STATE OF PUNJAB versus SAT PAL DANG & ORS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 30 July 1968 | [1969] 1 S.C.R. 478 | 1968 INSC 166
Key facts
- Decided
- 30 July 1968
- Bench
- M. HIDAYATULLAH*, J.C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI, G.K. MITTER, A.N. GROVER
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 1427/1968
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1969] 1 S.C.R. 478
- Neutral citation
- 1968 INSC 166
Text of the judgment
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STATE OF PUNJAB
A
v.
SAT PAL DANG & ORS.
I uly 30, 1968
(M. H!DAYATULLAH, C.J., J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAM!,
G. K. MITTER AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.]
B
Constitution of Jndic, 1950, Arts. 174, 189, 199, 208, 209, 212 and
213-J{u/es of Procedure atrd Conduct of Business in the Punjab Legislativ~ Assemb~y, rr. 7, 105 and 112-Prorogation of Assembly by Governor,
how to be notified-When co1nmences-Governor's power of proniulgation of Ordinance-Scope of-If' extends to ntaking law under Art. 209Punjab Lc{!islc.tive (ReJ?ulation of Procedure in Relation to Financial
Rwiness) Ordinance, (1 of 1968), s. 3-Cotzflict with Art. 189(4) and
r. 105 of Rules of l'rocedurc-Jf section unconstitutional-Speakers
ruling how far final and beyond challenge in
c
courts of law-Deputy
Speaker, if can certify Money Bills in place of Speaker.
On tho 7th of March, 1968, the proceedings in the Punjab Legislative
Assembly led to rowdy scenes and the Speaker, acting und·,r r. 105 of
the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the Punjab Legislative
A~embly
made. under Art. 208 of the C-Onstitution, c1djourncd the
Assembly for two months. This led to an impas<;;e. The -Assembly was
in session but it was put in a state of inaction by the adjournn1ent. The
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Budget Session of the A'Sembly had to reach a conclusion before 31st
March, as, after thai date, no money ~ould be drawn from the Consoli~
dated Fund and no expcndiru"rc in the State could ~ incurred. Tbe
(iovcrnor, therefore, on 11th March prorogued the Assembly under Art.
174(2)(a). The order of the Governor was caused to he printed in the
Stale Gazelle the same dav by the Chief Secretary uocler the Business
Rules, and copies of the Gazelle were despatched to the Secretary of the
Assembly, the Speaker and nther members on the following day. On
13th March, the Governor promulgated the Punjab Legislature (Regulation. of Procedure in Relation to Financial Business) Ordinance, 1968.
Section 3 of the Ordinance provides that the sitting of either House of
Lc~is1aturc was not to be adjourned \\lithout the consent of the House
until completion of financial Bu-;iness. On 14th ~iarch, the Governor
summoned the Legislative Assembly under Art. t 74, fixing 18th March
for its sitting, and. under Art. 175(2). directed the Ass-:!mbly to consider
the E.stimatcs of Expenditure, the Demands for Supplementary Grants and
two Appropriation Bills. On 18th March, :lfter considering certain other
matters, the Speaker nlled that the House was prorogued not on the 11th
f\1:i.rch but on the ·18th. and that in accordance with his earlier ruling
dated 7th March, the Hou-;c stood adjourned for two months. After
~ornc commotion the Deputy Speaker occupied th-~ Chair and the Assembly
kt..-pl sitting. The procccding:s were conducted ~ithout demur even f.rom
tho opposition. 'fhc Bills \\'Crc passed. The Rills w:re then transmitted
to the Legislative Council certified by the Depu.ty Speaker that they w7ro
Monev Bills. lllc Speaker wrote to the Cha1'rman of the Lcg1slallvc
CounCil pointing out that there. \VJS no certificate hy him as req~ircd hy
Art. 199( 4) and that he had ad1ourned the A''".:n1h.lv when the B1lh were
adopted. The Legislative Council, hoY-:r:vcr. coa .. 1dcrcd and pas~<l the
two Bills and the Governor assented to them.
On the questions whether : (I) the prorogation took effect on 18th
Marett and therefore the summoning of the Lc~1slature before prorogation
\O'as invalid; (2) the Ordinance could not be pas":d by the Governor,
bocau.qc, the prorogation was a fraud on the Constitution and since the
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PUNJAB V. SAT PAL
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prorogation was invalid the House continued to be in session; ( 3) The
Go\-emor's power to promulgate an Ordinance is confined to Lists II and
III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution; ( 4) Section 3 of the
Ordinance was unconstitutional as there was a conflict with, (a) r. 105
oi. the Rules of Procedure made under Art. 208 which gives power to
the Speaker to adjourn the Assembly or suspend sitting in case of grave
disorder, and (b) Art. 189(4) which gives power to the ·Speaker to
adjourn the Assembly or suspend the meeting for want of quorum; (5)
the ruling of the Speaker given on 18th March was not open to challenge
in courts; (6) the further proceedings in the Assembly were illegal and
(7) the two Appropriation Acts were ultra vires because. the Deputy
Speaker and not the Speaker, certified them as Money Bills to the Legislative Council and the Governor.
HELD: (1) Under r. 7 of the Rules of Procedure framed under
Aft. 208. when a session of the Asse1nbly is prorogued the Secretary of
the Assembly shall notify the order in the Gazette and inform the members. The words indicate that there is already a prorogation and the rest
of the rule is intended for communication of the fact to the public and
conveying the order to the members. It cannot be said from this that
only the Secretary of the Assembly could so notify and that the Governor
could not notify his order of prorogation. [489 E-F; 490 BJ
Article 174(2). which enables the Governor to prorogue the Legislature does not indicate the manner in which he is to make known his
orders. The means open to him are 'public notification' that is, notification
in the Official Gazette and 'proclamation'. If he notifies in the Gazette
through his Chief s~cretary acting under the Business Rules, it becomes
a public act of which the Court should take judicial notice. Therefore,
in the present case· the prorogation took place on the 11th March, 1968,
the date of publication in the Gazette, and the Legislature was resummoned only thereafter.
The resummoning of the Legislature by the
Governor was also a step in the right ditection as it set up once again
the democratic machinery which had been disturbed by the Speaker.
[490 A-E]
(2) Under
Art. 174(2) there are no restrictions on the power of the
1
Governor to prdrogue. The power being untramme11ed and an emergency
having arisen, there was no abuse of power by him nor can his motives
be described ..s ma/a fide. In fact it was the only reasonable method of
getting rid of the adjournment and solving the political crisis. Th~ House,
in fact, transacted other business showing that the prorogation and resummoning were considered va1id. After the prorogation there was no
further curb on the legislative power of the Governor to promulgate the
Ordinance. [448 D. F-G; 490 E-F]
·
Kalyanam v. Veerabhadrayya, A.I.R. 1950 Mad. 243, referred to.
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(3) The Governor's power under Art. 213 of the Constitution. of
legislation by Ordinance is as wide as the powelr of the Legislature of the
State ap.d therefore. includes the power to pass a law under Art. 209 in
relation to financial business. [490 G-H]
(4) (a) The inconsistency between ·the section and r. 105 has to be
resolved in favour of the section because the latter part of Art. 209 itself
provides that in cases of repugnancy between the rules of procedure
framed nnder Art. 208 and a law made nnder Art. 209, the latter shall
prevail: (b) As regards the conflict with Art. 189(4) the rule of statntory
fr1terpretation-namely, that. even if the language of a statute is prima
fm;ie wide it should be understood. if poi;sible, as not· attempting somethmg beyond the competence of the legislative body-applies, because,
·
480
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 1 s.c.R.
whether a llrovision should he struck down or read down depends upon
bow far 1t ts intended to go. ln rhc present case, the Ordinance could
De\-er provide for want of quorum which is dealt with in the Article and is
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~er~for~ a constitutional tcquiremcnt. The Article continues to operate
10 s1tuattons contemplated by it and s. 3 of the Ordinance can only deal
,.
with ocher situations.
Therefore, the section could be read down so as
to harmoni<e with the Article. [492 B-C; F-H; 493 A]
Diamond Sugar Mills v. U.P. [1961] 3 S.C.R. 242; Romesh Thappar
v. State of Madras. [1950] S.C.R. 594 and Kames/nvar Prascd v. State of
Bihar, (1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 369, refc'rred to.
(5) Whether the Speaker adjourned the Assembly afresh or declared
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that the former adjournment continued to operate made no difference,
because:
. (a) the former adjournment had come to an end by a valid prdroga•
llon and [493 F-GJ
(b) on the 18th March the Speaker was faced with a valid Ordinance,
which was binding on the Assembly, including the Speaker, by virtue of
Art. 209. Therefore, the Speaker was powerless and the fresh adjournment by him of the session without taking the mandate of the Assembly by
majority as required by s. 3 of the Ordinance was null and void. [493
C
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It could nol be urged that whatever the merits of the Speaker's ruling
may be, it should be treated as final and beyond challenge in courts. A
decision of the Speaker on a point of order is final under r. 112 of the
Rules of Procedure. only if it is raised in rela1ion lo the intetpretation
and enforcement of the rules and the interpreTation of the Articles of
the Constitution regulating the business of the House and if the question
to be decided wa.s within the Speaker's cognizance. In the present caoe.
the Speaker did not attempt to interpret Arts. 208, 209 and 213, and
instead of a resolution (which was the praper method of questioning tho
Ordinance) being pa.'5ed under Art. 213(2)(a) disapproving the Ordinance the Speaker asserted himself against a law which was binding on
him. [494 A-B, G-H]
( 6) The continuance of the proceedings under the Deputy Speaker
was valid, complying as it did, with the law promulgated by the Governor,
and therefore. the financial business transacted hcfdre the Assembly had
legal foundation. [495 C-D]
(7) A provision of law is usually regarded as merely directory, even
though a public duty is impooed by it and the manner of performance is
also indicated in imperative language, when general injustice or inconvenience results to others if strict compliance i5 deemed mandatory. and
they have no control over those excrcisinn the duty.
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Judged by this test,
Art. 199(4) requiring the Speaker's certificate cannot be viewed as mandatorv but only as directory in view of the inconvenience to the State and
to the public at large that may be caused bv holding the provision imoerative and not directory. If the Constitution saw the necessity of providing
a Dcnuty Speaker to act a. the Speaker during the latter's absence or to
perform the office of the Speaker when the office is vacant. it stands to
reason that the Constitution could never have reposed a power of mere
certification absolutely in the Speaker and Speaker alone. Further, Art.
212(1) Provides that the validitv of any proceeding in the Legislature of
a State shall not be called in question on the l?rOUnd of any alleged irregu•
larity of procedure. [496 D-G; 497 B-C, D-E]
State of Boml>av v. R. M. D. Chamarbauirwala, (t 957] S.C.R. 874,
State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, [1958] S.C.R. 533, State of
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PUNJAB v. SAT PAL (Hidayatu/lah, C.l.)
A
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B
c
481
U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya [19611 2 S.C.R. 679, M/s. Manga/ore
Ganesh Bidi Works v. State of Mysore, [1963] Supp, 1 S.C.R. 275, Patna
Zilla Brick Owners Association v. State of Bihar, A.LR. 1963 Pat. 16 and
May's Parliamentary Practice p. 842. referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION; Civil Appeals Nos. 1427
and 1428 of 1968.
Appeals from the judgment and order dated May 10, 1968
of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Wri:ts Nos. 12261227 of 1968 .
C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, Niren De, Solicitor·
General, G. R. Majithia, Dy. 4_dvocate-General for the State f!f
Punjab, R. N. Sachthey and S. P. Nayar, for the appellant (m
both the appeals) .
R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwal, Anil Kumar Gupta, N. M.
Ghatate, K. M. K. Nair, Chand Kishore, S. P. Singh, Baldev
Singh Khoji and B. P. Singh, for respondent No. 1 (in C.A.
No. 1427 of 1968). .
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S. K. Dholakia and K. L. Hathi, for respondents Nos. 2-4 (in
C.A. No. 1427 of 1968) .and respondents Nos. 2, 12 to 14 and
16 (in C.A. No. 1428 of 1968).
J. N. Kaushal,· and Urmi/a Kapur, for respondent No. 6 (iil
C.A. No. 1427 of 1968) and respondent No. 8 (in C. A. No.
1428 of 1968).
M. C. Chagla, B. S. Dhillon and Hardev Singh, for respondents
·
·
Nos. 1 to 6 (in C.A. No. 1428 of 1968).
Rajender Sachar and J. C. Ta/war, for respondent No. 7 (in
C. A. No. 1428 of 1968).
'
The Judgment of the Cqurt was delivered by
Hidayatullah, C.J. These appeals arise from two petitions
nnder Art. 226 of the Constitution questioning the validity of
Punjab Ordinance I of 1968 promulgated by the Governor of
Punjab on March 13, 1968 and Punjab Appropriation Acts Nos.
9 and 10 of 1968. A Full Bench of the High Court of Punjab &
Har:yana consisting of Mehr Singh C.J. and Capoor, .Harbans
Singh, Mahajan and Bedi, JJ. held unanimously that the two Acts
were unconstitutional and, by majority, that the Ordinance was
also unconstitutional. The High Court certified the cases nnder
Arts. 132 and 133(1)(c) of the Constitution and the State of Punjab
appeals. The relevant facts were these :
At the Fourth General Elections Congress won 43 seats in
the Legislative Assembly which has a membership of 104. The
other parties (none of which had a majority in the House) combined and formed the United Front Party. A Ministry was fprmed
482
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1969) J S.CR.
under Sardar Gurnam Singh. Some of the respondents here were
Minister and members supporting the Ministry. Lt. Col. Jogindcr
Singh Mann and Dr. naldco Singh were elected Speaker and
Deputy Speaker respectively.
On November 22, 1967, 18 members of United Front Party
including Sardar Lachman Singh Gill defected and formed a new
party-Punjab Janta Party. With the support of the Congress a
new Ministry was formed under Sardar Lachman Singh Gill on
November 25, 1967. The Legislative Assembly was then summoned to meet on February 22, 1968. As the budget was to be
considered, the Financial Statement was discussed on 4, 5 and 6
March. On the last day, following some disturbance in the House
and consequent disciplinary action, a Resolution was moved expressing non-<:onfidence in the Speaker. The House granted leaYe
and then adjourned itself to the following day.
When the Session commenced Sardar Gurnam Singh raised a
point of order under rule 112 (') of the Rules of Procedure made
under Art. 208 of the Constitution that there was a contravention of Art. l 79(c) in moving the Resolution. It is not
necessary to go into the merits of the point of order. Suffice it
to say that the Speaker declared the motion of non-confidence to
be unconstitutional and deemed not to have been moved. Another
Resolution was then moved which led to rowdy scenes. The
(I) "I 12. Poinls of order and decisions thereon.
(I) A point of order relate to the interpretation or !nforccment
of these rulec; or such Articles of I.he Conslilulion as refn}late the
business of the House and shall raise a qucs1ion which is within the
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cognizance of the Speaker.
(2) A point of order may be raised in relation to the husincs,,
before the House at the moment :
Provided that the Spc:1kcr may permit a memher to raise a point
of order <lurir.g the interval between the termination of one item of
business and the commencement of another if it relates to maintenance
of order in or arrangement of bus:necs before the House.
( 3) Subject to conditions referred to in sub-rules ( 1) and (2) a
mcmher may formulate a point of order and the Speaker shall decide
whether the point raised is a point of order and, if so, give his deci~ion
thereon, which shall be final.
(4) No debate _o;hall be allowed on a point of order, but the Speaker
may, if he thinks fit, hear members before givinJ? his decision.
(5) A point of order is not a point of privilege.
(6) A member shall not raise a pOint of order:(a) to ask for information, or
(b) to explain his position, or
( c) when a question on any motion is being put to the House,
or
(d) which may be hypothetical, or
( e) that division bells did not ring or were not heard.
(7) A member may raise a point of order during a division
on a matter ario;ing out of the division and shall do so sitti~."
only
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PUNJAB V. SAT PAL
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(Hidayatul/ah, C.J.)
<{83
Speaker purporting to act under Rule 105 (') adjourned the Asseinbly for two months.
A political crisis then arose. The budget had to be adopted
before March 31, 1968 but the House stood adjourned to May 6,
1968. No expenditure in the State could, therefore, be made
from April l, 1968. The Governor then acted under his constitutional powers. On March 11, 1968 the Governor prorogued
the Assembly under Art. 174(2)(a)( 2 ). The order of the Governor was caused to be printed in the State Gazette the same day by
the Chief Secretary and copies of the Gazette were despatched ~
the Secretary of the Assembly, the Speaker and other members
on the following day. On March 13, 1968 the Governor promulgated Ordinance No. I of 1968 (The Punjab Legislature Regulation of Procedure in Relation to Financial Business Ordinance,
1968). On March 14, 1968 the Governor summoned the Legislative Assembly under Art. 174( 2 ) fixing March 18, 1968 for its
sitting and under Art. 175(2)( 3 ) directed the Assembly to consider:
(i) Supplementary Estimates, 1967-68 (Second Instalment).
(ii) The Punjab Appropriation Bill, 1968, relating
to the Supplementary Estimates, 1967-68 (Second Instalment).
(iii) Demands for Grants as included in the Budget
Estimates for the year 1968-69.
(!) "105. Power of Speaker to adjourn the Assembly or suspend sitting.
F
In the case of grave disorder in the Assembly. the Speaker may,
if he thinks it necessary to do so adjourn the Assembly or suspend any
sitting for a time to be named by him."
(2) "Art. 174. Sessions of the Legislature, prorogation -and discussion,
( 1) The Governor shall from time to time summon the House or
Houses of the Legislature of the State to meet at such time
and plaee as he thinks fit. but six months shall not intervene
between its last sitting in one session and the date appointed
for their first sitting in the next session.
G
(2) The Governor may from time to time(a) prorogue the Houses or either House;
(b)
•
(3) "Art. 175. Right of Governor to address and send messages to tile
House or Houses.
(!)
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( 2) The Governor may send message to the House or Houses of
the Legislature of the State. whether with respect to a Bill then
pending in the Le·gislature or otherwise, and a House to which
any messa_ge is so sent shall with all corivenient despatch con~
sider any matter required by the message to be taken into
consideration."
484
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1969] I S.C.R.
(iv) The Punjab Appropriation Bill (No. 2) 1968,
relating to the Budget Estimates for the year
1968-69."
When the Legislative Assembly met it began by considering
certain other matters such as privilege motions, arrangement for
Watch and Ward Staff. The Speaker then read the Message of the
Governor referred to above. Sardar Gurnam Singh rose to move
a point of order but the Speaker a~kcd him to wait and the House
attended to some other matters. It granted leave of absence to one
member who was ill and the Speaker named the Panel of Chairmen. The Ordinance was then placed on the Table of the House.
TI1e text of the Ordinance is given in an appendix to this judgment. It consisted of four sections. Section 3 provided that the
sitting of either House of Legislature was not to be adjourned
without the consent of that House until completion of financial
business, and section 4 provided that the annual financial statement laid before the House under Art. 202 or the statement showing the estimated amount of any supplementary or additional expenditure had been laid under Art. 205 was not to lapse by reason
of the prorogation of the House and that it·would not be necessary
to relay such statements before the House.
Sardar Gurnam Singh again rose to urge his point of order.
He was reminded that a Resolution to the same effect was to be
brought before the Assembly, but he continued with his point. He
stated that the Ordinance was issued when the Assembly was in
Session and the House was summoned by the Governor before it
was prorogued. He elaborated his point of order on the same
lines a~ was done in the arguments before us and we shall come
to these in due course. A debate, punctuated with uproar in the
House, followed. It appears that the Speaker at first wa~ of the
opinion that" he had no power to adjourn the House in view of
section 3 of the Ordinance but Sardar Gumam Singh maintained
that he had such power under Rule 105. The Speaker observed :
"Yes, I can adjourn the (House) but what about the Ordinance?"
Sardar Gurnam Singh opined that there was no Ordinance. The
Speaker then ruled that the House was prorogued not on 11th
March but on the 18th and gave the ruling in the following
words:
'The order by the Governor dated 14-3-1968 summoning the House is also illegal and void and he had
no power. to re-summon the House once adjourned under
Rule I 05 of the Vidhan Sabha Rules referred to above.
There.fore in accordance with my earlier ruling dated
7-3-68 the House stands adjourned for two months from
that date.
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PUNJAB v. SAT PAL (Hidayatullah, C.J.)
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(The Sabha then adjourned)
5.05 p.m."
The meeting had lasted 3 hours.
What followed may be extracted from the proceedings.
"(At 5.05 P.M. the Speaker declared that the Hou.se
stand adjourned for two months and left the Chair.
The Members continued to sit in the House. There was
uproar and furore in the House. One of the Hon. Members occupied the Speaker's Chair and some members
rushed to the Speaker's dais and stood there. The Hon.
Deputy Speaker came and occupied seat No. 15 in the
House to conduct the proceedings. As the seats of the
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Secretary/other officers of the Punjab Vidhan Sabha Secretariat and Reporters were also occupied by the Members of the Opposition, they all occupied seats adjoining
seat No. 15).
(Noise and uproar in the House-voices of 'shame'
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'shame' from the Members of the Opposition).
Mr. Deputy Speaker:
As the Speaker had adjourned the House. (sic) When
he had no authority to do so (Interruptions and Uproar)
under the Ordinance promulgated by the Government,
any such adjournment ordered by the Speaker, is, thereE
fore, null and void (Uproar and renewed noise in the
House). The House will now resume consideration of
business before it and I now call upon the Chief Minister
to move the motion.
(Uproar and furore in the House)
F
(At this stage, the Speaker's dais was clear and the
Hon. Deputy Speaker occupied the Speaker's Chair at
the Dais).
The Chief Minister then moved that the consideration of the Financial Business be completed within half an hour. There was
. uproar in the House. The motion was carried. Next the EstiG mates of Expenditure, the Demands for Supplementary grants, the
two ~ppropriation Bills and the other demands were passed. A
Resolution that the Speaker be removed from office was moved
and forwarded to the Leader of the House after granting leave and
the Assembly was adjourned to meet at 2 p.m. on April 5, 1968.
The time taken is not stated but there is reason to think that the
H limit of 1/2 hour was not exceeded.
B
The Bills were then transmitted to the Legislative Council
certified by the Deputy Speaker that they were Money Bills. An
486
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] I 5.C.R.
objection was raised that the certificate under Art. 199 ( 4)( 1 )
must be signed by the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly. This
· was overruled by the Chairman and the Bills were passed. They
were then placed before the Governor with another certificate of
the Deputy Speaker. The Governor signified his assent.
A
Two writ petitions were then filed in the High Court. Civil
Writ Petition ( 1226; 68 was filed by Shri Satya Pal Dang, M.L.A.
against the State of Punjab. the Chief Minister, the Finance Minister, the Secretary to the Governor, the Secretary Legislative
Assembly and the Deputy Speaker. The second petition (1227/
68) was filed by 6 members and was directed against those named
in the other petition and also joined the Speaker, the Chairman
and Deputy Chairman of the Legislative Council, the Controller
of Printing and Stationery and one Sardar Kirpal Singh, M.L.A.
The arguments in the High Court ranged over a wide field. They
were summarized into eight points by Justice S. B. Capoor which,
it is common case, represent the essence of the matter. Stated
brieHy, the arguments were that the prorogation took effect on
the 18th March. As a consequence the summoning of the Legislature before prorogation was invalid. These points go together
Since both the prorogation and resummoning of the Legii;.laturc were invalid tlie House continued to be in session although
adjourned. Since the Legislature was in "Session", the Ordinance
could not be passed and it was a fraud upon the Constitution.
Section 3 of the Ordinance was specially attacked as unconstitntional. The ruling of the Speaker given on March 18. 1968 was
not open to challenge in courts and the further proccc<lings in the
Assembly were illegal. Even if everything was regular it was in
issue whether the Speaker alone was entitled to endorse a Money
Bill and certify it to the Legislativ~ Council and the Governor
and since the certificates were by the Deputy Speaker, the two
Acts were said to be ultra vires.
B
In the High Courts the Full Bench unanimow;ly held against
the petitioners on the question of the prorogation and resummoning of the Legislature which were held to be regular and legal.
The Full Bench also held unanimously that the ruling given by
the Speaker on the 18th March made the later proceedings illegal.
There was a difference on the point that the certification by the
Deputy Speaker in place of the SJ)eaker was vaJid. The majority
holding that it was not. Similarly a majority of Judges held that
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(J) "199. l)cfinition of"Moncy Bills"
(I)
(4) There shall be endorsed on every \foncy Bi!I when it is 1rans1nittcd to
the Legislative Council under /\rtidc 198, and when ii is prc~nlcd to the
Governor for assent under Article ::!00, the ccrliticatc of the Speaker of
the Lcgi.-;lativc Assembly signed hy hi1n that it is a ~oncy Bill."
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PUNJAB v. SAT PAL (Hidayatullah, C.l.)
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section 3 of the Ordinance was unconstitutional and invalid and
the Fnll Bench unanimously held the Appropriation Acts to be
unconstitutional.
In dealing with these appeals we shall follow the sequence of
events and examine the legality and constitutionality of each happening. That would show that the matter lies in a narrower compass than what has been made to appear. We begin with the
prorogation.
The question here is did the Governor possess the power to
prorogue the Legislature and was his action bad merely because
he was making way for the resummoning of the Legislature after
passing an Ordinance under Art. 213( 1 ) exercising the power
(1) "213. Power of Governor to promulgate Ordinances during recess of Legis-
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(1) If at any .time, except when the Legislative Assembly of a State is in session, or where there is a Legislative Council in a State, except . when
both Houses of the Legislature are in session the Governor is satisfied
that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action, he may promulgate such Ordinances as the circumstances appear to him to require :
Provided that the Governor shall not, without ihstructions from
the President, promulgate any such Ordinance if:(a) a Bill containing the same provisions would under this Constitution have required the previous sanction of the President for the introduction thereof into the Legislature ; or
(b) he would have deemed it necessary to reserve a Bill containing
the same provisions for the consideration of the President ; or
(c) an Act of the Legislature of the State containing the same provisions would under the Constitution have been invalid unless, having
been reserved for the consideration of the President, it had received the
assent of the President.
(2) An Ordinance promulgated under this Article shaII have the same force
and effect as an Act of the Legislature of the State assented to by the
Governor, but every such Ordinance :(a) shall be laid before the Legislative Assembly of the State, or
where there is a Legislative Council in the State, before both the Houses,
and shall cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the reassembly of the Legislature, or if before the expiration of that period a·
resolution disapproving it is passed by the Legislative Assembly and agreed
to by the legislative Council, if any, upon the passing of the resolution
or, as the case may be, on the resolution being agreed to by the Council ;
and
(b) may be withdraWn at any time by the Governor.
Explanation-where the Houses of the Legislature of a State having a Legislative Council are summoned to reassemble on different dates, the period
bf six weeks shall be reckoned from the later of those dates for the purposes of this clause.
(3) If and so far as an Ordinance under this article makes any provision which
would not be valid if enacted in an Act of the Legislature of the State
assented to by the Governor, it shall be void :
Provided that, for the purposes of the provisions of this Constitution
relating to the effect of an Act of the Legislature of a State which is repugnant to an Act of Parliament of an existing Jaw with respect to a matter
enumerated in the Concurrent List, an Ordinance promulgated under this
article in pursuance of instructions from the President shall be deemed
to be an Act of the Legislature of the State which has been reserved for
the consideration of the President and assented to by him."
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
488
(1969] J SC.R
under Art. I 09 (1) ? The power under Art. 213 is available to the
Governor when the Assembly is not in session. The position after
the 7th March adjournment of the Assembly was this : The Assembly was in session but it was put in a state of inaction for 2 months
by the adjournment which the Governor had no power to rescind
and the Speaker would apparently not be prepared to recall. Time
was running out and the Budget Session of the Assembly had to
reach a conclusion before March 31. After that date no money
could be drawn from the Consolidated Fund [Art. 266(3)]. The
Governor thus had to act and act quickly to put back the Legislative machinery of the State into life. Only two courses were
open. One was for the Ministers to ask the Speaker under Rule 16
to recall the Assembly which was, perhaps, attempting the impossible. The other was to prorogue the Assembly to get rid of
the adjournment and then to resummon the Assembly. The second
was not only a reasonable solution but the one most properly
adapted to achieve a constitutional result and it was followed.
The action of the Governor may now be considered.
Article 17 4 ( 2) which enables the Governor to prorogue the
Legislature does not indicate any restrictions on this power. Whether a Governor will be justified to do this when the Legislature
is in session and in the midst of its legislative work, is a question
that does not fall for consideration h~re. When that happens the
motives of the Governor may conceivably be questioned on the
ground of an alleged want of good faith and abuse of constitutional
powers. We do not go as far as the learned Judges in In Re
Kalyanam v. Veerabhadrayya (A.LR. 1950 Mad. 243). But that
is not the case here. The bona {ides of the Speaker's ruling adjourning the Assembly for so long as 2 months when the Financial Statement and the budget were on the agenda and tin~e was
running out are more in question than the conduct of the Governor. No mala {ides were attributed to the Governor except to
say that he acted in excess of his powers or in colourable exercise
of them. The power being untrammelled by the Constitution and
an emergency having arisen, the action was perfectly understandable. We shall presently show that the Governor acted not only
properly but in the only constitutional way open to him. There
was thus no abuse of power by him, nor can his motives be des(1) "209.
----
Regulation hy law of procedure in the Legislature of the State in relation to financial busincso;.
The Legislature of a State niay. for the purpose of the timely completion of
financial business, regulate hy law the procedure of. and the conduct of business in. the llnu··e C'r Houses of lhe Legislature of the State in rela1ion lo any
financial matter or to any Bill for the appropriation of moneys out of the
Consolidated Fund of the Stale and if and so far as any provision of any law
so made is iocnnsi.;tent with any rule mac1e hy the Houc;c or either House of
the Legislature of the Stale under clause (I) of article 208 or with any rule or
,;tanding order having: effect in rcla1ion to the Legislature of the Stale under
clause (2) of that article. such provision shall prevail."
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cribed as mala fide ~s has been said by one of the learned Judges
in the judgment under appeal. It is a matter of regret that such a
conclusion was reached without any plea or material.
Much energy was, therefore, spent in this Court and in the High
Court in an attempt to establish that the prorogation came into
effect either on the 18th or the 16th March at the earliest. This
was not accepted by the High Court and in our opinion rightly.
The argument is based upon rule 7 ( 1 ) of the Rules of Procedure
and Conduct of Business in the Punjab Legislative Assembly and
the fact that the notification of the Secretary of the Assembly must
be deemed to' have reached members on the 16th March or thereafter. This requires examination
Article 174(2) which enables the Governor to prorogue the
Legislature does not indicate the manner in which the Governor is
to make known his orders. He could follow the well-established
practice that such orders are ordinarily made known by a public
notification which means no more than that they are notified in
the official Gazette of the State. There was such a notification on
the 11th March and prorogation must be held to have taken effect
from the date of publication. It was not necessary that the order
must reach each and every member individually, before it would
become effective. Rule 7, which is framed under Article 208 of
the Constitution regulates the procedure of the Legislature but is
not intended to add a clause to Art. 174 ( 2) so as to make it
incumbent on the Governor to wait till the Secretary takes his
time and issue the notification (if at all) and informs members.
The words of the seventh rule 'when a session of the Assembly .
is prorogued' indicate that there is a prorogation and the rest of
it is intended for communication of the fact to the public and
conveying the order to the members. The communications is by
notification in the Gazette. The action of the Secretary in sending
copies of the Gazette to the members is merely ministerial. Rule 7
cannot be read as a condition precedent for the efficacy of the
Governor's order provided it was duly notified. It is significant
that while Mr. Chagla based his entire case on Rule 7, Mr. Garg
did not rely on it but questioned the very power to prorogue in
the circumstances of the case. We can understand Mr. Garg's
argument although we do not accept it, but we find it difficult·to
appreciate the stand taken by Mr. Chagla.
We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion (which the High
Court also unanimously entertained) that the prorogation became
H
(1) "7. When a session of the assembly is prorogued the Secretary· shall issue
a notification in respect thereof in the Gazette and inform the Members.
On prorogation aU pending notices subject to the provisions of the Constitution and these Rules shall lapse.".
.
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490
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
( 1969] I S.C.R.
effective on the 11th when the Governor issu.ed a public notification. The means open to the Governor under the Constitution are
'public notification' and 'proclamation'. Article 174 docs not
state what procedure is to be foUowed and rule 7 says that the
Secretary to the Assembly shall notify the order. If the Governor
followed the same procedure no exception can be taken. The argument that only tbc Secretary to the Assembly can notify the
order is to further refine a point already very fine, and ignores
the Business Rules. Under the business Rules, the Chief Secretary deals with all questions relating to the Assembly and the
Council and the Governor in notifying it in the Gazette through
the Chief Secretary was acting under the Business Rules. As a
matter of fact copies of the notification were despatched on the
12th and presumably reached the Secretary of the Assembly and
also the Speaker the same day. We arc bound to take judicial
notice of the prorogation and presume the regularity of these
actions which must be interpreted as far as possible so that the
thing done may be valid rather than invalid. This is not the extreme case, propounded by Mr. Chagla, of a Governor passing
an order and keeping it locked in his drawer. It is significant
that even in England where prorogation used to be through a writ
or writ patent or a commission under the Great Seal of the United
Kingdom read in the House now a proclamation by the Queen
suffices under the Prorogation Act of l 867. Therefore, the Governor's act became a public act after the notification. This was
on the 11th March I 968. We arc also satisfied that there was no
other motive than to set right the constitutional machinery by the
invocation of the powers conferred expressly on the Governor.
After the prorogation there was no further curb on the legislative power of the Governor. The power of legislation by Ordinance is as wid~ as the power of Legislature of the State. Article
213 (2) provides that an ordinance promulgated under that Article
has the same force and effect as an Act of the Legislature of the
State assented to by the Governor except that it must be laid
before the Legislative Assembly of the State and the Legislative
Council (where there is one) and expired after the expiration or
6 weeks or earlier if it is withdrawn by the Governor or disapproved by the Legislature of the State. Counsel argued that the power
of ·the Governor is only to pass a law under the second and third
of the Legislative Lists and not under Art. 209. We se~ .no
force in this submission which is not supported hy any provmon
of the Constitution or authority of this Court. In fact, the powers
of the legislature arc expressly indicated in Art. 209 and the
Governor must therefore possess an equal power unless there be
an expression of intention to the contrary in the Constitution.
There is no such expression of intention and none can be implied
from Arts. 245 and 246 in the face of the special provisions of
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(Hidayatullah, C.J.)
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Art. 213 ( 2) . The Ordinance was therefore, validly enacted
under the power derived from Arts. 209 and 213.
Article 209 is intended to speed financial business in the legislatures so that attempts to filibuster, adjourn or otherwis~ delay
such business may be avoided. If ever there was an occasmn for
the regulation of procedure in the legislature of the State in relati~n
to the financial business by a law under Art. 209, it was this.
The Legislature could not be allowed to hibernate for 2 months
while the financial business languished and the constitutional machinery and democracy itself were wrecked. To suggest that the
President's _rule should have been iniposed instead, it is to suggest
a line of action which a party not in majority would have obviously
preferred but it would have cut at the root of parliamentary government to which our country is fortunately committed. If by
adopting the present course parliamentary government could be
restored there was neither an error of judgment nor a mala fide
exercise of power. There was nothing colourable about it. It
was intended to achieve a definite purpose by using the constitutional power of the Governor. We are therefore quite clear
that the action of prorogation cannot be questioned on any of the
grounds suggested by the respondents .
The resummoning of the Legislature immediately afterwards
was also a step in the right direction. It set up once again the
democratic machinery in the State which had been rudely disturbed
by the action of the Speaker. Knowing that it would ordinarily
take much time to finish the Financial Business, that tinie was
short and attempt would be made to delay matters, the Ordinance
created a law which Art. 209 enables to be enacted for the speedy
disposal of financial business. The matters were, therefore, left
in the hands of the Legislature with the only restriction that the
Legislature would not adjourn except when a House by a majority
desired it. This respected the democratic right of the Legislature
but put down the vagaries of action calculated to delay the business. The measure was eminently healtlly and as it was also legal
the Assembly was bound by the law thus enacted.
Therefore, the next atteinpt was to challenge s. 3 of the Ordinance (see appendix). The learned Chief Justice upheld the
validity of the section but he w;is overruled by his four colleagues.
We are in entire agreement with the view expressed by the Chief
Justice. What is the complaint here ? It is argued that s. 3 of
the Ordinance conflicts with the Rules of Procedure particularly
492
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969) l S.C.R.
Ruic 105 and Art. 189(4)( 1 ). Article 189(4) is a provision of
the Constitution and can never be abrogated by an Ordinance or
even a law passed by the Legislature and so there is no rcpug·
nancy Article 189 ( 4) continued to operate in situations con·
tern plated by it. Ruic I 05 confer two powers, when, on grave
disorder arising in the Assembly, the work cannot be carried on.
One is a power to suspend for a time the sitting of the House and
the other is to adjourn the House. What the Ordinance did was to
put out of actio!:l the power to adjourn the session of the Legislature. The inconsistency between Rule I 05 in so far as it concerned such adjournment was to be resolved in favour of the Ordinance because the latter part of Art. 209 itself provides that in
cases of repugnancy between the rules of procedure framed under
Art. 208 and the law made under Art. 209, the latter provision
shall prevail. Article 209 gave full authority to s. 3 of the Ordinance and it was not ultra vires
It is argued that we cannot read down the provisions of section 3 of the Ordinance to make room for the application of
Art. 189( 4) and Ruic 105 'in regard to quorum and suspension of
business respectively. Reference is made to the case of Diamond
Sugar Mills Ltd. v. U.P. (') where the expression 'local area' was
not read down to make it accord with the Constitution. That case
was concerned with excess of legislative power under an entry.
The general words were read as they were and pointed to an
excessive power being conferred. In Ramesh Thappar v. The
Stare of Madras(') the law offended Fundamental Rights and there
was no escape from the operation of Art. 13 of the Constitution
when there was no room for severability. In Seth Bikhraj Jaipuria v. Union of India(') the capacity to contract was involved
and that case hardly applies. In Kameshwar Prasad and Others
v. The State of Bihar and Another(') there was difficulty in the
way of reading Rule 4-A of the Bihar Government Servants' Conduct Rules 1956 because of its general words and hence the whole
rule was struck down. We can read down section 3 of the Ordinance because the Ordinance could never provide for want of
quorum which is a constitutional requirement. Rule 105 gets out
of the way by the operation cf Art. 209. It depends always on
how far the provision of a law is intended to go. There is a
canon of construction that the language of a statute, even if it is
prima jacie w~dC:, is to be understood as not attempting something
(1) .. 189.
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Voting in Hou~. power of Houses to act notwithstanding vacancies
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and quorum.
(4) If at any iime during~ mccting of the Legi~Jative As_c;e~bly or th~ l.egis.
lative Council of a State there is no quorum, it shall be the duty of 1he
0
Speaker or Chairman, or person acting as such, either to adjourn the
House or to suspend the meeting until there is a quorum."
(I) [1%1) 3 S.C.R. 242.
(3) [1962) 2 S.C.R. 880.
(2) [1950) S.C.R. 594.
(4) [1962) Supp, 3 S.C.R. 359
H
PUNJAB v. SAT PAL (Hidayatullah, C./.)
49~
beyond the competence of the legislative body. In such a. case the
overriding law must have its play. Article 189 ( 4) was outside
the law-making power of the Governor and his Ordinance must
be read to harmonize with it. Similarly, the power of adjournment was curtailed but not the power to suspend business. Even
an adjournment was possible provided the House agreed. We see
no force in the argument that s. 3 is ultra vires.
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The adjournment of the Assembly on 18th March by the
Speaker is next presented as a valid and binding ruling. A word
may be said here about what the Speaker decided. The Speaker
in his ruling of the 18th based himself on the fact that in his
opinion the order proroguing the Assembly on the 11th March was
illegal and void. Therefore the Governor had no power to re~urnmon on the 14th the Assembly which stood adjourned for 2
months under Rule 105. It appears from the proceedings that
the Speaker was of the opinion that the Legislature was prorogued on the 18th and not the 11th. We have shown above that
the Legislature was prorogued not on the 18th but on the 11th
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and the resummoning of the Legislature on the 14th after the
Ordinance was promulgated on the 13th was perfectly valid. His
ruling, therefore, was based on wrong assumption. But can his
ruling be called in question ? Our answer is in the affirmative.
On the 18th the Speake£ was faced by the Ordinance. That Ordinwce, as we have shown above, was a valid law binding on the
Assembly (including the Speiiker) by virtue of Art. 209. The
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Speaker was, therefore, powerless and his adjournment of the·
=sion without taking the mandate of the Assembly by majority
as required by s. 3 of the Ordinance was null and void and of no
effect. The proceedings clearly show that the Speaker himself
was reluctant to adjourn the House till he was prompted by Sardar
Gurnam
Singb. He doubted his own powers. The Speaker did
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not attempt to order a fresh adjournment but only ruled that his
earlier adjournment stood. Whether the Speaker adjourned the
Assembly afresh or declared that the former adjournment continued to operate makes no difference. The former adjournment
hlld come to an end by a valid prorogation and the fresh adjournment was null and void. The House transacted other business
G mowing that the prorogation was considered valid. H this was
ro the session had to continue unless adjourned by the House by
majority.
Reference was made to Rule 112 which says that a point of
order once raised must be decided by the Speaker and his decision
thereon is final. It is thus urged that whatever the merits of the
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Speaker's ruling it must be treated as final. This is a claim which
is unfounded. Points of order can only be raised in relation to
the interpretation and enforcement of the rules and the interpre-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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[ 1969] I S,C.R.
tation of the Articles of the Constitution regulating the business
of the House and the question which is to be decided by the Speaker
must be within his cognizance (Rule 112(1). The finality of the
ruling applies ~ubject to this condition (Rule 112(3). Now the
exact po,int of order concerned the validity of the Ordinance.
The Speaker did not attempt to interpret ArL,. 208, 209 and 213.
He did not confine his ruling to matters within his cognizance.
He asserted himself against a law which was binding on him. If
the Ordinance was to be questioned this was not the method. A
resolution had to be passed under Art. 213 ( 2) (a) disapproving it.
Jn fact he was told that a resolution wa' to be made. Perhaps the
Speaker was not sure that a such resolution would be passed. Democratic process and parliamentary practice demanded that the
Speaker should have waited for a resolution to be moved for the
consideration of the Assembly. If he was at all sure that the majority was in favour of disapproving the Ordinance he would undoubtedly have waited. Not being sure, he proceeded to nullify
the Ordinance by a ruling which he was not competent to give.
Therefore, his ruling was only not final, but utterly null and void
and of no effect.
It is significant that the Deputy Speaker on occupying the
Chair declared on the validity of the Ordinance in words which
may be quoted again :
"Mr. Deputy Speaker :
As the Speaker had adjourned the House, when he
had no authority to do so (Interruptions and Uproar)
under the Ordinance promulgated by the Government,
(sic) any such adjournment ordered by the Speaker, is,
therefore, null and void (Uproar and renewed noi~ in
the House). The House will now resume consideration
of business before it and l now call upon the Chief
Minister to move the motion.
(Uproar and furore in the House)
(At this stage, the Speaker's dais wa' clear and the
Hon. Deputy Speaker occupied the Speaker's Chair at
the dais).
This ruling had more content under Rule 112 than the ruling
previously given. It was also eminently correct. There was no
reason why it should not prevail when the other ruling was null
and void. The Assembly kept sitting since (a' i' quite apparent)
the members too thought that the ruling of the Speaker was to
be ignored. All the proceedings were conducted without demur
even from the opposition. One is tempted to think that the
Speaker was not sure of his own position in a House in which
he had probably lost a sustaining majority. But even if the most
liberal view of the action of the Speaker is taken, one is forced
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to the conclusion that he acted contrary to law and the injunction
of the Constitution that the law made under Art. 209 is to
prevail over the rules of procedure. We regret to record this
conclusion which we would have willingly avoided but for some
arguments advanced on the lines indicated although somewhat
hesitatingly by the counsel r~presenting the· Speaker. Before tall
claims are made which cannot stand against law and the Constitution, those that make them should reasonably be sure that they
are right.
The necessary result of our findings is that the continuance
of the proceedings under the Deputy Speaker was valid complying, as it did with the law promulgated by the Governor.
Each item on the agenda was properly passed and there was no
objection either during the proceedings in the House or in the
argument before us regarding the regularity of the action. We,
therefore, hold that the financial business transacted before the
Assembly had legal foundation.
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This brings us to the last point which is that the certificate of
the Deputy Speaker under Art. 199 was of no effect. That certificate was issued under the fourth clause of that article. The
argument is that the provisions of this clause are mandatory and
only the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly should sign the
Money Bill. To this there are many replies. The Speaker was
not present when the Bills were passed. Under Art. 180(2) ( 1 ) the
Deputy Speaker acts as the Speaker when the Speaker is abSent.
Thus the Deputy Speaker was validly acting as the Speaker of the
Assembly which continued to be in sessiQll. No doubt Art. 199
mentions only the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly but the
question remains still whether the Deputy Speaker could not certify
the Money Bills effectively. Counsel for the answering respondents drew attention to the difference in the langµage of the two
clauses. In the first clause the Deputy Speaker or such m~ber
of the Assembly as the Governor may appoint for the purpose,
performs the duties of the office of_ the Speaker, when the office is
vacant, while in the second the Deputy Speaker merely acts as
Speaker during the absence of the Speaker from a sitting of the
(1) "180. Power of the Deputy Speaker or other person to perform the duties
of the office of or to act as, Speaker.
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(2) During the absence of the Speaker from any sitting of the Assembly tlae
Deputy Speaker or, if he is also absent, such person as n1ay be determined by the rules of procedure of the Assembly, or, if no such person
is present, such other person as may be determined by the Assembly,
shall act as Speaker."
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
( 1969] I S.C.R.
Assembly. They suggest that in the latter case the Deputy Speaker's powers come to an end as soon as the sitting is over and
the mandatory language of Article 199 ( 4) compelled that the
certificate of the Speaker ought to have been obtained.
The short question here is whether the provisions of Art. 199
The distinction between a mandatory provision of law and that which is
merely directory i~ this that in a mandatory provision there i~ an
implied prohibition lo do the act in any other manner while in a
directory provision substantial compliance is considered sufficient.
(4) must be read as imperative or merely directory.
There arc several tests to detcnninc when the provision may
be treated as mandatory and when not and they have been called
•
from books and set down by Subbarao, J. (as he then was) in The
State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Babu Ram Upadhya(') and
earlier by Venkatarama Iyer, I. in State of Bombay v. R. M. D.
Chamarbaugwa/a ('). For our purpose it is necessary to emphasise
only one distinction. In those cases where strict compliance is
indicated to be a condition precedent to the validity of the act
itself, the. neglect to perform it as indicated is fatal. But in
cases where although a public duty is imposed and the manner
of performance is also indicated in imperative language, the provision is usually regarded as merely directory when general injustice or inconvenience results to others and they have no control
over those cxerci~ing the duty.
Judged from this test the provisions of Art. 199(4) cannot be
viewed as mandatory but only as directory. If the Constitution
saw the necessity of providing a Deputy Speaker to act as the
Speak.er during the latter's absence or to perform the office of the
Speak.er when the office of the Speaker is vacant, it stands to
reason that the Constitution could never have reposed a power
of mere certification absolutely in the Speaker and the Speaker
alone. The happenings in the Assembly lend support to this inference. It is reasonable to think that the Speaker in his then
mood might have declined to certify and a second impasse would
have ensued. A similar situation may arise not because of intransigence but because of illness or absence. The inconvenience to
the State and the public at large i~ avoided by holding the provision to be directory and not imperative.
It might be mentioned that this Court has on occasions read
apparently imperative provisions as directory, only. In the case
of State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava(') the provisions of
(I) [196112 S.C.R. 670, 710.
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0) (1958] S.C.R. 533.
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Arts. 311(2) and 320(l)(c) were read as directory notwithstanding the mandatory language. Further it is interesting to note that
the Parliament Act of 1911 in England has an identical provision enjoining certification by the Speaker. However May in kis
'Parliamentary Practice' gives numerous instances of Money Bills
(from 1914 onwards) certified by the Deputy Speaker (see p.
842).
Further again, there is Article 212 clause (1) which provides
that the validity of any proceeding in the Legislature of a State
shall not be called in question on the ground of any alleged irregularity of .procedure. This clause was invoked in respect of a
Money Bill in Patna Zilla Brick Owners Association and others
v. State of Bihar and others(') following a case of this Court in
M/s. Manga/ore Ganesh Bedi Works v. The State of Mysore &
Another( 2 ). We are entitled to rely upon this provision. Our conclusion gets strength from another fact. There is no suggestion
even that the Appropriation Bills were not Money Bills or included any matter other than that provided in Article 199 or
were riot passed by the Assembly. It is also significant that the
Speaker wrote to the Chairman of_ the Legislative Council that
thne was no certificate by him and that he had adjourned the
Assembly when the Bills were adopted but the Legislative Council in spite of objection considered and passed the two Bills and
the Governor asse,nted to them. We are of opinion that the two
Bills were duly certified.
This concludes the whole case and the.events on which it is
based. Mr. Garg contended for a larger issue. He said that the
Legislature should not be at the mercy of the Governor and the
absolute field of action open to the Legislature and the Speaker
would be unreasonably cut down and thus lead to assumption of
absolute powers by Governors. We do not entertain any such
apprehensions. The situation created in the State of Punjab was
unique and was reminiscent of happenings in the age of the Stuarts.
The action of the Governor appears to be dra5tic. It was, however, constitutional and resulted from a desire to set right a
desperate situation. As Bacon once said, no remedies cause so
much pain as those which are efficacious.
For the reasons given above we allow the appeals, set aside
the judgment of the High Court and order the dismissal of the
two petitions with costs.
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V.P.S.
------·--(I) A.l.R. 1963 Pat. 16.
(2) [1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 275.
Appeals allowed.
498
[1969] l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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APPENDIX
"PUNJAB ORDINANCE NO. I OF 1968
2. Definitions.
In this Ordinance : -
(a) "article" means an article of the Constitution oi India;
(2) "Financial busineSS" means any busines.• relating to any of
the financial matter referred to in articles 202 to 206 (both
inclusive) including Bil1s for appropriation of moneys out
of the Consolidated Fund of State.
3. Sitting of either House of Legislature not to be adjourned with·
out consent of that House until completion of financial business.
Notwithst·anding anything contained in any rules made, or rules or
>landing order having effect, under Article 208, when any financial
bl1"ines.• is pending or is to be transacted in a House of the Legislature
of the State of Punjab during any session thereof, then : (a) Until the completion of such business durin~ that se.sion a
sitting of that House shall not be adjourned unle1& a motion
of that effect is p~ by a majority of the members of that
House present and voting;
( b) Any adjournment of that Hou,., in contr3\-cntion of the
provisions of clause (a) shall be null and void and be of
no effect:
(c) The Leader of the House, may, for the timely completion of
the Financial business, moYe a motion specifying the time
within which the consideration of such business shall be
completed and if the motion is adopted (whether with or
without modification) bv a majority of the Members of the
~ House present and voting, consideration of the business shall
be completed within the time spe\:ific<l in the motion as so
adopted and for that purpose, the Rules of Procedure and
Conduct of Business (including the standin.g orders, if any)
relating to that House shall have effect subject to the modifications thereof, if any. specified in the motion. and any
such motion may be moved without giving any prior notice
thereof and shall, unless the majority of the members of the
House present and voting determine otherwise, be taken
into consideration and voted upon on the same day on
which it is moved.
4. Financial -statcm'ents not to lapse.
For the rernoYal of the doubt.• it is herebv declared that if an annual
financial statement has been laid before a House under Article 202 or
a statement sho'Wing the estimated amount of any supplementary or
additional expenditure h:L'i been laid under article 205 such statement
shall not he necessary to relay such statement before the I-louse.
D. C. PAVATE
Governor of Punjab.
Chandigar/1, the 13th March. 1968
JASMER SINGH
Secretary to Government,
Punjab Legislntive Department."
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