UNION OF INDIA & ORS. versus M/S. INDO-AFGHAN AGENCIES LTD.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 22 November 1967 | [1968] 2 S.C.R. 366 | 1967 INSC 267
Key facts
- Decided
- 22 November 1967
- Bench
- J.C. SHAH*, S.M. SIKRI, J.M. SHELAT
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 885/1967
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1968] 2 S.C.R. 366
- Neutral citation
- 1967 INSC 267
Text of the judgment
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
v.
M/S. INDO-AFGHAN AGENCIES LTD.
November 22. J967
[J. C. SHAH, S. M. SIKRI AND J. M. SHEi.AT, JJ.J
Imports and Exports (Control) Act (18 of 1947), 3. 3-Import Trade
Policy-Notific111ions undtr-lf utcutivt instructions-Whether enforceablt-RtprtstntDlion to uporters that they wUl bt given ctrti{icatts to
import mattrial tqual to 100% of tht valut of tht exporrs-Whtn quan·
tum in import cerri{icatt can b1 rtductd-C/aim of uporttrs if foundtd
on tquity.
Section 3 of the Jmpons and Expons (Control) Act, 1947, authorises
the Central Government to make, by order, provisions for prohibiting,
restricting or otherwise controlling impon, export, carriage etc. of goods
of specified description: In exercise of this power, the Central Government issued the Imports (Control) Order. 1955, and other orders setting
out the policy governing the grant of import and export licences. The
Central Government also evolved an Import Trade Policy to facilitate
the mechanism of the Act and lhe orders issued thereunder. and it was
modified from time to time by issuin~ fresh Schemes in respect of new
commodities. Jn 1962, the Central Government promulgaied the Export
Promotion Scheme providing incentives l<' exporters of woollen textile~
and goods. It provided for the grant to on exponer, certificates to impon raw materials of a total amount equal to 100% of the F.0.B. value
of his export<. Clause 10 of the Scheme provided that the Textile Commissioner could grant an import certificate fo; a lesser a.mount if he ic;
satisfied, after holding an enquiry. that the <.~clared value of the goods
exported is hlgber than the real value of the goods. The Scheme was ex·
tended to export:-. of \\-·oollen textiles and goods to Afghanistan.
The respondents exported woollen goods to Afghaoisian and wero
i'5ued an Import Entitlement Ccnificate by the Textile Commissioner n01
for the full F.0.ll. value of the goods exponed. but for a reduced
amount. In doin.2 c;o, th-.: l'extilc Commissioner collected evidence ex
oarte and actini.; UL1on the report of a Committee apooinled by him
·passed orders without informing the respondents or giving them an
opportunity to explain the materials on the basis of which the 'imporl
entitlement' of the respondents was reduced. Some of the exporters had
appeared before the Committee and explained the circurnstances in which
they made the exports, but the report of the Committee -.:as not made
available to them. The respondents made representations tQ the Central
Government but the Government confirmed the orders. The rCsPondents then filed writ petitions in the. High Court. The High Coun set
aside the orders of the Textile Commissioner and Government, and held
that the respondents '\1.;ere entitled under the Scheme to obtain import
licences for an amount equal to 100% of the F.O.B. value of their expons, unles.< it was found on enquiry duly made under cl. IO of the
Scheme that the respondents had by 'over-invoicing' the goods disentitled
themselves to the import licences of the full value; and that the Textile
Commissioner without making any such enquiry. proceeded upon ht<
'subiectivc satisfaction' that the respondents had 'over invoiced' the
good.c; cxportedi. and that Government also acted in a similar -manner in
dealing with the representation of the respondents.
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In appeal to this Court, it was contended : ( 1) that the Export
Promotion Scheme was administrative in character, that it contained mere
executive instructions issued by the Central Government to the Textile
Commissioner, and created no enforceable rights in the exporters who
exported their goods in purauance of the Scheme and .that it imposed no
obligations upon the Government to issue import certificates, (2) that the
Textile Commissioner was the sole judge of the reasons for reducing the
import entitlement, that the Scheme did not require him to set out the
reasons for reducing the import entitlement, or to give an opportunity to
the respondents because, the exercise of the power to reduce, conferred
upon the Textile Commissioner, was not limited by the terms of cl. 10 of
the Scheme, and was not, except on proof of mala fide exercise, open to
judicial review; ( 3) that the Government on grounds of 'executive necessity' was the sole judge of the validity of its action in matters relating
to import. and export policy, because ~he policy depended upon tbe economic clim,.ate and other related matters and had to be in its very nature
flexible with power in the Government to mndify or adjust it as the altered
circumstances necessitate; and ( 4) that if the Government is held bound
by every r<'Presentation made by it regarding its intentions, the Government wouJd, be held bound .by a contractual obligation even though no
formal contract in the manner required by Art. 299 of the Constitution
was rotecuted.
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HELD : The Government is not exempt from liability to carry out
the representation made by it as to its future conduct and it cannot on
some undefined and undisclosed ground of necessity or expediency fail
to carry~ out the promise solemnly made by it, nor claim tO be the judge
of its own obligation to the citizen on an ex parte appraisement of the
circumstances in which th·~ 9h1igation had arisen. [385 E-F]
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(I) Whether the Schemes for implementing the Import Trade Policy
are 'merely exe<;mtive or administrative instructions, or are legislative
directions as well, depends not on their form, or the method of publication or the source of their authority. but it is their substflnce that determines their true character. It cannot be assumed merely because the
policy is general in terms and de3.ls with the grant of licences for import
of goods and related matters, that it is statutory in• character. But even
if it is ~oly executive or administrative in character, courts have power
in appropriate cases to oompel performance of the obligations imposed by
the Schemes upon the departmental authorities. [376 H; 377 B-C, F--0)
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(2) The Textile Commissioner was not the sole judge of the quantum of import Jit:ence to be granted to an exporter and courts are competent in appropriate cases to grant relief, if, contrary to the Scheme, the
Government and its officers at ·their mere whim ignore the promises made
by the Government and .aioitrarily decline to grant \he promised import
licence to an exporter who bas acted to his prejndice relying upon the
representation. [381 C-D]
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Where a person has acted upon representations made in an Export
Promotion Scheme that import liceqce upto the value of the goods exported will be issued, and had exported goods, his claim for the import
licence for the · maximum value pennissible by the Scheme cannot be
arbitrarily rejected. In such .a case reduction in the .amount of import
certificate may be justified on the ·ground of misconduct df the exporter in
relation to the goods exported or on special considerations such as difficult foreign exchange position, or other matters having a bearing on th<!
~enera t interests of the Stale. But, where, as in the present case, the
Scheme provided for the grant of import entitlement of the value and not
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(1968] 2 S.C.R.
up to tile value, of the goods eXported, the Textile Commissioner should
in the or<linarv course, grant import ccnificato for the full vaiue of the
goods exported : he may reduce that amount only after the enquiry conten1plated by cl. 10 l)l lhc Scheme, thar is. enquiry made after giving an
opportunity to the respondents and held in a manner consistent with the
rules of natural jusucc and the basic coriccpts of justice and fair-play.
[379 H: 380 A-Ci
Ramchand Jagadish Chand v. Union of India & Ors. [1962) 3 S.C.R.
72 •. Probhudas Morarjce Ra;kolia & Ors. v. llnion of India & Ors. A.l.R.
1966 S.C. 1044 and Joint Cileif Controller of Imports end Exports, Madras
v. Mis. Amin Chand Mu~ha, [1966) 1 S.C.R. 262, followed.
( 3) Executive necessity, if any, does not release the Government from
honouring its solemn promises relying oo which citiz.ens have acted to
their detriment especially when the representation in the Scheme was nor
subject to any implied term that the Government will not be bound to
gr>nt the import certificate for the full value of the goods exported if
they deem it inexJ>"dicnt (376 A-CJ
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Rederu1ktiebo/aget Amphitrite v. The King. [1921) 3 K.B. 500 :.:id
Robertson v. Minister of Pen.<ions. [1949) I K.B. 227, referred to.
( 4) The respondents were not seeking to enforce any contractual
right : they are seeking to enforce compliance with the obligation which
is laid upon the Textile Comnilieioner by the terms of the Scheme. 1be
claim of the r-espondents was founded upon the equity which arose in
their favour as a result of the representation made on behalf of the
Government in the Export Promotion Scheme, and the action taken by
the respondents acting upon the representation. Even though the case
did not fall within the terms of s. 115 of the Evidence Act, it was srtll
open to a party who had acted on a representation made by the Government to claim that the Government should be bound to carry out the
promise made by it, though not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by the Constitution. [382 D-G, 383 H1
Ahmad Yor Kh~rr d: Orr. ''· Secrrtarv of State for lf'dia in Council and
Anr. LR. 28 I.A. 211, The Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay
, •. The Secretary of State for India In CouncU, J.L.R. 29 Born. 580 and
The Gange• Manufacturing Co. v. Surujmul/, I.L.R. 5 Cal. 669, applied.
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Collector of Bombav v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombtzy
d Ors. 119521 S.C.R. 43. referred to.
Civ1L APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 885893 of 1967.
Appeals from the judgment and order dated
February
2,
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1967 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Writs Nos.
1947, 1921 to 1927 and 1949 of 1965.
AND
C1VJl Appeals Nos. 973 to 975 of 1967.
Arireals from the judgment and order dated April 26, 1967
of !he Punjab High Court in 1..etteB Patent Appeal Nos. 127 to
129 of 1967.
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UNION v. INDO-AFGHAN AGBNCIBS (Shah, J.)
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B. R. L. Iyengar, R. N. Sachthey and S. P. Nayar, for the
appellants (in all the appeals).
Bhagirath Dass, Sobhag Mal Jain and B. P. Maheshwari, for
the respondents (in C.As. Nos. 885 and 893 of 1967).
O.P. Varma, for the respondents (in C.As. Nos. 886 to 890
and 892 of 1967).
A. K. Sen and 0. P. Varma, for the respondent (in C.A.
No. 891 of 1967).
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K. L. Arpra and H. K. Puri, for the respondents. (in C.As.
Nos. 973 and 974 of 1967).
A. K. Sen, H. L. Anand and K. B. Mehta, for the respondent
(in C.A. No. 975 of 1967).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Shah, J. · The facts which give rise to Appeal No. 885 of 1967
are these: The Textile Commissioner published on October 10,
1962, a scheme called the Export Promotion Scheme providing
incentives to exporters of woollen goods. The scheme was extended by a Trade Notice dated January 1, 1963,-fo exports of
woollen goods to Afghanistan. Messrs. Ilido-Afghan Agencies-hereinafter called 'the respondents'-a firm dealing in woollen
goods at Amritsar exported to Afghanistan in September, 1963,
woollen goods of the f.o.b. value of Rs. 5,03,471-73 nP. The
Deputy Director in the office of the Textile Commissioner,
Bombay issued· to the respon<ients an Import Entitlement
Certificate for Rs. 1,99,459 only/-. Representations made by
the respondents to the Deputy Director and to the Union Government that they be granted Import Entitlement ~ertificate for the
. full f.o.b value of the goods exported failed to produce any response.
But in a :retition under Art. 226 of the Constitution moved
before the High Court cif Pumab "··· ;he ·· '.'nnc!ents for a writ
or an order directing the Union of fodia, 1he Textile Commissioner and the Joint Chief Contrnller of i '" ,Drts and Exports,
Bombay, to issue a licence ''permitting imDort . of wool-tops,
raw wool, wool waste and rags of the value of Rs: 3,04,012-73
nP", the orders of the Textile Commissioner and the Central
Government were set aside. The High Court held that the
Expgrt Promotion Scheme specifically ·provided for granting
tificates to import materials of the "value equal fo 100% of .the
f.o.b. value of the goods exported'', and the respondents were
.entitled to obtain import licences for an amount equal to l'OO'J'S
of. the f.o.b. value, unless it was found on enquiry duly made
under cl. 10 of the: Scheme that the respondents had by "overinvoic~g'' the goods disentitled themse!Ves to the import licences
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SUPllBMB COU1T llBPOR.TS
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of the fuli value; that no such enqwry was made by the Textile
Commissioner and that officer merely proceeded upon his "subjective satisfaction" that the respondents had 'over-invoiced" the
goods exported; and that the Union Government acted on irrelevant grounds. The Union of India, the Textile Commissioner
and the Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports have appealed to this Court with certificate granted by the High Court.
The genesis of the export control scheme may first be noticed.
The lmpon> and Exports (Control) Act 18 of 1947 was enacted on March 24, 194 7 wi•h the object of enabling the Central
Government to continue to exercise the power to prohibit, restrict or otherwise control imports and ·expor!s which had till then
been e<lntrollcd by orders issued in exercise of the powers conferred by r. 84 of the Defence of India Rules, I ~39, as extended
by the Emergency Provisions (Continuance) Ordinance 20 o[
1946. By s. 3 of that Act it wa5 provided :
" ( I ) The Central Government nfay by order
published in the Official Gazette, make provisions for
prohib;ting, restricting or otherwise controlling in all
cases or in specified classes of cases, and subject to
such exceptions if any, as may be made by or under
the order:"(a) the import, export, carriage coastwise or shipment as ships stores of goods of any specified
description;
( b) the bringing into any port or place in India
of goods of any specified description intended
to be taken out o[ India without lieing removed
from the ship or conveyance in which they are
being carried.
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(2)
(3).
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By s. 4 the orders made under r. 84 of the Defence of India
Rules, 1939, or under that rule as continued in force by the
Emergency Provisions (Continuance) Ordinance, 1946, and in
force immediately before the commencement of the Act were,
insofar as they were not inconsistent with the provisions of the
Act, to continue to remain in force and to be deemed to have
been niade under the Act.
In exercise of the pow.ers conferred on the Central Government by s. 3, the Central Government issued the Imports (Control) .Order, 1955. By paragraph-3 of the Order it was enacted
that:
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"(1) Save as otherwise provided in this Order, no
person shall import any goods of the description specified in Schedule I, except under, and in accordance
with, a licence or a customs clearance permit granted
by the Central Government or by any officer specified in
Schedule II;
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(2) If, in any case, it is found that the goods imported under a licence do not conform to the description given in the licence or were shipped prior to the
date of issue of the licence under which they are claimed to have been imported, then, without prejudice to
any action that may be taken against the licensee
under the Customs Act, ·1962 (52 of 1962), in respect
of the said importation, the licence may be treated as
having been utilised for importing the said goods."
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The Central Government also issued periodical orders which
were published in bi-annual official publications setting out the
policy governing the grant of import and export licences. By
paragraph 52 of the no!ification published in the Gazette Extraordinary dated December 29, 1954, it was declared that in
certain items there was "direct and intimate" inter-relationship
between imports and exports, and since the ability to export some
of those manufactured goods depended largely on the facility
with which the exporter or the manufacturer could procure the
basic raw materials required in the manufacture, a scheme had
been devised with a view to promote export of such goods for the
grant of special import licences to replace the imported raw
material content of the exported product, and to provide an
inducement for larger exports. The details of the Scheme were
set out in Appendix-23 to the Notification. The Scheme covered a number of commodities of which export was permitted.
Fiom time to time this Appendix was modified and fresh schemes
were issued in respect of new commodities.
. On October 10, 1962, .the Government of India promulgated the Export Promotion Scheme for woollen textiles and woollen
goods. Clause 2 of that Scheme provided, insofar as it is
material:
"It has been decided that manufacturers--exporters
and merchants-exporters of the above woollen textiles
and woollen goods will be en.ti'led to import raw materials, namely, raw wool, wo_ol, tops, shoddy, man-made
fibres and tops, permissible types of dyes and chemicals
and machinery and machinery parts and spare parts for
woollen industry for a total amount equal to 100% of
the f.o.b. value of the exports."
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SUPREME COURT REllORTS
(·1968] 2 S.C.R.
Clause 4 provided :
"Only such exporters who satisfy the Textile Commissioner that they are interested in export (either by
past performance or by showing proof of action taken
to obtain firm order etc.) will be registered by the
Textile Commissioner."
Clause 6 imposed certain obligations upon the registered exporters, such as adherence to the code of conduct as and when
evolved; adoption of the standard contract form with suitable
clauses for arbitration and settlement of disputes; abiding by the
decision of the Textile Commissioner in the matter of dispute
between the exporter and his foreign customers; forwarding
figures of exports of woollen goods made .by him every month to
the Textile Commissioner and abiding by such quality control
and pre-shipment inspection procedures :is may be evolved.
Clause 7 provided for the application for grant of import
licences against actual exports effoctcd on a monthly or on a
quarterly basis. Clause 9 provided :
"After scrutiny of the app"cations, the Textile Commissioner shall issue an entitlement certificate indicating the items and value for which licence should be
issued to the applicant. On receipt of the application
and entitlement certificate, the Joint Chief Controller
of Imports and Exports, Bombay, shall issue the
licence."
Clause 10 provided :
"In case where the Textile Commissioner considers
that the declared value of the goods exported is higher
than the real value of the goods, the matter may be
investigated further by calling for further evidence,
e.g. purchase vouchers and any other corroborative
"evidence to facilitate scrutiny. It shall be the dut,· of
.the registered exporter to furnish such evidence '' is
called for in this connection. On the basis of his
enquiry, the Textile Commissioner may assess the correct value of the goods exported and issue an entitlement certificate on the basis of such asses~~d value."
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By notification da'ed January 1, 1963, the Scheme was extended
to exports of woollen textiles and woollen goods to Afgham~tan
with effect from October l . 1962.
It was urged on behalf of the Union of India that the Export
Promotion Scheme was administrative in character and the
recital therein that the exporters will be entitled to import certificates equal to I 00% of the f.o.b. value of the exports was a
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mere instructioa issued by the Union Government to the Textile
Commissioner : it created no rights in the public generally or in
the exporters who exported their goods in pursuance of the
Scheme and imposed no obligations upon the Government to
issue the import certificates. On behalf of the respondents it was
contended that the Scheme was statutory in Character and obliged
the Textile Commissioner, unless the exporter was after due investigation under cl. JO of the Scheme, shown to. have "overinvoiced" the goods exported, to issue import certificates of the
full value of the exports, and a person exporting' goods in pursuance of the Scheme who was denied an import certificate of
!lie ftill f.o.b. value could seek the assistance of the High Court
by a petition for the issµe of a writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution, for an order compelling the Textile Commissioner to
carry out the obligations imposed upon him by the Scheme.
The Textile Commissioner in the present case made his order
without informing the respondents and giving them an opportunity to explain the materials on the basis of which the "import
of the respondents was proposed to be reduced. It
entitlement"
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was stated in the affidavit of the Union of India that it was not
a necessary requirement of the Scheme to set out the reasons for
redljCing the import entitlement :
that under paragraph
20(d) to Appendix 23 of the Import Trade Control Policy for
the year April 1962 to March 1963 the licensing authority was
authorised to refuse the issue of a licence or "to reduce the value
E of the licence to such amount as he deemed fit" in cases where
he considered the value of the goods exported was over-invoiced,
and the Trade Notice having been issued in exercise of the
executive power of the State, attack by the respondents on the
ground set up was "completely misplaced and without any
·foundation in law".
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In passing the orders impugned by the respondents, the
Textile Commissioner did not hold an enquiry consistent with
the rules of natural justice. Coun~el for the Union of India
submitted that for good reasons of which the Textile Commissioner was the sole judge, it wa> ·open to that Officer to reduce
the import entitlement below the f.o.b. value of the goods exported, and exercise of the power conferred upon him is not limited
by the terms of cl. 10 of the Scheme, and is not, except on proof
of mala fide exercise open to judicial review. This exalted claim
about the nature of the authority conferred upon the Textile
Commissioner as representative of the Government may first be
examined.
Counsel for the Union said that the import and export policy
of the Government is based on avai1abi!ity pf foreign exchange.
requirement of goods of foreign origin for !nternal consumption,
SUPREME COURT IU!POllTS
374
(1968] 2 S.C.R.
economic climate in the country, and other related matters, and
has in its very nature to be flexible, and on that account the
power of the Government to modify or a~just it as the altered
drcumstances necessitate, cannot be restricted on the ground
that promises made by the Government in different situations are
not carried out, however amoral that claim may appear to be
According to Counsel the Government is the sole judge of the
validity of its actions in matters relating to Import and Export
Policy, and the citizens who have ·acted on the representations of
'the Government have only such rights as the Government in its
wisdom chooses to recognise or accept at any given time. He
relied in support of his submission upon the doctrine of "executive necessity" on which Rowlatt J., relied in Rederiaktiebo/aget
Amphitrite v. The King.(') In that case during the First World
War certain neutral shipowners obtained an undertaking from
the British Government that if the shipowners sent a particular
ship to the United Kingdom with a specified cargo, she shall not
be detained. On the faith of that undertaking, the owners sent
the ship to a British port with that specified cargo. The British
Government withdrew their undertaking and refused her
clearance. On a petition of right for damages for breach of contract it was held that the Government's undertaking was not
enforceable in a Court of law, it not being within the competence
of the Crown to make a contract which would have the effect of
limiting its power of executive action in the future. RowJatt, J ..
-observed at p. 503 :
·• ...... what 1 have to consider is whether this
was a contract at all. I have not to consider whe!her
there was anything of which complaint might be made
outside a Court, whether that is to say what the Government did was morally wrong or arbitrary that would
be altogether outside my province."
He then proceeded to state :
nNo doubt the Government can bind itself through
its officers by a commercial contract, and if it does so it
must perform it like anybody else or pay damages
for the breach. But this was not a commercial
contract, it was an arrangement whereby the Government purported to give an assurance as to what its executive action would be in the future in relation to a particular ship in the event of her coming to this country
with a particular kind of cargo. And that is, to my
mind, not a contract for the breach of which damages
can he sued for in a Court of law. It was merely an
expression of intention to act in a particular way in a
---'-
(I) (1921] 3 K.B. 5UU.
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certain event. My main reason for so thinking is th.at
it is not competent for the Government to fetter Its
future executive action, which must necessarily be determined by the needs-of the community when the question arises. It cannot by contract hamper its freedom
of action in matters which concern the welfare of the
State."
This observation is, "cl~arly very wide and· it is difficult to
determine its proper scope": Anson's "English Law of Contract'',
22nd Ed., p. 174. It may also be noticed that before Rowlatt,
J., the applicants claimed enforcement of a contract against the
Crown, and the learned Judge came to !he conclusion that there
was no contract and no damages could be awarded. In Robert·
son v. Mini'ster of Pensions('), Denning, J. observed at p. 231 :
"The Crown cannot escape by saying that estoppels do not bind the Crown for that doctrine has long
been exploded. Nor can the Crown escape by praying
in aid the doctrine of executive necessity, that is,
the doctrine that the Crown cannot bind its.elf so as to
fetter i!s future executive action. That doctrine was
propounded by Rowlatt J., in Rederiaktiebo/aget Am·
phitrite v. The King but it was unnecessary for the
decision because the statement there was not a promise
which was intended to be binding but only an expression of intention. Rowlatt, .T., seems to have been influenced by the cases on the right of the Crown to dismiss its servants at pleasure, but those cases must now
all be read in the light of the judgment of Lord Atkin in
Reilly v. The King-(1954) A.C. 176, 179).
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In my opinion the defence of
executive necessity is of limited scope. It only avails
the Crown where there is an iniplied term to that effect·
or that is the true meaning of the contract."
Denning, J., was dealing with a case of a serving army officer,
who wrote to the War Office regarding a disability and received
a reply that his disability had been accepted as attributable to
"military service". Relying on that assurance he forebore to
obtain an independent medical opinion. The Minister of Pensions
later decided that the appellant's disability could not be attributed
to war service. It was held •hat as between subjects such an
assurance would be enforceable because it was intended to be
binding intended to be acted upon, and was in fact acted upon;
and the assurance was also binding on the Crown because no
term could be iniplied that the Crown was at liberty to revoke it.
(I) [1949] I K.B 227.
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[1968] 2 S.C.R.
The defence of executive necessity was not relied upon in the
pre.sent case in the affidavit filed on behalf of the Union of India.
It was also not pleaded that the representation in the Scheme was
subject to an implied term that the Union of India will not be
bound to grant the import certificate for the full value of the goods
exported if they deem it inexpedient to grant the certificate. We
are unable to accede to the contention that the executive necessity
releases the Government from honouring its solemn promises relying on which citizens have acted to their detriment. Under our
constitutional set-up no person may be deprived of his right or
liberty except in due course of and by authority of law : if a member of the executive seeks to deprive a citizen of his right or
liberty otherwise than in exercise of power derived from the lawcommon or statute---the Courts will be competent to and indeed
would be bound to, protect the rights of the aggrieved citizen.
The orders which the Central Government may issue in exercise of the power conferred by s. 3 of the Imports and Export~
Control Act may be executive or legislative. In exercise of that
power, the Order was issued on December 7, 1955, that was
clearly legislative in character. It appears that prior to the
issuance of this no'.ification several orders had been issued under
the Defence of India Rules and under the Imports and Exports
Act dealing \\ith the grant of licences to import certain classes of
goods. Those orders which are set out in the IVth Schedufo to
the Order were repealed by cl. 12 of the Order of 1955, and
machinery for granting licences was set up by foe Orc\er dated
December 7, 1955. Counsel for the respondents submitted that
the Export Promotion Schemes published by the Government
under paragraph-52 of the Government Notification dated
December 29, I 954, must be deemed to be issued under s. 3 of
the Imports and Exports Control Act, 1947, since the Schemes
have been published in the Gazette of India, and contain general
provi>ions relating to the grant of licences and impose restrictions
up•Jn the rights of citizens to carry on busines.~ in certain commod:t;es. Being general provisions restricting the rights of citizens
to c~rry on business in certain commodities, the Schemes were, it
was said, legislative in character, and the obligations imposed or
the snncrions prescribed thereby must on that account be deemed
to be enforceable by command of the Court.
I: cannot be assumed merely because the Import Trade Policy
is general in terms and deals with the grant of licences for import
of goods and related matters, it is statutory in character. The
Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947, au!horises the Central
Government to make provisions prohibiting, restricting or l'therwise controlling import, export, carriage etc. of the goods and by
the Imports (Con!rol) Order, I 955, dated December 7, 1955,
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and by the provisiCIDS which were sought to be repealed resirictions
were already imposed. The order was clearly legislative in
character. The Import Trade Policy was evolved to facilitate the
mechanism of the Act and the orders issued thereunder. Even
granting that the Import Trade Policy notifications were issued in
exercise of the power under s. 3 of the Imports and ExportS
(Control) Act, 1947, the Order as already' observed authorised
the making of executive or administrative instructions as well as
legislative directions. It is not the form of the order, the
method of its publication or the source of its authority, but
its substance, which determines its true character. A large
majority of the paragraphs of the Import & Export Schemes are in
the form of instructions to departmental officers and advice to
persons engaged in the export and import business with their
foreign counterparts. It may be possible to pick out paragraphs
from the Scheme which appear in isolation to be addressed generally and have direct impact upon the rights and liberties of the
citizens. But a large number of paragraphs of the Scheme reh:r
to matters of procedure of departmental officers and heterogeneous material : it sets out forms of applications, the designations of
licensing authorities, amounts of application and licensing fees,
last dates for applications, intermixed with definitions of 'Established Importers', 'Actual users', 'New comers', and others and
d.etails of different schemes such as Quota Registration Schemes,
Export Promotion Schemes etc. There is no pattern of order or
logical sequence in the policy statement: it is a jumble of executive instructions and matters which impose several restrictions
upon the rights of citizens. Some of the provisions which impose
restrictions upon citizens in the exercise of their right to carry on
trade without statutory limits may be open to serious objection,
but we do not find it necessary to embark upon an enquiry
whether the provision which authorises the issue of import entitlement certificate for the full f.o.b. value of th.e goods exported Is
legislative in character. Granting that it is executive in haractcr,
this Court has held that Courts have the power in appropriate
cases to compel performance of the obligations impo~ed by the
Schemes upon the departmental authorities.
The question whether the Import Trade Policy is legislative
in character has not been .expressly dealt with in any decision of
this Court. It appears to have been assumed in certain cases,
that it is executive in character, but even so it has been held that
when it is declared under an export policy that a citizen exporting
goods shall be entitled to certain import facilities, in appropriate
cases the Courts have the power to direct the concemerl authority
to make that facility available to the citizen who has acted to his
prejudice acting upon the representation in the policy, and has
been denied that facility. In Mis Ramchand Jagadish Chand v.
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(1968] 2 S.C.R.
Union of India and Ors.(') this Court was called upon to decide
whether a person who had, pursuant to a representation in the
Export Promotion Scheme that exporters will be awarded import
licences upto a certain percentage of the export value of the goods
was entitled to call upon the Union to issue in his favour import
entitlement of the value of the goods exported. Under the 'Export
Promotion Scheme" relating to artificial silk fabrics it was repre- B
sented that with a view to stimulate exports of Indian "artsilk
fabrics" etc. it was decided to grant import licences for the import
of permissible varieties of artsilk yarn upto the percentages specified. The Scheme empowered the Controller of Imports and
Exports to issue a licence upto 66 2/3 per cent. of the export
value in the case of Indian "artsilk sarees" and upto I 00 per cent
in the case of other Indian "artsilk fabrics". M/s Ramchllnd c
J agadish Chand, a firm of exporters relying upon the Scheme
exported Indian "artsilk" goods and earned foreign exchange and
applied for an import licence equivalent to the value of the goods
it had exported. They were, however, not given an import licence
for the value of the goods exported. They thereafter filed a writ
petition in this Court for an order that the import certificate had D
been arbitrarily reduced and thereby the fundamental right of the
exporter to carry on trade in artsilk was infringed. The Court
held in that case that the State had the right to impose control in
the larger interest of the general public on imports and to make
orders in exercise of the powers conferred by the Imports and
Exports (Control) Act providing for imposition of restrictions by
permitting import of certain goods only in accordance with the
licences or customs permits granted by th~ Central Government.
Since in that case the power granted to the licensing authority was
to grant licences only upto the maximum specified in cl. 2 of
Appendix 42, the restriction imposed was held not to be unreasonable. It was also observed that it did not impose an obligation
upon the controller enforceable at the instance of the exporter, to
issue a licence for the amount (subject to the maximum prescribed) claimed by the exporter, and since the order of the Controller
granting a licence only for 45 % of the value of goods exported
did not infringe the fundamental right of the exporter under Art.
19(1)(g) of the Constitution, the petition filed by the exporter
G
was liable to be dismissed. But the Court observed :
"The licensing authority would normally issue an
import licence for I 00% of the value of the goods exc
ported, but having regard to special considerations such
as diffkult foreign exchange position or other matters
which have a bearing on the general interest of the State,
H
import licences for a smaller percentage may be granted
to the exporters. But by the use of the expression 'up-
.
(1) !1962) 3 S.C.R. 72.
UNION v. INDO·AFGHAN AGENCIES (Shah, J.)
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to the rollowing percentage of the rupee equivalent'
power to fix arbitrarily a percentage of the value of the
goods exported for awarding an import licenc\: is not
granted."
Opinion was therefore expressed that if the power granted to the
was arbitrarily exercised, it was open to judicial review.
Controller
B
In Ramchand Jagadish Chand's case(') a Committee was appointed to detennine the value of the goods exported by the exporter
and the Committee scrutinised the claim 0f the exporter and
found that the rat.es of some of the items could not be accepted as
reasonable. Hnd recommended an import licence approximately
of th.~ value of 45 per cent. of the goods exported. The exporter
c was given a right to make a representation and to be heard before
the order was passed to his prejudice. In Probhudas Morarjee
Rajkotia and others v.
Union of India and others( 2 ), a
Special Exports Promotion Scheme for Engineering goods was
promulgated by the Government of India. To give incentives to
the manufacturers of engineering goods in India to export their
D products outside India. it was declared by the Scheme that import
licences will be granted to exporters for materials upto the specified
percentage of the f.o.b. value of the goods exported. An exporter claimed that he had exported goods of the f.o.b. value exceeding Rs. 9.44 lakhs and demanded import licence of the value of
Rs. 4. 39 lakhs odd. The licensing authorities issued to the fim1
import licences for Rs. 3.77 lakhs odd. The exporter then moved
E
this Court by a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution for the
issue of a writ against the Union of India granting an import
· licence for the balance of Rs. 62,337 /- in accordance with the
provisiqns of the Special Exports Promotion Scheme, and this
Court held that even though there was no absolute right to the
grant of an import licence for the maximum amount prescribed,
F the Controller could impose restrictions if special considerations
such as difficult foreign exchange position or othe.r matters which
have a bearing on the general interest of the State warranted, but
the discretion to be exercised by him was to be reasonable and
not arbitrary. On a consideration of the affidavit filed, and the
power given to the Controller to grant licences upto and not of the
G value of the goods exported, it was held that no case of arbitrary
exercise of the power to reduce the import entitlement was made
out.
H
In these cases it was clearly ruled that where a person has
acted upon representations made in an Export Promotion Scheme
that import licences upto the value of the goods exported will be
issued, and had exported goods, his claim for import licence for
the maximum value permissible by the Scheme could not be arbit(1) [19621 3 S.C.R. 72.
(2) A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1044.
380
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1968] 2 S,C.R.
rarily rejected. Reduction in th~ amount of import certificate mav
be justified on the ground of misconduct of the exporter in relation to the goods exported, or on special considerations such as
difficult foreign exchange position, or other matters wh:ch have a
bearing on the general interests of the State. In the present case.
the Scheme provides for grant of import entitlement of the value.
and not upto the value, of the goods exported. The Textile Commissioner was, therefore, in the.ordinary course r.~quired to grant
import certificate for the full value of the goods exported : he
could only reduce that amount after enquiry contemplated by cl.
10 of the Scheme.
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The judgment of this Court in Joi111 Chief Comro/lcr of Imports and Exports, Madras v. M/s Amin Chand Mutha etc.(') c
may also be usefully referred to. In that case, after the dissolution of a firm which was the holder of quota right as an established importer, one of the partners applied to the Chief Controller
to make a division of the quota rights between the partners. He
also applied to the Joint Chief Controller who was the licensing
authority for grant of a licence for the period January to June
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1957 but in the application he could not mention his share in the
quota right because the Chief Controller had not before the date
of the application approved of the division of the quota right.
After expiry of the period for which the licence was to be issued.
the Chief Con'.rolicr informed the applican! that instructions had
been issued to the Joint Chief Controller about the division of the
quota right. But the Joim Chd Controller declineq to grant a E
licence to the applicant on the ground that the order of the Chief
Controller had no retrospective operation. The applicant succeeded in obtaining an order from the High Court of Madr~s
directing the Joint Chief Controller to grant a licence. This
Court confirmed the order of the High Court. It was held
that the licensing authority had to deal with the appiication for a F
licence on the footing that the approved 4uota was given to the
partners of the dissolved firm from the date of dissolution and the
agre~ment o divide, and could not refuse the licence solely on
the groun<l that the approval of the Chief Controller was granted
.ifter the expiry of the import period. The Court observed that
th.~ C:hief Controller had no power to refuse division. of the quota
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righ1 if he was satisfied about the dissolu'.ion of the firm. and it
followed that when he gave his approval it must take effect from
the date of the agreement, and on that interpretation of the order
cf the Chief Controller, the application for the issue of the licence
should have been granted by the licensing authority. The Court
proceeded to observe that as no order of the C~ntral Government
prohibiting the import of the articles for which the licence wa~ H
appI:ed for was published in tj:te Gazette, it was open to the
(I) (1966) I s.c.R. 262.
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UNION v. INDO-AFGHAN AGENCIES (Shah, J.)
381
A
licensing authority to issue a licence f~r the i:ieriod Ja~uary to
June 1857, even if there was a change m the nnport pohcy of the
Government of India with respect to those articles. In Amin
Chand Mutha's case(') the Court enforced 1:2.mpliance with the
provisions relating to the grant of a licence under the licensing
instructions issued by the Central Government.
B
In each of the three cases, the Court observed that the Court.
was competent to grant relief in appropriate cases, if, contrary
to the Scheme, the authority declined to grant a licence or import
certificate or the authority acted arbitrarily. Therefore even
assuming that the provisions relating to the issue of Trade Notices
offering inducement to the prospective exporters are in character
executive, the Union Government and its officers are, on the
authorities of this Court, not eniitled at their mere whim to ignore
the promises made by the Government We cannot therefore accept
the plea that the Textile Commissioner is the sole judge of the
quantum of import licence to be granted to an exporter, and that
the Courts are powerless to grant relief, if the promised import
licence is not given to an exporter who has acted to his prejudice
relying upon the representation. To concede to the Departmental
authorities that power would be to strike at the very root of the
rule of law.
By the Export Promotion Scheme for woollen textiles as extended to exports to Afghanistan, the exporters were invited to get
themselves registered with the Textile Commissioner for exporting
woollen goods, and it was represented that the exporters will be
entitled to import raw materials of the to!al amount equal to
I 00% of the f.o.b. value of the exports. Machinery for scrutiny
of the applications and the issue of import eniitlement was provided by s. 9 of the Scheme, and the Texiile Commissioner was invested with the authority to detenlrine whether in any given case
the declared value of the goods exported was higher than the
real value of the goods and to assess the correct value of the
goods exported and to issue import certificates on the basis of
such assessed value. Undoubtedly the Textile Commissioner had
authority, if it was found that a fraudulent attempt was made to
secure an import certificate in excess of the true value of the
goods exported, to reduce the import certificate. Bnt the authority
vested in the Textile Commissioner by the rules even though
executive in character was from its nature an authority to deal
with the matter in manner conssmant with the basic concept of
justice and fair-play: if he made an order which was not consonant
with the basic concep•s of justice and fair-play his proceeding was
The Textile
open to scrutiny and rectification by the Courts.
Cornmiss;oner acted upon a report of the Committee appointed
by him, and before that Committee the respondents had no oppor-
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382
St;PREME COURT REPORTS
(1968] 2 S.C.R.
t~nity to present .their case. He colkctcd evidence ex parrc •mu
did not ~1sclose It to the respondent; and without giving an
opportunity to them to
represent
their
case
redu:ed
the import certificate.
Jn dealing with a representation
ma~e by the respondent, the Government of India also acted
s1m1larly and declined either to make avaihtbk 1hc evidence on
which the Textile Commissioner had acted or to give a hearing to
the responden1s. The Texttle Commissioner and the Union of
lndia did not purport to act in exercise of the power under cl. IO
of the Scheme: they have sought to support 1he order on the pka
that the subjective satisfaction of the Textile Commissioner is
d.£!erminative of the extent of the impor~ certificate which may be
granted to the respondents.
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It was somewhat fain1ly urged tha1 if the Government is held
bound by every representation made by it regarding its intention,
when the exporters have acted in the manner they were invited
to act, the Government would be held bound by a contractual
obligation even though no fomial contra~! in the manner required
by Art. 299 of the Constitution was executed, and the exporter
would be entitled to claim damages contrary to that provision for
breach of the contract even though no formal written contract
had been executed in the manner provided by that Article. Bot
the responden~s are not sczking to enforce any contractual right:
they are 5eeking to enforce compliance with the obligation which
is laid upon the Textile Commissioner by the terms of the Scheme,
and we are of the view that even if the Scheme is executive in
character, the respondents who were aggrieved becaui;e o! the
failure to carry out the terms of the Scheme were entitled to seek
reson to the Court and claim that the obligation imposed upon
the Textile Commissioner by the Scheme be ordered to be carried
out.
We hold that the claim of the respondents is appropriateiy
founded upon the equity which arises in their favour as a result
of the representation made on behalf of the Union of India in the
Export Promotion Scheme. and the action taken by the respondents acting upon that representation under the belief that the
Government would carry out the representation made by it. On
the facts proved in this case, no ground has been suggested before
the Court for exempting the Government from the equity arising
out of the acts done by the· exporters to their prejudice relying upon
the representation. This principle has been recognised by the
Courts in India and by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
in several cases. In The Municipal Corporation of the City of
Rombay v. The Secretary of State for India in Cou11cil(' ). it was
held by the Bombay High Court that even though there is no formal
(I) l.L.i.. 29 Born. 580.
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contract as required by the statute, the Government may be bound
by a representation made by it In that case in answer to a regu1sition by the Government of Bombay addressioct to the Mumc1pal
Commissioner to remove certain fish and vegetable markets to
facilitate the construction of an arterial road, the Municipal Commissioner offered to remove the structures if the Government would
agree to rent to the Municipality other land mentioned in )lis letter
at a nominal rent The Government accepted the suggestion and
sanctioned the application of the Municipal Commissioner for a
site for stabling and establishing the new markets. The Municipal
Commissioner then took possession of the land so made available
and constructed stables, workshops and chawls thereon. Twentyfour years thereafter the Government of Bombay served notices on
the Municipal Commissioner determining the tenancy and requesting the Commissioner to deliver possession of the land occupied by
the markets, and to pay i.n the meantime rent at the rate of
Rs. 12,000/- per annum. The Municipality declined to pay the
rent, and the s~cretary of State for India filed a suii against the
Municipal Commissioner for a declaration that the tenancy of the
Municipality created by Government Resolution of December 9,
1865, stood determined and for an order to pay rent at the rate of
Rs. 12,000/- per annum. It was urged be'ore the lligh court of
Bombay that the events which had transpired had created an equity
in favour of the Municipality which afforded an answer to the claim
of the Government to eject the Municipality. Jenkins, C.J., delivering the judgment of the Court observed :
"The doctrine involved in this phase of the case is
often treated as one of estoppel, but I doubt whether this
is " correct, though i: may be a convenient name to
apply.
It differs essentially from the doctrine embodied in
section 115 of the Evidenet! Act, which jS· not a rule
of equity, but is a rule of evidence that was formulated and applied in Courts of law; while the doctrine,
with which 1 am now dealing, takes its orii:in from the
jurisdiction assumed by Courts of Equity to intervene in the case of, or to prevent fraud."
After referring to Ramsden v. Dyson('), the learned Chief Jnsticc
observed that the Crown comes within the range of equity and
proceeded to examine whether the facts of the case invited the
application of that principle.
This case is, in our judgment a clear authority that even
though the case does not fall within the terms oi s. 115 of the
Evidence Act, it is still open to a party who has acted on a representation made by the Government to claim that the Government
(I) (1866) L.R. I. H.L. 17.J.
384
SCPREME COURT REPORTS
IJ968] 2 S.C.R.
shall be ~u~d to carry out the promise made by it, even ihough
the promise 1s not recorded in the form of a formal cohtract '"
required by the Con,titution.
In Ahmad Y ar Khan and others v. Secretary of Sia le for Indict
i11 Council and another('), the plaintiffs claimed title to a canal
supplied with water from the Sutlcj having been constructed at
great expense by their predecessors for purposes of irrigation,
with the sanction and encouragement of the Government, partly
on Government lands and partly on rhe lands of private own.ers
under ;irrangements with them. It was held that the plaintiffs
became proprietors of the canal and ..entitled to have the waters
of the Sutlej admitted into it so long as it was used for the purpose
for which it was originally designed. Similarly in The Ganges
Manufacturin11 Co. v. Surujmul/( 2 ), Garth C.J., observed that a
man may be cstoppcd not only from giving particular evidence.
but from doing any act or relying upon any particular argument
or contention, which the rules of equity and good conscience prevent him from using as against his opponent.
Counsel for the Union invited our attention to the observations made by Patanjali Sastri J., in Collec/or of Bombay v. MuniThe
cipal Corporation of the City of Bombay and others(').
learned Judge observed that equity cannot be enforced so as to,
violate an express statutory provision, and he was therefore unable to share the view expressed by Jenkins C.J. in The Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay v. The Secretary of State
for India i11 Council('). Jn Collector of Bombay v. Municipal
Corporation of the City of Bombay and others(') the facts were
these : Acting upon a representation made by the Government
of Bombay, the Municipal Commissioner of Bombay had given
up certain old markets and had constructed new markets on a
site made available to the Municipality by the Government at
considerable expense. The Resolution under which the Government had granted the land stated expressly that no rent should
be charged to the Municipality as the markets will l~ like other
buildings for the benefit of the whole community. When the
Collector of Bombay sought ·to enhance the land revenue, the
Corporation sued for a declaration that the order of assessment
was ultra vires and that it was entitled to hold the land for ever
withoui payment of any assessment. The High Court of Bombay
held that the Govcrrunent had lost its right to asseS> the land in
question because of the equity arising on the facts of the ca'e in
favour of the Municipality and a limitation on the right of the
Government to assess under s. 8 of the Bombay City Land Rewnue Act arose. A majority of the Judges of this Court held that
(I) LR. 28 I.A. 211.
(3) (1952] S.CR_ 4J.
(2) 1.L.R. S Cal. 669.
(4) 1.L.R. 29 Born. 58-J_
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the Government was not, under the circumstances of the case,
entitled to assess land revenue on the land in question, because
the Corporation had taken possession _of the_ land in terms of the
Government resolu~ion and had contmued m such possession
openly, uninterruptedly and as of right for over 70 ye_ars, and
had thereby acquired the limited title it had been prescnbmg for
during the period the right to hold the land in perpetuity free of
rent. Chandrasekhara Aiyar J., observed that even if it be assumed that there was no representation in fact that the land was rentfree at the time when it was given to the Municipaliiy, if there
was a holding out of a promise that no rent will be charged in
the future, the Government must be deemed in the circumstances
of the case to have bound themselves to fulfil it, and a Court of
Equity must prevent the perpetration of a legal fraud. Chandrasekhara Aiyar J .. observed at p. 63 :
"Whether it is the equity recognised in Ramsden's
case, or it is some other form of equity, is not of much
importance, Courts must do justice by the promotion
of honesty and good faith, as far as it lies in their
power."
Patanjali Sastri J., expressed a contrary view holdmg that the
express provisions of the statute could not he over-ridden by
considerations of equity.
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Under our _jurisprudence the Government is not exempt from
liability to carry out the representation made by it as to its future
conduct and it cannot on some undefined and undisclosed
ground of necessity or expediency fail to carry out the promise
solemnly made by it, nor claim to be the judge of its own obligation to the citizen on an ex parte appraisement of the circumstances in which the obligation has arisen. We agree with the
High Court that the impugned order passed by the Textile Commissioner and confirmed by the Central Government imp<lsing
cut in the import entitlement by the respondents should be set
aside and quashed and that the Textile Commissioner and the Joint
Chief Controller of Imports and Exports be directed to issue to
the respondents import certificates for the total amount equal to
l 00% of the f.o.b. value of the goods exported by them, unless
there is some decision which falls within cl. 10 of the Scheme in
question.
The facts which give rise to the other appeals are substantially the s~me as the facts in Civi.l Appeal No. 885 of 1967,
except that m four O!!t of those. ap~ls the exporters had appeared before the Committee appomtM by the Textile Commissioner
and had explained the circumstances in which the exports were
made by them. But it is common ground that the report of the
386
SlJPREME COURT REPORTS
[1968] 2 S.CR
Committee was not made available to them and the Textile Commissioner, before he pa-;sed the orders. did not call for their
explanations. It must therefore be held that enquiry in a man:
ner consonant with the rules of justice was not made in the case
of those four exporters also.
The appeals therefore fail and are dismissed with costs.
hearing fre.
V.P.S.
One
Appeals dismi.1.1NI.
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