METAL BOX CO. OF INDIA LTD. versus THEIR WORKMEN
Supreme Court of India | Decided 20 August 1968 | [1969] 1 S.C.R. 750 | 1968 INSC 201
Key facts
- Decided
- 20 August 1968
- Bench
- J.M. SHELAT*, C.A. VAIDYIALINGAM
- Bench size
- 2
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 2138/1966
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Citation
- [1969] 1 S.C.R. 750
- Neutral citation
- 1968 INSC 201
Text of the judgment
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METAL BOX CO. OF INDIA LTD.
v.
THEIR WORKMEN
August 20, 1968
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[J. M. SHELAT At<D C. A. YAlDlALlNGAM, JJ.j
Bonus Act, 1965 ss. 4, 6, 7--Scope
of-..Con1puta1io11
of
bonus--
Principles for deduction from /;l'O~S profit~; on uccuunt of deprecia1k>n,
deve/op111cn1 rebate, and estinwtt.'d liability .for grotuity-1'reat~nt OJ
interest on capira/ reserve attributable to revaluation of assets-Principks
for deter1nining allowance for direct tcxes that employer ''i.r liable to pay".
In a dispute between the appellant and it.; \!.'Ork.men relating to the
computation of bonll~ under 1hc Payment df Bonus Act, 1965. the Company contended that the available surplus came to R•. 49.96 lakhs, mty
per cent of which, namely, Rs. 29.98 laklt• was the alloeablc surplus.
The employees di.•putcd 1he computation claiming that the Company !tad
\\.Tongly reduced the gross profil~ and the available surplus and contended,
inter a/ia, that certain amounts deducted on accounl oi provic;ions for
gratuity and for doubtful debt' should be added hack: they challenged
a dcc!.uction of interest on reserves on the ground that the capital reserve
wa.~ artificially arrived at by a mere revaluation of the company's fixed
assets as on April I, i 956; and also dispuled the figures of depreciation,
development rebalc and direct taxes deducted by the company while
\vorking out the available surplus.
The Unions disputed the amount of Rs. 28.82 lakhs worked out by
the Company's auditors a.~ depreciation in accordance with the lncometax Act, 1961 on the ground (I) that there was no evidence that the
amount of depreciation came 10 Rs. 28.82 lakhs; and (2) that since the
profit and Joss account mentioned R~. 23.48 lakhs as depreciation, the
Company could only claim that ;1mount.
In it• award the Tribunal alloW<d Rs. 23.48 laklt• instead of Rs. 28.82
lak.hs claimed by the company as depreciation. Similarly it allowed only
Rs. 7 lakhs inslead of Rs. 8.8 lakhs claimed by the company as development rebate. The Tribunal held that the amount of Rs. 18.33 lakhs
claimed under the hcJd of grc1tuitv wa'i not a reserYe but a provision and
therefdrc. was not liable to be added hack, but it held 1hat the company
could deduct only ahout Rs. 10 Jakhs as also Rs. l.31 lakhs and
Rs. 87.000/- actually paid durin~ the year to employees who retired
during that year and added back 1he balance of Rs. 6 lakh• to the gross
profits. Except for these amount~. the Trihunal accepted_ the rest of the
company's comput.1tion.
Both the Unions and the Company ohtaioed
,pccial le.we and filed appeals challenging the correctness of the Tr;btinal's ay.·ard. In their appeal it was al<>o contended by the Union~ that
tho Trihunal had wrongly allowed a dcduc1jon of Rs. 145 lakhs as direct
t<tXCS under sec. 6( c); all that the empJoyer could deduct was direct
taxes which he "is liable to pay" for the accounting year in respect of
''his income, profits and ~ains during that year", i.r •• the employ« ~
entitled to deduct only his aclual tax liability. Such liability. therefore,
has to he wdrkcd out in accordanee wi!h the provision~ of the Income>-tax
Act and other relevant Act<> by first arriving at the actual taxable income,
oaill.'I and profit• under tho<e Acts and then compute the u..,. at ral"'i,
provided by them for that particular accounting year.
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METAL BOX CO. V. WORKMEN
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HELD : The appellant company contentions on the questions of
development rebate and the pro,isions for gratuity must be upheld; the
amount of depreciation must be ascertained afresh by the Tribunal after
giving the parties opportunity to lead such evidence as they desired. The
workmen's appeal must be dismissed.
(I) The depreciation deducted in the expenditure column in the
Profit and Loss Account was the depreciation wdrked out under s. 205(2)
of the Companies Act, but under. section 6 of the Bon~ Act, the _Company is entitled to deduct from its gross profits depreciation adm1ss1bJe
under Section 32(1) of the Income-tax Act, i.e., such percentage on the
written down value as may, in the case of each of the classes of assets,
be prescribed. It was 1for this. reason that Rs. 23.48 lakhs were shown
as depreciation in the Profit and Loss Account by the Company while in
the computation for bonus the company claimed Rs. 28.82 lakhs as
depreciation. [755 H-756 BJ
Since the Company claimed the deduction of depreciation, the burden
of proof that the amount claimed was in accordance with the Income-Otx
Act was on the Company and that burden the company must discharge
once its figures were challenged. It was not sufficient for it to produce
its auditors' certificates. The question as to the co:rlrect amount of depreciation must the·refore go back to the Tribunal for a further decision. The
Tribunal must give an opportunity to the Company to prove its claim
for depreciation by reasonable proof and to the Unions to test such
evidence by cross-examination or otherwise. [757 D]
Khandesh Spg. & Wvg. Mills Co. Ltd. v. The Rashtriya Girnl Kamgar
Sangh, [1960J 2 S.C.R. 841, 847, Petlad Turkey Red Dye Works Ltd. v.
Dyes & Che1nicc;·l Workers' Union [1960] 2 S.C.R. 906, 909, referred to.
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(2) Under s. 6(b) of the Bonus Act the Company is entitled to deduct
out of the gross profits arrived at under s. 4 the whole of the development rebate admissible under the Tncome~tax Act, i.e., the amount, 75
per cent of which comes to Rs. 7 lakhs in the present case. The Tribunal
was in error in mixing up the development rebate reserve to which the
Company had to appropriate Rs. 7 lakhs in the Profit and Loss Account
and the development rebate of Rs. 8.87 lakhs allowable to it under s. 6
of the Act. There was the.refcire no justification for the Tribunal to allow
Rs. 7 bkhs only instead of Rs. 8.87 lakhs as development rebate. [759D-
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(3) An estimated liability under gratuity schemes as in the present
case, even if it amounts to a contingent liability and is not a debt under
the Wealth Tax Act, if propef-ly ascertainable and its present value is fairly
di~ounted, is deductible from the gross receipts while. preparing the Profit
and Loss Account. This is in accordance with accepted principles of
commercial practice and is also the position under the Income-tax Act.
There is no rule or direction in the Bonus Act which prohibits such a
practice. [766 C; 767 DJ
The Tribunal in allowing Rs. 10 lakhs out of the estimated liability
of Rs. 16 lakhs impliedly accepted the same principle but allowed only
Rs. 10 lakhs because it thought the estimate to be excessive. This was
not done on the ground that the estimate of Rs. 16 Jakhs was not warranted on any valuation. In the absence of any challenge as to the
H correctn-e:ss of the valuation and in the absenee of any challenge that such
liability cannot be estimated on any fair standard. the Tribunal ought t0>
o have allowed the whole of Rs. 16 lakhs to be deducted while arriving
at the net profits in the Profit and Loss Account. f767 El
752
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1969] I SC.R.
c:.1.r.,
(.:a/curta Coinpany Lrd. V.
11960] 1 S.C.R. 185~ <:0111111is.sioner
nf Wealth T1tt v. Starulard Vacuum Oil Co. Lui. 11966] 2 S.C.R. 317;
Kesoram Industries and Co1to11 Mills Ltd. v. C.W:r., [1966] 2 S.C.R. 688:
Standard Mills Co. I.id. v. C:on11nissio11t;'r of lnco1nc Tax, 119671 l S.(;.R.
768; So11th('rn Roi/;1·ay Of Peru Lr,/. \', Owen, rt957J A.(:. 334 and Sun
Insurance Office v. c·1urk. 119121 A.t:. 443; referred to.
(4) There iw·a~ no justification fOr the contention that revaluation of
the company\ as.sets in J 956 wa~ fic1i1ious and that the difference ol
Rs. 57 Jakh'> y.·as a 1nere honk atlju~trnent :1nd did not :1<ld to the \vealth
of the conlpany so that no deduction hy \ray of interest \\'ii" pcm1issi~c
on such an arliticial :1moun1. 1767 If]
In the prc()enr case the revaluation \•la!> n1ade .is ca riv a'io J 956 and did
nnl appear ro ha,-c been objected to at any time either ·bv the Co111pany\
auditor~ or by any one ~lsc concerned \i.tith the (:ompany'S management. It
c;tonot. therefore, he lcg1tin1atcly said that it was done for any ohliquc purpo\e, much h:ss with a vie\\· to defeat the labour's claim 10 bonu'i. It is true
rhat c;uch revaluation docs not bring in any tangible additional amount into
the company's coffer!'> v.-·hich it can use 'for its business. Rul' under sec. 2l l
of the .~panic~ Act. c'·cry bJlance.,hcct of a comp.iny must givl.' a tnie
~nd f~rr VJC\~' of the slate of affairs of the company as at the end of the
hnanc1al year. Sch. \"l to the Companies Act ;1ho provide" that v.il.ere
-sums have hcen \.1:rittcn off on a reduction of capital or a re-valuation ol
;1sscts, the balance sheet, subsequent to such reduction or revaluation rnust
show the reduced or the increased figures as the case may he. Apart fron1
The provisionc; of the c:ompanie~ Act, it is ;t rccogni\cd principh: of accountancy to tran~fcr the increased value of as-sets on revaluation to a capital
n.."'ierve accolmt. Such <In increa..,cd fi!!ure is an unrcaliscJ ;1ccretion in the
value of a fixed as.;;ct. The fact tha·t such an incre:tscd figure docs not
·actually hrinj?. in any additional amount to the con1pan\' docs not make
rhc capital re'iervc any 1hc less a reserve. [768 (',,..GJ
·rhe Tribunal \\'as therefore right in accepting the figur:! of Rs
Ltkhs and deducting interest thereon from the gross profitc;.
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(5) Bonus being payable within eight months after the close of the
accounting year in cases where there is no dispute pending before an
authority under s. 22 of the Act as provided by s. 19, it i> hardly poosible,
t.."Xcept in rar~ cases. rhat assessment under the Tncome-tax Act and
-0ther such Acts would he completed by the time bonus has to be paid.
'fhcrcforc, the Tribunal "'·ould not have before it the taxahle income
a\scssed by the Income-tax and other such officers. If the Union's ~
rention were to he right, there would he two or more parallel authofttJcs
\.\.-'Orking under 1hc Bonus Act and the Income-tax Act and other such Acts
"·ho \.\.-:ould have to at.Sess taxable incomo and the tax payablo thereon,
hefore all of whom the emplover would have to prove his taxable income.
Jn each bonus dispute, the Tribunal. not equipped with the detailed
kno"·ledge of all such Acts, \\'ould have to undertake an enquiry into
variou~ dcductiono;;, rehates, reliefs. l'tc. claimable hy the employer ~nder
those Acts. The fact that payment of bonus cannot brooke delay v.-·1.t~~ut
causine hardship to Jabour \vould seem t(} n1ili1atc against the pos._..,1b1l11y
of such prolonged enquiries. [774 E-775 A)
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An examination of the provi.;;ions of the Bonu~ Act sho...,-s that tflc:
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·rribunal mu\t e.;;limatc the arnount of direct t;1xC"i. on thi..•. hala.nce of
!.!l'oc;.s profits as \\-'orked ottt under ss. 4 and 6. but without daluctt~ the
honus. 1h-.:n \\-'Ork out the quantum of t;1xcs thereon al ratL"S applicable •
-during that year to !he income. gain" and profits of the employer and
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METAL BOX co. v. WORKMEN (Shelat, J.)
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after deducting the amount of taxes so worked out arrive at the available
surplus. Section 6( c) being subject to s. 7 the computation has to be done,
without taking into account the irems specified in s. 7 (a) and in the
manner prescribed by the remaining clauses pf that ooction. This interpretation is commendable because; (l) it is consistent with the words
"iS'liable to pay" ins. 6(c), (2) it is in harmony with the provisions of
ss. 4 and 6 and Sch. II, and ( 3) it is consistent with the intention of
Parliament apparent from the scheme of computation of available surplus
in the Act. Furthermore, i'f Parliament intended to make a departure
from the rule laid down by courts and tribunals that the bonus amount
should be calculated after provision for tax was made and not before,
it would have made an express provision to that effect either in the Act
or in the Schedules. [776 B-D; F-GJ
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Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. The Workmen, [1959] S.C.R. 925
at 974; Crompton Parkinson (Works) Private Ltd. v. Its Workmen
[1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 936; and Workmen of India Explosives Ltd. v.
India Explosives Ltd., (1966] 2 L.L.J. 313, referred to,
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 2138
and 2196 of 1966 .
Appeals by special leave from the Award dated June 27, 1966
of the Sixth Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal in Case No. VIII-251
of 1965.
N. A. Palkhiva/a, Jatinder Mahajan, 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant (in C.A. No. 2138 of 1966) and
the respondent (in C.A. No. 2196 of 1966).
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A. S. R. Chari, R. K. Maheshwari and B. P. Maheshwari, for
the respondents (in C.A. No. 2138 of 1966.) and the appellants (in
C.A. No. 2196 of 1966).
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H. K. Sowani, K. Rajendra Chaudhuri and K. R. Chaudhuri, for
intervener No. 1.
N. A. Palkhiva/a and D. N. Mukherjee, for intervener No. 2.
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M. K. Ramamurthi, Shyama/a Pappu and Vineet Kumar for
intervener, No. 3.
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R. J. Ko/ah and 0. C. Mathur, for intervener No. 4.
N. A. Palkhivala and 0. C. Mathur, for Intervener No. 5.
A. N. Parekh and Subhag Mal Jain, for intervener No. 6.
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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Shela!, J. By a reference dated September 17, 1965, the Government of West Bengal referred to the Sixth Industrial Tribunal
the following question for adjudication :
"Whether computation of bonus in respect of the
accounting year ending 31st March 1965 payable to the
employees is in accordance with the payment of Bonus
? If not, what should be .the quantum of
• Ordinance
bonus for the employees ?"
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SCl'REME COURT REPORTS
[1969] I S.C.R.
The dispute between the appellant company and its employee-'
arose in the following manner. The company's accounting year
is from !st April to 3Isl March of the following year and iL' book_,
-0f account are maintained on the mercantile system of accounting.
The company computed the amount of bonus payable to its employees under the Payment of Bonus Ordinance which wa' promulgated on May 29, 1965 and furnished on July 5, 1965 copie'
of its computation to the three respondent Unions representing its
employees. The available surplus and allocable surplus, according to this computation, were Rs. 49.96 lacs and Rs. 29.98 lacs
On this basis the company declared the
respectively.
bonus at 13.28 per cent of the total wages paid to the employee.;.
According to this computation, the gross profits came to
Rs. 2,70,61,234;-. Out of this the company deducted the
fo!1owing amounts allowed under the Ordinance, namely :
R,. 28,64,000/- a' depreciation admi,sible under
the Income Tax Act, 196 I;
Rs. 9,00,000/- as development rebate.
Rs. I ,36.33,000/- as direct taxes.
Rs. 1,50,000/- a' dividend on preference share;;
R,. 23,37,000/- as interest at 8.5 p.c. on paid up
capital;
Rs. I 7.80,358/- as interest at 6 p.c. on reserves.
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Thus the available surplus came to Rs. 49,96,876/-, sixty per cent
of which, namely. Rs. 29,98,125/- was the allocable surplus. E
The employees disputed the computation contending that the company had wrongly reduced the gross profil' and the available
surplus and that the follownig amounts should be added back, viz ..
provi,ion for gratuity Rs. 18,38,605/- and provision for doubtful·
debts Rs. 50,000/-. They also challenged deduction of intere;t
on the reserves on the ground that the capital reserve of F
Rs. 57,00,151 /- was artificially arrived at by a mere revaluation
of the company's fixed assets as on April 1, 1956. They also disputed the figures of depreciation, development rebate and direct
taxes deducted by the company while working out the availabk
surplus.
Parliament in the meantime passed the Payment of Bonus Act, G
I 965 which by sec. 40 repealed the Ordinance hut which saved
all things done and action taken under the Ordinance as having
been done or taken under the Act. On September 27, I 965 the
company paid. subject to the result of the reference, bonus at the
rate of 13.28 per cent of the wages including dearness allowance
tH its employees.
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In its award the Tribunal allowed Rs. 23,48,226/- instead of
Rs. 28,82,261 /- claimed by the. company as depreciation. ~imi- •
larly it allowed only Rs. 7 lacs mstead of Rs. 8,87.371/- clatmed
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METAL BOX co. v. WORKMEN
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755
by the company as development reba~. As r~ards Rs. 18.38
lacs claimed under the head of gratmty, the Tnbunal held that
that amount was not a reserve but a provision and, therefore, was
not liable to be added back. But it held that the company could
deduct only Rs. 10 lacs and odd as also Rs. 1.31 lacs and
Rs. 87,000/- and odd actually paid during the year to employees
who retired during that year and added back the balance of Rs. 6
lacs to the gross profits. Except for 'these amounts, the Tribunal
accepted the rest of the company's computation. In the result
the Tribunal found the available surplus and the allocable surplus
to be 54. lakhs and odd and Rs. 32.42 lacs respectively and directed payment of bonus at 14.55 per cent of the total wages. Both the
Unions and the company obtained special leave and filed appeals
challenging the correctness of the Award.
In the profit and loss account for the year 1964-65, the Company .had shown Rs. 17 crores and odd as gross receipts and out
of that amount had deducted diverse amounts as expenditure
including the sum of Rs. 23,48,226/- by way of depreciation. In
its computation filed before the Tribunal, the Company, however,
D claimed depreciation at Rs. 28.82 lacs worked out by its auditors
in accordance with the provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
The Unions disputed this amount on the ground (I) that there
was no evidence that the amount of depreciation came to Rs. 28.82
lacs and (2) that since the profit and loss account mentioned
Rs. 23.48 lacs as depreciation, the company could claim that
E amount only. The Tribunal accepted the Unions' contention stating that there was nothing to show that the company through
mistake .had shown Rs. 23.48 lacs as depreciation in the profit and
loss account and that subsequently on finding out the mistake it
had revised in its computation depreciation at Rs. 28.82 lacs.
The Tribunal, as we shall presently show, was in error.in confusing
F depreciation claimed by it as a deduction under sec. 6 of the Act
and in thinking that the company had made or claimed to have
made a mistake and was tryint; to correct such mistake.
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Under sec. 205 ( 1) of the Companies Act, 1956, no dividend
can . be declared or paid by a company for any financial year
except out of profits arrived at after providing for depreciation in
accordance with sub-sec. (2).
Sub-sec. (2) provides different
methods of calculating depreciation, one of which is to calculate
it by dividing 95 per cent of the original cost of each of the
depreciable asset by a specified period in respect of each such
asset. . The depreciation deducted in the expenditure column in
the P&L account therefore was the depreciation worked out
Under sec. 2 (18)
under sec. 205 ( 2) of the Companies Act.
of the Bonus Act, gross profits mean gross profits calculated under
sec. 4. In the case of companies other than a banking company,
g~s profits under Sec. 4 are to be computed in the manner laid
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756
SUPREME COURT RllPORTS
(1969) I S.C.R.
down in the 2nd Schedule. That Schedule requires adding back·
to the net profit shown in the P & L account of depreciation
deducted in that account while computing gross 'profit1. Obviously, the depreciation so to be added back is the one worked ou!
by the company under sec. 205(2) of the Companies Act. Section
6 of the Bonus Act provides that having arrived at the gross
profits under sec. 4 read with the 2nd Schedule, the Company is
entitled to deduct therefrom depreciation admissible under sec.
32 ( I ) of the Income Tax Act, that is, such percentage on th.:
written down value as may, in the case of each of the classes of
assets, be prescribed.
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The fact that the company while preparing its P & L Account c
and its computation (Ex. 6) produced before the Tribunal, had
l.:cpt the distinction between depreciation worked out under the
Companies Act and the one to be worked out under the Incomer
tax Act for lhe purposes of the Bonus Act is clear from the evidence of its witness, Verma. It was for this reason that Rs. 23
lacs and odd were shown as depreciation in the P & L Account D
while in the computation (Ex. 6) the company claimed Rs. 28.64
lacs as depreciation. There was, therefore, no question of the
company having made any mistake in calculating depreciation in
the P & L Account or its trying to amend that mistake as erroneously thought by the Tribunal. The only mistake, the company
claimed it had made, was that the true figure of depreciation E
deductible under sec. 6(a) of the Bonus Act was Rs. 28.82 lacs
and not Rs. 28.64 lacs. The Company produced a certificate of
its auditors (Ex. U 2) dated December 20, 1965 wherein the
auditors certified that on the records produced before them the
true figure of depreciation would be the revised figure of Rs. 28.82
lacs and not Rs. 28.64 lacs. But the controversy between the
parties was not confined to the difference between these two F
figures. There were three figures for depreciation bewre the
Tribunal, Rs. 23 lacs and odd shown in the P & L Account.
Rs. 28.64 lacs shown in the computation and Rs. 28.82 lacs subsequently claimed by the company as the revised figure of depreciation. The last two figures were taken by the company from its
auditors' certificate certifying first Rs. 28.64 lacs and, later on. G
revising that figure to Rs. 28.82 lacs on certain further rocords
aR<l information produced before them. The evidence of Verma
shows clearly that the Unions disputed the Company's calculations of depreciation. When questioned by them, Verma could
only say that the calculations were done not by him but by the
Secretarial Department and, therefore, was not in a position W H
answer questions in that regard. No witness from the Secretarial
Department was produced. As regards their books and record'
produced before the auditors, his only answer was :
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METAL BOX co. v. WORKMEN
(She/at, J.)
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"So far as books and records mentioned in .the first
part of Ext. U 2 are concerned, the books and record
relating to the branches were produced before the
representatives . of the auditors' firm there, and the
other books and records were produced there before the
auditors' firm. So far as the record mentioned in the
second part of the certificate are concerned, they are
different records. The informations and explanations
given to the auditors were given verbally after consulting our books of accounts".
These books and records not having been produced or disclosed,
there was obviously no opportunity to the Unions to verify either
of the two figures, vziz., Rs. 28.64 lacs or Rs. 28.82 lacs. It is
true that Verma said that the calculations shown to the auditors
could be produced but he qualified the offer by saying that that
would be done if the Tribunal required.
Since the company claimed the deduction of depreciation, it
stands to reason that the burden of proof that the depreciation
claimed by it was the correct amount in accordance with the
Income Tax Act was on the Company and thfft burden the company must discharge once its figures were challenged. But it was
contended that once the company produced its auditors' certificate
that should be sufficient and must be accepted and that the Tribunal should not insist either on the auditors proving their certificate
or on the company proving depreciation on each and every item of
depreciable asset. Such an enquiry before the Tribunal, it was
argued, would be a harassing and prolonged enquiry, not contemplated in industrial adjudication and, therefore, the Tribunal
ought to have accepted as correct Rs. 28.82 lacs certified by the
auditors. Under sec. 23 of the Act the presumption of accuracy
is allowed only to the balance sheet and the P & L Account of
companies. No such presumption is provided for by the Act to
auditors' certificates. Speaking of rehabilitation amount deductible as a prior charge under the Full Bench formula while working out the available surplus this Court in Khandesh Spg. and
Wvg. Mills Co. Ltd. v. Rashtriya Girni Kamgar Sangh(') observed at page 847 as follows :
"The importance of this question (the procedure to
be followed for ascertaining facts) in the context of
fixing the amount required for rehabilitation cannot be
over-estimated. The item of rehabilitation is generally
a major item that enters into the calculations for the
purpose of ascertaining the surplus and, therefore, the
amount of bonus. So, there would be a tendency on
the part qf the employer to inflate this figure and the
• (l) [1960] 2 S.C.R. 841, 847.
l.1Sup. C. I.169-2
SUPRDIE COURT REPORTS
• 758
(1969] I S.C.R.
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employees to deflate it. The accounts of a company
are prepared by the management. The balance-sheet
and the profit and loss account are also prepared by
the company's officers. The labour have no concern
in it. When so much depends on this item, the principles of equity and justice demand that an Industrial
Court should insist upon a clear proof of the same and
also give a real and adequate opportunity to the labour
to canvass the correctness of the particulars furnished
by the employer."
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The necessity of proper proof of the correctness of statements in
the balance-sheet was repeated in Pet/ad Turkey Red Dye Works
Ltd. v. Dyes & Chemical Workers' Union(1). These observations c
made with regard to balance-sheets and P & L accounts would
equally apply to statements made in the auditors' certificates prepared on the instructions and information supplied to them by
employers. Mere production of auditors' certificate, especially
when it is not admilled by labour, not by the auditors but by the
employees of the company who admitted not to have been con- D
cerned with its preparation or the calculations on which it was
based would not be conclusive. We do not say that in such a case
the Tribunal should insist upon proof of depreciation on each and
every item of the assets. It should, however, insist on some
reasonable proof of the correctness of the figure of depreciation
claimed by the employer either by examining the auditors who
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calculated and certified it or by some other proper proof. Depreciation in some cases would be of a large amount affecting materially the available surplus. Fairness, therefore, requires that an ·
opportunity must be given ·to the employees to verify such figures
by cross-examination of the employer or his witnesses who have
calculated depreciation amount. Notwithstanding the Unions'
challenge to the figure of depreciation claimed by the company, F
the only thing that the company did was to examine Verma, who
admittedly had nothing to do with its calculation, and to produce
through him the said certificate. In our view, that was neither
proper nor sufficient. The proper course for the Tribunal in such
a case was to insist upon the company adducing legal evidence in
support of its claim instead of taking the figure of depreciation G
from the P & L account which was not worked out in acco:dance
with the Income Tax Act but under sec. 205 of the Companies
Act, and sayinl! that the Company had failed to prove that it was
a mistaken figure. In our view. the question as to the correct
amount of depreciation must go hack to the Tribunal for a fresh
decision. The Tribunal should give opportunity to the Company
to prove its claim for depreciation by reasonable proof and to the H
Unions to test such evidence by cross-examination .or otherwise.
------
(1)
[1960] 2 S.C.R. 906, 909.
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METAL BOX co.
v. WORKMEN (Shelat, !.)
759
An error of the same type seems to have been committed by
the Tribunal in the matter of development rebate. It allowed
Rs. 7 lacs as development rebate instead of Rs. 8.87 lacs claimed
by the Company. Under sec. 33 of the Income Tax Act, an
assessee is allowed by way of development rebate a certain percentage of the cost of machinery or plant depending on the date
of its installation. Section 34(3) of that Act provides,
B
however, that the said allowance shal! not be given unless an
amount equal to 75 per cent of the development rebate to be
allowed is debited to the P & L account of the relevant previous
year and credited to a reserve account to be utilised by the assessee
in the 8 years next following for the purposes of the undertaking.
Accordingly, the Company appropriated Rs. 7 lacs to the devec lopment rebate reserve as it was bound to do if it wanted to claim
development rebate. The Company took the round figure of
Rs. 9 lacs instead of Rs. 8.87 lacs for development rebate and
credited Rs. 7 lacs, being 75 per cent thereof to the development
rebate reserve. Under the Second Schedule to the Bonus Act,
read with sec. 4 thereof the Company is required while computD ing its gross profit to add the development rebate and as footnote
1 ill that Schedule shows "to the extent charged to profi~ and loss
account", that is, Rs. 7 lacs. Under sec. 6(b) of the Bonus Act,
the Company is entitled, however, to deduct out of the gross
profits arrived at uruler sec. 4, the whole of the devdopment rebate
admissible under the Income Tax Act, i.e., the amount, 75 per
cent of which comes to Rs. 7 lacs. The error which the Tribunal
E fell into was in mixing up the development rebate reserve to which
the Company had to appropriate Rs. 7 lacs in P & L account and
the development rebate of Rs, 8.87 lacs allowable to it under sec.
6 of the Act. Mr. Chari for the Unions fairly conceded that he
could not challenge this position. There was, therfore, no justification for the Tribunal to allow Rs. 7 lacs only instead of
F Rs. 8.87 lacs as development rebate.
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The next question relates to a sum of Rs. 18.38 lacs, being
the estimated liability under two gratuity schemes framed by the
Company, which was deducted from the gross receipts in the
P & L account. In 1960 the Company introduced a gratuity
scheme for its employees other than · its officers. Under that
scheme gratuity was payable on the termination of an employee's
service either due to retirement, death or termination of service,
the amount of gratuity payable being dependent on his wages at
that time and the number of years of service put in by him. The
Company had worked out on an actuarial valuation its estimated
liability and made provision for such liability not all at once but
spread over a number of years. Thus in 1959-60, 1960-61 and
19til-62 the Company allocated towards this liability Rs. S lacs.
Rs. 10 lacs and Rs. 5 lacs respectively from out of the profits,
•
760
SUPRE11E COURT REPORTS
[1969] I S.C.R.
debiting these amounts in the profits and loss account. In all Rs.
40 lacs have so far been provided in the aforesaid manner aga-insc
the said liability. The practice followed by the Company is that
every year the Company works out the additional liability incurred by it o.n the employees putting in every additional year of
service. Whenever an employee retires, the amount of gratuity
payable to him is debited against the amount provided for ,..,
aforesaid. The amount so paid is not debited in the P & L
account as an outgoing or expenditure but again~! the estimated
liability provided as aforesaid. In 1964-65 the, Company introduced a similar gratuity scheme for its officers. According to
the Company, the estimated liability under this scheme was worked out at Rs. 20 lacs. But instead of providing the whole for it,
it provided only Rs. 11.31 !acs. It also provided Rs. 7 lacs under
the scheme for its non-officers against the liability for service put
in by them in that year. Out of Rs. 18.38 lacs so provided, the
Company paid as gratuity Rs. 1,31,585/- and Rs. 87,295/ to
officers and other employees who retired during 1964-65, debiting
as aforesaid, these amounts not as an outgoing or expenditure but
against the said amounts of Rs. 11 lacs and Rs. 7 lacs. The
Company claimed that it was entitled to deduct !he baiance of
Rs. 16 lacs from the gross receipts in the P & L accour.t while
working out its net profit. The Unions contended that the
Company could deduct from the gross receipts only Rs. 1.31 lacs
The
and Rs. 87.000/- and odd actually paid during the year.
Company, on the other hand, maintained that what it had done
was legitimate and was warranted by the principles of accountancy and. therefore, the whole amount of Rs. 18.38 lacs was
deductible in arriving at its net profits. What the Tribunal did,
however, was that instead of squarely facing this controversy, it
held that as the Company had in the former years debited Rs. 5
lacs e.g., in 1959-60 and 1961-62, it would allow only Rs. 5 lacs
for each of the two schemes. Thus it allowed Rs. l 0 lacs a~
debitable in the P & L account in addition to the said Rs. 1.31
lacs and Rs. 87,000/- and disallowing the balance of Rs. 6 lacs
added back that amount in !he net profits shown in the P & L
account.
The contention of Mr. Chari was two fold: (I) that the
amount which could be debited was that which was actually paid
and the Company was not entitled to debit in the P & L account
anv amount worked out by it as estimated liability. The Tribunal.
therefore, was not justified in allowing the Company to debit any
such amount and that the Tribunal arbitrarily fixed Rs. 10 lacs
and allowed wrongly that amount to be deducted; and (2) even
if such estimated liability was debitable, the appropriation amowited to a reserve and under the Bonus Act such a reserve had to be
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added back wlJ'ile. working out the gross profits under the 2nd
Schedule to the Act.
Two questions, therefore, arise : ( 1) whether it is legitimate
in such a scheme of gratuity to estimate the liability on an actuarial valuation and deduct such estimated liability in· the P & L
account while working out its net profits; and (2) if it is, whether
B
such appropriation amounts to a reserve or a provision. If it is a
reserve, obviously the amount has to be added back while computing the gross profits. But in that event the Company would
be entitled to interest thereon at 6 per cent per annum under Item
1 (iii) of the Third Schedule to the Act. In the case of an assessee
maintaining his accounts on mercantile system, a liability already
c accrued, though to be discharged at a future date, would be a
proper deducrion while working out the profits and gains of his
business, regard being had to the accepted principles of commercial practice and accountancy. It is not as if such deduction is
permissible only in case of amounts actually expended or paid .
Just as receipts, though not actual receipts but accrued due or
brought in for income tax assessment, so also liabilities accnued
D
due would be taken into account while working out the profits and
gains of the business. A Company carrying on business of buying land and selling it after development sold certain plots, recei ved a part .of the price but entered the whole of the price receivable
as it maintained its books of accounts on mercantile method. It
also debited a certain sum, being the estimated expenditure for
E the
developments it undertook to carry out within six months from
the execution of the sale deeds although no part of such expenditure was actually incurred during that year.
It was held that
having regard to the accepted commercial practice and trading
principles and there being no prohibition against it in t11e Income
Tax Act, deduction of such estimated liability even though it did
F not come under any specific provisions of sec. 10(2) of the
Income Tax Act, 1922 was permissible; (see Calcutta Company
Ltd. v. C.l.T. (')
Such a deduction of an accrued liability
tliough not actuaJly paid is not confined to the Income Tax Act
only but is also permissible under the Wealth Tax Act 1957. In
Commissioner of Wealth Tax v. Standard Vacuum Oil Co. Ltd.(2)
G demands in respect of paym€int of tax under sec. 18A of the
Income Tax Act, 1922 were made against the 'assessee company
for 1956-57. The final instalment of Rs. 47 lacs and odd for
each of the two years was outstanding on the respective valuation
dates. The question was whether the demand for such tax could
be deducted while determining the net wealth of the Company.
This Court held that a debt is "owed' when an order is passed
H
under sec. 18A and a notice of demand is sent. The ·amount
merotioned in the notice begins to be 'owed' till a new figure is
(1)
[1960] 1 S.C.R. 185.
(2)
[1966] 2 S.C.R. 317.
7 62
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
fl 969] I S.C.R.
substituted by the assessee under sec. 18A(2) of the Income Tax A
Act. But till that is done, the amount is ascertained and there is
a statutory liability to pay the amounts mentioned in the order
under sec. l 8A ( I ) and were debts on the valuation dates and,
therefore, deductible for the purpose of arriving at the Company's
net wealth. The Court also held that a condition subsequent, the
fulfilment of which may result in the reduction or even extinction
B
of the liability, would not have the effect of converting that·
liability into a contingent liability. The decision, no doubt,
turned on the meaning of 'debt' as defined by sec. 2(n1) of the
Wealth Tax Act, the Court there holding that the statutory liability to pay the amount mentioned in the order commen~cd when
the demand notice was served and, therefore, the liability did exist
c
in presenti. In Kesoram Industries and Collon Mills Ltd. v.
C.W.T.(') also a case under the Wealth Tax Act, the appeitant
company showed in its P & L account two amounts : ( l) the
amount of dividend proposed to be distributed for that ye::r and
( 2) another sum as a provision for tax liability under the Income
Tax Act, 1922. The question was whether these two sums were
debts and could be deducted while computing the Company's I>
net wealth. It was held that the dividend amount was not a debt
as on the valuation date nothing more than a recommendation by
the Directors had taken place. But as regards the estimated tax
liability, it was held that it was a debt inasmuch as the liability
to pay the tax was in presell/i though payable ill futuro and was
in respect of an ascertainable sum of money. In Standarci Mills E
Co. Ltd. '" Commissioner of Income Tax(') the decision turned
on the question whether an estimated liability under gratuity
schemes framed under Industrial awards amounted to debts and
could be deducted while computing the net wealth. On reliance
having been placed on Southern Railway of Peru Ltd. v. Owen ( 8 )
a decision to which we shall presently come the Court observed
at page 773 that that decision had no relevance to the question F
before it as 1he House of Lords in that decision was concerned
in determining the deductibility of the present value of a liability
which may arise in future in the computation of taxable income
for the relevant year under the Income Tax laws-The Court
held, i;n view of the terms of sec. 2(m) of the Wealth Tax Act.
that as the liability to pay gratuity Wds not ill presell/i but wquld G
arise in future on the termination of service i.e. on retirement,
death or tern1ination; the estimated liability under the schemes
would not be a debt and·, therefore, could not be <.leduct:!d while
computing the net wealth. These observations show that the
Court was of the view that though such a liability is a contingent
liability and therefore not a 'debt' under sec. 2(m) of the Wealth H
Tax Act, it would be deductible under the Income Tax Act while
(I)
[19661 2
S.C.R. 688.
(2)
(3) [1957) A.C. 334.
[1%7] I
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computing the taxable profits. In the instant case, the question
is not whether such estimated liability arising under the gratuity
schemes amounts to a debt or not. The question that concerns
us is whether while working out the net profits a trader can provide from his gross receipts Iris liability to pay a certain sum for
every additional year of service which he receives from his employees. This, in our view, he can do, if such liab.ility is properly
ascertainable and it is possible to arrive at a proper discounted
present value. Even if the liability is a contingent liability, provided its discounted present value is ascertainable, it can be taken
into account. Contingent liabilities discounted and valued as
necessary can be taken into account as trading expenses if they
are sufficiently certain to be capable of valuation and if profits
cannot be properly estimated without taking them into account.
Contingent rights, if capable of valuation, can similarly be taken
into account as trading receipts where it is necessary to do so in
order to ascertain the true profits : (see C. N. Beatti's Elements
of the Law of Income and Capital Gains Taxation 8th ed. 54).
In Southern Railway of Peru Ltd. v. Owen('), the House of
Lords was concerned with the problem similar to the one before
us and, therefore, the observations made there would be of assistance. An English Company operating a railway in Peru
was under the laws of that country liable to pay its employees compensation on the termination of their services either by
dismissal or on termination of service by notice or on such termination by death or aftlux of contractual time. The compensation
so paid was an amount equivalent to one month's salary at the
rate in force at the date of determination of every year of service.
The Company claimed to be entitled to charge against each year's
receipts the cost of ma.king provision for the retirement payments
which would ultimately be thrown on it, calculating the sum
required to be paid to each employee if he retired without forfeiture at the close of the year and setting aside the aggregate of
what was required insofar as the year had contributed to the
aggregate. The House of Lords rejected the deductions on the
ground that in calculating the deduction the company had ignored
the factor of discount. But their Lordships recognised the
principle that the company was entitled to charge against each
year's receipts the cost of making provision for the retirement
payments whlch would ultimately be payable as the company had
had the benefit of the employees' services during the year provided
the present value of the future payments could be fairly estimated. The contention on behalf of the Crown was very nearly
the same as the one before us. Counsel conceded, that a trader
computing his taxable profits for a particular year may properly
cfeduct not only the payments actually made to his employees but
(l)
[1957] A.C.334.
.
764
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
also the present value of any payments in respect of their services in that year to be made in a subsequent year if it can be
satisfactorily estimated. But it was argued that that proposition
would not apply to that case as the company was not in any year
under a definite obligation to pay its employees lump sums on
the termination of their employment as in each case the right to a
Jump sum was contingent on certain conditions being faltilled and
so the prospective liability remained contingent until the service
wa' actually ended. The lump sum could not be regarded as
earned or payable in respect of a particular year of service and,
therefore, the whole sum should be debited in the account of the
last year of servioe. This contention was not upheld. In the
course of his opinion, Lord Radcliffe cited with approval the
<lictwn of Lord Haldane in Sun Insurance Office v. Clark(') at
p. 455, namely :
"It is plain that the question of what is or is not
profit or gain must primarily be one of fact, and of fact
to be ascertained by the tests applied in ordinary business. Questions of law can only arise when (as was
not the case here) some express statutory direction
applies and excludes ordinary commercial practice, or
where, by reason of its being impracticable to ascertain
the facts sufficiently, some presumption has to be invoked to fill the gap."
Holding that there was no such statutory rule prohibiting the
commercial practice of providing for such an estimated liability
for each year, he compared the two systems and observed at pp.
351-352 as follows:
"Now the question is how ought the effects of this
statutory scheme to be reflected in the appellant's accounts of the annual profits arising from its trade? One
way, which is certainly the simplest one, is to let the
payments made fall entirely as expenses of the year of
payment and ignore any question of making provision
for the maturing obligation during the years of service
that precede it. . . . . . . . . . . . It has one considerable
advantage; no clement of estimate or valuation appc~rs
in the profit assessment and nothing is charged to profits
except the actual cash outgoing. But, when this has
been conceded, I think that there is the very serious
disadvantage to be set against the inefficient method of
arriving at the true profits of any one year. The retirement benefit is not obviously paid to obtain the services
given in the year of retirement. The incident of retirement payments must be variable from year to year, and
(!)
[1912] A.C.441.
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(1969J I S.C.R.
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they may inordinately depress the profits of one year
just as they may inordinately inflate th~ profits o~ another. It is true that the company cames on busmess
from one year to another, but it is not charged on the
average of its annual profits. Tax rates and allowances
themselves vary and apart from that, to charge tax on a
profit unduly accel;rated or unduly deferred is, in my
opinion, no more respectable an achif'.vement .than to
admit that the annual accounts of busmess do rn some
cases require the introduction of estimates or valuations
if a true statement of profit is to be secured.
Another method is that which the appellant is seeking to establish with regard to its assessments for the
four years 1947-1950..... What the appella1tt claims
the right to do is to charge against each year's receipts
the cost of making provision for the retirement payments that will ultimately be thrown upon it by virtue
of the fact that it has had the benefit of its employees'
services during that year. As a corollary it will not
make any charge to cover the actual payments made in
the year in respect of retirement benefits. Only by
such a method, it is said, can it bring against th~
receipts of the year the true cost of the services that 1t
has used to earn those receipts. Generally speaking,
this must, I think, be true. For, whereas it is possible
that any one of its many employees may forfeit his
benefits and so never require a payment, the substantial
facts of the situation are that when the company has
paid every salary and wage that is due for current
remuneration of the year it has not by any means wholly
discharged itself of the pecuniary burden which falls
upon it in respect of the year's employment."
Agreeing with the company's claim he observed that provision for
retireinent payments would give an accurate reflection of the true
costs of earning the year's receipts than merely charging against
them the year's payment to employees who retired in the year.
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That there is no rule against providing for any such contingent liability but on the contrary such a provision is permissible
can be seen from the form ofbalance-sheet in Schedule VI to the
Companies Act, 1956 where provisions for taxation, dividends.
provident fund schemes, stall benefit schemes and other items for
which a company is contingently liable are to be treated as current liabilities and, therefore, debitable against the gross receipts.
Schedule VI, Part 2, lays down the requirements of profit and
loss account and cl. 3 (ix) of it provides that a profit and loss
"account shall set out amongst other things the aggregate of
amounts set aside or provisions made for meeting specific liabili-
•
• 766
St:PRE:>!F. COlJRT REPORTS
fl 969] I S.C.R.
ties, contingctJcies or commitments. But the contention was that A
though Schedule VI to the Companies Act may permit a provision
for contingent liabilities, the Income-tax Ac'C, 1961 does not, for
under sec. 36(v) the only deduction from profits and gains permi<sible is of a sum paid by an assessee as an employer by way
of his contribution towards an approved gratuity fund created by
him for the exclusive benefits of his employees under an irrevoc- B
able trust This argument is plainly incorrect because sec. 36
deals with expenditure deductible from out of the taxable income
already assessed and not with deductions which ar~ to be made
· while making the P & L account. In our view, an estimated liability under gratuity schemes such as the ones before us, even if it
amounts to a contingent liability and is not a debt under !he . C
Wealth Tax Act if properly ascertainable and its present value
is fairly discounted is deductible from the gross receipts while
preparing the P & L account. It is recognised in trading circles
and we find no rule or direction in the Bonus Act which prohibits
such a practice.
The next question is whether the amount so provided is a
D
provision or a reserve. The distinction between a provision and
a reserve is in commercial accountancy fairly well-known. Provisions made against anticipated losses and contingencies are
charges against profits and, therefore, to be taken into account
against gross receipts in the P & L account and the balance-sheet.
On the other hand, reserves arc appropriations of profits, the
assets by which they arc represented being retained to forrn part E
of the capital employed in the business. Provisions are usually
shown in the balance-sheet by way of deductions from the assets
in respect of which they arc made whereas general reserves and
reserve funds arc shown as part of the proprietor's interest: (Su
Spicer and Peglar's Book-keeping and Accounts, !5th ed. p. 42).
An amount set aside out of profit and other surpluses, not F
designed to meet a liability contingency commitment or diminution
in value of assets known to exist at the date of the balance-sheet
is a reserve but an amount set aside out of profits and other surpluses to provide for any known liability of which the Jmount
cannot be determined with substantial accuracy is a provision,
(see William Pickles Accountancy, Second Edn., 192, Part ill, G
cl. 7, Sch. VI to the Companies Act, 1956 which defines provision and reserve).
Under sec. 23 of the Bonus Act, there is a presumption of the
genuineness of the P & L account produced by the company
unless it is challenged in the manner provided therein. The Company's case was that the estimated liability under the gratu!ty H
schemes in respect of the accounting year was ascertainable with
fair accuracy under the actuarial valuation and Rs. 16 lacs which •
it took into account while making it P & L account was the
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present discounted liability. This position doe.s n:ot seem to h~ve
been disputed before the Tribunal. The pi:mc1pal . c~n.tentton
urged against that figure was not that the estimated llab1ltty was
not ascertainable or as in the case of Southern Railway of Peru( 1 )
that it did not represent the present discounted value, but that
the Bonus Act permits only the deduction of the amount actually
paid during the accounting year. This was also th~ principal
contention of Mr. Chari before us. Mr. Ramamurth1, appeanng
for one of the interveners, argued that though it may be possible
to take into account such a contingent liability in arriving at the
true profits and gains under the Income-tax Act, it would not be
so under the Bonus Act as the scheme of the Act treats the
accounting year as a unit and, ·thel'efore, reserves or provisions on
the footing of estimated liabilities to be paid in future cannot be
taken into account. But under the Income-tax Act also the previous year is a unit and it is only the profits and gains during that
year which are taxable. If under the Income-tax Act an estimated
liability ascertainable with substantial accuracy can be taken
into account for arriving at the true profits and gains, there is no
reason why the same cannot be done under the Bonus Act unless
there is any provision therein forbidding such a practice recognised
by commercial accountancy. No such provision was shown to
exist in the Bonus Act.
The Tribunal in allowing Rs. 10 lacs out of the estimated
Rs. 16 lacs impliedly accepted the principle canvassed by the
company. It, however, allowed only Rs. 10 lacs because it
thought it to be excessive as in some prior years the Company
had deducted Rs. 5 lacs. But this was not done on the ground that
the estimate of Rs. 16 lacs was not warranted on any valuation.
In our view, in the absence of any challenge as to the correctness
of the valuation and in the absence of any challenge that such
liability cannot be estimated on any fair standard, the Tribunal
ought to ha\'e allowed the whole of Rs. 16 lacs to be deducted
while arriving at the net profits in the P & L account.
Turning now to the appeal filed by the employees two question besides those already disposed of were raised: one dealing
with interest on capital reserve and the other relating to the
amount of direct taxes to be deducted from the gross profits.
As regards the first question, Verma's evidence was that the
Company had revalued its fixed assets in 1956 and credited the
difference of Rs. 57 lacs between its cost and the value fixed on
such revaluation, to the capital reserve. The Tribunal accepted
the valuation as bona fide and allowed interest on the said reserve
H at 6 per cent in accordance with sec. 6(d) and cl. 1 (iii) of the
• 3rd Schedule. Mr. Chari's contention was that the revaluation
(I)
[1957] A.C. 334.
768
SUPRE:l-IE COt:RT REPORTS
by the director in 1956 was fictitious; that the difference of
Rs. 57 lacs was a mere book adjustment and did not add to the
wealth of the Company and though that amount was transferred
to the capital reserve it was not as if any additional amount
became available for the Company's business and therefore, no
interest was permissible on such an artificial amount. At first
blush it would seem a' if there is some force in this contention,
for it would be possible for a company to deflate its gross profits
by fictitiously revaluing its fixed assets at regular intervals and
claiming interest on the excess by carrying such excess to capital
reserve and to reduce thus labour's claim to bonus. In the present case the revaluation was made as early as in 1956 and it docs
not appear that it was ever objected to either by the Company's
auditors or by any one else concerned with the Company's
management. It cannot. therefore, be legitimately said that it
was done for any oblique purpose. much less with a view to defeat
the labour's claim to bonus. It is true that such revaluation docs
not bring in any tangible additional amount into the company''
coffers which it can use for its business. But under sec. 211 of
the Companies Act every balance-sheet of a company must give
a true and fair view of the stale of affairs of the company as at
the end of the financial year. Sch. VI to lhc Companies Act als0
provides that where sums have been written off on a reduction of
capital or a revaluation of assets the balance-sheet subsequent
to such reduction or rcvalualion must show the reduced or the
increased figures as the case may be. Apart from the provisipns
of the Companies Act, it is a recognised p1inciplc of accountancy
to transfer the increased value of assets on revaluation· to a capital
reserve account. Such an increased figure is an unrealised accretion in the value of a fixed asset. '(se'e Pickles Accountancy 2nd
Edn. pp. I 03 and 935). So that the fact such an increased
figure does not actually bring in any additional amount to the
Company does not make the capital reserve any the less a re:;ervc.
Nor is it possible to postulate that if such a claim is allowed to be
deducted, the management would go on artificially inflating the
value of the fixed assets with a view to claim interest. In the
first place, if such an inflation is made ma/a fide, the Tribunal
can always reject it. Jn the second place, it is hardly profitable
for a company to resort to such a practice for under the Wealth
Tax Act the company would be liable to an increased assessment.
Section 7 ( 2) of that Act provides that where an asscssce is carrying on a business for which accounts are maintained regularly, the
Wealth Tax Officc,r may instead of detern1inin~ separate the value
of each asset held bv the assessec detcrn1inc the net value of the
asset of the business as a whole having regard to the balance
In Kesoram
sheet of such business as on the valuation date.
Industries v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax(') the asscssce sought
(ll J!966j 2 S.C.R. 688.
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[1969) I S.C.R·
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769
to argue exact! y what Mr. Chari cont~nde~, namely, that the
revaluation of the assets made by hnn did not represent the
true value of the assets. That contention was rejected and this
Court held that the Wealth Tax Officer was entitled to rely on
such revaluation and proceed to assess on the basis of the net
wealth shown as a result of such revaluation. We do not, therefore, see any justification for the apprehension felt by Mr. Chari,
for, by trying to reduce the gross pro.fits, the Company would
land itself into being assessed on a higher net wealth. The
Tribunal was, in our view, right in accepting the figure of Rs. 57
lacs and deducting interest thereon from the gross profits.
There remains now the question regarding computation of
direct taxes. Section 6 ( c) of the Act provides :
"subject to the provisions of section 7, any direct
tax which the employer is liable to pay for the accounting year in respect of his income, profits and gains
during that year;"
Section 7 inter alia provides :
"For the purpose of clause ( c) of section 6, any
direct tax payable by the employer for any accounting
year shall, subject to the following provisions, be calculated at the rates applicable to the income of the
employer for that year, ......... .
The Company claim a deduction from the gross profits of
Rs. 145 lacs as direct taxes. l't had made provision, however,
for Rs. 130 lacs for direct taxes in the P & L account. In its
computation it had made a provision for Rs. 136 lacs. At the
stage of the evidence and arguments it contended however that
the proper amount would be Rs. 145 lacs. It claimed that direct
taxes are to be worked out under sec. 6 ( c) on the gross profits
F worked out under sec. 4 less the prior ·charges allowable under
sec. 6, namely, depreciation and development rebate, but without
deducting from such balance the bonus payable by the Company
in the particular accounting year. The Tribunal accepted the
contention and allowed Rs. 145 lacs as direct taxes to be deducted
under s. 6(c).
This conclusion has been seriously disputed by the Unions.
G
Mr. Chari's argument was that the Act lays down its own statutory formula for working out available surplus and allocable
surplus, that the deduction from gross profits allowable are those
permissible under the Act, namely, depreciation admissible in
accordance with the provisions of sec. 32 ( 1) of the Income-tax
Act, the development rebate and subject to the provisions of sec.
H
7 of the Act, the amount of direct taxes which the employer "is
liable to pay" for the accounting year in respect of "his income,
• profits and gains during that year". Mr. Chari laid stress on the
D
770
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1969] J S.CR
words "is liable to pay" and "in respect of his income, gains and A
profits during that year" and argued that inasmuch as cl. ( c)
incorporatt--s lhe language of the Income-tax Act, it contemplates
that the employer is entitled to deduct his actual tax liability.
Such liability, therefore, is to be worked out in accordance with
the provisions of the Income-tax Act and other relevant Acts by
first arriving at the actual taxable income, gains and profits under B
those Acts and then computing the taxes at rates provided by them
for thal particular accounting year. He argued that since cl. ( c)
is subject to the provisiO!l<; of s. 7, the only departure permissible
under the Act is that which is provided in s. 7. His contention
thus was that the Tribunal must start it' calculations from the net
profit shown in the P & L account which would have made provi·
sion for direct taxes and then deduct from the gross profits cal- c
culated under s. 4 the prior charges permissible under s. 6. The
provision for direct taxes made in the P & L account would be
computed after deducting from the gross receipt<; such deductions,
allowances, reliefs, rebates, credits etc. as arc permissible under
the Income-tax Act which would include the bonus amount payable during the year, for, without such deduction the P & L D
account cannot reflect the true net profit of the employer. The
Company's contention, on the other hand, was that the employer
is entitled to compute his tax liability without deducting first the
amount of bonus he would be liable to pay from out of the amount
computed under s. ·4 and s. 6. Mr. Palkhiwala submitted from
the different provisions of the Act that the concept of actual tax E
liability under the Income-tax Act is foreign to the Bonus Act
inasmuch as the Bonus Act is concerned with gross profits calculated in accordance with s. 4 and Sch. II, and that s. 7 to which
s. 6 ( c) is made subject, militates against the concept of actual
tax liability as worked out under the Income-tax Act. The contention was that prior to the enactment of the Act when available
surplus was worked out under the Full Bench Formula bonus was F
not deducted while arriving at the amount of income-tax deductible from gross profits, that Parliament could not possibly have
contemplated a departure from the course foJlowed in a number
of decisions both of courts and tribunal<; and suddenly decided to
incorporate into this Act the complicated and elaborate provisions
of the Income-tax Act and throw the burden on Industrial Tribu- G
nals to work out deductions, allowances, reliefs, rebates etc. under
the Income-tax Act and then finally to assess the actual tax
liability. It was submitted that what has to be done by the Tribunal is first to work out gross profits under s. 4 and Sch. II and
then to deduct therefrom the prior charges under s. 6 (a) and (b)
and estimate direct taxes on the balance and thus arrive at the H
available surplus. The controversy thus is one of principle rather
than on the amount deducted by the Tribunal by way of direct •
taxes.
•
•
METAL BOX CO. v. WORKMEN
(She/at, J.)
771
Before we attempt to resolve this controversy, it will be worth
our while to recount the principle consistently follow before the
passing of this Act, not with a view to interpet s. 6(c), but to
ascertain whether Parliament has made a departure from that
principle and laid down a new procedure on which direct taxes
are to be computed. Mr. Chari's contention was that the Bonus
B Act is drafted on a clean slate giving a go-bye to the earlier principle of working out bonus, and, therefore, we must proceed on
the footing of the language used in s. 6 ( c). At first sight it would
appear that the language of cl. ( c) lends support to his contention. But acceptance of that contention would mean incorporating into the Bonus Act the elaborate and complicated provisions
not only the Income-tax Act but other Acts levying direct taxes
c of
and throwing a considerable burden on Tribunals, least equiPPed
with working out the provisions of those Acts entailing inevitably
prolonged enquiries. Therefore, we must proceed cautiously in
examining the scheme of the Act before we conclude
on the interpretation to be given to s. 6 ( c) and s. 7.
Calculating the available surplus under the Fuli Bench Formula
D
used to work out notionally the amount of bonus which they
thought would be awarded and deducted that amount from the
gross profits, on the remaining balance of which, income tax
payable by the employer would be determined. The result of this
procedure was that the amount of tax so worked out was propor·
tionately less. Deprecating this procedure, Gajendragadkar, J.,
E (as he then was) observed in Associated Cement Companies Ltd.
v. 1'he Workmen(') as follows:
A
•
•
"Logically it is only after all the prior charges have
been determined and deducted from the gross profits
that available surplus can be ascertained; and it is only
after the available surplus is ascertained that the question of awarding bonus can be considered. Some tribunals seem lo work out notionally the amount of bonus
which they think can be awarded and placed that
amount higher up in the process of making calculations
before the income-tax payable is determined. . . . We
wish the make it clear that this procedure should not
be followed."
·
F
G
H
In Crompton Parkinson (Works) Private Ltd. v. !ts Workmen(')
disapproval of the said procedure was once again voiced, Das, C.J.
observing that such a procedure is certainly not giving effect to
the bonus formula "but amounts to ad hoc determination which
may vary according to the length of the proverbial foot of the
Lord Chancellor and is bound to lead to chaos and industrial
unrest." In Workmen of India Explosives Ltd. v. lndian Explosives
(I'
[1959] S.C.R.
925 at 974.
(2)
[1959] Supp.
2 S.C.R. 936.
772
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1969) I S.CR.
Ltd. ( 1 ) the labour relied on the report of the Directors which
was to the effect that no income tax was payable on the year's
result and a total of Rs. 62.39 lacs made up of income tax and
development rebate was being carried forward. On this report
it was argued that no deduction should be made for income tax.
Negativing the contention it was held that in the application of
the Full Bench Fonnula the deduction of income tax is notional,
the gross profits arc arrived at by adding back certain items to
the net profits and then the gross profits are reduced by making
certain notional deductions, one such deduction is under the
head of income tax. It was held that this deduction is not made
on the actual amount payable, but what would be notionally payable on the profits determined undct the Full Bench Formula and
that if th~ argument on behalf of the labc>ur were to be accepted
the Tribunal would in effect not be applying the formula. Similar
observations arc to be found in several other decisions but we
need not add them here.
The question is whether the concept of notional tax liability
which was adopted so long was laid aside by Parliament when it
enacted s. 6 ( c) and s. 7 and replaced the concept of actual t:u..
liability. To answer this question we must examine the scheme of
the Act and Sch. II. Broadly speaking, it can be safely said that
Parliament has retained the main outlines of the Full Bench Formula in the Act. It maintained, for instance, the accounting
year as the unit, the principle that the employer, and where it happens to be a company, the company and its shareholders and
labour as are each entitled as contributories to the profits to a
share therein, the deductions of certain prior charges, the concept
of gross profits etc. which were the features of the Formula. The
principal change it introduced was the statutory formula of minimum and maximum bonus and the corollary flowing therefrom of
"set on" and "set off" and the doing away of rehabilitation as a
prior charge against which labour had clamoured Jong. But do
these changes envisage the doing away of the concept of notional
tax liability which the Tribunals used to work out and substituting
actual tax liability by first working out the taxable income of the
employer under the Income Tax Act and other Acts ? The answer
of course, must he found from the provisions of the Act and not
from what used to be done befo're its enactment.
Sections 4, 5, 6 and 7 together with the Schedules deal with
computation of gross profits and available surplus out of which
67% in cases falling under cl. (a) of sec. 2(4) and 60% in cases
falling under cl. (b) of that sub-section would be the allocable
surplus. Under Sch. II, which applies to establishments which
arc not banking companies, the starting point is the net proijt
(I)
(1966) 2 L.L.J. 311.
A
B
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METAL 130X CO. V. W0RK~fEN ~he/at, /.)
A
B
C
D
,
E
F
G
H
77 3
shown by the employer in his P. & L ~cco1mt. The reas<;m f_or
doing so seems to be that the T~btmal is not expected or~1n~nl_y
to reopen the P & L accoun~, venfy the accounts from which ii ts
worked out or find out for itself the true net profit. Parliament
was aware that Tribunals which would adjudicate disputes under
the Act would be the. least efficacious for such a purpose, apart
from the fact that such enquiries would be prolonged and bitter
enquiries. That is why s. 23 was enacted to raise a presumption
about the correctness of the P & L account and balance-sheets of
companies duly certified by auditors qualified under s. 226 of lhe
Companies Act, 1956. Since the P & L account would have
taken into account, besides expenditure aHowable under the
Income Tax Act, bonus payable to labour, provisions for tax,
development rebate or development allowance and reserves, Item
2 of Sch. II requires these amounts to be added back. Similarly,
the amounts set out in Items 3 & 4 in Sch. U are also to be added
back. Item 5 provides for certain deductions such as capital
receipts, capital profits, profit and receipts. relating to business
outside India, income of foreign concerns fl"Ol)l inve3tments outside India etc. It is clear from the nature ef these deductible
items that they are items in which generally, labour would not have
made any contribution. Having thus arrived at the gross profits,
s. 6 provides for deduction of prior charget> set out in els. (a),
(b), (c) and (d). Clause (a) allows the deduction of depreciation admissible under s. 32 ( 1) of the Income Tax Act or a similar
provision under other Acts charging direccta.xes, but not depreciation unabsorbed in any earlier previoos year by reason of there
being no profits or gains chargeable for that year or of such profits
or gains being less than the allowance allawable under s. 32(2)
of the Income Tax Act. The resul~ is that while making his
P & L account the employer would deduct both· the depreciation
allowable under s. 32(1) as also the depreciation unabsorbed
during the earlier years. The whole of such depreciation, however, has to be added back under i~ 2(b) of Sch. II while computing. ~e gross profits. Notwithstanding such· adding back of
depreciation allowable under both sub-sees. 1, & 2 of s. 32 of the
Income Tax Act, the depreciation deductible.under s. 6(a) of tb.e
Act is the one allowed under s. 32(1-), that is,. the depreciation
relating to the accounting year only and· not the depreciation
unabsorbed in any earlier accounting yeru:. Similar is the position
regarding bonus paid during the accounting· year but which relates
to the earlier accounting years. Even· in· the case of an employer
keepin~ his accounts on mercantile basis, he would not get a
deduction of bonus though payable but nOt· actually paid during
the accounting year. He would, however,. be entitled to deduct
such bonus from his taxable profits. and gains as expenditure in.curred wholly for the business, Under Sch.; II, Item 3 (a)
bonus, even though paid during the aeeounting year, has to be
Su~.Cl/66--3
774
SUPRllME COURT REPORTS
.,
[ 1969] I S.CR
added back if it is deducted in the P & L account. The net profit
in the P & L account would thus not he the same as the available
surplus worked out under the Act. The same is the position of
losses and expenditure relating to a foreign business which though
allowable under the Income Tax Act have to be added back tn
the ner prolit shown in the P & L account. As already sta!ed
deductions pennissible under Sch. II arc those items in which it
can be said that labour could have made no contribution in earning them. So far as development rebate is concerneJ, s. 6 ( b)
allows the whole of such rebate allowable under the I i:come Tax
Act and, therefore, there would be no diJliculty in working out
the development rebate under this head and the Income Tax Acc.
A
B
c
Coming now to cl. ( c) of s. 6, is it the actual taxable income,
the direct tax on which is a prior charge, which is to be worked
out, or the tax on the estimated balance of gross profits after
deducting depreciation and development charges but without
deducting the bonus payable during the year? Jn other words,
when the Tribunal reaches the stage of cl. ( c), does it have to D
assess the taxable income in accordance with the various provisions of the Income Tax Act just as an Income Tax Oflicer would
do and assess the liability of income ta\ on such taxable income
according to the rates applicable during the particular accounting
year, or should it compute the balance of gross profits and as
stated above and apply the said rates and estimate the amount of E
direct tax and deduct them from the remain gross profits? Bonus
being payable within· eight months after the close of the accounting year in cases· where there is no dispute pending before an
authority under s. 22 cif the Act as provided by s. 19, it is hardly
possible, except in rare cases, that assessment under the Inwme
Tax Ace and otJ1er such Acts would he completed by the time
bonus has to he paid. Therefore. the Tribunal would not have F
before it the taxable income assessed by the Income Tax and
other such officers. If the Unions' contention were to be right.
there would be two or more parallel authorities working under this
Act and the Jncome·Tax Act and other such Acts who wr:mkl
have to assess taxable income and the tax payable thereon, before
all of whom the employer would have to prove his taxable income. G
Prima facie, it would seem that the Bonus Act could not intend
an enquiry into the actual taxable income worked out under all
the elaborate provisions· relating to deductions, allowance<, reliefs.
rebates etc. provided by the Income Tax Act and other such Acts.
This is particular1y so as in each bonus dispute the Tribunal not
equipped with the detailed knowledge of a!J such Acts would have H
to undertake an enquiry into the various deductions, rebates.
reliefs etc. claimable bv the employer under those Acts.
Th<J1
fact that payment. of bonus cannot brooke delay without causing
·-
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METAL BOX co.
A
B
c
D
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v. WORKMEN (Shelat, !.)
hardship to labour would seem to militate against the possibility
of such prolonged enquiries.
1he key to the words in s. 6 ( c), namely, "is liable to pay"
emphasised on behalf of the unions and some of the interveners
lies in the opening words "subject to the provisions o.f s~ctioi;i 7"
in cl. ( c). These words are used, whether the tax hab1hty 1s to
be calculated on actual taxable income or on the notJOnal amount
worked out under ss. 4 and 6 and Sch. II, because the direct
taxes payable by the employer are. to be calculated at the rates
applicable during that year as provided by s. 7. That both such
amounts cannot be the same is clear because s. 7 in expn:ss terms
prohibits taking into account unabsorbed losses and. arrear of
depreciation allowable under s. 32 (2), the exempt10n allowed
under s. 84 and the deduction allowed under s. 101 (1) of the
Income Tax Act. Similarly, where an assessee is a religious or
charitable institution and its income either wholly or partially, as
the case may be, is exempt under the Income Tax Act, such an
employer to whom s. 32 of the Act does not apply is treated as
a company in which the public are substantially interested and its
income is to be assessed accordingly by the Tribunal and compute its liability for direct taxes. Clause ( c) of s. 7 does away
for the purposes of ss. 6 and 7, the distinction between the liability
of an individual and a Hindu Undivided Family under the Income
Tax Act and provides that the income derived by such a Hindu
Undivided Family is to be treated as the income of that employer as an individual. Likewise, where profits and gai.ns of an
employer include profits from export, a rebate allowed under the
Income Tax Act on such profits is not to be taken into account
while working out the tax liability under s. 6 ( c). Also, the rebate a!lgwed under any of the Acts levying direct taxes on sums
spent on development of an industry is also not to be taken into
account while computing the tax liability. It was, however,
argued that the provisions of s. 7 lay down the only departure
from the Income Tax Act and that except for that departure the
Tribunal must assess the actual taxable income and arrive at the
tax liability thereon at rates prevailing during the accounting
not correct.
year in question. In our view this submission
What s. 7 really means is that the Tribunal has to compute the
direct taxes at the rates at which the income, gains and profits
of the employer are taxed under the Income Tax Act and other
such Acts during the accounting year in question. That is the
reason why s. 6 ( c) has the words "is liable for" and the words
"income, gains and profits". These words do not, however,
mtan that the Tribunal while computing direct taxes as a
prior charge has to assess the actual taxable income and the taxes
,thereon. How can the Tribunal arrive at the amount of bonus
to be paid to labour without first estimating the amount of taxes
and deducting it from the gross profits and thus ascertaining the
is
·G
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775
776
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] J SC.R.
available surplus ? If it were to reverse the process and first
deduct bonus and ascertain the tax amount, it would have to do
so on a somewhat ad hoc figure thus bringing about the same
result deprecated by this Court in decisions referred to :ibove.
This and the other difliculties already pointed out must deal to
the result that the Tribunal must estimate the amount of direct
taxes on the balance of gross profits as worked out under ss. 4
& 6, but without deducting the bonus, then work out the quantum
of taxes thereon at rates applicable during that year to the income, gains and profits of the ,employer and after deducting the
amount of taxes so worked out arrive at the available surplus.
Section 6 ( c) being subject to s. 7 the computation has to be done
without taking into account the items specified ins. 7(a) and in
the manner prescribed by the remaining clauses of that section.
This interpretation is commendable because : ( 1) it is consistent
with the words "is liable to pay" ins. 6(c), (2) it is in hacmony
with the provisions of ss. 4 and 6 and Sch. II, and (3) it is consistent with the intention of Parliament apparent from the scheme
of computation of available surplus in the Act. The Act recognises the principle laid down in the Full Bench Formula that both
labour and capital are entitled to a share in the profits. That is
why 40 p.c. of the available surplus is left to the capital and
interest is allowed to the employer on paid up and working capitals while working out the gross profits. Parliam~nt besides was
or at any rate is presumed to have been aware that depreciation
allowed under the Income Tax Act would not be sufficient for
rehabilitation purposes. It did away with rehabilitation as a
prior charge partly because there were complaints that it was
being ill-used, but partly also because it knew that the rebate in
Income Tax Act on bonus paid would go to the employer with
which he could recoup the depreciation which would be larger
than the one allowed under s. 32 of the Income Tax Act. In
our view it was for that reason that it did not lay down that
bonus is to be deducted before computing the amount on which
direct taxes are to be calculated under s. 6(c). If Parliament
intended to make a departure from the rule laid down by courts
and tribunals that the bonus amount should be calculated after
provision for tax was made and not before, we would have expected an express provision to that effect either in the Act or in
the Schedules. In our view the contention urged by the Company that the tax liability is to be worked out by rirst working out
the gross profits and deducting therefrom the prior charges under
s. 6 but not the bonus payable to the employees is right.
A
B
c
D
F
G
In the result, the appellant Company succeeds on the questions H
of development rebate and the provision for gratuity amount. ll~
appeal on those questions is therefore allowed and to that extent•
the award is set aside. As regards the question of depreciation ·
METAL BOX CO. V. WORKMEN (She/at, J.)
A
777
amount the Tribunal will ascertain the amount afresh after giving
the parties opportunity to lead such evidence as they desire and
taking that amount and the amounts of development rebate and
of the provision for gratuity in the light of this judgment, the Tribunal will adjust it award and arrive at the quantum of bonus
payable to the workmen.
B
Appeal by workmen is dismissed.
to costs.
R.K.P.S.
•
There will be no order as
Appeal by Company allowed in part.
Appeal by Workmen dismissed .
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