatlon on
that ground. [965 G-H; 968 A-Bl
( c) It was not suggested that the affairs of the u::>Sessee were n1is..
managed. Hence, even if one of the families threatened to apply for
the appointment of a receiver for the management of the assessee company no receiver would have been appointed for the management of the
assessee. Therefore, it was unlikely that :such a futile threat was taken
into account for determining the managing agency, necessitating the payment of compensation. [967 G-H]
There was thus ample material on which the conclusion of the Tribunal
was based, The Tribunal considered all the relevant evidence and its
finding could not be said to be based on mere surmise~ and conjectures.
[968 H]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION :
of 1966.
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Civil Appeal No. 2139
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
July 27, 1965 of the Allahabad lligh Court in Income-tax
Reference No. 586 of 1961.
S. T. Desai and J. P. Goyal, for the appellant.
B. Sen, R. N. Sachthey and B. D. Sharma, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
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Shah, J. In proceedings for assessment of tax for the year
1945-46 the Lakshmirattan Cotton Mills--hereinafter called 'the
Company'--claimed allowance under s. l0(2)(xv) of the
Income-tax Act, 1922, of Rs. 18,90,000 paid by it as compensation for termination of the managing agency of the finn Beharilal Kailashpat and Rs. 13,300 incurred as expenditure in respect
of arbitration proceedings in connection with the determination
of compensation. The Income-tax Officer disallowed the claim.
The order was confirmed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner
and by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. - The lligh Court of
Allahabad in a reference under s. 66(2) of the Income-tax Act,
1922, held that ther.~ was material on which the Tribunal could
hold that the allowance claimed was not spent wholly and exclusively for the p!irpose of the company's business.
The facts which give rise to the reference require to be stated
in some detail. The Company was incorporated in 1934. The
shares of the Company were held in equal moieties by members of
two families, who may for the sake of convenience be referred to
as "Singhanias" and "Guptas". Under a deed dated August 3.
1934, Singhanias and Guptas formed a partnership to carry on,
in the name of Beharilal Kailashpat, several businesses including
~e business of Secretaries, .Treasurers and Agents of the Company.
By agreement dated May 2, 1935, the Company appointed
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954
st;PREME COURT REPORTS
(1969] I S.C.R.
Beharilal Kailashpat as its managing agents. The fi!Jil then consisted of eight partners--four belonging to the family of Singhanias
and the other four belonging to the family of Guptas. Under the
Articles of Association of the Company two ex-officio directors
were to be nominated by Beharilal Kailashpat. Clause 2 of the
managing agency agreement read as follows :
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"In consideration of the agreement hereinbefore
contained on the part of the firm and in further consideration of the firm having promoted the Company, the
Company hereby promise and agree with the Finn and
its Members for the time being . -
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(a) That the Firm shall be the Agents of the Company for a period of ninety-nine years and thereafter until they shall resign or until they aro
thereafter removed from their office as Agents
of the Company by a majority of three-fourths
of the shareholders of the Company.
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( b) The Firm shall receive from the Company a
commission at the rate of two per cent on the
sale price of all the cotton, yarn and cotton
cloth manufactured and sold by the Company
and a commission of one per cent on the sale
proceeds of all materials, yams and fabrics
manufactured from wool, jute, silk and other
fabrics, and sold by the Company, and a commission of ten per cent on the gross profits
after deducting all expenses but before deducting depreciation, made by the Company from
its ginning or pressing operations independently
of the usual adat commission, exchange and
interest payable to their branch firms or agents
and adatias appointed by them outside Cawnpore for purchasing or selling any goods or commodities for or on account of the Company.
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( c) The Company shall defray the expenses of
maintaining a suitable office and such staff as
the Firm may deem proper to transact the business of the Firm as Agents of the Company.
(d) In case the Company shall sell their Mill
premises and machinery and the business
thereof. the same shall be sold subject to
the rights and claims of the Finn of the Agents
of the Company as provided by this Agreement
and the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Company."
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L, C. MILLS v. C.J.T. (Shah, J.)
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By cl. 3 of the agreement it was provided that in the event of the,
Company being wound up the managing agents Beharilal Kail~
pat shall be entitled to receive compensation for loss of appomtment as agents a sum equal to the amount earned by the firm
during five years preceding the winding up of the Company.
Beharilal Kailashpat were under els. 3 (f) and (g) to purchase
all cotton, wool, machinery and stores that may from tim" to
time be required for the use of the Company Mills and to sell the
same and also to sell all loose or baled yarn, and cloth produced
or manufactured at the Company's Mills. By cl. (h) the managing
agents were to exercise all the powers given to them by the Articles
of Association of the Company. It was also provided that if the
firm be not dissolved it shall be lawfnl for the firm to change its
constitution, name or style from time to time, without thereby in
any way affecting their appointment as agents of the Company.
From time to time the constitution of Beharilal Kailashpat
was changed-some members ceased to be partners and new members entered the firm-without affecting the equal representation
of Singhanias and Guptas. On February 15, 1943, a fresh deed
of partnership of Beharilal Kailashpat was executed under which
the four representatives of Singhanias were--( 1) Smt. Ansuiya
Devi; (2) Smt. Pushpavati Devi; (3) Vijaipat (minor) and (4)
Ajaipat (minor) [Nos. (3) & ( 4) being minor sons of Lala
Kailashpat Singhania): the representatives of Guptas were--( 1)
Smt. Ramdevi; (2) Smt. Keshobai; (3) Lala Ram Rattan Gupta
and ( 4) Lala Ram Prasad Gupta. Each of the family collectively held an eight annas share. Under the terms of this partnership deed it was agreed that Lala Ram Rattan Gupta a partner of the firm will be entitled to carry on business on behalf of
the firm. ,
Disputes arose in 1943 between Singhanias and Guptas in
regard to the management of the various businesses in which thev
were interested. These disputes were referred _for · adjudicatic·n
to Thakur Kanhaiya Singh who made and publisbed his award on
January 18, 1944. Under the award the arbitrator allotted ·certain
businesses exclusively to Singhanias and the rest to Guptas. In
regard to the managing agency of the Company, the award
directed that the Singhania group do withdraw from the Company, and the shares held by them be given to the Gupta group
"at the rate of Rs. 2,000 per share" : that Padamoat and his two
brothers do resign from the Board of Directors, that the
Singhania group be deemed to have retired from the partnership
of the managing agency as from 25th January 1944 and that L.
~am Rattan .Gupta alonll' with his members of the group be entitled to continue the said managing agency business : that
~e name of Kailashpat be removed from the firm's name of
Beharilal Kailashpat; that the profit and loss account of Beharilal
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[l 969] l S.C.R.
Kailashpat be made up to J?nuary 18, 1944, and that the amount
due to either of the groups ascertained after providing for exc.ess
profits tax and incol)le..tax liabilities be paid. Pursuant to the
award the shares .held by the Singhanias were taken over -by the
Guptas, and the name of the managing itgency firm was changed
to- Beharilal Ramcharan. On March 31, 1944, the shareholders
of the Company approved .of the changes in the constitution of
the n1anaging agency firm.
Apparently Singhanias were not satisfie\i with the award made
by Thal:;ur Kanhaiya Singh and they commenced an action (Suit
No. 31 of 1944) in the Civil Court at Kanpur, and claimed relief
in respect of the termination of their interest in Beharilal Kailashpat, and in respect or certain other matters. There was correspondence between Singhanias and Guptas which it is unnecessary
at this stage to refer. On September 19, 1944, at a meeting of
the shareholders of the Company the firm of Beharilal Ramcharan
which was brougqt into existence under a deed of partnership
dated January 27, 1944, were appointed managing agents of the
company. The Singhanias insisted that they remained interested
in the managing agercy and the Guptas asserted that under the
award of Thakur Kanhaiya Singh the Singhania group had ceased
to have interest in the managing agency and on retirement of
the members of the Singhanias, the name of Beharilal Kailashpat
.was changed to Beharilal Ramcharan. The shareholders of the
Company at their meeting held on September 19, 1944, also
passed a resolution that the managin,g agents be dismissed from
the office and the managing agency agreement be terminated with
effect from September 30, 1944.
Thereafter the members representing the Singhanias claimed
compensation from the Company for wrong.fut termination of
the managing agency. The Guptas also made a claim for compensation and threatened to bring an action against the Company. By
agreement dated October 19, 1944, the disputes between the
Colllpany and Beharilal Kailashpat were referre9 to the arbitration of Mr. K. M. Munshi with authority to decide two questions-( l) whether the termination of the managing agency and
removal from the office of the managing agents of the firm of
Beharilal Kailashpat and/or its alleged successor Beharilal ~am
cl\aran was wrongful or not; and (2) if it was wrongful, to what
compensation, if any, are the ex-managing agents entitled ?
Before Mr. Munshi entered upon the reference, the award made
by Thakur Kanhaiya Singh was modified by a supplementary
award made by Thakur Ka;nhaiya Singh with the consent of the
parties. Under the award so modified, it was provided that
"Regarding the claim of the retiring partners· for a
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share in the goodwill of the said finn and in the value
of the said Managing Agency the said ' LR.C.M. Co.
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L. C. MILLS v. C.l.T. (Shah, /.)
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Ltd. having terminated the said Managing Agency
Agreement ·and the Managing Agents having claimed
compensation for the said termination which they allege
· was wrongful and the dispute arising_ out of such claim
having been referred to arbitration, it is agreed 'and
awarded that any sum awarded as compensation in the
said arbitration shall be paid to and retained by the
continuing partners and that irrespective of the result
of the said award and in any event they, i.e. the continuing partners shall pay to the retiring partners a sum
of Rs. eight lacs as representing their share in the compensation for the premature and wrongful termination of
the Managing Agency Agreement with the said firm.
The above payments shall be in full satisfaction and
discharge of all claims and demands whatsoever of the
retiring partners on and to the assets, goodwill and
contracts of the said firm including the Managing
Agency Agreement with the L.R.C.M. Co. Ltd., and
also in full satisfaction and discharge of the claim made
by them against the Lakshmirattan Cotton Mills Co.
Ltd., for compensation for the tem1ination of the said
Managing Agency."
On this modified award a consent decree was obtained in Suit
No. 31 of 1944 filed by Singhanias.
Thereafter Mr. Munshi made an award on March 25, 1945,
. directing·( 1) That the termination of the managing agency
of Mis Beharilal Kai\ashpat and their removal from
the office of Managing Agents of the said company i.e.
Laxmiratllm Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. was wrongful.
(2) That the said Laxmirattan Cotton Mills Co.
Ltd. are liable to pay to the firm of M/s Beharilal
Kailashpat a sum of Rs. 18.90,000 only as and by way
of compensation for such wrongful c\ismissa\..
(3) That the said Laxmirattan Cotton Mills Co.
Ltd. to pay to party of the third part, that is to say,
L. Ramrattan Gupta and Lala Ramprasad Guota sons
of L. Beharilal, and Smt. Keshobai: wife of L. Ramgopal, the said sum of Rs. 18,90,000 only, with interest
· thereon at the rate of 3 per cent. per annum from the
date hereof.
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( 4) That the said company do pay the said parties
of the 2ncl part and of the 3rd part their respective
costs ol the reference and the arbitration proceedings
(which included fees of Rs. 10,000) to Mr. K. M .
Munshi.
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SUPREME COURT RF.PORTS
( 1969] t S.C.R .
Payment was thereafter made by the Company in pursuance of
this award of Rs. 18,90,000 to Beharilal Kailashpat and
Rs. 13,300 were .disbursed as expenses of arbitration.
The Income-tax Ollicer rejected the claim of the Company to
treat as a permissible allowance under s. IO ( 2) (xv) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, the amount of Rs. 19,03,300. He held that
the expenditure incurred was not connected with the busines5 of
the Company and in any event it was capital expenditure. In
appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that the payment was made "for some improper purpose .
. not eoneected with the business". In further appeal before the Tribunal,
counsel for the Company urged two arguments in support of the
claim for allowance :
( 1) that the main object in terminating the managing agency was to save the Company from loss which
the Company would have suffered on account of the
disputes between the two groups of partners of the
managing agency firm; and
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( 2) that the Company was by the payment absolved from liability to the remuneration of the managing
agents for the year of account and for future years also.
The Tribunal held that before the termination of the managing
agency agreement the affairs of the Company were administered
by Lala Ram Rattan Gupta and Lala Ram Pnt,ad Gupta, that
even after the termination of the managing agency Lala Ram
Rattan Gupta and Lala Ram Prasad Gupta continued to administer the affairs of the Company, and that on the materials on record it was not proved that the managing agents were performing
any service to the Company. The Tribunal therefore held that the
payment of the managing agency commission to the managing
agents was not expenditure wholly and exclusively incurred for
the purpose of the Company·s business. The Tribunal also observed that the disputes between the two groups could in no way
harm or cause hindrance to the "nomrnl day-t<Hlay working" of
the Company.
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RefcrrinJ! to the second plea the Tribunal ob~~rved that consideration for the appointment of the managing agents were-(I) promotion of the Company; (2) rendering service to the
Company : anything paid for promoting the Company was not
admi>sible a' a revenue deduction, and hy making a consolidated
payment to ·pay off such a liability the Company did not reduce
the future revenue liability of the Company.
The Tribunal in summarising the findings observed :
"These disputes (between Singhanias and Gupta')
were taken to the Court and (were) also referred to
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L, C. MILLS v. C.I.T. (Shah,/.)
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arbitration. After the first arbitration dated 18-1-1944,
the Singhania group was not satisfied. Ultimately
· some sort of a settlement was arrived at through an arbitrator whose supplementary award forms the basis of
the consent decree of the Court. Under this award
each party had to pay the other large sums. Therefore,
a device was adopted to provide funds in the hands of
the parties at the expense of the company for the purpose of settling their individual accounts. In preparing
the scheme the authors had made an effort to reduce
the tax liability of the company by claiming the amount
as a revenue deduction."
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The Tribunal also observed that the firm styled Beharilal Ramcharan was brought into existence in place of Beharilal Kailashpat, but it rendered no services as managing agents. The Tri~u
nal accordingly rejected the claim of the Company for treatrng
the compensation paid to the managing agents and the legal expenses in relation thereto as a permissible deduction in the computation of its total income.
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The Company submitted an application under s. 66 (1) of
the Income-tax Act, 1922, for submitting a statement of case and
prayed that seven questions set out in the application be ref.erred
to the High Court. The Tribunal rejected the application holding that no question of law arose out of the order of the Tribunal,
and that the questions sought to be raised by the Company "were
pure questions of fact". The Company then moved an application in the High Court of Allahabad requesting that the Tribunal
be directed to state a case in respect of two questions :
" ( 1) Whether in the circumstances of the case the
expenditure made by the assessee company for the purpose of getting rid of the Managing Agents was not the
expenditure admissible under s. 10 (2) (xv) of the
Income-tax Act ?
(2) whether there was any or sufficient evidence to
justify the Tribunal to hold that no services whatever
were rendered by Managing Agents to the assessee
Company under the Managing Agency Agreement and
that therefore nothing was payable to the Managing
Agents in respect of such services ?"
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Too Hig~ ~ourt dire~ted the Tribunal to state a case on que~tions
of law ansmg out of its order. Pursuant to this order the Tribunal on December 29, 1954, submitted the following q~estion :
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"whether there was material on which the Tribunal
could have come to the conclusion that Rs. 19,03,300
were not spent by the assessee company wholly and ex·
elusively for the purpose of its business ?"
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960
(1969] I S.C R
SUPREME CQl;RT REPORTS
The Company was apparently dissatisfied with the question referred by the Tribunal and tiled a petition in the High Court praying that certain questions set out in the application be decided
along with the question already referred and the Income-tax
Appellate Tribunal be directed to amend the statement of case
and to refer the additional questions also to the High Court for
decision. The High Court in purported exercise of the power
under s. 66( 4) of the Indian Income-tax Act. called upon the
Tribunal to submit another ;tatement of case on the tollowing
questions :
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•· t. Was the_re any material for the finding-( a) ·that the managing agents had rendered no service to th-~ assessec company:
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(b) that Lala Ram Rattan (iupta and Lala Ram
Prasad Gupta were acting qua their position as
Directors and not as partners of the managing
company:
( c) that a device '"'-' adopted to provide funds in
the hands of parties at the expense of the company for the purpose of settling their individual
accounts and that th-~ payment of the amount
in question was made only as a part of this
device;
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t d) that the disputes between the partners of the
mana~ing agcncv firm could ·not, in any way,
have affected the carrying on of the normal
business of the company; and
E
( c) that the company gained nothing by terminating the rn<Jnaging a~cncy a~recmcnt ?
2. Whether the whole or any part of the sum of
Rs. 18,90,000 was paid by the company to the managin~ aµcn1' having promoted the company 0
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:1. What was the true nature of the payment of the
sum of Rs. 18,90.000 hy the company to the managing
,
n1anaging
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4. Whether the 'Ulll of Rs. I R,90,000 together
with the sum of Rs. 13,300 paid as expenses of litigation or any part thereof was an expenditure incurred
wholly and exclusively by the company for purposes of
its business and as such it was an allowable deduction?"
H
a}!.i:nts nn a correct
interpretation of
the
apcncy agrccnient ?
The Trilo·.11tal complied with the order and submitted another•
""tement of the case ~elling out in detail the materials on which
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L. C. MILLS V. C.I.T.
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(Shah, J.)
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the various findings which were sought to be incorporated in the
questiens were founded.
At the hearing of the reference the High Court was of the
view that the Court had no jurisdiction under s. 66( 4) of the
lncorne-tax Act to direct the Tribunal to submit second statement of case and the questions in addition to the one submittr...d
before the Tribunal "could not legally have come before the High
·court", since the earlier ctatement of the case was not quashed,
no1 was it returned to the Tribunal; and the Court in calling upon
the Tribunal to. submit another statement of case did not act in
conformity with the provisions of sub-s. ( 4) of s. 66 of the
Income-tax Act. In the view of the High Court a comparison of
the question originally framed with the questions referred with
the second statement of case by the Tribunal showed that the
second set of questions were not parts of, or included in, the
former question but were substantially different : some of the
questions in the view of the High Court were pure questions of
fact, some of them were overlapping, and the questions were
different from the two questions mentioned in the application
under s. 66(2), and that on the application submitted by the
Company, even if it be treated as an application for calling for a
statement of case under s. 66 (2), the only question that the Court
could call upon the Tribunal to refer was Question No. 1 (a)
submitted with the second statement of case. The High Court
then observed that they were under a duty to refuse to answer
questions which did not arise out of the order passed by the
Tribunal or were not included in the application under ss. 66(1)
and (2). But out of deference to the order previously passed the
Court proceeded to consider and set out reasons in support of the
answers to the questions referred if those questions were required
to be answered. The High Court said that on the question there
was evidence that no change had taken place for carrying on the
company's busi"ness after the termination of the agreement.
Questions 1 (b), l(c), l(e) and (2) & (3), the High Court
observed, were not incorporated in the applications under ss,
66 ( 1) & (2) and Question 1 ( d) was not mentioned in the appli
cation under s. 66(2), and those questions did not arise out al
the order of the Tribunal. Further, the High Court observed,
Questions l(b), l(c), l(d), l(e) and (2) could not be answered
in favour o[ the assessee, and Question (3) was irrelevant and
need not he considered. In the view of the High Court Question
( 4) consisted of two limbs .
whether the payment of
Rs. 18,90,000 was made for the purpose of the company's business,· and whether the payment for that purpose amounted to
revenue expenditure. The first, in the view of the High Court,
was a question of fact and the second though a mixed question
~f law and fact did not arise for determination unless the first
limb was answered in favonr of the Company, and that in any
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962
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969]
.C.R.
event if the question were to be reduced to the form whether there
was any material for the finding that the payment was not an expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the
company's business, the answer must be against the Company.
After a detailed consideration the High Court held that the
expenditure in question was not made wholly and exclusively for
the pmpose of the company's business, and was by way of distribution of profits, and being wholly gratuitous or "for some improper or oblique purpose outside the course of business management", it could not be treated as a permissible deduction. Against
the order recorded by the High Court, this appeal has been preferred with special leave.
We propose in the first instance to consider whether th~ High
Court acted with jurisdiction in calling for a second statement of
case on questions which were not incorporated in the applications
under ss. 66 (I) & ( 2) of the Act after the Tribunal had submitted
a statement of case in response to the order under s. 66(2).
Under s. 66( I) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, the assesscc or the
Commissioner may by application in the prescribed form within
the period provided require the Appellate Tribunal to refer to the
High Court any question of law arising out of such order and the
Tribunal is enjoined by law to draw up a statement of case and
refer it to the High Court. If on any application made under
sub-s. (I) the Appellate Tribunal refuses to state a case on the
ground that no question of law ari,;cs, the assessee or the Commissioner may, if he is not satisfied with the correctness of the
decision of the Appellate Tribunal make an application to the
High Court to require the Appellate Tribunal to state the cao;e
and to refer it to the High Court and on receipt of any such
requisition the Tribunal shall state the case and refer it. If the
High Court is not satisfied with the statement of case referred
1mder sub-s. (1) & (2) of s. 66 and the facts are not sufficient to
enable. determination of question raised thereby, the Court may,
in exercise of the power under sul:>-s. ( 4), refer the case back to
the Appellate Tribunal to make such additions thereto or alterations therein as the Court may direct in that behalf. Under sub-s.
(5) of s. 66 the High Court upon hearing any such case shall
decide the question of law raised thereby.
This Court in New Jehangir Vakil Mills I.rd.
sioner of Income Tax(') observed.
v.
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Commis-
"It is clear .
. that the only question of law
which the assessee or the Commissioner can require
the Tribunal to refer to the High Court is 'any question
of law arising out of the order of the Tribunal' .....
Wh3! has. therefore. to be looked at in the first ins-
<'' (1060] I S.CR. 249: 17 J.T.R. 11
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tance is whether the question of law thus required to be
referred arises out of the order of the Tribunal.
. . . . Section 66 ( 2) which gives the power to the
High Court to require the Tribunal to state the case
and refer the question of law to it also proceeds on the
same basis and even where the High Court exercises
the power under section 66 (2) it can <?nlY require ~e
Tribunal to state the case on any question of law ansing out of such order. The scope and subject-matter
. is coof the reference under section 66(2)
extensive with that of the reference under section 66 ( 1)
of the Act and the High Court has no power or jurisdiction under section 66(2) to travel beyond the
ambit of section 66 ( 1). .Section 66 ( 2) comes into
play only when the Tribunal refuses to state the case
on the ground that no question of law arises and if the
High Court is not satisfied of the correctness of the
decision of the Tribunal, it has . . . . the power and
jurisdiction to require the Tribunal to state the case·
and refer the same to it.
. This statement of case which is based
. on the facts which are admitted and/or found
by the Tribunal may not contain sufficient material to
enable the High Court to determine the question raised
thereby and in that case the High Court under section
66 ( 4) is vested with the jurisdiction to refer the case
back lo the Tribunal to make such additions thereto or
alterations therein as the Court may direct in- that behalf only for the purpose of determining the questions
referred to it. . . . . . . . . But section 66 ( 4) does
not enable the High Court to raise a new question of
law which does not arise out of the Tribunal's order
and direct the Tribunal to investigate new or further
facts necessary to determine this new question which
had not been referred to it under section 66 ( 1) or
section 66 ( 2) and direct the Tribunal to submit a supplementary statement of case. This power and jurisdiction which is vested in the High Court is to be exercised
within the four corners of section 66."
It is also well settled that in an application under s. 66(2) of the
Income-tax Act the High Court cannot order that a case be stated
o~ questions which were not included in the application submitted under s. 66 ( 1). It was observed by this Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. Ltd.(')
" . . . . . . the power of the Court to direct a refe
rence under section 66(2) is subject to two limitations
(I)
4,2 1.T.R. 589. 609 (S.C.\
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SLl'REME COURT RF.PORTS
[1969] 1 S.C.R .
-the question must be one which the Tribunal was
bound to refer under section 66 (I) and the applicant
must have required the Tribunal to refer it . .
It
is, therefore, clear that under section 66 ( 2), the Court
cannot direct the Tribunal to refer a question unless it
is one which arises out or the order of the Tribi.rnal and
was specified hy the applicant in his application under
section 66 ( I ) .''
The High Court was, therefore, incompetent to call upon the
Trihunai to submit a statement of case ori ques~ions of fact or
questions which were not incorporated in the application under
s. 66(1 ).
The Company in its application under s. 66 ( 2) requested
that a statement of case be called for in respect of only two ques'
tions. Thereafter the Company applied to the High Court for
an order that other questions which were neither incorporated in
the application under s. 66( I) nor in the application under
s. 66(2) he submitted to the High Court. The l·ligh Cou11 had
no power. in our judgment, t0 grant that application. The power
under s. 66( 4) may he exercised to call for a supplementary
statement only when the Court is satisfied that the statements in
a case referred under sub-s. (I) or sub-s. (2) of s. 66 are not
sufficien~ to enable it to detem1ine the question raised by that
statement. It does not confer a power to raise any additional
questions or to call for a statement of case on questions not referred by the Tribunal. If it happens that the Tribunal makes an
inadequate statement of case and docs not submit all the questions of law arising out of the order of the Tribunal, the remedy
of the aggrieved party is to proceed in the manner su)!gestcd hy
Kania. J. in /V. V. K/zandva/a v. (·0111111issio11tr of /11co111e~rax( 1 ):
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"When a statement of case. with the question of
F
law framed bv the Tribunal. is filed in Cnurt for disposal, if a party is aggrieved and wants to contend that
certain further facts ought to be stated, or certain questions of law should be raised. he can make an application bv wav of notice of motion. That 'hould be
heard ·a!on; with the case stated D\· the Tribunal for the
Court's opinion. At that time th.e Court will consider
G
whether the statement of case is complete for the question of law raised by the Tribunal. The Court can
also consider whether on the case stated bv the Tribunal
the proper question is raised or not."
·
The power under s. 66( 4) may be exercised when the High
('ourt is not s:1tisfied that the statements in a case referred arc II
sufficient to determine the question referred thereby. it cannot be
exercised for calling for another statement on questions not •
(I) t4 l.T.R. 635. 6ii _ __
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L. C. MILLS v. C.I.T. (Shah, /.)
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965
referred by the Tribunal. The procedure followed by the High
Court in calling for, in exercise of the power under s. 66 ( 4), an
additional statement of the case on questions which were not in··
corporated in the applications under ss. 66(1) & (2) was, in our
judgment, irregular.
Correctness of an order of the High Court calling for a statement of case may be challenged at the hearing of the referenca
and the Court may decline to answer the question referred pursuant to the direction of the Court, if it did not arise out of the order
of the Tribunal, or is a question of fact or is academic or could
not have been raised because it was not incorporated in the application under s. 66 (1); Commissioner of Income-tax v. Smt.
A nusuya Devi('). Counsel for the Company has therefore
rightly confined himself to the question which was originally submitted by the Tribunal by order date& December 29, 1954, and
has raised .his argument on that question only.
The Company claims that the expenditure of Rs. 19,03,300
is a pem1issible allowance under s. 10(2) (xv) of the Indian
lncome-tax Act as expenditure wholly and exclusively incurred
for the purpose of the business of the company. The burden of
proof lay upon the Company to prove that the expenditure was
incurred wholly and exclusively for the business of the Company.
In the view of the Tribunal the management of the Company was
being carried on by two members of the Gupta group who were
acting as ex-officio directors. Even after the termination of the
managing agency on September 30, 1944, those two members
continued to carry on fue management, and the Company appointed no managing. agents till July 1947, when a private limited Company styled B. R. Sons Ltd., of which the members of the Gupta
group were shareholders, was brought into existence. Singhanias
were represented at the relevant time in the firm of Beharilal
Kailashpat by two women and two minors who could not and did
not take any effective part in ilie business of the partnership or in
the management of the Company's business. The members of
the Gupta group were managing the affairs of the Company, not
as partners of Beharilal Kailashpat but in their capacity as directors of the Company, and there was no evidence that the firm of
Beharilal Kailashpat rendered any services to the Company. After
the termination of the managing agency, Lala Ram Rattan Gupta
and Lala Ram Prasad Gupta were appointed directors of the Company and looked after the business of the Company.
The Tribunal held that the disputes between the Singhania
group and the Gupta group were real, but the ' disputes were
personal to the two fan1i!ies who constituted the firm, and the disputes did not and could not prejudicially affect ilie business of
tl!e Company. The Tribunal also found that the firm Beharilal
(l) 68 I.T.R. 750.
L!Sup.Cl/69-15
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966
SUPRE:\!E COURT REPORTS
[ 1969] I S.C.R.
Ramcharan who were appointed managing agents on March 31,
1944, were not formally dismissed: . but they merely drew remuneration under the agreement and rendered no service. There
was no evidence that any specific functions were entrusted to the
managing agents, besides those specified in the managing agency
agreement, and it was conceded by the representative of the
managing agents that after the termination of the managing
a.~cncy agreement on September 30,
1944, "no change took
place besides that Ram Rattan and Ram Prasad who were the
ex-officio directors became ordinary directors". From these facts
the Tribunal inferred that the managing agents as such rendered
no 'crvice to the Company.
Counsel for the Company contended that the findings of the
Tribunal w~re based upon mere surmises and conjectures and
were in any event based on no evidence. He relied upon the last
paragraph of the statement of case that the "Tribunal's real finding" on which the finding relating to the inadmissibility of the
expenditure was based was that a device was adopted to provide
funds in the hands of the parties at the expense of the Company
for settling their individual accounts. Counsel also submitted
that there was a mass of evidence which the Tribunal ignored in
d.~ciding whether the managing agents rendered any service. Our
attention was invited to the terms of the managing agency agreement and also to assertions made in the correspondence between
the Company and the Singhanias, and also to the finding recorded
bv the Income-tax Officer who observed that all circumstances
p-ointed to the fact that "the managing agents were managing the
affairs of the Company well. Hence if still they were removed
from service the inference is clear that they were removed for
somt reasons not connected with business".
In reaching its conclusion the Tribunal considered all the
relevant evidence. The Tribunal has referred to the order of the
Incc1mc-tax Officer, to the terms of the managing agency a?rccmcnt and also to the correspondence. The Tribunal primarily
relied upon the facts that before and after the termination of the
manoµing agency agreement, only two directors Lala Ram Rattan
Gupta and Lala Ram Prasad Gupta carried on the business of the
Company and no explanation was rendered before the Tribunal
about the specific services rendered by the managing agents. They
.ibservcd :
"There is nothing on record to show or even to indicate the nature of the services rendered by them besides
nominating . directors to act as ex-officio directors.
Whatever may be the functions assigned to the exol]icio directors, they were qua their position as direc•
tors. We have looked everywhere but we failed to
have any indication as to the services rendered by the
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(Shah, J.)
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967
managing agents. Services are not rendered by merely
entering into an agreement with the company to do the
functions of the managing agents. There must be something more than that and we. have not the least hesitation in saying that in th.e present case on the facts on
record there is nothing to indicate that the managing
agents as such rendered any service."
We are unable to hold that the finding that no services were
rendered by the managing agents was based on "surmises and
conjectures", or that it was based on no evidence. The burden
of proving that services were rendered by the managing agents
for earning the remuneration lay upon the Company, and if no
reliable evidence was forthcoming, the Tribunal was competent
to reach the conclusion it did.
The recitals in the agency agreement which authorised the
managing agents to do certain acts could not be a substitute for
evidence that those acts were done by the managing agents.
Counsel for the Company made no effort to enlighten the Tribunal
on how the business of the Company would have suffered by the
quarrels between Guptas and Singhanias. Even prior to the
termination of the contract of the managing agents of the Company, the Singhanias had no effective voice in the management
of the firm. No representative of the Singhanias was on the Board
of Directors prior to the termination of the contract. If in that
state of evidence the Tribunal concluded that quarrels between
the Guptas and Singhanias could in no way harm or put hindrance in the normal day to day working of the Company, the finding could not be again said to be based on surmises and conjectures.
Counsel for the Company invited our attention to the threat
by the Singhanias to move the Civil Court to ·appoint a receiver
for the management of the Company, and contended that if a
receiver was appointed for management of the Company, the
affairs of the Company might possibly have been mismanaged. It
is difficult to understand that because of the disputes between the
two sets of partners of the managing agency firm, a civil court
could have appointed a receiver to manage the affairs of the Company : a receiver may have been appointed of the remuneration
payable by the Company, but not of the management. It is not
suggested that the affairs of the Company were mismanaged. The
management of the Company was conducted after September 30,
1944, in the same manner and by the same directors as it was
originally conducted. A futile threat could not reasonably be
taken into consideration, and was not apparently taken into
act:ount, for determining the managing agency agreement. This
plea was apparently not even suggested before the Tribunal.
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968
St.:PRnJE COURT REPORTS
[l 969) I S.CR .
The burden of proving that the expenditure was incurred
wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business lay upon
the Company and no evidence was led and not even an attempt
was made to explain how the affairs 9f the Company would have
been prejudiced by the disputes pending between the Singhania>
and Guptas.
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The remuneration payable under the managing agency agreement was for a two-fold consideration-( 1) the services rendered
by the managing agents in the promotion of the Company; and
(2) for rendering services to the Company. Expenditure incur·
red for remunerating the persons who had promoted the Company
was not in law a revenue expenditure admissible under s. 10(21
(xv) of the Income-tax Act and if no services were rendered by
the managing agents, the remuneration must be regarded as
elusively payable for the services rendered by the managing agents
in the promotjon of the Company. TI1e expendiiure could not
in the circumstances be said to be mad:~ wholly and exclusively
in the interest of the business of the Company.
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The Tribunal has stated in paragraph 30 of its order th'1t
under the award of Thakur Kanhaiya Singh each party had to
pay the other large sums. and a device was adopted to provide
funds in the hands of the parties at the expense of the Company
for settling their individual accounts; and that "in preparing the
sch.~me the authors had made an effort to reduce the tax liability
of the Company by claiming the amount as a revenue deduction··.
The Tribunal appears to have reached this conclusion from th~
terms of the award of Thakur Kanhaiya Singh, the settlement
between Singhanias and Guptas of the civil suit by consent decree
dated January 11. 1945, by a supplementary award which provided for distribution of compensation which it was expected
"would be receivable" for determination of the managin_g agency.
and the ultimate award of Mr. K. M. ~lunshi which contained
a mere bald decision and no reasons in support thereof. Whether
this part of the judgment of the Tribunal is correct need not detai•1
us in this case. If the amount paid was not expenditure incurred
wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business, it is unnecessary to consider whether a "device" was adopted to provide
funds in the hands of the parties at the expense of the Companv
for the purpose o( settling their individual account< ·or for some
other reasons. The question raised by the Tribunal for the decision of the High Court. it may be recalled. was whether iherc
was anv material on which the conclusion of the Tribunal could
he justified, and, in our judgment, there wa< ample material on
which the conclusion could be founded. The answer recorded
by the High Court was, on the question referred by the Tribuaal
bv their statement dated December 29, 1954, in our judgment.
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right. The High Court was also right in declining to record formal answer on the other questions.
No separate argument Wfls advanced in regard to the amount
of Rs. 13,300 which was incurred for the costs of the arbitrator
and for the arbitraiton proceedings. No argument was also apparently raised before the High Court supporting the claim for that
amount as a permissible allowance even if the claim for
Rs. 18,90,000 was disallowed.
The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs.
.
V.P.S.
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Appeal dismissed .
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