THE CENTURY SPG. & MFG. CO. LTD. versus DISTRICT MUNICIPALITY OF ULHASNAGAR
Supreme Court of India | Decided 9 November 1967 | [1968] 2 S.C.R. 211 | 1967 INSC 257
Key facts
- Decided
- 9 November 1967
- Bench
- J.C. SHAH*, S.M. SIKRI, J.M. SHELAT
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 2014/1966
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Citation
- [1968] 2 S.C.R. 211
- Neutral citation
- 1967 INSC 257
Text of the judgment
A
THE CENTURY SPG. & MFG. CO. LTD.
v.
DISTRICT MUNICIPALITY OF ULHASNAGAR
November 9, 1967
ll
[J. C. SHAH, S. M. SIKRI AND J. M. SHELAT, JJ.]
c
Bombay Di>rrict Municipal Act (Hom. 3 o/ 1901), ss. 4, 7, 59 60, 61,.
62, 63 and Home Tax Rules framed under s; 46 of the Act-Rules I, 3
and Schedule !-Notification selling up rnunicipality whether invalid for
contravention of ss. 4 and 1-House 1'.ax Rules whether in conformity
with ss. 59-63 of Act-Flat Rate on ccrpet area ·whether a perrnissible
1nethod of assessn1ent--Open land not liable to be included fur purpose
of rating factory buildings.
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By notifications issued under the Bombay District Municipal Act 1901,
the State of Bombay set up the respondent Municipality comprising portions of certain villag.;:s. The Munjcipality framed .House Tax Rules.
under s. 46 of the Act and served notice to the appellant-company that
it propo\c<l to assess its buildings at a certain amount. On, the appelants'
objections, it was asked to furnish the cost. of constructions, which it failed
to furnish. The a,!)pellant was serv~d a boUSe tax bill. Thereupon the
appellant unsuccessfully filed petitions in the High Court under Arts. 226
and 2'27 of the Constitution for quashing the notifications, assessment. and
bills. In appeal to this Court, the appellant, inter alw, contended : (i)
that the notifications were invalid as ss. 4 and 7 of the Act!' do not permit
the Ciovernrncnt to constitute a local area by including in it not villages
hut only portions thereof; (ii) that the House Tax Rules w.ere not in
conformity with ss. 59 to 63 of the Act, as they failed to prescribe the
basis of valuation of e3:Ch class of property oQ which it imposed tlie
house tax; what these. Rules provided was merely to impose the house
lax at th•.! rate of 15% or Rs. 12/. whichever was more on the valuation
arrived at <1fter deducting 10% from the annual Jetting value without
specifying the method by which such annual letting value was to be
arrived at . and (iii) that the bill served on the appellant was not in conformitv with the Ruks, as (a) the buildings could be assessed on their
annual letting value and not at a flat rate on the carpet area, and (b) in
asses~ing the rate it could not include the rate on open lands.
Held : (i) The notifications were not in any way. contrary to or
ultra rires ss. 4 or 7 of th~ Act. There is nothing either in ss. 4 or 7 to
limit the pov...cr of the Government in constituting a muni<.::ipal district to
include therein the whole of the village or ·suburb. The Act.. on t!'ie other
hand. pcrn1its the Government to include .. land adjoining thereto" which
shows· that a part of land adjoining an existing village or a suburb can
also be added if it is thought expedient so to do. Likewise, while altering
the limits of an existing municipal district it C'dn exclude frola or include
in it part of the Jand where it becomes necessary or expedient so to do.
(216G, HJ
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(ii) The word "rate" in s. 59(i) means a tax for local purpo.ses imposed by local authorities, the hasis of which is the annual value of the
lands or buildings arrived at in one of the three ways. viz., ( 1) the actual
rent fetched by such land or building where it is actually let; ( 2) where
it is not let rent based on hypothetical tenancy particularly in the case of
buildings ·and ( 3) where either of these two modes is not available. by
valuatio.n ba')ed on capital value from v.·hich annual value has to be found
212
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1968] 2 S.C.R.
by applying a suitable percentage which may not be the same for Ja~js
and building<. It is legitimate to infer that the legislature intended this
meaning of the word .. rate" in s. 59 ( I) by using the word "rate" as
·distinct from other imposts specified in that very sub-oection and designated
as toll, cess, tax etc. [218 C-E]
"
I~. case of huil~ing.~ or lands or. both the m:.inicipality colud impose a
rate and. nut a tax '. The rate is as understood in such statutes. viz.,
on the basis not of capual but on the annual letting value ascertained by
a~y of che >aid recognised melhods, . Soction 60 leaves it to the option of
B
tbe- municipality for arriving at the annual value for assessment of the
rate to choose any one of the aforesaid recognised methods, the only res-
triction being that it must specify in the rules which basis of valualivn
capital or annual letting value or any other basis, it proposes to adopt'.
[218H; 219B!
The Municipality had complied with the procedure required by tho
Act before a tax was imposed by selecting the tax, by laying down the
class of property which it desired to make liable, the amount of the rate
at which such property would be liable and lasUy the basis of valuation
for purposes of the rate on buildings and houses. [22vF-G]
(iii) (a) Schedule I to Che Rules expressly providcs that the house
tax is lo be assessed on the Lasis of the annual letting value. The annual
letting V-dlue can he arrived at by any one of the recognised methods.
Neither 'the Rules nor Sch. I constri :t the Municipality to adopt ""Y one
particular m·~thoJ of arriving at the annual letting value.
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ll may wet; be
that a flat rate on the carpet area may correspond to the annual Jeni~~
value of a buildmg in which case it would be the annual letting value as
provided bv Sch. 1 which would ·be the basis of asse~sment, lf it is not.
the own-,r or occupier of the building can legitimately challenge the assessment on thi: ground that such assessment on the basis of a fhit rate on
the carpet area do:s not reflect the annuJI value so calculatc<l.
{221E-0]
' Ahmcda.
Pare/ (io\-crdhandas Hargovindas v. AfuniC'ipa/ Con11niv;io11er,.
bod, I I 964] 2 S.C.R. 603 and Lokmanya Mills v. Bcr.<i Borougli Municipa/ir,v, I I 962) I S.C.R. 306, refrncd to.
( b) The open lands could not bo included while rilling Ille
factory
buildings of the appellant companies a.\ such inclusion wa~ ultra vires
the Rules and therefore invalid. Rule 3(7) expressly excludes the definition of a building or a house in sec. 3(7). The word ..building" or
"house" must therefore bear the meaning given to it by the Ruic and
not the meaning given to it by the Act. By virtue of r. I (ii) these rule.
extend to buildings or houses or shops or huts . <ihupras) onl1 and a
building or a house under r. 3(7) means a building, house,. shop, hut
(jhupras) etc. "'·ith a roof thereon constructed for .human. h~o1tatton or
otherwise. Open lands obviously arc not only not included 1n tm tl!rm
•huilding" or "house" but the Rules do not extend to such open lands.
[222H-223BJ
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 2014,
2565 and 2567 of 1966.
Appeals from the judgment and o_rdcr dated July 6: 7. 1965
of the Bombay High Court in Special Ctvtl Applccatcons Nos.
635, 517. 518 and 1816 of 1964 respcctively.
S. v: G11pte, Soli.-:itor·Genera/, S. A. Shroff, J>. C. Bhartari.
Ravinder Narain and 0. C. Mdthur, for the appellant (in C.A.
No. 2014 of 1966).
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CENTURY SPG.
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co. v. MUNICIPALITY (Shelat, I.)
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S. T. Desai, A. B. Diwan, Ravinder Narain and 0. C. Mathur,
for the 11ppellant (in C.A. No. 2565 of 1966).
A. B. Diwan, Ravrnder.Narain and 0. C. Mathur, for the
<!ppellants (in C.As. Nos. 2566 and 2567 of 1966).
A. K. Sen, N. H. Gurshoni, Prah/ad H. Advani and N. N.
Keswani for the respondents Nos. 1-5 (in C.A. No. 2014 of
1966) and the respondents (in C.As. Nos. 2565-2567 of 1966).
S. P. Nayar for R. H. Dhebar for respondent No. 6 (in C.A.
No. 2014 of 1966.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Shelat, J. These four appeals by certificate from the High
Court at Bombay raise common questions of law and are therefore disposed of by a common judgment. As the facts in all these
appeds are similar it is not n.ecessary to narrate the facts of each
appeal. However, for appreciating the contentions raised in
these appeals we propose to set out only the relevant facts in Civil
Appeal No. 2014 of 1966 as typical.
By a notification dated October 30, 1959 the Government of
Bombay proposed to set up a local area comprising of parts of
Shahad, Ambernath and other viliages into a municipal district
under the name of the Municipal Disirict of Ulhasnagar, the limits
of which wer" set out in a Schedule thereto. After considering
the objectior; to the said proposal the Government by another
notification elated September 20, 1960 issued under secs. 4 and
7 of the Bombay District Municipal Act, fl! of 190 I declared
the said local area as the Municipal District wilh effect from
April 1, 1960. By the said notification the Government .also set
up an interim Municipality for Ulhasnagar, consisting of 18
Counciilors with effect from November ·1, 1950 for one year
in the first instance or till an elected body took over, whichever
was earlier. Under sec. 46 of the Act the first respondent
Municipality became entitled to frame rules and bye-laws in
relation to taxes it proposed to impose. Accordingly,· it framed
Rules and in particular the House Tax Rules, with which these
appeals are concerned. On November 8, 1963 the Municipality
served a notice under s. 65 ( 1) of the Act informing the appellant Company that it proposed to assess its buildings at
Rs. 1,97,609/52. On November 28, 1963 the appellant Company submitted its objections to the said assessment and the said
bill. On February 22. 1964 the assessing officer requested the
appellant Company to furnish to him the cost of construction of
its factories and buildings and on the appellant Company failing
to do so he passed his order dated March 6, 1964 assessing the
appellant Company to house fax at Rs. 1,13,647/- for the period
from April I. 1963 to March 31. 1954. On March. 20, 1964
the Municipality served a house tax bill for the said amount.
-214
SUPREME CQURT REPORTS
[ 1968] 2 S,C.R.
Similar liouse tax bills- W.e[e served on the other appellant com- A
panies. Thereupon the appellan\ Company in Civil Appeal No .
.2014 9f 1966 and the appellant companies in other appeals filed
writ petitions in the High Court .under. Arts. 226 and 227 of the
Constitution aileging that the said notification~, the sald assess_rnent and the said bills were invalid and should be quashed. On
April 20, 1964 the High Coun issued a rule Jlisi against -th.i- -B
respondent municipality in all the said petitions, out summarily
dismissed the said petitions sd far as respondents 2; 4 and 6 were
concern.zd and also restricted the rule .only to certain 'grounds in
-the petitions. The peti~ions were resisted by the municipality on
several grounds, viz .• that they were not maintainable, that the
proper remedy for the appellants was by way of appeal in th~ C
coun of the first class judicial magistrate, as ·provided ·by "the Act.
that the municipality was competeht"to levy the said tax under
s. 59, that the said notificatio~ were valid, that the tax was
properly· levied, tha,t the assessing officer unJer sec. 67 A was .
authorised' to prepare, finaliSe and authenticate the a'iSessment list
and that the same was prd~rly done. The appellant Company,
on the other hand, ·urged before the High Cou_rt (I) that the n
·said rules were ultra \I.ires as they did.not provide for the basis for
the fixation of valuation; (2) that the valuation was arrive(! at at a
-flat 'rate on the carpet area, a method which was not permissible
in law; (3) that .. in any e,vent, t)le }.1unicipality was not entitled
-io tax> the open lands; ( 4) that the a,sessmen l was bad or,
account of discrimination between the app.:!llant companies inter r:
· se inasmuch. as whereas nssessment was made in the case of the~
Century Mills1 on th:c basis of cost of .constructiem the :issessment
in respect o( ot)ler appellant ·companies was made at. a flat rate
'on the ca,rpet an'a occul?ied by them·; ( 5) that the register prepared under sec. 65 became operative after the d(lte of tl\ca·uthentication of the said list anq that therefore the tax for .the
period ·prior to t]le_ said date was illegal; ( 9) that the tax was F
imposed -b)( the· Municipamy which had no legal existence .as the
tenure of "one vear of its. couilcillqrs was over"by Septem~r 30,
1961, and that-therefore thp sa:fd rules were- ineffective and lastly
that-1 the appointm.ent of the Pre~iC:ent and tl1e Vice-P're.,idcnt of
the· responden~ Municipality was. illegal. , 'rbe Higij Court d.ismissed the._petitions holding (1) that the said Rules were vahd; G
(2) that 1hc principles of valuation were not modes of valuation
and therefore it ,was not neces.sary to Jay down in the said RJ!Jes
methods by whi~h the valuation should b'e. arrived at; {3) that
tbe ·assessm~nt list was proper; (4) ,that th6µgh untjer the said
Rules ,only houses aiia bui_ldings and not ·oIJ!:n lands FQuld bt:
taxed it was impos~ible, to say in a writ petition without a detailed H
inguiry as to whet)ler the tax in fact, was levied on open Janos
·or-tas adjuncts to their factories m~rely because their valuation
was separately made. and tha,t the\efore such a question should
•
CENTURY SPG.
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co. v. MUNICIPALITY (She/at, J.)
21"
be more properly raised in the appeals filed by the Companies:
( 5) (a) that the Municipality was entitled to levy tax for the
official year 1963-64, (b) that the appointment of the said
President and Vice President was valid and lastly that the re»·
pondent Municipality though an interim municipality was com·
petent to levy the said tax.
Mr. Gupte for the Century Mills raised the following contentions which were adopted by Counsel for the other companies:
( l ) that the said notifications were invalid having regard to
secs. 4 and 7 of the Act;
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(2) that the House Tax Rules were not in conformity with
secs. 59 to 63;
( 3) that the bill served oa the Mills was not in accordance
with the Rules; (a) to the ex!ent that the said bill sought l<J
assess open lands, (b) that the flat rate method on carpet area
was not permissible as it was not a recognised method of detcrminin?; the annual letting value and ( c) that the assessing officer
had arrived at the annual letting value on the basis of construction
cost without giving an opportunity to the Company to be heard
on such cost;
1
( 4) that as the authentication was made to the assessment
list on March 6, 1964 it could not operate under tlie said Rules
for assessment for the period prior thereto, viz., April l. 196'.1
to March 31, 1964 and lastly;
( 5) that the assessment suffered from discrimination inas·
much as the assessing officer assessed the Century Mills on the
basis of construction cost while he did so in the case of the
other companies at a flat rate on the carpet area occupied by
them .
As regards the first contention, the argument was that secs.
4. 7 and 8 do not permit the Goverrunent to constitute a local
area by including in it not villages but only portions thereof ar.d
ll!at when it is proposed to amalgamate different units such as vii·
!ages or suburbs situate adjacent to each other to 19nn one-municipal district it can do so by bringing them into such-a district as
whole units and not breaking them up and having r. part or
parts of such unit and not the rest. The contention was founded on the fact that the notification dated October 30, 1959
'lated that the Government proposed to constituk the local area
comprising of parts of Shahad, Ambemath, and other village'
into a permanent municipal district, the limit> of which were
specified in the Schedule thereto. The said Schedule set out the
boundaries of the proposed municipal district by showing Ulbas
river as its boundary in the north and certain survey numbers of
216
SUPREMt COURT REPORTS
[1968] 2 S.C.R.
the said villages a' boundaries in the east, south and west. After
considering the objections as required by the Act the Government by a further notification dated September 20, 1960 declared
tbe said local area of which the same boundaries were set out
in the Schedule thereto to be a permanent mun;cjpaJ district. It
i-; true that in constituting the municipal district of Ulhasnagar
the ·Government included parts of villages enumerated in the
said Schedule. But the qucsti~n is, was the Government competent to do so or not. Section 4 provides that subject to secs. 6,
7 and 8 the Government may declare by a notification any local
area to be a municipal district and may, by a like notification;
extend, contract or otherwise al'.er the limits of any municipal
district, that every such notification constituting a new municipal
district or altering the limits of an existing municipal district
shalt clearly setforth the local limits of the area to be included
in or. excluded from such municipal district as the case may be
and when so done it is the duty of the municipality already
exrstiiig or of every ·municipality newly constituted or whose
limits are altered to set up as required by the Collector boundary
marks defining its limits or the altered limits of the municipal
district subject to it~ authority. Section 7 provides that any local
area which comprises of (a) a city, town, or station or two or
more neighbouring cities, towns or stations with or w:thout any
village, suburb or land adjoining th.~reto 0r (b) J village or
suburb or two or more neighbouring villages or suburbs, may be
declared a pennanent municipal district. It will ~e seen that
while the Government can declare a municipal district cOtnprlsing of two or more neighbouring cities, towns or s•ations or a
village or suburb or two or more neighbouring villages or suburbs.
sec. 7 expressly provides that such a local area may comprise not
only of N'O neighbouring villages or suburbs but a15o Jaiid adjoining to a village or suburb. Therefore while constituting a municipal
district the Government. when it is expedient so to do, can join
to an existing village or suburb the land adjoining thereto. Similarly sec. 4 empowers the Government tn extend, ~ontract or
otherwise alter from time to time the existing limits of a municipal
district or declare any local area to be a municipal district.
There is nothing either in sec. 4 or sec. 7 to limit the power of the
Government in constituting a municipal district to include therein
the whole of the village or suburb as contended. The Act, on
the other hand, pennits the Government to incluJe "lJnd adjoininll thereto" which shows that a part of the Jan~ a.djoi.ning to an
existing village or a suburb can also be added 1f tt 1s thought
expedient so to do. Likewise, while altering the limiL' of , an
existing municipal district it can exclude from or include in it part
of the land where it becomes necessary or expedient to do. That
being so, it is impossible to say' that b ytaking parts of the villa)!e'
set out in the Schedules to the two notifications the Government
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CENTURY SPG. CO. V. MUNICIPALITY
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(S/ie/at, J.)
217
formed a municipal clistrict contrary to the provisions of secs. 4 or
7 or that the constitution by it of the municipal district of Ulbasnagar was in any way contrary to or ultra vires the two sections.
The next contention was that the House Tax Rules framed
by the municipality were not in conformity with sec. 60 inasmuch
as they failed to prescribe the basis of valuation of each class of
R
property on which it imposed the house tax, that what these
.Rules provided was merely to impose the house tax at the rate of
15 % or Rs. 12/ - whichever was more on the valuarion arrived
at after <;feducting 10% from the annual letting value without
specifying the method by which such annual letting value wall to ·
be arrived at. The argument was that it was incumbent on the
c Municipality to Jay down specifically :n the Rules, the method or
methods by which such annual letting value had to be calculated
and not having done so the Rules were not in accord with the
express provisions of sec. 60. Mr. Gupte argued that the High
Court was in error in holding that this was not necessary on the
mere ground that sub-clause (iv-a) of sec. 60(a) was inappropriate or that the legislature had inserted that sub-clause without
])
properly understanding its implications.
Dealing wi~h this contention the High Court observed as
follows:"Inasmuch as in 190 l Act in sec. 60 there was no
provision corresponding to the Explanation to sec. 75
of the 1925 Act, the addition of sub-clause (iv-a) of
E
sec. 60 was most inappropriate and has no meaning.
In the Act of 1925 it had to be provided because both
the land and the building could be taxed on the basis
of the annual letting value, or, if the Municipality so
chose, the land could be taxed on the basis of capital
value and it is for this reason that it became aecessary
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to provide that a rule shall be framed by the municipality laying down the basis on which valuation has to
be made."
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"In fact, there is nothing, either in the provisions of
the Municipal Boroughs Act or in the provisions of the
present Act, to suggest that what was intended by
clause 3 in sec. 75 of the 1925 Act and by sub-clause
(iv-a) of cl. (a) of sec. 60 of the 1901 Act, was that
the Municipality was required to frame rules prescribing the modes by which the annual letting value was to
be determi11ed."
Sec. 3(11) defineo "annual letting value" as the annual rent for
which. any building or land might reasonably be expected to let
IOSup.Clj67-l 5
218
SUPREME COURT RLl'ORlS
11968] 2 s ( "
from year to year. Sec. 59 ( J) provides that a municipality, after A
obser'ing the procedure required by sec. 60 and with th.e sanction
of the State Government in the case of city municipalities and in
other cases of the Commissioner, may impose any of the following taxes, that is to say, (i) a rate on buildings, or lands or both,
situate within the municipal district; (ii) a tax on all or "any
vehicles, boats" etc. Sub-clauses (iii) to (ix) describe various B
other imposts which the municipality can impose such as toll.
octroi, cess and a general or special water rate or tax. It will be
seen that though sub-sec. I authorises the municipality to impose
"the following taxes", when it comes to imposing a tax on buildings or lands or both it describes the tax as "rate", in distinction
of the other imposts described variously as toll, cess, octroi and
tax. The distinction as pointed out in Patel Goverdhandas Har- c
/?Ovindas v. Municipal Commissioner, Ahmedabad(') is a deliberate one. As laid down there the word "rate" in sec. 59( I) must
be understood to mean a tax for local purposes imposed by local
authorities the basis of which is the annual value of the lands or
buildings arrived at in one of .the three ways, vi:., (I) actual rent
fetched by sueh land or building wttere it is actually let; (2) [)
where it i~ not let rent eased on hypothetical tenancy particular!~
in the case of buildings and { 3) where either of these two modes
is not available by valuation b; sed on capital value from which
annual value has to be found by applying a suitable percentage
which may not be the same for lands and buildings. It 1s therefore legitimate to infer that the Jcgislatur.~ intended this meaning E
of the word "rate" in s. 59 (I) by using the word "rate" a'
distinct from other imposts specified in that ·very sub-section and
designated as toll, cess, tax etc. Section 60 provides that before
imposing any one of these taxes the Municipality shall by a r~~o
lution select one or other of those taxes, prepare rules tbe~efor,
specify by such resolution and in such rules the class or classes of
persons or of property or of both which the municipality desire'
to make liable, the amount for which or the rate at which it is
desired to make such classes liable and by sub-clause (iv-a) in
the case of a rate on buildings or lanGs or both the basis, for
;:ach class, of the w_~uation on which the rate is to be imposed
Section 60 therefore requires the municipality both in the said resolution and the said rules to specify (a) the class or classes of (;
persons or property which it desires to make liable; {b) the
amount or rate at which it wants such classes to be liable and ( c)
in the case of buildings or lands or both the basis of valuation for
each class of property, that is, building~ or lands or both. As
aforesaid, in the cao;c of buildings or lands or both the Municipality
can impose a "rate" and not a "tax". The rate is a~ understood II
in such statutes, viz., on the basis not of capital but on the annual
(I) [19641 2 S.C.R. 608.
CENTURY SPG.
co. v. MUNICIPALITY (She/al, J.)
21 ~
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letting value as observed in Patel Govardhandas Hargol·indas v.
Municipal Commissioner, Ahtnedabad (1) ascertained by any of
the said recognised. methods. The words "the basis, for each class,
of the valuation" on which such rate is to be imposed indicate that
the municipality can adopt any one of those basis for different
classes of property, viz., buildings or lands for arriving at the
annual value for each such class. Section 60 thus leaves it to the
B
option of the municipality for arriving at the annual value for
assessment of the rate to choose any one of the aforesaid recognised methods, the only restriction being that it must specify in the
rules which basis of valuation; capital or annual Jetting value or
any other basis, it proposes to adopt.
Section 75 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, XVIII of
c
1925 contains provisions similar to those in sec. 60 of the present
Act except that in addition it contains an Explanation which provides that "in the case of lands the basis of valuation may be either
capital or annual Jetting value". But under sec. 7 5 the Borough
Municipality also as the District Municipality under sec. 60 of the
D . present Act is authorised to impose a "rate" and not a "tax". on
buildings or lands or both. The effect of adding the Expknation
to sec. 75 therefore is simply that whereas sec. 60 of the District
Municipal Act leaves it to the discretion of the municipality to
assess the annual value upon anfbasis of valuailon of its choice,
the Explanation to sec. 75 in Act XVIII of 1925 restricts the
choice to either the capital or the annual Jetting value. In both
E the cases, however, the Municipality can impose a rate and not
a tax as understood in Ideal Acts, i.e., a rate on the annual letting
value of the building or the land. That was why in Lokmanya
Mills v. Barsi Borough Municipality(') .it was held that a rate
may be levied by a municipality under the Bombay Municipal
Boroughs Act 1925 on the valuation made on the basis of capital
F or on the annual letting value of a building and not on· a valua~
tion computed merely on the floor area of the s!ructures, that
such a rate was clearly not a tax based either on the capital value
or on the annual letting value, for, annual letting value postulates rent which a hypothetical tenant may reasonably be expected to pay for the building if let. Therefore, the municipality had
no power under that Act to ignore the basis of valuation presG
cribed by the Act and to adopt a basis not sanctioned by the
Act. There is therefore nothing inappropriate in adding sub-cl.
(iv-a) in sec. 60 (a) by sec. 10 of Bombay Act XXXV of 1954
as observed by the High Court. The effect of both sec. 60 in the
present Act and sec. 7 5 in the 1925 Act is the same. Both ~be
classes of municipalities are authorised to impose rate on buildH
ings or lands or both. The rate as consistently understood 1s a
certain pi:rcentage on the annual value, such value being arrived
(1) [1964] 2 S.C.R. 608.
(2) [1962] I S.C.R. 306.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1968] 2 S.C R
at on a basis specified by it. The only difference·is that wherca'
.under the Bombay Act of 1925 where a rate is imposed on huildrngs or lan.ds, the Borough Municipality call arrive at the annual
value on. either of the basis mentioned in the Explanation to sec.
75, that 1s e1t~er the. capital value or the annual letting va!ue only,
no such rcstncuon m the ab>.encc of such an explanation as in
s. 75 as to the basis of valuation is placed by sec. 60 of the 1901
Act.
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A, rcquircJ by sec. 60, the Municipality ha' framed Ruic'
under sec. 46 and selected the tax, viz.. the house-tax. Subclausc (iv-a) of sec. 60(a) no doubt requires the Municipality
in the case of the rate on buildings or lands or both to specif)
, the basis. for each class, of the valuation on which such rate "
to be imposed. That is done in the pre.-;ent case by the Rules.
Rule 3 of the House Tax Rules provides that in respect of every
build;ng <>r house the house tax shall be payable to the Secretary
or any other ~rson appointed by the Municipality for that purpose
in each year by the OWQ-:!r or occupier thereof at the rates calculated in accordance wllh Schedule I. The Rul~ thus requires D
the a'isessing authority to assess the house tax calculated in
accordance with Schedule I. Schedule I provides that the tax is to
be assessed on the net annual letting value. that is, after deducting from the gross annual letting value 10% allowance in lieu of
the cost of repairs or on any other account whatsoever. It also
provides that the house tax is to be 15 % of such annual lettini:
value or Rs. I 2/- per year whichever is more. Rule 3 and Sch. I
thus specify as required by sec. 60(a) the rate. the class of property to be made liable 3nd in the case of houses or buildings the
basis of valuation. vi: .. the annual letting value. The effect of
Ruic 3 and Sch. I is that the assessing authority can assess the
rate on buildings only on the annual letting value and no other
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value such as the capital value. The Municipality therefore ha-'
complied with the procedure required by the Act before a tax ''
impo!.ed by selecting the tax. by laying down the class of property
which it desires to make liable. the amount of the rate at which
such property would be liable and lastly the basis of valuation for
purposes of the rate on buildings and houses. We are unable
therefore to accept the contention that the basis of valuation is G
the method of valuation of annual value or with the contention
of Mr. Desai for the companies in other appeals that the Ru'e'
not only have to specify the classification of properties which are
'°ught to be taxed but also the method of valua!ion for each
class. vi: .. the rental basis. cost or capital value or the profits
hasis. The fallacy in the contention lies in mixing up the
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me!l\Od with the basis of valuation. The basis as provided in the
Rule.• i• the annual value which can be ascertained or arrived at
t-oy any one or more of the recognised methods.
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CENTURY SPG.
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Though we are not able to accede to these contentions we
think the ,appellants are on a surer ground in their third contention, viz., that the said house tax bills we1e not in accordance with
the Kules to the extent that they sought- to assess the open lands.
ln the case of the Century Mills the assessment first. made as
aforesaid was for Rs. 1,97,609/52 nP a&sessed at fiat rate on
the carpet area occupied by the Mills. The same was aiso the
basis in respect of other appellant companies in the rest of the
appeals. When the assessment was objected to by the Century
Mills the assessing officer changed the method of assessment from
the fiat rate on the carpet area to the construction cost taken from
the Company's balance-sheet for 1962. Taking· the figure of
Rs. 1,46,05,920 as the cost of construction of the buildings he
assessed at 53 on the said cost after deducting 10% allowance
in lieu of cost of repairs. He fixed the rate on buildings at
Rs. 98,590 and Rs. 15,057 on the open land at the rate of Rs. 2
per 1000 sq. ft. The total assessment arrived at by him thus
came to Rs. 1, 13,647. In the case of the other companies he
retained the method of valuation adopted by him, i.e., a fiat rate
on the carpet area but reduced the rate to a certain extent.
The objection raised by the appellant ·companies is 'two-fold;
on their
annual letting value and not at a fiat rate on the carpet area and
(ii) that in assessing the rate he cannot include the rate on open
lands. · As regards the first part of the objection, Sch. 1 to the
said Rules expre5sly provides that the house tax is to be assessed
on the basis of the annual letting value. The annual Jetting value
can be arrived at by any one of the recognised methods. Neither
the Rules nor Sch. 1 constrict the Municipality to adopt any one
particular method of arriving at the annual letting value. It may
well be that a fiat rate on the carpet area may correspond to the
annual letting value of a building in which case it would be the
annual letting value as provided by Sch. 1 which would be the
basis of assessmeDt. If it is not, the owner or occupier of the
building can legitimately challenge the assessment on the ground
that such assessment on the basis of a fiat rate on the carpet area
does .not reflect the annual value so calculated. The question is
at best one of calculation, viz., whether considering other similar
buildings .in the locality, their hypothetical rents and other data
calculation of the house tax on the basis of caryet area at a fiat
rate, corresponds to their annual letting viiiue. Smee such a question would be one of fact and can properly be decided in the
appeals before the Judicial Magistrate we do not · propose to
go into this question. It will be for the apJ?ellant companies to
establish in th~ appeals that such a valuation at a fiat rate on
the carpet area is 11ot eqwivalent to the annual letting value of
their factnries and other buildings.
( 1) that the assessing officer can assess the 1,>uildings
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S\:PREME EOURT REPORTS
[1968] 2 S.CR
The second pan of the objection unlike the Jmt pan however touches upon the validity of the assessment. The question is
whether the bill includes ass.~ssment on open lands tis· such and
if so whether the Rub permit their assessment. The bill served
on the Century Mills clearly shows that Rs. 15,057 out of the
total assessment of Rs. 1,13.647 are assessed on the open lands
calculated at the fiat rate of Rs. 2 per 1000 sq. ft. The bills
similarly served on the other appellants are all CJlculated at
va~ing fiat rates on different areas of their properties. But the
basis of the assessment though varying rates have been applied
is the carpet area and the carpet area does include open lands in
the case of each of the appellant comf>anies.
Is the assessing oflicer authorised by the Rules to include the
open lands while assessing the rates '1 Under sec. 59(1)(b)(i)
the municipality. subject to observing the procedure laid down
in sec. 60, can impose a rate on buildings or lands or both. As
already observed the municipality, however, has jly its resolution
to select the tax. and in the Rules prescribing the tax so selected
specify the class or classes of property which it desires lo make
liable as also· the rate at which it wishes to subject such class or
classes of property. Sub-clause (iv-a) of sec. 60(a) requires that
in the case of buildings or lands or both the basis of vaiuation for
each such class has also to IJ.z specified by the said resolution and
in the said Rules. We must therefore turn to the Rules to sec if
they specify therein the open lands, the rate at which they are to
be subjerted to the tax and the basis of valuation of such open
l:inds.
Ruic 1 (ii) of the House Tax Rules provides that these Rules
shall exicnd to "all buildings or houses or shops or huts '(jhupras)
whatsoever form any property" within the Ulhasnagar District
Municipal limits except the tenements !yin)! vacant etc. Rule 3(7)
defines a building or a house to which these Rules apply by virtue
of Rule I (iii). A building or a house according to the definition given by Rule 3 ( 7) means "any building, house, shop, hut
( jhupras) and with a roof thereof constructed for human habitation or otherwise". Section 3 ( 7) of the Act contains no doubt a
wider definition of the word "building" and includes within that
word any hut, shed or other enclosure whether. used as human
dwelling or otherwise and shall include also the walls (including
compound wall and fencing) verandahs, fixed platforms, plinths,
door-steps and the like. But that definition cannot be available
to the respondent municipality as Rule 3(9) provides in express
terms that only the words and expressions other than those d~fined
in Rule 3 shall be deemed to be used in the Rules in the same
sense in which they are used in the Act. Rule 3 (7) therefore
expressly excludes the definition of the building given in the Act
hy providing a special definition of a building or a house in Rule
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CENTURY SPG. CO. V. MUNICIPALITY (She/at, J.)
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3 ( 7). It is clear therefore that the word "building" or "house"
must bear the meaning given to it by this Rule and not the meaning given to it by the Act. It follows that as by virtue of Rule l
(ii) these rules extend to buildings or .houses or shops or huts
(jhu(>ras) only and a building or a house under Rule 3 (7) means
a butldtng; house, shop, hut (jhupras) etc., with a roof thereon
constructed for human habitation or otherwise, open lands
obviously are not only not included in the t.erm "building" or
"house" but the Rules do not extend to such open lands.
In his assessment order dated March 6, 1964 passed against
the Century Mills the assessing officer justified the inclusion of
the open lands in the'· assessment by observing as follows :
"The Superintendent (of the appellant Company)
states that tb.e Municipality has decided to levy tax on
the buildings or shops only and that there is no resolution, rule or bye-law "for the levy of house tax on land.
·Apparently the Superintendent's contention seems to
be correct. But on deeper consideration it will be seen
that the words "whatsoever form the property" have
a significance and the same can include lands . also.
According to the District Municipal Act of 1901, building includes, "any hut, shed or other· enclosure whether
used as human dwelling or otherwise" and also "walls,
verandahs, fixed platforms, plinths, door-steps and the
like" .. Now the Century Rayon Factory is bounded by
a compound wall in which all the open space lies. Whole
enclosure can therefore be held as enclosure and is
·therefore liable for rating. On the whole, the Act and
the Rules have empowered the Municipality for the
assessment on the open s;>ace."
-in our view, tb.e asse·ssing officer was clearly wrong, for, wh.at
he did was to apply the definition of a building as given in sec. 3.
of the Act instead of the definition in R. 3 ( 7), That he was not
right in doing as Rule 3(9) excludes the application of that definition. He was bound by the definition of building in Rule 3 (7)
G and in view of Rule 1 (ii) he could base his assessment only on
the annual letting value of a building as provided by Sch. 1 and
not the open lands. He was also not entitled to rely upon the words
"whatsoev.er form any property" in Rufe 1 (ii) as those words go
with the previous words "buildings or houses or shops or huts'"
and do not include open lands to means buildings or houses. The
H .reasoning of the High Court regarding the objectian to the cOilclusion of the open lands in the assessment also does not appear
to be correct. Though the High Court on a consideration of the
Rules beld that th~ Municipality was not authorised to levy the
224
St:PRDI[ COuRT REPORT;
[1968]2!>CR
rate on open lands it observed that if an open land formed an
adjunct of the factory building it would constitute an amenity,
that in that event a hypothetical tenant would pay a higher rent
taking such an amenity into consideration, that the assessing
authority would be entitled in such a case to take into account
such an additional amenity, that there could be no objection, if
he did so and that to decide whether the assessing officer had
valued the open land as an adjunct to the factory building or
separately as open land evidence would have to be led and scrutinised and therefore it would not be possible to decide sucn a question in a writ petition. With respect, it is not possible to agree
with the High Court on this part of its fudgment, firstly, because
the open lands have been separatefy valued and secondly bec.ause
the assessing officer in his said order has in clear tenns repelled
the appellants' objection to his taxing the open Ian~ by relying
on the definition of building in sec. 3 of the Act as including open
lands when bounded by compound walls and not on the ground
that they formed an adjunct of the factory buildings and were an
amenity or additional advantage which a hypothetical. tenant
would take into account when offering rent. In our view the
assessing o&icer was not ertitled to include the open lands while
rating the factory buildings of the appellant companies as such
inclusion was ultra vires the Rules and therefore invalid.
So far as the rest of the contentions are concerned they can
be dealt with, in our view, more properly by the appellate tribunal
before whom the appeals by the appellant companies are at
present pending rather than in these appeals. We theref0~~ do
not propose to go into those questions, especially as it is agreed
_by Counsel for the Municipality (1) that the Municipality will
not take any objection to these questions being canvassed in those
appeals on the ground that any one or more of them were not
taken by the appellant~ in their objections to the assessment list
and ( 2) that it will not also take any objection to the appeal by
the Century Mills having been filed beyond the time prescribed
therefor. Before the High Coun the Municipality had in fact
under!aken that it will not insist that the appellants should confine their objections in their appeals only to the grounds urged in
their objections to the a~sessment list under sec. 65 of the Act.
The nppellant Companies would therefore be entitled to urge that
the valuation made by the assessing officer is erroneous or bad on
any ground available to them under the Act.
The appeals are partly allowed and the judgment and order
passed by the High Coun are set aside to the extent that the assessment on open lands in each of these appeals is declared ultra
vires the Rules and therefore invalid. We also set aside the order
of costs p3ssed by the High Coun a~ainst the Century Mills; ~
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"25
far as these appeals are concerned the parties will bear their own
costs.
Before parting with these appeals, we may mention that the
appellant companies have filed a statement regarding the various
amounts deposited by them either in the High Court or in this
B Court. For 1963-64, the Century Mills deposited in the High
Court Rs. 1,13,647, and the Municipality has withdrawn that
amount. Out of this amount Rs. 15,057was, as held by us;
wrongly mcluded in the house tax bill and therefore that sum
should be refunded to the Mills V(i~hin. one month from today.
The balance should ~.treated as -aeposit under sec. 86 of the
Act in the appeal filed by the Company. For 1964-65 also the
c Century
Mills deposited Rs. 1,13,647 in this Court. Out of this
amount the Company will be at liberty to withdraw Rs. 15,057
and the balance may be withdrawn by the Municipality but it will
be treated aS deposit in the Company's appeal for the year 196465. For 1965-66 the Company has deposited Rs. 1,13,647
against the total assessment of Rs. 1,27,147, the difference being
D the tax on open lands. The Municipality will be at liberty to
withdraw the amount but it will be treated as deposit in the
Company's appeal pending before the · said Magistrate. For
1967-68 the Company has deposited. Rs. 2,78,829/78 in this
Court. The Municipality will be at liberty to withdraw the
amount but the said amount shall be treated as deposit in the
E appeal pending before the said Magistrate.
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The Indian Dye Stuff Industries Ltd., has deposited
Rs. 49,282.92/- for the year 1963-64. Of this amount
,Rs. 14,722/92 nP is referable to assessment on open lands. The
Municipality will refund the·sum of Rs. 14,722/92 nP to the
Company within one month from t<;>day and treat the balance as
deposit in the appeal filed by the Company. For 1967-68 the
Company has deposited Rs. 2,96,724.33 in this Court. The
Municipality is at liberty to withdraw this amount but shall treat
the amount. as deposit in the appeal jiled by the Company as
required by the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, 1965.
Amar Dye Chemical Co., has deposited with the Municipality
Rs. 42,819.12 nP for 1963-64. The Municipality will refund to
the Company such amount out of this sum as is referable to tax
on open lands within one month from today and retain the rest
but shall treat such balance as deposit in the appeal filed by the
Company before the Magistrate. For the year 1967-68 the
Company has deposited Rs. 1,07,553. 92 nP. in this Court. The
Municipality will be at liberty to withdraw this amount but will
treat the amount as deposit in the Company's appeal pending
before the Magistrate.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1968] 2 S.C.R.
Power Cable ( P) Ltd., has deposited Rs. 18,084.40 nP "ith
the Municipalily. The Muntcipality will refund to the Company
such amount, if any, out of this amount as is referable to .the
tax on open lands and treat the balance as deposit in the appeal
filed by the Company before the Magistrate.
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Y.P.
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Appeals allowed in part.
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