BHAGAT RAJA versus THE UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 29 March 1967 | [1967] 3 S.C.R. 302 | 1967 INSC 76
Key facts
- Decided
- 29 March 1967
- Bench
- K. SUBBA RAO*, J.C. SHAH, J.M. SHELAT, VISHISHTHA BHARGAVA, G.K. MITTER
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 2596/1966
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1967] 3 S.C.R. 302
- Neutral citation
- 1967 INSC 76
Text of the judgment
BHAGAT RAJA
A
v.
THE UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
March 29, 1967
[K. SUBBA RAO, C.J., J. C. SHAH, J. M. SHELAT, V. BHARGAVA
B
AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.J
Mines & Minerals (Regulation and Dev.elapme11t) Act, 1957, s. 30
and Rules 54 & 55 1nade under the Act--State Governnient's order
refusing mining lease to one party and granting it 'to another-Central
Governnient whether in deciding revision under r. 55 should pass 'speaking order.
The appellant was one of several applicants for a mmmg lease in
Andhra Pradesh. The State Government however granted it to respondent No. 3. The appellant then filed an application in revision, under
s. 30 of the Mines & Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957,
read with r. 54, to the Union of India. Respondent No. 3 filed a
counter statement and the State Government filed its comments. The
appellant filed a rejoinder. · The Union Government without hearing the
appellant rejected his revision application, An appeal was filed before
this Court. The question that fell for consideration was whether it was
necessary for the Government of India to give reasons for its decision
in view of the provisions of the Act and the Rules or aliunde because
the decision was liable to be questioned in appeal to this Court.
HELD: (i) In exercising its powers ·of revision under r. SS the
Central Government discharges fuiictioas which are quasi-judicial, The
decisions of tribunals in India are subject to the supervisory powers of
the High Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution and of appellate
powers of this court under Art. 136. Both the High Court and this
Court are placed under a great disadvantage if no reasons are given and
the revision is dismissed curtly by the use of the single word 'rejected'
or 'dismissed'. In such a case this Court can probably only exercise its
appellate jurisdiction ..,,atisfactorily by examining the entire records of the
case and after giving a hearing come to its conclusion on the merits of
the case. This would certainly be a very unsatisfactory method of dealing
with the appCal. [308E-F; 309B-C]
If the State Government gives sufficient reasons for accepting the
application of one party and rejecting that of others, as it must, and the
Central Government adopts the ·reasoning of the State Government, this
Court may proceed to examine whether the reasons given are sufficient
for the purpose of upholding the decision. But when the reasons given
in the order of the State Government are scrappy or nebulous and the
Central Government makes no attempt to clarify the same, this
Court. in appeal may have to examine the case de novo, without
anybody being the wiser for the review by the Central Government. The same difficulty would arise where the State Government
gives a number of reasons some of which are good and some are not and
the Central Government gives its decision without specifying those
reasons which according to it are sufficient to uphold the ord~r of the
State Govemn1ent. That is why in such circumstances, what 1s known
as a 'speaking order' is called for. [309C-FJ
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BHAGAT RAJA v. UNION (Mitter, J.)
303
A
A 'speaking order' is all the more necessary in the case of a decision
under r. 55 because there is provision for new material being placed
before the Central Government which was not there before the State
Government, and further, because the decision, affecting important rights
of parties, is given in a sui:imary manner without a hearing. ~eing allowed
to the parties. A party IS entitled to know why the dec1S1on has gone
against him. [320G-321B]
B
The absence in r. 55 of any provision for giving such reasons is not
decisive of the matter in view of the above considerations. [315H]
Shivji Nathub/Jai v. The Union of India, [1960] 2 S.C.R. 775, M.P.
Industries v. Union, [1966] 1 S.C.R. 466, Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v.
Shyam Sundar lhunjhunwala, (1962] 2 S.C.R. 339 and Sardar Govindrao
v. State, [1965] I S.C.R. 678, followed.
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Nandram Hunatram, Calcutta v. Union of India, A.i.R. 1966 S.C.
1922 and Commissioner of Income-tax v. K. V. Pi//iah, 43 I.T.R. 411,
distinguished.
Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal Ex flprte
Shaw, [1951] 1 K.B. 711, Vedachala Mudaliar v. State of Madras, AO.R.
1952 Madras 276, Ramayya v. State of Andhra, I.L.R. 1956 Andhra 712,
Annamalai v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1957 Andhra Pradesh 738 and
Joseph v. Superintendent of Post Officts, Kottayam, J.L.R. 1961 II
Kerala 245, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION ; Civil Appeals Nos.
and 2597 of 1966.
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2596
Appeals by special leave from the Orders dated May 2, 1966
and June 22, 1966 of the Government of India, Ministry of
Mines and Metals, New Delhi on application is filed by the
appellant under Rule 54 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960.
S. J. Sorabji, A. J. Rana, J. R. Gagrat and B. R. Agarwal
for the appellant (in both the appeals).
'
G. N. Dikshit, R. N. Sachthey for S. P. Nayyar for respon'
dent No. 1 (in both the ap~als).
P. Ram Reddy and B. Parthasarathy, for respondent No. 2 (in
both the appeals) .
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M. C. Setalvad, B. Dutta, and 0. C. Mathur for respondent
No. 3 (in both the appeals).
'
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Milter, J. These two appeals by special leave, are limited
to the question as to whether in dismissin_g a revision and confirming the order of the State of Andhra Pradesh the Union of
India was bound to make a speaking order. The text of the
order is the same in both the cases, the only difference being in
304
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1967] 3 S.C.R.
A
the situs and the area in respect of wh,ich tho lease was applied
for. One of the orders runs as follows :
"New Delhi, the 22nd June, 1966".
~-
I am directed to refer to your revision application dated 14-12-1964 and letter dated 28-1-1966 on
the above subject and to say that after careful consideration of the grounds stated therein, the Central
Government have come to the conclusion that there is
no valid ground for interfering with the decision of the
Government of Andhra Pradesh rejecting your application for grant of mining lease for asbestos over an area
of Ac.113-50 in Brahmanapalli village, Cuddapah
District, Andhra Pradesh. Your application for revision is, therefore, rejected."
B
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The facts leading to the two appeals are as follows : In response
to a notification dated January 8, 1964 published in the State D
Gazette by the Andhra Pradesh Government inviting applications
under r. 58 of the rules framed under the Mines and Minerals
(Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred
to as the Rules and the Act) the appellant submitted two applications in the prescribed form viz., Form "I" for areas aggregating
Ac. 113-50 in village Brahmanapalli and Ac. 13-10 in village E
lppatta both in the district of Cuddapah for mining asbestos. Res·
pondent No. 3 also made similar applications on the same date.
According to the appellant. his applications complied with all the
requirements of Form "I" while those of respondent No. 3 were
defective in some respects. Besides the appellant and the respondent No. 3, there was only one other person who applied for a F
prospecting licence which was rejected off-hand. As between the
appellant and the respondent No. 3, the Government of Andhra
Pradesh preferred the latter. The relevant portion of the order
dated 19th October 1964 in respect of the village Brahmanapalli
under s. 10(3) of the Act was as follows:
"As between the other applicants Sri Bhagat Raja
and M/s. Tiffin's Barytes, Asbestos and Paints Ltd.,
the Government prefer M/s. Tiffin's Barytes, ..... as
they are having adequate general experience and technical knowledge, and are old lessees in the district,
without any arrears of mineral dues to the Government.
The mining lease application of Sri Bhagat Raja for
the areas covered by the mining lea1e application of
M/s. Tiffin's Barytes, Asbestos and Paints Ltd. is
rejected."
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BHAGAT RAJA v. UNION (Mitter, J.)
305·
A
The text of the order with regard to village Ippatta is practically
the 5ame.
The appellant filed application in revision in the prescribed
fonn i.e. Fonn 'N' under s. 30 of the Act read with r. 54 to the
Union of India on December 14, 1964. The appellant tried to.
bring out in his revision applications that the financial condition
B of the 3rd respondent was extremely precarious as would be evidenced by documents, copies whereof were annexed to his petition. The 3rd respondent filed a counter statement to the
revmon application in April 1965. In March 1966 the appellant received the comments of the Andhra. Pradesh Government
on his revision applications. The appellant filed rejoinder to
c the counter statements of the 3rd respondent in May 1965 and
to the comments of the Andhra Pradesh Government in April
1966. He also asked for the grant of a personal hearing
before the decision of the case which was not given. Ultimately,
his applications were rejected by· ord.ers quoted hereinabove.
Various grounds of appeal were taken in the application
D for special leave to appeal preferred by the appellant. An
attempt has been made therein to show that respondent No. 3
had no experience in asbestos mining, that its financial position
was very unsatisfactory and that its application for mining lease
was not in proper form. A complamt was also made that in
rejecting the applicant's revision applications the Union of
India was bound to give reasons for its decision as it was exercising quasi .iudicial powers under s. 30 of the Act read with
tT. 54 and 55, that principles of natural justice and £airplay
requiring the divulgence of the grounds were violated and that
a personal hearing should have been given to the appellant before
the disposal of the revision applications.
We are not called upon in this case to go into the merits of
' thenecessary
case but only to examine the question as to whether it was
for the Government of India to give reasons for its
decision in view of the provisions of the Act and the Rules or
aliunde because the decision was liable to be questioned in appeal
to this Court. It is necessary to take note of a few provisions of
the Act and the relevant rules framed thereunder to ascertain the
a scope
of a party's right to apply for a lease and the powers and
duties of the Government in accepting or rejecting the some. The
preamble to the Act shows that its object was to provide for the
regulation of mines and the development of minerals under the
control of the Union of India. Under s. 4( 1) no person can
undertake any prospecting or mining operations in any area,
H except under and in accordance with the tenns and conditions of
a prospecting licence or a mining lease granted under the Act and
the Rules. Under sub-s. (2) of the section
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1967] 3 s.c.R.
"No prospecting licence or mining lease shall be
granted otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder."
.S. 5 Jays dowp, certain conditions which a person desiring to
have a mining lease must fulfil. S. 8 provides for the period
for which a mining lease may be granted. Under s. 10( 1) an
application for a mining lease has to be made to the State
Government concerned in the prescribed form. Sub-s. (3) of
s. 10 runs as follows :
"On receipt of an application under this section,
the State Government may, having regard to the provisions of this Act and any rules made thereunder,
grant or refuse to grant the licence or lease."
Under sub-s. (2) of s. 11 a person whose application for a
licence is received earlier than those of others shall have a preferential right for the grant thereof over the others. The proviso
to this sub-section enacts that where applications are received on
the same day, the State Government, after taking into consideration the matters specified in sub-s. ( 3), may grant the mining
lease to such one of the applicants as it may deem fit. Sub-s. ( 3)
specifies 4he matters referred to in sub-s. (2) and they are as
follows:(a) any special knowledge or experience in, prospecting operations or mining operations, as the case
may be, possessed by the applicant;
(b) the financial resources of the applicant;
( c) the nature and quality of the technical staff
employed or to be employed by the applicant; and
( d) such other matters as may be prescribed.
·s. 13(1) enables the Central Government to make rules for
regulating the grant of prospecting licences and mining leases.
Under s.19 any mining lease granted, riinewed or acquired in
contravention of the provisions of the Act' is to be void and of
no effect. Power of revision of the order of the State Government is given to the Central Government in the following terms :
"The Central Government may, of its own motion
or on application made within the prescribed time by
the aggrieved party, revise any order made by a State
Government or other authority in exeip~se of the
powers conferred on it by or under this Act."
Rules were made by the Central Government under s.13 of
the Act known as the Mineral Concession Rules, 19~0. R.22 pres-cribes that an application for the grant of a mining lease must
be made to the State Government in Form "I" accompanied by a
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DllAGAT RAJA V. UNION (Mille!', J.)
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fee of Rs. 200/-, a deposit of Rs. 500/- and an income-~
clearance certificate. Under r. 26 the State Government IS
obliged to give reasons for refusal to grant a mining lease. Any
person aggrieved by an order made by the State Government
may prefer an application for revision under r. 54 in Form 'N'. In
every such application against the order of the State Government refusing to grant a mining lease, a person to whom .a. lease
has been granted must be impleaded as a party. R. 55 onginally
framed in 1960 was amended in July 1965. Under the amended
r. 55 the position is as follows : " ( 1) On receipt of an application for revision
under r. 54, copies thereof shall be sent to the State
Government and to all the impleaded parties calling
upon them to make such comments as they may like
to make within three months of the date of issue of the
communication and if no comments are received
within that period, it is to be presumed that the party
omit.ting to make such comments has none to make.
( 2) On receipt of the comments 'from any party
under sub-rule ( 1), copies thereof have to be sent to
the other parties c,alling -upon them to niake further
comments as they may like to make within one month
from the date of the issue of the communication.
( 3) The revision application, the communications
containing comments and counter-comments referred
to in sub-rules (1) and (2) shall constitute the
record of the case. .
( 4) After considering the records referred to in
sub-rule ( 3), the Central Government may confinn,
modify or set aside the order or pass such other order
in relation thereto as it may deem just and proper."
From t)le above, it will be amply clear that in exercising its
powers of revision under r. 55 the Central Government mu5t
take into i;:onsideration not only the material which was before
the State .Government but comments and counter-comments, if
any, which the parties may make rejlarding the order of the
State Government. In other words, it is open to th.e pa1 ties to
show how and where the State Government had gone wrong,
or, why the order of the State Government should be confinned.
A party whose application for a mining lease is turned down by
the State Government is therefore given an opportunhy of
showing that the State Government had taken into consideration
irrelevant matters or based its decision on grounds which were
not justified. At the time when applications for a licence are
made by different parties to the State Government, they are not
LSSup/67-7
308
SUPREME COURT. REPORTS
[1967] 3 S.C.R.
giYen a~ opportunity of showing any defects or demelits in the
applications of the others or why their applications shuuld be
preferred to others. The State Government has to make up its
~ind by considering the applicatlo115 before it as to which party
1s to be preferred to the other or others. S.11 ( 3), as already
noted, prescribes the matters which the State Government must
consider before selecting one out of the numerc;ius applicants.
But the po3sibility of the State Government being misled in its
consideration of the matters cannot be ruled out. It may be
that a p~rty to whom a lease is directed to be granted has in fact
no spl?C1al kn~wledge or experi~nce requisite for the mining
operations or 1t may be that hts financial resources have not
been properly disclosed. It may also be that the nature and
quality of the technical staff employed or to be employed by him
is not of the requisite standard. En an application for revision
under r. SS it will be open to an aggrieved party to contend that
:the matters covered by sub-s. (3) of s. 11 were not properly
examined by the State Government, or that the State Government had not before it all the available material fo make up its
mind with respect thereto before granting a licence. In a case
where complaints of this nature are made, of necessity, the Central
Government has to scrutinise matters which were not canvassed
before the State Government. A question may arise in such cases
as to whether the order of the Central Government in the form in
which it was made in this case would be sufficient, specially in
view of the fact that the correctness thereof may be tested in
appeal to this Court.
It is now well-settled that in exercising its powers of revision
under r. S5 the Central Government discharges functions which
are quasi judicial : see Shivji Nathubhai v. The Union of India
& Ors.(') and M. P. Industries v. Union('). In the latter case one
of us (our present Chief Justice) said (at p. 471):
"The entire scheme of the rules posits a judicial
procedure and the Central Government is constituted
as a tribunal to dispose of the said revision. Indeed
this Court in Shivji Nathubhai v. The Union of I.n~ia
(supra) rules that the Central Government cxerc1s1ng
its power of review under r. 54 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949, was acting judicially as a tribunal.
The new rule, if at all, is clearer in that regard and
emphasises the judicial character of the proceeding.
If it was a tribunal, this Court under Art. 136 of the
Constitution can entertain an appeal against the order
of the Central Government made in exercise of its
revisional powers under r. 55 of tbe Rules."
(i}(I96':ji S.C.R. 775.
(2) [1966] 2 S. C.R. 466,
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BHAGAT RAJA v. UNION (Mitter, J.)
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309
A
Let us now examine the question as to whether it was incumbent on the Central Government to give any ·reasons for its
decision on review. It was argued that the very exercise of
judicial or quasi judicial powers in the case of a tribunal entailed
upon it an obligation to give reasons for arriving at a d~ision
for or against a party. The decisions of tribunals in Indta are
B subject to the supervisory powers of the High Courts under
Art. 227 of the Constitution and of appellate powers of this
Court under Art. 136. It goes without saying that both the
High Court and this Court are placed under a great disadvantage if no reasons are given and the revision is dismissed curtly
by the use of the single word "rejected", or, "dismissed" In
such a case, this Court can probably only exercise its appellate
c jurisdiction satisfactorily by examining the entire records of the
case and after giving a hearing come to its conclusion on the
merits of the appeal. This will certainly be a very unsatisfactory
method of dealmg with the appeal. Ordinarily, in a case like this,
if the State Government gives sufficient reasons for accepting
the application of one party and rejecting that of the others,
D as it must, and the Central Government adopts the reasoning
of the State Government, this Court may proceed to
examine whether the reaspns given are sufficient for the purpose
of upholding the decision. But, when the reasons given in the
order of the State Government are scrappy or nebulous and the
Central Government makes no attempt to clarify the same, this
E Court, in appeal may have to examine the case de novo without
anybody being the wiser for the review by the Central Government. If the State Government gives a number of reasons some
of which are good and some are not, and the Central Government merely endorses the order of the State Government
without specifying those reasons which according to it are
sufficient to -uphold the order of the State Government, this
F Court, in al?peal, may find it difficult to ascertain which are the
grounds which weighed with the Central Government in upholding the order of the State Government. In such circumstances,
what is known as a "speaking order" is called for.
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The order of the Central Government of June :2, 1966 is
so wo~ded as to be open to the construction that the reviewing
authority was primarily concerned with finding out whether any
grounds had been made out for interfering with the decision of
the State Government. In other words, the Central Government was not so much concerned to examine the grounds or
the reasons for the decision of the State Government but to find
out whether here was any cause for disturbing the same. Prima
facie the order does not show that the reviewing authority had
anv thought of expressing its own reasons for m:uutaining the
decision arrived at. If detailed reasons had been given by the
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(1967] 3 S,C.R.
State Government and the Central Government had indicated
clearly that it was accepting the reasons for the decision of the
State Government, One would be in a position to say that the
reasons for the grant of a lease to a person other than the
appellant were· obvious. But, where as here, the State Government does not find any fault or defect in the application of the
unsuccessfully applicant and merely prefers another on the ground
that "he had adequate general experience and technical knowledge and was an old lessee without any arrears of mineral dues"
it is difficult to say what turned the scale in favour of the successful
applicant excepting the fact that he was known to the State
Government from before. We do not want to express any views
on this but if this be a proper test, then no new entrant in the
field can have any chance of success where there is an old lessee
competing with him. The order of the Central Government
.does not bring out any reason for its own decision except that
no ground for interference with the decision arrived at was
established.
Now we propose to examine some decisions of this Court
where the question as to whether the reviewing authority should
give reasons for its decisions was gone into. In Harinagar Sugar
Mills v. Shyam Sundar Jhunjhunwala(") this Court had to
consider whether the Central Government exercising appelVate
powers under s.111 of the Companies Act, 1956 before its
amendment in 1960 was a tribUI)al exercising judicial functions
and as such, subject to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court
under Art. 136 of the Constitution and whether the Central
Government had acted in excess of its jurisdiction, or acted
illegally otherwise in directing the company to register the transfer or transfers in favour of the respondents. There, the articles of
association of the company concerned gave the directors the
right in their absolute discretion and without assigning any
reason to refuse to register any transfer of shares. The directors
declined to register some shares in the name of the transferees
who applied to the High Court at Bombay for orders under
s. 38 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 for rectification of the
share register on the ground that the board of directors had
exercised their right ma/a fide, arbitrarily and capriciously. The
High Court rejected tbese petitions on the ground that controversial questions of law and fact could not be tried .in summary
proceedings under s. 38. The transferees request.ed the directors
once more to register the shares. On their refusal to do so,
appeals were preferred to the Central Government under
s.111 (3) of the Indian Companies Act, 1956 which had since
come into operation. The Joint Secretary, Ministry of Finance,
who heard the appeals declined ·to order registration of transfers
(I) [1962] 2 S.C.R. 339 @<' 357.
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BHAGAT RAJA v. UNioN (Mitter, J.)
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practically on grounds similar to those put forward by the High
Court of Bombay. Thereafter, the original holder of the shares
transferred some shares to his son and some to his daughter-iniaw and the transferees requested the company to register the
transfers. The directors once more refused. Against the resolution of the directors, separate appeals were preferred by the son
B and daughter-in-law of the original holder of the shares. The
Deputy Secretary to the Government of India set aside the resolution passed by the board of directors and directed the company
to register the transfers. No reasons were however given for such
order. The company came up in appeal to this Court under Art.
136 of the Constitution. According to the judgment of the
majorit)'
Judges, the exercise of authority by the Central Govc e.rnment of
was judicial as it had to adjudicate upon the rights of
contesting parties when there was a !is between them. It was
observed in that case that
"If the Central Government acts as a tribunal
exercising judicial powers and the exercise of that
power is subject to the jurisdiction of this court under
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Art. 136 of the Constitution, we fail to s~e how the
power of this court can · be effectively exercised if
reasons are not given by the Central Government in
support of its .order."
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This Court further held that there had been no proper trial of
the appeals, no reasons having been given in support of the
orders of the Deputy Secretary who heard them and in the
result, the orders were quashed with a direction that the appeals
be re-heard and disposed of according to law.
In Sardar Govindrao v. State ( 1 ) the appellants who claimed
to be descendants of fonner ruling chiefs in some districts of
F Madhya Pradesh applied under the Central Provinces and Berar
Revocation of Lan;:i Revenue Exemptions. Act, 1948 for grant
of money or pension as suitable maintenance for themselves.
They held estates in two districts on favourable terms as
Ja!zgirdars Maufidars and Ubaridars and enjoyed an exemption
from payment of land revenue aggregating Rs. 27,828-5-0
per
year. On the passing of the Act, the exemption was lost and
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they claimed to be entitled to grant of money or pension under
the pr<;>visions of the Act. They applied to the Deputy
Commissioner who forwarded their applications to the
State Government. These were rejected without any reasons
being given therefor. The appellants file.ct a petition in the High
Court of Madhya Pradesh under Art. 226 of the Constitutfon
H for a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the State Government. l'he High· Court held that the State Government "was
(1) [1965] 1 S.C.R. 678.
312
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1967) 3 S.C.R.
not compelled to grant either money or pension because the
exercise of the power under s. S was discretionary and the peti·
tion, therefore was incompetent." S. S (3) of the C.P. and Berar
Act provided as follows : "The Provincial Government may make a grant
of money or pension( i) for the maintenance or upkeep of any religious, charitable or public institution or service
of a like nature, or
(ii) for suitable maintenance of any family of a
descendant from a former ruling chief."
S. 6 barred the jurisdiction of civil courts. It was observed b}
this Court:
"The Act lays down upon the Government a duty
which obviously must be performed in a judicial
manner. The appellants did not seem to have been
heard at all. The Act bars a suit and there is all the
more reason that Government must deal with such case
in a quasi-judicial manner giving an opportunity to
the claimants to state their case in the light of the
report of the Deputy Commissioner. The appellants
were also entitl~ to know the reason why their claim
for the grant of money or pensipn was rejected by
Government and how they were considered as not
falling within the class of persons who it was clearly
intended by the Act to be compensated in this
manner. . . . . . . . As the order of Government does
not fulfil the elementary requirements of a quasijudicial process YI!: do not consider it necessary to order
a remit to the High Court."
In the result this Court set aside the order of the Government
and directed the disposal of the case in the light of the remarks
made.
In M. P. Industries v. Union(') the order of the Central
Government rej~cting the revision application under r. 55 of the
Mineral Concession Rules was couched in exactly the samo
language as the order in appeal before us (see at p. 475 of the
report). One cannot help feeling that the Ministry concerned
have a special form which is to be used whenever a review
application is to be rejected. This may easily lead anyone to
believe that the review is a sham and nothing but the formal
observance of the power granted to the Cen!):al Government.
In that case, all the three learned Judges of this Court who heard
the appeal were unanimous in dismissing it : sorne of the obser·
(I) [196] I S.C.R. 466.
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vations made bear repetition. It was there 11rgued that if tho
Central Government had to give reasons when it functioned u
a tribunal, it would obstruct the work of the Govenunent and
lead' to unnecessary delays. As to this it said by our present
Chief Justice :
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"The Central Government functions only through
different officers and in this case it functioned through
an Under Secretary. The condition of giving reasons
is only attached to an order made by the Government when it functions judicially as a tribunal in a
comparatively small number of matters and not in
regard to other administrative orders it passes . . ... .
Our Constitution posits a welfare State ..... .
In the context of a welfare State, administrative tribunals
have come to stay. Indeed, they are the nece~sary concomitants of a welfare State. But arbitrariness in their
functioning destroys the concept of a welfare State itself. Self-discipline and supervision exclude or at any
rate minimise arbitrnriness. The least a tribunal can do
is to disclose its mind. The compulsion of disclosure
guarantees consideration. The condition to give reasons
introduces clarity and excludes or at any rate minimises arbitrariness; it gives satisfaction to the party
against whom the order is made; and it also enables
an appellate or supervisory court to keep the tribunals
within bounds. A reasoned order is a desirable condition of judicial disposal.
.
. . . If tribunals can make orders without giving reasons, the said power in the hands of unscrupulous or dishonest officers may turn out to be a
potent weapon for abuse of power. But, if reasons for
an order are given, it will be an effective restraint on
such abuse, as the order, if it discloses extraneous or
irrel~vant considerations, will be subject to judicial
scrutmy and correction. A speaking order will at its
best be a reasonable and at its worst be at least a
plausible one. The public should not be deprived of this
only safeguard."
It was further obseryed in that case that the position of ordinary
courts of law was different from that of tribunals exercising judicial functions and it was said :
H
. "A Judge is trai~ed t~ look at t~ings objectively,
uninfluenced by cons1derallons of pohcy or expediency;
but, an execul!ve officer generally looks at things from
the standpoint of policy and expediency. The habit of
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mind of an executive .offi6er so formed cannot be expected to change from function to function or from act
to act. · So it is essential that some restrictions shall be
imposed on tribunals in the matter of passing orders
affecting the rights of parties; and the least they should
do is to give reasons for their orders. Even in the case
of appellate courts invariably reasons are given, except
when they dismiss an appeal or revision in limine and
that is because the appellate or rcvisional court agrees
with the reasoned judgment of the subordinate court or
there are no legally permissible grounds to interfere
with it. But the same reasoning cannot apply to an
appellate tribunal, for as often as not the order of the
first tribunal is lacoruc and does not give any reasons.
That apart, when we insist upon reasons; we do. not
prescribe any particular form or scale of the reasons.
The extent and the nature of the reasons depend upon
case of aflirmance where the original tribunal gives
hunal shall give its own reasons succinctly; but in a
case of affirmance where the original tribunal gives
adequate reasons, the appellate tribunal may dismiss
the appeal or the revision, as the case may be, agreeing
with those reasons. What is essential is that reasons
shall be given by an appellate or revisional tribunal
expressly or by reference to those given by the original
tribunal. The nature and the elaboration of the reasons
necessarily depend upon the facts of each case."
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It must be noted however that the above view was not shared
by the two other Judges of the Bench constituting this Court. It
was said by them :
"For the purpose of an appeal under Art. 136,
orders of Courts and tribunals stand on the same footing. An order of court dismissing a revision application often gives no reason, but this is not a sufficient
ground for quashing it. Likewise, an order of an adminstrative tribunal rejecting a revision application
cannot be pronounced to be invalid on the sole ground
!hat it do.es not give reasons for the rejection."
They distinguished the case of Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd.(') on
the ground that the Central Government had reversed the. deci·
siOL appealed without giving any. reasons and the latter did not
disclose any apparent grounds for reversal and added :
"There is a vital · difference between the order of
reversal by the appellate authority in that case for no
(1) [19621 2 S.C.R. 339.
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reason whatsoever and the order of affinnance by the
revising authority in the present case."
As has already been :noted, the board of directors in that case
did not give any reasons for the refusal to register and th~ ~entral
Government adopting the same course reversed the decmon of
the directors without giving any reasons. Clearly, the act of the
Central Government there savoured of arbitrariness.· Under the
articles of association of the company, the directors were not
obliged to give any reasons. Their power of refusal was unrestricted if they acted bona fide or in the interest of the company.
The reversal of their discretion clearly amounted to a finding that
they had acted arbitrarily or ma/a fide and one was, left to guess
the reasons of the Central Government for coming to this conclusion. As has already been said, when the authority whose
decision is to be reviewed gives reasons for its conclusion and the
reviewing authority affinns the decision for the reasons given by
the lower authority, one can assume that the reviewing authority
found the reasons given by the lower authority as acceptable to
it; but where the lower authority itself fails to give any reason
other than that the successful applicant was an old lessee and the
reViewing authority does not even refer to that ground, this
Coun has to grope in the dark for finding out reasons for upholding or rejecting the decision of the reviewing authority. After
an a tribunal which exercises judicial or quasi-judicial powers can
certainly indicate its mind as to why it acts in a particular way
and when important rights of parties of far-reaching consequence
to them are adjudicated upon in a summary fashion, without
giving a personal hearing where proposals and counter-proposals
are made and examined, the least that can be expected is that the
tribunal should tell the party why the decision is going against
him in all cases where the law gives a further right of appeal.
On behalf of the res{Xlndents, it was contended that r. 55
whic~ provided for a revision did not envisage the filing of fresh
pleadmgs and fresh material but only invited comments of the
pllrties with regard to the matter before the Central Government.
It was argued that if after going through the comments and
co'!nter-comments t_he C~ntral Government found no reason to
arnve .at a conclusion different from that of the State Governll}Cnt: 1t W'.15 not called upon to disclose any grounds for its decis10n 1~ review. Our. attention was drawn in particular tor. 26 of
the Ml!leral Concession Rules which enjoined upon the State
Gov~rnment to communicate in .writing the reasons for any .order
tefus.1~g ~ grant or re~e~ a mining lease. The absence of any
P.?OV1S1on Ill r. 55 for glVlng such reasons was said to be decisive
911, the.matter ~s·indiCl\tiye of.the view of the legislature that there
was no necessity f~r giving reasons for the order on review. We
find ounel\"e8 unable to ·accept this contention. Take the case
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where the Central Government sets aside the order of the State
Government without giving any reasons as in Harinagar Sugar
Mills' case('). The party who loses before the Central Government
cannot know why he had lost it and would be in great difficulty
in pressing his appeal to the Supreme Court and this Court would
have to do the best it could in circumstances which are not con·
ducive to the proper disposal of the appeal. Equally, in a case
where the Central Government merely affirms the order of the
State Government, it should make it clear in the order itself as
to why it is affirming the same. It is not suggested that the Cen·
trnl Government should write out a judgment as courts of law are
wont to do. But we find no merit in the contention that an
authortiy which is called upon to determine and adjudicate upon
the rights of parties subject only to a right of appeal to this Court
should not be expected to give an outline of the process of reasoning by which they find themselves in agreement with the decision
of the State Government. As a matter of fact, r. 26 considerably
lightens the burden of the Central Government in this respect. As
the State Government has to give reasons, the Central Govern·
ment after considering the comments and counter-comments on
the reasons given by the State Government should have no diffi·
culty in making up its mind as to whether the reasoning of the
State Government is acceptable and to state as briefly as possible
the reasons for its own conclusion.
Our attention was drawn to a judgment of this Court in Nand·
ram Hunatram, Calcutta v. Union of India('). There, one of the
points made by the appellant in the appeal to this Court was that
the order of the Central Government, in review, upholding the
action of the State Government cancelling the mining lease grant·
ed to the appellant was bad inasmuch as no reasons were given. It
was pointed out in the judgment in that case that the facts there
were so notorious that the reasons for the action of the State Gov·
ernment and the confirmation of its order by the Central Government were too obvious and could not possibly be questioned by
anybody. The1·e the partners of the appellant firm had fallen out
among themselves and none of them was willing to spend money
on the colliery with the result that the work came to a stand-still
and the colliery began to get flood~. At this junc~re, Govern·
mcnt stepped in and made ~ pronus~ to the essentt~l workmen
that their wa&es would be paid and this saved the colhery. There·
;1fter, the Chief Inspector of Mines was infom1ed by one of the
partners of the appellant firm that the othe~ partners were pre·
venting him from making payment ~o.r runmng expelll!es of. the
colliery and that he was. not in a position to perfom1 his duties .as
an occupier. He accordingly resigned his office. Tre Manager also
·---- .. ..
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(I) (196212 S.C.R. ,39,
(2) A.1.R.. \966 S.C.R. l9l2
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BHAGAT RAJA v. UNION (Mitter, /.)
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resigned and the Sub-Divisional Officer of the district informed
Government that the situation had become so alam1ing that some
action on the pa1t of the Government was absolutelr nec~ary.
In spite of notice, the partners refused to take any action with the
result that the Government took over the colliery and terminated
the lease. The revision application filed before the Central
Government under r. 54 of the rules was turned down without
giving any reasons. Negativing the contention of the appellant
that the order of the Central Government was bad in law because
no reasons were given, it was said by this Court that
'The documents on the record quite clearly establish that the colliery was being flooded as the essential
services had stopped functioning and but for the
timely intervention of the State Gover~ment the co~
liery would have been lost. In these circumstances, it
is quite clear that the action of the State Government
was not only right but proper and this is hardly a case
in which any action other than rejecting the application
for revision was called for and a detailed order was
really not required because after all the Central Government was merely approving of the action taken in
the case by the State Government, which stood completely vindicated . . . . . The action of
the State Government far from being arbitrary or capricious was perhaps the only one to take and all that the
Central Government has done is to approve of it."
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The last portion of the passage was relied upon by the counsel
for the respondents in support of his argument that as the order
in review is merely in confirmation of the action of the State
Government reasons need not be 'given. But the above dictum
cannot be considered dissociated from the setting of the circum·
'1ances in which it was made. There it was plain as a pike-staff
lhat the State Government had no alternative but to cancel the
lea>e : t~i: absence of any reasons in the order on review could
not possibly !~ave a~ybody in doubt as to whether reasons were.
As ~ matter ?f fact In the setting of facts, the reasons were so
~1bv1?us t~at It .11'.as not necC'.ssary to set them out. There is noth··
mg. in t1h1s dem1on which is contrair to M.P. Industries v.
Un!on( ). What the decision says is that the reasons for the
acuo? of the State were so obvious th.at it was not necessary, on
the fact~ of the case, to repeat them m the order of the Central
Government.
Ou~ attention was also drawn to another judgment of this
Court in Cornmi,V;rioner of Income-tax v. K. V. Pilliah (a). One
th~ -~~-e~~J~~s.. m that case before the High Court of Mysore
(I) (1966] I, S. C. R. 466.
(2) 43 1. T· R. 411.
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.under s. 66(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act was, whether, on
1he facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax
Appellate Tribunal was justified in sustaining both the addition
.of Rs. 41,142/- as income from business and Rs. 7,000/- as cash
credits, nnd whether such addition did not result in double taxa.tion. It was held by this Court that the question whether
Rs. 41,142/- was liable to be taxed fell to be detennined under
the first question. In respect of the other amount of Rs. 7,000/the Income-tax Officer had held that the explanation of the assessec
was untrue and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the
Tribunal had agreed with that view. In this setting of facts, it
•was said by this Couri:
''The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is the final factfinding authority and normally it should record its conclusion on every disputed queftion raised before it, setting
out its reasons in support of its conclusion. But, in failing
to record reasons, when the Appellate Tribunal fully
agrees with the view expressed by ihe Appellate Assistant
Commissioner and has no other ground to record in support of its conclusion, it does not act illegally or irregularly, merely because it does not repeat the grounds of
the Appellate Assistant .Commissioner on which the decision was given against the assessee or the department.
The criticism made by the High Court that the Tribunal
had "failed to perfonn its duty in merely affirming the
conclusion of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner"
is apparently unmeri!PA. On the merits of the claim for
exclusion of the umount of Rs. 7,000/-, there is no question of law which could be said to arise out of the order
of the Tribunal."
The above observations were sought to be pressed i·nto service
'by the counsel for the respondents but there is a good deal of
·difference between that case and the one with which we have · to
·deal. The High Court there was merely called upon to give its
·opinion on the statement of facts set out by ihe Appellate Tribunal.
It was for the Income-tax Officer in the first instance to accept or
reject the explanation with regard to the cash credit. It the Income• tax Officer found the assessee's explanation unacceptable, he had
·to say why he did not accept it. Unless the assessee in appeal was
able to point out to the Appellate aut~o~ities some flaw in the
reasoning of the Income-tax Officer, 1t is not necessary for the
appellate authorities to give their reasons independently. The
explanation of the assessee is either accepted or rejected; but in the
case which we have before .us, the State Government has to consider the merits and demerits of the applications and to give its
reasons why it prefers one to the ?ther or .others. There is a dispute between two or more contestmg parties and the reasons for
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BHAGAT RAJA. v. UNION (Mitter, J.)
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A ·preferring one to the other or others may be more than one. It i&
not a question of accepting or rejecting an explanation. In our
opinion, what was said in the above Income-tax case will not apply
.in the case of a review by the Central Government of a decision of
the State Government under the Act and the Rules.
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It may be of interest to note that in Rex v. Northumberland
Compensation Appeal Tribunal, Ex parte Shaw(') an application
was mi.de in the King's Bench Division in England for an order of
certiorari for the quashing of a decision reached by the Compensation Appeal Tribunal dismissing an appeal by Shaw against an
award to him of compensation for loss of employment as a clerk to
a Hospital Board payable under the National Health Service
c (Transfer of Officers and Compensation) Regulations, 1948. There
the question of the practice and procedure with regard to the issue
of a writ of certiorari was gone into at some length. The tribunal
in that case had made a speaking order, It was contended by the
co•msel for the tribunal that the King's Bench Division had no
power to examine the order in the case before it on certiorari on
D the ground that certiorari went only to defect of jurisdiction, This
was turned down and the Divisional Court held that it had jurisdiction to quash by certiorari the decision of an inferior tribunal
when the latter had embodied the reasons for its decision in its order
and those reasons are bad in law. For our purpose, we need only
refer to the observations of Lord Goddard. C.J. at p. 724 of the
E report where he said :
"I think it is beneficial in this case that we should do so,
not merely having regard to the facts of this case, but
because so many tribunals have now been set up, all of
whom, I am certain, desire to do their duty in the best
way, and are often given very difficult sets of regulations
and statutes to construe. It certainly must be for their
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benefit., and I have no doubt but that they will welcome,
!ha.t this e;ourt s~ould be able to give guidance to them
if, m makmg their or~er~, they make their orders speakmg orders, so that th.is court can then consider them if
they are brought before the court on certiorari."
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The case for giving reasons or for making a speaking order
becomes much stronger when the decision can be challenged not
only by the issue of a writ of certiorari but an appeal to this court.
Counsel for the respondents referred us to the comment on this
c.ase made by Sir C. K. Allen in his Law and Orders (Second EditlOn) at p. 259 to p. 261. According to the learned author the
Northumberland Compensation case might be a great dete~rent
than encouragement to speaking orders inasmuch as "the prospect
(I} (1951] 1 K.B. 71 I. · -
,
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of having their mental process set forth in literary form, might be
extremely disagreeable to them" and up to the year 1956 did not
seem to have assisted iireatly the means of recourse against decisions of inferior jurisdictions. Speaking for ourselves, with great
respect to the learned author, we do not think that the position of
the Central Government as a reviewing authority under the
Mineral Concession Rules can be equated with an appellaie tribunal of the type whose decision was before the King's Bench
Division in England. If the State Government is enjoined by law
to give its reasons, there is no reason why it should be difficult for
the appellate authority to do so. The necessity and the desirability of tribunals making speaking orders has been adverted upon by
different High Courts in India. Thus in Vedachala M udaliar v.
State of Madras(') where the State Government of Madras set
aside the order of the Central Road Traffic Board without giving
any reasons, it was observed that
"When the policy of the Legislature is to confer
powers on administrative tribunals with a duty to discharge their functions judicialJy I do not see any reason
why they should be .exempted from all those safeguards
inherent in its exercise of that jurisdiction. . . .
From the standpoint of fair name of the tribunals and
also in the interests of the public, they should be expected
to give reasons when they set aside an order of an
inferior tribunal. . . . . . Further, if reasons for
an order are given, there wilJ be less scope for arbitrary
or partial exercise of powers and the order 'ex facie' will
indicate whether extraneous circumstances were taken
into consideration by the tribunal in passing the order.'.'
Refrence may also be made to Ramayya v. State of Andhra(')
and Annamalai v. State of Madras(•). To the same effect is the
judgment of the Kerala High Court in Joseph v. Superintendent of
Post Offices, Kottayam (').
We have already commented that the order of the Central Government in this case is couched in the same language as was used
in the case before this court in M.P. Industries v. Union(') in
August J 965. The old rule 55 was replaced by a new rule which
·came into force on 19th July 1965. Whereas the old rule directed
the Central Government to consider comments on the petition of
review by the State ~overnment or other. aut~ority ~nly, the new
rule is aimed at calling upon all the parties mcludmg the State
Government to make their commenw m the matter and the parties
are given the right to make further comments on those made by
(I} A.l:R. 1952 Modras 276.
(2) 1,L.R. 1956 Andhro 712
(3) A.l.R. 1957 Andhra Pradesh 739,
(4) l.L.R. 1961·11Kerala245.
(5) [1966] l S.C.R. 466.
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the other or others. In effect, the parties are given a right to bring
forth material which was not before the State Government. It is
easy to see that an unsuccessful party may challenge the grant of
a lease in favour, of another by ·pointing out defects or demerits
which did not eome to the knowledge of the State Government. The
order in this case does not even purport to show that the comments
B and counter-comments, which were before the Central Governme.nt
in this case, had been considered. It would certainly have been
better if the order of 22nd June 1966 had shown that the Central
Government had taken into consideration all the fresh material
adduced before it and for the reasons formulated they thought that
the order of the State Government should not be disturbed.
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In the result, the appeals are allowed and the orders of the
Central Government passed on 22nd June, 1966 are set aside. The
Central Government is directed to decide the review applications
afresh in the light of the observations made. The appellant will
get his costs throughout from the 3rd respondent.
G.C.
Appeals allowed.
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