MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI versus BIRLA COTTON, SPINNING AND WEAVING MILLS, DELHI AND ANOTHER
Supreme Court of India | Decided 23 February 1968 | [1968] 3 S.C.R. 251 | 1968 INSC 47
Key facts
- Decided
- 23 February 1968
- Bench
- K.N. WANCHOO*, M. HIDAYATULLAH*, J.C. SHAH*, S.M. SIKRI, V. RAMASWAMI, J.M. SHELAT, C.A. VAIDYIALINGAM
- Bench size
- 7
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 1857/1967
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1968] 3 S.C.R. 251
- Neutral citation
- 1968 INSC 47
Text of the judgment
A
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI
v.
ll
c
D
E
F
G
BIRLA COTION, SPINNING AND WEAVING MILLS, DELHI
AND ANOTHER
February 23, 1968
[K. N. WANCHOO, C.J., M. HIDAYATULLAH, J.C. SHAH,
S. M. S!KRI, V. RAMASWAMI, J.M. SHELAT
AND C. A. VAIDIAL!NGAM, JJ.j
Delhi Municipal Corporation Act 66 of 1951 ss. 113 and 150-Powcr
to Corporation under ss. 113(2) and 150 to levy optional taxes subject to
Ce111ral Governmenfs approval-if excessive delegation and therefore ultra
vi:res.
Dtlhi Municipal Corporation (Validation of Electricity Tax) Act 35
of 1966-Wlrether effectively validated levy of tax between July I, 1959
and March 31, 1966.
Constitution of India, Art. 11-Centrcl Governmenfs sanction signed
by Deputy Secretary without the words "By order oJ the President'• or
similar words-Whether deficiency made up by subsequent affidavit sta.tin~
approval given by minister-If Deputy Minister assigned certain work
can give effective approval-or whether matter must go to Cabinet
Minister also.
On February 9, 1959, the appellant Corporation passed a resolution
under section 150(1) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act 66 of 1957
for the levy of certain taxes including a tax on the consumption or sale of
electricity, Under s. 150(2) the Central Government sanctioned the l'!J<
with'effect from July I, 1959 and also modified the rates of tax. The
Corporation resolved on June 24, 19S9 under s. 150(3 )' to determine the
rates sanctioned by the Central Government as the rates at which the tax
would be leviable for the year 1959-60. The respondent challenged the
levy of the tax by a writ petition which was allowed in appeal and it was
held, inter alia, that the Central Government could not modify the rates
but only withhold .or &fant sanction.
Parliament th<'n passed Act 35 of 1966 te> validate the levy of the electricity tax from July I, 1959 to March 31, 1966. On February 17, 1965,
the Corporation passed another resolution under s. 150(1) providing for
the maximum rates fdr the Ievv of tax on electricity and after obtaining
the Central Governmenes sanction, passed a second resolution on Decen1ber 27, 1965, under s. 150(3) fixing the maximum rates as the actual rates.
The respondents filed two writ petitions challenging the levy of tax by the
resolutions of February 17, and December 27, 1965, and the vires of the
Validation Act. The High Court allowed the petitions holding that though
the Validation Act validated the levy and collection of tax from July !.
1959 to March 31. 1960 it did not do so for the period from April I, 1960
to March 31, 1966. It also held that section 150 suffered from the vice
of excessive delegation of legislative power and was therefore ultra virt.~.
The respondent appealed to this Court.
· HELD: (i) (By the Full Court) : The Validation Act 35 of
H
1966
validly levies and imposes tax on consumption Or sale of electricity till
March 31, 1966.
(Per Wanchoo, C. J.. and Shelat, J.) : The High Court was in error
in holding that levy and collection of the tax was not validated for the
252
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1968] 3 S.C.R.
period from April I, 1960 to March 31, 1966 and that the Validation Act
meiely validatc,d the fixation of the rate of tax for that period. When
~cction 2(1) lays down that the rates deducible from the resolution of
June 24, 1959 shall be the actual rates of tax for the entire period from
July l, 1959 to March 31, 1966 it must be understood to sanction the
A
Icvy and collection of tax at the rates· fixed. This is implicit in the word
''actual'' which governs the words 11rates oj the tax". Even if there was
some doubt in the matter from the words of s. 2(1), that doubt is resoJv..
cd by the words of s. 2(2), which lays down that "all taxes on the con ..
sumption or sale of electricity levied or collected or purporting to have
h.::en Jevie<l or collected in pursuance of the resolution referred to in sub-section (I) shllll, for all purposes, be deemed to be, and to have always
beep. validly levied or collected." This clearly shows that the vali<latlo11
was not merely of the rate of tax hut of levy and collection also for the
entire period from July I, 1959 to March 31, 1966, A reading of s. 2(1)
;md s. 2(2) together shows that Parliament not only validated what was
done but also itself impoo>d the rates deducible from the resolution of
June 24. 1959 and authorised the levy and collection thereof for the entire
period from July I. 1959 to March 31. 1966 notwithstanding anything
contained in any judgm~nt, decree or order of any court to the contrary.
ll
c
I:!76 H-278 BJ
(ii) (Per Wanchoo, C.J. and Shelat, J.) : On a consideration of the
various provisions of the Act, it must be held that the power conferred by
section 150 of the Act on the Corporation is not unguided and cannot be
said to amount to excessive delegation. Although the delegation made in
relation to the optional taxes under ss. 113(2) and 150 is wide, there arc
sufficient guidelines, limits, controls or safeguards provided by the legislature in view of the fo11owing: la) The dele.gation has been made to an
elected body respons'blo to ~he people including those who pay the taxes;
1his is an important check on the elected CounciJlors acting unreasonably
and fixing unreasonable rates of taxation; (b) the limit to which the Cor··
poration can tax is cifcun1scribed by the need to .finance the functions,
obligatory or optional, which it has to or mal' un<Nrtakc to perform,
under the Act. It \viii not be. op·~n to the Corporation by the use of taxing
pO\\'Cr to collect more than it needs for the functions it performs; though
the mere tac·t that specific purposes and functions are set out in an itn··
pugnec.i Act may not be conclusive it is one of the factors which should be
taken into account along with oth~r relevant factors; ( c) budget estin1atc:;
J1a'\iC to be adopted each year as laid do,vn in section 109 of the Act; (d)
under section 150(2). the maximum rates fixed by the Corporation have
to be submitted to the Central Go·vcrnment for its sanction; thou11:h there~
forz the legislature may not have provided ttiat the rates of tax shall bo
,ubmitted to it for approval. the fact that they have to he suhmitl·'d to
Governn1ent for approval and the Government in its turn is r-~sponsiblc
to the legislature is a factor \Vhich has to be taken into account when
consid~ring whether the tlelcg:ition by s<:ction 150 of the. Act is- cxc~&sive
or not. [275 B; :!71 D; 272 D; H; 273 E]
D
E
F
G
Furthermore, should the Corporation fix ra 1es v.:hich are unrcasoaablc
it would always be open lo the Courts to strike down such in1post. Kruse
v. Johnson, [1898] 2 Q.B.D. 91; referred to. [274 El
Under certain circums'.ances fixation of rates of taxation can also be
delegated to subordinate authorities v.-·ith prop~r guidance. and !-.UhjC?Ct to
safeguards and limitations.
Pandit Banarsi Dc.s Bhanot v. lhe Stale of Madhya Prad£'.\h, [1959.1
S.C.R. 427; considered.
l·I
MUNL. CORPN. DELHl V. BJRLA. MllLS _
253
·--------~
n
c
D
E
F
G
H
\\'There is a clear distinction between del~gation of power to fix the Z?-te
of a tax like sales tax to- the State Government and delegation of fi-nng
rates of certain taxes for purposes of local taxation. The needs of the
S[ate are unlimited and the purposes for which the State exists are also
urdimited. Ou the other hand, in the case of a municipality, however
large may be the amount required by it for its purposes, it cannot be
unlimited, for the amount that a municipality can spend is limited by
the purposes for which it is created. [268 D-Gl
(Per Hidayatulla!J and Ranzasn:ami; JJ.) : \Vhile the provisions \vbfch
have been characterised as safegUards {wh_ere found necessary) are desirable~ the proper test-ta apply is not the existence of safeguards but \vh.:t!-..cr
lhe I~gislative will to impose ·the tax is adequately expressed so as to bind
those who have to pay the tax. This requires an examination of the poliC"f
and provisions of the Act with a v:cw to determining \vhether the legislative will is fully expressed to invest tho;!- ~Iunicipal Corporation \\.·t:th t::e
po..ver to levy the tax subject, of course, to- a proper procedure beirt~
evolved. [280 D, El
The doctrin·~ that Parliament cannot delegate its po\.\o·ers must be unJt:rstood in a limlted Vlay .. It only means that the legislature must not efface
itself but mus.t give the l·egislative sanction to the imposition of the ta.."t.
and must keep the control in its own hands. There is no specific provision
i~ the Constitution which says that the Parliament cannot delegate to certain specified instrumentalities the power to effectuate its o\vn \\.ill. TLlc
question always is whether the legis!a•ive vrill has been cx~rciscd or not.
Once it is established. that the legislature itself ha3 "·illeJ. that a parti..:clar
thing be done and has merely left the execution of it to a chosen instrumentality (provided that it has not parted. "With its control there can be nQ
question of excessive del~gation.. If the delegate acts contrary to the
v.·ish:s of the legislature, the legislature can undo •.vhat the delegate has_
Jone. Even the courts may be asked to intervene when the Jclcgat\! exceeds its pov.;ers and functions. The observations and theories in Am~rican
case:; cannot be applied in our country without reflection. Even in America
the doctrine is much \Vatered down especially v.·hen it is. a qu:stion of
inves:ing municipalities 'Nith power of such taxation. In the present case~
in addition to prescribing the mode. the legislature has kept a check by
rnaking Government. answcrable to itself. the supervising authority. This
is not a safeguard. hut is ind·ca•ive of the exercise of the legislative will
by the legislature itself. The details of the tax are to be consiJe·rcd by the
supervising authority and if 1he tax is no~ what th~ legio;lature intended
should be imposed. the t:c"< cannot be imposed. [287 B-Gl ·
As local bo<l~es are intended to carry on local self-governm.znt. the
po\\o·er of taxation is a nc~ary adjunct to their other pov.·ers. They
function under the supervision of the Government. This supervi.,ion is
considetcd necessary because ~lunicipal Councillors as a rule are Un\.i.-illing
to tax in 3. manner likely to affect them.selves.. To insis~ that the lt!gislaturc
.<,hould provide for every matter connccl.ed v.ith municipal taxation \YOuld
rr1akc n1unicipalities mere tax collecting departments of Government and
not self-governing bodies wh'ch they are intended to be. [288 E, Fl
(Per Sikri, J.) : Parliament h;.is full power to delegat·: leglsiativc authority to subordinate bodies. This po\.\o'er flO\.VS from A'rt. ::!46 of the Con3titution. The \vord exclusive" in that Article means exclusive of any other
legislature and not exclusive of subordinate body. There is. hov,;ever. one
res.triction in this respect and that is also contained in Art. '.!-1-6. Parliament must pass a law in respect of an item or items of the relevant legislJ.tive list. Negatively, this means that Parliament cannot abdicate its
functions. This was th.! position under the various Government of India
1
•
254
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Acts, and the Constitution has made no
1309 H-310 BJ
(1968] 3 S.C.R.
difference in this respect.
A
.In 3!1-Y event how~ver, in the present case there is adequate guide, or
po~cy, m the expression "purposes of the Act" in s.- 113. The Act has
pomte~ out the objectives or the results to be achieved, and taxation can
be .levied on!Y for .the purpose of achieving the obje.c•ives or the results.
ThIS JS sufficient guidance especially to a self-governing body like the Delhi
Municipal Corporation. It is not necessary to rely on the safeguards to
sustain the delegation under s. 113(2) and s. 150. [310 OJ
B
(Per Shah c.nd Vaidialingam, JI. dissenting) : Section 150(1) of the
Act 66 of 1957 is void as permitting excessive delegation of legislative
authority to the Corporation.
Authority to legisla:e in respect of powers of local bodies may encompass authroity to confer power upon the local bodies to tax within certain
specific fields in the appropriate list. But the power conferred by the
Jegislative entry cannot override the constitutional limitations against abdi.
cation of Jegislative authority. The expression j'power'' therefore does not
include authority to delegate the essential legislative function without
disclosi»g principles, policy, or standard guiding the local bodies in the
exercise of the power. [302 C-D]
The vice of delegation lies not in its capacity for abuse, but in its
delegation beyond permissible limits and contrary to the constitutional
scheme. Undoubtedly delegation of the authority to legislate is always
subject to the rule that action of the delegale which amounts to unreasonable exercise of the powers will be invalid. But that does not alter the
true character of the rule against excessive delegation of legislative authority. It cannot be said that this rule may be departed from on the ground
that the delegate is hedged in by controls or restrictions which will prevent
it from abusing its authority. Safeguards against abuse do not alter the
character of unauthorised delegation of legislative power. They cannot be
a substitJte for the guidance which the constitutional scheme requires
that the Parliament must give to a delegate. As. the validi'y of the constitutional protection cannot ·be judged in the light of what the character.
capacity or the special aptitude of the delegate may be, it cannot also
be adjudged in the light of the provisions made against abuse of power.
c
I>
E
In the present case the Act leaves it to the Corporation by resolution
to define the maximum limits of tax to be levied. the class or classes of
persons, or description or description·s of articles and propert:es to be taxed.
the system of assessment to be adopted and the exemptions, if any, to be
granted. The Act discloses by eXpress enactment no 'Standard, no principle
and no policy laid down by the Parliament to guide the Corporation in
levying and collecting the optional taxes. By providing in sub-section (2)
of s. 150 that the resolution will come into force on or from the date as
may be specified in the order of sanction of the Centr~l Governmel?-t· an
overriding authority is conferred upon the Union Executive, but that is not
G
a substitute for, guidance. [303 C-El
The Corporation is competent to levy tax only "for the purposes of
the Act" and for no other purpose, and by providing expressly what is
implicit i~ a statute relating to municipal taxation no guidanee is furnished
to the Corporation in the exercise of the power delegated. It cannot be
held that because the delegate is a local authority which "needs" large
funds depending upon diverse and changing circumstances, the power
conferred upon the Corporation to adjust the tax to its varying need~ may
be regarded as an adequate guide. The circumstance that the affairs of
H
MUNL. CORPN. DELHI v. BIRLA MILLS (Wanchoo, C.J.) 255 •
..\
the Corporation are administered by the elec!ed representatives responsibleto lhe people is wholly irrelevant in determining whether the rule against
excessive delegation may be departed from. If that excr.ption be tme, the
Parliament may justifiably delegate its power to enact laws to other bodie5
merely by the expedient of constituting those bodies from among the representatives of the people.
Case Jaw r-:viewed.
B
(iii) (Per Wanclwo C.J. and Size/at, J,) : There was no force in the
contenlion that the sanction of the Central Government given under sec-
tion 150(2) was .not in accordance with the Constitution as it was: glven by
a Deputy Secretary to the Government wlio had no authority to do so.
Although the words ""by the orders of the Central Government" or "by
the order of the President" were not used above the signature of the Deputy
c
D
E
F
Secreta'ry and the authentication therefore was not quite in accordance
with the provisions of Art. 77 of the Constitution, that deficiency had been
made up by the affidavit filed on behalf of the Central Government in
which it was stated that the resolution was approved by the then Deputy
Home Minister and the Minister in the Ministry of Home Affairs to whom
1he work relating to the Corporation was assigned by the Home Minister.
Furthermore, i.'. is not necessary \\'here business has been as·signed by a
Cabinet Minister to a Minister or a Deputy Minister that the malt·!r should
he put before the Cabinet Minister also after the Minister or the Deputy
Minist~r has approved of it in accordance, wi_th the assignment made in
his favour. [275 E-276 DJ
CIVIL APPELLATE JuRISD!CTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 1857
and 1858 of 1967.
Appeals from the judgment and order dated October 9,
1967 of the Delhi High Comt in Civil Writ No. 105 of 1967,
and Writ Petition No. 564-D of 1966 respectively.
C. K. D£!phtary, Attorney-General, H. R. Gokhale, D. D.
Chawla and K. Rajendra Chaudhuri, for the appellant (in both
the appeals).
A. K. Sen, B. Parthasarthy, J. B . .,Dadachanji and Ravinder
Narain, for respondent No. 1 (in both the appeals).
R. N. Sachthey, for respondent No. 2 (in both the appeals).
M. K. Nambiyar, D. R. Thadani, Da/ip K. Kapur, Bhuvanesh
Kumari, J. B. Dadachanji and Ravinder Narain, for intervener
No. !.
.
G
N. A. Palkhiva/a, J. B. Dadachanji, and Ravinder Narain,
for in'erveners Nos. 2. 5 and 6.
Purshottam Trikamdas and I. N. Shroff, for intervener No. S-.
S. T. Desai and I. N, Shroff, for intervener No. 4.
H
The Judgment of WANCHOO, C.J. and SHELAT, J, was delivered by WANCHOO, CJ,, HIDAYATULLAH, J. delivered a separate
Judgment on behalf of himself and RAMASWAMI, J., SnrnI, J.
delivered a separate Judgment SHAH, J. delivered a dissenting
opinion on behalf of himself and VAID!ALINGAM, J.
256
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1968] 3 S.C.R.
Wanchoo, C.J. These two appeals on certificates granted
by the High Court of Delhi raise common questions relating to
the constitutionality of delegation of 'taxing powers to municipal
corporations and the effect of the Validation Act, passed by
Parliament, in connection with tax on the consumption or sale
pf electricity levied by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi
(hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) from July 1, 1959
to March 31, 1966. The fac'.s are not in dispute and may be
briefly narrated. On February 9, 1959, the Corporation passec
a molution purporting to be under sub-section (I) of s. 150 or
the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, No. 66 of 1957. (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for levy of three taxes, includini;
a tax on the consumption or sale of electricity. Section 113 ot
the Act which confers powers on the Corporation to impose
taxes has divided them into two kinds, namely, obligatory taxes.
which the Corporation must impose [s. 113(1)], and optiona'.
taxes which the Corporation may impose [section 113(2)].
Fur:her s. 150(1) of the Act provides that maximum rate of la""
to be levied in the case of optional taxes will be specified by ''
resolution of the Corporation. After the maximum rate has 1hu.i
been specified, the resolution. has to be submit'.ed to the Centra:
Government for sanction under s. 150(2), and if sanctioned by
Government, the rate comes in'.o force on and from such dat~
as may be specified in the Order of. sanction. Under subsection ( 3) of s. 150 the Corporation lhen passes another resolu:ion determining the actual rates at which the tax is l.~vied and
the tax comes into force on the first day of the quarter of the
year next following the date on which such second resolutio11
is pa5'ed. The Corporation forwarded the resolution dated February 9. 1959 which was somewhat defect.iv.~ inasmuch as it die
not specify the maximum rates, but merely the rates, which were
to be enforced for the ensuing year, to Government for sanction
On June 20, 1959, the Central Government sanctioned the tax
on consumption or sale of electricity with effect from July I, 1959
In giving the sanction the Central Government modified the rates
On June 23, 1959, the Standing Committee took the Government
sanction into consideration and recommended to the Corporatim'.
that rntes of tax as sanctioned by Government be detenninec
under sub-s. (3) of s. 150 as !he actual rates at which the ta:would be leviable for the year 1959-60. On June 24, 1959, the
Corporation resolved that the recommendations of lhc :>tanding
Committee regarding tax on consumption or sale of ,~Jectricity be
approved. Then followed demands by the Corporation on the
basis of the imposition of tax from July 1, 1959.
When the tax was demanded from the respondent, it filed a
writ petition in the High Court challenging the levy of the tax
This writ petition was dismissed by a learned Single Judge. Th~
A
B
c
0
E
F
G
H
MUNL, CORPN. PELHI v. BIRLA MILLS (Wanchoo, C.J.) ·257
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
respondent then went in appeal, and the appeal court allowed
the appeal holding inter a/ia (i) that the Central Uovernment
could not modify the rate; spedied in the resolution under s. 150
( 1) but could only either withhold sanction thereto or sanction
them, and (ii) that the liability to pay tax could not commence
earlier than April 1, 1960. in view of the provisions contained in
s. 109(2) read withs. 150(4) of the Act.
On December 3, 1966, Parliament passed the Delhi M\!nicipal Corporation (Validation of Electrici'ty Tax) Act, No. 35 of
1%6 (hereinafter referred to as the Validation Act). By :his
Act, it purported to validate the levy of electricity tax from July
I, 1959 to March 31, 1966 (both days inclusive). In view of
the Validation Act, fresh demands were made by the Corporation
on the respondent.
On February 17, 1965, the Corporation passed another resolution in pursuance of s. 150(1) and this time provided maximum
rates for the levy of tax on consumption or sale of electricity.
These rates were higher than the rates fixed by the resolution of
February 9, 1959. This resolution was submitted to Government
and was sanctioned, on December 8, 1965. Thereafter the Corporation passed the second resolution under s. 150(3) of the Act
resolving that the maximum ratei should be adopted as the actual
rates for the levy of tax. This resolution was passed on December 27, 1965. Then followed two writ petitions by the respondent. By the first writ petition it challenged the levy of tax by
resolutions of February 17 and Dec.ember 27, 1965, and by the
second writ petition the appellant challenged the vires of the
Validation Act.
We may now refer to the grounds of the challenge. So far
as the Validation Act is concerned, it is contended that the Validation Ac't has failed in its object inasmuch as it did not provid~
for the levy of tax and merely validated the rates fixed by the
resolution of June 24, 1959. Other grouncjs were also stres•ed in
this connection but it is unnecessary to refer to them as they have
not been pressed before us. As to the aitack on the. resolu~iqns
dated February 17, 1965 and December 27, 1965, the main contention is thats. 150 is unconstitutional inasmuch as it suffers from
the vice of excessive delegation of legislative power and is therefore
ultra vires and no tax could be levied by the Corporation thereunder. There are some other minor points raised in this connection to which we shall refer later.
The High Court held, so far as the Validation Act is concerned, that though it validated the levy and collection of tax
from July I. 1959 to March 31, 1960, it failed to validate the
levy and collection from April 1, 1960 to March 31, 1966 on
258
SuPRBMB COUllT REPORTS
the ground that there was no ·Jevy of tax for this latter period,
even though the rates were specified in the Validation Act. On
the question of excessive delegation, 'the High Court held that
s. 150 suffered from the vice of excessive delegation of legislative power and was therefore ultra vires. In consequence, the
two writ petitions succeeded except as to the period from July
I, 1959 to March 31, 1960. The Corporation then applied for
and obtained certificates and that is how the rna~ter has come up
before us.
Before we deal with the main question that has been argued
before us, namely, whether s. 150 of the Act suffers from the
vice of excessive delegation, we may briefly refer to certain provisions of the Act whiCh are material for our purposes. Section
3 of the Act creates a Corporation from such date as the Central
Government may by notification in the official i:azet•e, appoint
and this Corporation is charged with the municipal government
of Delhi and is to be known as the Municipal Corporation of
Delhi. Section 7 of the Act provides that the persons entitled to
vote at elections of co11ncillors shall be .the persons registered by
virtue of the provisions of the constitution and the Representation of the People Act, No. 43 of 1950, as voters at elections to
the House of t.'1e People. It wilJ be seen therefore that the Councillors of the Corporation are elected by universal adult suffrage.
The total number of councillors is 80 and to these are added 6
eldermen, and they to~ether form the Corporation. Section 42
Jays down certain obligatory functions of the Corporation. It
is not necessary to refer to them in detail; it is enough to say
that the main obligatory functions of the Corporations are .the
supply of water for public and private purposes, the constructlOll,
maintenance and cleansing of drains and drainage works and of
public latrines, the scavenging, removal and disposal of fil!h, the
consiruction or purchase, maintenance, extension, management
and conduct of (i) any undertaking for the generation or supply 11nd distribution of electricity to the public, and (ii) any
undertaking for providing road transport servi~s by mechanicaDy
propelled vehicles, the establishment and maintenance of hospitals, dispensaries and maternity and child welfare ~entres ~nd
carrying out of other measures necessary for public medical
relief, the construction and rnain•enance of municipal markets
and slaughter houses and regulation thereof, the construction,
maintenance, alteration and irn provements of public streets,
bridges, culverts, cau5eways and ihe like, the lighting, watering
and cleansing of public streets and other public places, the
es~ablishment, maintenance of, and aid to, schools for primary
education and the maintenance of a fire-brigade and the protection of life and property in case of fire.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
MUNL. CORPN. DELHI v. BIRLA MILLS (Wanchoo, C.J.)
259
A
Section 43 provides for optional functions of the Corporation
which it may in its discretion prqvide and a large number of such
functions are enumerated therein. Some of these optional func•
tions are : the establishment and maintenance of, and aid to,
libraries, museums, art galleries, boianical or zoological collections, the providing of music or other entertainments in public
B places or places of public resort and the establishment of theatres
and cinemas, the construction and maintenance of (i) rest
houses, (ii) poor houses, (iii) infirmaries, (iv) children's
homes, (v) houses for the deaf and <!umb and for disabled and
handicapped children, (vi) shelters for destitute and disabled
persons, and (vii) ,asylums for persons of unsound mind, the
c organisation or management of chemical or bacteriological
laboratories for the examination or analysis of water, food, and
drugs for the detection· of diseases or research connected with
public health or medical relief; the provision for relief to destitute and disabled persons; the establishment and maintenance of
veterinary hospitals; the organisation, construction, maintenance
D and managenient of swimming pools, public wash houses; bathing places and other institutions designed for the improvement
of public health; the organisation and management of farms and
dairies within or without Delhi for the supply, distribution and
processing of milk and milk products for the benefit of the residents of Delhi; the organisation and management of cottage
industries, handicraft centres and sales emporia; the provision
E for unfiltered water supply; the improvement of Delhi in accordance with improvement schemes approved by the Corporation;
and the provisions of housing accommodation for ·the inhabitants
of any area or for any class of inhabitants.
F
G
H
These duties, both obligatory and optional, which have been
placed on the Coryoration requir~ large funds and for that purpose the Corporation has been given the power to levy taxes
under s. 113 of the Act. Section 113 consists of two sub-sections;
the first suD-sectfon provides for obligatory taxes and they are
six in number. These six taxes have been dealt with in detail in
sections 114 to 149. It is not necessary to refer to these sections except to say generally that in most cases the Act has fixed
a maximum for the obligatory taxes except in the case of water
tax, scavenging tax and ~ tax, the rates of which have to be
fixed. at a reasonable am()unt by the Corporati<>n. Then com~
s. 150, which deals with optional taxes and with which we are
particularly concerned. It reads thus :
"(1) The Corporation may, at a meeting, pass a
resolution for the levy of any <>f the taxes specified in
sub-section (2) 6f secti<>n 113, defining the maximum
rate of the tax to be levied, the class or cla!!Ses of
260
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1968] 3 S.C.R.
persons or the description or descriptions of articles
and properties to be taxed, the system of assessment to
be adopted and the exemptions, if any, to be granted.
(2) Any ~esolution passed under sub-section (1)
shall be submitted to the Central Government for its
sanction, and if sanctioned by that Government shall
come into force on and from sue!\ date as may be
specified in the order of sanction.
(3} After a resolution has come into force under
sub-section ( 2), the Corporation may, subject to the
maximum rate, pass a second resolution determining the actual rates at which the tax shall be leviable;
and the tax shall come into force on the> fi!'St day of the
quarter of the year next following the date on which
such second resolution is passed,
A
B
c
( 4) After a tax has been levied in accordance with
the foregoing provisions of this section, the provisions
of sub-section (2) of section 109, shall apply in relaD
tion to such tax as they apply in relation to any tax
imposed under sub-section ( l) of section 113."
It will be seen that sub-section (1) of s. 150 leaves it to the
Corporation, at a meeting, to pass a resolution for the levy of
any of the optional taxes by prescrib:ng the maximum rate. The
Corporation is also given the power to. fix the class or classes E
of persons or the description or descriptions of articles and
properties to be taxed, for this purpose. It has also the power
to lay down the system of asseisment and exemptions, if any,
to be granted. Th' contention of the respondent is that s. 150
( 1) delegates completely unguided power to the Corporation in
the matter of optional taxes and suffer from the vice of exces- F
sive delegation and is upcopstitutional.
We may also refer. to certain o'.her sections which deal with
revenue and expenditure of the Corporation. Section 99 deals
with the constitution of the municipal fund, in which all moneys
of the Corporation go. Section 109 provides for adoption of
budget estimates. It lays down that the Corporation shall on or G
before the 31st day of March of every year adopt for the ensuing year four budget estimates, namely, (iJ budget estimates
(general), (ii) budget estimate (electric supply), (iii) budget
estima~ (transport) and (iv) budget estimate (water supply
and sewage disposal). Section 109(2) lays down that on or
before the 15th day of February of each year, the Corporation H
shall determine the rates at which various municipal taxes, rates
and cesses shall be levied in the next following year. Section
102 inter alia provides that no payment of any sum out of the
MUNL. CORPN.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
DELHI I". BIRLA MILLS
(Wane/Joo, C.J.)
261
municipal fund shall be made unless the expenditure of the
sume is covered by a current budget-grant.
It is in the light of these provisions that we have 10 consider
whether the delegation made to the Corporation by s. 150 in
the mat!er of imposing optional taxes is within the penuissible
limits of delegation. The contention on behalf of the appellant
is !hat in view of these provisions there is sufficient guidance to
the Corporation in the matter of fixing the rates of optional
taxes and levying them on the inhabitants of the area and it
cannot be sa'd that Parliament by enacting s. 150 transgressed
·
the limits of pennissible delegation.
The question as to the limits of permissible delegation of
legislative power by a legisla'.ure to a subordinate authority has
come before th's Court in a number of cases and the law as laid
down by this Court is not in doubt now. Considering the complexity of modern life it is recognised on all hands that legislature cannot possibly have time to legislate in every minute
detail. That is why it has been recognised that it is open to the
legislature to delegate to subordinate authorities the power to
make ancillary rules for the purpose of carrying out the intention
of the leg:slature indicated in the law which gives power to
frame such ancillary rules. The matter came before this Court
for the first time In re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912( 1 ), and it was
held in tha: case that it could not be sa'd that an unlimited right
of delegation was inherent in. the legislative power itself. Th:s
was not warranted by the provisions of the Cons'.itution. which
vested the power of legislation either in Parliament or Sta'.e
legislatures and the le2itimacy of delegation depended upon its
being used as an ancillary measure which the legislature considered to be necessary for the purpose of exercising its legislative
powers effec'.ive'ly and completely. Tht.: legislature must retain
in its own hands the essential Jeg'slative functiop. Exactly what
constitu1ed
"essential
legislative
function",
it
was
held further, was difficult to define in general tenus, but this
much was clear that the essential legislative function mnst at least
consist of th.~ de'.ermination of the legisiative policy and its
fonnulation as a bind'ng rule. of conduct. Thus where the law
passed by the legislature declares the legislative policy and lays
down '.he standard which is enacted into a rnle of law. it can
leave· the task of subordinate leglslation which by its very nature
is ancillary to the statute to subordinate bodies. i.e., the makin•r
of rules, regulations or bye-laws. The subordinate authority
must do so within the frame-work of the law which makes the
delegafon, and such subordinate legislation has to be consistent
with ~he law under which it is made and cannot go beyond the
(I) [1951] S.C.R. 747.
262
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1968] 3 s.cR
limits of the policy and standard laid down in the Jaw. l'rovidetl A
the legislative policy is emmciated with sufficient clearness or a
standard is laid down, the courts should not interfere with the
discretion that undoubtedly rests with the legislature itself in
determining the ·extent of delegation necessary in a particular
case.
In Raj Narain Singh v. The Chairman Patna Administration B
Committee(') the same question arose and it was held that "an
execuilve authority can be authorised by a statute to modify
either existing or future Jaws but not in any essential feature.
Exactly what constitutes an essential feature cannot be enunciat·
ed in general terms but it is clear that modification cannot in·
elude a change of policy. Essential legisla1ive function consists c
in the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation
as a binding rule of conduct."
In Han'shankar Bag/a v. The State of Madhya Pradesh(').
s. 3, of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946
was attacked as unconstitutional on the ground of excessive
delegation of legislative power. In that case reliance was placed D
on the re in Delhi Law Act(') where the majority held ¢hat
"the essential powers of legislation carmot be delegated and that
the legislature must declare the policy of the law and the legal
principles which are to control any given cases and must provide
a standard to guide the officials or the body empowered to
execU'te the law. Applying these pri11ciples this Court held that
the Act there impugned had laid down the principle and that E
principle was the maintenance or increase in supply of essential
commodities and of securing equitable distribution and availabi·
lity at fair prices. It was further held that this sufficienily fonnu·
lated the legislative policy and the ambit and ·the character of
that Act was such that the details of that policy could only be
worked out by delegating that power to a subordinate authority F
within the frame-work of that policy. The Court therefore held
that s. 3 of the-impugned Act was not ultra vires the legislature
on the ground of excessive delegation of legislative power.
In the Western India Theatres Limited v. Municipal Corpo·
ration of the City of Poona('), a question arose with respect to
the Bombay District Municipal Act, 1901, which gave power to G
the municipality to levy "any other tax to the nature and object
of which the approval of the Governor in Council sha!J haVll been
obtained prior to the selection contemplated in sub-cl. (i) of cl.
( ~) of section 60". This provision was attacked as unconstitu ·
tional on the ground .that the legislature had completely abdicated
its function and delegated essential legislative power to the
municipality to determine the nature of the tax to be imposed
(1) [1955] l S.C.R. 290.
(3) [t95l] S.C.R. 747.
(2) [1955] l S.C.R. 3~0.
(4) [1959) Suppl. 2. S.C.R. 71.
-.
MUNCL. COR.PN... OELHI v. BlllLA MILLS (Wanchoo, C.J.)
263
on the ratepayers and that power was unguided, uncanalised and
vagaranit. The delegation was upheld b.J this Court on the
ground that s. 59 authorised the municipality to impose tax
thereunder for the purposes of the Act. The Act there under
consideration defined tho obligations and functions cast upon
the municipality and it was observed that taxes could only be
B levied for implementing those purposes and not for any other
purpose. It was finally observed that the impugned section did
lay down the procedure which the municipality had to follow in
imposing a tax and the legislature could not in the circumstances
be said to have .abdicated Its function in favour of the municipality.
A
c
D
Jn Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf) Lal Kuan v. Union of
India('), this Court struck down one provision of the impugned
Act as the legislature had established no critedon or standard
and had not prescribed any princ'ple on which the particular
disease or condition was to be specified. It .will be seen that the
same principle that the legislature could not delegate unguided
power to a subordinate body was the basis of this decision.
Jn Vasant/al Maganbhai Sanjanwal v. The State of
bay('), the question of delegation of legislative power
This Court .enunciated the principle thus :
F
G
H
Bom•
arose.
1 "Although the power of delegation is a CO!!Stituent
element of the legislative power, it is well-settled that
a legislature cannot delegate its essential legislative
function in any case and before it can delegate any
subs!diary or ancillary powers to a delegate of its
choice, it must lay down the legislative policy and
principle so as to afford the delegate proper guidance
in implementing the same. A statute challenged on
the ground of excessive delegation must therefore be
subjected to two tests, ( i) whether it delegates essential ·legislative function or power and (2). whether the
leg'slature has enunciated its policy and principle for
the guidance of the delegate."
In Jyoti Pershad v. The Administrator for the Union Terri•
tory of Delhi('), in connection with the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956, it was observed that "so long
as the legislature indicated in the operative prov'sions of the
sta"ute with certainty, the policy and purpose of the enactment,
the mere fact that •he legislation was skeletal or that very detail
of the applicaion of Jaw to a particular case, was not laid down in
· tn 119601 2 s c.R. 671.
(1) 11962] 2 S C.R.
L6Sup.C.l/6~
m.
12> [19611 1 s.c.R. 341.
264
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1968) 3 S.C.R.
the enactment itself or the fact that a discretion was left to those
entrusted with administering the law, afforded no basis either for
the contention that there had been an excessive delegation of
legislative power so as to amount to an abdication of its functions, or that the discretion vested was uncanalised and unguided
so as to amount to a carte blanche to discriminate."
A
B
The last case to which reference may be made is Devi Das
Gopal Krishnan v. State of Punjab('). There the law on the
subject of excessive delegation on was summarised thus at p. 1901:
"The Constitution confers a power and imposes a
duty on the legislature to make laws. The essential
legislative function is the determination of the legislative
policy and its formulation as a rule of conduct. Obviously it cannot abdicate its functiom in favour of
another. But in view of the multifarious ac'.ivities of a
welfare State, it cannot presumably work out all the
details to suit the varying aspects of a complex situation. It must necessarily delegate the working out of
details to the executive or any other agency. But there is
danger inherent in such a process of delegation. An
over-burdened lesislature or one controlled by a powerful executive may unduly overstep the limMs of delegation. It may not Jay down any policy at all; it may declare its policy in vague and general te'111s; it may not set
down any standard for the guidance of the executive;
it may confer an arbitrary power on the executive to
change or modify the policy lrua down l>y it without
reserving for itself any control over subordinate legislation. This self effacement of legislative power in favour
of another agency either in whole or in part is beyond
the permissible limits of delegation. It is for a Court
to hold on a fair, generous and liberal construction of
an impugned statute whether the legislature exceeded
such limits. But the said liberal construction should not
be carried by the Courts to the extent of always trying
to discover a dormant or latent legislative policy to
sustain an arbitrary ·power conferred on executive
authorities. It is the duty of the Court to strike down
without any hesitation any arbitrary power conferred on
the executive by the legislature."
It may be added that Devi Das's(') case did not differ from
the Liberty Cinema(') case. What was held there was that there
(I) A.l.R. [1967] S.C. 1895.
(2} (1965] 2 S.C.R. 477.
c
D
E
F
G
B
MUNCL. CORPN., DELHI v. BIRLA MILLS ( Wanchoo, CJ.)
A
B
D
E
F
G
H
265
can be no general principle that merely the needs of the delegate
can necessarily and always be a guideline. It was further held
that each statute has to be examined to find out whether there are
guidelines the1ein which prevent delegation from being excessive.
It is in the light of these general principles which are wellsettled that the constitutionality of the delegation in s. 150 has to
be considered. However, as we are particularly concerned with
the fixation of rates of a tax, we may refer to certain cases which
deal with th:s aspect of the 1matter. In Pandi~ Banarsi Das
Bhanot v. The State of Madhya Pradesh('), this Court observed
as follows : "Now the authorities are clear that it is not unconstitutional for the legislature to leave it to the executive to determine details relating to the working of
taxation laws, such as the selection of persons on whom
the tax is to be laid, the rates at which it is to be charged
in respect of different classes of goods, and the like."
The appellant relies on this observation to show that the
delegation in s. 150 of the Act cannot be said to be excessive as
1he rates of tax cannot be said to be an essential feature of the
law relating to taxation. On the other hand, Jearned1 counsel for
the respondent cont.ends that this observation is much too wide if
it means that it is open to the legislature to delegate without any
guidance whatsoever the power to fix the rate of tax. In particular, it is urged on behalf of the respondents that the cases which
have been referred to in support of this conclusion in Pt. Banarsi
Das case(') do not support the proposition laid down there if it
is to be read as giving unqualified power to fix the rate without
any guidance, control or safeguard. With respect, it seems to us
that if this observation means that it is open to the legislature to
del.egate the power to fix the rate of tax · to another authority
without any qualification, guidance, control or safeguard, it ts
too widely stated and does not appear to be supported by the
authorities on which it is based, though those authorities do Indicate that in certain cases it is open to the legislature to give power
to another authority to fix rates under proper guidance, contrbl
and safeguard. Take the case_of Powell v. Apollo Candle Company Limited("). In that case s. 133 of tlle Customs Regulation Act of 1879 of New South Wales was under attack. That
section ran thus :
"Whenever any article of merchandise then unknown to the collector is imported, which, in the
opinion of the collector or the commissioners, ts apparently a substitute for any known dutiable article, or is
(I) [1959) S.C.R. 427.
(2) L.R. (1885) X A.C. 282.
266
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1968] 3 S.C.R.
A
~pp~rently designed. to evade ~uty, but possesses properties 1n the whole or ill part which can be used or were intended to be applied for a similar purpose as such dutiable article, it shall be lawful for the Governor to
direct that a duty be levied on such article at a rate to
be fixed in proportion to the degree in which such unknown article approximates in its qualities or uses to
B
such dutiable article; and such rate thus fixed shall be
published in a Treasury order in the Gazette, and one
other newspaper published in Sydney, and exhibited in
the long room or other public place in the Custom
House, and a copy of all such Treasury orders shall,
without unnecessary delay, be laid before both Houses
c
of Parliament."
A bare perusal of the section shows that though the power
was delegated to the Governor to levy the duties, it gave complete
guidance to him in the manner of fixing the rate of duty and finally
provided that the order passed by the Governor would be laid
Jiefore both Houses of- Parliament without unnecessary delay.
The observations of the Privy Council in that case have in our D
opinion to be read in the context of the words of s. 133 where
full guidance was provided as to the fixation of the rate.
In J. W. Hampton v. United States('), the Congress gave
power to the President to make changes in the rates ptovided in
the Tariff Act of 1922. That was challenged as a forbidden
<!elegation of legislative power to executive. authority. But the E
challenge was negatived by the Supreme Court of the United
States on the ground that the Congress had laid down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person authorised to
fix the rate of customs duties on imported merchandise was to
conform. In that case the President could vary the rates with the
aid of his advisers after proper investigation on the ground of F
differences of cost of production in the United States and abroad
l\Ild to make, such increases and decreases in rates of duty as were
found .neces8ary to equalise the· cost of production. The limit
of such change was also fixed upto 50 per centum of the rates
specified in the law. This case does not support the proposition
that rates of tax can be delegated to a subord!nate authorl!y G
withou! any guidance, though it is an authority for the proposition that this can be done if guidance is given for the purpose.
The observation in Banarsl Das's case(') tha! rates of tax are not
essential features of legislation therefore seems, with respect, to be
too broadly sta'ed, though it may be admitted that rates of taxation also can in certain circumstances be delegated to a subordi·
nate author'ty with proper guidance and subjeot to safeguards H
and limitations in that behalf.
(2) (1959) S.C.R. 427.
(I} 72 l;>.w Ed. 624 : 276 U.S. 624.
MUNCL. CORPN., DELIU v. BIRLA MILLS (Wanchoo, C.l.)
A
267
The next case to which referenee may be made is Corporation
of Calcutta and Another v. The Liberty Cinema( 1 ) where the
majority upheld the fixation of a tax on cinema shows, even
though the Calcutta Municipal Act of 1951 prescribed no limits
to which the tax could go. In that case the majority referred to
the view taken in Pandit Banarasi Das's case(') and inteipreted
B the dictum in that case to mean :that the fixation of rate can be
left to a non-legislative body but this was qualified by the observation that when the power to fix the rate of trut was reft to another
body, the legislatum must provide guidance for such fixation. Tu
that case the maP.fity found guidance in various provisions of
the statute to which it is not necessary to refer, though the
c minority was of the opinion that there was no guidance therein.
The question again arose in Municipal Board, Hapur v.
Raghuvendra Kripal('). There the U.P. Municipalities Act No. 2
of 1916, gave power to the municipality to fix rates of trut and
provided an elaborate procedure for doing so and also provided
for sanction of Government. But one provision of that statute
D raised a conclusive presumption that the procedure prescribed
had- been gone through on a certain notification being issued by
Government and the question arose whether by reason of such
conclusive presumption there was not a delegation of essential
legislative function. In that case the majority while dealing with
the question of excessive delegmion observed that the taxes in
E question were local taxes for local needs for which local enquiries
_had to be made and so they were left to the representatives of the
local population which would bear the tax. It was further observed that such taxes must vary from town to town, from one
Board to another, and from one commodity to another. Regard
being had to the democratic set-up of the municipalities which
need
the proceeds of these taxes for their own administration, (it
F
was observed) it was proper to leave to these municipalities the
power to impose and collect those truces, which were pre-determined along with a procedure for consulting the wishes of the
people concerned. -Over and above that there was power given te
the State Government to check their action. In those circwnstances delegation as to the fixing of rate of tax to the Municipal
0
Board was upheld as permissible delegation. The minority judgment also accepted these propositions and observed that though
generally speaking, the rate of tax was one of the essentials of
taxing power given to the legislature, it must be recognised that
there might be situations where the legislature might delegate to
a subordinate authority that power under proper safeguards. It
was also observed that in the matter of local taxation, like taxation
H
by municipal boards, district boards and bodies of that character,
:a
(l) [1%5) 2 S.C.R. 477.
(2) [ 1959] S.C.R. 427.
(3) [1966] 2 S.C.R. 950.
268
SUPREMB COURT RBPOllTS
(1968] 3 S.CR.
" the fixation of the
there was pre-eminently a case for delegating
rate of tax to the local body, the reason for this being that problems of different municipalities might be different and one municipality might require one kind of tax at a particular rate at a
particular time while another municipality might need another kind
of tax at another rate at some other time. It was further observed
that "the legislature can in the case of taxation by local bodies
delegate even the authority to fix the rate to the local body provided it has taken care ro specify the safeguards for the purpose."
The difference between the majority and the minority only was
that the majority thought that the conclusive presumption raised
by' one of the provision was valid while the minority thought that
by reason of the conclusive presumption all the safeguards were
wiped 'OUt at one stroke and therefore it became a case of excessive
delegation.
A
B
c
The last case to which reference may be made is Devi Das
Gopal Krish11an( 1 ). This was not a case of municipal taxation.
In this case the legislature gav(;l power to the State Government
to fix sales tax at. such rates as the State Government thought fit.
The case of Liberty Cinema(•) was distinguished in this case and
it was pointed out that the needs of the S'ate and the purposes of
the Act could not give sufficient guidance for the purpose of fixing
rate of sales tax by the State Government. There is in our opinion
a clear distinction between delegation of fixing the rate of tax like
sales tax to the State Government and delegation of fixing rates
of certain taxes for purposes of local taxation. The needs of the
State are unlimited and the purposes for which the State exists
are also unlimited. The result of making delegation of a tax like
sales tax to the State Governmem means a power to fix the tax
without any limit even if the Meds and purposes of the State _are
~o be taken into account. On the other hand, in the case of a
municipality, however large may be the amount 'required by it
for its purposes it cannot be u11rimited, for the amount that a
municipality can spend is limited by the purposes for which it is
created. A municipality cannot spend anything for any purposes
other than those specified in the Act which creates it. Therefore
in the case of a municipal body, however large may be its needs,
there is a limit to those needs in view of the provisions of the Act
creating it. In such circumstances there is a ~!ear distinction
between delegating a power to fix rates of tax, like the sales tax,
to ¢be State Government and delegating a power to fix certain
local taxes for local needs to a municipal body.
A review of these authorities therefore leads to the conclusion
that so far as this Court is concerned the principle is well estab(1} A.J.R. 1967 S.C. 1895.
(2) [1965] 2 S.C.R. 477.
D
E
F
G
H
>- '. \.
l
:
\< .MUNCL. CORPN., DELHI v. BIRLA MILLS (Wanchoo, C.I.)
.
\ -
;~~
"I
lished that essential legislative functioo consists of the deteimination of the legislative policy and its formulation as a binding
rule of conduct and cannot. be delegated by the legislature. Nor
is there any unlimited right of delegation inherent in the legislative
. power itself. This is not warranted by the provisions of the Con-·
sti!ution. The legisjature must retain in its own hands the essential
B ·legislative functions and what can be delegated is the task of
subordinate legislation necessary for implementing the purposes
and objects of the Act. Where !he legislative policy is enunciated
with sufficient clearness or a standard is laid down, the courts
should not interfere. What guidance should be given and to what
extent and whether guidance has been given in a particular case
at all depends on a consideration of the provisions of the particuc lar Act with which the Court has to deal including' its preamble.
Further it appears to us that the nature ·of the· body to which
delegation is made is also a factor to be taken into consideration ·
in determining whether there is suffiicent guidance in the matter
of delegation. · ·
··
·
, What form the guidance should take is again a matter which
.cannot be stated in general tenll.s. _It will depend upon the circumstances of each statute under consideration; in some cases
guidance in broad general terms may be enough; in other cases
more detailed guidance may be necessary. As we are· <:On. cemed in the present case .with the field of taxation; let us
)ook at the nature of guidance necessary in this field. The guidE ance. may_ take the form of providing maximum rates of tali: upto
which a local body may be given the discretion to make its choice,
cir it may take the. form of providing for consultation with the
. people of the local aq:a and then fixing the rates after such consultation. It may also take the form of subjecting the rate to be
fixed by the local body to the approval of Government which acts
F · as a watch-dog on the actions of the local body in this matter on
. behalf of the legislature, There may be. other ways in which
guidance may be provided. But the purpose of guidance, what.
soever may be the manner thereof, is to see that the local body
fixes a reasonable rate of taxation for the local area concerned.
So long as the legislature has made provision to achieve that
G reasonable rates of taxa!ion are fixed by local bodies, whatever
may be the method employed. for this purpose-provided it is
effective-, it may be said that there is guid:yice for the purpose
of fixation of rates of taxation. The reasonableness of rates may ·
oo ensured by fixing a maximum beyond which the local bodies
inay not go. It may be ensured by. providing safeguards laying ,
down the procedure for consulting the wishes of the local inhabiH
tants. It may consist in the supervision by Government of the
rate of taxation by local bodies. So long as the law has provided
a method by which the local body can be controlled and there is
D
i ,
'
-
•
269
270
SUPRBMB COUllT llBPOll.TS
[1968] 3 S.C.R.
provision to see that reasonable rates are fixed, it can be said thi!!
there is guidance in the matter of fixing rates for local taxation.
As we have already said there is pre-eminently a case for delegating the fixation of rates of tax to the local body and so long as the
legislature has provided a method for seeing that rates fixed are
reasonable, be it in one fonu or another, it may be said that there
is guidance for fixing rates of taxation and the power assigned to
the local body for fixing the rates is not uncontrolled and uncanalised. It is on the basis of these principles that we have to consider the Act with which we are concerned.
We may, before we consider the provisions of the Act, refer
to the position prevaleDt in the United States of America so far
as local taxation is concerned. Even though the doctrine of
sq>aration of powers prevails in that country, it is recognised there
that delegation of power to local authorities for fixing rates of
taxes for local purposes does not amount to excessive delegation
by the legislature. This conclusion has been reached there on
the basis of historical facts. Whenever a municipal· corporation
is created, and is charge4 with carrying on certain specified functions, it is necessary to provide it with funds, for otherwise it
cannot carry on the purposes for which it has been created. Thi:
funds may be provided as grants; but the general pattern hlis
always been that power of local taxation is vested in a municipal
body as an essential attribute for all the purposes of its existence.
Thus in the United S~ates of America, even though the power of
taxation belongs exclusively to the legislative branch of the
Government, it may be delegated by the legislature to municipal
corporations : [See United States v. City of New Orleans(')] .
.Though delegation as to municipal taxation is held to be !?fr·
missible under the U. S. Constitution, it is so because of histoncal
reasons peculiar to that country. The American example may
not be an apt analogy bu~ the history of municipal Acts in our
country indicates tha.t for nearly a century or more power of taxation has been delegated to municipal bodies. In some Acts aU
taxes delegated to the municipiil bodies are compulsory; in o'.her
Acts all taxes so delegated are optional: (see U.P. Municipalities
Act). In some cases some taxes are compulsory and some taxes
are optional as is the case in the present Act. In some cases
maximum limits are provided for some taxes and not for others;
in some ·cases no maximum is provided, though there are restric,.
lions and safeguards within which the municipal bodies must act.
In all cases however, there has been a large area of delegation
of taxing power for local purposes to local bodies subject to con·
tr61 by Government or to such other procedural safeguards as the
legislature considers necesiary in the matter of imposition of
(I) 25 1. Ed. 225.
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
MUNCL. CORPN., DELHI v. BIRLA MILLS (Wa11choo, C.J.)
271
taxes. According to our history also there is a wide area of
delegation in the matter of imposition of taxes to local bodies subject to controls and safeguards of various kinds which partake of
the nature of guidance in the matter of fixing rates for locali taxation. It is in this historical background that we have to examine
'die provisions of the Act impugned before us.
B
c
We have already set out. s. 150 of the Act which delegates
power to the Corporation to levy any of the optional taxes at such
rates as it thinks fit and further gives power to it to specify persons,
and articles and properties on which tax will be levied and the
system of assessment to be adopted and exemptions if any to be
granted. The delegation thus made is certainly wide and the
question is whether there is any guidance in the form already
indicated to the Corporation in carrying out the duti.es imposed
upon it under s. 150 of the Act.
The first circumstance which must be taken into account in
this connection is that the delegation has been made to an electD ed body responsible to the people including those who pay taxes.
The councillors have to go for elec!ion every four years. This
means that if they have behaved unreasonably and the inhabitants
of the area so consider it they can be thrown out at the ensuing
elections. This is in our opinion a great check on the elected
councillors acting unreasonably and fixing unreasonable ralei of
taxation. This is a democratic method of bringing to book the
E elected representatives who act unreasonably in such matters. It
ii however urged that s. 490 of the Act provides for the superie<>sion of the Corporation in case it is not competent to perfonn
or persistently makes default in the perfo_ ,.lance of the duties
imposed upon it by or under the Act or a._,y other law or exceeds
or abuses its power. In such a case the elected body may be
F superseded and all powers and duties conferred and imposed upon
the Corporation shall be exercised and performed by such officer
or authority as the Central Government may provide in this behalf.
It is urged that when this happens the power of taxation goes in
the hands of some officer or authority appointed by Government
who is not accountable to the local electorate and who may exerG cise all the powers of taxation conferred on the elected Corporation by the Act. This however has not happened in the present
case and we nel'..d not express any opinion on the question whether
such officer or authority would be competent to increase the rates
of taxes already fixed when the Corporation is superseded or can
impose new taxes which were not there at the time of supersession. That is a matter which may have .to be considered when
H such a situation arises; but so long as the power of taxation conferred by s. 150 is exercised by the elected body there will always
be a check in the form of the members thereof having to face the
272
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1968 j 3 S.C.R.
elect.orate after every four years with lhe liability of being thrown
out 1f they act unreasonably. This check which is inherent in an
elected municipal body, must enter into the verdict whether the
delegation to such a body, even though it is wide in extent, can
be .upheld on the basis that this is a method of controlling the
actions of the elected body and setting a limit to which it can go
in the matter of taxation, even though no maximum as such is provided in the Act.
A
B
Another guide or control on the limit of taxation is to be found
in th~ pul'Jloses of the Act. The Corporation has been assigned
~erta1n obligatory functions which it must perform and for which
1t must find money by taxation. It has also been assigned certain
discretionary functions. If it undertakes any of them it must fin<\- C
money. Even though the money that has to be found may be
large, it is not, as we have already indicated, unlimited for it must
be only for .the discharge of functions whether obligatory or
optional assigned to the Corporation. The limit to which the
Corporation can tax is therefore circumscribed by the need to
finance the functions, obligatory or optional which it has to or D
may undertake to perfonn. It will be not open to the Corporation by the use of taxing power to collect more than it needs for
the functions it performs. It cannot, for example, raise the rate
of taxation to such an extent, as to provide a surplus which is
much more than what it needs for its existence in carrying out the
functions assigned to it, subject to its having the minimum cash E
balance of Rs. 4,00,000 as provided in the Act at the end of a
year. This is in our opinion another check which will guide the
Corporation in fixing its rates of tax under s. 150 after taking into
account the yield from obligatory taxes. Though the mere fact
that specific purposes and functions are set oµt in an impugned
Act may not be conclusive--it is one of the factors which should
be taken into account along with other relevant factors. It cannot therefore be said that there is no guidance to the Corporation
ii) the matter of fixing rates of optional. taxes, though it must be
admitted that a large d'scretion is left to it in thts behalf. Even
so there are limits to which the Corporation can go in fixing these
taxes and .those limits fke the maximum fixed for obligatory taxes
G
are the guidelines within which the taxing power of the Corporation with respect to optional taxes must be exercised. This power
is exercised by the Corporation after debate by the elected represen•atives of the local area which the Corporation administers. In
such circumstances we think that there is a limit and guidelines
provided by the Act beyond which the Corpora!ion cannot go.
Another limit and guideline is provided by the necessity of
adopting budget estimate~ each year as laid down in s. 109 of
the Act. That section provides for division of the budget of the
H
I
MUNCL. CORPN., DELHI v. B!RLA MILLS (Wane/zoo, C.J.)
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
273
Corpora:tion into four parts i.e., general, electricity supply, transport, water and sewage disposal. The budget will show the revenue
and expenditure and these must balance so that the limit of taxation cannot exceed the needs of the Corporation as shown in the
budget to be prepared under the provisions of the Act. These four
budgets are prepared by four Standing Committees of the Corporation and are presented to the Corporation where they are adopted after debate by the elected representatives of the local area.
Preparation.of budget estimates and their approval by the Corporation is therefore another limit and guideline within which the
power of taxation has to be exercised. Even though the needs
may be large, we have already indicated that they cannot be unlim!ted in the case of the Corporation, for its functions both obligatory and optional are well defined under the Act. Here again
there is a limit to which the taxing power o.f the Corporation can
be exercised in the matter of optional taxes as well, even though
·there is no maximum fixed as such in the Act.
Then there is the provision in s. 150 itself which says that the
maximum rates fixed by the Corporation at its meeting by a
resolution have to be submitted to the Govermnent for its sanction
and without such sanction there can be no imposition of tax. As
we have already stated the legislature has made Government the
watch-dog to control the actions of the Corporatio11 in the matter
of fixing rates and other incidents of the taxes and that is also a
check to see tha! reasonable rates are fixed by the. Corporation
when it proceeds to impose taxes under s. 150. · We have a parliamentary system of government in which the Government is
responsible to the legislature. That is also a circumstance which
may be taken into account in cons'dering the check imposed by
the Act upon the taxing power of the Corporation, namely, that
the rates fixed by it have to be sanctioned by Government which
in its turn is responsible to Parliament. Though therefore the
legislature may not have provided that the rates of tax shall be
submitted to it for approval. the fact that it has provided that such
ra.tes shall be submitted to Government for approval and the
Government in its turn is respomible to the legislature is a factor
which has to be taken into account when considering whether the
delegation by s. 150 of the Act is excessive or not. It stands to
reason that Government which is responsible to the legislature
would act with care and circumspection when exercising its function as the watch-dog on behalf of the legislature on the taxing
power Conferred by the legislature on the Corporation. Under
these circumstances we do not think that it can be said that there
are no guidelines, limits, controls or safeguards urovided by the
legislature in the matter of the exercise of the power of taxation
under s. 150 of the Act by the Corporation. The legislature cannot in the circumstances be said to have abdicated its power for
274
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1968] 3 S.C.R..
it has indicated the taxes which the Corporation caq, impose. The
Corporation cannot go beyond the taxes the imposition of which
has been entrusted to it by the legislature. In .the case of obligatory taxes, the legislature itself has provided the maximum in some
cases or the fixation of reasonable rates in other cases like water,
tax, scavenging tax or fire tax. In the case of optional taxes, however, greater freedom has been left to the Corporation to arrange
its budgets and fix rates of taxation; but this freedom is circumscribed and guided and controlled under the various provisions qi.
the Act which we have already referred to and· which must be
taken to limit the taxing power of the Corporation even though no
~pecific maximum has been fixed in the Act for optional taxes.
It seems to us therefore that considering that the power is entrusted to the elected representatives of the local area who are
liable to go for election before the local electorate every four
yearn, the nature of guide given by the Act is sufficient for the
purpose of keeping the Corporation within limits. In such circumstances, considering the constitution and set up of the municipal corporation, its need for finance to carry out the functions
entrusted to it, its elective character, its responsibility to the
electors, the safeguards and controls provided in the Act, procedural and otherwise,.it is difficult to hold that the power of taxation conferred on it is either uncanalised, arbitrary or without
guidance or policy.
Finally there is another check on the power of the Corporation which is inherent in the matter of exercise of power by sub.ordinate public representative bodies, such as municipal boards.
In such cases if the act of such a body in the exercise of the power
conferred on it by the Jaw is unreasonable, the courts can hold that
such exercise is void for unreasonableness. This principle w8$
laid down as far back as 1898 in Kruse v. Johnson(') in connection with a bye-law made by a county council. In that case the
county council made a certain bye-law and its validity was challenged on the ground that it was unreasonable. The Court held
that a bye-law could be struck down on the ground of unreason;.ableness _but took pains to point out that in determining the validity
of a bye-law made by a public representative body, such as a
county council, the court ought to be slow to hold that the byelaw was void for unreasonableness. The Court further held that
"a bye-law so made out ought to be supported unless it is manifestly partial and unequal in its operation between different classes, or
unjust, or made in bad faith, or clearly involving an unjustifiable
interlerence with the liberty of those subject to it." The same
principle would apply to the fixation of rates of taxation and if per
oehance the Corporation fixes rates which are unreasonable, there
(l) [1898] 2 Q.B.D. 91.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
J.IUNCL. CORPN., DELHI v. BIRLA MILLS (Wanchoo, C.l.)
A
is control in the court to strike down such
275.
an unreasonable,
impost.
On a careful consideration therefore of the various provisions.
of the Act, we must hold that the power conferred by s. 150 of
the Act on the Corporation is not unguided in the circumstances.
B
C
D
E
F
G
8
and cannot be said ti> amount io excessive delegation.
This brings us to two minor points raised before us. It ls
urged that the tax was imposed on the production of electricity
and not on consumption as required by the Act and as provided
in item 53, List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.
We cannot accept this contention. The resolution which was
passed on February 9, 1959, shows that the tax was imposed
inter alia on the consumption of electricity by a person generating
it for his own consump1ion. The words used in the resolution
are somewhat inapt but the meaning in our opinion is quite clear,
namely that a tax at the rate of 5 n.p. per KWHR is imposed on
the consumption of electricity on a person generating it for his
own consumption. The tax is thus on the consumption of electricity where it is generated by a person for his own consumption
·
and not on the production of electricity.
Then .it is urged that the sanction by Government was not in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and that in this
case the sanction was given by the Deputy Secretary to Govemment who obviously had no authority to do so. We are of opin:on
that there is no force in this contention. The order conveying
sanction specifically says that "the Central Government hereby
sanctions the resolution passed by the Municipal Corporation of
Delhi under sub-section (1) of sec!ion 150." It ·s true that the
order is signed by the Deputy Secretary but that does not mean
that it was the Deputy Secretary who sanctioned the rates. It is
also true· that the words "by the order of the Central Government"
or "by the order of the Pre·ident" are not there above the signature of the Deputy Secretary and the authenfcation therefore is
no'. quite in accordance with the provisions of Art. 77 of the
Constitution; but that deficiency has been made up by the affidavit
filed on behalf of the Central Govemmen'. in wb' ch it is stated
that the resolution was approved by the then Deputy Home Minis~er and the Minister in the Ministry of Home Affairs to whom
the work relat'ng to the Corporation was assigned by the Home
Minister. Reliance in this connection was placed on the Gov-;
ernment of India (Allocation of Business) Rules. 1961, pai<ed
on January 14, 1961 to the effect tha• "in relafon to the bus:ness
allotted to a Minister, another Minis'er or Deputy Minister may
be associated to ~orm such functions as may be assigned to him."
That in our opinion clearly means that a Cabinet Minister may
276
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1968] 3 S.C.R.
be assisted in the performance of functions allotted to him by
another Minister or Deputy Minister. It is not necessary where
business has been assigned by a Cabinet Minister to a Minister or
a Deputy Minister thaf the matter shbuld be put before the
Cabinet Minis'.er also after the Minister or the Deputy Minister
has approved of it in accordance with the assignment made in his
favour. We are therefore of the opinion that the sanction; has
been given by the Central Government as required by the Act.
A
B
That talces us to the question of validation. The Validation
Act was passed in December 1966 and section 2 thereof wl!h
'Which we are concerned reads thus : " ( 1 ) ·Notwithstanding anything contained in section 150 read with sub-section (2) of section 109 of
the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, the resolution of the Delhi Municipal Corporation dated the
24th Juru;, 1959, passed under sub-section (3) of section 150 aforesaid, insofar as the said resolution
relates to the determination of the rates at which
tax shall be leviable on the consumption or sale
of electricity shall. be deemed to have been passed in
accordance with law and the ra!es specified in the said
resolution in respect of tax on the consumption or sale
of electricity shall be deemed to be, and to have been,
the actual rates of.the tax under the said Act with effect
on and from 1st day of July 1959 and up to and inclusive of the 31st day of March, 196.6.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any
judgment, decree or order of any court to the contrary,
all taxes on the consumption or sale of electricity levied
or collected or purporting to have been "levied or collected in pursuance of the resolution referred to in subsection ( 1 ) shall, for all purposes, be deemed to be,
and to have always been, validly levied or colle-Oted .. "
The argument which found favour with ·the High Court was
1hat the words of s. 2 only validated the levy and collection of tax
for the year ending March 31, 1960 and no further, though the
'.Section 1n terms refers to the period from July 1, 1959 to March
.31, 1966. The contention, which was accepted by the High
·Court, was that though fixation of rate of tax was validated up to
March 31, 1966, the levy of the tax was not validated for the
-whole period by s. 2 of the Validation Act. The same argument
·was raised before us in support of the contention that the Validation Act failed in its purpose so far as the period from April l,
1960 to March 31, 1966 is concerned. We are of opinion that
·the High Court was in error in holding that the levy and collec-
c
D
E
F
G
H
MUNCL. CORPN., DELHI v. BIRLA MILLS (Wanchoo, C.J.)
tion was not validated for the period from April J, 1960 to
March 31, 1966 and that the Validation Act merely validated the
fixation of rate of tax for that period. Section 2 (1) which is said
to have failed in validating the levy and collection of tax for the
period from April 1, 1960 to March 31, 1966 is in two
parts. In the first place it valida'.es the resolution of the Corpo..
B ration dated June 24, 1959 by which rates were fixed under
s. 150(3) for the year ending March 31, 1960. As the High
Court says-and rightly so-this mean~ that everything that
went before the resolution of June 24, 1959 was passed was
validated. It was on this ground that the High Court held that
the Validation Act validated the levy and collecfon of tax at the
c rates fixed for the period from July 1, 1959 to March 31, 1960.
The High Court seems to have over-looked the second part of
s. 2 (I ) which lays down ,that the rates specified in the resolution
of June 24, 1959 in respect of tax on the consumption or sale of
electricity under the Act with effect on and from the !st day of
July, 1959 and up to and inclusive of the 31st day of March, 1966
shall be deemed to be, and to have been, the actual rates of the
D tax. By this part of s. 2 (1), Parliament has clearly approved
the rates deducible from the resolution of June 24, 1959 as the
actual rates of tax for the entire period from July 1, 1959 to
March 31, 1966. This could only be to validaje the levy and
collection of tax at that rate for that period, for otherwise we can
see no sense in the Validation Act. It is however said that the
E words "at which 'tax shall be levied and collected" do not appear
after the words "the actual rates of the tax" in s. 2 (I ) and therefore the section must be taken to have validated the rates only. It
has neither provided for levy and collection of tax nor validated
its levy and collection for the period mentioned therein. It seems
to us that when s. 2 (1 ) lays down that the rates deducible from
F the resolution of June 24, 1959 shall be the actual rates of tax
for the entire period from July 1, 1959 to March 31, 1966, it
must be understood to sanction the levy and collection of tax at
the rates fixed. This to our mind is implicit in the word "actual"
whlch governs the words "rates of the tax". We may add that
even if there was some doubt in the matter from the words of s. 2
G (1), that doubt is resolved by the words of s. 2(2), which lays
down that "all taxes on the consumptjon or sale of electricity
levied or collected or pm;porting to have been levied or collected
in pursuance of .the resolution referred to in sub-section ( 1 ) shall,
for all purposes, be deemed to be and to have always been validly
levied or collected." This clearly shows that the validation was
not merely of the rate of tax but of levy and collection also for
H the entire period from July l, 1959 to March 31, 1966. We
cannot therefore agree with the High Court that only the rates of
tax were validated and not levy and collection thereof for the
A
•
·•
277
278
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1968) 3 S.C.R.
period from April 1, 1960 to March 31, 1966. We may go further and say that as we reads. 2(1) ands. 2(2) together it
seems to us that Parliament not only validated what was done but
also itself imposed the rates deducible from the resolll'tion of 1une
24, 1959 and authorised the levy and cgllection thereof for the
entire period from July 1, 1959 to March 31, 1966 notwithstaDding ariything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any
·
court to the contrary.
It
B
We therefore allow the appeals, set aside the order of the
High Court insofar as it is against the appellant and dismiss the
writ petitions. No order as to costs throughout.
Hidayatnllah, J.-The Delhi Municipal Corporation in exercise of powers under its constituent Act has levied a tax on the
consumption, sale or supply of electricity. This power is expressly conferred by the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957
(66 of 1957). Section 113(2)(d) and (3) reads:
"(2) In adfiition to taxes specified in sub-section (1)
the corporation may, for the purposes of this Act, levy
any of the following taxes, namely :
(d) a tax on the consumption, sale or supply of
electricity.
(3) The taxes specified in sub-section (2) shall be
levied, assessed and collected in accordance with the
provisions of this Act and the bye-laws made thereunder".
The Act provides further in s. 150 :
"150. Imposition of other taxes.
(1) The Corporation may, at a meeting, pass a
resolution for the levy of any of the taxes specified in
sub-section (2) of section 113, defining the maximum
rate of the tax to be levied, the class or classes of persons or the description or descriptions of articles and
properties to be taxed, the system of assessment to be
adopted and the exemptions, if any, to be granted.
(2) Any resolution passed under sub-section (1) shall
be submitted to the Central Government for its sanction, and if sanctioned by that Government, shall come
into force on and from such date as may be specified
in the order of sanction.
(3) After a resolution has come into force under
sub-section (2), the Corporation may, subject to the
C
D
E
F
G
H
,...
MUNCL, CORPN. DELHI V. BIRLA MILLS
A
•
c
D
E
F
G
H
(Hidayatul/ah, J.)
279
maximum rate, pass a second resolution determining the
actual rates at which the tax shall be leviable, and the
tax shall come into force on the first day of the quarter
of the year next following the date on which such second
resolution is passed.
(4) After a tax has been levied in accordance with
the foregoing provisions of this section, the pro".i·
sions of sub-section (2) of section 109, shall apply m
relation to such tax as they apply ·in relation to any tax
imposed under sub-section (1) of section 113".
On February 9, 1959 the Municipal Corporation passed a
resolution stating the rate at which the tax would be levied. The
resolution was submitted to the Central Government for its ap·
proval. The Central Government modified the rate by enhancing
it. On June 23, 1959 the Standing Committee of the Corporation recommended the rate sanctioned by the Governmeat as
the actual rate to be imposed. The Corporation then resolved on
June 24, 1959 that the tax was imposed at that rate.
The respondent cnallenged the imposition of the tax by a
writ petition in the Punjab High Court: A learned single Judge
dismissed the petition but on appeal in the High Court the decision
was reversed. It was held that the Central Government lacked
power to alter the rate. On December 3, 1966, Parliament pass·
ed the Delhi Municipal Corporation (Validation of Electricity
Tax) Act, ·purporting to validate the rate of tax. On February
17, 1965, the Municipal Corporation passed another resolution
under s. 150(1) stating the maximum rate of tax. This resolution
was approved by Government and a second resolution was then
adopted under s. 150(3) naming the maximum rate as the actual
rate. This was on December 27, 1965. Two writ petitions were
filed by the respondent in the High Court of Delhi. The first
questioned the imposition -0f the tax by the resolutions of February
17 and December 27, 1965 and the second questioned the legality
of the Validation Act. These petitions succeeded and the present
appeals followed.
The learned Chief Justice in his judgment .has upheld the
validity of the Validation Act. As we are of opinion that the
earlier resolutions were also legal, we need say nothing about
the Validation Act. We agree, however, that the Validation Act
cannot be questioned. The learned Chief Justice has adequately
answered the objections and although we might have stated our
reasons separately we do not find it necessary to do so. We agree
that the relevant appeal must be allowed.
On the other point we agree with the conclusions of the
learned Chief Justice that the other appeal must also be allowed.
L6Sup.C.J/68-S
280
SUPREME COUAT REPORTS
(1968] 3 S.C.R.
In our opinion, the Delhi Municipal Corporation was legally A
invested with the power to levy the electricity tax. We are satisfied that there is no flaw in the conferral of power on the
Municipal Corporation by s. 113 and 150 of the Act and the
resolutions passed thereunder. The objection in this connection
is that the parliamentary Act itself is invalid inasmuch as it
amounts to an excessive delegation of essential legislative func- B
tions by Parliament to an outside body. The learned Chief Justice has upheld s. 150 by pointing out certain inbuilt safeguards
in the Act which, in his view, save it from being characterised
as a piece of excessive delegation. With all due respects we
think this is not the only approach to the problem. We do not
wish to be understood as saying that the conferral of a power of c
taxation on Municipalities must always be accompanied by a
detailed enumeration in the constituent Act of the rate of the
tax, the persons to be taxed, the manner of the levy and collection, before it can be said that there are sufficient safeguards.
Nor do we think that these matters cannot be left to the determination of the Municipal Corporation subject, cif course, to such
controls as the legislature may think necessary to effectuate its D
own will. While the provisions which have been characterised as
safeguards (where found necessary) are desirable the proper test
to apply is not the existence of safeguards but whether the legislative will to impose the tax is adequately expressed so as to bind
those who have to pay the tax. This requires an examination of
the policy and provisions of the Act with a view to determining E
whether the legislative will is fully expressed to invest the Municipal Committee with the power to levy the tax subject, of course,
to a proper procedure being evolved. We shall briefly indicate
reasons which compel us to give our opinion separately.
The charge here B that the power to impose the tax granted
by ss. 113 and 150 amounts to an excessive delegation of essen- F
tial legislative functions without adequate control or guidance of
Parliament and, therefore, the grant is beyond the competence
of Parliament. This contention is raised because of the gloss
put upon the Delhi Laws Act(') case in some subsequent cases
which seem to carry the observations in that case to fields which.
perhaps, were not in the minds of the Judges who gave the Advi' G
sory opinion. In those fields other consider_ations apply which
unfortunately have been overlooked more particularly when the
question is of investing a Municipal Corporation with the authority
to levy taxes.
The Delhi Laws Act(') case was concerned with certain
legislation which conferred a general power on the Executive H
Governn1ent to apply any Act in force in British India, to certain
(I) [19511 S.C.R. 747.
MUNCL. COJ!.PN. DELHI v. B!RLA MILLS
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
(Hidayatullah, 1.)
281
areas with such modifications, amendments, restrictions (involving
repeal of Jaws already in force) as the Executive Government
might consider expedient or necessary. The Executive Government was not contained in its discretion by any direction on
the subject. This made it free to choose any Jaw and to modify
it as it thought fit before applying it and incidentally to repeal
such Jaws as were already in force in those areas. The general
observations in the case were that the proposed measures there
considered in several respects amounted to the effacing of the
legislature and the setting up of a parallel legislature. The issue
obviously was a narrow and a special one. It concerned direct
legislatfon in an area by imposition of Jaws at the hands of the
Executive. The legislature gave too free a hand to the Executive.
The Advisory opinion ought, therefore to be read secumdam
subjectam materiam and need not be extended to those cases in
which the legislature outlines the entire policy of the municipal
administration and keeping the control in its own hands authorises
the Municipal Committee to leyy taxes which it itself determines
and sanctions. How deeply must the policy of a law be searched,
of course, depends upon the kind of the Jaw and its purpose.
This obvious point has got lost in the application of this Delhi
Laws Act(') case, particularly in Devidas Gopal Krishnan v. State
of Punjab(') where it received an extension to fields to which the
observations could not logically extend. In other cases many
points were evolved to get over the difficulties of accepting those
observations simpliciter. The observations were, of course, m:>t
statutory prescriptions. The result is that the courts seem to
struggle to discover what have been variously d.escribed as the
policy of the Jaw, the guidance, the safeguards, the limits, the
standards and the restrictions. These attempts merely show that
what is intended to be found out is whether the legislature has
expressed its own will in unequivocal terms so as to make the law
a binding rule of conduct. The several expressions here enumerated do not, of course, mean the same thing. Nor can it be said
that an aggregate of all of them must clearly appear from the
impugned statute because if they do there will be no need for the
agent. The agent is then only an executing authority and not
acting in aid of the legislature which is the underlying principle
on which delegated legislation is upheld. The result as noticeable from case to case has been somewhat strange. A search has
been made in the various Acts from the policy of law as stated in
the preamble to the operative parts, from the positive directive
enactments to what may be considered as mere policy statement to
sustain the law. No search appears to have been made from the
standpoint wh~ther the legislature has or has not expressed its
o) 119s11 s.c.R. 747.
(2) A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 18~5.
282
SUPREME COURT IU!PORTS
(1968) 3 S.C.R.
own will completely leaving the application of the law to those
circumstances which the legislature has already pre-determined.
The learned Chief Justice resolves the present controversy
by highlighting the provisions which indicate that there are "safeguards", "guidelines" and "limits" in the Municipal Corporation Act. In reaching his conclusion the learned Chief Justice
emphasises that there are 'safeguards sufficient! to enable the
Municipal Corporation to validly impose the tax. If any such
"safeguards" (as to which \ve do not consider it necessary to express an opinion here) were necessary, it is sufficient to point out
that the scheme of the Municipal Act as a whole, the function£
the Municipality is expected to perform, the resources it must
have, the gradation of compulsory taxes, their limits, the control
of Government and various other provisions, furnish a sufficient
answer. They are safeguards enough to sustain the Act.
But, in our opinion, this matter goes further. Whether a
legislature can confer on a Municipal Corporation a power to
levy a tax and how, is a very different question from that which
was resolved in the Delhi Laws Act(') case. It involves a consideration of what our Constitution enables to be done under the
relevant legislative entry and the nature of the Munici1;1al administration. It must be resolved on the basis of sovereignty which
the legislative entries are intended to confer.
The entry in question is Entry No. 5 in the State List. It
reads:"5. Local government, that is to say, the constitution and powers ~f municipal corporations, improvement trusts, district boards, mining settlement authorities and other local authorities for the purpose of local
self-government or village administration."
Under this entry power is given to the legislature to create selfgoveming units. It has always been understood, as we shall show
presently, that such self-governing units must have resources for
their own administration and duties. There are only two methods
by which money can be made available : one is to give them a
grant; and the other is to allow them to raise funds by fees and
taxes. The second method is generally followed and the legislatures in India on times out of number have invested these local
self-governing units with powers of taxation. No .such legislation
has been questioned on the ground that it offends against the
competency of the legislature. It is now contended that such
exercise of power by the legislature offends against the doctrine
of separation of powers and also is hit by the maxim deletatus
non~potest delegare. We shall now discuss these two questions.
(1) [1951] S.C.R. 747.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
MUNCL. COR.PN. DELffi v. BIR.LA MILLS (Hidayatu//ah, J.)
A
283
Our Constitution no doubt divides the functions of the State
between three organs of the Government but it does not make a
clean-cut division of the functions of these three organs as do
some other Constitutions. For example, the Constitution of
Massachusetts carries the provision"the legislative departments shall never exercise the
B
executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the
executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never
exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either
of them."
Even the Constitution of the United States in Article I section (1)
c provides:
"Section 1. All legislative powers herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which
shall consist of a Senate and House of Representative."
The Australian Constitution also makes a much more rigid cut
D between the three organs. By reason of such provisions the theory
of separation of powers advanced by Montesquieu (who regarded
the separation of powers as the best feature of the British Constitution) has played a great part. Montesquieu, of course, was
not quite right in imagining that there was a complete separation
of powers in England. The other theory, which has played a
part flows from the maxim already quoted. In the Bonus case
E of Jalan Trading Co. Private Ltd. v. Mill Mazdoor Union(') we
had the occasion to say that that theory was wrongly understood.
We may recall here what we then said :
"This doctrine, it has been accepted on all hands
was originated by the glossators and got introduced into
English Law by a misreading of Bracton as a doctrine
F
of agency and was applied by Coke in decisions to prevent the exercise of judicial power by another agency
and later received its present form in the United States."
This theory has been discountenanced even in America where in
spite of a iomewhat rigid separation of powers delegated legislation is permitted in various fields. No doubt the Donoughmore
G Committee in England recommended that delegation should be
put within bounds. But the example of the United States is to the
contrary. The question was examined by the Moreland Commission, the Brownlow Committee and the Acheson Committee.
They permitted the delegation of ancillary powers to instrumentalities other than the legislatures. The Donoughmore Committee
H had before if the opinion of the First Parliamentary Counsel in
these words :
(I) [1967] I S.C.R. IS at 59.
284
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1968] 3 S.C.R.
" ... it would be impossible to produce the amount
and the kind of legislation which Parliament desires to
pass and which the people of this· country are supposed
to want, if it became necessary to insert in the Acts of
Parliament themselves any considerable portion of what
is now left to delegated legislation."
Therefore, in England and America many writers (for example,
Lowell) have pointed out that previously English and American
statutes were over-burdened with details and tried to provide in
advance fof all matters. Things have now changed. Delegated
legislation is now held "inevitable" and the criticism of it is only
because of 'nostalgic yearnings for an era that had passed'. The
result is noticeable in England, America, Australia, Canada and
in our country. Take any statute and it will be found that quite a
lot of things are left to be done by some other instrumentality.
The rule making power, 'the appointed day' clauses, the provisions for extending the Act, for granting exemptions and so on
and so forth are to be met with everywhere. Otherwise, how
can one justify the controls which have come into existence in
India? The Gold Control Order sprang from the Defence of
India Act without there being any statement in the Defence
of India Act of any "guidelines" or "safeguards". The Essential
Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 was sustained by reading the preamble without maldng a search for "guidelines", "limits"
or "safeguard"-see Harishankar Bag/a v. The State of Madhya
Pradesh(') . . In Raj Narain Singh v. The Chairman Patna Administration Committee('), the power to modify existing statutes
was recognised provided no essential feature was changed. In
Western India Theatres Ltd. v. Municipal Corpn. of the City of
Poona('), a general provision that the Municipality may impose
"any other tax" to the nature and object of which the approval
of the Governor-in-Council was obtained was held valid only
because the tax was imposed "for the purposes of the Municipality." In Hamdard Dawakhana(•) case the selection of diseages
or conditions was left to the Executive but was held not to be an
instance of excessive delegation. In Pandit Banarsidas Bhanot v.
The State of Madhya Pradesh(•), it was observed:
"Now the authorities are clear that it is not unconstitutional for the legislature to leave it to the executive to determine details relating to the working of taxation laws, such as the selection of persons on whom
the tax is to be laid, the rates at which it is to be charged in respect of different classes of goods and the like."
(I) [1955] I S.C.R. 380.
(2) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 29).
(4) [1960] 2 S.C.R. 671.
(3) [1959] 2 Supp. S.C.R. 71.
(5) [1959] S.C.R. 427.
A
B
c
D
F
G
H
MUNCL. CORPN. DELHI v. BIRLA MILLS Uiidayatullah,
B
c
0
E
F
G
H
J.) 285
This was justified on the ground that in doing this the legislature
could not be considered to have lost its perfect control since it
retained the power to interpose its own authority. The principle
was accepted on the basis of the decision of the Judicial Committee in Powell v. Apollo Candle Co. Ltd.('). The learned Chief
Justice has expressed that the case was wrongly read but with
all due respects it has always been understood in this sense.
Lastly in Liberty Cinema(') case the rate of a tax was not
considered a part of the essential legislative function.
These cases in themselves cover the present matter. The
principle now advocated that the legislature must itself impose
the tax by laying down the rate, the persons to be affected and
the manner of levy and collection when it concedes power to
Municipal Corporation appears to be a novel doctrine which ha~
not been accepted even in the land where the doctrine about
delegated legislation took its birth. It is not necessary to clog
this judgment by many citations but an extract from United States
v. City of New Orleans(') may usefully be cited:
'The position that the power of taxation belongs exclusively to the legislative branch of the government,
no one will controvert. Under our system it is lodged
nowhere else. But it is a power that may be delegated
by the Legislature to municipal corporations, which are
merely instrumentalities of the State for the Detter administration of the govermnent in matters of ·local concern. When such a corporation is created, the power
of taxation is vested in it as an essential attribute, for
all the purposes of its existence, unless its exercise be
in express terms prohibited. ·For the accomplishment
of those purposes, its authorities, however limited the
corporation, must have the power to raise money and
control its expenditure. In a city, even of small extent,
they have to provide for the preservation of peace,
good order and health, and the execution of such measures as conduce to the general good of its citizens;
such as the opening and repairing of streets; the construction of sidewalks, sewers and drains; the introduction of water, and the establishment of a fire and police
department. In a city like New Orleans, situated on a
navigable stream, or on a harbor of a lake or sea, their
powers are usually enlarged, so as to embrace the building of wharves and docks or levees for the benefit of
commerce, and they may extend also to the construction of roads leading to it, or the contributing of aid
(I) [1885] IO A.C. 282.
(2) [1952) 2 S.C.R. 477
(3) 25 L. Ed. 225 at 226.
286
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1968).3 S.C.R.
towards their construction. The number and variety of
works which may be authorized, having a general regard
to the welfare of the city or its people, are mere matters
of legislative discretion. All of them require for their
execution considerable expenditure of money. Their
authorization without providing the means for such expenditure would be an idle and futile proceeding. Their
authorization, therefore, implies and carries with it
the power to adopt the ordinary means employed by
such bodies to raise funds for their execution, unless
such funds are otherwise provided. And the ordinary
means in such cases is taxation. A municipality without the power of taxation would be a body without life,
incapable of acting, and serving no useful purpose."
It is argued that in America this is held to fall outside excessive delegation because of the history of t.1.e municipal corpora.tions in· that country. There is no essential difference between
the United States and India in this respect. M•micipal Corporations have a hoary past in our country also. The first Municipal
Corporation was created in India by a Ro,al Charter in 1687
at .Madras. In 1726 three Charters established Municipal Corporations at Bombay Calcutta and Madras. Since then scores of
statutes have established municipalities all over India. The Conservancy Act X of 1842, which applied to Bengal, allowed
municipalities to tax houses. The Act remained a dead letter. But
in 1882 Lord Rippon's Government passi:d the well-known Resolution extending Local Self-Goverument in India and the municipalities have since been accepted as a limb of local self-government. Every Municipal Act (whether for a single municipality or
for a group) contains ahnost identical provisions regarding taxation. It is one of the attributes of the local self-government.
The various Constitutions which have governed us have always
included the power to set up local self-government and provided
that it must be financed and must have the power of raising funds.
Therefore the constituent Acts have ahnost in every instance
provided for raising of funds through taxes in the local areas
subject to control of Government. Today the entry in the Constitution also recognises this power in the legislature. The provisions about taxes have followed the same method as in the Delhi
Municipal Corporation Act. Sometimes the provision enables
pubt;c opinion to be elicited before the tax is imposed but this is
not an invariable rule. The exercise of the power has not been
questioned as it has been in recent years.
We are concerned here with Parliament which by a concentration of all the powers of legislation derived from all the three
Legislative Lists becomes the most competent and potent legisla-
B
c
I)
E
G
H
:11.UNCL. CORPN. DELHI v. BIRLA MILLS
A
(Hidayatullah, J.)
287
ture it is possible to erect under our Constitution. The doctrine
that it is a delegate of the people which coloured certain American
decisions does not arise here. It has been discarded also in
America. The old plea that the Indian legislatures were delegates
of the British Parliament and therefore could not delegate further,
(rejected in a string of cases by the Judicial Committee), is not
B open today. The doctrine that Parliament cannot delegate its
powers, therefore, must be understood in a limited way. It only
means that the legislature must not efface itself but must give
the legislative sanction to. the imposition of the tax and must keep
the control in its own hands. There is no specific provision in
the Constitution which says that the Parliament cannot delegate
to certain specified instrumentalities the power to effectuate its
c own
will. The question always is whether the legislative will
has· been exercised or not. Once it is established that the legislature iiself has willed that a particular thing be done and has
merely left the execution of it to a chosen instrumentality (provided that it has not parted with its control) there can be no
question of excessive delegation. If the delegate acts contrary
D to the wishes of the legislature the legislature can undo what the
delegate has done. Even the courts, as we shall show presently,
may be asked to intervene when the delegate exceeds its powers
and functions. The observations and theories culled from American cases cannot be applied in our country without reflection.
Even in America the doctrine is much watered down especially
E when it is a question of investing municipalities with power of
such taxation. Parliament, when it confers such powers, cannot
be said to abdicate or efface itself unless it can be said that it
has lost its control over the action of the delegate. In the present
case. in addition to prescribing the mode, it keeps a check by
making Government, answerable to itself, the supervising authority. This is not a safeguard in the sense in which the matter
F has been accepted in the opinion of the learned Chief Justice,
but is indicative of the exercise of the legislative will by the
legislature itself. The details of the tax are to be considered
by the supervising authority and if the tax is n9t what the Jegis- ·
lature intended should be imposed, the tax cannot be
imposed.
G
It is no use comparing compulsory taxes with optional taxes
in the Municipal Corporation Act. Even in the compulsory taxes [see
for examples. 114(1)(a)(b)(c)] much of what may. otherwise,
be described as essential is left to the determination of tl1e Municipal Corporation. The percentage in each case is not named
and
has been left to the determination of the Municipal CorporaH
tion. No standards are prescribed nor are there any restrictions
to ensure that the percentage will not be unduly high. No doubt
in some of the taxes limits are fixed but even below the maximum
288
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
f1968] 3 S.C.R.
limit or between the maxima and minima there is still a broad
discretion in the Municipal Corporation. In making bye-laws
there is no direction, guidance or safeguards except the approval
of the Government. If section 150 is to be questioned the other
sections must equally be bad. If the Corporation cannot be
trusted to do this and the vesting of the power in it is illegal it
must be so in the other cases. The respondents, however, do
not criticise the compulsory taxes as bad. There is nothing to
show in what order the optional taxes are to be chosen and
imposed. Further, there is no indication of the proportion wltich
the compulsory taxes must bear between themselves. There is
no difference in principle between what is intended to be doRe
by s. 150 and that which is to be done by s. 114 and several
other sections. In fact, s. 150 is mild when compared with some
of the other sections. We cannot agree to the proposition which
has been urged before us that s. 150 is excessive delegation when
these sections are not characterised as excessive delegation.
Local bodies are subordinate branches of governmental activity. They are democratic institutions managed by the representatives of the people. They fnnction for public purposes and
take away a part of the government affairs in local areas. They
are political sub-divisions and agencies which exercise a part of
State functions. As they are intended to carry on local selfgovernment the power of taxation is a necessary adjunct to their
other powers. They function under the supervision of the Government. This supervision is considered necessary, because
Municipal Councillors as a rule are unwilling to tax in a manner
likely to affect themselves. House-holders seek to transfer burdens to tradesmen and vice-versa. To insist that the legislature
should provide for every matter connected with municipal taxation would make municipalities mere tax collecting department;
of Government and not self-governing bodies which they are
intended to be. Government might as well collect the taxes and
make them available to the municipalities. That is not a correct
reading of the history of Municipal Corporations and other selfgoverning institutions in our country.
The tax has not been challenged as unreasonable. If it had
been it might have been necessary to consider it from another
angle. The delegation to the Municipal Corporation of the
power to levy taxes and fees is for the purpose of its own duties
under the Act. The power must be reasonably exercised for
attaimnent of those purposes. These purposes include supply
of water, running of transport services, lighting of streets and
their maintenance, conservancy, establishment of hospitals and
so on. The interrelation of taxes with expenditure has to be
maintained. This relation must be reasonable. Suppose it were
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
MUNCL. CORPN. DELHI v. BIRLA MILLS
A
B
c
D
E
F
(Hidayatul/ah, J.) 289
to become unreasonable. Is there no remedy ? Now the rule
regarding reasonableness of byelaws was laid down in Kruse v.
Johnson('). This rule has been universally accepted and applied
in India and elsewhere.
The same rule is applied to fees and taxes imposed by the
Mt:nicipal bodies. Since illustrative cases were not cited at the
BBI it is not necessary to give a full list. A few representative
cases, selected by us ,at ran!lom may be seen in Mewa Ram v.
Municipal Board, Mathura('), Corporation of Madras v.
Spencer & Co. Ltd('), V. M. Raghavalu v. Corporation of
Madras('), Municipal Corporation of Rangoon v. Sooratee Bara
Bazar Col. Ltd.(•), Municipal Council, Kumbakonam v. Balli
Bros.('). Nor is the reasonableness of a tax open to question in
relation to municipalities alone. It was even considered in relation to legislatures by the Judicial Committee in Attorney General
of Alberta v. Attorney General of Canada('). An unreasonable
tax can be considered by the courts but it must be a cleaI!y exorbitant tax which goes so high as to be extortionate.
We do not agree that our view will make it easy for the
legislatures to name a tax and leave it to be imposed by the
Executive at its sweet will. These horrible imaginings need not
detain us because neither does this flow from our view nor it
is possible that such action will go unchallenged. The position
of self-governing bodies is different from that of the Executive.
For these reasons we agree with the learned Chief Justice
that the tax was validly imposed and the appeal in relation to
it must be allowed. We agree in the order regarding costs proposed by him.
1
Shah, J. The facts which give rise to the appeals have been
set out in the judgments just delivered, and need not be repeated.
Two principal questions arise for determination in these
appeals:
~
G
(1) Whether the Delhi Municipal Corporation
(Validation of Electricity Tax) Act 35 of 1966 effectively imposes liability to pay tax on consumption or
sale of electricity for the period April 1, 1960 to March
31, 1966; and
(2) Whether by enacting s. 150(1) of the Delhi
Municipal Corporation Act 66 of 1957 which confers
authority upon the Corporation by resolution to levy tax
H
(I) [1898j2 Q.B. 91.
(3) l.L.R. 52 Mad. 764.
(S) J.L.R. S Rang. 139.
(2) I.L.R. 1939 Allahabad 710.
(4) I.L.R. 53 Mad, 722.
(6) A.l.R. 1931 Mad. 497.
(7) A.LR. 1939 P.C. SJ, 57.
290
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1968] 3 $.C.R.
in respect of the optional taxes specified in s. 113(2),
the Parliament has violated the rule against excessive
delegation of legislative authority.
Sub-section ( 1) of s. 113 of Act 66 of 1957 requires the Corporation to levy for the purposes of the Act six named taxes-(a)
property taxes; (b) a tax on vehicles and animals; ( c) a theatretax; (d) a tax on advertisements other than advertisements published
in the newspapers; (e) a duty on the transfer of property; and (!)
a tax on buildings payable along with the application for sanction
of the building plan. By sub-s. (2) the Corporation is authorised,
in addition to the taxes specified in sub-s. ( 1 ) , to levy for the purposes of the Act any of the following taxes, namely : (a) an education cess;
(b) a local rate on land revenues;
( c) a tax on professions, trades, callings and employments;
( d) a tax on the consumption, sale or supply of electricity;
( e) a betterment tax on the increase in urban land
values caused by the execution of any development or improvement work;
( f) a tax on boats; and
(g) tolls.
By sub-s. (3) it is provided that the taxes specified in sub-s. (1)
and sub-s. (2) shall be levied, assessed and collected in accordance
with tlie provisions of the Act and the bye-laws made thereunder.
The Act proceeds by ss. 114 to 149 to make detailed provisions
in respect of the taxes set out in s. 113 (1) about the levy and
imposition of taxes, the system of assessment, and maximum rates
or the standards to guide the determination of the rates of taxes
and incidental matters. In respect of the optional taxes it is pro·
vided in s. 150 of the Act that :
"(l) The Corporation may, at a meeting, pass a
resolution for the levy of any of the taxes specified in
sub-section (2) of section 113, defining the maximum
rate of the tax to be levied, the class or classes of persons
or the description or descriptions of articles and properties to be taxed, the system of assessment to be adopted and the exemptions, if any, to be granted.
(2) Any resolution passed under sub-section (1)
shall be submitted to the Central Govermnent for its
sanction, and if sanctioned by that Government, shall
come into force on and from such date as may be speci
lied in the order of sanction.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
"' .
I
-
\ \
MUNCL.~CORPN. DELHI. V. BIRLA MILLS (Shah, J.)
B
c
(4) After a tax has been levied in acc'°ordance with
the
the foregoing provisions of · this · section,
provisions of sub-section (2) · of section ·109,
shall apply in relation to such tax as they
apply in relation to any tax imposed under sub-section
(I) of section 113."
·
D
E
F
G
•
H
291
I
(3) After a resolution has. come into force under
sub-section (2), the Corporation may, subject to the
maximum rate, pass a second resolution determining the
actual rates at which the tax· shall be leviable; and the
tax shall come· into force on the first day of the quarter
of the year next following the date on which such second
resolution is passed.
•
•
'
There is, it is manifest, a significant difference in the schemes
relating to. the levy -arid imposition of compulsory and optional
taxes, fixation of rates· and systems of taxation. Sections 114 to
149 set out elaborate provisions relating to the maximum rates of
tax to be levied, the class or classes of persons or the description
or descriptions of articles and properties to be taxed, the system
of assessment to be adopted and the exemptions, if any, to be·
granted. In s. 114 the property taxes are divided under four
heads : water tax, scavenging tax, fire tax and general tax. The
rates of water tax, scavenging tax and fire tax are to be such percentages of the rateable value of lands and buildin£s as the Corporation may deem reasonable for providing water supply, for providing.scavenging services and for the conauct and management of
the Fire Service Undertaking .. The Parliament has, besides specifying the persons liable to tax and the system of assessment also
set out standards or guidelines for determining the rates of tax.
The general tax which is leviable in addition is to.be not less ·than
ten per cent and not more than twenty per cent of the rateable
value of lands and buildings within the urban areas and such lower
rates in the rural areas as may be determined by the Corporation.
Sections 114 to 135 enact a complete code relating to the levy of
property taxes. Schedules 3 to 6 to the Act set out the maximum
rates which may be charged as tax on vehicles and animals, theatretax and taxes on advertisements and buildings, and by. diverse
provisicins in Ch. VIII the persons or properties to be charged are
specified and the mechanism of assessment is P.rescribed. The
Act also prescribes the maximum rate of duty on transfer of property leviable in the form of a surcharge on the duty imposed by
the Indian Stamp Act. But in respect of optional taxes the Parliament has merely enumerated the taxes in sub-s. (2) of s. 113, and
has provided by sub-s. ( 3) of s. 113 that the taxes_ specified in
sub-s. (2) shall be levied, assessed and collected in accordance
with the provisions of the Act_ ii_nd the bye-laws made thereunder.
/
292
SUPRBMB COURT REPORTS
[1968] 3 S.C.R.
Section 109 deals with the adoption of the annual budget estimates of the Corporation. It is provided by the first sub-s. of
s. 109 that the Corporation shall, on or before the 31st day of
March of every year, adopt for the ensuing year the budget estimates of the income and expenditure of the Corporation to be
received and incurred on account of the municipal government of
Delhi, Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking, Delhi Transport Undertaking and Delhi Water Supply and Sewage Disposal Undertaking.
By sub-s. (2) it is enacted that on or before the 15th day of February of each year the Corporation shall determine the rates at
which various municipal taxes, rates and cesses shall be levied in
the next following year and save as otherwise provided in the Act
the rates so fixed shall not be subsequently altered for the year for
which they have been fixed. By s. 110 power is reserved to the
Corporation to alter the budget estimates in certain circumstances
and in the manner provided therein.
The scheme of levy and imposition of taxes readin,g ss. 113 to
150 with the provisions relating to the adoption of budget estimates, is that the Corporation determines in the first instance the
rates at which the municipal taxes, rates and cesses may be levied
in the nex1 following year and then prepares the budget estimates
in the light of the estimate of income and expenditure. The compulsory taxes have to .be levied subject to the limits or standards
prescribed in that behalf by 1he Statute : in respect of the opti011al
taxes ihe Co1por::~ion is left free to pass a resolution to levy all
or any of the optional taxes, prescribin,g the maximum rates, system
of assessment, the incidence of taxation and exemptions, if any.
Having noticed the relevant statutory provisions we may deal with
the effect of the Validating Act 35 of 1966. The High Cou~t
was of the view that by merely fixing the rates of tax on consumption or sale of electricity, for the period April 1, 1960 to March
31, 1966, the Parliament bad not effectivelv imposed liability upon
the tax payers to pay that tax. The first sub-section of s. 2 of the
Validating Act consists of two parts. It commences with the
non-obstante clause and proceeds to enact-(a) that the resolution of the Corporation dated June 24, 1959, insofar as it relates
to the determination of the rates at which tax shall be leviable
on the consumption or sale of electricity shal! ,be deemed to have
been passed in accordance with law; and (b) that the rates specified in the said resolution in respect of tax on the consumption or
sale of electricity shall be deemed to be, and to have been, the
actual rates of tax under the Act "with effect on and from the
1st day of July, 1959 and upto and inclusive of the 31st day of
March, 1966". The non-obstante clause plainly governs both the
parts of s. 2 ( 1). It is clear that it was the intention of the
Parliament to declare that notwithstanding anything contained in
s. 150(2) ands. 109(2) of Act' 66 of 1957, the resolution dated
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
MUNCL. CORPN. DELHI V. BIRLA MILLS (Shah, J.)
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
293
June 24, 1959, purporting to be made under s. 150(3) shall be
deemed to be in accordance with law insofar as it relates to the
rates of electricity tax. The effect of the first part of sub-s. ( 1)
of s. 2 is therefore to impose liability un the consumption or s·ale
of electricity purported to be levied under the resolution of the
Corporation under s. 150(3). The High Court has accepted that
position.
By the second part of sub-s. ( 1) of s. 2 liability is imposed for
payment of tax for the period April l, 1960 to March 31, 19~6.
at the same rate, that is the rate which was adopted by the resolution dated June 24, 1959. The function of both the parts is to
impose liability for tax levied under resolution of the Corporatian
under s. 150(2). It is true that the second part does not expressly
levy tax for the period to which the rates were extended, but by
sub-s. (2) the Parliament has provided that all taxes on the consumption or sale of electricity "levied or collected or purporting
to have been levied or collected in pursuance of the resolution
dated June 24, 1959, shall, for all purposes, be deemed to be, 2nd
to have always been, validly levied or collected." The Corporation
bad year after year passed resolutions in purpmted exercise llf
authority under s. 150(1) of the Corporation Act for the levy of
tax on consumption or sale of electricity, and by virtue of s. 2 (l)
of the Validating Act notwithstanding anything contamed ms. 150
and sub-s. (2) of s. 109 the rates undtr the resolution dated June
24, 1959, were to be deemed the rates for the years 1960-61 to
1965-66.
Sub-section (2) of s. 2 of the Validating Act in terms deems
the tax levied or collected in pursuance of the resolution referred
to in sub-s. 0). The resolution re(erred to in sub-s. (2) is the
resolution dated June 24, 1959; the rates prescribed by that resolution are by the terms of sub-s. (l) made rates of tax on the
consumption or sale of electricity for the period July 1, 1959 to
March 31, 1966; and the tax is deem to be validly levied and co!lected for the entire period. If the view which· found favour with the
High Court be correct, the taxes collected by or paid to the Corporation would not be liable to be refunded by the Corporation, suits
filed for refund of tax may not be instituted or continued, for the
tax already paid, and the acts and proceedings taken in pursuance
of the resolution will be deemed to be done in accordance with
Jaw, but there being no levy of tax, liability for payment of tax
for the period referred to in sub-s. ( l) of s. 2 could be enforced.
This could not have been the intention of the Parliament.
The Parliament was faced with the decision of the Punjab High
Court that the levy of the tax pursuant to the resolution dated
June 24, 1959, passed by the Corporation which undoubtedly was
restricted to the year 1959-60 was invalid, because the Union
294
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1968] 3 S.C.R.
Government had modified the rates fixed urlder the resolution of A
the Corporation under s. 150(1) for the year 1\159-60. Before
the High Court decided the dispute, several years had elapsed and
the tax was collected on the footing that the resolution dao.ed June
24, 1959, and the resolutions subsequently passed were valid. If
the Parliament intended to enact an Act only for validating the
levy of tax under the resolution dated June 24, 1959, it was plainly B
1:11lllecessary to enact the second part of s. 2(1). The decision of
the High Court which necessitated the enactment of the Validating
Act was undoubtedly the judgment of the Punjab High Courr
which related only to the ".!llidity of the resolution levying tax for
the year 1959-60, but that is not a ground for implying that !he
Parliament was seeking to validate the levy of tax only for the
c
year 1959-60.
We may tum now to the second question on which the argument was mainly advanced. It was conceded by the AttorneyGeneral that under our Constitutional scheme, the Parliament cannot abdicate its essential legislative functions and set up another
authority or body to perform essential legislative functions either
generally or in respect' of a particular head of legislation or even D
in respect of a part of the subject-matter of that particular head.
Again the power to enact subordinate or ancillary legislation to
carry out the details of parliamentary Acts may undeniably be
invested in other bodies. The increasing complexity of modern
administration, the difficulty of passing compltcated 111easures
through the method of parliamentary debate aud discussion, and E
the number of details and technical matters which must of necessity be provided for in statutes, have led to an increase in the practice of entrusting power. to executive or other agencies to make
subsidiary or ancillary legislation. By entrusting that power to
another body, the Parliament does not delegate its essential legislative functions.
F
But the authority .to entrust subsidiary or ancillary power is
not unrestricted : the power cannot be conferred upon a del~gate
without setting out some principle, policy, or standard which is to
guide the delegate in dischargin~ its delegated funcuons. Jf the
Parliament Jays down by legislative act adequate guidance, whatever form it takes, and the delegate is required to confom1 to that G
J!Uidance, entrustment of authority to the delegate to m·~ke :.ubordinate legislation will be upheld. The power of delegating
legislative authority cannot, however, be extended to investment of
authority in another body in respect of matters relating to principle or policy of legislation, to the amendment of Parliamentary
Acts so as to affect the substance thereof or to investment in the
executive power when no guidance or standard is laid down in H
that behalf or to authorize the executive to encroach upon the
judicial power of the State.
\
MUNCL. CORPN., DELHI v. BIRLA MILLS (Shah, /.)
295
A
In Panama Refining Company v. A. D. Ryan('), Hughes, C.J.,
pronouncing the majority opinion of the Supreme Court of the
United States observed :
"The Congress manifestly is not permitted to abdicate, or to transfer to others, the essential legislative
functions with which it is thus vested. Undoubtedly
B
legislation must often be adapted to complex conditions
involving a host of details with which the national legislature cannot deal directly. The Constitution has never
been regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary
resources of flexibility and practicality, which will et'l!ble
it to perform its function in laying down policies -and
establishing standards, while leaving to selected instruc
mentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits anti the determination of facts to which the
policy as declared by the legislature is to apply. Without
capacity to give authorizations of that sort we should
have the anomaly of a legislative power which in many
circumstances calling for its exertion would be but a
D
futility. But the constant recognition of the necessity
and validity of such proVisions, and the wide range of
administrative ·authority which has been developed by
means of them, cannot be allowed to obscure the !imitations of the authority to delegate, if our constitutional
system is to be maintained."
E
Again Chief Justice Hughes observed : (at p. 426)
"Applying that principle, authorizations given by
Congress to selected instrumentalities for the purpose of
ascertaining the existence of facts to which legislation is
directed, have constantly been sustained. Moreover, tho
ll
Congress may not only give such authorizations to determine specific facts but may establish primary standards, devolving upon others the duty to carry out tho
declared legislative policy, that is, as Chief Justice
Marshall expressed it, "to fill up the details" under the
general provisions made by the Legislature."
G The observations of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
made in Archibald G. Hodge v. The Queen(') in relation to the
nature of delegated powers exercisable by the local legislature of
the self-governing dominions do not imply a different role. In
Archibald G. Hodge's case(') the Judicial Committee observed
that the local legislature was competent under s. 92 of the British
H North America Act, 1867, to make Regulations in the nature of
police or municipal regulations of a merely local character for the
g<J09 government of taverns. It was contended that assuming that
(l) 293 U.S. 388 : 79 L. ed. 446.
L6Sup.C.I/68-6
(2) [1883! 9 A.C, 117.
296
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1968] 3 S.C.R.
the local legislature of Ontario Province had power to legislate to A
the full extent of the resolutions passed by the License Commissioners, and to have enforced the observance of otheir enactments
by penalties and imprisonment, the Imperial Parliament had conferred no authority upon the local legislature to delegate those
powers to the License Commissioners or any other persons, and
therefore the power conferred upon the. Imperial Parliament on B
the local legislature could be exercised in full by the local legislature alone and no body else. The Judicial Committee rejected
that eontention on the ground that the maxim "de/egatus non potest
delegare" had no application within the limits of subjects and areas
prescribed by s. 92 as the Imperial Parliament in the plenitude of
its power possessed and could bestow. Within those limits of sub- c
jects and areas the local legislature was supreme, and had the same
authority as the Imperial Parliament, or the :rarliament of the
Dominion, would have had under like circumstances to confide to
a municipal institution or body of its own creation authority to
make bye-laws or resolution as to subjects specified in the enactment, and with the object of carrying the enactment into operation
and effect. The Judicial Committee regarded the power to make D
the bye-laws as ancillary to legislation, that without it an attempt
to provide for varying details and machinery to carry them out
might become oppressive or absolutely fail, that entrustment of a
limited discretionary authority to others has many illustrations of
its necessity and convenience, and othat the legislature by "committing important regulations to agents or delegates" does not efface E
itself.
The Judicial Committee in In re The Initiative and Referendum
Act(') struck down the Initiative and Referendum Act (6 Geo. 5,
c. 59, Manitoba) on the ground that it would compel the Lieutenant-Governor to submit a prOpOsed' law to a body of voters totally
distinct from the legislature of which he is the constitutional head
and would render him powerless to prevent it from becoming an
actual law if approved by those voters. The offending p1ovisiom
of the Act being so interwoven with its scheme as not to be severable, the Colonial Laws Validity Act, i865, could not be applied
to validate any part of the Act.
Opinion in this Court has with the passage of time become
crystallized. In re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912( 2 ) two views were
broadly propounded. Patanjali Sastri, J., was of the view that the
Indian Parliament acting within the limits circumscribing its
legislative powers, intended to have plenary powers of legislation
as large and of the same nature as thQse of the British Parlianumt,
and no constitutional limitation on the delegation of legislative
power to a subordinate unit was to be found in the Constitution
(I )(1919] A.C. 935.
(2) (1951] S.C.R. 747.
•
F
G
H
;
MUNCL. CORPN., DELHI V. BIRLA MILLS (Shah, J.)
A
B
c
297
Acts. The Indian Parliament is therefore competent to make a
law delegating legislative power, both quantitatively and qualitatively as is the British Parliament, and in the absence of any
constitutional inhibition, delegation of legislative power, however
extensive, could be made so long as the delegating body retained
its own legislative power intact. But for the effacement of its
power a positive enabling provision in the constitutional document
was required. The learned Judge further observed that the O>urt
cannot strike down an Act of Parliament as unconstitutional merely because the Parliament decides in a- particular instance to entrust its legislative power to its appointed inS'lrumeµtality, however
repugnant such entrustment may be to the democratic process.
Faz! Ali and S. R. Das, JJ., expressed views though not identical
closely approximating that opinion.
On the other hand Kania, C.J., was of the opinion that the
essentials of legislative function are the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation as a rule of conduct. If the legislature having made its laws leaves the details for working out and
D for carrying an enactment into operation to another subordinate
agency or to some executive officer, there is no delegation of legislative power. While the so-called delegation which empowers the
making of rules and regulations has been recognised as ancillary
to legislative power, the Constitution Acts in India do not recognise
a general power in the legislature to abdicate legislative authority.
E Abdication of its powers by a legislature need not necessarily
amount to complete effacement of itself : it may be partial. If
full powers to do everything that the legislature can do are conferred on a subordinate authority, although the legislature retains
the power to control the action of the subordinate authority by
recalling such power by or repealing the Acts passed by the subordinate authority, there is still an abdication or effacement of the
F legislature conferring such power.
G
H
Mahajan, J., agreed with Kania, C.J. According to him not
only the nature of legislative power, but the very existence of
representative government depends on the doctrine that legislative
powers cann.ot be. transferred. The legislature cannot substitute
the judgment, wisdom and patriotism of any other body, for those
to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this sovereign
trust. Unless. the power of the delegation is expressly given by
the Constitution, the Legislature cannot delegate its· essential legislative function to any other body, and since the Indian Constitution does not give such a power to the Legislature it has no power
to delegate the essential legislative functions to any other body
and that· abdication by a legislative body need not necessarily
amount to complete effacement. When in respect of a subject in
the Legislative List the legislative body says in effect that it will
298
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1968] 3 S.C.R.
not legislate but will leave it to another to legislate on that subject,
there is abdication of legislative authority.
Mukherjea, J., was of the opinion that the legislature must
retain in its own hands the essential legislative functions which
consist in declaring the legislative policy and laying down the
standard which is to be enacted into a rule of law and what can be
delegated is the task of subordinate legislation which by its very
nature is ancillary to the statute which delegates the power to make
it. Provided the legislative policy is enunciated with sufficient
clearness or a standard is laid down, the Courts may not interfere
with the discretion that undoubtedly rests with the legislature itself
in determining the extent of delegation necessary in a particular
case.
Bose, J., without definitely committing himself to either view,
observed that the Indian Parliament may legislate alqng the lines
of the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Queen v. Burah('),
that is to say, it can leave to another person or body the introduction or application of laws which are, or may be, in existence at
that time in any part of India which is subject to the legislative
control of Parliament, whether those laws are enacted by Parliament or by a State Legislature set up by the Constitution, and that
he saw no reason for extending the scope of legislative delegation
beyond the confines which have been hallowed for so long.
Since opinion in that case was delivered, in several cases
brought before this Court, the extent of the power which the Legislature possesses to delegate legislative authority was discussed. A
brief summary of some of those cases may be attempted.
In Rajnarain Singh v. The Chairman, Patna Administration
Committee, Patna and Anr.(') Bose, J., attempted to summarise
the effect of the various opinions expressed in the Delhi Laws Act
case( 3 ), and speaking for a unanimous Court observed that an
executive authority can be authorised by a statute to modify either
existing or future laws, but not in any essential features. Exactly
what constitutes an essential feature cannot be enunciated in general terms, but it is clear that modification cannot include a change
of policy. Essential legislative function consists in the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation as a binding rule
of conduct.
Modifications which are authorised are limited to
local adjustments or changes of minor character and do not mean
or involve any change of policy or change in the Act.
In Hrrrishankar Bag/a v. The State of Madh,va Pradesh(') in
dealing with the validity of cl. 3 of the Cotton Textile (Control
of Movement) Order, 1948, promulgated by the Central Govern(l) 5 I.A. 178.
(3) [1951] S C.R. 747.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
(2) [1955] IS.C.R. 290.
(4)[1955] IS.CR. 380.
•
MUNCL. CORPN., DELHI 1'. BIRLA MILLS (Shah, J.)
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
299
ment under s. 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers)
Act, 1946, it was observed that the Legislature IJmst declare the
policy of the law and the legal principles which are to control
any given cases and must provide a standard to guide the officials
or the body in power to execute the law, and where the Legislature
has laid down such a principle in the Act and that principle is the
maintenance or increase in supply of essential c9mmodities and
of securing equitable distribution and availability at given prices,
the exercise of the power was valid.
Within the frame-work of the case law so far developed, Venkatarama Aiyar J., in Pandit Banarsi Das Bhanot v. The State of
Madhya Pradesh & Ors.(') speaking for the majority observed:
". . . . the authorities are clear that it is not unconstitutional for .the legislature to leave it to the executive to determine details relating to the working of taxation laws, such as the selection of persons on whom the
tax is to be laid, the rates at which it is to be charged in
respect of different classes of goods, and the like."
The learned Judge held that the power conferred on the State
Government by s. 6(2) of the Central Provinces aml Berar Sales
Tax Act, 1947, to amend the Schedule relating to exemptions was
in consonance with the accepted legislative practice relating to the
topic and was not unconstitutional.
In The Western India Theatres Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation
of the City of Poona(") it was held that by enacting ins. 59(1)
(xi) of the Bombay District Municipal Act, 1901, that the Municipality may levy "any other tax" to the nature and object of which
lhe approval of the Governor-in-Council shall have been obtained
prior to the selection the Legislature has not abdicated to the Municipality its legislative authority. Since the section authorised the
imposition of taxes alone as were necessary for the purpose of the
Act, the taxes could, it was held by the Court, be levied only for
implementing those purposes and for no others, and delegation on
that account was not unguided.
In Vasantlal Maganbhai Sanjanwala v. The State of Bombay
and Ors.(') the validity of s. 6(2) of the Bombay Tenancy and
Agricultural Lands Act 67 of 1948 which authorised the Provin·
cial Government by notification in the Official Gazette to fix a
lower rate of the maximum rent payable by the tenants of lands
situate in any particular area or to fix such rate on any other
suitable basis a~ it thought fit fell to be determined. Speaking for
the majority of the Court, Gajendragadkar, J., observed that
although the power of delegation was a constituent element of
(I) [1959] S.C.R. 427.
(2) [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 71.
(3) [1961] S.C.R. 341.
300
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1968) 3 S.C.R.
legislative power, the legislature cannot delegate its essential legislative function in any case and before it can delegat.e any subsidiary
or ancillary powers to a delegate of its choice, it must lay down
the legislature policy and principle so as to afford the delegate
proper guidance in implementing the same.
In Corporation of Calcutta and Anr. v. Liberty Cinema('), it
was held that the Calcutta Municipal Corporation had power to
levy fee pursuant to a resolution, in exercise of the power under
s, 548(2) of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951, at such rates as
may from time to time be fixed by the Corporation. It was observed by the majority that the fixing of the rate of a tax not being
of the essence of legislative power may be left to !I non-legislative
body, but when it is so left to another body the legislature must
provide guidance for such fixation, and that in the case before the
Court there was sufficient guidance in the Act for determining the
rate of"the levy under s. 548.
Two recent cases may also be noticed : In B. Shama Rao v.
Union Territory of Pondicherry( 2 ) this Court held that a statute
which extended the Act passed by another Legislature as it stood
immediately -before the date on which it was to be brought into
force by a notification issued by the Government was "void and
still-born'', because the Legislature in enacting the Act in that
manner had totally abdicated its legislative functions and had
surrendered it in favour of another Legislature.
A
B
c
D
In M/ s. Devi Das Gopal Krishnan v. State of Punjab and
Ors.('), Subba Rao C.J. speaking for the Court observed in
dealing with a case under the Punjab General Sales Tax Act,
1948:
"The Constitution confers . a power and' imposes a
E
duty on the legislature to make laws. The essential
legislative function is the determination of the legislative
policy and its formulation as a rule of conduct. Obviously it cannot abdicate its functions in favour of another. But in view of the multifarious activities of a
welfare State, it cannot presumably work out all the
details to suit the varying aspects of a complex situation.
G
H must necessarily delegate the working out of details to
the executive or any other agency. But there is a danger
inherent in such a process of delegation. An overburdened legislature or one controlled by a powerful
executive may unduly pverstep the limits of delegation.
It may not lay down any policy at all; it may declare its
H
policy in vague and general terms; it may not set down
(I) 11965] 2 S.C.R. 477.
(3) A.l.R. 1967 S.C. 1895, 1901.
(2) A.T.R. 1967 S.C. 1480·
MUNCL. CORPN., DELHI V. B!RLA MILLS (Shah, J.)
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
301
any standard for the guidance of the executive; it may
confer an arbitrary power on the executive to change or
modify the policy laid down by it without reserving for
itself any control over subordinate legislation. This self
effacement of legislative power in favour of another
agency either in whole or in part is beyond the permissible
limits of delegation."
On a review of the cases the following principles appear to be
well-settled: (i) Under the Constitution the Legislature has plenary powers within its allotted field; (ii) Essential legislative function cannot be delegated by the Legislature, that is, there can be
no abdication of legislative function or authority by complete
effacement, or even partially in respect of a particular topic or
matter entrusted by the Constitution to the Legislature; (iii) Power
to make subsidiary or ancillary legislation may however be entrusted by the Legislature to another body of its choice, provided
there is enunciation of policy, principles, or standards either expressly or by implication for the guidance of the delegate in that
behalf. Entrustment of power without guidance amounts to excessive delegation of legislative authority; (iv) Mere authority to
legislative on a particular topic does not confer authority to delegate its power to legislate on that topic to another body. The
power conferred upon the Legislature on a topic is specifically entrusted to that body, and it is a necessary intendment of the constitutional provision which confers that power that it shall not be
delegated without laying down principles, policy, standard or guidance to another body unless the Constitution expressly permits
delegation; and (v) the taxing provisions are not exception to these
rules.
It was asserted that the doctrine of excessive delegation of
legislative power is inapplicable to the conferment of taxing power
on local authorities. It was said that the power to tax is in its
essence a sovereign power of the State, and since a Municipal
Corporation exercises auxiliary authority in the important business
of local self-government, in exercising the power to tax for limited
municipal purPQses, it is not acting as a delegate, but on behalf
of the State. We are unable to accept the broad proposition that
when authortiy is conferred upon a local authority by the Legisla·
ture to tax, the local authority exercising power so conferred acts
as an agent of the State. A local authority is undoubtedly an
instrument of the State in the matter of local government restricted
to a particular area in which it functions. By investing a local
authority with powers of legislation for administration of the Act
relating to local government, sovereign power of the State is entrusted to the. body for limited purpose : but the entrustment of
power is as a delegate, and must in our view be within the
302
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1968) 3 S.C.R.
limits of permissible entrustment consistent with the constitutional
scheme. The power of the State to legislate in mattenl of taxation
within the allotted field is plenary, but in entrusting that power to
a local authority the legislature cannot confer unguided authority.
A
In our judgment, the constitutional power to legislate in respect of a particular topic such as local government-in Entry 5 B
List II of the Seventh Schedule,-does not carry with it the power
to delegate the legislative functions of the .State. Entry 5 List II
confers upon the State the authority to legislate in respect of local
government that is to say, the constitution and powers of municipal
corporations, improvement trusts, district boards, mining se!'tlement authorities and other local authorities for the .Purpose of local c
self-government or village administration. Authority to legislate
in respect of powers of local bodies may encompass authority to
confer power upon the local bodies to tax within certain specific
fields in the appropriate list. But the power conferred by the
legislative entry canno.t override the constitutional limitations
against abdication of legislative authority. The expre5!1ion "power'' D
therefore does not include authority to delegate the essential legislative function without disclosing principles, policy, or standard
guiding the local bodies in the exercise of the power.
Again the guidance which saves delegation from the vice of
excessiveness may be express or may be implied : and the extent E
of the guidance must be determined by the subject-matter of legislation and the power entrusted. But, in our judgment, the delegation cannot be upheTd, merely because of the special status,
character, competence or capacity of the delegate or by reference
to the provisions made in the statute to prevent abuse by the
<lelegate of i~ authority. The question is one of the restriction
upon the power of the legislative body to delegate the power of F
legislation and that restriction is not removed because the delegate
is a high dignitary of the State or is especially versed in a particular branch of administration or has special information or is in
a position to collect that information, or is not likely to abuse its
authority. The Constitution entrusts the legislative functions to
the legislative branch of the State, and directs that the functions G
shall be performed by that body to which the Constitution has
entrusted and not by some one else to whom the Legislature at a
given time thinks it proper to delegate the function entrusted to
it. A body of experts in a particular branch of undoubted integrity or special competence may probably be in a better-position
to exercise the power of legislation in that branch, but the Consti- H
tution has choren to invest the elected representatives of the people
to exercise the power of legislation, and not to such bodies of
experts. Any attempt on the part of the experts to usurp, or
MUNCL. CORPN., DELHI V. BIRLA MILLS (S/tah, J.)
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
303
of the representatives of the people to abdicate the functions vested
in the legislative branch is inconsistent with the constitutional
scheme. Power to make subordinate or ancillary legislation may
undoubtedly be conferred upon a delegate, but the Legislature
must in conferring that power disclose the policy, principles or
standards which are to govern the delegate in the exercise of that
power so as to set out a guidance. Any delegation which
transgresses this limit infringes the constitutional scheme.
It is necessary then to consider whether in the present case the
Parliament bas disclosed any policy, principles, standards or
guidance in conferring authority upon the Corporation to fix the
rates of tax selected by the Corporation out of the list contained in
s. 113(2), to select persons to be rendered liable to tax, the system
of assessment to be adopted and the exemptions, if any, to be
granted. The Act leaves it to the Corporation by resolution to define
the maximum limits of tax to be levied, the class or classes of
persons, or descriptions or descriptions of articles and properties
to be taxed, the system of assessment to be adopted and the
exemptions, if any, to be granted. The Act discloses by express
enactment no standard, no principle and no policy laid down by the
Parliament to guide the Corporation in levying ·and collecting the
optional taxes. By providing in sub-s. (2) of s. 150 that the resolution will come into force on or from the date as may be specified
in the order of sanction of the Central Government, an overriding
authority is conferred upon the Union Executive, but that is not
a substitute for guidance; Counsel for the Corporation and some
interveners contended that the Act contained some indications of
policy and principles governing the exercise of the power to tax.
They relied upon the use of the expression "for the purposes of
this Act" ins. 113(2) and contended that this was sufficient guidance to the Corporation. The Corporation is undoubtedly competent to levy tax only for the purposes of the Act, and for no
other purpose and by providing expressly what is implicit in a
statute relating to municipal taxation no guidance is furnished to
the Corporation in the exercise of the power delegated. Even if
the expression "for the purposes of this Act" were not used in
s. 113(2), the Corporation could not levy or collect taxes for
purposes other than those for which it is set up by the Act. The
Corporation is a statutory body charged with municipal admini1tration. It is a body corporate with power to acquire, hold and
dispose of property in its name, and is charged with municipal
government, and can exercise its powers only for the purposes of
the Act, and for no other purpose. Again by the use of the expression "for the purposes of this Act" no principfo, policy, or
stllndard is disclosed in the matter of the rates of tax, liability of
persons, objects or transactions to be taxed, and the scheme or
system of taxation to be adopted.
304
SUPREME COUllT llEPOllTS
[1968] 3 s.c.ll.
It was then urged that the delegate being the Corporation
which is traditionally associated with the exercise of functions in
the sphere of local government, it has the same powers which
the State has within the limited field allotted to it, and therefore
when the Legislature of the State confers upon the Corporation
the power to tax, it is not in substance delegating any legislative
function, but investing the Corporation :.vith the State's power to
tax. As we have already observed, the power to tax vested in the
State is because of the exigencies of administration invested for
limited purposes in local bodies, but the investment is as a delegate of, and not as an agency of, the State.
It was also said that the standards or guidance furnished by
the Act for exercising the delegated authority are to be found in
"the needs of the Corporation", and "needs of the Corporation"
are of necessity an adequate guidance. Strong reliance in that
behalf was placed upon the judgment of this Court in the Liberty
Cinema's case('), which we have already referred. Sarkar, J.,
speaking for the majority of the Court observed at p, 494 :
"It seems to us that there are various decisions of
this Court which support the proposition that for a
statutory provision for raising revenue for the purposes
of the delegate, as the section now under consideration
is, the needs of the taxing body for carrying out its functions under the statute for which alone the taxing power
was conferred on it, may afford sufficient guidance to
make the power to fix the rate of tax valid."
The learned Judge proceeded to derive the principle stated by him
from the decisions in The Western India Theatres Ltd v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Poona('); Vasant/al Maganbhai'
Sajanwa/a v. The State of Bombay('); Union of India v. Bhana
Ma( Gu/zari Mal('); Harishankar Bag/av. The State of Madhya
Pradesh(•). But the cases cited did not make the needs of the taxing body a test for determining whether guidance was furnished to
the delegate in exercising the power to tax. While we agree with
the view expressed by Sarkar, J., that in the case of a self-governing local authority with taxinp; power, a large amount of flexibility
in the guidance to be provided for ·the exercise of that power must
exist, we are unable to hold that because the delegate is a local
authority which "needs" large funds, depending upon diverse and
changing circumstances, the power conferred upon the Corporation
to adjust the tax to its varying needs may be regarded as an
adequate guide.
(1) [1965] 2 S.C.R. 477.
<3> [1961J s.c.R. 341.
(2) [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 71.
(4) [1960] 2 S.C.R. 627.
(5) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 380.
A
B
c
D
It
F
G
H
MUNCL. CORPN., DELHI V. BIRLA MILLS (Shah, J.)
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
305•
If the needs of a local body be an indication of guidance, the
rule against excessive delegation of legislative authority is reduced
to a varnishing paint. The requirement of a large degree of flexibility in the matter of municipal tax~tion can in any event be no
guidance- in determining the persons, propertie~ or transactions
which are to be taxed and the system of taxatt_on to be adopted.
Failure to give a guidance in respect of all these matters exposes
the legislation to the vice of excessive delegation. In the Liberty
Cinema's ease(') the Corporation was invested with the po,wer to
fix the rates : the persons who were liable to pay the tax, and the
system of assessment were easily determinable by the scheme of
the Act and no question of exemption fell to be detem1ined.
In M/s. Devidas Gopal Krishnan's case('), Subba Rao, C.J.,.
speaking for the Court observed :
"The argument of the learned Counsel (for the
State) that such a policy could be gathered from the
constitutional provisions cannot be accepted, for, if accepted, it would destroy the doctrine of excessive delegation. It would also sanction conferment of power by
Legislature on the executive Government without laying
down any guidelines in the Act."
The Court was concerned with the delegation of uncontrolled'
power to the executive Government to fix rates of sales tax. In·
our judgment, in the case of a statute delegating taxing power to
a municipality, the same rule applies and a guideline cannot be·
inferred from the constitutional provision conferring power to tax.
It was also said that the action of the Corporation in levying
and imposing optional taxes is subject to a two-fold control : ( 1)
the Act expressly prescribes that the resolution of the Corporation
shall be sanctioned by the Central Government before it becomes
effective; and (2) that the act of levying tax together with aU
incidental matters is entrusted to a body of elected representatives
of the people who are responsible to the electorate. We do not
think that the existence of either of these controls warrants a
departure from the rule against excessive delegation. They may
probably operate as effective safeguards against abuse. But the
Constitution has entrusted the power of legislation to the Parliament and has also imposed a restriction against delegation of its
authority without setting out guidance to the delegate; the Parlia
ment cannot by providing against abuse of its functions by its delegate reduce the rigour of the rule against excessive delegation of
authority. The rule against excessive delegation of legislative
power is a restriction upon the power of Parliament : whether' in
a given instance the rule is violated must depend on the nature
(1) [1965] 2 S.C.R. 477.
(2) A.J.R. !967 S.C. !895, 1901.
306
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1968] 3 s.c;R.
and the extent of delegation and not by the application of the
test that delegation of authority to some other body may more
effectively administer the Act. If the argument that by imposition
of controls which ensure that the power delegated wjll not be abused
by the Corporation is regarded as determinative of the JY.:>licy or
principle guiding the Corporation, it may be open to the Legislature in many other cases e.g. 'in statutes relating to 'Income-tax
Wealth-tax, Sales-tax and the like, to delegate the power to tax
including the fixation of rates, persons, objects and transactions
to be charged, the system of taxation to be adopted and other
related matters to persons of unimpeachable credit and undoubted
technical competence, with avenues and means f()r collecting 1he
necessary information and for acting upon it. Whether that
·scheme of levying a tax may, on practical considerations be.
deemed better suited lo effective administration of the taxing Acts
than the vote of the elected representatives of the people is a matter
·On which no ·opinion need be expressed. It may suffice to state
that such entrustment of legislative power with'()ut guidance is in
consistent with the basic concept on which our constitutional
scheme is founded. Our Constitution-makers have entrusted the
power of legislation to the el~ted representatives of the people
~o that the power is exercised not only in the name of the people
but by the people. The rule against excessive delegation of
legislative authority is a necessary postulate of the S\'.lvereignty of
the people. It is not claimed to be nor intended to be a panacea
3gainst the shortcomings of public administration. Governance
of the State in manner determined by the people through their
representatives being of the essence of our form of government, the
plea that a substitute scheme for governance through delegate;
may .be more effective is destructive of our political structure. If
it be remembered that legislation on a given topic is intended to
be a declaration of the popular will relating to the administration of that topic in the larger public interest, the futility of the
argument that a delegate of the Legislature which is invested with
the power to determine and announce the popular will, may either
because of its special competence, or because of controls on it
will be as good as, or even better than, the legislature, becomes
obvious.
The circumstance that the affairs of the Corporation are administered by the elected representatives responsible to the people is
in our judgment, wholly irrelevant in determining whether the rule
against excessive delegation may be departed from. If that exception be true, the Parliament may justifiably delegate its power
to enact laws to other bodies merely by the expedient of constituting those bodies from among the representative of the people.
It may also be noticed that under s. 490 of the Delhi Municipal
<'orporation Act, 1957, in certain eventualities t11e Central
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
MUNCL. CORPN., DELHI v. BIRLA MILLS (Shah, /.)
A
B
c
D
E
F
307
Government may supersede the Corporation for such period as may
be specified in the order. When the order of supersession is passed
all concillors and aldermen vacate their offices and during the
period of supersession of the Corporation, all powers and duties
conferred and imposed upon the Corporation are exercisable and
performable by such officer or authority as the Central Government may appoint in that behalf, and that would include power
of taxation. Certainly during the period that the Corporation
remains under supersession, the power to tax would be exercised.
by a nominee of the Central Government and not by the representatives of the people.
The Parliament has undoubtedly at any given time power to·
withdraw the delegated power in favour of the Corporation. But
by retaining authority to withdraw power from the delegate, no
principles, policy, or standards governing the delegate are set out.
If an express provision which ensures against abuse is not a substi·
tute for guidance in another garb, the power of the Parliament to
withdraw authority will not for the like reason be a substitute.
It was then s~id that there has been a long standing practice·
in the Indian Legislatures for conferring upon the Corporations
and Municipalities power to tax in the form in which it is conferred by s. 113 ( 2). But the issue of constitutional validity of the·
provisions under challenge cannot be permitted to be clouded by
reference to a practice, assuming that it is of a long duration. We
have not thought it necessary to, and it would be impossible for
us to examine all the statutes under which the power has, it is
claimed, been conferred upon the Corporations or Mwtlcipalities
in the form in which it has been conferred by s, 113(2) of the
Act.
It was also said that it is impossible for the Legislature, having
regard to the varying needs of the Municipalities to lay down any
guidance, principles or policy to govern them in the imposition of
diverse taxes.. But that argument has, in our judgment little substance. In the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 19S7, the imposition of major taxes set out in sub-s. (1) of s. 113 is made
subject to clear and precise provisions providing for principles.
G policy and standards. It is only in respect of the oPtional taxes
set out in sub-s. ( 2) of s. 113 that no such guidance is =·closed.
It was also urged that fixing a maximl!m rate is not any 'dance.
because it would be possible for the Legislature to fix a m · um
rate which is wholly unrelated to the realities, and the formal
requirement of ~idance may, by prescribing that unreal maxlH mum, be complied with. But it is not suggested that in all cases
by fixing a maximum rate, .a guidance would be deemed to be
supplied. Fixing .of maximum rate which prevents the Corporation or Municipality from levying a tax at a rate higher than that
308
SUPRBMB COURT, REPORTS
[1968] 3 S C.R.
A
rate, to be a guidance, must not be wholly unrelated to the demands
·of the Corporation, the capacity of the tax-payers to bear the
liability and the other relevant matters.
Reliance was sought to be placed upon the minority judgment
·Of this Court in Municipal Board, Hapur v. Raghuvendra Kripal
and Ors. ( 1 ). The primary question which fell to be determined in
that case related to the validity of s. 135(3) of the U.P. Munici- B
palities Act 2 of 1916, which shut out all enquiry into the regularity of the procedure by which tax has been imposed 3fter the
sanction of the Government to a resolution of the Municipality
·selecting a tax for imposition had been obtained. It was held by
the majority 1hat the rule of conclusive evidence in s. 135 ( 3) did
.not shut out all enquiry by courts. The Court incidentally con- c
:sidered the question whether the enactment of s. 135(3) amounted
to delega1ion of legislative power to tax insofar as the rate and
incidence. were concerned and in the minority judgment it was
observed that the Legislature may delegate to a subordinate authority the power to fix rates under proper safeguards, and it is not
:necessary to specify all the situations under which this can be D
·done. It was observed at p. 970 :
"But there can be no doubt that in the matter of
local taxation Jike taxation by municipal boards, district
boards and bodies of that character there is pre-eminently
· a case for delegating the fixation of the rate of tax
to the local body, be it a municipal board or a district
E
board or some other board of that kind. The reason for
this is that problems of different municipalities or districts may be differept and one municipality may require
one kind of tax at a particular rate at a particular time
while another municipality may need another kind of tdX
at another rate at some other time. Therefore, the legisF
lature can in the case of taxation by local bodies delegate even the authority to fix the rate to the local body
provided it has taken care to specify the safeguards in
the form of procedural provisions or such other forms as
it considers necessary in the matter of fixing the rate."
'If thereby it is meant that the rule against excessive delegation of
·1egislative power may be departed from on the ground that the
delegate is hedged in by controls or restrictions which will prevent
'it from abusing its authority, we are unable to agree. Safeguards
against abuse do not alter the character of unauthorised dele11:ation
of legislative power. They cannot be a substitute for the guidance
·which the Constitutional Scheme requires that the Parliament must
give to a delegate. As the validity of the constitutional protection
.cannot be judged in the light of what the character, capacity or
(I} (1966] I S.C.R. 9SO.
G
JI
MUNCL. CORPN., DELHI v. BIRLA MILLS (Sikri, J.)
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
309
the special aptitude of the delegate may be, it cannot also be
adjudged in the light of the provisions made against abuse of
power.
Turning to the terms of s. 113(2) of the Act, we are of the
opinion that the Parliament has not set out the limits of the tax
which will be levied, persons from whom or the transactions on
which the taxes will be levied, the system of taxation which will
be adopted, and the eXeihptions, if any, which will be grauted. All
these matters are left to the Corporation. In possible cases such
a power is capable of the grossest abuse. We may, however,
hasten to observe that the vice of delegation lies not in its r.apecity
for abuse, but in its delegation beyond peri'nissible limits and
contrary to the constitutional scheme. Undoubtedly delegation
of the authority to legislate on those mat:ers is always subject to
the rule that the action of the delegate which amounts to unreason··
able exercise of the powers will be invalid. But that does not alter
the true character of the rule against excessive delegation of legi~
lative authority.
In our view, the provisions of s. 150(1) insofar as they leave
to the Corporation to fix the maximum rates of taJt to be levied,
class or classes of persons, or the description or description of
articles and properties to be taxed, the system of assessment
to be adopted and the exemptions if any to be granted
are invalid. We hold that the Validating Act 35 of 1966 validly
levies and imposes tax on consumption or sale of ·electricity till
March 31, 1966. It will however be declared thats. 150(1) is
void as permitting excessive delegation of legislative authority to
the Corporation.
Sikri, J. I have had the advantage of reading the judgments
prepared by the learned Chief Justice Hidayatullah, J., and Shah,
J. I agree with the learned Chief Justice that the appeals be
atlowed and with the order regarding costs. I further agree with
the reasons given by him for holding (a) that the tax was imposed
on consumption of electricity (b) that the sanction by Government
was in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, and ( c)
that the Validation Act validated the levy and collection for the
period April 1, 1960, to March, 1966. But as I hold different
views as to the powers of legislatures in India, I would briefly
indicate them.
Apart from authority in my view Parliament has full power
to delegate legislative authority to subordinate bodies. This power
flows, in my judgment, from Art. 246 of the Constitution. The
word "exclusive" means exclusive of any other legislature and not
exclusive of any subordinate body. There is, however, one resriction in this respect and that is also contained in Art. 246.
310
SUPREME OOUIT REl'O&TS
(1968] 3 s.c.R.
Parliament must pass a law in respect of an item or items of the
relevant list. Negatively this means that Parliament cannot abdicate its functions. It seems to me that this was the position under
the various Government of India Acts, and the Constitution has
made no difference in this respect. I read Hodge v. R. (') and
Powell v. Appollo Candle Co.( 2 ) as laying down that legislature
like Indian legislatures had full power to delegate legislative
authority to subordinate bodies. In the judgments in these cases
no such word as "policy" "standard" or "guidance" is mentioned.
It is true that in Hodge v. R. (1 ) the words 'ancillary to legislation'
are mentioned but if we examine ss. 4 and 5 of the Liquor License
Act, 1877, it would bl found that no guidance is contained in these
sections for defining the conditions and qualifications requisite to
obtain tavern licenses, for limiting the number of tavern and shop
licenses, and the nature of the penalty to be irnPosed for the infraction thereof. Any person drafting these conditions and qualifications and other matters will find no guidance in s. 4 or s. 5 of
the Liquor License Act. It is, however, true that the objective to
be achieved is given in the Act and the words "ancillary to legislation" in the context must mean ancillary to the objective underlined in the legislation.
The case of In re : The Initiative and Referendum Act( 1)
provides an instance of abdication of functions by a legislature.
No inference can be drawn from this case that delegatiollS of the
type with which we are concerned amount to abdiC<ltion of func·
tions.
The question then arises : Is the Delhi Municipal Corporation
Act, 1957, a law with respect to any of the items in List II? The
answer is plainly in the affirmative. I can see no sign of abdication of its functions by Parliament in this Act. On the contrary
Parliament has constituted the Corporation and prescribed its
duties and powers in great detail.
But assuming I am bound by authorities of thi' Couft to test
the validity of s. 113(2)(d) ands. 150 of the Act by ascertaining
whether a guide or policy exists in the Act, I find adequate guid~
or policy in the expression "purposes of the Act" in s. 113. The
Act has pointed out the objectives or the results to be achieved
and taxation can be levied only for the purpi>se of achieving the
objectives or the results. This, in my view, is sullicfont guidance
especially to a self-governing body like the Delhi Municipal
Corporation. It is not necessary to rely on the safeguards mentioned by the learned Chief Justice to sustain the delegation.
There is no need to think that delegations of the pr~nt ty~
)Vill lead to arbitrary taxation or rules. Fmt, we must have farth
(IJ 9 A.G 117.
(3) [1919] A.C. 935.
(2). 10 A.C. 282.
B
c
D
E
F
H
MUNCL. CORPN., DELHI v. BlllLA MILLS (Sikri, J.)
311
A in our rep~tative bodies and secondly, I ame .with the learned
Chief Justice and Hidayatullah, J., that in suitable cases taxation
in pursuance of delegated powers by a Municipal Corporation can
be struck down as unreasonable by Gourts. If Parliament chooses
to delegate wide powers it runs the risk of the bye-Jaws or the
rules framed under the delegated power being challenged as
B umeasonable.
ORDER
In accordance with the opinion of the majoliiy, the appeals
are allowed, the order of the High Court is set aside in so far as
C it is against the appellant and the writ petitions filed by the
respondent a»e dismissed. There will be no order as to costs
throughout.
R.K.P.S.
L6Sup. Cl/68-7
Report an error or ask for masking: grievance@lawgrids.org