SHRI BABURAO PATEL & ORS. versus DR. ZAKIR HUSAIN & ORS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 7 November 1967 | [1968] 2 S.C.R. 133 | 1967 INSC 251
Key facts
- Decided
- 7 November 1967
- Bench
- K.N. WANCHOO*, R.S. BACHAWAT, V. RAMASWAMI, G.K. MITTER, K.S. HEGDE
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- ELECTION PETITION (CIVIL) No. 1/1967
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1968] 2 S.C.R. 133
- Neutral citation
- 1967 INSC 251
Text of the judgment
A
SHRI BABURAO PATEL & ORS.
v.
DR. ZAKIR HUSAIN & ORS.
November 7, 1967
B
JK. N: WANCHOO, C.J., R. S. BACHAWAT, V. RAMASWAMI,
G. K. MITTER AND K. S. HEGDE, JJ.]
Constitution of J11dia, Arts. 58, 84 a11d 324-Scope o/~andidates
to Presidential Ofjice--Oath if necessary for eligibility.
c
D
E
Presidential & Vice-Presideniial Elections Act (30 of 1952), s. 18L1n.due lnfluence--Canvassing by Pri111e Minister and Minister u '10 is
Chief Whip of Party, if amounts undue influence.
1
As a result of the Presid·ontial election held in May, 1967, respondent
No. 1 was declared elected. The petitioners challengod the election on
the following two grounds, namely (i) Art. 58( I) (c) required that
a person to be eligibl·o for election as President must be qualified for
election as a member of the House of People. After the Sixteenth
Amendment, under Art. 84(a). it was necessary for a person standing
for election to either House of Parliament to take an oath in the fonn
prescribed in the Third Schedule, TherefoN, a person standing for
election as President had also to take a similar oath: since the respondent
had not taken the oath he was not eligible for election. (ii) As (a)
the Prime J\ilinister addressed a letter to all electors commending res~
pondent No. I and requesting them to vote for him; (b) the Prime
Minister deputed Ministers to various State Capitals to make doubly
certain that respondent-...No. 1 was elected; (c) a Minister who was also
F
the chief whip of the Congress party wrote two letters to all members
of his. party in Parliament and signed them as Chief Whip, explaining
the situation with respect to the. election and requesting them to come
to Delhi and corrtact him and also requesting th·em to give the first preference to respondent No. 1 and not to mark the second or any other
preference in favour of the candidates; and (d) the Chief Minister of
Maharashtra had briefed members of the Legislative Assembly as to how
and for whom to vote, the result of the election has materially been
affected by vndue inftuenoo.
HELD : The petition must be dismissed.
G
(i) The candidate standing for election to the office of the President
had not to tak·~ any oath before becoming eligible for election as
President.
A comparison of Art. 58 with Art. 84 as it stood· before· the amendment shows that cl. (a) of Art. 84, corresponded to cl. (a) of Art.
H
58 ( 1). as both provided that the respective candidates should be citizeris
of India. It was therefore, not necessary to go to cl. (a) of Art. 84
for the purpose of finding out whether a person w;.ts eligible for election
as President for the purpose of citizenship for that partcof cl: (a). of Art.
H-1 was specifically provided for in cl. (a) of Art. 58( 1). Similarly,
cl. Cb) of Art. 84 corresponded to cl. (b) of Art. 58(1), with this
Jiffci-ence that it provided a special qualificati9n as. ·10. ~tb"e and therefore·
:J 34
SUl'R[ME COIJRT REPORTS
[1968] 2 SCR
one woul<l not have to go to cl. (b) of Art. 84 for the purpose of finding
out the qualification as to age. Clause (c) of Art. . 58( 1) clearly corresponded to cl. (c) of Art. 84 and reading them together it would
follow lh~t a. person standing for election act Presid:nt would _require
such qualifications as may be prescribed in that behalf bv or under any
law made by Parliament. Further as cl. (c) of Art. SS( J) Jays down
that a pe.rson . standing for Presidential election has to be qualifL~d for
~embe.rsh1p. ot the House of the People, Art. 102 (which Jays down
d;squahficat1ons for members of Parliament) would also be attracted
ex..:cpt in so far ac;, there is a special provision contained in Art.
A
B
58(2).
Thus cl. (c) or Art. 58(1) woul<l bring in such qualifications for mcm·
her.; of the House of the People as may as prescr'bc<l bv Jaw by Parlia·
ment. as required by Art. 84(c). It w!IJ by its own force bring in Art.
102 of the Con~titution, for that Article Jays Jo"'" certain Jisqualifications "'hich a presiJcot1al candi<lat-~ mu~t not have for he has to he
eligible for election as " member of the House of the Peoplo. But it is
clear that what is vrov;ded in cl. (a) an<l (bl of Art. 58( 1) must be
taken from there and it is not necessary travel to els. (a) and (h) of
Art. 84 in the matter of cit:zcnship and of age of the prc,idcntial candi-·
<late. Clause< (a) and (h) of Art. 58(1) havin~ made a specific provi'ion in that behalf exclude els. (a) and (h) of Art. 84. There is nothing
in th: Amendment Act which m:ikec, any difference 10 that position, for.
if the intention of ParliamC'Tlt was that an oath similar in form to the
oath for mcml1crship of Parliament had to be taken by pcr"ons standinJ,!
for election to the office.. of the President thcr..: i'> no reason why a
'imilar amendment was not made in Art. 58( 1) (a) and why the form
of oath not also prescrihcd either in the Third Schc<lulo or by amendment
of Art. 60, which provides for oath by a person elected as President
·before he takes hi< office. (140H-141E; 142B-C]
Th~ particular O<tth v,:hich a person standing for election as a member of Parliament has to take has hcen prescribed in the 'fhird Schedule
·10 the Constitution. and it is only that oath which such a person ha.s tO
take. However. no form of oath is prescribed for a person standing for
election as President anvv.·here in the Constitution and in the abs1.."nce
of such fonn. it is impoSsihlc to hold that taking of oath heforc standing
for election as President is a neccs.Ciary ingredient of eligibilit}' for such
election. The Amendment Act having not made any .c;.uch provision
with respect to those standing for election to the office of the President.
it cann•t be open to the F.lcction Commission to prescribe a form of
oath for such person~ by chan.c,injl form Jfl-A 1n11tuti.r 1nuta11dil·. Such
power cannot he ;pelt out of Art. 324 under which the Election Com·mission is conf~rred po1,1,·er to superintend direct, and ~ontrol the pre·
paration of the Electoral Rolls and the conduct of elections. [143G-144B]
Further. a comp<trison of the form of oath under Art. 60 for the
President with form 111-B of the Thir<l Schedule which prescribes the
oath for a member of Parliament before he takes his seat. shows that
even after clcc1ion the Prcsi<l·~nt is not rCQuircd to swear that he will
uphold the sovereignty and integritv of lndia. 'fhc oath he takes is to
preserve. protect and <lef.~nd the ('onstitution and that he Y.111 devote
himself to the scrvicl! and v.·ell being of the people of India. Thus. the
form of oath intrO\luceJ by the ~ixtccnth am·~ndmcnt for pcrWM ~tand·
ing (or election to Parliament and even after election was not considered
~uitah1c f)r a oerson standing for election as President or ·:lected
a"
Pr.zsidcnt and that ·is why no form is prescribed by Parliament. [14JA.Cl
(ii) Any volunt;1ry action which interferes v.:ith or attempts to
·interfere witt-. the fr·:c exercise of electoral right would amount to undue
c
D
E
G
ti
BABURAO I'. ZAKIR HUSAIN
A
(Wanchoo, C.J.)
I 35
influence. It cannot take in mere canvassing in favour of a candidate
at an election. Jf that \vere so, it wou\i be impossible to run democratic
elections. It is difficult t6 lay <lawn in general terms where mere canvassing ends an<l interference or attempt at interfere·ace with the free
exercise of any electoral right begins. That is a matter to be determined·
in each case; hut there can be no doubt that if what is done is merely
canvassing it would not be undue influence. [!45G-146C].
B
(a) There was nothing in th·o letter of the Prime Minister wh(ch
even remotely amounted to undue influence.
As a leader of the party
she was entitled to a3k the ek~ctors to vote for respondent No. 1 and
the fact that she. is the Prime Minister makes no difference to her right
c
ID make an appeal of this nature.. It is said that th·e office of the President is- a no-party office and therefor~ an appeal of this nature should
not have been made -and must amount to undue influence. It is uue
that the offiee of the President is not a party office meaning thereby
that after his election the President is no lo'nger a party man. But that
cannot take away the fact that in a... ·democratic system, persons who
stand for election are candidates sponsored 'by parti·es for without such
support no one would have a chance of being elected. for the electors
are mostly members of one party or other. [149G-150B]
D
(b) Mere canvassing of support for a candidate can never amount
to undue influence. There was no interference with the free exercise of
electoral right by the electors, everi if the Ministers were sent to' the
various Sate capitals to canvass support 'for respondent, No 1. [148H]
E
F
G
H
( c) The fact that the Minister signed the letters as Ch>ef Whip was
of no consequence; even if he had not done so all members of the C,ongress party il-i Parliament must be knowing that he was the Chief Whip.
Just as a Minister has a right to canvass for support, so has the Chief
Whip. The fact th+i.t he asked the memb~rs to contact him after reaching
Delhi could only be to know who had come and who had not and could
not give rise to any infe~nce of undue influerlce from the fact alone.
There was nothing in the second letter also to show that undue influence
was being exercised thereby. Th·~ two letters read together merely show
that the Chief Whip of the Congress party- was canvassing in favour of
r~pondent No. 1.
There was nothing improper in members of the
party being told in the course of canvassing that it would be better if
they only marked their first preforence and no other preference in a
syst.em where voting is by single transferable vote. Such a re.quest or
advice does not interfcra with the free exercise of their electoral right,
for the electors still would be free to do what they desired inspite of the
advice. [150B-151D1
(d) Thern can be no objection if the leader of the party indicates
to the members of his party how to vote in order to ensure that votes
may not become invalid for want of knowledge of the procedure of
voting. Further if th·e leader of the party indicates to members of his
party for whom to vote_. he -is merely canvassing with his own party
men to support the candidate of the party. The mere fact that the
µerson who canvass".!s is a Chief Minister does not mean that he is exercising undue influence in the sense of interfering with the free exercis~
of the electoral right. Once canvassing is permissible, and in a democratic
set up where parties put up candidates for election it is not only pern1issible but necessary. it follows that if a leader of the party asks mem.
hers of his party for \Vhom to vote he is merely canvassing. The voting
is after aU scc.ret and every el·~ctor is free to vote for Whomsoever he
likes, even though he mav have been asked by the leader to vote for a
particular candidate. f152C-FJ
136
[1968) 2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
It j51 open to Ministers to canvass for candidates of their party standing for eJection. Such canvassing does not amount ·to undue influeoce
but is proper use of the Minister's right to ask the public to support
candidates belonging to the Minister's party. It is only where a Minislu
abtJ.., his position as •uch and goes beyond merely asking for support
for candidates belonging to his party that a question of undue influence
may arise. But so loog as the Minister only a<k.s the electors to vole
for a particular candidate belonging to his party and puts forward before
the public the merit of h's candidatc it cannot be said that by merely
making such request to the electorate the Minister exercises undue influence. The fact that the Minister's request was addressed in the form
of what it called a \\'hip is also immaterial so long as it is clear that there.
i~
no compulsion on the
electorate to vote in the
manner
A
B
indicated
[149A-Cl
R. B. Surendra Narayan Sinha v. Amulyadho11• Roy & 43 Ors. 1940
Indian Election Cases by Sen and Poddar, Case No. XXX at p. 188,
Linge Gowda v. Slrivananjappa. ( 1953) VI E.L.R. 288, Amirchand v.
Surendra Lc./ !ha. (1954) X E.L.R. 57, Mast Ram v. S. Iqbal SUrg!t;·
(1955) X.lf E.L.R. 34, Radhakrislrna Shukw v. Tara C/iand Ma/1<shwar,
(1956) XII E.L.R. 378, N. Sankara Reddi v. Yashoda Rtddi (1~7)
Xlll E.L.R. 34, Dr. Y. S. Parmar v. Hira Singh Pal. (1958) XVI E.L.R.
45, Tri/oki Singli v. Slrivrajw111i Ne~ru. (1958) XVI E.L.R. 234 and
Jcry,;/akshmi 0<1·a111ma v. Janardhan R<ddi, (1959) XVII E.L.R. 302,
n'ferrecl to.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Election Petition N'o.
Election Pe1ition under Presidential
Elections Act, 1952.
and
c
D
1 of 1967.
Vice-Presidential
R. V. S. Ma11i, for the petitioners.
E
M. C. Seca/md, J. M. M11khi and A. S. Nambiar, for respondent No. I.
E. Udayaracnam, for respondent No. 6.
Ja1wrdan Sharma, for respondent No. I 0.
0. P. Varma, for respondent No. 12.
F
C. C. Pace/ and M. V. Goswami, for respondent No. 14.
Blzimsena Rao and R. A. Gupta, for respondent No. 17.
C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-Genera/, R. ll. Dhebar and S. P.
Nayar, for Election Petition of India and Returning Officer.
Presidential Election, New Delhi.
G
C. K. Da11htary, Attomey-Genera/, N. S. Hindra and R. II.
Dhebar, for A rtomey-General for India.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Waaclioo, C. J. The presidential election in India was held
in May 1967. In that election. 17 candidates were nominated.
The result of the election was declared on May 9. 1967, and Dr.
Zakir Husain was declared elected. The present petition is againsl
ll
BABURAO v. ZAKIR HUSAIN
A
B
c
D
E
F
(Wanchoo, C.J.)
137
the election of Dr. Zakir Husain as President and has been filed
under Art. 71 of the Constitution read with the Presidential and
.:Vice-Presidential Elections Act, No. 31, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) by 13 members of Parliament. The attack on
the validity of the election of Dr. Zakir Husain has been made on
two grounds. The first ground is that no oath was taken by Dr.
Zakir Husain before l\is nomination as required by Art. 84 read
with Art. 58 of the Constitution. In consequence he was not
eligible foi; election as President and his election is liable to be
set aside. Curiously enough, however, the petitioners pray for a
declaration that Sri Subba Rao, who received the second highest
number of votes should be declared elected, though he (like Dr.
Zakir Husain) also did not take the oath before his nomination.
The second ground on which the election of Dr. Zakir Husain
is challenged is that the result of the election has been materially
affected by reason of undue influence, thrreat and in this connectimi reliance is placed on four matters to 'which reference will be
made later.
The petition has been opposed on behalf of Dr, Zakir Husain.
It has been urged in reply that no oath was necessary under Art. 84
read with Art. 58 of the Constitution, and as such he was eligible
to stand. It has also been said on behalf of Dr. Zakir Husain
that in case his nomination is invalid on that ground, Sri Subba
Rao's nomination is equally invalid as he also did not take the
oath. As to undue influence it is urged that no undue influence
was exercised, nor was the result of the election materially affected
by any exercise of undue influence. Of the four matters urged in
supp(>rt of the attack on the ground of undue influence, the truth
of one of them was not accepted. But it is urged in the alternative
that even accepting all that has been said by the petitioners in
support of their case of undue influence, the allegations maJe by
the petitioners do not in law amount to undue influence and therefore there could be no question of the result of the election being
materially affected by tl)e exercise of any undue influence.
G
On the pleading of the parties, the following issues were
framed:-
H
I. Whether the acceptance of the nomination papers of respondents Nos. 1 to 17 by the Returning Officer was illegal and
contrary to law for the reason that Respondents Nos. I to 17 did
not subscribe to the oath required under Artie!<' 84(a) of the
Constitution read with Article 58(1 )(c) thereof;
2. Whether the result of the election has
affected;
LIOScp,(Cl)/68~10
been
materially
•
138
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1968) 2 S.C.R
. ~· Whether the acts and conduct alleged in para 12 of the
petition and set out under heads A. B, C and D thereof amount to
undue influence within the meaning of s. I 8{l)(b) of the Act.
4. Whether the allegations made under heads A, B, C and D
in para J 2 of the petition in so far as they are not admitted arc;
true:
A
B
5. Whether the petition is entitled to any relief, and ii so, to
what relief.
It will be seen that issues Nos. 1 and 3 raise pure questions of
law. We made it clear to learned counsel that we would try this
petition in two parts. We shall firs( deal with the two issues of
law, and then. if necessary, set the petition down for further hearing on evidence. We also indicated that if issue No. 1 is decided
in favour of the ~:titioners. the election would have to be set aside
and then there 1-.•ould be no question of any further hearing on
evidence. We further indicated that if issue No. 3 is decided in
favour of the p:litioners, the petition would have to be set down
for further hea;·ing on evidence on matters of fact which were in
dispute. Lastly, we indicated that if both these issues were decided
against the petitioners, the petition would fail and it would not be
necessary then to set it down for further hearing on evidence.
We propose now to consider the two issues of law.
Issue No. I.
D
E
In order to decide this issue, we !lave to sec what the Constitu·
tion provided, before the Constitution (Sixteenth Amendment) Act,
1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Amendment Act). This Act
Wl\~ passed on October 5, 196~. Before that amendment Art. 58
(I l with which we are concerned in the present petition was in
these terms : "(I) No person shall be eligible for
President, unless he-.
c
election
F
as
(a) is a citizen of India,
( b) has completed the age of thirty-live years, and
( c) is qualified for election as a member of the
House of the People."
G
Artide 84. which is also relevant read thus" A person shall nov be qualified to be chos~n to
fill a scat in Parliament unless he(a) is a citizen of India;
(h) is. in the ca;e of a scat in the Council of States,
not less than thirty years of age and, in the case
H
BABURAO
A
B
c
D
E
f
G
v. ZAKIR HUSAIN ( Wanchoo, C.J.)
1:; 9
of the House of the People, not less than twentyfive years of age;
(c) possesses such other qualifications as may be
prescribed in that behalf by or, under any law
made by Parliament."
The Representation of the People Act, No. 43 of 195 l provided
some qualifications for membership of the House of the People,
by s. 4. Besides that Art. 102 of the Constitution provided for
certain disqualifications for membership of either House of Parliament and thus indirectly provided for qualifications necessary for
bei11i; a member of either House of Parliament, and these were-( l) that the person should not hold any office of profit under the
Government of India or the Government of any State, other than
an office declared by Parliament by law not to disqualify its
holders; (2) the person should not be of unsound mind and should
not have been so declared_ by a competent court; (3) the person
should not be an undischarged insolvent; (4) the person should not
have voluntarily acquired the citizenship of a foreign State, or be
under any acknowledgement of allegiance or adherence to a
foreign State: and (5) the person should not be disqualified by or
under any law made by Parliament.
A perusal of these provisions show that there was no requirement of taking an oath at the time of nomination by the presidential candidate in Art. 58. Nor was there any requirement of
taking any oath. at the time of nomination by a candidate for
election to the House of the People under Art. 84. There were
howe'<er provisions in the Constitution for taking an oath after
election. The oath of the President and its form was provided
in Art 60 while the oath for a member of the House of the People
after election was provided in Schedule III to the Constitution,
which a member of Parliament had to take before taking his seat
in the House of the People or the Council of States, as the case
may be. It _is nqt disputed on behalf of the petitioners that this
was the undoubted position in Jaw before the Amendn1en_t Act.
Then came the Amendment Act, which came into force from
October 5, 1963. By that amendment, no change was made in
Art. 58, which stood as it was: a change was however made in
cl. (a) of Art. 84, which after the Amendment Act read thus :
"84. Qualification for membership of Par/iamentA person shall not be qualified to be chosen to fill a
seat in Parliament unless he--:(a) is a citizen of India, and makes and subscribes
before some person authorised in that behalf by the Elec-
140
SUPREME COURT REl'OR"JS
[1968] 2 SC.R.
lion Commission :m oath or atlirmation accordin~ to the
form set out for the purposes in the Third Schedule;··
The Third Schedule was :dso amended and provided the follow111g form of oath to be taken by a member of Parliament who
stands for election to Parliament, namely-
A
"l, A. B., having been nominated as a candidat~ to
B
Council of States
do
till a seat in the
House of thCPeople
swear in the name of God
that I will bear true
solemnly affirm
faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by
c
law established and that I will uphold the sovereignly
and integrity of India."
At the same time amendment was made in the form of oath to
be taken after election, the change being that the words "I will
uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India" were added to the
already existing oath to be taken by a member of Parliament after
his election before he took his seat in the House of the People n
or the Council of States.
The contention on behalf of the petitioners is that becau -~ of
this change in cl. (a) of Art. 84 by which it became necessary to
take oath for a person standing for election to either House of
Parliament in the form prescribed in the Third Schedule, a person
standing for election as President had also to take a similar oath E
because Art. 58(1)(c) requires that a person to be eligible for
election as President must be qualified for election as a member
of the House of the People. It is urged that no one is qualified,
after tne amendment of cl. (a) of Art. 84, for election as a member of the House of the People unless he makes and subscribes
an oath in the form set out for the purpose in the Third Schedule, F
:md therefore this provision applied to a person standing for election as President, for without such oath he would not be qualified
to stand for election to the House of the People.
The argument looks attractive prima facie but must in our
opinion be rejected. The qualifications for eligibility to stand for
election as President arc to be found in Art. 58(1 ). The main G
rdiance on behalf of the petitioners is placed on cl. ( c) of Art. 58
(I ) • which lays down that a candidate standing for election as
President has to be qualified for election as member of the House
-of the People. A comparison however of Art.· 58 with Art. 84
as it stood before amendment shows that cl. (a) of Art. 84
corresponded to cl. (a) of Art. 58 (I). as both provided that the H
respective candidates should be citizens of India. It was therefore
not necessary to go to cl. (a) of Art. 84 for the purpose of finding
out whether a person was eligible for election as President for
llAllURAO V. ZAKIR HUSAIN (Wanchoo, C.J.)
A
B
c
E
F
G
H
141
the purpose of citizenship for that part of cl. (a) of Art. .84 was
specifically provided for in cl. (a) of Art. 58 (i). Similarly, cl.
(b) of Art. 84 corresponded to cl. (b) of Art. 58 ( 1), with this
difference that it provided a specil qualification as to age and
therefore one would not have to go to cl. (b) of' Art. 84 for the
purpose of finding out the qualification as to age. .Cl. ( c) of Art.
38( 1) clearly corresponded to cl. (c) of Art. 84 and reading them
together it would follow that a person standing for election as
President would require such qualifications as may be prescribed
in that behalf by or under any law made by Parliament. Further
as cl. ( c) of Art. 58 ( 1) Jays down that a person standing for presidential election has to be qualified for membership of the House
of the People, Art. 102 (which Jays down disqualifications for
members of Parliament) would also be attracted except in so far
as there is a special provision contained in Art. 58(2). Thus cl.
( c) of Art. 5 8 ( 1) would bring in such qualifications for members
of the House of the People as may be prescribed by law by Parliament, as required by Art. 84 ( c). It will by its own force bring
in Art. 102 of the Constitution, for that Article Jays down certain
disqualifications which a presidential candidate must not have for
he has to be eligible for e~ection as a member of the House '>f
the People. But it is clear to us that what is provided in clause
(a) and (b) of Art. 58(1) must be taken from ·there and we need
not travel to els. (a) .and (b) of Art. 84 in the matti:r of citizenship
and of age of the presidential candidate. Clauses (a) and (b) of
Art. 58(1) having made a specific provision in that behalf in our
opinion exclude els. (a) and (b) of Art. 84. This exclusion was
there before the Amendment Act and we are of opinion that there
is nothing in the Amendment Act which makes any difference to
that position.
The Sixteenth Amendment was introduced on the recommendation of the Committee on National Integration and Regionalism.
which was greatly concerned over the preservation and maintenance of the integrity and sovereignty of the Union. It therefore
recommended that every candidate for the membership of a State
legislature or Parliament, should pledge himself to uphold the
Constitution and to preserve the integrity and sovereignty of the
Union and for that forms of oath in the Third Schedule to the
Constitution should be suitably amended. It also recommended
that every candidate for the membership of Parliament or State
Legislature, Union and State Ministers, Members of Parliament
and State Legislatures, Judges of the Supreme Court and High
Court and the Comptroller and Auditor General of India should
take oath to uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India. In
consequence of these recommendations, the sixteenth amendment
was made and Art. 84 (a) as well as Art. 173 which provides for
qualifications for membership of State legislature were suitably
142
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1968] 2 S.C.R.
amended. Further two new forms were added in the Third
Schedule. one relating to oath to be taken by candidates for election
to Parliament and the other relating to oath to be taken by candidates for election to State legislatures. Further other. forms of
oath in the Third Schedule were also amended by addil)g therein
the words "I will uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India."'
A
B
Now if the intention of Parliament was that an oath similar
in fom1 to the oath to be taken by persons standing for election
to Parliament had to be taken by persons standing for election to
the office of the President there is no reason why a similar amendment was not made in Art.· 58 ( 1 )(a). Further if the intention
of Parliament was that a presidential candidate should al.so take
an oath before standing for election, the form of oath should also
have been prescribed either in the Third Schedule or by amendment of Art. 60, which provides for oath by a person elected as
President before he takes his office. But we find that no change
was made either in Art. 58(1){a) or in Art. 60 or in the Third
Schedule prescribing the form of oath to be taken by' the presidenThis to our
tial candidate before he could stand for electi0n.
mind is the clearest indication that Parliament did not intend,
when making the Amendment Act, that an oath similar to t.he
oath taken by a candidate standing for election to Parliament had
to be taken by a candidate standing for election to the office of the
President. So there is no rea ..Jn to import the provision of Art.
84(a) as it stood after the Amendment Act into Art. 58(1)(a),
which stood unamended. That is one reason why. we arc of
opinion that so far as the election to the office of the President is
concerned, the candidate standing for the same has not to take
any oath before becoming eligible for election as President:
Another reason which leads to the same conclusion is this.
We have already indicated that no change was made in Art. 60
by introducing the form of oath to be taken by a person standing
for election as President; nor was there any change made in the
Third Schedule by the introduction of a form of oath to be taken
by a person standing for election as President. In the absence of
such a form, we fail to see how an oath would be neecssary before
a person could stand for election as President. It is not as if a
person standing for election as a member of Parliament can take
any oath that he likes or that may be administered to him. The
particular oath which a person standing for election as a member
of Parliament has to take has been prescribed in the Third
Schedule to the Constitution, and it is only .that oath which such
a person has to take. However no form of oath is prescribed for
a person st.anding for election as President anywhere in the Constitution and in the absence of ~uch form, it is impossible to hold
that taking of oath before standing for election as President is a
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necessary ingredient of eligibility for such election. Further a
comparison of the form of oath under Art. 60 for the President
with form III-B of the Third Schedule which prescribes the oath
for a member of Parliament before he takes his seat shows that
even after election the President is not required to swear that he
will uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India. The oath he
takes is to preserve: protect and defend the Constitution and that
he will devote himself to the service and well being of the people
of India. Clearly therefore the form of oath introduced by the
sixteenth amendment for persons standing for election to Parliament and even after election was not considered suitable for a
person standing for election as President or elected as President
and that is who/ we find no form prescribed by Parliament.
It has been urged on behalf of the petitioners that, though no
form of oath may be prescribed it was open to the Election Commission to prescribe an oath by making changes mutatis mutandis
in form III-A of the Third Schedule relating to candidates for election to Parliament, and that it was the duty of the Election Commission to appoint somebody to administer the oath in the form to
be evolved by him by changing form III,A in the Third Schedule
mutatis mutandis. Reliance in this connection has been placed on
Art. 324 of the Con$titution. We are of opinion that there is no
force in this contention. Article 324 inter alia provides for "the
superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of the
electoral rolls for, and the conduct of, all elections to Parliament
and to the Legislature of every State and of elections to the offices
of President and Vice-President". These words do not in our
opinion give any power to the Election Commission to introduce a
form of oath to be taken by a candidate for election whether it be
for election as President or as a member of Parliament or of a
State legislature. If an oath has to be taken by any .such person
it has to be provided by law and the form thereof has. also to be
prescribed by law--(we are using the word "law" in its broadest
sense, including constitutional provisions) and that is what was
done by the Sixteenth· Amendment so far as election to Parliament
and State legislatures was concerned. But as already observed,
Parliament did not think. it fit when it brought in the Amendment
Act to make any change in Art. 58 (!) (a) or to introduce a form
in Art. 60 or. in. the Third Schedule to the Constitution with reference to candidates standing for election as President. If Parliaml'nt did not choose to do so, the Election Commission cannot do
so under the power it has been given under 'Art. 324 to superintendent, direct and control the preparation of the electoral rolls and
the conduct of all elections. That power is very different from
the power to prescribe an oath before a candidate can stand for
election. Such prescription can only Be by law as indicated above.
The Amendment Act having not made any such provision with
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1968] 2 S.C.R.
respect to th°'e standing for election to the office of the President,
it cannot be open to the Election Commission to prescribe a form
of oath for such persons by changing form III-A mutatis mutandis.
Such power cannot be spelt out of Art. 324 on which reliance has
been placed on behalf of the petitioners. It follows therefore that
no form whatsoever having been prescribed by Parliament when
it made the sixteenth amendment for taking an oath by a presidential candidate. Art. R4 la) when it prescribed for taking an
oath for candidates for election to the House of the People has no
application 10 candidates standing for election to Prc.sidentship.
So far as these candidates are concerned we mu'1 look to Art.
58 (I) (a) only and need not go to Art. 84(a).
Another reason for coming to the same conclusion is that
when Art. 58 I I) (c) lays down that a person standing for election
as President has to be qualified for election as a member of the
House of the People it only brings in qualifications other than
those which arc specifically mentioned in Art. 58 (I) itself. Now
specific qualifications provided in Art. 58 (1) arc that a candidate
for presidential election has to be a citizen of India and he must
have completed the age of 35 years. So far as these qualifications
are concerned. we need not go anywhere else in order to search
for eligibility to contest election as President. For example, the
specific qualification in cl. (b) of Art. 58 (1) is that the person
concerned should have completed the age of 35 years. On the
other hand, cl. (b} of Art. 84 lays down the age of 25 years for
membership of the House of the People. Therefore when one
has to look for the qualification of age one must only go to Art.
58 (1) (b) for the purpose of presidential election and need not
look elsewhere. What is specifically provided for by Art. 58 (I)
mu.;t be accepted as it stands and no addition can be made to that
provision and no subtraction can be made therefrom. It will be
seen therefore that though there may be some qualifications which
may be necessary for election to the House of the People, they
need not necessarily apply to the election for the office of the
President. where there is a specific provision in Art. 58 (I) itself.
We arc therefore clearly of opinion that in view of the specific
provision in Art. 58 (a) and (b} we cannot and should not apply
clauses (a) and (b) of Art. 84. to persons standing for election as
President. This conclusion is reinforced if we look at Art. 58 (2)
and compare it with Art. 102 (I) (a). It is dear that when there
is a specific provision with respect to an office of profit in Art. 58
(2). it is that provision which will apply and not Art. 102 ( 1) (a).
We therdore. hold that the acceptance of the nomination papers
of respondents 1 to 17 by the Returning Officer was neither illegal
nor contrary to law on the ground that these respondents did not
subscribe to an oath under Art. 84 (a) read with Art. 58( I }(c).
The issue is decided against the petitioners.
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The petitioners rely on four ~negations on t~1e q~~tion o!
undue influence. Before we deal with those allegations 1t 1s necessary to understand what undue influenc~ is in the context of th~
Act. Section 18 (1) (b) lays down that 1f the result of the electJon
has been materially affected by reason of undue influence at the
election committed by any person other than the returned
candidate or a person acting in connivance with t.hc
returned candidate, the election will be liable to be declared void.
Sub-section (2) of s. 18 lays down that undue influence would
have the same meaning as in Chapter IX-A of the Indian Penal
Code. Section 171-C of the Indian Penal Code defines· what
""undue influence" is in these terms : "(!) Whoever voluntarily interferes or attempts to
interfere with the free exercise of any electoral right commits the offence of undue influence at an election.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-section ( 1), whoever(a) threatens any candidate or voter, or any person
in whom a candidate or voter is interested, with injury of
any kind, or
(b) induces or attempts to induce a candidate or
voter to believe that he or any person in whom he is
interested will become or will be rendered an object of
Divine displeasure. or of spiritual censure, shall be deemed to interfere with the free exercise of fhe electoral
right of such candidate or voter, within the meaning of
sub-section (1).
(3) A declaration of public policy or a promise of
public action, or the mere exercise of a legal right
without intent to interfere with an electoral right, shall
not be deemed to be interference within the meaning of
this section."
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It will be seen, from the above definition that the gist of undue influence at an election consists in voluntary interference or
attempt at interference with the free exercise of .:my electoral right.
Any voluntary action which interferes with or attempts to interfere
with such free exercise of electoral right would amount to undue
influence. But even though the definition in sub-s. (l) of s. 171-C
is wide in terms it cannot take in mere canvassing in favour of a
candidate at an election. If that were so, it would be impossible
to run democratic elections. Further sub-s. (2) of s. 171-C
shows what the nature of undue influence is though of course it
does not cut down the generality of the provisions contained in
sub-section (!). Where any threat is held out to any candidate or
voter or any person in whoin a candidate or voter is interested and
J.IG
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1968) 2 S.CR.
the threat is of injury of any kind, that would amount to voluntary
interference or attempt at interference with the free exercise of
~lectoral right and would be undue influence. Again where a
person induces or attempts to induce a candidate, or voter to
believe that he or any person ih whom he is interested will become
<1r will be rendered an object of Divine displeasure or of spiritual
c~nsure, that would also amount to voluntary interference with
1he free exercise of the electoral right and would be undue influence. What is contained in sub-s. (2) of s. J 71-C is merely illustr<1tive. It is difficult to lay down in general terms where mere
.:anvassing ends and interference or attempt at interference with
: he free exercise of any electoral right begins. That is a matter
to be determined in each case; but there can be no doubt that if
what is done is merely canvassing it would not be undue influence.
As sub-section (3) of s. 171-C shows. the mere exercise of a legal
right without intent to interfere with an electoral right would not
he undue influence.
We may in this connection refer to s. 123(2) of the Repre'entation of the People Act 1951 which also defines "undue influence". The definition there is more or less in the same language
as in s. 171-C of the Indian Penal Code except that the words
"direct or indirect" have been added to indicate the nature of
interference. It will be seen that if anything, the definition of
"undue influence" in the Representation of the People Act may be
wider. It will therefore be useful to refer to cases under the clec1ion law to see how election tribunals have looked at the matter
while considering the scope of the words "undue influence".
The earliest case to which reference may be made is
R. B.
S11rendra Narayan Sinha v. Am11/yadhone Roy & 43 Others.(')
There the question raised before the Election Tribunal was whether by i5suing a whip on the day of election requesting members
to cast their preferences in a particular order, the leader of a Party,
who was also the Chief Minister, could be said to have exercised
undue influence. The Election Tribunal held that the leader
of the party was entitled to use his influence as a leader and he
could not be deprived of that right hecause he happened to be a
ti1inister. The issue of a whip of that kind was thus held to be no
more than canvassing in favour of the candidates of the party to
which the leader or the Chief Minister belonged.
In Linge Gowda v. Shivananjappa('). the Election Tribunal
held that a leader of a political party was entitled to declare to the
public the policy of the party and ask the electorate to vote for his
riarty without interferin!! with any electoral right and such declarations on his part would not amount to undue influence under
(ll 194l-J11d~I\ Election Cl.Ses byS:nandPJdd1r,Cai~
(2) 1t9S3) V~E.l.R. 288.
No.XXX atp.188.
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the Representation of the People Act. The fact that such a leader
happened to be a Minister or Chief Minister of the State would
make no difference. It was further observed in that case that "the
Jaw cannot strike at the root of due influence and under the law
of election, only undue influence is forbidden, and the leaders of
a party will be deemed to exercise their due influence if they ask
the electorate to vot<' for their party candidate, even if they happen
to be Ministers."
In A mirchand v. Surendra Lal Jha( 1 ) it was held by the
Election Tribunal that Ministers were prominent members of their
party and in that capacity they were entitled to address meetings
and to tell people what their party had done and what its programme was and to ask them to vote for the candidate set up by
their party, and such action of the Ministers could not be held to
amount to exercising undue influence. It merely amounted to canvassing by the Ministers in favour of candidates belonging to their
party.
In Mast Ram v. S. Iqbal Singhe) it was held by the Election
Tribunal that the legitimate exercise of influence by a political
party or an association should not be confused with "undue influence". lt was further held that "Ministers in their capacity as
members of their party are entitled to address meetings and to tell
people what their party had done and what its programme was
and to ask them to vote for the candidate set up by their party.
Such action of the Ministers cannot be held to amount to 'exercising undue influence'". It was further held that "if a political
party passes a resolution of support to a candidate and asks its
members to vote for him, it will be only a legitimatP. exercise of
influence".
In Radhakrishna Shukla v. Tara Chand .Maheshwar,(') the
Election Tribunal held that even where Ministers conducting an
electioneering campaign promised people, who put their grievances before them during the campaign,· ger;erally to redress their
grievances, it could not be held that there was exercise of undue
influence and their promise merely amounted to a promise of
public action, which would not be for the benefit of merely those
who voted for candidates of their party but for the public as a
whole.
The next case to which reference may be made is N. Sankara
Reddt v. Yashoda Reddi('). In that case the Election Tribunal
held that "a political party is entitled to issue a manifesto to the
voters requesting them to vote only for the candidate set up by
the party. The fact that the leader of the Congress Legislature
Party who was also the Chief Minister of the State had written·
(I) (195~) X E.L.R. 57,
(3) ( 1956) XII E.L.R. 378.
(2\ (1955) XII E.L.R. Jd.
(4) (1957) XIII E.L.R. 34.
148
SU.PREME C.OURT REPORTS
[1%8] 2 S.C.R
letters to the members of the Congress P~rty ,o support the cal'didates set up by the party would uot Jmount fo undue influence
within s. 123(2) of the Representation of the People Act." It
was added_ that it was only where a Minister abused his position
for furthenng the prospects of the candidate belonging to his party
t~at. undue influenc" might arise; b~t where a leader merely used
his influence m the form of canvassing for candidates of his party
there would be no question of undue influence.
In Dr. Y. S. Parmar v. Hira Singh Pa/( 1 ), the Judicial Commissioner of Himachal Prndesh held that "a leader of a political
party is entitled to declare to the put nc the policy of the party,
and ask the electorate to· vote for his party without interferin$ with
any electoral right and such declarations on his part woutd not
amount to undue influence under s. 123 ( 2) of the Representation
of the People Act."
In Triloki Singh v. Shivrajwati.Nehru (2) it was held by the
Election Tribunal that "the right to canvass must be conceded to
Ministers a~ lenders of a political party ...... Just ns they have
a right to vote and to stand as a candidate, they also have u right
to canva~s for thcmsc)ves and for the other capdidntes set up by
their party." It was further held that though a Minister occupied
a high position and commanded great influence, if he only solicited
votes and tried to persuade the electors to vote for a candidate
of his party and asked them not to vote for any other candidate
or to remain neutral and did nothing more, he could not be said
to intcreferc with the free exercise of the electoral right of the
voters.
The last case to which reference may be made is Jaya/akslimi
Devamma v. lanardhan Reddi( 3 ). In that _case the Andhr~
Pradesh High Court held that in a democratic set up where candidates contested elections on the basis of their affiliation to a particular political party, there was nothing intrinsically wrong in
Ministers canvassing support for their party candidates. It wa~
further held that a Minister merely by reason of his office did not
suffer from any disability in this behalf and had the same right~
and obligations a.< any other citizen in the matter of canvassing.
It was also held that in their capacity as leaders of their party.
they had to explain to the electors the policies and programmes
which they sought to enforce and one way of doing that was to
ask the electors to vote for those who were pledged lo support
them and their poHcies.
It will be seen from the above review of the cases relating to
undue influence that it has been consistently hCid in this country
that it is open to Ministers to canvass for candidates of their party
(I) 11958) 16 E.L.R. 4S.
(2) (1958) XVI. F..LR
!3 (1959) XVII F.l..R. 302.
~~4.
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standing for election. Such canvassing does not amount to undue influenc.~ but is proper use of the Minister's right to ask the
public to support candidates belonging to the Minister's. party.
It is only where a Minister abuses his position as such amd goes
beyond merely asking for support for candidates belonging to his
party that a question of undue influence may arise. But so Jong
as the Minister only asks the electors to vote for a particular
candidate belonging to his party and puts forward before the public the merits of his candidate it cannot be said that by merely
making such request to the electorate the Minister exercises undue·
influence. The fact that the Minister's request was addressed in
the form of, what js called a whip is also immaterial so long as
it is clear that there is no compulsion on lhe electorate to vote in
the manner indicated. It is in the light of these principles that
we have to see whether the four allegations made in this case,
assuming them to be correct, make out a case of undue influence.
The first allegation is that Shrimati Indira Gandhi, the Prime
Minister, addressed a letter to all the electors in which she com·
mended Dr. Zakir Husain and requested the electors to vote for
him. A copy of that letter, has been produced, and we have been
taken through it. In our !opinion there is nothing in that letter
which may even remotely 'amount to undue influence. Most of
the letter is concerned with commending the qualities of Dr. Zakir
Husain and it ends by saying that Dr. Zakir Husain's long and
meritorious service in the cause of national freedom and national
re-construction after Indep.~ndence makes him a candidate richly
deserving universal support. It bas been urged .that the Prime_
Minister is a person of great influence and therefore Shrimati
Indira Gandhi should not have written this letter because she was
Prime Minister and the mere fact that she wrote this letter commending Dr. Zakir Husain's election amounted to undue influence
i.e. interference with the free exercise of the electoral right. We
cannnot agree with this contention. Shrimati Indira Gandhi is
certainly the Prime Minister, but she is also one of the leaders of
the party to which Dr. '2akir Husain belonged. As a leader of
th.~ party she was entitledlo ask the electors to vote for Dr. Zakir
Husain and the fact that she is the Prime Minister makes no difference to her right to make an appeal of this nature. It is said that
the office of the President is a no:party office and therefore an
appeal of this nature should not have been made and must amount
to undue influence. It is true t)lat the office of the President is
not a party office meaning thereby that after his election the President is no longer a party man. But that cannot take away the
fact that in a democratic system, like ours, persons who stand for
election are candidates sponsored by parties for without· such
support nd one would have a chance of being elected, for the
electors are mostly members of one party or other. We have given
J 5 ()
StJPRE~E
COURT REl'ORTS
{1968]
c S.C.R
-0.ur earnest consideration to the letter wri!ten by s:.rimati Indira.
(1andh1 and have come to the conclusion that there is nothing in
that letter which can be said to be improper or wh:ch c:in even
remotely amount to interefcrencc with the free exercise of the
electoral rights. It cannot therefore be said that Shrimati Indira
Gandhi even though she is the Prime Minister exercised any undue
influence in this presicbntial election.
The next allegation is based on two letters wri•tcn by Sn Rwi
S~bhag Sin~h" In t!1ese letters Sl'i Ram Subhag Singh signed
himself as Chief Whip and they were addressed to all members
·Of the Congress Party in Parliament. The fact that he signed the
letters as Chief Whip is in our opinion of no consequence; even
if he had not don.~ so all members of the congress party in Parliamen! must be knowing that he was the Chief Whip. J us'. as a
Minister has a right to canvass for support so has in our opinion
the Chief Whip. Jn the first.letter he pointed out 1hat the Presidential and Vice-Presidential elections were to be held on May
6. 1967. He also pointed o'ut that members of Parliament could
vote for the presidential election at New Delhi or at State capitals
but they had to come to Delhi in connection wHh the election of
the Vice-President. He therefore added that as the two elections
were to he helu on the same day and voting for the Vice-Presidential election could only be at Delhi, every member of the party
must be present in Delhi to participate in the elections. lie finally
requested the members of his party to reach New Delhi by May 4,
1967 and contact him on reaching New Delhi. This letter merely
explains to members of his party the situation with respect to the
two elections which were to be held simultaneously and requested
the members to come to Delhi, as otherwise they could not vote
in the Vice-Presidential election. The fact that he asked the
members to contact him after reaching Delhi could only be to
know who had come and who had not and cannot give rise to any
inference of undue influence from that fact alone.
In the second letter, Sri Ram Subhag Singh pointed out that
the election to th.e office of the President would be in accordance
with the system of proportional representation by means of single
transferable vote. He also invited the attention of the members
of the Congress Party in Parliament to r. I 9 of the Election Rules.
He then went on to say that it was th.eir desire, i.e., of the congress
party, that Dr. Zakir Husain should be returned with a thumpinv.
majority. He therefore requested the members to place figure '1'
opposite the name uf Dr. Zakir Husain. He also advised them
not to mark the second or any other preference in favour of any
other candidate.· As we read this letter we only find in it a
request to members of the party to vote for Dr. Zakir Husain.
There is nothing in that letter to show that undue influence was
heing exercised thereby. The two letters read together mere!)' show
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that Sri Ram Subhag Singh who happened to be the Chief Whip
of the congress party was canvassing in favour of Dr. Zakir Husain.
It is however urged that his advice to the members not to mark
their second or any other preference in favour of any other candidate runounted to interference-with the free exercise of their electoral right. We cannot agree with this contention. Sri Ram
Subhag
Singh asked the members of his party to give the first
B
preference to Dr. Zakir Husain. He also asked them not to mark
their second or any other preference, and that is a method to
ensure· that the candidate to whom the firs: preference is given
should be in a strong position in case there is not a majority in
the first counting. In the present election there was apparently a
majority ii:t the first counting .and therefore the marking of th~
c .secorid
or any other preference was immaterial. Apart from it.
we see no!hing improper in memb~rs of the party being told in the
cours.~ of canvassing that it would be better if they only marked
their first preference an<! .no other preference in a system where
voting is by single transferable vote. Sµch a request or advice
does not in our opinion interfere with the free exercise of their
D electoral right for the electors still would be free to do what they
desired in spite of the advice. We cannot agree after going
through th.~ two letters written by Sri Rllf!l Subhag Singh that there
was .any interference with the exercise of the electoral right
by the electors.
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The third allegation is that the Prime Minister had deputed
certain senior members of her cabinet to the various States to make
doubly certain that Dr. Zakir Husain was elected. .In consequence, Shri Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed was sent to Assam, Shri Y. R.
Chavan to Bombay, Sri J agjivan Ram to Bihar, Sri I. K. Gu jral
to Calcutta and Sri Din~h Singh to Uttar Pradesh. lt is further
urged that sending of the Minister!> to various States was to influ
ence the members of the electoral· college there to vote for Dr.
Zakir Husain or attempt to do so. Such action it is urged.
would amount to undue influence,. We cannot agree with this
contention. A~suming that these Ministers were asked to go to
various States it was obviously to canvass support for Dr. ZaLir
Husain· so that' he may be certain to be elected, Even assuming
that the5e Ministers canvassed support for Dr. Zikir Husain in
various State capitals, their action cannot be said to amount to
undue influence, for all that they can be said to have <lone was to
canvass support for Dr. Zakir Husain and mere canvassing cannot possibly be held' to be undue influence. There is nothing in
the allegation in para 12-C of the petition to show that there wa.;
any interference with the free exercise of eleetoral right by the electors, even if these Ministers were sent to the various State capitals
to canvass support for Dr. Zakir Husain and did so. Mere
canvassing of support for a candidate can never amount to undue
SU PREM[ COURT REPOR I>
1968] 2 S.CR.
influence, and all tha'. para 12c· shows is lhat there was mere
canvassing in favour of Dr. Zakir Husain. No case of 11ndue
influence can he made out on the basis of the al!cgations contained m para l 2C of the petition.
The last allegation in support of the ca~.~ of undue influence is
that the Chief Minister of Maharash•ra had briefed members of
the Legislative Assembly on May 5, 1967 on how to vote and
"horn to vote for. It is urged that even if the leader of the party
m the Maharashtra legislature could indicate the manner of voting
to the members of his party, he could not indicate to them whom
they were to vote for, as that interfered with the free exercise of
their ele;;toral right. I! is said that such a request amounted to
a command from a person in authority, like the Ctiief Minister,
and would be exercise of undue influ.~nce. We are of opinion
that there is no substance in this contention either. There can
possibly be no objection if the leader of the party indicates to the
members of his party how to vote in order to ensure that votes
may not become invalid for want of knowledg.~ of the procedure
of voting. Further if the Jcader of the party indicates to membeN
of his party for whom to vote he is merely canvassing with his
own party-men to support the candidate of the partr. The mere
fact that the person who canvasses is a Ch:ef Mimster does not
mean that he is exercising undue influence in the sense of interfering with the free exercise of the electoral right. Once canvassing is permissible, and we have no doubt that in a democratic
.set up where parties put up candida'.es for election it is not only
permissible but necessary, it follows that if a leader of the party
asks members of his party for whom to vote he is merely canvassing.. The voting is after all secret and every elector is free to vote
for whomsoever he likes, even though he may have been asked by
the leader to vote for a particular candidate. There is nothing
in para 12 (D) of the petition to suggest that anything improper
was done by the Chief Minister of Maharashtra, which could sive
rise to an inference that the free exercise of the ekctoral right
was being interfcred with.
On a careful consideration of paragraphs 12(A) to 12(D)
of the petition we have come to the conclusion that there is nothing
in those paragraphs which ev.::n remotely suggests that there was
anv undue influence exerci~ed by anybody in connection with the
Presidential election of May 6, 1967. Our finding on the issue
in question is that the acts and conduct alleged in paragraph 12
of the petition and set out in sub-paras A ro D .thereof do not
amount to undue influence within the meaning of s. 18(1 )(b) of
tile Act. The issue is decided against the petitioners.
As we have indicated already if' both these issues of law are
decided against the petitioners as we do decide them-the petirion
A
B
c
D
E
I!
G
H
BABURAO v. ZAKIR HUSAIN
A
"'
(Wanchoo, C.J.)
I SJ
must fail and it is ~nnecessary to set it down for hearing on evidence with respect to other issues.
The petition is hereby dismissed but in the circumstances of
the case we pass no order as to costs.
a
Y.P.
LIOSupCj/68-11
Petition dismissed.
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