SATWANT SINGH SAWHNEY versus D. RAMARATHNAM, ASSISTANT PASSPORT OFFICER GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, NEW DELHI AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 10 April 1967 | [1967] 3 S.C.R. 525 | 1967 INSC 99
Key facts
- Decided
- 10 April 1967
- Bench
- K. SUBBA RAO*, M. HIDAYATULLAH*, R.S. BACHAWAT, J.M. SHELAT, C.A. VAIDYIALINGAM
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 230/1966
- Citation
- [1967] 3 S.C.R. 525
- Neutral citation
- 1967 INSC 99
Text of the judgment
SATWANT SINGH SAWHNEY
A
v.
D. RAMARATIINAM, ASSISTANT PASSPORT OFFICER;.
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, NEW DELm AND OTHERS
April 10, 1967
B
[K. SUBBA RAO, C.J.,
M. HIDAYATULLAH, R. S. BACHAWAT,
J, M. SHELAT AND C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.]
c
D
E
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G
H
Constitution of India, Articles 14 and 21-Whether right to travel
abroad and to a passport part of personal liberty within the meanln1 of
A.rt, 21-ln the absence of any law whether exercise of executive d/scre.
tion ·to issue or refuse passport discriminatory.
The petitioner carried on the business of import, expart and the manu·
facture of automobile parts and in connection with his business it was
necessary for him to travel abroad. For this pur} ;e he was holdin11 two
valid passports when on August 31, 1966 and on September 24, 1966 the
first and the second respondents, bein11 the Assistant Passport 011icer at
New Delhi and the Rejlional Passport 01licer at Bombay respectively
wrote to the petitioner callini: upon him to surrender the two passports
as the Central Government had decided to withdraw the passport facilities extended to him. The petitioner filed the present petition under Art.
32 of the Constitution alleging that the respondent's action infringed his
fundamental rights under Art. 21 and 14 of the Constitution and prayed
for a writ of nuindamus di'recting the respondents to withdraw and cancel
the decision contained in the two letters.
It was contended, inter al/a, on behalf of the petitioner that the right
to leave India and travel outside India and return to India is part of personal liberty illaranteed under Art. 21 of the Constitution; refusal to
give a passport or withdrawal of one given amounts to deprivation of
personal liberty inasmuch as, (a) it is not practically possible for a
citizen to leave India or travel abroad or to return to India without a
passport; (b) instructions are issued to shipping and air travel companies
by the Central Government not to Ulke passengers on board without a
passport: ( c) under the Indian Passport Act, re-<lntering India without
a P!"'Sport is penalized. The deprivation of personal liberty in the refusal
or impounding of a passport is not in accordance with any procedure
!"'tablished by. law within the meaning of Art. 21, as admittedly there
is no law placing any restrictions on the citizens of the country to travel
abr~ad. Furthermo:e. the unfettered discretion given to the respondents
to iss~e ,or not to issue a passport to a person offends Art. 14 of the
ConstltuUon.
The respOJ!den!3 contested the petition mainly on the JllOunds that no
fundamental nght of the petitioner had been infringed that the petitioner
had ~ontr~v"'!ed the cond.itions of an import licenc~ obtained by him
that investigations were going on against him in relation to offences unde;
the Exl'!'rt and Import Control Act, and that the passport authorities
were satisfied that if the petitioner was allowed to continue to have the
fa"ports, he was likely to leave India and not return to face a trial beore a court of la"'. and that therefore it was necessary to impound his
p~sport. ~urthe' 1t was contended that the passport was a document
wf "I,~ was .ti~su edf to ~ person at the pleasure of the President in exercise
o is po 1 1ca unction and was a political document, and the refu'tl
1 1
526
SUPllBMB COUllT RBPORTS
(1967] 3 S.C.R
to grant a passport could not be a subject of review in a court of law.
:For the same reason it was contended that the petitioner had no right to
bave the passpom issued to him.
HELD: (per Subba Rao, C.1., Shelat and Vaidialingam, JJ.),
A \Hit of mandamus must issue to the respondent to withdraw and
cancel the decision contained in their letters dated Augir.;t 31, 1966 and
September 20, 1966.
A person living in India has
a fundamental right to travel abroad
under Art. 21 of the Constitution and canriot be denied a passport be·ca~ factually, a pass~rt rs a necessary condition for travel eh road and
lhe uovernment, by wtthholdin& the passport, can effectively deprive him
Of his right. (528 H; 530 G; 540 BJ
"Liberty" in our Constitution bears the same comprehensive meaning
as is given to the expression "liberty" by the Sth and 14th Amendmenta
to the U.S. Comtitution .and the expression "personal liberty" in Art. 21
only excludes the ingredients of liberty ensbrindd in Art. 19 of the
Constitution. In other words, the expression "personal liberty" in Art.
2,1 takes in the right of locomotion and to travel abroad, but the ,nght
to move throughout the territories of India Is .not covered by it inasmuch
.as it is specially provided in Art. 19. (540 C-DJ
Kharak fijngh v. Stat• o/ U.P, [1964J I S.C.R. 332, 347, referred to.
•
c
D
Under Art. 21 of the Constitution no person can be d•prived of his
right to travel except accordin2 to procedure established by law and no
law ~ been made by the State regulating or depriving a person of such
ca rigbti (542 BJ
W11ether the right to travel is part of personal liberty or not within
·tho meanina of Art. 21 of the Constitution, the unchanelled arbitrary dis·
cretion with the executive in the matter of issuing or refusing passports
to different persons is violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. [542 B-F; H]
E
Case law discussed.
Per Hidayatullah and Bachawat JJ.. di!m•ting :
The citizen's ri2bt of motion and locomotion, in so far as it ii recog·nisable, has been limited by Art. 19 of the Constitution to the territories
•of India and according to Kharak Singh's case, that is the limit of the
:right. It is not possible to read more of that right in Art. 21. (554 HJ
Whatever the view of countries like the U.S.A. where travel is a
·means of spending one's wealth, the better view in our country is that a
person is ordinarily entitled to a passport unless, for reasons which """
be established to·the satisfaction of the. Court, the passport can be validly
Tofused to him. Since an ~rieved party can always ask for a mandamus if he is treated unfairly, 1t is not open by straining the Constitution,
to create an absolute and fundamental right to a passport where none
exists in the Constitution. There is no doubt a fundamental ril!ht to
-equality in the matter of grant of passports (subject to reasonable classifi.·
cation&) but there is no fundamental right to travel abroad or to the
grant of a passport. The solution of a law of passports will not make
things any better. Even if a law were to be made the position would
·hardly change because utmost discretion will have to be al.lowed to decide
'Upon the worth of an applicant. The only thing that can be said is that
where the passport authority is proved to be wrong, a mandamus will
F
G
H
'9ATWAJ'.IT SINGH v. PASSPORT OFFIC)jR (Subba Rao, C.1.) 527
arr=
always right the matter. The affidavits filed by the respondents showed
·lbat one of the petitioners was a member of a gang of passport racketeers
JI
c
and .bad got many students stranded in foreign count.ms by
for ·their travel with a company which did not exut, had counter·m
tillllgration laws of a foreign power and had suppressed the fact that he
had once been refused a passport. The other petitioner had obtained an
import licence to import goods of the value of Rs. 3 lakhs on condition
lb;it he would export finished g<J?<ls worth Rs. 4 lakhs but had sold away
most of the imports in the Indian market; he was also alleged to bave
defrauded the import control authorities in di1fe=t ways and investiga·
1ioas .into his activities were proceeding. It was fOr these reasons that the.
respondenlls took the action complained of and judging of these cases on
the evidence of the affidavits, it was possible to hold that the passports were
properly refused or impounded. In the present cm.e there was therefore no
valid ground for the issuance of a mandamus. (543 M44 F]
The passport is a political document
and one which the State 111ay
obooie to give or to withhold. Since a passport vouches for the rmpec·
t&bility of the holder, it stands to reason that the Government need ·not
VClllch for a person it does not consider worth.
(555 A·B]
Case law discussed.
D
0Rm1NAL JUR1so1cT10N : Writ petitions Nos. 230 of 1966
and 30 of 1967.
Petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the
enforcement of fundamental rights.
S. J. Sorabjee, A. J. Rana, J. R. Gagrat and B. R. A.garwa/a,
for the petitioner and the intervener (in W.P. No, 230 of 1966).
A. K. Sen, J. C. Ta/war and R. L. Kohli, for the petitioner (in
W.P. No. 30 of 1967).
·
Niren De, Additional So/icltor·General, N. S. Bindra and
R. N. Sachthey for R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents (in both
die petitions).
The Judgment of SUBBA RAo, C.J., SHELAT and VAIDIALIN·
G!'-M, JI. was delivered by SUBBA RAo, C.J. The dissenting Opimon of HIDAYATULLAH and BACHAWAT, JJ. was delivered by
HIDAYATULLAH, J .
H
.~abba Rao,. C.J. Satwa.nt Singh Sawhney, the petitioner, is
a citizen of India. He carries on the business of Importer, Exporter .and Manufacturer of automobile parts and engineering
~ds m the name 8.lld style of Jodi-Europeans Trading Corpo!'tion. He also carries on another business in engineering goods
in ~lro n~m~ of "Sawhney Industries". For the purpose of his
business 1t is necessary fo~ the petitioner to travel abroad. From
th_e y~ar 1958 h~ was takmg passports for visiting foreign countne.~ m. connect1on with his business. On December 8, 1965
he . obt~med . a regular passport from the Government of India
which is vahd upto March 22, 1969. So too, on October 27
.
.
528
StlPlU!MB OOtJRT RBPOl.TS
(1967] 3 S.C.R.
1965 he obtained another passport which was valid upto March
22, 1967. On August 31, 1966 the Assistant Passport Officer,
Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi,
the 1st respondent herein, wrote to the petitioner calling upon
him to return the said two passports, as the 3rd Respondent, the
Union of India, had decided to withdraw the passport facilities
extended to the petitioner. So too, the '2nd respondent, the B
Regional Passport Officer, Bombay, wrote to the petitioner a
Jetter dated September 24, 1966, calling upon him to surrender
the said two passports immediately to the Government and intimating him that in default action would be taken against him.
Though the petitioner wrote letters to the respondents requesting
them to reconsider their decision, he did not receive any reply c
from them. The petitioner, alleging that the· said action pf the
respondents infringed his fundamental rights under Arts. 21 an.d
14 of the Constitution, filed the writ petition 'in this Court for
the issuance of a writ of mandamus or other appropriate writ or
writs directing the respondents to withdraw and cancel the said
decision contained in the said two letters, to forbear from taking
any steps or proceedings in the enforcement of the said decision D
and to forbear from depriving the petitioner of the said two
passports and his passport facilities.
The respondents contested the petition mainly on the ground
that the petitioner's fundamental right had not been infringed,
that the petitioner contravened the conditions of import licence E
obtained by him, that investigations were going on against him
in relation to offences under the Export and Import Control Act
and .that the passport authorities were satisfied that if the petitioner was allowed to continue to have the passports he was likely
to leave India and not return to face a trial before a court of
law and that, therefore his passports were impoun?ed. F~rther
it was alleged that the passport was a document which was issued F
to a person at the pleasure of the President in exercise of his
political function and was a political document, and the refusal
to grant a passport could not ~e a subject of review in a. ~ourt
of law. For the same reason 1t was alleged that the petitioner
had no right to have the passports issued to him.
It would be convenient at the outset to record briefly the G
respective contentions advanced by learned counsel on behalf
of the petitioner and the respondents.
The ~rguments of Mr. Sorabji, learned counsel for the petitioner, may be summarized thus : 'J!1e. right to leave lndi~ and
travel outside India and return to India is Part of personal liberty H
guaranteed under Art. 21 of the Cm~stitution. (2) Refusal. to
give a passport or withdr~wal of one given .~ounts to dlll!nvation of personal liberty mas.much as, (a) 1t 1s not practically
SATWANT SINGH v. PASSPORT OFFICER (Subba Rao, C.J.) 529
possible for a citizen to leave India or travel abroad or to return to India without a passport, (b) instructions are issued to
shipping and travel companies not to · take passengers on
boaid without passport, (c) under the Indian Passport ~ct .reentering India without Passport is penalized•. ( 3) The depnvation
of personal liberty is not in accordance with the proced~re esby law wit1!in the me~g. of Art. 21, !1~ adrruttedly
B tablished
there is no law placing any restrictions on the c1t~ens of the
coUlltry to travel abroad. (4) The unfettered discretion given
to the respondents to issue on not to issue a passport to a person
offends Art. 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as (a) it enables
the State to discriminate between persons similarly situated and
also because i! offends the doctrine of rule of Jaw, (b) the rule
c of law requires that an executive action which prejudicially
affects the rights of a citizen must be pursuant to Jaw. And
(S) the said orders offend the principles of fairplay •
A
. The learned Additional Solicitor General presented his arguments from a different perspective. The gist of his arguments
D may be stated thus, ( 1) Passport is an official political document
to .be presented to the Governments of foreign nations and ntended to be used for the protection of the holder of the passport in foreign countries : it is only a facility provided by the
Government and no person has a right to it.
(2) The right
to travel is not included in "personal liberty" guaranteed by Art.
E 21 of the Constitution for the following reasons : a) the right
to travel necessitating a passport cannot be a right because a
.passport gives only a facility and does not confer a right : b)
no constitutional guarantee of the right to travel is conferred
under our Constitution for such a guarantee would obviously
be ineff~ve out~id~ the territories of th~ country governed
~ ,the said Constit1;1t!on : and ( c) as the nght to travel depends
F ~1rely on the :°1umc1pal law of tl!-e foreign country governing the
nght of entry mto that country, m the very nature of things no
Constitution can confer such a right on the people governed by
that country.
G
Before we consider the validity of the conflicting arguments
and the. case-la:"': on. the subject it will be convenient to notice
the f!!Ctual position 111. ~dia vis-a-vis the importance of a ass·
port m the matter of exit from India for foreign travel.
p
. As ~ :esult of i~temational convention and usa am
nati<;>ns 1t is n?t possible for a person residing in Indf: to ~n~
foreign countries, with a few exceptions, without th
. v.1s1t
H of. a 1;1assport. The Government of India has issued . e poss~ss1on
:pvmgpmglnandiad ~~!,~~companies not t~ take on boar~::=~:e~
•. ......,... they possess valid passports Und s. 3
of the Indian Passport Act 1920 the Central ao'
er ·
L7Sup. CJ/67-4
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vemment may
530
SUPR.BMB OOUI.T UPOR.TS
[1967] 3 s.c. .
make rules requiring that persons entering into India shall be A
in possession of passports. In exercise of the power conferred
under s. 3 of the said Act rules were made by the Central
Government. Under r. 3 thereof, ilo persons proceeding from any
place outside India shall enter or attempt to enter India by
water, land or air unless he is in possession of a valid passport
conforming to the conditions prescribed in r. 4 thereof. Under B
s. 4 of the said Act any such person may be arrested by an
officer of police not below the prescribed rank; and under r. 6
of the Rules any person who contravenes the said rules shall be
punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to
3 months or with a fine or with both. Under s. 5 of the Act
the Central Government is authorised by general or special c
order to direct the removal of any such person from India. The
combined effect of the provisions of the Act and the rules made
thereunder is that the executive instructions given by the Central
Government to shipping and air-line companies and the insistence of foreign countries on the possession of a passport before an Indian is permitted to enter those countries make it
abundantly clear that possession of passpori, whatever may be D
its meaning or legal effect, is a necessary requisite for leaving
India for travellin& abroad. The argument that the Act docs
not impose the takmg of a passport as a conditioµ of exit from
India, therefore it does not interfere with the right of a person
to leave India, if we may say so, is rather hypertechnical and
ignores the realities of the situation. Aport from the fact that E
possession of passport is a necessary condition of travel in the
international community, the prohibition against entry indirectly
prevents the person from leaving India. The State in fact tells
a person Jiving in India "you can leave India at your pleasure
without a passport, but you would not be allowed by foreign
countries to enter them without it and you cannot also come F
back to India without it''. No person in India can possibly
travel on those conditions. Indeed it is impossible for him to do
so. That apart, even that theoretical possibility of exit is expressly restricted by executive instructions and by refusal of
We have, therefore, no hesitation to hold
foreign-exchange.
that an Indian passport is factually a necessary conditio11 for
travel abroacl and without it no person residing in India can G
travel outside India.
If that be the factual position, it may not be necessary to
consider the legal effect of the possession of a passport. But
as much of the argument turned upon the question of its scope,
.it is as well that we noticed the law on the subject.
At the outset we may extract ·some of the forms of passport
obtaining in different countries. The British form reads thus :
H
SATWANT SINGH v. PASSPORT OFFICER (Subba Rao, C.J.)
B
·C
D
E
F
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G
H
531
"The Secretary of State requests and requires in
the name of His Majesty all those whom it may concern to allow the bearer to pass freely without let or
hindrance and to afford him every assistance and protection of which he may stand in need."
The form obtaining in the United States of America reads :
"The Secretary of State requests all whom it may
concern to permit safely and freely to pass and in
case of need to give ali lawful aid to ... , ,., ..... .
the named person. .. ....................... ..
a citizen of the United States."
In India the form reads thus :
"These are to request and require in the Name of
of the President of the Republic of India all those
whom it may concern to allow the bearer to pass freely
without let or hindrance, and to afford him or her
every assistance and protection of which he or she may
stand in need."
There are also other forms. It will be seen from the phraseology used in the three forms that they are in the nature of requests from one State to another permitting the holder to .pass
freely through the State and to give him the necessary assistance.
Alverstone, C.J., in R. V. Brailsford(') described a passport thus:
"It is a document ··issued in the name of sovereign
on the responsibility of a Minister of the Crown to a
named individual, intended to be presented to the
Governments of foreign nations and to be used for that
individual's protection as a British subject in foreign
countries, and it depends for its validity upon the fact
that the Foreign Office in an officMl1 document vouches
the respectability of the person named ..,
'.file same de~~tion is given to passport in Wharton's Law
Lexicon, XIV Edition, p. 741. The House of Lords in Jayco v.
Director of Public Prosecutions(') accepted the statement of
Alverstone, C.J., R. v. Brailsford(') and held that by its terms
the passport requested and required in the name of His Majesty
~ those whom i~ might concern to allow the bearer to pass freely
withou~ let or h~drance and to afford him every assistance and
protect10n of which he may stand in need. Lord Jowitt L. c.
proceeded to state :
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·
"It is, I ~. true that the possession of a passport by a Bntlsh subject does not increase the
(I} [19o5] 2 K. B. 703.
(2) L.R.[1946]A. C, 347, 369.
53~
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1967) 3 s.c.a.
sovereign's duty of protection, though ii will make his
path easier. For him it serves as a voucher and
means of identification. But the possession of a pass·
port by one who is not it British sub1ect gives him
rights and imposes upon the sovereign obligations
which would otherwise not be given or imposed."
A s<1mmary of the present law on passports is found in Halsbury's
Laws of England, Volume IV, at p. 519 and it reads thus :
"Passports may be granted by the Crown at any
time to enable British subjects to travel with safety in
foreign countries, but such passports would clearly not
be available so as to permit travel in any enemy's
country during war."
A footnote to the above says :
c
"The possession of a passport is now almost al·
ways required by the authorities to enable a person to
enter a country."
P. Weis in his book "Nationality and Statelessness in International Law'', after narrating briefly the earlier history of the
passport system speaks of the position in the 19th Century and
the beginning of the 20th Century thus :
"Only since the First World War has the passport
system in its modern sense· been introduced in most
countries, i.e., the system whereby aliens who wish to
enter a foreign territory are required to produce a
passport issued by the authorities of their country of
nationality."
The learned author then described the character of the docu
ment thus:
" ........ the modern passport is largely an iden·
tity and travel document issued to the State's own
nationals."
Then the learned author stated at p. 226 thus :
"In the normal intiircourse of State, a forei!m
national passport is, as a rule, accepted as prima facie
evidence of the holder's nationality."
He also pointed out that British and American passports contained a request to whom it might concern to afford protection
to the holder, but passports of most other countries did not contain such a request. Professor Harry Street in his book "Freedom, the Individual and the ~aw" in describing the essence of
a passport says much to the same effect thus, at p. 271 :
E
F
•
G
SATWANT SINGH v. PASSPORT OFFICER
(Subba Rao, C.l.) 533
"In essence a passport is a document which identi·
fies the holder and provides evidence of his nation·
ality."
I'n "The Grotius Society" Vol. 32-Transactions for the year
1946" under the heading "Passports and Protection in Inter·
national Law" Kenneth Diplock, after tracing the history of the
passport system from the earliest times, observed thus :
"'Passport' in the modem sense is, in essence, a document of identity with which a State may, but not .•.•
necessarily does-require alien travellers within its
territories to be furnished."
<C
ID
E
The learned author concludes :
"They (passports) are in the same category as
any other evidence of the national status of an individual; and any rights to protection recognised in inter·
national law flow from national status, not from the
evidence by which national status is proved."
It is, therefore, clear that in England a passport takes the form
of a request to foreign countries and enables the British subjects
to travel in safety in those countries. It is a document of
identity. It also afiords prlma facie evidence that the person
holding the passport is a national of England. In the modern
times without it, h is not possible to enter any State.
Now let us trace its history in the American law. In
Domingo Urtetiqui v. John N. D.' Arcy( 1 ) the scope·of a passport
before relevant statutes were made is discribed 'thus :
"It is a document which, from its nature and object,
to foreign powers; purporting only to be
a request that the bearer of it may pass ··safely and
freely; and is to be considered rather in the character
of a political document, by which the bearer is recognised in foreign countries as an American citizen; and
which, by usage and the law of nations, is received as
evidence of the fact."
~ addressed
In Ballentine's Law Dictionary, 2nd Edition, at p.
following meaning is given ,to "passport" :
lH
940, the
"A document issued on behalf of a citizen of the
United States by the Secretary of State, addressed to
foreign powers and purporting to be a request that the
bearer of it may pass safely and freely. It is to be con(1)(1835) 9 L. Ed. 275, 279.
534
SUPRBMB COURT llEPO&TS
[1967] 3 s.c.a.
sidered as a political document by which the bearer is
recognized in foreign countries as an American citizen,
and which by usage and the law of nations is received
as evidence of the fact.
A.
This definition is taken from the decision in Uretiqul v.
D'Arbel(' ). So too, in American Jurisprudence, Vol. 40, the B
samei description is given of a passport and it is added that it is
a political document.
But the Supreme Court of America for the first time had
defined the scope of passport in Kent v. Dulles('). There the
Secretary of State refused to issue passport to each of the two
plaintiffs because of the refusal to file affidavit concerning their c
membership in the Communist Party. To obtain the passport
each of the plaintiffs instituted an action against the Secretary
of State in the United States District Court for the D-Vitrict of
Columbia. In due course the case went up to the Supreme
Court. Mr. Justice Douglas described the nature of the passport thus : "A passport not only is of great value-indeed necessary-abroad; it is also an aid in establishing citizenship for purposes of re-entry into the United States." At page 1212 he went
on to. say that the document involved more "in part, of course,
the issuance of the passport carries some implication· of intention
to extend the bearer diplomatic protection, though it does no
more than request all whom it may concern to permit safely
and freely to pass, and in case of need to give a11 lawful aid and · E.
protection to this citizen of the United States. But that function
of the passport is subordinate. Its crucial function today is control ov.er exit". While in the earlier judgment the emphasis was
laid on the request to protect the citizen, this judgment says that
the main function of a passport is to control the exit. So a passport, whether in England or in the United States of America F
serves diverse purposes; it is a "request for protection", it is a
document of identity, it is prima facie evidence of nationality,
in modern times it not only controls exit from the State to "'.hich
one belongs, but without it, with a few exceptions, it is not possible to enter another State. It has become a condition for free
travel.
The want of a passport in effect prevents a person leaving
India. Whether we look at it as a facility given to a person to
travel abroad or as a request to a foreign country to give the
holder diplomatic protection, it cannot be denied that the Indian
Government, by refusing a permit to a person residing in India.
completely prevents him from travelling abroad. ·If a person
living in India, whether he is a citizen or not, has a right to travel H
abroad, the Government by withholding the passport can deprire
(ll (1835) 9 L. Ed. 276,
(2) (1958) 2 L. Ed. 12C4.
SATWANT SINGH
A
v. PASSPORT OFI'ICER (Subba Rao, C.J.) 53$
him of his right. Therefore, the. real question in these writ peti·
tions is : Whether a person living in India has a fumlamcntnl
right to travel abroad ?
The relevant article of the Constitution is Artkk 21.
reads :
Jt
"Art. 21 No person shall be deprived of his lifo
or personal liberty except according to procedure
established by law."
B
c
If the right to travel is a part of the personal liberty of a
person he cannot be deprived of his right except according ll'
the procedure established by law. This court in Gopalan's case(' l
has held that law in that article means enacted law and
it is conceded that the State has not made any law depriving
or regulating the right of a person to travel abroad.
Before we advert to the Indian decisions on the subject it
may be useful to consider the American law on the subject. The
5th and 14th amendments embody a constitutional guarantee
D that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due pro·
cess of law. In American Jurisprndence, 2nd Ed. at page 359,
it is stated that "Personal liberty largely consists of the right of
locomotion-to go where and when one pleases only so far res·
trained as the rights of others may make it necessary for the welfare of all other citizens."
E
Chief Justice Fuller in R. A. Williams v. Edgar Fears &
Anr.( 2 ) says: "Undoubtedly the right of locomotion.,, the right to
remove from one place to another according to inclination. is an
attribute of personal liberty, and the right ordinarily, of free
transit from or through the territory of any State is a right secured
by the 14th Amendment and by other provisions of the ConstiF tution."
(,
In Leo11ard B. Bozmdin v. John Foster Dul/es( 8 ) the law is
put thus : "travel abroad is more than a mere privilege accorded
American citizens. It is a right, an nttribute of personal liberty,
which may not be infringed upon or limited in any way unless
I.here be full compliance with the requirements of due process."
The Supreme Court in Kent v. Dulles( 4 ) re-affirmed the
.said doctrine and declared that the right to travel is a part of the
liberty of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due pro·
ccss of law under the Fifth Amendment. It further emphasised
that freedom to travel is an imuortant asoect of the citizen's
liberty. No doubt the said statement of Jaw was conceded by
tile Solicitor General, but that fact docs not detract from the
··---------(ll [195'] S.C.R 88.
r3) 136 Fadcml Supplement 218.
(21 •\ L. Ed. 186.
(41 [1958] 2 L. Ed. 1204.
SUPRBMB COURT REPORTS
536
(1967) 3 S.C.R.
validity of the view, as the decision was on merits and not solely
on concession.
A
The Supreme Court again in Herbert Aptheker v. Secretary
of State(') re-affirmed the view expressed in Kent's case( 1 ).
Douglas J., in a concurring judgment pin-pointed the importance
of that right thus : "Freedom of movement, at home and abroad, is important for job and business opportunities-for cultural, political and social activities-for all the commingling
which a gregarious man enjoys." Later on the learned Judge emphasised the importance of the said freedom and described it
graphically thus : "America is of course sovereign; but her
sovereignty is woven in an. international web that makes her
one of the family of nations. The ties with all the continents are
close commercially as well as culturally. Our concerns are
planetary, beyond sunrises and sunsets. Citizenship implicates
us in those problems and perplexities, as well as in domestic ones.
We cannot exercise and enjoy citizenship in worId perspective
without the right to travel abroad; and I see no constitutional
way to curb it unless, as I, said, there is the power to detain."
An interesting article in the Yale Law Journal(') discusses the
subject. There the content of the word 'Liberty' in the Fifth
Amendment was described as "not a static conception" but a
broad and pervasive view adapatable to the changing circumstances of American life and it was expressed that the right of
locomotion; the right to move from one place to another according to inclination is an attitude of personal liberty. "Freedom
to leave one's country temporarily for travel abroad was considered to be important to an indiVldual, national and international
well-being".
It is, therefore, clear that in America the right to travel is
considered to be an integral part of personal liberty.
In England the right to go abroad was recognised as an attribute of personal liberty as early as in the year 1915 in Article
42 of the Magna Carta. The said article reads :
"42. It shall be lawful to any person, for the future,
to go out of our kingdom, and to return, safely and
securely, by land or by water, saving his allegiance to
us, unless it be in time of war, for some short space,
for the common good of the kingdom : excepting
prisoners and outlaws according to the laws of the
land, and of the people of the nation at war against
us, and merchants who shall be treated as it is said
above."
12 L. Ed. 992.
(3) Yale Law Journal, Vol. 61 P. 171.
(I}
(2) (1958) 2 L, Ed. 1204.
B
c
D
...
It
F
G
H
SATWANT SINGH v. PASSPORT OFFICER
A
B
c
lSubba Rao, C.J.)
537
True that this article was omitted in the final version of the
Magna Carta and Article 39 only dealt with personal liberty.
Article 39 read :
"No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or disregarded or outlawed, or exiled, or any way destroyed;
nor will we go upon .him, nor will we send upon him,
unless by the lawful judgment of his peers, or by the
law of the land."
This article, no doubt, in terms does not guarantee a right to
travel abroad. But it speaks in absolute terms. Blackstone,
great authority on 'Common Law', speaking of personal liberty
observed:
"Personal libe1ty consists in the J>Ower of locomotion, of changing direction or movmg one's Eerson
to whatever place one's own inclination may desire."
D
So too, another authority on Common Law, Odgers, in his book
on Common Law in Ch. II under the heading "Rights common
to all" states this aspect of the personal liberty thus :
"Every citizen enjoys the right to personal liberty;
he is entitled to stay at home or walk abroad at his
pleasure without interference or restraint from others."
E
F
G
H
In the Grotius Society, Vol. 32, under the heading "Passports and protection in the International Law", this facet of
liberty was traced. In the early development of Common Law
it is said that a subject was prohibited from leaving the Realm
without the leave of the Crown, for to do so would deprive the
King of a subject's military and other feudal services. But by
the time of Blackstone, the subject has acquired a general common law right to leave the Realm, subject to the prerogative right
of the Crown to restrain him by the writ, exeat Vegno. This
prerogative writ later lapsed through desuetude. The result is
that in England, subject to any special legislation, British subjects are entitled at Common Law to leave and enter the countty
at will. The right of exit is a common law right.
In India, the Supreme Court had made some observations on
the scope of personal liberty in Art. 21 in some decisions which
throv.; light on. ~e content of pers~nal liberty. In Gopalan's
case ( ) the pet1t1oner who was detamed under the Preventive
Detention Act, applied under Art. 32 of the Constitution for a
writ of habeas corpus and for his release from detention on
the ground that the said Act contravened the provisions of Arts.
13, 19, 21 and 22 of the Constitution and in consequence it was
(I) [19SO] S.C.R. 88.
538
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1967] 3 s.c.R.
11/tm l'ir~s •md that his detention was, therefore, illegal. This
Court, by majority, held that Art. 19 of the Constitution has no
application to a law which relates directly to the preventive
Jetention even though as a result of an order ot detention the
rights referred to in Art. 19 are restricted or abridged. This
Court was not directly concerned with the question whether the
expression 'personal liberty' in Art. 21 takes in the right to
travel abroad. Some of the observations made in regard to the
iimits of the right to move throughout the territory of India in
Art. 19 ( 1 )( d) of the Constitution are not of much relevance as
the limits of the movement are circumscribed by the said clause
itself. But we are concerned in this case with the question
whether the right to travel abroad falls within the scope of perrnnal liberty in. Art. 21. At page 13g, Fazal Ali J., says :
B
c
"There can therefore be no doubt that freedom of
movement is in the last analysis the essence of personal
liberty, and just as a man's wealth is generally measured in this country in terms of rupees, annas and pies,
one's personal liberty depends upon the extent of his
D
freedom of movement. But it is contended on behalf of
the State that freedom of movement to which reference
has been made in article 19(1){d) is not the freedom
of movement to which Blackstone and other author8
have referred, but is a different species of freedom
which is qualifiecl by the words 'throughout the terriE
tory of India'. How the use of the expression 'throughout the tcuitory of India' can qualify the meaning of
the rest of the words used in the article is a matter beyond my comprehension. In my opinion, the words
"throughout the territorr of India" were used to
stretch the ambit of the freedom of movement to the
utmost extent to which it could be guaranteed by our
J1
Constitution."
This passage makes a distinction between freedom of movement, which is a part of personal liberty and the limits of that
liberty under Art. 19(1)(d).
Das J., at page 299, also brings out this distinction when he
G
says :
"I'n my judgment, Article 19 protects some of the
important attributes of personal liberty as independent
rights and the expression "personal :fiberty'' has been
used in article 21 as a compendious term including
within its meaning a!l the varieties of rights which go
to make up the personal liberties of men."
Later on he points out that Art. 19(1)(d) comprehends only
a specific and limited aspect of the freedom of movement. Again
SATWANT SINGH
A
B
c
D
v. PASSPORT OFFICER (Subba Rao, C.J.) 539
at page 301 the learned Judge reverts to the same position.
observes :
He
"Its purpose is not to provide protection for the
general right of free movement but to secure a specific
and special right of the Indian citizen to move freely
throughout the territories of India regarded as an independent additional right apart from the general right
to locomotion emanating from the freedom of person.
It is guarantee against unfair discrimination in the
matter of free movement of the Indian citizen throughout the Indian Union. In, short, it is a protection
against provincialism. It ha:s nothing to do with the
freedom of the person as such. That is guaranteed
to every person, citizen or otherwise, in the manner
and the extent formulated by article 21."
The observations of Mukherjee J., at page 258 must also be·
restricted
to the scope of the free movement
under
Art. 19(1) (d).
In Kochunni's case (1) this Court pointed out that personal
liberty in Art. 21' is a more comprehensiye concept and has a
much wider connotation than the right conferred under Art. 19
(I) (d).
E
F
In Kharak Shgh v. The State of U.P.(') the question was
whether the State by placing the petitioner under surveillance
infringed his fundamental right under Art. 21 of the Constitution. This Court, adverting to the expression "personal liberty'',
accepted the meaning put upon the expression 'liberty' ia the
5th and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution by Field, J.,
111.Munn v. .Illinois(•) but P?inted out. that the ingredients of the
said express10n were placed m two articles, viz., Arts. 21 and 19
of the Indian Constitution.
This Court expressed thus :
G
H
"It is true tl•Jt in Art. 21 as contrasted with the
4th and 14th Amendments in the U.S. the word
'Liberty' is qualified by the word 'personal' ~nd theref?re its content is narro"'.er. Bu_t the qu.alifying adject_tve has b,een employed m ?r~er to avoid overlapping
between !nose clements or mc1dents of "liberty" like
freedom of speech or freedom of movement etc. already dealt within Art. 19 ( 1) and the "liberty'' 'guarnntced by Art. 21 ............ "
---<1)-[1961 J s.c.il:-s~--
•
( 2)[19b·4] l S.C.R.
)32, 345. 147
(lJ [1877] 94U.S. 113 l
540
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1967) 3 S.C.ll.
The same idea is elaborated thus :
"We ............ consider that "personal liberty"
is used in the Article as a compendious term to include
within itself all the varieties of rights which go to
make up the "personal liberties" of man other than
those dealt with in the several clauses of Art. 19(1).
In other words, while Art. 19 (1) deals with particular
species or attribute~ of that freedom, "personal liberty"
in Art. 21 takes in and comprises the residue."
A
B
This decision is a clear authority for the position that "liberty''
in our Constitution bears the srune comprehensive meaning a>
is given to the expression "liberty" by the 5th and 14th Amend- c
ments to the U.S. Constitution and the expression "personal
liberty" in Art. 21 only excludes the ingredients of "liberty" enshrined in Art. 19 of the Constitution. In other words, the expression "personal liberty" in Art. 21 takes in the right of loco·
motion and to travel abroad, but the right to move throughout
the territories of India is p.ot covered by it inasmuch as it b D
specially provided ir. Art. 19. There are conRicting decision:;
.of High Courts on this question. A division Bench of the Madras High Court, consisting of Rajamannar, C.J., and Venkatarama Ayyar, J. in V. G. Row v. State of Madras(!) considered
this question in the context of the application filed for the issue
.of a writ of mandamus directing the State of Madras to endorse E
passport of the petitioner as valid for travel to U.S.S.R. and other
countries in Europe. The petitioner there complained that the
refusal of an endorsement of the passport to any country was a
violation of the fundamental right granted to him under Art. 19
( 1) (d) of the Constitution and Art. 14 thereof. The learned
Judges considered the scope of a passl'ort and its place in the ...
foreign travel and came to the conclusion that, as the law then
stood, the State could not prevent the petitioner from leaving
for U.S.S.R. merely on the ground that he did not hold a passport endorsed to that country and that there was no provision
of law under which a citizen like the petitioner could be prevented from re-entering India aft11r travel to foreign countries except
with a passport. On the basis of that finding the Court held on G
the assumption that Art. 19 ( 1) ( d) would apply to foreign travel,
that there was no restriction on that right. lt may also be
noticed that no argument was advanced before the Bench on the
basis of Art. 21 of the Constitution. This decision does not help
the respondents.
A full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Francis Man}oora11
·v. Governme111 of India, Ministry of External Af]alrs, New
<ll !19541 s.c.R. 399.
ll
SATWANT SINGH
v. PASSPORT OFFICER (Sttbba Rao, C.J.) 541
A
Delhi(') held that the expression "personal liberty" took in the
right to travel. M. S. Menon, C.J., observed :
"The right to travel, except to the extent provided
in An:icle 19(1) (d), i~ within the ambit of the expression "personal liberty" as used in Art. 21 ........ "
B
Raman Nayar, J., held that the right of free movement whether
within the country or across its fronti11rs, either in going out or
in coming in, was a personal liberty within the meaning of Art.
21. Gopalan Nambiyar, J., observed that the right to travel beyond India. or at least to cross its frontiers was within the purview of Art. 21 and that personal liberty in Art. 21 was
not intended to bear the narrow interpretation of freedom from
physical restraint.
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Tarkunde, J., of the Bombay High Court in Choithram
Verhomal Jethawani v. A.G. Kazi(') held that the compendi·
ous expression "personal liberty" used in Art. 21 included in
its ambit the right to go abroad and a person ·could not be deprived of that right except according to procedure established by
law as laid down in Art. 21. On Letters Patent Appeal a divi·
sion Bench of the same High Court in A.G. Kazi v. C. V .
.fethwanl( 3 ) came to the same conclusion. Tambe, C.J., after
olaborately considering the relevant case law on the subject, came
to the conclusion that the expression "personal liberty" occurring
in Art. 21 included the right to travel abroad and to return to
India.
A division Bench of the Mysore High Court in Dr. S. S.
Sadashiva Rao v. Union of India(') came to same conclusion.
Hegde, J., as he then was, expressed his conclusion thus :
"For the reasons mentioned above, we are of the
opinion :-(i) the petitioners have n fundamental right
under Art. 21. to go abroad; (ii) they also have a
fundamental right to come back to this country .... "
But a full Bench of the High Court of Deihl in Rabindernath
Malik v.
The Regional Passport Officer, New Delhi and
other~( 1 ), came to a contrary conclusion. Dua, Actin~ C.J..
speaking for the Court, was un~blo to agree, on a consideration
~f tho lang~age ~! the Constitution and its scheme. Ho held that
personal liberty guaranteed by Art. 21 was not intended to
extend to ~ho li~erty of going out of India and coming back.
He wo~ m111nly influenced by tho fact that Art. 21 applled to
~n-clttzens also m1d that the Constitution not having given 11
(ll l.L.R. (1965! 2 KeraJR 663, 664.
(2) [1965] 67 Bom LR 551
(3l [1966] 68 Bom. L.R. 529.
(4) [1965] 2 My1, i..1'. 6'.l5,
(5) CMI Writ No. 857 or 966 (Uoreporlrd d<4ld•d on 23-12-66)
6u.
542
SUP&EMB COURT REPORTS
[1%7] 3 S.C.R.
limited right. to move throughout the territories to non-citizens
under Art. 19 (i) (d) could not have given a higher right to
them under Art. 21.
For the reasons mentioned above we would accept the view
of Kerala, Bombay and Mysore Hig_h Courts in preference to
that expressed by the Delhi High Court. It follows that under
Art. 21 of the Constitution no person can be deprived of his
right to travel except according to procedure established by Jaw.
It is not disputed that no Jaw was made by the State regulating
or depriving persons of such a right.
The next question is whether the act of the respondents in
refusing to issue the passport infringes· the petitioner's fundamental right under Art. 14 of the Constitution. Article 14 says
that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the
law or the equal protection of the Jaws within the territory of
India. This doctrine of equulity before the law is a necessary
corollary to the high concept of the rule of Jaw accepted by
our Constitution. One of the uspects of rule of Jaw is that every
executive action, if it is to operate to the prejudice of any person,
must be supported by some ·legislative authority : see The State
of Madhya Pradesh v. Thakur Bharat Singh('). Secondly, such a
law would be void, if it disctiminatcs or enables an authority to
discriminate between persons without just classification. What
a legislature could not do, 'the executive could not obviously do.
But in the present case the executive claims a right to issue u
passport at its discretion; that is to say, it can at its discretion
prevent a person from leaving India on foreign travel. Whether
the right to travel is part of personal liberty or not within the
meaning of Art, 21 of the Constitution, snch an arbitrary prevention of a person from travelling abroad will certainly affect
him prcjndicially. A person may like to go abroad for many
reasons. He may like to see the world, 'lo study abroad, to
unde.rgo medical treatment that is not available in our country,
to collaborate in scientific research, to develop his mental horizon in different fields and such others. An executive arbitrariness can prevent one from Joing so and permit another to travel
merely for pleasure, While in the case of enacted .Jaw one knows
where he stands, in the cnse of unchannelled arbitrary discretion,
discrimination is writ large on the face of it. Such u di~cretion
patently violates the doctrine of equality, for the d!fforence in the
treatment of persons rests solely on the arbitrary selection of the
executive. The argument that the said discretionary power of the
State is a political or a diplomatic one does not make it anytheless
an executive power. We, therefore, hold that the order refusing
to issue the passport to the p0titioner offends Art. 14 of the
Constitution.
(l) [1961] l S.C.R. 454.
A
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11
SATWANT SINGH v. PASSPORT OFFICER
8
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(Hidayat111/ah, J.)
543
In the view we have taken, it is not necessary to express our
opinion on the other points raised.
In the result we issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to withdraw and cancel the decision contained in their
letters dated August 31, 1966, and September 20, 1966 and to
forbear from taking any steps or proceedings in the enforcement
or implementation of the aforesaid decision and further to forbear
from withdrawing and depriving the petitioner of his two passports and of his passport facilities. The petitioner will have his
costs.
Hidayatullah, J. On April 10, 1967, the Chief Justice of India
on behalf of himself and our brethren Shelat and Vaidialingam
delivered the majority judgment in these two writ petitions. For
reasons, into which it is not necessary to go here, our judgment
could not be delivered with the judgment of the Chief Justice. We
expressed our dissent and indicated that our reasons would follow.
We now state the grounds on which our dissent to the judgment of
the Court is founded.
Some of the facts of these cases have been set out by the learned
Chief Justice in his judgment and they need not be repeated. What
has not been stated is that in the affidavit in reply on behalf of the
Union of India it is clearly stated why the passports had been
withdrawn or cancelled. As the learned Chief Justice has not mentioned these facts, they need to be mentioned, before our appraisal
of the so-called fundamental right to travel can be appreciated.
In W:rit Petition No. 30 of 1967, Mr. R. D. Chakravarti, Undersecretary to the Government of India in the Ministry of External
Affairs states on afildavit that Orn Prakash Kapur was a member of
a gang of passp01t racketeers and had got many students stranded
in foreign countries, because, as a travel agent he had arranged for
their travel with a company which did not exist. In another instance he countermanded the emigration laws of a foreign power.
He was once refused a passport, but in a subsequent application he
suppressed this fact and a passport was issued to him. The proposed journey was to visit his mother stated to be seriously ill in
London. An attempt to impound his passport failed as he had already left India. In proof of the objectionable activities of the
petitioner, the Union of India filed a photostat copy of his Jetter
in which the petitioner had written in his own handwriting how
tickets were to be manipulated. It was on this ground that the
passport was refused to him.
In Writ Petition No. 230 of 1966, the affidavit in reply states
that the petitioner Satwant Singh Sawhney obtained in 1961 an
import licence under the Export Promotion Scheme for import of
brake liners in ribbons and brass rivets of the face value of Rs. 3
lakhs on condition that he would export finished brake liners worth
544
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1967) 3 S.C.R.
Rs. 4 lakhs to non-rupee account areas. He however sold away
in Indian markets 91 % of the imports. He was also alleged to
have defraude~ the i~port contro~ ~uth?rities by showing fraudulent exports with a view to obtammg import licences under the
Export !'romoti~n Scheme. Investigations were going on into his
domgs m .Kuwait and 1;he passports were withdrawn, because
Satwant Smgh Sawhney, 1t was apprehended, wished to leave India
to tamper with evidence. No doubt in a rejoinder affidavit he
denied these allegations but the matter was not gone into at the
hearing before us because the two petitions were heard and disposed
of by the Court on the high plane of fundamental rights and their
breach divorced from any facts whatever. The facts have therefore, to be stated because persons seeking the facility of pi:ssports
~ay have very different credentials. For example the case of an
mnocent traveller can never be the same as that of an anarchist
who is suspected of going into another country with the object of
assisting at a coup or to commit an offence or wanting to avoid his
prosecution for offences committed in India.
Many questions have been raised but they resolve themselves into
a single question in two parts which is : Is there a fundamental right
to ask for a passport and does the Constitution guarantee such a
right 7 It may be stated at once that in limiting the controversy, it
is not intended to say that arbitrary action in refusing a passport
or evidence of discrimination will not have any redress. Executive
action has to comply with the equal protection clause of our Con·
stitution, and a complaint of refusal of a passport on insufficient or
improper grounds is capable of being raised, irrespective of whether
there 1s a fundamental right to travel abroad or not. Judging of
these cases on the evidence of the affidavits it is possible to hold that
the passports were properly refused or impounded; but as the question has assumed a constitutional hue, we express our opinion on
the general question.
What is a passport is the first question. It is not necessary to
go into the history of passports which have become very common
from the days of the First World War. The character of the passports, however, has not changed and the classic definition of Alver·
stone, C.J. in R. v. Brallsjord( 1 ) has been generally quoted and
applied in cases dealing with passports. It says that a passport
" . , , , •is a document issued in tho name of
Soverclgn on the responsibility of a Minister of tho Crown
to 11 named individual, intended to be presented to the
Governments of foreign nations and to be, used for that
individual's protection as a British subject In forelan
countries, and It depends for its validity upon tho fact that
(1) [Ul051 2. K. B. 703,
A
B
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•
D
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F
...
G
H
SATWANT SINGH v. PASSPORT OFFICER
A
(Hidayatullah, J.)
54S
the Foreign Office in an official document vouches the
respectability of the person named."
In essence this document serves as a means of establishing identity
and nationality. See Weis : Nationality and Statelessness .~ International Law p. 226, Harry Street : Freedom, the Ind1v1dual
and the Law p. 271, The Grotius Society-Vol. 32(19~6) Pass·
ports and Protection in International Law by Kenneth D1plock.
B
'
In India the passport reads :
"These are to request and require in the name of the
President of the Republic of India all those whom it may
concern to allow the bearer to pass freely without let or
hindrance and to afford him or her every assistance and
prot,ectio; of which he or she may stand in need."
c
This form of passport follows closely that of the English passport.
The American passport is slightly different. There the passport
contains the following writing :
D
"The Secretary of State. requests all whom it may
concern to permit safely and freely to pass and in case
of need to give aU lawful aid to ...... a citizen of the
United States."
(name)
E
The American form not only makes a request but also states that
the holder is n citizen of the United States. In certain other
countries, such as Switzerland, the passport only declares the ho!··
der's na.tionality but makes no request.
Whatever the form of the passport, it is clear that it is a political
document and the ownership of it strictly speaking remains in the·
Government which grants it although a fee may be charged for it.
In England a passport is considered to be a document of the Crown.
and can be recalled.
In Indiu the Constitution does not make a mention of foreign·
travel at all. In the Legislative Lists the subject of passports i~
c item No. 19 in the Union List. The entry reads :
19. "Admission into, and emigration and expulsion
from, India; passports and visas."
('-s the ex~utiv,e power o_f the l!nio!1 extends to the topics included
!n the Union List, ~~uti~e action 1s open on the topics mentioned
m the 1cntry. Adnuss1on mto and emigration and expulsion from
11 India may be subject of legislative action and equally of executive
action. Similarly there may he executive action in re~pect of pass·
ports and visas. Of course executive action normally must follow
F
L7SupC.l./67-5
546
SUPRllMB COURT REPORTS
[1967] 3 S.C.R.
legislation and not precede it, but the existence of statutory enact·
ment is not a condition for the exercise of executive action.
Since it is questioned that the action to refuse a passport or to
withhold one granted must be based on law, it is necessary to find
out the true nature of a passport. It appears to us that passports
must be treated as falling within the prerogative domain of foreign
affairs, and the authorities which grant or withhold them must pos·
sess considerable freedom of action. In England, the passport is
so regarded. Halsbury, summarising the law on the subject says :
"Passports may be granted by the Crown at any time
to enable British subjects to travel with safety in foreign
countries but such passports would clearly not be available so as to permit travel in an enemy's country during war."
A
B
c
NoTB : "The possession of a passport is now almost
always required by the authorities to enable a person
to enter a country."
D
(Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. IV, p. 519).
The history of passports in India is a chequered one. Before
the First World War, passports were not so common. During
the First World War, the necessity for a passport arose because
several countries began to insist on the possession of a passport
before allowing entry. The Indian Passport Rules of 1917 created E
a double obligation. There was an obligation to obtain passports
to leave India and an obligation to obtain passports to enter Jndia.
In 1920, the Indian Passport Act was passed. The obligation to
obtain a passport to leave India was abandoned. This, however,
made no practical difference because almost all the countries of
the world had begun to insist o;.i the possession of a passport and
no shipping company would take a passenger on board a ship F
bound for a foreign land unless the passenger was in possession
of a passport endorsed for the foreign country and a visa (if neces·
sary) granted by that country. The Indian Passport Act, 1920
has continued to be the only legislation on the subject. It is an
extremely short Act. The long title shows its purport by stating
that it is an Act by which power is taken to require passports of G
persons entering India. After setting out the title and the extent
of the Act and giving the necessary definitions, the Act proceeds
to confer on the Central Government by s. 3 the power to make
rules requiring that persons entering India shall be in possession
of passports and for all matters ancillary and incidental to that
purpose. Without prejudice, however, to the generality of this H
power, the Act gives illustrations of the topics on which rules may
be made, such as to prohibit the entry into India or any part thereof
of any person who has not in his possession a passport issued to
SATWANT SINGH v. PASSPORT OFFICER
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(Hidayatullah, J.)
547
him; to prescribe tlie authorities by whom passports must have
been issued or renewed, and the conditions with which they must
comply, for the purposes of the Act; and to provide for the exemp·
tion either absolutely or on any condition, of any person or class
of persons from any provision of such rules. The Act also gives
power to make rules for punishment of the contravention of the
rules or orders issued under the Act and sets the maximum limit
of such punishments. The rules so made have to be published
in the Official Gazette and thereupon have effect as if enacted in
the Passport Act. The last two sections give power of arrest and
remov~J of persons who enter India without a passport or against
whom a reasonable suspicion exists that they have contravened
any rule or order made under the Passport Act. The Act is enab·
ling. The force resides in the rules.
In furtherance of the power, the Indian Passport Rules, 1950
have been framed and promulgated. They lay down in detail
the condition for the grant of passports and of visas. These are
to be read as part of the parent Act. No rule states specifically
that a passport is needed by a person leaving India. Indeed there
is no provision which compels a person to take a passport to
leave India. The necessity for a passport arises from the fact that
no travel agency would agree to take out a person who is not in
possession of a valid passport, because if it did so, the agency would
expose itself to the burden of bringing back such person to the
place from where he started. No foreign country (except Nepal)
todfly accepts an Indian citizen who is not in possession of a
vahd passport. The necessity for a passport also arises indirectly,
because a citizen who leaves India needs a passport to re-enter
his own country. This is true of most of the countries of the
worl~. France did attempt to exempt French citizens from the
requirement of a passport to enter their own country but it was
found that s?ch persons were delayed considerably because they
ha~ to estabhsh the fact of their French nationality independently.
Th~s was a very arduous process. In fact foreigners found it
easier to enter France than a national, because every foreigner
who poss~ssed a passport issued by .his country with a visa for
entering mto France could walk in whereas every national had
to establish his nationality.
It is however not to be thought that a passport is the only
me~ns by which .a person can be enabled to leave or to enter
India. . The~e exist two modes in which persons can leave and
three in which they can enter, India. The first two modes are
(a) pa~sport. ~nd (b) identity certificate. The former are granted
to !ndian c1!Jz~ns and the latter to Stateless persons residin~ in
lndm or to foreigners whose countries are not represented in India
and who cannot obtain passports from their countries or to
548
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1967] 3 S.C.R.
persons whose nationality is in some doubt. Exit from India whether by an Indian or a foreigner through the ordinary traffic lines
is only on the strength of one of these two documents. Similarly,
exit through customs barriers is allowed only on the production
of one of these two documents. For entry into India, one of
three documents is needed : a passport, issued by a foreign country and visaed by Indian Diplomatic Mission or Government, serves
for foreigners; the same is the case with persons holding identity
certificates. Then there is an emergency certificate which is issued
for a single journey to a person not in possession of a passport.
The emergency certificate is regarded as a passport for purposes
of entry of an Indian into India.
It will therefore be seen that there is no compulsion of law that
a passport must be obtained before one leaves India. Compulsion
arises because no travel line will take an Indian out of India unless he possesses a passport. If an Indian wishes to leave India
without a passport he may do so, if he can. There is nothing to
prevent an Indian getting into a jolly boat and attempting to cross
the Arabian sea; but a foreign country would refuse to receive
him unless he possesses a passport and on his return to India he
would not be able to enter India unless he produces the passport
as required by the Indian Passport Act. The need for passport is
indirect. Passport is ne~essary because it requests the foreign
Governments to let the holder pass and it vouches for the respectability and nationality of .the holder.
It is now necessary to consider whether there is a right to
demand a passport. Is it a right of the same nature as the right
to buy a railway ticket ? The difference obviously is that before
Government places in the hands of a person a document which
pledges the honour of the country, Government is entitled to scrutinise the credentials of such person. The right therefore to obtain
a passport is a qualified one, and not an absolute one. Since Government pledges its honour, it is a privilege which can be exercised with the concurrence of Government. Subject to this there
arises a qualified right. A person refused a passport may ask
that his case be considered by a court of law. But what is there in
the document on which one can found an absolute right ? Is the
State compelled to grant a document pledging its honour to all
kinds of person and must it vouch for the respectabiliJ:y of everyone going abroad ? The considerations which must enter in the
appraisal of a person's worth, before his respectability can be
vouched, are so numerous and varied that they can never be
the subject of a successful enumeration and categorisation. If a
person is wrongfully refused a passport, he can complain that he
has been discriminated against and. the courts would right the
matter unless the State gives a valid reason. There is thus no
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(Hidayatullah, J.) 549
absolute right that the State must grant a passport to whomsoever
applies for it ·and subject to a question of arbitrariness or discri·
minatlon no one can really be said to possess a right enforceable
at law.
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It is however contended that the right to travel abroad is a
fundamental right because it is a part of the personal liberty of a
person guaranteed by Art. 21 of the Constitution, which a person
can onlly be deprived of according to procedure established by law.
In support of the contention that foreign travel is a part of per·
sonal liberty, reliance is plaoed on certain observations in A. K.
Gopalan v. The State of Madras(') and Kharak Singh v. The State
of Uttar Pradesh (•) and some cases of the High Courts following
Gopalan's oase('), and drawing support from the cases of the
Supreme Court of the United States. Reliance was placed in these
judgments upon the classic definition of 'personal liberty' by Black·
stone. Blackstone divided 'jus personarum' (rights attaching to
the person) into two : "personal security" and "personal liberty".
Under the former he included rights to life, limb, body, health and
reputation and under the latter, the right to freedom of movement.
Blackstone's words were :
"personal liberty consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation or moving one's person to
whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct, with·
out imprisonment or restraint unless by due process of
law".
(W. Blackstone: Commentaries on the Laws of
England 4th Edn., Vol. 1, p. 134).
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The expression 'life' and 'personal liberty' in Art. 21, it is said,
incorporated these two meanings respectively.
There is no doubt that this Court has accepted the meaning
of 'life' as 'personal security' according to Blackstone's definition.
In Kharak Singh's case(") this Court considered Art. 21 in connection With the domiciliary visits and such other checks upon a
person. under police surveillance. The word 'life' was interpreted
according to the definition of Mr. Justice Field in M un11 v.
1Uinois( 3 ). Mr. Justice Field observed in that case:
"By the term "life'.' as here used something more is
meant than mere animal existence. The inhibition
against its deprivation extends to all these limits and
facultie~ ?Y which l~fe !s enjoyed. The provision equal·
ly proh1b1ts the mutilation of the body or amputation of
(l) [19501 S.C.R. 88.
(3) (1877] 94
u.s. 113.
(2) [1964] 1 S.C.R. 332.
550
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
-
[1967] 3 s.c.R.
an arm or leg or the putting out of an eye or the destruc·
tion of any other organ of the body through which the
soul communicates with thi: outer world ...... by the
term liberty, as used in the provision something more is
meant than mere freedom from physical restraint or the
bounds of a prison."
Mr. Justice Field was merely reaffirming Blackstone's definition in
relation to the word 'life' in the 5th and 14th amendments of the
U.S. Constitution. It may be pointed out that the American deci·
sions on the subject of passports accept also Blackstone's definition
of "personal liberty" and this has led to the acceptance of travel
abroad as more than a privilege and as a right. These cases are
mentioned in the judgment of the learned Chief Justice.
The question, however, is whether this Court has accepted the
definition of Blackstone to interpret the expression "personal
liberty" in Art. 21 so that foreign travel or the right to leave India
can be said to be included in the expression. The American
cases cannot of course be used to establish a fundamental right to
travel or aliter to a fundamental right to leave India. The claim
of such a right must be established strictly on the terms of our
own Fundamental Law. The difference between the American
and the Indian Constitutions arises because of the existence of certain specified fundamental rights in Art. 19 guaranteed to a citizen
of which sub-cl. (d) of cl. (I) read with cl. (5) deals with the
right of a citizen to move freely throughout the territory of India.
There is no doubt that the right of niotion and locomotion throughout the territory of India is guaranteed to the Indian citizen. Does
the Constitution speak again of a further right of motion or
locomotion in Art. 21 for the citizen and the non-citizen ? The
Indian Constitution cannot, of course, guarantee the right of motion
and locomotion in foreign land. Thus in so far as an Indian
citizen is concerned, if Art. 21 adds anything to the right of motion
and locomotion of a citizen guaranteed under Art. 19, it can only
speak of the right to leave India. The learned Chief Justice gives
this meaning to Art. 21. We respectfully disagree and think that
it was not open to the learned Chief Justice to take this view of
Art. 21 so long as the earlier decisions of this Court stand.
Now it is obvious that Blackstone, when he defined 'personal
liberty' was not writing a commentary on the Indian Constitution.
The generality of his observations cannot be woven into our Constitution without paying heed to the context in which the words
occur. It seems strange that the Constitution should have guaranteed the right of motion, in one place, limited to the territories of
India, and in another, without specifying the right of motion given
an added fundamental right to leave India. This, in our opinion,
has been earlier noticed indirectly in the two cases of this Court
already referred to.
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SATWANT SINGH v. PASSPORT OFFICER
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(Hidayatullah, I.)
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Gopalan' s case ( 1) ·is one of them. It was conccmed with pre·
ventive detention and was not directly concerned with the que.ition
whether Art. 21 comprehends the right to travel abroad or to leave
India as an attribute of personal liberty. The point now.before us
did not really arise. However, varied opinions were expressed by
the Constitution Bench. Kania, C.J. did not express any clear
view. According to him there was no conflict between Arts. 19
and 21. He thought of personal liberty in terms of right to eat or
sleep when one likes, to work or not to work. To him personal
liberty meant liberty of the physical body. Faz! Ali, J. accepted
that frec:dom of movement was the essence of personal liberty; but
observed at p. 139 as follows:
"In my opinion, the words 'throughout the territory
of India' were used to stretch the ambit of the freedom
of movement to the utmost extent to which it could be
g1mrantced by our Constitution." (Italics added).
Patanjali Sastri, J. (later C.J.) thought that personal liberty in Art.
21 was used in a sense which excluded freedoms dealt with in
Art. 19, that is to say, personal liberty in the context of Part III
of the Constitution was something distinct from the freedom to
move freely throughout the territory of India. Das, J. (later C.J.)
dealing with Art. 19 observed at p. 301 :
"Its purpose, as I read it, is not to provide protection for the general right of free movement but to secure
a i:pecific and special right of the Indian citizen to move
freely throughout the territories of India regarded as an
independent additional r.ight apart from the general right
of locomotion emanating from the freedom of the person.
It is a guarantee against unfair discrimination in the
matter of free movement of the Indian citizen throughout
the Indian Union. In short, it is a protection against
provincialism. It has nothing to do with the freedom
of the person as such. That is guaranteed to every person, citizen or otherwise, in the manner and to the extent
formulated by article 21."
Mahajan !- (later C.J.) thought that in providing that life and
liberty might be deprived only in accordance with procedure established by law, the intention was to give immunity against exercise
of despotic power by the Executive. Mukherjea J. (later C.J.)
thought that movement throughout the territory of India could be
curtailed in the interest of the public but movement outside could
only be curtailed by law.
The, learned Chief Justice. has selected the views of Faz! Ali
and Das JJ. and drawn the conclusion that personal liberty in Art.
21 is a more comprehensive concept and has a much wider
(i)[f950]S.C.R. ss:-
552
SUPRBMB COURT RBPORTS
[1967] 3 s.c.R.
connotation than 'tho ri2ht conforred by Art. 19(l)(d). The
learned Chief Justico ro1ers to Kharak Singh's caso( 1 ) and ob·
serves as follows :
"This Court, adverting to the expression "personal
liberty", accepted the meaning put upon the expression
'liberty' in the 5th and 14th Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution by Field, J, in Munn v. Illinois, but pointed
out that the ingredients of the said expression were
placed in two articles, viz., Arts. 21 and 19 of the Indian
Constitution."
He then extracts two passages from Kharak Singh's case( 1 ) which
are as follows :
"It is true that in Art. 21 as contrasted with the
4th and 14th Amendments in the U.S., the word 'liberty'
is qualified by the word 'personal' and therefore its con·
tent is narrower. But the qualifying adjective has been
employed in order to avoid overlapping between those
elements or incidents of "liberty" like freedom of speech,
or freedom of movement etc., already dealt with in Art.
19(1) and the "liberty" guaranteed by Art. 21. ... "
"We ........ consider that "personal liberty" is used
in the Article as a compendious term to include within
itself all the varieties of rights which go to make up the
"personal liberties" of man other than those dealt with
in the several clauses of Art. 19(1). In other words,
while Art. 19(1) deals with particular species or attri·
butes of that freedom, "personal liberty" in Art. 21
takes in and comprises the residue."
The learned Chief Justice then reaches the conclusion that Kharak
Singh's case(') was
·
"a clear authority for the position that "liberty" in
our Constitution bears the same comprehensive meaning
as is given to the expression "liberty" by the 5th and 14th
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and the expression
"personal liberty" in Art. 21 only excludes the ingredients
of 'liberty' enshrined in Art. 19 of the Constitution. In
other words, the expression "personal liberty" in Art.
21 takes in the right of locomotion and to travel abroad,
but the right to move throughout the territories of India
is not covered by it inasmuch as it is specially provided in
Art. 19."
In our Judgment, these remarks, with due respects, involve a mis·
reading of Kharak Singh's case. They are rather the minority
(I) [1964) l. S,C.R. 332.
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view expressed in the same case by the learned Chief Justice. They
are not the views of the majority.
In Kharak Singh's case ( 1), the concept of personal liberty was
considered in connection with surveillance by the police under the
Police Re~gulations. The expression "life" in Art. 21 was interpreted according to Mr. Justice Field's definition already quoted
earlier. Domiciliary visits were considered violative of Art. 21
in the absence of a valid law. Other modes of surveillance such
as secret picketing etc. were considered valid as they did not
directly and tangibly impede either movement or personal liberty.
Dealing, however, with Arts. 19 ( 1)( d) and 21 together, it was
pointed out that the right to move about was excluded from Art.
21. Article 21 represented other residuary personal liberties, not
the subje,ct of treatment in Art. 19(1). The majority stated its
opinion as follows :
"Having regard to the terms of Art. 19(1)(d), we
must take it that expression (personal liberty) is used
as not to include the right to move about or rather of
locomotion. The right to move about being excluded its
narrowest interpretation would be that it comprehends
nothing more than freedom from physical restraint or
freedom from confinement within the bounds of a
prison; in other words, freedom from arrest and detention,
from false imprisonment or wrongful confinement. We
feel unable to hold that the term was intended to bear
only this narrow interpretation but on the other hand
consider that "personal liberty" is used in the Article as
a compendious term to include within itself all the
varieties of rights which go to make up the "personal
liberties" of man other than those dealt with in. the
several clauses of Art. 19(1). In other words, while Art.
19 ( 1 ) deals with particular species or attributes of that
freedom, "personal liberty" in Art. 21 takes in and comprises the residue."
·
Referring to the observations of Mr. Justice Field, it was stated
that 'life' meant "not. merely the right to the continuance of a
person's animal existence, but also a right to the possession of
each of his organs-his arms and legs, etc." An invasion of one's
house ~as. therefore co~sidered an invasion of personal liberty.
The. maionty, ~owever, did not attempt to add to the right of locomollon, the nght to go abroad or to leave India. In fact the
!Ilajority :implies .that the right of locomotion posse~<ed by a citizen
is all contamed m Art. 19(1)(d) and is guaranteed only with respect to the territories of India.
(l) [1964] 2 S.C .R. 332.
SS4
SUPRBMB COURT RBPORTS
(1967] 3 s.c.a.
Subba Rao J. (as he then was) read personal liberty as the
antithesis of physical restraint or coercion and found that Arts.
19 ( 1 ) and 21 overlapped and Art. 19 (1 )( d) was not carved out
of personal liberty in Art. 21. According to him, personal liberty
could be curtailed by law, but that law must satisfy the test in
Art. 19(2) in so far as the specific rights in Art. 19(1)(3) are concerned. In other words, the State must satisfy that both the fundamental rights are not infringed by ~bowing that there. is a law and
that .it does not amount to an unreasonable restriction within the
meaning of Art. ·19(2) of the Constitution. As in that case there
was no law, fundamental rights, both under Art. l 9(1)(d) and
Art. 21 were held to be infringed .. The learned Chief Justice has
read into the decision of the Court a meaning which it does not
intend to convey. He excludes from Art. 21 the right to free
motion and locomotion within the territories of India and puts the
right to travel abroad in Art. 21. He wants to see a Jaw and if
his earlier reasoning were to prevail, the law should stand the
test of Art. 19(2). But since cl. (2) deals with matters in Art.
19(1) already held excluded, it is obvious that it will not apply.
The law which is made can only be tested on the ground of arti·
cles other than Art. 19 such as Arts. 14, 20 and 22 which alone
bears upon this matter. In other words, the majority decision of
the Court in this case has rejected Ayyangar J.'s view and accepted
the view of the minority in Kharak Singh's case('). A similar rea·
soning had previously prevailed with the Chief Justice in the case
of Kava/appara Kottarathi/ Kochuni and others v. The State of
Madras and others( 2 ), but there Art. 19 was held not excluded
by Art. 31 after the latter ceased to be a self-contained article by
reason of the fourth amendment and the addition of cl. 2-A and
the amendment of cl. (2). The same exercise in the reverse direction i.e., extending protection to property beyond what is stated
in Art. 31 by calling in aid something extra from Art. 19 was
aitempted. According to the learned Chief Justice there is an
absolute right of property [Art. 19(1)(f)] curtailed to some extent
by cl. (5) and Art. 31. The same reasoning is adopted here. There
is an absolute right of locomotion in Art. 21 of which one aspect
alone is said to be covered by Art. 19(1 )(d). This view obviously
clashes with the reading of Art. 21 in Kharak Singh's case, because
there the right of motion and locomotion was held to be excluded
from Art. 21. In other words, the present decision advances the
minority view in Kharak Singh's case above the majority view
stated in that case.
We have shown above that the citizen's right of motion and
locomotion in so far as it is recognisable. has been limited hy the
Constitution to the territories of India and that according to Kharak
Singh' s case that is the limit of the right. It is not possible to read
(\) [196l] I S.C.R. 332.
'(2) [1960] 3 S.C.R. 887.
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more of that right in Art. 21. In any event, there is no absolute
right to demand a passport because that is not a right to person~!
liberty even in the Blackstonian sense. The passport being a pohtical document, is one which the State may choose to give or to
withhold. Since that document vouches for the respectability of
the holder, it stands to reason that Government need not vouch
B for a person it does not consider worthy. This is not to say that we
are insensible to the importance of travel, so adequately described
by writers and judgments. Those observations apply to the bulk
of the people to whom passport is generally never refused. What
we are <:oncemed with is a slender body of persons whose travel
abroad is considered harmful to the larger interests of our country
who themselves are in any event undesirable emissaries of our
c and
nation and who might, if allowed to go abroad, cause many complications. A system of passports is thus essential and requires a
wide discretion.
The Universal declaration of human rights-"Everyone has the
right to leave any country including his own" is applicable to norD mal persons. It does not apply to criminals avoiding penalties or
political agitators, etc. likely to create intern11tional tensions or
persons who may disgrace our country abroad.
To conclude : whatever the view of countries like the U.S.A.
where travel is a means of spending one's wealth, the better view
in our country is that a person is ordinarily entitled to a passport
E unless, for reasons which can be established to the satisfaction of
the Court, the passport can be validly refused to him. Since an
aggrieved party can always ask for a mandamus if he is treated·
unfairly, it is not open, by straining the Constitution, to create an
absolute and fundamental right to a passport where none exists
in the Constitution. There is no doubt a fundamental right to
equality in the matter of grant of passports (subject to reasonable
classifications) but there is no fundamental right to travel abroad
or to the grant of a passport. With all due respect we say that
the Court has missed one for the other. The solution of a law
of passports will not make things any better. Even if a law
were to be made the position would hardly change because the
utmost discretion will have to be allowed to decide upon the worth
G of an applicant. The only thing that can be said is that where
the pas:~~rt authority is proved to be wrong, a l!IOndamus will
always right the matter. In the present cases we found no valid
ground.. for the issuance of a mandamus. We had,. therefore, earlier ord·ered the dismissal of the petitions.
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ORDER
In accordance with the opinion of the majority a writ of mandamus will issue directing the respondents to withdraw and cancel
the decision contained in their letters dated August 31, 1966, and'
$56
SUPllBMB COUllT llBPOllTS
[1967) 3 S.C.R,
September 20, 1966 and to forbear from taking any steps or proceedings in the enforcement or implementation of the aforesaid
decision and further to forbear from withdrawing and depriving
the petitioner of his two passports and of his passport facilities.
The petitioner will have his costs,
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11
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