ANANDJI HARIDAS & CO. (P.) LTD. versus S.P. KUSHARE, S. T. O. NAGPUR & ORS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 28 September 1967 | [1968] 1 S.C.R. 661 | 1967 INSC 222
Key facts
- Decided
- 28 September 1967
- Bench
- K.N. WANCHOO*, R.S. BACHAWAT, V. RAMASWAMI, G.K. MITTER, K.S. HEGDE
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 511/1966
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Citation
- [1968] 1 S.C.R. 661
- Neutral citation
- 1967 INSC 222
Text of the judgment
ANANDJI HARIDAS & CO. (P.) LTD.
A
I!.
S. P. KUSHARE, S. T. O. NAGPUR & ORS.
September 28, 1967
tK. N.
B
c. J., R. S. llACHAWAT, v. RAMASWAMI,
G. K. MITTER AND K. S. HEGDE, JJ.J
WANCHOO,
Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act (21 of 1947) as amended by the Bombay Sales Tax Laws (Validating Provisions and Amendment) Act (22 oj 1959) ss. 11(4)(a), 11A(1) and (3)-Scetion 11(4)(a),
if violative of Art. 14 of Constitution.
c
Notices under s. 11(4)(a)-0ne notice for severql quarters-Inapplicable portion of printed notice not strnck off-Assessment year,
wrongly mentioned in notice-Notice, if valid.
C.P. and Berar Sales Tax Rules, r. 32-30 days notice prescribed
for submitting explanation-Notice giving shorter period-Validity.
Under s.10(1) of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act,
1947, every dealer required so to do by the Commissioner by notice,
and every registered dealer, shall furnish such returns by such dates
and to such authority as may be prescribed, and r.19 of the Rules
framed under the Act provides that every registered dealer should
D
furnish quarterly returns· accompanied by a treasury chal}an in
proof of payment of the tax payable. If the registered dealer does not
so furnish his return, the Connnissioncr may, after giving the dealer
E
a reasonable opportunity assess hin1 to th(-: best of his judgment
under s.11(4) (a). Rule 32 pre,cribes that ordinarily not less than 30
days notice should be given to an asscssee for submitting his explanation, before action is taken under s.11(4)(a).
In 1953, s.llA was added to the Act. Under s.llA(l) if in consequence of any information which has come into his possession, the
Commissioner is satisfied that any turnover of a dealer has escaped F
assessment, the Commissioner may, \vithin three calendar years from
the expiry of such period, after giving the dealer a reasonable opportunity of being heard, proceed to re-assess the tax payable on any
such turnover and also direct the dealer to pay a penalty. In 1959
s.11A(3) was added by which, nothing in s.IIA(l) shall apply to any
proceeding including any notice under s.11, that is, the period of
limitation of 3 years mentioned in s.llA(l) shall not apply to a G
proceedmg under s.11(4\(a) on best judgment basis.
The appellants were registered dealers. Their assessment year
was from !st November to 31st October. They submitted their
q~arterly returns upto 30th April 1952. Since no returns were submitted there~fter, on 13th September 1955, the assessing authority
issued a notice wit.h respect to the period 1st January 1953 to 31st
December 1953 callmg upon them to show cause why action should
!'Ot be taken agamst them under s.11(4) (a). A similar notice was H
issued on 27th October 195if for the period !st January· 1954 to 31st
n·cernbcr 1954, and on 7th July 1956, for the period !st January 1955
w 31.st. Decem_be~ 1955, The appellants repeatedly took time for
subm1ttmg thetr explanation. In 1958, fresh notices were issued for
L/P(N)78CI--3(•)
661
662
[1%8j l :<.c.1~.
A the calendar years 1952 to 1955 and the appellants raised the objec-
ti<in, for the first time, that their assessment year was not the
calendar year, but 1st November to 31st October. In view of that
objection, the first respondent issued another S<)t of notices on 8th
July 1959 for the periods 1st May 1952 to 31st October 1952, !st
November 1952 to 31'! October 1953, 1st November 1953 to 31st
October 1954 and 1st November 1954 to 31st October 1955 respectively.
The appellants contended that those notices were barred by the
B 3-year period of limitation under s.llA(l), but the assessing authority
assessed the appellants on best judgment basis under s. 11(4) (a). The
appellants thereupon filed writ petitions in the High Court challeng..
ing the validity of the notices and the order of assessment, but the
petitions were dismissed.
In appeals to this Court, the appellant contended that: (1)
Section 11(4). (a) read with s.llA(3) contravenes Art. 14 of the
C Constitution, because, a registered dealer who had failed to submit
his return could be proceeded against either under s.11(4)(11) or
s.llA(1), but, whereas s.l IA(l) provides a 3-year period of limitation, a proceeding unde1· s. 11(4)(a) could be initiated at any time
in view of s.11A(3); (2) the notices of 1959 were barred by time;
and (.'l) the notices of 1955 and 1956 were not valid, because, (a) the
issue of one notice for several quarters ·was contrary to law, (b)
that portion of the printed notice which said that the appellants
D had failed to furnish the return as required by a notice in that
behalf served on them under s.10(1) did not apply to the appellants
as no notice under s.10(1) had been given to them, (c) the assessment year mentioned in the notice was the calendar year which
was not the assessment year of ·the appellants, and (d) though r. 32
provides that ordinarily not Jess than 30 days notice should be
given to the assessee for submitting his explanation, the first notice
gave to the appellants only 9 days time.
E
Held: (Per Wanchoo C. J., Mitter and Hegde. JJ.) (I) Section
11(4)(a) is wid as it is violative of Art. 14.
The expression 'dealer' in s.11A(1) includes both registered and
unregistered dealers, and it cannot be contended that dealers are
classified into registered and unregistered dealers, the former coming under s.11(4)(a) and the latter und<•r s.1IA(1). To be a valid
classification, it must not only be founded on an intelligible differF entia which distinguishes persons and things that art> grouped
together from others loft out of the group, but that differentia must
h&ve a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. In
the present case, both s.1!(4)(a) and s. llA(l) are concerned w.ith
taxing escaped assessments, and judged from this object sought to
be achieved by the Act, !he classification of dealers into registered
and unregistered dealers is not reasonable. Therefore, even regisG tered dealers are covered by s. llA(l). As the 'information'. contemplated by s.11A(l) need not be from outside sources. but
could be gathered by the assessing authority from his own records,
his knowledge of the facts that the appellants had--not submitted
quarterly returns and treasury challans and that they were not
assessed to tax with respect to the turnovers in question constituted 'information' to the assessing authority from which he could be
satisfied that the turnovers had escaped assessment. It would thus
R be .open to the assessing authority to proceed against the appellants
either under s.11(4)(a) or s.llA(l). Buf as they were proceeded
against under s. 1!(4)(a), they could not get the benefit of the limitation prescribed under s. llA(1). It follows that s. 11(4)(a) has be·
come a discriminatory provision in view of s. 11A<3). [fl72 B~ 674
IJ..E: 075 II; 676 A-G].
'
I
.1.:<rA:<rOJI &
co. v. s:r.o. (Hcgile, J.)
668
Ghanshyam Das v. Regional Assistant Commissioner of Sales A
tax, Nagpur [1964] 4 S.C.R. 436 and Sura; Mall Mohta & Co. v. A. V.
Visvanatha Sastri & Anr. [1955] 1 S.C.R. 448, followed.
Maharaj Kumar Kamal Singh v. Commissioner of Income-tax,
Bihar & Orissa [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 10, Commissioner of Income•
tax, Bombay City v. M/s. Narsee Nagsee · & Co. Bombay, [1960)
3 S.C.R. 988. Salem Provident Fund Society Ltd. v. C. I. T. Mad1·as, B
42 I.T.R. 547 and United Mercantile Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of
Income-tax, Kerala, 64 I.T.R. 218 referred to.
(2) But s.11(4)(a) is severable from the rest of the Act and its
severance does not affect the implementation of the other provisions
of the Act. Therefore, the validity of the notices should be tested
under s.11A(1). So tested, the notices of 1959 are all barred by the
3-year period of limitation. [676 G-H].
0
(3) Since there was no valid notice for the period 1st May 1952
to 31st October 1952, there could be no assessment in respect of that
period. As regards tbe quarter 1st November 1952 to 31st January
1953 also, there was no valid notice. The notice issued on 13th Sei>tember 1955, no doubt refers to the period 1st January 1953 to 31st
January 1953, but that is only a part of the quarter. As a quarter
is a unit in itself and there should be a notice for the entire quarter, D
the proceeding in respect of the quarter from 1st November 1952 tn
31st January 1953 is also barred by limitation [677 E-F].
But the notices issued in 1955 and 1956 are valid notices in so
far as they relate to the period 1st February 1953 to 31st October
1955. Any irregularity in the issue of the notices does not vitiate the
proceeding, because, the liability to pay tax is founded on the charging sections. [680 B-C].
E
Chatturam & Ors. v. C:I.T. Bihar, [1947] F.C.R. 116; 15 I.T.R.
302, applied.
Further, (a) The issue of one notice for several quarters is not
contrary to law. [678 E].
State of Orissa and Anr. v. Mfs. Chakobhai Chelabhai & Co.
"]1961] 1 s.c.R. 719, followed.
(b) The assessing authority, by mistake, had failed to strike out
the oortion in the printed form which was inapplicable to the
appellants who were registered dealers and on whom no notice need
be served to furnish a return. But this circumstance could not have
prejudiced the appellants and such a mistake does not vitiate the
notice. [678 HJ.
_,
F
G
Chakobhai Chelabhai's case, [1961] 1 S.C.R. 719, followed.
(c) The mistake. as regards the assessment year in the notices
d?es not render the· notices invalid. The assessees deliberately kept
silent and when t~ey felt that the period of limitation prescribed
b_y s. llA had expired, brought the fact to the notice of the autliO'
r1ty. The assessees were not prejudiced and· could not be permitted
to take advantage of such a mistake. [679 G-H].
B
(_d) Rule 32 prescribes that ordinarily 30 days' notice should
be given. The~efo~e. the period is not mandatory. All that ss.11(4)
and llA. require 1s th~t an assessee should be given a reasonable
opportu111f)' before he '" proreedecl ogainst. Sin<'<'. in tho present
664
811PREJIE COURT REPORTS
(1968] 1 B.O.R.
A case, the appellants appeared before. the assessing authority and did
not object to the validity of the notices but asked for time for submitting their explanation, and as the time asked for was given, th"
appellants had a reasonable opportunity, for submitting their explanation. [679 D-G).
(Per Bachawat and Ramaswaml JJ.) (1) Section 11(4) Is not
violative of Art. 14.
B
Construing ss.11(4)(a) and 11.AO) tnfPlhPr it must be held that;
cases falling within s.11(4)(a) are excluded from the purview of
s.UA(l), Section 11(4)(a) specially provides for the initiation of.
proceedings against a registered dealer. Having made this special
provision, the legislature must be tnkc:; to have intended that the
sales tax authorities must proceed against a registered dealer under
s.11(4)(a) and not under s.llA(l). [68~ C-EJ.
C
The classification and differential treatment of ·registered and
unregistered dealers are based on substantial differences having a
reasonable relation to the object of the Act. The legislature did not
prescribe a period of limitation for a proceeding initiated under
s. 11(4)(a) against a registered dealer. because. (il the reg:stered
dealer is under a statutory obligation to file a retum, (ii) no penalty
is leviable under s.11(4) and (iii) the registered dealer is given many
D advantages under the Act which are denied to an unregistered
dealer. Therefore. the bar of limitation in the case of an unregistered dealer and the absence of such a bar in the case of a registered
dealer cannot be regarded as unjust or discriminatory. [684 B. G-HJ.
Ghansh11am Das v. Reqional Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax,
Nagpur, [1964)4 S.C.R. 436, Mahara.i Kumar Kamal Sinqh v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar & Orissa, [!9591 Supp. 1 S.C.R. 10 and
J!l Commissioner of Income-tax v. Narsee Nagsee & Co. [1960} 3 S.C.R.
988, explained.
(2) Section 11A(3) expressly Provides that nothing in s.l!A(l)
shall apply to any proceeding including any notice under s.11, and
the section is retrospective. It follow< that the period of limitation
provided bv s.tlA(l) cannot be applied to a proceeding or notice
under s. II (4). Consequently, tl:j' impugned notices of 1959, Issued
under s.11 (4) are not barred bv limitation and are not invalid.
r f682
H; 683 AJ.
Ghanshyam Das's Case, [1964) 4 S C.R. 436, referred to.
(3) Even the notires issued in ms; and 1956 initiated proceedings
validly under s. 11(4) for the period from 1st February !953 to 31st
October 1955, as the irregularities in the notices did not invalidate
them. [685 B-CJ.
CIVIL APPELLATE JuRISDJCTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 511-514
of 1966.
Appeals by special leave from the iudgments and orders date(!
August 9, 1961, July 20, 1964. of the Bombay High Court, Nagpur
Bench in Misc. Civil Applications Nos. II 18 of 1959. 192 of 196T.
1360 of 1959 and 193 of 1961 respectively.
B
H. R. Gokhale, M. R. Bhandare, P. C. Bhnrtnri, and 0. C.
Mathur, for the appellant (in all the appeals).
G
N. S. Bindra, P. C. Chatterjee, S. P. Nayar for R. H. Dhebar,
for the respondents (in all the appeals).
!
AlfANDJI & co: ~. 8.T.O.
(Hegile, J,)
The Jud11ment of WANCHOO c. J., MITTER and HEGOE, JJ. was A
delivered by HEGDE, 1. The dissenting judgment of BACHAWAT and
RA\fASWAMT, JJ. was deliveted by BACllAWAT, J.'
Degele, J. The principal question canvassed in this group of
appeals by special leave is whether s. 11(4)(a) of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act 1947. to be referred to as the Act B
hereinafter, is ultra vires Article 14 bf the Constitution and consequently the notices impugned in the writ petitions from which
these appeals arise are liable to be struck down and the respond·
ent~ restrained from levying sales tax on the appellants for the
period May I, 1952 to October 31, 1955.
The appellants are a private limited company carrying on 0
business inter alia as dealers in iron and steel materials in Vidharba
region of the Maharashtra State. In that region they have more
than one place of business. They registered themselves as dealers
under s. 8A of the Act and obtained a certificate of registration on
August, 17, 1947. Their assessment year as shown in their registration certificate is from November I to October 31. They were re· D
quired to submit quarterly returns of their turnovers. They did so
till April 30, I 952. Thereafter no returns were submitted. On
September 13. 1955, the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, the
assessing authority at that time, issued a notice calling upon the
appellants to show cause why action should not .be taken against
them under ss. 10(3) and 11(4\(a), on account of their failure to
furnish the return for the period 1.1.53 tb 31.12.53. Similar notices I:
were issued to them on October 27, 1955 for the period 1.1.54 to
31.12.54 and on July 7, 1956 for the period I.1.55 to 31.12.55. It
appears that the aopellants repeatedly took time for submitting
their explanation. The first respondent to whom the appellants'
case stood transferred issued in 1958 fresh notices to the appellants similar to those issued in 1955. At that stage the appellants 11'
obiected to the validity of those notices both orally as well as in
writing on the ground that their assessment year was not the
calendar year as mentibned in those notices but the year ending
October 31. Evidently in view of that ob.iection. the first respondent issued another set of notices on July 8, 1959. The appellants
contended that those notices were barred by time. Thereafter G
the appellants challenged the validity of the nbtices issued in 1959
in the petitions under Art. 226 from which these a'Ppeals arise.
In these appeals the questions arisin11 for decision are whether
s. I 1(4)(a) ors. llA(3) or any parts thereof contravene the guarantee
of eoual protection of the laws or equality before the law or
whether those provisions are based on a valid classification which H
is reasonable in view of the object with which they were enacted.
Mr. H.R. Gokhale learned counsel for the appellants, urged that
both these provisions deal with the same class of persons having
common characteristics and properties and hence there 'is 11(1 iv.st
6GG
SUl'REllE COUllT llEPORTS
(1968] I S.('.11,
A basis for the classification made. According to him the classification complained of has brought about u discrimination. Further
he asserted that the Act had conferred a>rbitrary power on the
assessing authority to pick and choose from the persons belonging
to the same class to be dealt with either under s. I 1(4)(a) or under
llA(I). He urged that as a case coming under s. 11 (4)(a) also falls
under s. llA, as the law now ·stands, the persons proceeded against
B under s. l!A(I) will have the benefit of the period of limitation
nrescribcd therein; while the said benefit is not available for those
proceeded under s. I I (4)(a).
According to the Jear11ed counsel for the revenue. ss. 11(4)(a)
and J IA deal with different classes of persons; the classification
c made under those provisions is a reasonable classification having
nexus with the object sought to be achieved.
Before adverting to the points ut issue, it would be convenient
to !et out the circumstances under which s. l IA(3) which is said
to have brought about the discrimination complained of came to
be enacted. The Act is in force ever since 1947. Section llA as it
D originally stood w~s inserted into the Act in 1953. In Bisesar House
v. State of Bombay(') the question arose whether a notice under
s. 11 (2) initiates a fresh proceeding and if that is so, whether the
limitation prescribed under s. llA(I) is attracted to that proceeding. A Fu.II Bench of the Bombay High Court speaking through
Chagla, C. 1. held that a notice under s.11(2) initiates a fresh pro1 ceeding and to such a proceeding the limitation prescribed in s. llA
is attracted. From 'the ratio of that decision it followed that the
limitation prescribed under s. llA also governed proceedings
under s.l 1(4)(a). Evidently, to get over the effect of that decision,
the Bombay Legislature enacted the Bombay Sales Ta~ Laws- <Validating Pl'ovisions and. Amendment) Act 1959 (No. 22 of 1959)
F which came into force on April 18, 1959. Section 6 of that Act
inserted the new sub-section (3) into s. llA and the reason for that
amendment, as stated in the statement of objects and reasons. is
as follows:
"In its judgment in Bisesar House v. Commisslcmer
of Sales Tax, Nagpur, the Bombay High Court. bas
G
held that the period of limitation laid down in s. llA' of.
the Central Provinces and· .Bera? Sal~ Tax Act, 194~;
for reassessment of· the turnover which has escaped
assessment applies to original assessment also. It has
been found that the said limitation applies to suo. mot11
revisions also. The said decision affects the original assei8'
ments and suo motu revisions, which have been made alb'
the expiry of the period of limitation laid down for the
reassessment of turnover escaping a98eSSlllent undet the
different sales tax laws in force in this State.• It has,
ah\>
B
(') 60 B.L.R. 1395.
,\llANl>Jl &
"°·
I". A.'l'.O.
(1/e_qde, J.)
therefore. become nccess:1ry to estublish the validity of
all such assessments uml to pro\ide that the period of
limitation prescribed for reassessment of escaped turn·
overs does not apply to original assessments and .1111>
111t1t11 revisions."
667
A
In Glu111.1·/Jyam Das v. Re.~ional Assi.ltalll Commissioner of S11/e.1
Tax, Nagpur.(') this Court did not agree with that decision so for B
as the scope of s.11 t21 is concerned. Therein it was held that u
notice under s. 11\21 does not initiate a fresh proceeding and to
that proceeding the limitation prescribed ins. llA does not apply.
Though in view of that decision. s.11 A(3\ became superfluous in
respect of a proceeding in which a notice under s. 11 (2) is given, it
u11doubtedl)· c_hanged the law in respect of proceedings under c
s. l 1(4)(a).
Before we proceed to consider the aforementioned complaint
of discrimination. it is necessury to have a survey of the relevant
provisions of the Act. 'Dooler' is defined in s. 2(c) as meaning a
per5on who whether as principal or agent carries on in the State
the business of selling or supplying goods whether for cmnmis_~ion.
· remuneration or otherwise and includes a firm. a partnership, a
Hindu undivided family or a State government or any of their
departments and includes also a society. club or association selling
or supplying goods to its members. A 'registered dealer' is defined
in s. 2(f\ as meaning a dealer registered under the Act. Section 2(j)
defines 'turnover' as meaning the aggrega'le of the amounts of sale
prices and parts of sale prices received or receivable by a dealer
in respect of the sale or supply of goods or in respect of the sale
or supply of goods in the carrying out of any contract effected or
made during the prescribed period: und the expression 'taxable
turnover' means that part uf a dealer's turnover during such period
which remains after deducting therefrom his turnover during that
period in respect of the sale of goods declared tax free under s. 6
The definition of the term 'year" as provided in s. 2(1) to the ''xknl
net·essarY. for our present purpose read~: -" 'year' means the 12 months ending on 31st day of
March. or if the accounts ,,f the assessec are made up to
any other uay in respect of a year ending on any date
other than the 31st day of March, than at the option of
the assessee the year ending tm the day to which his
accounts have been so made up .................. ".
Section 8 suys:
"(!) No dealer shall. while being liable lo pay tux
under this Act, carry on business as a dealer unless he
has been registered as such and possesses u re~istration
certificate."
('l [19R4] 4 S.C.R 4.~li,
D
E
F
G
B
I
668
SUPllEUE COURT REPORTS
[1968] l 8.C.11.
A Seclion 8A provides for voluntary regislration of a dealer. Sub-s.
(3) thereof provides tlwt every dealer who has been registered
upon an application made under this section so long as his registration remains in force, be liable to pay tax under this Act.
Sub-s. (4) of that section stipulates that the registration of a dealer
upon an application made under that section shalJ be in force for
a period not Jess.than three complete years and shall remain in
B force thereafter unless cancelled under the provisions of the Act.
Section IO provides for returns by dealers. It reads:
c
"()) Every such dealer as may be required so to do
by the Commissioner by notice served in the prescribed
manner and every registered dealer shall furnish such
returns by such dates and to such authority as may be
prescribed."
Sub-s. (2) of that section is not necessary for our. present
purpose. Sub-s. (3) of that section reads:
"(3) If a dealer fails to comply with the requirements
of
a
notice issued under sub-section (I) or a registered
D
dealer fails to furnish his return for any period within the
prescribed time to the prescribed authority without any
sufficient cause, the Commissioner may, after giving such
dealer a reasonable opportunity of being heard, direct
him to pay. by way of penalty. a sum not exceeding onefourth of the amount of the tax which may be assessed on
E
him under s. 11.".
Sections 11 and 11 A are important for bur present purpose. They deal with assessment and assessment on turnovers
escaping assessment. They, to the extent necessary for our present
purpose read:
F
"! 1(1). If the Commissioner is satisfied that tbe re·
G
B
turns furnished by a dealer in respect of any period are
correct and complete, he shall assess the dealer on them.
12) If the Commissioner is not so satisfied he shall
serve the dealer with a notice appointing a place and day
and directing him Ii) to appear in person or by an agent
entitled to appear in accordance with the provisions of
section I IB, (ii) to produce evidence or have it produced
in support of the returns; or (iii) to produce or cause to be
produced any accbunts, registers. cash memoranda or
other documents as may be considered necessary by the
Commissioner for the purpose;
(3) After hearing the dealer or his agent and examin·
in.I! the evidence produced in compliance with the re·
quirements of clause (ii) or clause (iii) of sub-section (2)
and such further evidence as the Commissioner may require, the Commissioner shall assess him to ta:t;
ANANDJI & CO. V. S.T.0, (Hegde, J.)
(4) If a registered d~der (a) does not furnish returns
in respect of a'ny period by the prescribed date, or (b)
having furnished such returns fails to comply with any
of the terms of a notice issued under sub-section (2), or
(c) has not regularly employed any method of accounting,
or if the method cmplo)'eJ is such that, in the opinion of
the Commissioner. assessment cannot prcperly be made
on the basis thereof,
the Commissioner shall in the prescribed manner assess
the dealer to the best of his judgment:
Provided that he shall not so assess him in respect
of the default specified in clause (a) unless the dealer has
been first given a reasonable opportunity of being heard."
(Sub-ss. 5 and (6) are not necessary for our present purpose).
669
A
B
c
Section 11 A provides:
"(!). If in consequence of any information which
has come into possession. the Commiss;oner is satisfied that any turnover of a dealer during any period has
been under-assessed or has escaped assessment or assessed at a lower rate or any deduction has been wrongly
made therefrom, the Commissioner may, at any time within three calendar years from the expiry of such period,
after giving the dealer a reasonable opportunity of being
heard and after making such enquiry as he considers necessary, proceed in such manner as may be prescribed
to reassess or assess, as the case may be, the tax payable on
any such turnover: and the Commissioner may direct that
tJie dealer shall pay. by way of penalty in addition
to the amount of tax so assessed, a sum not exceeding
that amount.
D
E
F
(2). The assessment or re-assessment made under sub·
s. (l) shall be at the rate at which it would have been
made, had there been no under-assessment or escapement.
(3) (a). Nothing in sub-sections (1) and (2) (i) shall
apply to any proceeding (including any notice issued)
under Sections 11 or 22A or 22B, and (ii) notwithstanding
any judgment. decree or order of a Court or Tribunal,
shall he deemed ever to have been applicable to such proceeding or notice.
G
(b)_Jhe validity of any such proceeding or notice
shall not be called in question merely on the grou!!d that
such proceeding or notice was inconsistent with the provisicms of sub-sections (I) and (2)."
B
Rule 19 of the rules framed under the Act provides that
every registered dealer should furnish to the appropriate sales tax
670
8Ul'BBl4E OOURT ll!iil'OIITS
[1968] 1 s.c.n.
A officer his . quarterly return in the prescribed form within one
calendar month from the expiry of the quarter to which the return relates. Each of such returns submitted should be accompani·
ed by a treasury challan in the form prescribed in proof of the
fact that he had paid the tax payable on the basis of his return.
The only other rule relevant for our present purpose is r. 32 in
Part VII of the Rules, which deals with assessment of tax and/
B or penalty. That rnle provides that where a registered dealer has
rendered himself to a best judgment assessment as well as penalty
by reason of his default in furnishing the prescribed return or returns in respect of any period by the prescribed date. the assessing
authority shall serve on him a notice in form 12 specifying the
default, escapement or concealment as the case may be and calling
O upon him to show cause by such date ordinarily not less than 30
days, from the date of issue of the notice. as may be fixed in that
behalf, why he should not be assessed or re-assessed to tax, or a
penalty should not be imposed upon him and directing him to
produce on the said date his books of account and other documents which the assessing authority may require or which he may
D wish to produce in support of his objection. That rule further provides that no such notice shall be necessary where the dealer,
having appeared before the assessing authority. waives such
notice.
Now we may turn to the questions formulated for decision.
As mentioned earlier. the main contention advanced on behalf of
E the appellants 'ls that sulJ..s. {3) of s. I I A has brought about a discrimination between those dealers proceeded against under
s. J 1(4)(a) and those dealt with under s. 11A. The contention
advanced on behalf of the appellants is that the turnover of a
registered dealer who has failed to submit his return and also to
deposit the tax due from him, has escaped assessment; the clise of
P such a dealer comes both within s. J 1(4)(a) as well ass. llA; therefore, he can be dealt with under either of those two provisions.
Where s. JI A prescribes a period of limitation for a proceeding
under that provision, in view of sulJ..s. 3 of s. llA a proceeding
under s. l I (4)(a) can be iniliated at :rny time; under those circumstances it is open to the authorities to proceed against some of the
G same class of dealers under s. J 1(4)(a) and others under s. llA. It
was said on their behalf that it is well-settled that in its applica•
tion to legal proceedings, Art. 14 assures to every one the same mies
of evidence and modes of procedure; in other words, the same rule
must exist for all in similar circumstances. On the other hand, it
was urged on behalf of the revenue that .s. 11 (4)(a) de~ls only
\\ ith reb<istered dealers who have certain advantages under the
B Act. whereas s. l lA deals with dealers who do not come either
under s. 11 (4) or s. 11 (5), and therefore the classification of dealers
made under the varitms provisions is based on real and substantial
distinction bearing a just and reasonable relation to the object
sou?ht to be attained.
.\1'A1'llJl & co. '" S.'l'.O, (Heyde, J.)
611
We have now to sec whether the dealers who come within
the mischief of s. 11 (4)(a) can also be dealt with under s. llA. Before a person can be dealt with under s. llA, it must be shown
that in consequence of any information which has come into his
possession, lhe Commissioner is satisfied that any turnover of that
dealer during any period has been under-assessed or has escaped
assessment or assessed at a lower rate or any deduction has been
wrongly made therefrom. Quite plainly the expression 'dealer' in
s. l!A(I) includes both registered and unregistered dealers. In this
case we are concerned with the escapement of assessment. Therefure the first question that arises for decision is whether it can bll
said that the appellants' turnovers for the period 1-5-52 to 30-10-55
had escaped assessment. There is no dispute that those turnovers
lwd not been assessed. From the fact that those turnovers had not
been assc~sed. can it 1'c said that they had escaped assessment? In
Maharaj Kumar Kamal Singh v. Commissioner of fl!come Tax,
liilwr and Orissa.('), this Court laid down that the expression "has
escaned assessment" in s. 34(l)(b) of the Indian Income Tax Act.
I 92i is applicable not only where the income has not been assessed
owing to inadvertence or oversight or owing to the fact that no
return has been submitted. but also where a return has been submitted but the inco111c tax 0fliccr erroneously failed to tax a part
L>I' ib,cssablc income. In Com111issio11<'1" of lllcome Ta.r, Bombay
City v. MI s. N11rs1•e Nagsec and Co., Bombay!") interpreting the
words ··profits escaping assessment" ins. 14 of the Business Profits
Ta.\ Act, 1947, this Court held that those words apply equally to
cases where a notice was received by the assessee but resulted in no
assc;sment. under-assessment or excessive relief ttnd to cases wl1erc
due to any rca,on no notice was issued tn the assessce and there was
l1ll assessment of his income. Kapur, J. speaking for the majority
of Judges in that t:ase, observed (at p. 993 of the report) that it is
well-settled thul an income escapes assessment when the process
of assessment has not been initiated as also in a case where it has
resulted in no assessment after the completion of the process of
assessment. The true scope of the expression "escaped assessment"
in s. 11 A came up for cons.ideration before this Court in Glumshvam
Das v. Regional Assistant Commissio11e1· of Sales Tax, Nagp~rO.
This is what Subba Rao . .I. (as he then was) who delivered the
.iudgment of the majority of the Judges. observed in that regard:
A
'"In Co111111i.1l°io11a of l11co11n: fax. IJ0111b1n- v. Pirojbai N. Contrai:ror (5 I.T.R. 33~) the wonb "cscajied assessment' in the Indian Income-tax Act were defined. IL was
held thereiu that the said words were wide enough to include cases where no notice. under s.22121 of the Income
tax Act had been bsucd to the asscssee and therefore
his income had not been assessed at all under s. ~3 thereof.
('\ [l!l/i0] Supp l S C.R. 10.
(') [191;0] :i S.C.R. !tllll.
C') (1964) l S C.R 4:lfi. .
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
672
SUPREME COURT REPOllTS
[1968) 1 B.C.R.
A
The said view has been assumed to be correct by this
Court in Maharaj Kumar Kamal Singh v. Commissioner
of Income Tax. Bihar and Orissa [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 10
and Maharajadhin1j Sir Kameshwar Sin,gh v. State of
Bihar ([1960] 1 S.C.R. 322) and extended to cover wcase
where the first assessment was made in due course but
a part of the income escaped therefrom. This Court, in
Commissioner of Income tax. Bombay v. Narsee Nagsee
B
and Co. ([1960] 3 S.C.R. 988), construing the provisions of
s. 14 of the Business Profits Tax Act, 1947, reviewed the
law on the subject and came to the following conclusion:
'All these cases show that the words "escaping assessment" apply equally to cases where a notice was received
by the assessee but resulted in no assessment at all and
c
to cases where due to any reason no notice was issued to
the assessee, and, therefore, there was no assessment of
his income.'
It 's true that the said deci;ions were given with reference
to either s. 34(1) of the Income Tax Act or s. 14 of the
D
Business Profits Tax Act. but so far as th8 present enquiry is concerned the said sections are in pari materia
with s. 11 A of the Act. In construing the meaning of the
expression 'escaped assessment' ins. I IA of the Act there
is no reason why the said expression sh1mld bear a more
limited meaning than what it bears under the said two
E
Acts. All the three Acts are taxing statutes imd the three
relevent sections therein are intended to gather the revenue which hus improperly escaped. A division Bench
of the Madras High Court in the State of Madras v. Batu
Cheltiar (7 S.T.C. 519) following the decision of a Full
Bench of that Court, held that where an assessee did not
F
file at any time a return of h;s .turnover for a year and,
therefore, there was no r.ssessment made, the turnover
escaped assessment. It was observed therein:
'Whether it was a case of omission or of deliberate
concealment on the part of the assessee, he did not submit
any return. It was his default that led to the escape of the
G
turnover for 1951-52 from assessment to the tax lawfully
due. It was the whole of the turnover for that year that
escaped assessment.'
It is not necessary to multiply citations. We, therefore,
hold that the expression 'escaped assessment' in s. I IA
of the Act includes that of a turnover which has not been
assessed at all. because for one reason or other no assessH
ment proceedings were initiated and therefore no assessment was made in respect thereof."
In one of the appeals dealt with in that judgment, i.e. C.A.
No. 102 of 1961, this Court had to consider whether a case under
>
t-
ANAND.JI & CO. v, B.T.o. (Hegde, J.)
s. II (4)(a) also comes under s. llA. The Court answered that
question in the affirmative.
As seen earlier it was the duty of the appellants not only to
submit their quarterly returns but send along with those returns the
treasury challans in proof of the payment of the tax admittedly
due from them. As they have failed to do so within the prescri·
bed period, it follows that the turnovers in question had es~aped
assessment.
This takes us to the next question whether in the instant case
the assessing authority can be said to have been satisfied about
the escapement of the assessment as a consequence of any information which had come into his possession. From the notices
issued in 1955 as well as later on, it is clear that the assessing
authorities were satisfied about the escapement of the assessment
due from the appellants. But the real question is whether they
were so satisfied "in consequence of any information which had
come into their possession". The assessing authorities knew that
the appellants had neither submitted their returns nor treasury
chal!ans in proof of the payment of the tax due from them. From
that circumstance it is reasonable to hold that in consequence of the
information that the appellants had not submitted their returns as
well as the treasury challans the assessing authari.ty should have
been satisfied about the escapement of the assessment. It was
urged on behalf of the revenue that 'information' contemplated by
s. I IA should be from some outside source and not something that
could be gathered by the assessing authority from his own records.
According to the revenue in the instant case there was no information from any outside source, therefore, it cannot be said that the
assessing authority was satisfied about the escapement of tax in
consequence of 'any information which has come into its possession'. In our view, this contention is untenable. In Maharaj
Kumar Kamal Singh v. Commfasioner of Income Tax, Bihar and
Orissa, this Court held that the word 'information' in s. 34(1)(b)
of the Income Tax Act, 1922, includes information as to the true
and correct state of the law and so would cover information as
to the relevant judicial decisions, It was laid down therein that
the information need not be about any fact; it may be even as to
the legal position. In other words, the term 'information' in s. 34
(l)(b) of the Income Tax Act 1922 really means knowledge. In
Salem Provident Fund Society Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income
Tax, Madras,(') a division bench of the Madras High Court interpreting the scope of the words 'information which has come into
his possession' found in s. 34 of the Indian Income Tax Act,
observed thus :
"We arc unahlc tn accept lhc cxlrcmc proposition
that nothing that can be found in the record of the
(') 42 I.T.R. 547.
673
A
B
0
D
B
F
G
B
674
A
B
c
·D
MUPREM~:
CulJRI' l•EPOl\TS
Ll9tl~J I 8.U.lt.
assessment which itself would show escape of assessment
or under-assessment, can be viewed as information which
led to the ·belief that there has been escape from assessment or under-assessment. SuppdSe a mistake in the
original order of assessment is not discovered by the In·
come Tax Officer himself on further scrutiny but it is
brought to his notice by another assessee or even by a
subordinate or a superior ollicer, that would appear to be
information disclosed to the Income Tax Officer. If the
mistake it5elf is not extraneous to the record and the in·
formant gathered the information from the record, the
immediate source of information to the Income Tax
Officer in such circumstances is in one sense extraneous to
the record. Tt is difficult to accept the position that while
what is seen by another in the record is 'information'
what is seen by the Income Tax officer himself is not information to him. In the latter case he just informs himself. · It will be information in his possession within the
meaning of, section 34. In such cases of obvious mistakes
apparent on the face of the record of assessment, that record itself can be a source of information, if that informa·
tion leads to a discovery or belief that there has been
an escape of assessment or under-assessment.''
The meaning of the word 'information' came up again for
E consider(!tion before a division bench of the Kerala High Court in
United Mercantile Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax
Kera/a('). Their Lordships held that to 'inform' means to 'impart
knowledge' and a.detail available to the Income Tax Offi~r in the
papers filed before him does not by its mere availability become
an item of 'information'. It is transmuted into an item of informaF tion in his possession only if and when its existence is realised and
its implication~ recognized. Applying that test to the facts of the
case before them, the Court held that the awareness of the Income
Tax Officer for the first time after the assessment order of November 19, 1957, that the bonus shares were issued not t>ut of Premiums receive.Ii in cash and the consequent result in the light of the
'G Finance Act, 1957, was information within the mea'lling of that
expi:~sion as used i11 s. 34(1) l)f the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922,
'allaconseqtiently, the reopening of the assessment under that provision wa~ not illegal.
. in our judgment, the knowledge of the fact that the appellanL~
had not submitted their quarterly returns as well as the treasury
B cha!Jans, c.onstituted an information to the assessing authority
from which it could be satisfied and in fact it was satisfied that the
turnover~ with which we are concerned in this case had escaped
assessment.
(') 64 I.T.R. 218.
ANANDJI & 00. V. S.T.O. (Hegrk, J.)
6711
From the above conclusions it follows that the appellants' A
case falls both under s. I !(4)(a) and s. llA(l). Therefore, it was
open to the assessing authority to proceed against them under any
one of those two sections. But as they were proceeded against
under s. 11 (4)(a) they cannot have the benefit of the period of
limitation prescribed under s. II A(]). Hence, it must be held that
the present case falls within the rule laid down by this Court in Sura;
Mall Mohta and Co. v. A. V. Visvanatha Sastri & <mother(').. On B
the facts found it follows that s. 11 (4)(a) has become a discriminatory provision in view of s. II A(3). Hence the same is liable to be
struck down under Art. 14. But for the inclusion of sub-s. 3 in s.
I IA, there would have been no discrimination between those
dealt with under s. 1H4)(al and those under s. llA(I). The period
of limitation prescribed in s. I IA(!) would have attracted itself to o
proceedings under s. 11 (4)(a) as held by this Court in Gha11shyam
Das's case(').
Mr. Bindra, learned counsel for the revenue, contended that
a registered dealer has certain advantages over an unregistered
dealer; therefore the classification made under the Act is a reasonable classification. To be a valid classification, the same must not D
only be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes
persons and things that are grouped together from others left out
of the group but that differentia must have a reasonable relation
to the object sought to be achieved. Both s. I 1(4)(a) and s. llA(l)
concern themselves with escaped assessments. The classi~tion
suggested has no nexus with that object. That much is esta.· ished B
by the decision of this Court in Ghanshyam Das'.~ case('),' · hich
Is binding on us. It is true the State can by classification determine
who should be regarded as a class for the purpose of legislation
and in relation to a law enacted on a particular subject, :b*t the
classification must be based on scme real and substantia(djstinction bearing a just and reasonable relation to the object sought to r
be attained and cannot be made arbitrarily and without any substantial basis. Judged from the object sought to be achieved by
the Act. we are of the opinion that the classification made between
the registered and un-registered dealers is not a reasonable classification. From this conclusion it follows thats. 11(4)(a) is liable'1to
he struck down as being discriminatory in view of s. 11A(')1 !
fl
Section II (4)(a) is separable from the rest of the sub-section.
Its 11eparation from that sub.section does not affect the implementation of the other provisions of the Act.
:
This takes us to the question which was debated at our instance whether the notices issued by the assessing authority in I 9SS H
were valid notices. The High Court had not considered this question, though it appears that the same was presented to it for decision
(') [1955] 1 S.C.R. 448.
L/P(N)7SCl--4
(') [19641 4 S.C.R. 436.
676
SUPREME COUllT R&l'OJITS
[1968) 1 s.C.lt,
A by the parties. In the course of its judgment, the High Court
observed:
B
"In this view (in view of its earlier findings) of the
matter it is not necessary to consider whether the earlier
notices of the .year 1955 are good and valid notices or
whether they stood superseded by subsequent notices of
1958 and 1959".
For convenience we shall take up for consideration notice
No. 4519/STN dated 13-9-55. Our conclusions in respect of that
notice would cover the other notices. The material facts as set out
by the High Court, the correctness of which was not disputed
before us, are these:
c
"On the 3rd September, 1955, the Assistant Commissioner, Sales Tax, issued a notice under s. 10(3), s. 11(4)
(a). s. 1IA and sub-s. (I) of s. 22C of the Act, calling upon
the petitioners to show cause why action should not be
taken against them under s. 10(3) and s. 11(4) of the Act
on ac~'Ount of their failure to furnish the returns for the
D
period 1-1-53 to 31-12-53. Similar notices were given on
27th October. 1955 for the period 1-1-54 to 31-12-54 .rnd
on 7th July 1956. for the period 1-1-55 to 31-12-55."
From those facts. it is seen that no notice had been issued within
three years in respect of the turnover relating to the period from
E 1-5-52 to 31-12-52. The assessment in respect of that period is
clearly barred in view of our earlier conclusion. The period 1-11-52
to 31-1-53 forms part of the quarter commencing from 1-11-52. No
notice was given in respect of that quarter. A quarter forms a
unit by itself. Therefore, it follows that the proceeding in respect
of that quarter is also barred by limitation.
F
Now we shall take up the question whether the notices issued
in 1955 in respect of the turnovers relating to other quarters were
in accordance with law. The notice No. 4519/STN dated 13-9-55
reads.
"Notice (for 1-1-53 to 31-12-53) dated 13-9-55. No. 45191
STN. D /13-9-55.
G
Form XII
(See rule 32)
H
Notice under sub-section (3) of section 10, sub-section (4)
(a) and (5) of section II, sub-section (!) of section 11 (Al
and sub-section (I) of section 22 of the Central Provinces
and Berar Sales Tax Act,.1947.
Whereas Shri Anandji Haridas and Co., Ltd.,_ Nagpur.
You have failed to furnish a return as required by a
.ANANDJI & CO, V, B.T.O. (Hegde, J,)
notice in that behalf served on you under section 10(1)
of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tait Act, 1947.
677
A
OR
You being a registered dealer have failed to furnish
a return for the periods 1-1-53 to 31-12-53 and have thereby rendered yourself liable under section 11 (4) to be assessed to the best of judgment;
Further, you are hereby directed to attend in person
or by a person authorised by you in writing in that behalf, being a person specified in section 11 BO) before me
and to produce or cause to be produced your books of
accounts and the documents specified in the schedule
hereunder and any evidence on which you rely in support of your objection at Jabalpur at 11-00 A.M. on
22-9-55.
Sd/Asstt. Commissioner of Sales Tax
Nagpur Region, Nagpur."
B
c
D
It is true that it is not a notice in respect of any particular quar- E
ter, it is a notice in respect of the period 1-1-53 to 31-12-53. In the
State of Orissa and another v. M Is. Chakobhai Chelabhai and
Company,(') this Court held that the issue of one notice under s.
12(5) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947 which section is similar to
s. II (4)(a), for several quarters was not contrary to Jaw as the
section makes reference to a period which might consist of more
than one quarter.
F
From the notice in question it cannot be made out whether
the assessing authorities wanted to deal with the appellants under
s. 10(1) or under s. JI (4). The notice says that the appellants "had
failed to furnish the return as required by a notice in that behalf
served on them under s. 10(1) of the Act. or that they being regis- G
tered dealers had failed to furnish return for the periods mentioned
therein and thereby rendered themselves liable under s. 11 (4) to
be assessed to the best of judgement." Quite clearly, the first
alternative mentioned in the notice did not apply to the appellants.
They are registered dealers. No notice under s. 10(1) had been
given to them. The assessing authority by mistake had failed to
strike out the first alternative shown in the printed fonn. That H
circumstance could not have prejudiced the appellants. It was
held by this Court in Chakobhai Chelab/1ai's case(') referred to
earlier that such a mistake does not vitiate the notice issued.
(') [1961] 1 S.C.R. 719.
L/P(N)7SOI-~ {<)
_,
678
A
SUPllllKB COURT RllPORTS
[1968] l s.o...
But the more serious mistake pointed out by Mr. Gokhale
in that notice is that the assessment year mentioned in that notice
is not the assessment year of the appellants.
Their assessment
Years commenced from 1st November. This error acoording to
Mr. Gokhale vitiated the notices issued. Yet. a:nother complaint
made by Mr. Gokhale was that though r. 32 provides that ordinarily
not less than 30 days notice should be given to the assessee, only
B 9 days notice was given. But this defect was found only in the
notice quoted above and not in the other notices issued in 1955.
For the reasons to be mentioned presently, we see no merit in
either of these contentions.
We are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Gokhale that
a notice under s. 11(4)(a) or llA(l) is a condition precedent for
0 initiating proceedings under those provisions or that it is the very
foundation for the proceedings to be taken under those provisions.
The notice contemplated under r. 32 is not similar to a notice to
be issued under s. 34(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1922. All that
sS. 11(4) and llA(l) prescribe is that before taking proceedings
against an assessee under those provisions, he should be given a
D reasonable opportunity of being heard. In fact, those sections do
not speak of any notice. But r. 32 prescribes the manner in which
the reasonable opportunity contemplated by those provisions
should be afforded to the assessee. The period of 30 days prescribed
in r. 32 is not mandatory. The rule itself says that 'ordinarily'
not less than 30 days notice should be given. Therefore, the only
II question to be decided is whether the defects noticed in those
notices had prejudiced the appellants. It may be noted that when
the assessees received the notices in question, they appeared before the assessing authority, but they did not object to the validity
of those notices. They asked for time for submitting their explanation. The time asked for was given. Therefore. the fact that only
Jr nine days were given to them for submitting explanation could
not have in any manner prejudiced them. So far as the mistake
in the notice as regards the assessment year is concerned, the
assessees kept .silent about that circumstance till 1958. It was
only when they were sure that. the period of limitation prescribed
by s. llA had expired, they brought that fact to the notice of
G the assessing autboritx. It is. clear that the appellants were merely
tryins to take advantage of. the mistakes that had crept inti> the
notices. They cannot be perniitted to do so. We fail to see why
those noticll$ are not valid in respect of the periods commencing
from February 1, 1953 till 31-10-55: We are unable to agree with
Mr. Gokhille's conti:n.tion that .each one of those notices should be
read separately and that we should not consider them together. If
B. thi>se notices are. read together as we think they should be, then
it is clear that those !lotices give the appellants the reasonable
opportunity contemplated by ss. 11(4) (a) and llA(l). In Chatturam and Others v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bih(IT.(') the
(') 15 I.T.R. 302,
ANAND.JI & CO. W, 8,T.O, (JJacJiawat J.)
679
Federal Court held that any irregularity in issuing a notice under A
s. 22 of the Income Tax Act, 1922 does not vitia:te the proceeding; that the income tax assessment proceedings commence with
the issue of the notice, but the issue or receipt of the notice is,
however, not the foundation of the jurisdiction of the Income Tax
Officer to make the assessment or of the liability of the assessee
to pay the tax. The liability to pay the tax is founded on ss. 3
and 4 of the Income Tax Act which are the charging sections. B
Section 22 and others are the machinery sections to determine the
amount of tax. The ratio of that decision applies to the facts of
the present case. In our opinion, the notices issued in the year 1955
are valid notices so far as they relate to the period commencing
from February I, 1953 to 31-10-55.
In view of our conclusion that every escapement of assessment
coming within the scope of s. 11 (4)(a) is also an escapement of
assessment under s. 11 A(I). a notice issued under s. ll (4)(a) would
be a vaild notice in respect of a proceeding under s. I IA(I).
c
In the result, we hold that the assessing authority has no com- D
petence to assess the turnovers of the appellants in respect of the
quarters commencing from 1-5-52 and ending with January 31,
1953 as the same is barred by time under s. I IA. We further
hold that s. I 1(4)(a) is void as it is violative of Art. 14. We accordingly issue a direction to the respondents to refrain from assessing the appellants in respect of those turnovers. In other r~spects, E
the appeals fail and they are dismissed. Jn the circumstances of
these cases, we make no order as to costs.
Bachawat, J, Sections 11(4), 11(5) and 11-A of the C.P. and
Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947 are as follows:
p
"11(4) Jf a registered dealer-(a) does not furnish returns in respect of any period by
the prescribed date, or
(bl having furnished such return fails to comply with
any of the terms of a notice issued under subsection (2), or
(c) has not regularly employed any method of accounting, or if the method employed is such that, in the
opinion of the Commissioner, assessment cannot
properly be made on the basis thereof,
the Commissioner shall in the prescribed manner assess
the dealer to the best of his judgment :
Provided that he shall not so assess him in respect
, of the default specified in clause (a) unless the dealer has
been first given a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
II
680
SUPRK~E
COUl\1' llEPOl\"!S
(1968) l ).u.11.
(5) lf upon information which has come into his possession, the Commissioner is satisfied that any dealer
has been liable to pay tax under this Act in respect
of any period and has nevertheless wilfully failed to
apply for registration, the Commissioner shall, at
any time within three calendar years from the expiry of such period, after giving the dealer a reasonB
able opportunity of being heard, proceed in such
manner as may be prescnbed to assess to the best
of his judgment the amount of tax due from the
dealer in respect of such period and all subsequent
periods: and the Commissioner may direct that the
dealer shall pay by way of penalty in addition to the
c
amount of tax so assessed a sum not exceeding one
and a half times that amount.
11-A.· (!) If in consequence of any information which
has come into his possession, the Commissioner is
satisfied th~t any turnover of a dealer during any period
has been under-assessed or has escaped assessment
D
or assessed at a lower rate or any deduction has been
wrongly made therefrom the Commissioner may, at
any time within three calendar years from the expiry of such period, after giving the dealer a reasonable opportunity of being heard and after making
such inquiry as he considers necessary, proceed in
E
such manner as may be prescribed lo re-assess or
assess, as the case may be, the tax payable on a11y
such turnover; and the Commissioner may direct
that the dealer shall pay, by way of penally in ad·
dition to the amount of lax so assessed. a sum not
exceeding that amount.
(2) The assessment or re-assessment nrndc under subF
section (I) shall be at the rate at which it would
have been made, had there been no under-assessment
or escapement."
The Bombay Sales Tax Laws (Validating Provisions and
G Amc'.·dment) Act, 1959 inserted the following sub-section (3) in
s. llA:
''.3)(a) Nothing in sub-sections (I) and (2!
(\) shall apply to any proceeding (including any nolicc
issued) under section 11 or 22A or 2213, and
(1. i notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of
a court or Tribunal, shall be deemed ever to have
K
been ·applicable to such proceeding or notice.
(b) The validity of any such proceeding or nolice
shall not be called in question merely on the ground
that such proceeding or notice was inconsistent with
the provisions of sub-sections (I) and (2)."
A
ANABNI & CO. V. S.T.O, (Bachawat, J.)
681
The appellant is a registered dealer. It failed to file returns A
for the periods 1-5-1952 to 31-10-1952, 1-11-1952 to 31·10-1953,
1·11-1953 to 31-11H954 and 1-ll-1954 to 31-10-1955. The Sales
Tax Officer, Non-resident Circle, Nagpur issued four notices to
the appellant initiating proceedings under ss. 10(3), 11(4), llA(l)
and 22C(J) of the Act. The appellant filed a writ petition in the
High Court challenging the notices and asking for an order res·
training the respondents from taking steps under the notices and B
making assessments or levying penalties in respect of the aforesaid periods. The High Court dismissed the application. From
this order, the appellant has preferred the present appeals.
Notices under s. 22C(J) can be issued only in cotirse of any
proceedings under the Act. As no proceedings were pending
against the appellant, no notice under s. 22C(J) could be issued to
it. We shall presently show that no notice can be issued to a registered dealer under s. l IA(l) for assessing the turnover which
has escaped assessment by reason of his not filing a return. The
impugned notices so far as they were issued under ss. 22C(l) and
llA(l) may be treated as surplusage and rejected.
c
Under s. 10(3), if a registered dealer fails to furnish his return D
for any period within the prescribed time without any sufficient
cause, the Commissioner may after giving him reasonable oppor·
tunity of being heard direct him to pay by way of penalty a sum
not exceeding one-fourth of the amount which may be assessed on
him under s. 11. If no assessment can be made under s. 11, no
penalty can be levied under s. 10(3). Therefore, ·the point for
determination is whether the impugned notices so far as they were E
issued under s. 11(4) are valid.
The contention of the appellant is that the notices under s. 11
(4) are invalid as they were not issued within three years from
the expiry of the aforesaid periods. Wc see no force in this con- F
tention. Section 11 (4) does not prescribe a period of limitation
for the issue of a notice under it. In Ghanshyam Das v. Regio11al
Assistant ConlJ!lissioner of Sales Tax. Nagpur('), the Court by a
majority decided with reference to s. 11(4) and s. IJA, as it stood
before its amendment by the Bombay Sales Tax Laws (Validating G
Provisions and Amendment) Act, 1959, that a notice under s. J 1(4)
initiates new proceedings and it also decided or to be more a~-curate.
assumed that the period of limitation prescribed by s. 1JA(I)
should be imported into s. 11 (4). The case was decided without
reference to s. l 1A(3) inserted by the Amending Act and is no
authority on the interpretation of that sub-l>ection. Section 1JA(3) B
now expressly provides that nothing in s. I IA(!) shall apply to
any proceeding including any notice issued under s. 11. The sec·
tion is retrospective in operation. It follows that the period of
(') [1964] S.C.R. 436.
682
SuPBKMll OOUBT BBPOBTS
(1968] 1 S.O,B,
A limitation prescribed by s. 1IA(l) cannot be applied to a proceeding or a notice issued under s. 11(4). There is no period of limitation prescribed for a notice or a proceeding initiated under s. 11 (4).
Consequently, the impugned notices issued under s. 11 (4) are not
barred by limitation and are not invalid.
The argument then is that s. 11 (4)(a) offends Art. 14 of the
B Constitution in two ways. Firstly, it is said that it is open to the
sales tax authorities 19 proceed at their sweet will either under
s. 11(4)(a) or under s. IIA(l) against a registered dealer for his
failure to file returns and the principle of Shree Meenakshi Mills
Ltd. v. Sri A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and Another(') is invoked.
We find no merit in this contention. Section 11 (4)(a) specially proC vides for the initiation of proceedings against a registered dealer
who has not furnished returns in respect of any period by the
prescribed date. Having made this special provision. the legislature
must be taken to have intended that in a case falling under s.
11 (4)(a) the sales tax authorities must proceed against the registered dealer under s.• 11 (4)(a) and not under s. 11 AO). The special
D provision must be taken silently to exclude all cases falling within
it from the purview of the more general provision. Moreover. if
a statute is capable of two constructions, that construction should
be given which will uphold it rather than the one which will in- .
validate it. Construing ss. 11 (4J(a) and 11 A(!) together we should. 1
therefore, hold that the cases falling within s. 11 (4)(a) are excluded
E from the purview of s. ll A(!). The point that there is no overlapping of ss. ll (4Ha/ and I IA(!) is made clearer by s. llA(J).
The decisions under s. 34(1 )(b) of the Indian Jncome-tax Act, 1922
such as Maharaj Kumar Kamal Singh v. Commi."iona of Income·
tax, Bihar and Orissa(') and under s. 14 of the Business Profits
Tax Act, 1947 such as Commissioner of Income Tax v. Narsee
F Nagsee & Co.(") are dis~inguishablc. In those Acts, there was no
special provision corresponding to s. I! (4) for proceeding against
registered dealers who have not filed returns, and the question
how far the special provisions would exclude cases within it from
the purview of the more general provision could not arise. In
Ghanshyam Das's case('), none of the notices in question was
G issued under s. l lA, and the Court did not say that a registered
dealer could be proceeded agaimt under s. 11 A for not filing a
return. Nor did the Court consider the effect of s. l IA(3). It is
true that the majority decision held that the phrase "escaped
assessment" in s. IIA includes that of a turnover which has not
been assessed at all because no assessment proceeding.s were ini·
tiated. But having regard to the special provisions .of s. 11 (4) read
with s. I IA(3), the power under s. 1IA(I) as interpreted in Ghana shyam Das's case(') to assess turnover which escaped assessment
by reason of non-filing of returns must be confined to cases of
(') [1955] I S.C.R. 787.
(') [1960] 3 S.CR.. 988.
I') [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. JO
(') (1964] 4 S.C.R. 436.
ANANDJI & co. v, 8.1'.0, (Bacl1awat, J.)
unregistered dealers. As pointed out already, cases of registered
dealers falling within s. 11(4) are excluded from the purview of
U&l
A
s. I IA(!).
It is next said that s. 11 (4) offends Art. 14 of the Constitution
because no period of limitation is prescribed for a notice under
it, whereas periods of limitation are prescribed for notices under
ss. llA(I) and II (5). We see no merit in this contention. The
Act deals with registered and unregistered dealers differently in B
many ways. The classification and differential treatment of registered and unregistered dealers are based on substantial differences having reasonable relation to the object of the Act. A registered dealer unlike an unregistered dealer is under a statutory
9bligation to file returns without any notice being served upon
him and to pay the full amount of tax due from him before fur- C
nishing the return (ss. 10 and 12). A dealer who has registered
himself under the Act admits his liability to furnish returns whereas a dealer who has not registered himself makes no such admission. A registered dealer has certain advantages under the Act
which are denied to an unregistered dealer. Section 2(j)(a)(ii) exempts from tax sales of a registered dealer of goc-ds specified in D
his certificate of registration as being intended for use by him
as raw materials in the manufacture of goods for sale by actual
delivery in the State for consumption therein. An unregistered
dealer cannot get the benefit of this exemption. Moreover, s. 2(j)
(a)(ii) exempts from tax sales to a registered dealer of goods declared by him in the prescribed form as being intended for resale E
by him by actual delivery in the State for consumption therein. The
sales to an unregistered dealer are not so exempt. Consequently,
a registered dealer can buy his gocds from the producer or the
wholesaler at a cheaper price and has thus an economic advantage
over an unregistered dealer. l n the ma tier of penalties, ss. 10(3)
and 22CW treat the two classes of dealers on the same footing, F
but ss. I 1(4l. I HSI and 11 A(I) treat them differently. No penalty
can be levied on a registered dealer. under s. 11 (4) but heavy
1Jenalties may be levied on an unregistered dealer under ss. 11 (5)
and II A( I). While prescribing periods of limitation for proceedings against an unregistered dealer under ss. 11 (5) and 11 A(!). the
legislature has wisely not prescribed a period of limitation for a G
proceeding initiated under s. I I (4)(a) against a registered dealer
considering that (I) the registered dealer is under a statutory c·bligation to file the return, (~) no penalty is leviable under s. I 1(4).
and (3) the registered dealer is given many advantages under the
Act which are denied to an unregistered dealer. The bar of limitation in the case cf an unregistered dealer and the absence of
such a bar in the case of a registered dealer cannot be regarded as H
unjust or c!iscriminatory. Questions of policy are not to be debated
in this Court. There is no compulsion on the legislature to prescribe a period of limitation in every case. Tn taxing statutes the
legislature has a large measure of discretion. We cannot strike
stil'REME COURT RBPORt8
l1968j l s.0.11.
A down s. I 1(4)(a) because of some preconceived notion that the
same period of limitation should be prescribed for proceedings
against both registered and unregistered dealers. In Ghanshyam
Das's case('), Raghubar Dayal, J. at p. 459 clearly 'held that s.
11(4) is not violative of Art. 14. The majority did not dissent from
this opinion.· We hold thats. 11(4) is not violative of Art. 14 and
we uphold it.
B
It follows that the notices issued on July 8, 1959 under s. 11(4)
are valid in respect of the entire period from 1-11-1952 to 31-10-1955.
As regards the alternative contention of the respondent that the
notices issued in 1955 validly initiated proceedings under s. I 1(4)
for the period from 1-2-1953 to 31-10-1955 we are glad to find that
the majority has accepted this contention. The irregularities, if
C any, in·the notices do not invalidate them. However. for the reasons ·already mentioned, we are of opinion that the impugned
notices issued on July 8, J959 are valid.
Jn the result. the appeals are dismissed with costs.
ORDER
D
In accordance with the opinion of the majority these appeals
are partly allowed with respect to turn-over from 1-5-1952 to
31-1-1953. In other respects the appeals are dismissed. No order
as to costs.
V.P.S.
-··~-------
(') [1964] 4 S.C.R. 436,
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