NAIR SERVICE SOCIETY LTD. versus REV. FATHER K. C. ALEXANDER & ORS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 12 February 1968 | [1968] 3 S.C.R. 163 | 1968 INSC 39
Key facts
- Decided
- 12 February 1968
- Bench
- M. HIDAYATULLAH*, S.M. SIKRI, K.S. HEGDE
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 1632/1966
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Citation
- [1968] 3 S.C.R. 163
- Neutral citation
- 1968 INSC 39
Text of the judgment
A
:
NAIR SE~VICE SOCJf:TY L'ID.
v.
B
c
D
E
11
REV. FAtllER K. C. ALEXANi>l!;R & ORS.
February 12, 1968
[M. HIDAYATULLAH, s. M. SIKlll ANO K. s. HEGDE, JJ.]
Specific Relief Act, 1877 (1 of 1877), ss. 8 aild 9-Suit under s. 8
wheiher must he based on proof of title-Jus-tertli-lndian Evidence Act,
1872 (!of 1872), s. 110 presumption under-The Limitation Act, 1963
(36 of 1963) Arts. 64 and 65-Travancore Limikztion Regulation (VI of
110 M.E. s. 32)-Travancore Specific Relief.Act XJ/l of 1115, ss. 7 and
8-(Trcvancore) Regulation IV of 1091-Effect <Jf incurring penalty
under Regulations on right to bri111: suit for ·recov~ry of pos,ression -of land
-Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act 5 of 1908), 0. VJ, r. 11-Amem/.
ment of pkadings-Effect of /aches.
After a case under the Travancore Land Conservancy Regulation · IV
of 1094 M.E. the plaintiff was evicted from 160 acres of Poramboke land.
Thereafter in August 1938 the appellant Society applied for a Kuthakapattom lease of this area which was granted and the Society entered inti)
possession in July 1939. The suit land was adjacent to the above land. In
the map prepared by the, Court Commissioner the suit land was marked
as L(l) and tho area of 160 acres aforesaid as L(2). In his suit which
was filed in 1942 the plaintiff alleged that after ·entering into possession of
L(2) the Society in October 1939 through its agents forcibly dispossessed
him of L(l) as well. He. asked for restoration of ~session of L(I) and
for related relief. The Society in its defence contended that the plaint
lands were Government Reserve and that the plaintiff was dispossessed by
Government from these lands when he was dispossessed of L(2). In 1948
the Society was granted Kuthakapa•tom lease in respect of a party of L(I)
as well, .and this portion was marked as L(l)(b), the rest of the suit land
being marked as L(l)(a). 1he Society in its written statement did not
aver that it was not in possession of L(l)(a). Subsequently, it attempted
by argument to limit its defence to L(l)(b) on the !IQis of the 1948 base,
But although the- suit was pending iii the trial cou'rt for 17 years no application for amendmen! of the pleadings to this effect was made. The trial
court decreed the plaintiff's suit for L(l)(a). In the High Court the
Society applied on the last day of the hearing of the aJlpeal, for amendment
of its wntten statement limiting its defence to portion L( I )(b), disclaiming all interest in portion L(l)(a). The High Court rejected the application as belated and decreed the suit against the Society in respect of L(l)
(b) as well. The Society appealed, by certificate to this Court. The main
contention urged on behalf of the Society based on the Travancore law
corresponding to ss. 8 and 9 of the. Indian Specific Relief Act. was that
after the expiry of six months from the date of dispossession a suit folr
possession without proof of title was incompetent. On facts the Society's
plea was that the plaintiff bad been evicted by the Government from the
suit lands at the same time as he was evicted from L(2).
HELD : (i) The High Court accepted the plaintijf's allegations as to
his forcible dispossession from the suit land by the Society. On examination Of the evidence there was no reason to depart from the finding of the
High Court. [171 D-E]
(ii) It cannot be said that the distinction between ss. 8 and 9 of the
Indian Specific Relief Act was based on the distinction that was at one
163
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19681 3 S.C.R.
A.'
time drawn in R_qman Law bet,\\'.~en the two kinds of Interdicts namely,
tie vi cotidlana and de vi crmilta. In the time of Justinian the two Interdicts
de vi ~-ere fused and there was only one action representing both. The
appeal to Roman Law, l"as· therefore of no .assistance. [)74 B-C]
(iii) The contention that while under s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act a
SJ.lit based mereJy on prior possession must be filed within six months, while
a suit unper s. 8 based on proof of title may be filed within 12 years can~
not be sustained. Section 8 of the Act does not limit the kinds of suit but
only lays down that the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure must be followed. This i_s very different from saying that a suit based
on possession alone is incompetent after the expiry of 6 months. Under ·
s. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure itself all sui~s of a civil nature are
triable excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. There is no prohibition expressly barring a suit based on
possession alone. [175 F-GJ
Ram Harakh Rai v. Scheodihal Joti, (1893) 15 All. 384, considered.
Mustapha Sahib v. Santha Pillai. l.L.R. 23 Mad. 179, .and Kutta11
Naraya111an v. Thonunan Mat.hcti, (1966) Kerala Law Times 1, applie.d.
The uniform view of the courts is that if s. 9 of the Specific Relief
Act is ultilised the plaintiff need not prove title and the title of the defen·
dant does not ayaiJ him. When, ho\vever, the period of 6 n1onths has passed
questions of title can be raised by the defendent and if he doeiil so the plaintiff must establish a better title or fail. In other words the right is restricted to possession only in a suit under s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act but
that does not bar a suit on prior possession within 12 years and title need
not be proved unless the defendant can prove one. Articles 64 and
65 of the Indian Limitation Act as recently an1cnded bring out this difference. Article 64 enable, a suit within 12 years fron1 dispossession for
poSSession of immovable property bi:.::;ed on possession and not on ·title,
when the .plaintiff while in possession of the property has been disprissessed.
Article 65 is for posscs~ion of immovable property or any interest there~
in ba'Sed on title. The amendment is not remedial but declaratory of the
Jaw. In the present case therefore, the plaintiff's suit was competent.
fl77 A-DJ
.
(iv) The Society could not on the· basis of possession claim a presumption of title in. its favour· relying on s. 110 of the Indian Evidence Act.
'fhis presumption can hardly arise when the fac~ arc known. When the
facts disclose no title, possession alone decides. Jn the present case neither
party had title and therefore s. 110 of the Evidence Act was immaterial.
[177 E-Fl
(v) The plea of jus terlii on behalf of the appellant could not succeed.
The plea is base<! on Doe v. Barnard (1849] Q.B. 945 which was departed
from in Sher v. Whitlock, (1885] 1 Q.B 1 and was overruled in Pe".v v,
C/issold. (1907] A.C. 73. The view taken in Perry v. C/issold that a person
in possession of land has a perfectly good· title against all the world but
the rightful owner_. has been consistentJy accepted in India . and the
amendment of the Indian Limitation Act has given approval to- that proposition. Accordifigly the :Society was_ not e}1titl"ed to plead in t~e. present
case that the title to the suit land lay 1n the State. Such a plea 1f allowed
will always place the defendant in a position of dominance. He :has only
to evict the prior trespasser and sit pretty pleading that the title is·in some·
one else. The Jaw does not countenance the doct'rine of 'findings keepinw.'.
[179 H, 182 F-G]
Perry v . .Cllsso/d, [1907] AC. 73, Burlin/! v. Read, 11 Q. B. 904 and
Smith v. Oxenden. 1 Ch. Ca 25, appJ;ed.
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NAIR SERVICE SOCY. V. ALEXANDER (Hidayatul/ah, !.)
.
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165
Dlzc.rani Kllanta Lalliri v. Garbar Ali Khan, 25 ·M.LJ. 9 P. C. and
Afa/u;hir Prasad v. Ja1nuna _Singh, 92 LC. 31 P.C. distinguished,
(vi) The plaintiff's claim could not be refused on ground that he was
an offender liable to pZnalty under Regulation IV of 1091 M.E. and other
connected Regulation and rules. The Regulations were intended to regulate the relation of Government and persons but had no bearing upon the
relations between persons claiming to be in possession. The penalty under
the Regulations were a fine for wrongful occupation and in no· sense a
punishment for crime. The illegality of possession was not. thus a criminal
act and the. regaining lost possession could not he described as an action
to take·advantage of one's own illegal action. In fact the plaintiff was not
required to rely upon any illegality, Which is the consideration which makes
the courts deny their assistance a party. [183 C-D]
8
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Ho/mas v. Johnson, (1775) 1 Cowpar 341, referred to.
(vii) The Society had failed to amend its pleadings in .respect of suit
land marked L(l)(b), and had made a request to the High Court to
ailow such amendment only at the eleventh hour. But on the·facts and
circunis.!ances of the case it was desirable. to allow the amendment in order
to determine the effect of the 1948 lease On the rights of the parties in
L(l)(b). Without amendment another suit based on the second Kuthaka·
pattom was inevitable. There is good authority for the proposition tltat
Subsequent events may be. taken note of if they tend to reduce litigation.
This was not one of those cases in which there was likelihood of prolonged
litigation after remand or in which a new case would begin. [Case remanded to trial court to try issue arising out of amendment in respect of
L(l)(b)]. [187 D-E]
.
Ca<:""-law referred to.
r
(viii) The exact implications of the second K·uthakapattom after _the
amendment of pleadings as allowed were for the trial court to determine
but it was clear that the second Kuthakapattom could ncit be regarded as
re~roactive from the date -of the grant of the first Kuthakapattom. The
document granting the· 1948 lease. did not mention that it was retrospective.
A formal document which has no ambiguity cannot be varied by reference
to othe'r documents which are not intended to vary it. [187 G]
(ix) In respect of portion of the land L(l)(a) the appeal must be
di1missed. [188 D·E]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
of 1966.
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1632
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated December 23,
1965 of !he Kerala High Court in Appeal Suit No. 406 of 1961.
M. K. Nambiar, N. A. Subramanian, K. Velayudhan Nqir,
T. K. Unnithan, Rameshwar Nath and Mahinder Narain, for the
appellant.
H
S. V. Gupte, T. P. Pauloo·e, B. Dutta, Annamma Alexander,
J. B. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for res-
pondent No. 1.
166
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1968] 3 S.C.R.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
A
Hidayatull8'a, J. This is an appeal by .certificate from. the
judgment of the High Court of Kerala, December 23, 1965,
reversing the decree of the Sub-Court, Mave!ikara. By the
judgment and decree under appeal the suit of the first respondent, Rev .. Father K. C. Alexander (shortly· the plaintiff) was B
decreed in respect of the suit lands of which he had sought possession from the appellant, Nair Service Society Ltd. (shortly the
Society or the first defendant) and some others who are shown
as respondents 2 to 6. The facts in this appeal are as follows :
The plaintiff filed a suit in forma pauperis on October 13,
1942 against ihe Society, its Kariasthan (Manager) and four c
others for possession of 131.23 acres of land from Survey Nos.
780/1 and 780/2 of Rannipakuthy in tb.e former State of
Travancore and for mesne profits past and future with compensation for waste. The suit lands are shown as L( 1) on a map
Ex. L prepared by Commissioners in CMA 206 of 1110 M.E.
and proved by P.W. 10. The two Survey Nos. are admittedly D
Government Poramboke lands. The plaintiff claimed to be in
possession of these lands for over 70 years. In the year 1100
M.E. a Poramboke case for evicting hiin from an area shown as
L(2) measuring 173.38 acres, but described in the present suit
variously as 160, 161 and 165 acres, was started under the
Travancore Land Conservancy R.egulation IV· of 1094 M.E.
(L.C. c~e No. 112/1100 M.E.) by Pa~anamathitta Taluk E
Cutchery. This land is conveniently described as 160 acres and
has been so referred to by the High Court and the Sub-Court.
The plaintiff was fined under the Regulations and was evicted
from the 160 acres. The Society applied for Kuthakapattom
lease of this area 011 August 11, 1938. The lease was granted
but has not been produced in the case. It was for 165 acres F
and the Society was admittedly put in possession of it on July
24, 1939 or thereabouts. The lease was for 12 years. Plaintiff's case was that on 13/16 October, 1939 a nµmber of persons
acting on behalf of the Society trespassed upon and took possession of the suit lands (131.23 acres) in addition to the 160 acres.
The plaintiff, therefore, claimed possession of the excess land G
from the Soci.ety, its Manager and defendants 3 to 6, who were
acting on behalf of the Society. The plaintiff also claimed mesne
profits and compensation for waste.
The Society contended that the plaint lands were Government Reserve and that the plaintiff was dispossessed by Government from these lands when he was dispossessed of .the 16o' acres.
The suit land is in two parts. Ex. L. shows these two parts as
L (I )(a) and L 0 .)(b). The Society had apP.lied · for another
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NAIR SERVICE SOCY. v. ALEXANDER
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(Hidayatullah, J.)
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Kuthakapattom lease in respect of L(l)(b) and obtained it
during the pendency of the suit on March 10, 1948. In this
Kl/thakapattom, which is Ex. l, the land is shown as 256.13
acres and the lease is made without limit of time. Simultaneously a demand was made from the Society for arrears of Pattom at
1he same rate as for the Kuthakapattom in respect of the whole
land after setting off the amount already paid by the Society.
The Society in its written statement did not aver that it was not
in possession of L(l)(a) and resisted the suit in regard to the
entire suit lands. Subsequently it attempted by argument to limit
its defence to L ( 1)(b) which was additionally granted to it in
the Kuthakapattom Ex. 1. Although the suit pended for 17
years in the Sub-Court no application for amendment was made.
The Society asked for amendments several times, .the last being
on October 15, 1958 .. However, on the last day of hearing of
the appeal in the High Court (December 14, 1965) the Society
applied for an amendment of the written statement limiting its
defence to portion L(l)(b) disclaiming alt interest in portion·
LI 1)(a) and attempted to plead the grant of the second Kuthakapattom in its favour on March 10, 1948. The High Court
rejected this application by its judgment under appeal and'
awarded possession against the Society of the entire suit land.
The Society in its case denied the right of the plaintiff to bring
a suit for ejectment or its liability for compensati.On as claimed·
by the plaintiff. In the alternative, the Society claimed the value
of improvements· effected by it, in case the claim of the plaintiff
was. decreased against it. The other defendants remined ex-parte
in the suit and did not appeal. They have now been shown as
proforma respondents by the Society.
The suit went to trial on 13 issues. The main issues were
(a) whether the plaintiff was in possession of lands L(l) for
over 70 years and had improved these lands; (b) whether the·
first defendant was entitled to possession of any area in hcess
of the first K uthakapattom for 12 years; and ( c) whether tlie
trespas~ was on 13/16 October, 1939 or whether the plaintiff
was evicted on July 24, 1939 by the Government from the suit
land in addition to the 160 acres in respect of which action was
taken in the Land Conservancy case. ·other issues arose from therival claims for mesne profits and compensation to which refer~
e~ce has alrea~y J:>een m~de. The suit was dismissed by ~ !he
tnal Judge agamst the Society but was decreed against defendants
3 to 6 in respect of land L(t)(a) with mesne profits and compensation for waste. The trial Judge held that the possession of
the plaintiff dated back only to 1920-21 and that he was evicted
from portion L(l )(b) as per plan AZ and that the Society was
in possession from the time it entered into possession of 160
-.!68
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1968] 3 s.c.R.
.acres. The trial Judge held that as the land was Poramboke
.and the plaintiff has been ousted by Government he could not
claim possession. The subsequent ,grant of Kuthakapattom
(Ex. 1) was not considered relevant and the suit was decided
on the basis of the facts existing on the date of the commencement of the suit. The trial Judge, however, held that if . the
plaintiff was entitled to ~ecover possession he would also be
entitled to mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 3,392/- from tlctober
16, 1939. The defendants' improvements were estimated at
Rs. 53,085;-: Possession of L(l) (a) was decreed with costs,
mcsne profits past and future, and compesation for waste against
defendants 3 to 6.
B
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The plaintiff filed an appeal in forma pauperis. The High
Court reversed the decree of the trial Judge and decreed it
against the Society and its Manager ordering possession of the
entire suit lands witlr mesne profits past and future, and compensation for any waste. The High Court held that the Society had
admitted its possession in respect of the entire suit land and that D
the grant of Kuthakapattom in respect of L(I )(a) to defendants
3 to 6 by the Government was immaterial. The High Court held
that the evidence clearly established that the plaintiff was in
possession of the plaint lands at least from 1924 to 1925 and
that it made no difference whether the plaintiff was dispossessed
on October 16, 1939 as stated in the plaint or July 24, 1939 as E
alleged by the Society. The main controversy, which was
decided by the High Court, was . whether the plaintiff could
maintain a suit for possession (apart from a possessory suit
under the Travancore laws analogous to s. 9 of the Indian
Specific Relief Act) without proof of title ·basing hil11self mainly
on his prior possession and whether the Society could defend it- F
self pleading the title of the Government. On both these points
the d~cision of the High Court was in favour of the plaintiff.
In this appeal the first comenuon of the Society is that it did
not dispossess the plaintiff on October 16, 1939 but on July 24,
1939 when he was evicted from the 160 acres in respect of which. G
Poramboke case was started against hirn. According to the
Society, if the plaintiff's possession was terminated by the rightful owner and the Society got its possession from the rightful
owner the suit for ejectme.nt could not lie. It may be stated
here that the plaintiff had applied for an amendment to implead
.Government but the amendment was disallowed by the trial H
Judge. In 1928 the plainti~ had filed O.~. 156/1~~3 3:gain~t
the Government for declaration of possess10n and miunction m
respect of the 160 acres of land and L(l)(b), but the suit was
NAIR SERVICE SOCY. V. ALEXANDER
(Hidayatullah, J.)
169
A
dismissed in default and a revision application against the
order of dismissal was also dismissed by the High Court of
Kerala: The suit had delayed the Poramboke case as a temporary injunction has been issued against Government. On the
dismissal of that suit the first Kuthakapattom lease was granted
to the Society. The next contention of the Society is that a suit
B in ejectment cannot lie wihout title and a prior trespasser cannot maintain the suit generally against the latter trespasser and
more particularly in this case in respect of lands belonging to
Government specially when the Iattei- trespasser (even' if it was
one) had the authority of the true owner either given originally
or subsequently but relating back to the date of the trespass. The
c Society also submits that as trespass on Government land was
prohibited by law the plaintiff could not get the assistance of the
court. The Society, also contends more specifically that there is
no true principle of law that possession confers a good title
except against the owner or that possession is a conclusive title
against all but the true owner. In its submission, if a possessory
suit analogous to ·s. 9 of the Indian Specific Relief Act was no'.
D
filed by the plaintiff's only remedy was to file a suit for ejectrnent
pleading and proving his title to the suit land. A mere possessory suit after the expiry of 6 months was not possible. There
are other branches of t)Jese main arguments to which reference
need notl be made here. They will appear when these arguments
will be considered.
E
The first question to settle .is when dispossession took place,
According to the plaintiff he was dispossessed on October 16,
1939 and according to the Society plaintiff was dispossessed on
July 24, 1939 when he was evicted from 160 acres. The trial
Judge accepted the case of the Society and the High Court that
F of the plaintiff. The High Court, however, remarked that it did
not mater when thil, plaintiff was first dispossessed, The difference
in dates is insisted upon by the Society because if it can show
that the plaintiff was dispossessed by the true owner, namely, th~
State, it can resist the suit pleading that it was in possession
under the authority of the owner and that the possession of the
G plaintiff was already disturbed and a suit in ejectment did not
. lie against it. There are; howeve,r, several circumstances which
indicate that the plaintiff's case that dispossession took place in
·
October 1939, is true.
H
To begin with we are concerned with three areas. The Land
Conservancy case concerned L(2) or 160 acres. The other two
areas are L(l)(a) 55.47 acres and L(l)(b) 75.76 acres. These
total t9 291.23 acres. The·suit.was filed··. to obiain possession
L4 Sup CI/68-12
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1968] 3 S.C.R.
of 131.23 acres, that is to say, 291.23 acres minus the 160 acres.
The Society attempted to disclaim all interest in L( 1)(a) and
even attempted to deny that defendants 3-6 were in possession of
it. This was not allowed for very good reasons. In the written
statement no distinction was made between L(l)(a) and L(l)
(b). Although amendments were allowed, no amendment of
the written statement to withdraw L(l)(a) from dispute was B
asked for. The attempt consisted of oral arguments which the
Court did not entertain. Even in the High Court the written
statement was sought to be amended as late as December 14.
1965, the last day of the arguments. The application had two
prayers. About the second of the two prayers we shall say
something later but the amendment we are dealing with was not c
only belated but also an after thought. The High Court rightly
points out that a defendant, who after trial of the suit for 16
years orally asks for the withdrawal of an admission in the
written statement, cannot be allowed to do so. Therefore, the
dispute covered the entire 131.23 acres and the Society was claiming to be- in possession. The plaint had asserted that the defen- D
dants 2-6 were in possession and that defendant 2 was acting for
the Society. In reply the Society claimed to be in possession.
It, however, led evidence on its own behalf that L(l)(a) was
not in its possession. That could not.be considered in view of
the admission in .the pleadings. The contrary admission of the
plaintiff that defendants 3-6 were in possession was cited before
us as it was before the High Court. But the High Court has
already given an adequate answer when it observes that the
plaintiff only said he had heard. this. Therefore, we· are of
opinion that the issue was joined between the plaintiff and the
Society with respect to the entire suit land.
The alternative contention of the Society is that the plaintiff F
was dispossessed by the rightful owner, that is, the State. This
contention was accepted by the trial Judge but rejected by the
High Court. We shall now consider it. It is an admitted fact
that eviction in tlte Land Conservancy case took place on 8-121114 M.E. corresponding to July 24, 1939. Since the order was
to evict the .plaintiff from 160 acres, it is fair to assume that he G
would be evicted from that area only. The Mahazar Ex. AG.
proved by the village Munsiff who was personally present, establishes that eviction was from 160 acres. The High Court judgment mentions the names. of several other witnesses who have
also deposed in the same way. The High Court also points out
that the rubber quotas from the rubber treeil continued to be in H
the name of the plaintiff except in 160 acres in which the quotas
were transferred to the name of Government. All this was very
clear evidence. Further even if some n\ore area was taken over
NAIR SERVICE SOCY. V. ALEXANDER (Hidayatul/ah, /.)
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from the plaintiff, it would be small and not as much as 131.23
acres or even 75. 76 acres. It is to be noticed that the Society
applied on August 11, 1939 for grant of a Kuthakapattom only
in respect of 165 acres and this was on the basis of p<>sSession.
If the Society was in possession of 291.23 acres, it would not have
omitted on August 11, 1939 to apply for the additional area as
well. Another application was made for a second Kuthakapattom
in respect of the additional land on the basis of possession but
only after certain events happened. On September 29, a ' complaint (Ex. AO) was made by Phillippose Abraham (P.W. 8), the
Manager of the plaintiff, that the land was trespassed upon by
the Society's men .who had harvested the paddy. On October
2. 1939 the second defendant made a counter complaint Ex. AS.
This. made a mention of 'land from which the 1st accused (plaintiff) was evicted'. It is, however, to be seen that in the Mahazar
(Bxs. AT, AT-1 and AT-2) the encroached area is shown as 160
acres. On October 13, 1939 one Krishna Nair made a complaint (Ex. AH) against plaintiff's men of beating and dacoity.
On October 16, the servants of the plaintiff were arrested. Bail.
was delayed and was only granted on October 20,. 1939. On
October 24, 1939 the plaintiff complained of dispossession. The
case of dacoity was virtually withdrawn and the accused were
discharged. The High Court accepted the. plea that the false
charge of dacoity and the arrest were a prelude to dispossession
and a ruse to get the servants of the plaintiff out of the way. On
looking into the evidence we cannot say that this inference is
"Tong.
The Society, however draws attention to several circumstances from which it seeks to infer the contrary. We do not think
that they are cogent enough to displace the other evidence. We
may, however, refer to them. The Society first refers to plaintiff's application (Ex. 16) on July 28, 1939 that he was dispossessed of suit buildings and requesting that 160 acres be correctly
de~~rcated. In ot~er documents also the plaintiff complained of
ev~cll~n from land 11;1 excess
160 acres and dispossession from
butldrngs. The Society submits that the evidence showed that
there were no buildings in 160 acres and that only bamboo huts
were to b~ found. . The map Ex. L shows some buildings in
L(2). It 1s more likely that as these buildings were close to the
western boundary between L(2) and L(l), the plaintiff hoped
that he would be abl!" to save them as on admeasurement they
:vould .~e found outside 160 acres. It may be mentioned that
m add1t10n to 160 acres, land 20 acres in extent was further encroach~d upon. _This land is shown in plan Ex. BB and represents httle extens10ns all round the 16(,) acres. If this area was
taken into account and 160 acres admeasured then there was a
possibility of the buildings being saved. This is a ~ore rational
o!
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[1968] 3 S.C.R.
explanation than the contention that as many as 13 i.23 acres
were additionally taken in possession when the plaintiff was dispossessed from 160 acres. We have therefore, not departed from
the finding of the High Court which we find to be sound.
Failing on the facts, the Society takes legal objections to the
suit. According to the learned counsel for the Society the suit
· in ejectment, based on possession in the character of a trespasser
was not maintainable. His contention is that a trespasser's only
remedy is·to file a suit under s. 32 of the Travancore Limitation
Regulation (VI of 1l 00) as amended by Regulations IX of 1100
and 1 of 1101, but within 6 months. This section corresponds
to s. 9 of the Indian Specific Relief Act. Now if dispossession
was by Government the suit could not be filed because there was
a .bar to such a &11it. If dispossession was by the Society a suit
under s. 32 was· competent. The question is whether after the
expiry of 6 months a regular suit based on prior possession withol,it 'proof of 'title was maintainable. This is the main contention
'on merits. although it has many branches. We now proceed to
consider· it.
This aspect of the case was argued by Mr. Nambiar .with
great elaboration for a number of days. The argument had
many facets and it is convenient to deal with some facets separately
because they have no inter connection with others and some.others
together. The main argument is that a suit by a trespasser does
not lie for ejectment of another trespasser after the period of 6
months prescribed by s. 32 of the Travancore Limitation Act (VI
of 1100). The provisions of the Travancore Specific Relief Act
{XIII of 1115)' are iil pari materia and also i[JSissima verba with
· 1he Indian Specific Relief Act and are set out below•.
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•ACT XIII OF lllS.
"S. 7. Recovtry of specific lmin.ovahle property, A person entitled to the
possession of specific immovable property may recover it in the- manner pres·
cribed .bY the Code of _Civil Procedure."
"S. 8. Suit by person dispoJMeSNil of immovable pro~rty. Jf any person is
disp9ssessed without his c;onsent of immovable property otherwise than in due
course of I.aw, he or any person claiming through him may be -·suit recover
possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title~ that may be set up in such
-suit.
G
Nothing in this Section shaU bar ·any person from suf:ig to establish. his
title ~o such property and to recover possession thereof. ·
.
No suit under this section sha11 be brought aa.ainst Our Government.
No appeal ·shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit imtituted
under this secticr.i. nor shall anv review of any such ·order or decree be
.allowed."
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It is convenient to refer to the Indian Act. According to Mr.
Nambiar a contrast exists between ss. 8 and 9 of the Specific
Relief Act. These Sections are reproduced below*. Mr. Nambiar
submits that s. 8 refers to suits for possession other than those
under s. 9, and while question of title is immaterial in suits under
s. 9, under s. 8 a suit for ejectment must be on the basis of title.
In other words, in a suit under s. 8 title must be proved by a
plaintiff but under s. 9 he need not. Once the period of six
months has been lost a suit brought within 12 years for obtaining
possession by ejectment must be based on title and not bare prior
possession alone.
In support of this argument Mr. Nambiar refers to Roman
Law of Interdicts and urges that the same distinction also existed
there and has been borrowed by us through the English practice.
We may first clear this misconception. Possession in Roman Law
was secured to a possessor by two forms of Interdicts-Utipossidetis for immovables and utrubi for moveables. But we are not
concerned with these, but with actions to recover possession which
were compendiously called recuperandae possessionis causa.
•ACT YI OF 1110.
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"S. 32. Right to sue for recovery of unlawfully dispossessed property by
person so disposSessed or his representative. Jf any person is dispos$essed with·
out his consent of any house. building or land otherwise than in due coutse of
law, he or any person claiming through him may by suit instituted within the
period prescribed in Article 2 of the First Scl.iedule appended to this Regula~
tion, recover possession thereof, ·notwithstanding any other title that may be set
up in such suit.
Excep1io11 : Nothing in this section shall bar any person from suing to
establish his title to such property and to- recover possession thereof.
F
Bar to sttit against Gover11111e11t 1111der this sectio11. No suit under this section shall be brought against our Government."
INDIAN SPECIFIC RELIEF /\CT.
"S. 8. Recovery of Sp·ecific immoveable property. A person entitled to the
possession of specific immoveable property may r~over it in the manner prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure."
"
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"S. 9. Sttit by person di.~possessed of inunoveable property. If any· person
i<> dispossessed without hi~ consent of immoveable property: otherwise than in
due course of law, he or any person claiming through him may. by suit.
recover possession thereof, notwithsta:iding any other title that maY be set up
in such suit.
Nothing in this section. sha,11 bar any per..bn from suing to establish his
title to such property and to recover possession thereof.
H
No suit under this section shaU be brought against the Central Government.
or any State Government.
'No appeal shall lie from any order or decree. passed in any suit instituted
under this section. nor shall any review of any such order or decree he
allowed."
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{1968) 3 S.C.R.
There: werl} two interdicts known as deprecario and de vi. Of the
latter two of tbe branches were the Iaterdict de vi cotidiana by
whic)J. possession was ordered "to be restored on an application
made within the year where one had been ejected from land by
force, provided there had not been vi dam.· aut precario from the
ejector." The other d evi armata for ejection by armed force,
was without restriction of time. Mr. Nambiar says that the same
distiQ.cti<>l) exists between suits under ss. 9 and 8 of the Specific Relief Act. This is aa ingenious way of explaining his point
of view but it does not appear that these principles of Roman Law
at all influenced law making. These principles were in vogue ia
early Roman Law. In the time of Justinian the two Interdicts
de vi were fused a.nd there was only one action represeating both.
Even the clausa about vi clam aut precario disappeared and the
restriction toi a year applied to be.th. The appeal to Roman Law
does not, therefore, assist us.
We may now consider whether ss. 8 aad 9 are to be distinguished on the lines suggested. In Mulla's Indiaa Contract and
Specific Relief Acts there is a commentary which explains the
words 'in the manner prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure'
by observing"that is to say by a suit for ejectment 011 the basis of
title: Lachman v. Shambu Narain (1911) 33 All.
174"
The question in that case in the words of the Full Bench was"The sole questioa raised in this appeal is whether a
plaintiff who sues for possession an,d for ejectment of
the defendant 011 the basis of title and fails to prove his
title is still entitled to a decree for possession under
section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, if he can
prove possession within six months anterior to the date
of his dispossession."
In the course of decision the Full Bench dissented from the
earlier view in Ram Harakh Rai v. Sheodihal Joti(') and observed:
"With great respect we ate unable to agree with this
view. Section 8 of the Act provides that a person entitled to the possession of specific immovable property may
recover it in the maaner prescribed by the Code of Civil
Procedure, that is to say, by a suit for ejectment 011 the
basis of title. Section 9 gives a summary remedy to a
person who has without his consent been dispossesSed
of immovable property, otherwise than in due course of
law, for recovery of possession without establishing title,
It) [1893] JS All. 384.
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provided that his suit is brought within six months of
the date of dispossession. The second .paragraph of
the section provides that the person against whom a
decree may be passed under the first paragrap~ m~y,
notwithstanding such decree, sue to establish his title
and to recover possession. The two sections give alternative remedies and are in our opinion mutually exclusive. If a suit is brought under section 9 for recovery
of possession, no. question of tit~e c~ be raised or. determined. The obiect of the section 1s clearly to d1SC011rage forcible dispossession and to enable the person dispossessed to recover possession by merely proving title,
but that is not his only remedy. He may, if he so
chooses, bring a suit for possession on the basis of his
title. But we do not think that he can combine both
remedies in the· same suit and that he can get a decree
for possession even if he fails to prove title. Such a
combination would, to say the least of it, result in anomaly and inconvenience. In a suit under section 9_ no
question of title is to be determined, but that question
may be tried in another suit in~tuted after the decree
in that suit. If a claim for establishment of title can
be combined with a claim under section 9, the court will
have to grant a decree for possession or dispossession
being proved, in spite of its finding that the plaintiff
had no title and that title was in the defendant."
We agree as to a part of the reasoning but with respect we
cannot subscribe to the .view that after the period of 6 months
is over a suit based on prior possession alone, is not possible.
Section 8 of the Spei:ific Relief Act does not limit the kinds of
suit but only lays down that the procedure laid down by the Code
of Civil Procedure must be followed. This is very different from
saying that a suit based on possession alone is incompetent after
the expiry of 6 months. Under s. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure itself all suits of a civil nature are triable excepting suits
of which their cognizance is either expressly' or impliedly barred. No prohibition expressly barring a suit based on possession alone has been brought to our notice, hence the added attempt
to show an implied prohibition by reason of s. 8 (s. 7 of the
Travancore Act) of the Specific Relief Act. Tbefe is, however,
good authority for the contrary proposition. In Mustapha Sahib
v. Santha Pillai('), Subramania, Ayyar J. observes :
" .... that !I party ousted by a person who has no better
right is, with referenc!l to the person so ousting, entitled
to recover by virtue of the possession he had held before
(0 l.L.R. 23 Mad. 179 at 182.
176
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1968) 3 S.C.R.
the ouster even though that possession was without any
title."
;'The rule in question is so firmly established as to
render a lengthened discussion about it quite superfiuous. Asher v. Whitlock (L.R. 1 Q.B. 1) and the rulings
of the Judicial Committee in M 11sammat Sundar v.
m11ssammat Parbati (16 I.A. 186) and Ismail Arif] v.
Mahomed Ghouse (20 I.A. 99) not to mention numerous other decisions here and in England to the same
effect, are clear authorities in support of the view stated
above. . . . . . Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act cannot possibly be held to take away any remedy available
with reference to the well-recognised doctrine expressed
in Pollock and Wright on possession thus : - Possession
in law _is a substantive right or interest which exists ·
and has legal incidents and advantages apart from the
owner's title (p. 19)".
·In the same case O'Farell J. point> out that
"all the dictum of ·the Privy Council in Wise v. Ameerunissa Khatoon (7 I.A. 73) appears to amount to is this,
that where a plaintiff ill. possession without any title
seeks to recover possession of which he has been forcibly deprived by a defendant having good title, he can
only do so under the provisions of section 9 of the Specific Relief Act and not otherwise."
It is not necessary to refer to the other authorities some of which
are already referred to in the judgment under appeal and in the
judgment of the same court reported in K11tta11 Narayaman v.
Thomman Mathai('). The last cited case gives all the extracts
from the leading judgments to which we would have liked to
refer. We entirely/ agree with the statement of the law in the
Madras case from which we have extracted the observations of
the learned Judges. ·The other cases on the subject are collected
by Sarkar on Evidence under s. 110.
The Limitation Act, before its recent amendment provided
a period of twelve years as limita~io~ to recov_er possess.ion of
immovable propert_y when the plam!I~, w~1le m posses_s1on of
the property was dispossessed or had d1scontm.ued pos~ess10n a~d
the period was calculated from the date of d1spossess1on or discontinuance. Mr. Nambiar argues that there cannot be two
periods of limitation, namely. 6 months and 12 years for suits
based on possession alone and that the longer period of limitation
(I) 1966 Kenlln J.nw Times 1.
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requires proof of title by the plaintiff. We do not agree. No
doubt there are a few old cases in which this view was expressed.
but they have since been either overruled or dis~ented f~om. T~e
uniform view of the courts is tbat if s. 9 of the Specific Relief
Act is utilised the plaintiff need not prove title and· the title of the
defendant does not avail him. When, however, the period of
6 months has passed questions of title can be raised by the defend-·
ant and if he does so the plaintiff must establish a better title or
fail. In other words, the right is only restricted to possession
only in a suit under s. 9 of the Specific Relief ·Act but that does
not bar a suit on prior possession within 12 years and title need
not be proved unless the defendant can prove one. The present
amended articles 64 and 65 bring out this difference. Article·
64 enables a suit within 12 years from dispossession, for posses-·
sion of immovable property based on possession and not on
title, when the plafotiff while in possession of the property has
been dispossessed. Article 65 is for possession of immovable
property or any interest therein based on title. The amendment
is not remedial but declaratory of the law. In our judgment the
suit was competent.
Mr. Nambiar a!So relies in this connection upon s.· 110 of the·
Indian Evidence Act and claims that in the case of. the Society
there is a presumption of title. In other words, he relies upon
the principle that possession follows title, and that after the expiry of 6 months, tbe plaintiff must prove title. · That possession
may prima facie raise a presumption of title no one can deny
but this presumption can hardly arise when the facts are known.
When the facts disclose no title in either party, possession alone·
decides. In this case s. 110 of the Evidence Act is immaterial
because neither party had tiile. It is for this reason that Mr.
Nambiar places a greater emphasis on the plea that a suit on
\>are possession cannot be maintained after the expiry of 6 months
and that the Society has a right to plead jus tertii. The first
must be held to be unsubstantial and the second is equally un-.
founded.
The proposition of law on the subject has been summed up·
by Salmond on Torts (13th Edn.) at page 172 in the following
words:
"The mere de facto and wrongful possession of land is a
valid title of right against all persons who cannot show
a better title in themselves, and is therefore sufficient
to support an ·action of trespass against such Jiersons.
Just as a legal title to land without the possession of it is
insufficient for this purpose, so conversely the possession of it without legal title is enough.
In other
words, no defendant in an action of trespass can plead
l78
[1968] J s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
the jus tertii-the right of possession outstanding in
some third person--as against the fact of possession in
the plaintiff."
The maxim of Jaw is Advers11s extraneous vitiosa possessio
prodesse so/et,• and if the plaintiff is in possession the j11s tertii
.does not afford a defence. Salmond, however, goes on to say :
"But usually the plaintiff in an actibn of ejectment is
not in possession : he relies upon his right to possession,
unaccompanied by actual pos5e5sion. In such a case
he must recover by the strength of his own title, without
any regard to the weakness of the defendant's. The
result, therefore, is that in action of ejectment the jus
te11ii is in practice a good defence. This is sometimes
spoken of as the doctrine of Doe v. Barnard [1849]
l3 Q.B. 945."
Salmond, however, makes two exceptions to this statement and
the second he states thus :
"Probably, if the defe11dant's possession is wrongful as
against the plaintiff, the plaintiff may succeed though
he cannot show a good title : Doe d. Hughes v. Dyba/I
(1829) 3 C & P 610; Davision v. Gent (1857) 1 H &
N 744. But possession is prima facie evidence is not
displaced by proof of title. If such prima facie evidence is not displaced by proof of title in a third person
the plaintiff with prior possession will reeover. So in
Asher v. Whitlock ((1865) L.R. 1 Q.B. 1] where· a
. man inclosed waste land and died without having had
20 years' possession, the heir of h,is devisee was held
entitled to recover it against person who entered
upon it without any title. This decision, although long,
doubtful, may now be regarded as authoritative in
consequence of its express recognition of the Judicial
Committee in Perry v. C/isso/d [1907] A.C. 73."
a
Mr. Nambiar strongly relies upon the above exposition of the
'law and upon institutional comments by Wiren ''lbe Plea of ;us
terlii in ejectment" (1925) 41 L.Q.R. 139, Hargreaves "Terminology and Title in Ejectment .(1940) 56 L.Q.R. 376 and Holdsworth's article in 56 L.Q.R. 479.
In our judgment this involves an incorrect approach to our
problem. To express our meaning we may begin by reading
Perry v. Clissold to discover if the principle that possession is
0
• Prior possession i~ a good title of ownership against all who cannot show a
better.
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good against all but the true owner has in any way been departPerry v. Clisso/d reaffirmed the principle by stating
quite clearly :
"It cannot be disputed that a person in possession of
land in .the assumed character of owner and exercising
peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perB
fectly good title against all the world but the rightful
owner. And if the rightful owner does not come
forward and assert his title by the process of law within the period prescribed by the provisions of the statute
of Limitation applicable to the case; his right is _for
ever extinguished, and the possessory owner acquires
an absolute title."
Therefore, the plaintiff who was peaceably in possession was
.entitled to remain in possession and only the State could evict
him. The uction of the Society was a violent invasion of his
possession and in· the law as it stands in India the plaintiff
could maintain a possessory suit under the provisions :o! the
Specific Relief Act in which title would be immaterial or a suit
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for possession within 12 years in which the question of title
could be raised. As this was a suit of latter Jcind title could
be· examined. But whose title ? Admittedly neither side could
establish title. The plaintiff at least pleaded the statute of
Limitation and asserted that he had perfected' his title by adverse
possession. But as he did not join the State in his suit to get
E
a declaration, he may be said to have not rested his case on
an acquired title. His suit was thus limited to · reco,·ering
possession from one who had trespassed against him. The enquiry, thus narrows to this : did the Society have any title in
itself, was it acting under authority express or implied of the
true owner or was it just pleading a title in a third party? To
F the first two questions we find no difficulty in furnishing an
answer. It is clearly in the negative. So the only question is
whether the defendant could plead that the title was in the
State ? Since in every s_uch case between trespassers the title
~ust be ?'!!standing i~ a third party a defendant
be placed
ID a position of dominance.
He has only to evict the prior
trespasser and sit pretty pleading that the title is in someone
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e~. ~ Er!e, J. put it in Burling v. Read (11 0.B. 904) 'parties
~1ght 1magme t~at they. acquired some right by merely. intrud~ng upon land. 1°; the ~1ght;. running up a hut and occupying
it be~ore m~mg. Thi~ will be subversive of the fundamental
doctrine which was accepted always and was reaffirmed in
Perry
v. C/issold. The law does not therefore countenance the
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doctrine of 'findings keepings'.
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ed from.
will
Indeed Ash~r v. Whitlock [1885j 1 Q.B. I goes much
further.
It laid down as the head-note correctly summarizes :
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SUPREME COUl.T llEPOR.TS
[1968] 3 S.C.R.
A person in possession of land without other title has a devisable
interest, and the heir of his devisee can maintain ejectment
against a person who had enter¢ upon the land cannot show
title or possession in any one prior to the testator. No doubt
as stated by Lord Macnagthen in. Perry v. Clissold, Doe v.
Barnard (supra) lays down the propo,'>ition that "if a person
having only a possessory title to land be supplanted in the
possession by another who has ·himself no better title, and
afterwards .brings an action to recover the land, he must fail
in case he shows in the course of the proceedings that the title
on which he seeks to recover was merely possessory". Lord
Macnaghten observes further that it is difficult, if not impossible
to reconcile Asher v. Whitlock with Doe v. Barnard and then
concludes:
"The judgment of Cockburn, C.J., is clear on the point.
The rest of the Court concurred and it may be observed
that one of the members of the court in Asher v. Whitlock (Lush, J.) had been counsel for the successful
party in Doe v. Barnard. The conclusion at which the
court arrived in Doe v. Barnard is hardly·consistent with
the views of such eminent authorities on real property
law as Mr. Preston and Mr. Joshua Williams. It is
opposed to the opinions of modern text~writers of such
weight and authority as Professor Maitland and Holmes,
J. of the Supreme Court of the United States (see
articles by Professor Maitland in the Law Quarterly
Review Vols. 1, 2 and 4; Holmes, Common Law p. 244;
Professor J. B. Ames in 3 Harv. Law Rev. 324 n.")
The differenca in the two cases and which made Asher v. White
prevail was indicated in that case by Mellor, J.. thus :
"In Doe v. Barnard the plaintiff did not rely on her
own possession merely, but showed a ·prior possession
in her husband, with whom she was unconnected in
point of title. Here the first possessor is connected in.
title with the plaintiff; for there can be no doubt that
the testator's interest was devisable."
The effect of the two cases is that between two claimants,
neither of whom has title in himself the plaintiff if dispossessed
is entitled to recover possession subject of course .to the law of
limitation. If he proves that he was dispossessed within 12
years he can maintain his action.
It is because of this that Mr. Nambiar claimed entitled to
plead jus tertii. His contention is that in action of ejectment
(as opposed to an action of trespass) jus tertii is capable of
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being pleaded. The old action of ejectment was used to try
freehold titles but it was abolished in 1873. It was .also used
"for recovery of land by one who claimed not the righf to seisin
but the right to possession by virtue of some chattel interest
such as a term of year." In such cases "the defence of jus tertii
admits that the plaintiff had such a right of entry as would
generally entitle him to succeed, but seeks to rebut that concluB
sion by setting up a_ better right in some third person" or that
the plaintiff had no right of entry at all.
To summarize, the difference between Asher v. Whitlock
and Doe v. Barnard is this : In Doe v. Barnard the principle
settled was that it is quite open to the defendant to -rebut the
presumption that the prior _possessor has title, i.e., seisin. This
he can do by showing that the title is in himself; if he cannot
do this he .can show that the title is in some third person.
Asher v. Whitlock Jays down that a person in possessiop of
land has a good title against the world except the true owner
and it is wrong in principle for any one without title or authority
of the true owner to dispossess him and relying on his position
D as defendant in ejectment to remain in possession. As Loft in
his Maxim No. 265 puts it Possessio contra omnes velet praeter
eur cui ius sit possessionis (He that hath possession
hath right · against all but him that hath the
ve1y
right): See Smith v. Oxenden I Ch. Ca 25. A defendant in
such a case must show in himself or his predecessor a valid
E legal title, or probably a possession prior to the plaintiff's and
thus be able to raise a presumption prior in time. It is to be
noticed that Ames (Harvard Law Review Vol. III p. 313 at .37J;
Carson (Real Property Statutes 2nd Ed. p. 180); Halsbury (Laws
?f England, Vol. .24, 3rd Ed. p. 255 f.n.(o); Leake (Property
m Land, 2nd Ed.· p. 4, 40); Lightwood (Time Limit on Actions
F pp. 120-133); Maitland (supra), _Newell (Action in Ejectment,
American Ed. pp. 433-434); Pollock (Law of Torts, 15th Ed.
p. 279); Salmond Law of Torts (supra); and William and Yates
(Law of Ejectment, 2nd Ed., pp. 21&; 250) hold that Doe v.
J!arnard does _not represent true law. Winer (to whom I am
mdebted for much of the infom1ation) .gives a list .. ·of · other
w.ho adhere still to.the-view that jus tertii can be pleaded.
writers
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Mr. Nambiar pressed ·upon us the view that we should not
accept Perry v. Cllssold. It must be remembered that that case
was argued twice before the Privy Council and on the second
occasion Earl . of Ha~sbury, L. C. Lords Macnaghten, Davey,
Robertson, Atkmson, Srr Ford North and Sir Arthur Wilson
heard the case. Lord Macnaghten's judgment is brief · but
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quite clear .. Mr. Nambiar relies upon two other cases of the
Privy Council and a reference to them is necessary. In Dhara'ni
Kanta Lahiri' v. Garbar Ali Khan, 25 M.L.J. 95 P.C. a sliit
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(1968] 3 s.c.R.
in ejectment was filed. The plaintiffs failed to prove that the
lands of which they complained dispossession were ever in their
possession within 12 years before suit and that the lands were
not the lands covered by a sanad which was · produced by the
defendants. The case is distinguishable. It is to be noticed
that Lord Macnaghten was the President of the Board and the
judgment of the Board, December 5, 1912, did not base the
case on Doe v. Barnard or even refer to it. The second is
Mahabir Prasad v. Jamuna Singh, 92 I.C. 31 P.C. In this
case the Board observed as follows : "Counsel for the appellant (defendant) admits that in
the face of the ruling by the Board he could not impugn the reversionary right of the plaintiff's vendors,
but he contends that the defendant is in possession and
in order to .eject him the plaintiff must show that there
is no other reversionary heir in the same degree or
nearer than his assignors whose title he (the defendant) can urge against the plaintiff's claim for ejectment. In other .words, the action being one of
ejectment the defendant is entitled to plead in defence
the right of someone else equally entitled with the
plaintiff's vendors."
After observing this the Board held that the defendant had
failed to prove his point. The observation does not lead to the
conclusion that a defendant can prove title in another unconnected with his own estate. The case is not ati authority for the
wider proposition;
The cases of the Judicial Committee are not binding on us
but we approve of the dictum in Perry v. Clissold. No subsequent case has been brought to our notice departing from that view.
No doubt a great controversy exists over the two cases of Deo
v. Barnard and Asher v. Whitlock but it must be taken to be
finally resolved by Perry v. Clissold. A similar view has been
consistently taken in India and the amendment of the Indian
Limitation Act has given approval to the proposition accepted
in Perry v. Clissold an.d may be taken to be declaratory of the
law in India. We hold that the suit was maintainable.
It is next submitted that the High Court should not have
given its assistance to the plaintiff whose passi:ssion was unlawful
to begin with especially when, by grantmg the decree, an illegality would be condoned and perpetuated. In support of this
case the Society relies on the provisions of Regulation IV of 1091
and other connected Regulations and rules. It points out that
under Regulation IV of 1091, it was unlawful for anyone to
occupy Government land and a punishment of fine in addition
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to eviction was prescribed, and all crops and other products were
liable to confiscation. If eviction was resisted the Pewan could
order the arrest and detention in jail of the offender. Section 18
barred Civil Courts from taking any action in respect of orders
passed 11!1.der the said Regulation except only when it was established that the land was not government land. The civil court,
B it is submitted, could not grant a decree for possession nor set
up the possession of a person who was an offender under the
Regulation.
Jn our opinion these submissions are not well-founded. The
Regulations were intended to regulate the relation of Government and persons but had no bearing upon the relations between
C persons claiming to be in possession. Further the penalty was.
a fine for ·wrongful occupation and in no sense a punishment for
crime. The illegality of the possession was thus not a criminal
act and the regaining of lost possession cannot be described as
an action to take advantage of one's own illegal action. In fact
the plaintiff was not required to rely upon any illegality which
'is the consideration which makes courts deny their assis0
tance to a party. The Society relie\I upon the oft-quoted observations of Lord Mansfield, C.J. in Holman v. Johnson, (1775) 1
Cowper 341:
"the ·objection that a contract is immoral or illegal as
between plaintiff and defendant sounds at all times
very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for
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his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed;
but it is founded in general principles of policy which
the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the
real justice, as between him and the plaintiff, by accident, if I may say so. The principle of public policy
is this : ex dolo malo non orit11r actio. No court will
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lend its aid to a man who founds· his cause of action
upon an immoral or. an illegal act. If, from ·the
plaintiff's own stating or otherwise the cause of action
appears to. arise ex turpicausa or the transgression of a
positive law of this country, there the court says he has
no right to be assisted. It is upon that ground the Court
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goes; not for the sake qf the defendant, but because they
will not lend their aid to such a plaintifi.
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These .are general observations applicable to a case ?f illegality
on which a party must rely to succeed. In a case m which a
plaintiff must rely upon his own illegality the court may refuse
hi~ .~ssistance. But there is the other pro1>'?5ition that if a
pl amtiff does not have to rely upon any such illegality, then
although the possession had begun in trespass a suit .can be
maintained. for restitution of possession. Otherwise the oppasite
184
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1968] 3 s.c.R.
party can make unjust enrichment although its own possession
is worngful against the claimant. It is to be noticed that the
Jaw regards possession with such favour that even against the
rightful owner a suit by a trespasser is well-founded if he brings
the suit' within 6 months of dispossession. We have also shown
that there is ample authority for the proposition that even after
the expiry of these 6 months a suit can be maintained within
12 years to recover possession of which a person is deprived by
one who is not an owner or has no authority from him.
The Society next argues that since it has -got a second
Kuthakapattom we must relate it back. to the original dispossession and treat it as a statutory order under the laws of Travancore.
It refers us to the Travancore Survey and Boundaries Regulation
of May 1942 (Rule 9), the Land Conservancy Regulation (as
amended from time to time), the Puduval Rules and the Land
Assignment Regulations and some other rules to show that the
forest lands were property of Government and the plaintiff
could not be said to be holding land under a grant from Government but the Society is. We think that this argument is of the
same character as the argument about jus tertii. The case is
between two persons neither of whom had any right to the suit
lands and were trespassers one after the other. No question
-of implementing a statutory order arises. The grant of the
second Kuthakapattom is not relaioo back to the grant of ihe
original grant and can only be considered if and when it is
pleaded. It is therefore not necessary to consider this point at
the moment when we are riot in possession of the case of the
plaintiff which he may set up in answer to this case.
This brings us to the q11estion wheth~r the High Court should
have allowed the am_endment sought in 1965. The suit was
filed in 1942 and the second Kuthakapattom, was granted in
1948. The last amendment was asked for in 1~58. Before this
the plaintiff had pointedly drawn attention to the fact that arguments based on the new Kuthakapattom were likely to be pressed.
The ·trial Judge had ruled that arguments could not be shut out
in advance. These circumstances have to be borne in. lllind in
approaching the problem.
It is, however, plain that after the grant of Kuthakapattom
in 1948 the possession of th_e Society became not only de facto
biit also de jure unless there was a flaw in the grant. It is
equally plain that the Society could only resist the present suit
by proving its title or ihe· authority of the true owner, namely,
the State. The former was not open to the Society before ] 948
but the latter was after the grant. . The Soc<iety contends that even
if the facts were not pleaded the documents were before the _Court
. and the parties knew of them and indeed the plaintilf had himself
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NAIR SERVICE SOCY. v. ALEXANDER (Hidayatul/a/1, J.)
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caused some of them to be produced. It was the duty of the
court to take note of them and suo motu to frame an issue. This
point has hardly any force. The Society could take advantage
of such evidence as was provided by the plaintiff but it had to put
it in support of a plea. Issue No. 2 on which great reliance is
placed was not concerned with an abstract proposition but what
flowed from the pleas. Nor could the court frame an issue from
documents which not the Society but the plaintiff had caused to
be brought on file. The cases reported in Ganoo & Anr. v. Shri
Dev Sideshwar & Ors.('), Shamu Patter v. Abdul Kadir Ravlllhan
and Ors.(') and Kunju Kesavan v. M. M. Philip, l.C.S., and
Ors.( 3 ) do not help the Society. If the plea had been raised by
the Society it would undoubtedly have been countered and one
does not know what use the plaintiff would have made of the
documents he had got marked. Therefore it cannot be said that
the trial Judge was in error in not considering the documents.
This brings us to the general proposition whether the High
Court should have allowed the amendment late as it was. The
plaintiff is right that the application was made literally on the eve
of the judgment. This argument is really based on delay and
!aches. The application has not been made for the first time in
this Court when other considerations might have applied. It was
made in the High Court after the argument based on the documents on record was urged. This argument was also urged in
the court of trial. The contention of the Society was thus present
on both the occasions and it would have been better if 'the Society
was directed to amend the pleadings before the argument was
heard. The omission, however, remained.
Now it is a fixed principle of law that a suit must be tried on
the original cause of action and this principle govems not only
the trial of suits but also appeals. Indeed the appeal being a
continuation of the suit new pleas are not considered. If circumstances change they can form the subject of some other proceedings but need not ordinarily be considered in the appeal. To this
proposition there are ·a few exceptions. Sometimes it · happens
that the original relief claimed becomes inappropriate, or the law
changes affecting the rights of the parties. In such cases courts
may allow an ameadment pleading the changed circumstances.
Sometimes also the changed circumstances shorten litigation and
then to avoid circuity of action the courts allow an amendment.
The practice of the courts is very adequately summarized in Ram
Ratan Sahu v; Mohant Sahu('). Mookerjee and Holmwood, JJ.
have given the kind of changed circumstances which the courts
usually take notice, with illustrations from decided cases. The
(I) 26 .Dom. 360.
(3) [19641 3 S.C.R. 634.
L4 Sup. Cl/68-13
(2) 3S Mad. 637 P.C.
(4) [l9a7] 6 C.L.J. 74,
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SUPREME COUll.T REPOR.TS
(1968) 3 S.C.R.
judgment in that case has been consistently followed in India.
In Raicharan Manda/ v. Biswanath Manda/(') other cases are
to be found in which subsequent events were noticed. The same
view was taken by the Federal Court in Lachmeshwar Prasad
Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Cha11dl111ri(') following the dictum of
Hughes, C.J., in Patterson v. State of Albama("). In S11ri11der
Kuiilar & Ors: v. Gian Cha11d & Ors. (') this Court also took a
subsequent events into account and approved of the case of the
Federal Court. In view of these decisions it is hardly necessary
to cite further authorities.
Mr. Gupte on behalf of the plaintiff has strenuously oppos.:d
the request for amendment. His objection is mainly based on
the ground of delay and !aches. He relies on Gajadhar Mah/011 C
v. Ambika Prasad Tiwari("), R. Sha11n111ga Rajeshwara Seth11pa1hie v. Chidambaram Chettiar(') and Kanda t'. Wagh11(1) in
which the Judicial Committee declined amendment before it.
These cases' were differerrt. Jn the first case the Judicial Committee held that it was within its discretion to allow amendment
but did not feel compelled to exercise the discretion. In the D
second case the runendment was no doubt refused because it was
asked for at the last moment but the real reason was that under
it a relief of a wide and exceptional nature was granted. The
point was so intricate that it required careful and timely pleading
and a careful trial. In the last case the Judicial Committee relying on the leading case of Ma Shwe Mya v. Maung Mo H110ung('>
he1d that it was not open to allow -an amendment of the plaint
to cover a new issue which involved setting up a new case.
As against these cases, this Court in L. I. Leach & Co. v.
Jardine Skinner & Co. ( 1 ) Pungonda Hongo11da Patil v. Kalgo111/a
Sl1idgonda Plllil( 10 ) and A. K. Gupta and So11s v. Damodar Valley
Corprr.( 11 ) allowed amendments when a fresh claim would have
been "time-barred. The cases of 1his Court cannot be said to be
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dir~f in point.
They do furnish a guide that amendment is a
discrettonary matter and although amendment at a late stage is
not to be granted as a matter of course, the court must hear in
favour of doing full and complete justice in the case where the
party against whom amendment is to be allowed can be compensated by costs or otherwise. Also the amendment must be on~
which does not open the case or take the opposite party by
surprise.
(0 A.l.R. l91S Cal. 103.
(3) [1934] 294 U.S. 600 at 607.
(S) A.t.R. 192S p.c. 169, 110.
(7) LR. 77 I.A. lS.
(9) r19s11 s.cR. 4Js.
(2) [19-10] F.C.R. 8-1 <tis;.
(-ll [1958] S.C.R. S-18
(6) [1938] P.C. m.
(Sl 1921 LR. -18 I.A. ~l-1. 217.
11oi r19;11 s.c.R. s~5.
(1 ll [1966] I S.C.R. 7%.
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NAIR SERVICE SOCY. v. ALEXANDER (Hidayatu//ah, /.)
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In the present case the amendment sought was not outside the
suit. In fact issue No. 2 could have easily covered it if a proper
pica had been raised. The Society was perhaps under an impression that the fresh Kuthakapattom would be considered and the
trial Judge had also said that the argument could not be shut out.
Although it is not possible to say that parties went to trial in
regards to the fresh Kuthakapattom, it cannot be gainsaid that
the plaintiff had himself caused all the documents necessary for
the plea to be brought on the record of the case. No doubt plainti!I tried to implead Government with a view to obtaining an injunction but as no notice under s. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure was given this was an exercise in futility. But the Society
was under no disability except its own inaction. If it had made a
timely request it would have been granted.
Thus it is a· question of the delay and !aches on the part of
Society. In so far as the court was concerned the amendment
would not have unduly prolonged litigation; on the other hand,
it would have cut it short. Without the amendment another suit
based on the second Kuthakapattom is inevitable. As we have
>hown above there is good authority in support of the proposition
that subsequent events may be taken note of if they tend to reduce
liti~ation. This is not one of those cases in which there is a
likelihood of prolonged litigation after remand or in which a new
case will begin. The amendment will prima facie allow the
Societv to show to the court that in addition to possession it has
aiso title. This will enable the court to do complete justice, if the
plea is found good, without the parties having to go to another
trial.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that we should allow the
amendment. Of course, the plaintiff will be at liberty to controvert the new plea but he will not be allowed to raise new picas
of his own having no relation to the grant of the second Kuthakaoattom. As this amendment is being allowed w~ do not consider
it advisable to state at this stage what the implications of the new
grant will be under 1he Jaw applicable in 1948. We are, however, clear for reasons, already given, .that $,e second Kuthakapattom cannot be regarded as retroactive from the date of the
grant.of the first.Kuthakapattom. We wish to add that the document Ex. 1 does not mention that it was to be retrospective. Now
a formal document which has no ambiguity cannot be varied by
reforence to othe~ documents not intended to vary it. The only'
ot11er documents are Ex. 6, the order conferring the second Kuthakapattom and Ex. 7 a demand by the Tahsildar of the Pattom
caiculated at the same rate from the date of the first Kuthakaoattom. This follows from the Rules. Any person in unlawful
possession may be compelled under the Rules to pay pattom and
188
SUPREME COUKT REPORTS
[1968] 3 S.C.R.
this is what appears to have been order::d. There is also nothing
to show that this was not the Tahsildar's own interpretation of the
facts and the documents. We are therefore quite clear that the
second Kuthakapattom must be read prospectively from the date
of its grant, if it be held that it is valid.
A
There are only two other matters to consider. They are the
question of mesne profits and improvements. The rate of mesne
profits has already been decided and no argument was addressed
to us about it. We say no more about it except that the rate will
be applicable to the new state of facts in the case after the amendment. It is also not necessary to go into the question of improvements now because in answer to the pleas to be raised hereafter
the question of improvements will have to be gone into de novo
in the light of the findings reached. The argument of the parties
that the Rules do not contemplate payment for improvements is
neither here nor there. That applies between Government and a
private party·and not between two private parties. These matters
will be left for determination in the proceedings hereafter to be
taken.
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In the result we dismiss the appeal as to portion L(l) (a) both
in regard to possession and mesne profits and improvements. As
regards L(l )(b) the amendment based on the second Kuthaka·
pattom will be allowed and parties will go to trial on that amendment. The plaintiff will be entitled to raise his defence in refer- E
ence to the second Kuthakapattom. The question of mesne profits and improvements in relation to L( 1)(b) will be reconsidered
in the light of the finding regarding the second Kuthakapattom
but the rate of mesne profits as already determined shall not be
altered. The plaintiff wjjl, .of course, be entitled to mesne profits
till the date of the grant of the second Kuthakapattom.
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There is no dou'bt that the Society was wrongly advised and
allowed the question of amendment to be delayed. At the same
time by not allowing the amendment the plaintiff forces the issue
regarding possession of L(l)(b). In our judgment the Society
must pay the costs thrown away, that is to say, that it must bear
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by the plaintiff in addition to costs on its own account. In so far
as the costs of this Court are concerned parties will bear the costs
as ihe case is being sent to the trial court for further trial.
G.C.
Appeal a/lowed in part 'and case remanded.
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