I. C. GOLAK NATH & ORS. versus STA TE OF PUNJAB & ANRS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 27 February 1967 | [1967] 2 S.C.R. 762 | 1967 INSC 45
Key facts
- Decided
- 27 February 1967
- Bench
- K. SUBBA RAO*, K.N. WANCHOO*, M. HIDAYATULLAH*, J.C. SHAH*, S.M. SIKRI*, R.S. BACHAWAT, V. RAMASWAMI, J.M. SHELAT, VISHISHTHA BHARGAVA, G.K. MITTER, C.A. VAIDYIALINGAM
- Bench size
- 11
- Case number
- WRIT TO PETITION (CIVIL)... No. 153/1966
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1967] 2 S.C.R. 762
- Neutral citation
- 1967 INSC 45
Text of the judgment
I. C. GOLAK NATH & ORS.
v.
STA TE OF PUNJAB & ANRS.
(With Connected Petitions)
February 27, 1967
B
[K. SVBBA RAo, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, M. HIDAYATULLAH,
J. C. SHAH, S. M. SIKRI, R. S. BACHAWAT, V. RAMASWAMJ,
J. M. SHELAT, V. BHARGAVA, G. K. MITTER AND
C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JI.]
Co11stitution of India, Arts. 13(2), 368, 245, 248, Schedule ?,-Li11 I,
Entry 91-Power to amend Constitution lfhere residu-Wluther resides
c
in Art. 368 or in residuary power of Parlio1nent under Art. 248 read with
Entry 97 List /-Fu11damenta/ Rights in Part Ill whether can be ammded and abridged by tile procedure in Art. 368-'Law' under Art. 13(2)
whether includes constitutional amendt~nJs-Scheme of ConstitutionFunda1nerrtal rights nd1ether intended to be permanent and unamendabl~Amendmen1 whether exercise of
sovereign power-Amendment
whether a political mptter outside the purvlew oi courts.
D
Constitution Seventeenth A1nend111ent Act, 1964-Whether invalid for
contravention of Art. 13(2).
Prospective overruling, doctrine of-Vasi agrarian changer under
coru1ilutional amendmenls-Necersity of preserving pJSt while protecting
lu1ur~tare decisis.
Punjab Security of Land Te11ures Act, 1953 (Act 10 of 1953)Mysore Land Reforms Act (Acr 10 of 1962) as amtnded by Act 14 of
1965-Acts contravening fundamental rights-Whether valid.
The validity of the Punjab Security of Land Tenure. Act, 1953 (Act
10 of I 953) and of the Mysore Land Reforms Act (Act 10 of 1962)
as amended by Act 14 of 1965 was challenged by the petitioners under
Art. 32 of the Constitution. Since these Acts were included in the 9th
Schedule lo the Constitution by the Constitution (Seventeenth) Ameodment Act, 1964, the validity of the said Amendment Act was also challen~cd. Jn this connection it was urged that Sankari Prasad's case in
which the validity of the Constitution (First) Amendment Act, 1951 had
been upheld and Sajjan Singh's case in which the validity of the Constitution (Seventeenth) Amendment Act, 1964, had been upheld by this
Court, had been wrongly decided. It was contended that Parliament had
no power to ame.id fundamental rights in Part Ill of the Constitution.
HELD : Per Subha Rao, C.1., Shah, Sikri, Shelat and Vaidialingam.
JJ. (Hidayatullah, 1. Concurrin11) : Fundamental Rights cannot be abrid~
ed or taken away by the amending procedure in Art. 368 of tr.e Consbtution.
E
F
G
An amendment to the Constitution is 'law' within the meaning
of Art. 13(2) and is therefore subject to Part Jll of the Constitution.
Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Unfon of Indi.l & Anr. [19521 S.C.R.
89 and Sajjarr Sin11h v. State of Rajasthan, [1965) 1 S.C.R. 933, reversed.
Per Subba, Rao, C.J., Shah, Sikri, Shelat and Vaidialingam, 11.
(i) Fundamental rights are the primordial rights necessary for the
development of human pe™>nality. They are the rights which e.!llblc a
H
GOLAKNATH V. PUNJAB
/I.
763
man to chalk out his own life in the manner he likes best. Our Constitution, in addition to the well-known fundamental rights, also included
the rights of minorities and other backward communities in such rights.
[789 El
The fundamental rights are given a transcendental position under our
B
Coostitution and are kept beyond the reach of Parliament. At the
same time Parts III and IV of the Constitution constituted an integrated
scheme forming a self contained code. The scheme is made so elastic
that alt the Directive Principles of State Policy can rea,onably be enforced without taking awar. or abridging the fundamental rights. While recognising the immutab11ity of the fundamental rights, subject to social
control, the Constitution itself provides for the suspension or the modification of fundamental rights under specific circumstances, as in Arts. 33,
c
D
E
F
34 and 35. The non--0b~tante clause with which the IO't article opens
makes it clear that all the other provisions of the Constitution are subject
to this provision. Article 32 makes the right to move the Supreme
Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by the said Pans a fundamental right. Even during grave emergencies Art. 358 only suspends Art. 19 and all other rights are untouched except those sperifically suspended by the President under Art. 3S9.
[789 H; 790 D]
The Constitution has given a place of permanence to the fundamental freedoms. In giving to themselvea tho Constitution the people have
r..erved the fundamental freedoms to themselves. Art. 13 merely incorporates that reservation. The Article is however not the source of
the protection of fundamtntal rights but tho expression of the reservation. The importance attached to the fundamental freedoms is so transcmdental that a bill enacted by a unanimous vote of •It the members of
both Houses is ineffective to derogate from its guaranteed exercise. It is
not what Parliament regards at a given moment as eonducive to the
public bt.nefit but what Part Ill decl;rres protected, which determines the
ambit of the freedom. The incapacity of Parliament therefore in exercise of its amending power to modify, restrict, or impa'!ie fundamental
freedoms in P:rrt III arises from the scheme of the Constitution and the
nature of the freedoms. [792 D-F]
A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, [1950] S.C.R. 88, State of Madras
v.Smt. Champakam Dorairajan, [1951] S.C.R. 525, Pandit M. S. M.
Sharma v. Shri Sri Krishna Sinha, [1959] Supp. I S.C.R. 806 and
Ujjam Bai v. Stat• of Uttar Pradesh, [1963] 1 S.C.R. 778, referred to.
If it is the duty of Parliament to enforce directive
G
there is an express provision.
H
principles it ia
equally its duty to enforce them without infringing the fundamental rildlts.
The verdict of Parliament on the scope of the law of social control of
fundamental rights is not final but justiciable. If it were not so, the
whole scheme of the Constitution would break. (815 H; 816 A-Bl
(ii) Article 368 in terms only prescribes various steps in the matter
of amendment. The article assumes the power to amend found elsewhere. The completion of the procedural steps cannot be said to culminate in the power to amend for if that was so the Constitution makers
could have stated that in the Constitution. Nor can the power be implied either from Art. 368 or from the nature of the articles sought to
be amended; the doctrine of necessary implication cannot be invoked if
There is no necessity to imply any such
power as Parliament has the plenary power to make any law including the
law to amend the Constitution subject to the limitations laid down therein.
[793 E-0]
(iii) The power of Parliament to amend the Constitution is derived
from Arts. 245, 246 and 248 read with item 97 in List I. The residuary
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
764
(1967] 2 S.C.R·
power of Parliament can certainly take in the power to amend the Coll&·
titution. [794 A-DI
Though a Jaw made under Art 24S is s>1bject to the yrovisions of
the Constitution it would be wrong to "'Y that every law o amendment
made under it would necessarily be inconsistent with the articles sought
to be amended. Ii cannot reasonably be said that a lhw llll1ending 111
article is inconsistent with it. The limitation in Art. 24S is in respect of
the power to make a Jaw and not of the content of the law made within
the scope of its power. (794 E-F]
An order by the President under Art. 392 cannot attract Art. 368 II
the amendment contemplated by the latter provisions can be initiated only
by the introduction of a bill in Parliament It cannot therefore be said
that if the power of amendment is held to be a legisMive power the l'f&.
•ident acting under Art. 392 can amend the Constitution in terms of
Art. 368. (794 G-HJ
(iv) 1be Constituent Assembly. if so minded. could certainly bav.
A
B
c
conferred an expre~-s le8islative power on Parliament to amend the Consti-
tution by ordinary legislative proces.. There is, therefore. no inherent
inconsistency berwcen legislative process and the amending one. Whether
in the field of a constitutional law or statutory law amendment can be
brought about only by 'law". [794 C-D)
Article 13(2), for the purpose of that Article, gives an inclu<ive definition of 'law'. It does not prima /acie exclude constitutional law. The
process under Art. 368 :tself closely resemble; the legislative proce5'.
Article 368 is not a complett code in respect of the proeedu •., o!
amendment.
D
The d<.1:ails of procedure in respect of other bills have to
be followed so far as possible in respeco of a Bill under Art 368 also.
The rules made by the House of the People providing procedure for
amendments lay down a procedure similar to that Of other bills with
the addition of certain special provisions. If amendment is intended Ill
be something other than law the constitutional insistence on the said
legjslative process is uMecessary. The imposition of further conditiono
is only a safeguard against hasty action or a protection to the Stab
but does not change the legislative charac141' of the amendment (7950796 CJ
Article 3 of the Constitution permit• changes in States and their boundaries bv a legislative process. Under Arts. 4 and 169 amendments lo
the Constitution are made by 'law' but by a fiction arc deemed not to be
amendments for the purpose of Art. J68. This shows that amendment ii
law and that but for the fiction it would be an amendment within the
meaning of Art. 368. [796 C-F]
Therefore amendments either under Art. 368 or under olher Articlm
are onlv made by Parliament by following the legislative process and are
'law' for the purpose of Art. 13(2). [798 CJ
Mccawley v. The King, (1920) A.C., 691 and TM Brib"Y Commissio111!r v. Pedrick Ran.·inghe, [1964) 2 W.L.R. 1301, referred to.
E
f
G
(v) One need not cavil at the description of amending power as a
wvereign power for it is sovereign only within the scope of the power
conferred by a panicular Constitutl.>n which may expressly limit the
pcwer of amendment both substantive and procedural. It cannot therefore
he said that :tmending power can have no limitations. being a sovercigr
power. [804 B.C]
lbe argument that the amending process involves political auestion ...
and is· therefore outside. the scope of jud:cial revic.v cannot alc:o he acceptecl. It may he Parliament seeks to amend the Constitution for
oolilical reasons hut rht court in denying that power will not be deciding
H
GOLAKNATH V. PUNJAB
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
765
a political que.!tion; it will only be holding that Parliament has no power
to amend particular articles of the Constitution for any purpose whatsoever, be it political or otherwise. [804 E-GJ
(vi) If power to abridge the fundamental rights is denied to Parliament revolution is not a necessary result. The existence of an all comprehensive power canno~ prevent revolution if there is chaos. in t~e country brought abolit by misrule O!' abuse of power. Such cons1derat1ons are
out of place in construing the provisions of the Constituti0n by a Court of
law. [816 B-CJ
(vii) While ordinarily this Court will be reluctant to reverse its previous decisions it is its duty in the constitution.al field to correct itself
as early as possible, for othe.rwise the future progress of the country and
happiness of the people will be at stake. As it was clear that the decision
in Sankari Prasad's case was wrong, it was pre-eminently a typical case
where this Court should overrule it. The longer it held the field the
greater the scope for erosion of fundamental rights. As it contained the
Seeds of destruction of the cherished rights of the poople, the sooner it
was overruled the better for the country. [816. G-H]
The Sup.,lnfendent and Legal Remembrancer State of West Bengal v.
The Corporation of Calcutta, [1967] 2 S.C.R., 170 relied on.
(viii) The Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act; 1964, inasmuch as it takes away or abridges fundamental rights was beyond the
amending power of Parliament and void because of contravention of
Art. 13(2). But having regard to the history of this and earlier amendment to the Constitution, their e,ffect on the social and economic affairs
of the country and the chaotic situation that may be brought about by
the sudden withdrawal at this stage of the amendments from the Constitution it was undesfrable to give retroactivity of this decision. The present
was therefore a fit case for the application of the doctrine of "prospective
overruling", evolved by the courts in the United States of America. [805 E;
807 E, G; 808 C-D]
Great Northern Railway v. Sunburst Oil & R.ef. Co. ( 1932) 287 U.S.
358 : 77 L. Ed. 360, Chicot County Drainage v. Baxter State Bank,
(1940) 308 U.S. 371, Griffin \'. lllionis, (1956) 351 U.S. 12, Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 : 193 L. Ed. 872, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 :
6 .L. Ed. {2nd Edn.) 1081 and Linkletter v. Walker, (1965) 381 U.S. 618,
referred to.
(ix) The doctrine of "prospective overruling" is a modem doctrine
suitable for a fa.st moving society. It does not do av.ay with the doctrine
~f st~re decisis, but confines it to past transactions. While in strict theory
1t may be said that the doctrine involves the making of law, what the
court reaHy does is to declare the law but refuse to give retroactivity
to it. It is reaHy a pragmatic solution reconc "ling the two conflicting
doctrines, namely, thc.t a court finds the Jaw and that it does make law.
It finds law but ·restricts its operation to the future. It enables the court
to bring about a smooth transition by correcting its errors without dis·
turbing the impact of those errors on past transactions. By the applica~
lion of this doctrine the past may be preserved and the. future protected.
[813 A-C; 814 E-F]
9ur Constituti?n does not exr;ressly or ~y necessarv in1nlica'ion speak
against the doctnne of prospective overruling. Articles 32, 141 and
142 are. design.edly made comprehenc;ivc to enable the Suprenie Court to
declare Jaw and to give such directions or pass such orders as are necessary to do complete justice. ·Tue expreS"Sion 'declared' in Art. 141 is
wider than the words 'found or made'. The law declared by the Supreme
Court is the law of the land. If so, there is no acceptable reason 'vhy
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
766
1967) 2 S.CR.
the Coun, in declaring the law in supersession . of tbe law declared by
it earlier, rould not restrict the operation of the Jaw as declared to the
A.
future and save the transactions whether st~tutory or otherwise that wera
affected on the basis of the earlier la"I. [813 F-HJ
As this Coun for tho fir>t time has been called upo1. to a~ply the doctrine evolved in a different country under different circuru~tanccs, it would
like to move warily in the beginning and would Jay <io"ln the following
propositions : ( 1) The doctrine of prospective overruling can be invoted
B
only in matters arising under our Constitution; (2) it can be :ipplied only
..
by the highest coun of the country, i.e. the Suprecno Court as it h.tS
the coostitutional jurisdiction to declare law binding on all the Courts in
India; (3) the scope of the retrospective operation of tho law declared
by the Supreme Coun superseding its earlier decisions is left to its di•·
cretioo to be moulded in accordance with the justice of the cau~e or malttr
before it. (814 C-DJ
c
[Applying the doctrine of prospective overruling in the circwmstances
of the present ca•e the Coun declared that this decision would not affect
the validity of the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act 1964, or
oth..- amendments to the Constitution taking away or abridging the fundamental riglits. It further declared that in future Parliament will
have no power to amend Part 111 of the Constitution so as to tako aY..·ay
or abridge the fundamental rights.) (814 F-0]
D
(ll) As according tc thr above dccis'on. the Consti'.ution (Scv.nleenth
Amendm.in1) Act held the fiel1 the validity of the two impugned Acts,
namely the Punjab Security of Land Tenurct; Act, 10 of I ~53 and tho
Mysore Land Reforms Act, 10 of 1962, a.s amended by Act 14 of 1965,
could not be questioned on the ground that they offended Arts. 13, 14 or
31 of the Constitution. [815 E]
(xi) On the findings the followin~ que•tion• did not fall to be considered :
E
(a) Whether in the exercise of the power of amendment tho fun.
darnental structure of the Constitution may ho changed or
even destroyed or whether the power is restricted to making
modifications within the framework of the original instrument
for its bener effectuation 7
(b) Whether,the amendment of fundamental rights is covered by
the proviso to Art. 368?
, (c) To what extent can 1he provisions of the Constitution other
than fundamental rights be amended '!
(d) To what extent can Pan 111 be amended otherwise than by
·
taking a.way or abridging the fundamental rights ?
le) Whether t1-e impugned Acts could be sustained under the pr<>visions of the Constitution without the aid of Arts. 31A and
31 B of the Schedule.
F
G
Obiter : If neoessity to abridge the fundamental rights does arise the
residuary power of Parliament may be relied upon to call for a constituent
assembly for making a new O>nstitution or radically changing it. The
recent Ac: providin.& for a poll in Goa, Daman and Diu was an inst11ncc
of analogous exercise of such residuary power by tho Parliament. [816
E-FJ
Per Hidayatulla, J. : (i) The 5COpe of the amending power under the
C'..onstltution is nor to be determined by tak..ing an apr•ori view of the
H
GOLAKNATH V. PUNJAB
A
B
c
D
•
E
F
767
omnicompetence of Art. 368. When there is conflict· be.t\veen that J\rticle and Art. 13(2) juridical hermeneutics requires the Court to interpret
them by combining them and not hy destroying one with the aid of the
other. No part in a Constitution is superior to another part unless tfie
Constitution itself says so and there is no accession of strength to any
provision by calling it a code. It is the context of the legal provisions that
illustrates the meaning of the different parts so that among them and between them there should be correspondence and harmony. [857H-858C]
(ii) It is wn:.ng to think of the Fundamental Rights as within Padiament's .giving or taking. They are secured to the people b: 1 Arts. 12, 13,
32. 136, 141. 144 and 226. The High Courts ar.d finally this Court have
been made the Judge" of whether any legislative or executive action on
the part of the State, considered as comprehensively as is possible, offends
the Fundamental Rights and Art. 13(2) declares that legislation which s·0
offends 's to be deemed t0 he void. The general words of Art. 368
cannot be taken to mean that by calling an Act an Amendn1cnt of the
Olnstitution Act a majority of the. total strengh and a 2,· 3rds rnaj:;.;rity
of the members present and voting in each HoU'Se may remove not only
any of the Fundamental Rights but the "'hole Chapter giving them. [860
A-D; 867 E-F]
(iii) In Bri!ain there is no distinction bet·ween constitutional la\\' and
ordinary law as to the procedure of their enactment. In our Constitution
too in •pite of the claim that Art. 368 is a Code Arts. 4, 11 and 169
show that the amendment of the Constitution can be by the ordinary law
making procedure. By this method one of the legislative limbs in a
State can be removed or created. This destroys at one itroke· the claim
that Art. 368 is a code and also that any special method of amendmmt
of the Constitution is fundamentally necessary. [861 E-G]
The only difference between constitutional law and ordinary Jaw c~n
be said to arise- from the fact that constitutional Jaws are generally aroPnoi-able under a process which in vatying degrees. is more difficult or elahorate. This may give a distinct character to the Ja\>v of the Constitution
but it does not serve to distinguish it from the other laws of the land for
the purpose of Art. 13(2). The Article itself does not exclude co~stit11tional law which could have 'been easily done had the constitution m~L:-"'rs.
so intended. [862 B; 866 Bl
An amendment to the Constitution 1s not made unJer po,ver derived
from Arts. 245 or 248 of the. Constitution read with entry q7 of List I.
Tlie power of amendment i.s sui generis. [900 EJ
(iv) A na·rrM•: viev' neci:J "'Jt
be
taken of the
word 'amendmc;t',
By an ame,ndment new matt!'! .. may be added, old matter remnvcd or
G
altered. The power of amending the
Constitution is however not intended to he used for experiments or as an escape.. from restrictions
against undue State action enacted in the Constitution itself. Nor is the
power of amendment available for the puroo:-:e of removing express or
implied restrictions against the State. [862 F; 863 B..C]
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 443 (83 L. Ed. 1385), Luth<r v. Borden.
7 How. 1(12 L. Ed. 58) and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (7 L. Ed; 2d.
633), referred to.
H
The State is no doubt supreme but in the supremacy of its powers it
may create impediments on its own sovereignty, There is no1'hing to prevent the Sfate from placing certain matters outside ~he amendin.g proce\Vhen this happens the ordinary procedure. of amendment ceases
dure,.
to apply. Amendment can then only be by a freshly constituted body.
768
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1967] 2 S.C.R
To attempt to do this otherwise is to attempt revolution which is to alter
the will of the people in an iJJegal manner. Courts can interfere to
nullify the revolutionary change because there is an infraction of
existing JcgaJity. Democracy may be lost if there is- no liberty based on
la" and law based on equality. ·rhe protection of the funda1nental rights
is necessary so that we may not walk in fCM of democracy itself. [863 G;
864 A-C; 865 A-DJ
(v) In Art. 13(2) the restrict'on is against the State. There is a
Jiffercnce between the State and its agencies such as GovernmenJ, Parlia..
mcnt, 1he Legislature of t!1e States, and the local and other authorities.
The State me.ans more than any of these or all of them put together.
By making the State subject to Fundamental Right< it is clearly stated
in A:t. 13(2) that any of the agencies acting alone or all the agencies
acting together are not above the Fundamental Rights. Therefore when
the House of the People ->r the Council of Stales introduces a Bill for
the abridgement of the Fundamcn1al Rights, it ignores the injunction
against it and even if the h\'O Hou~es par,s the Bill the injunction is next
operotive against the President since the expression Government _of India
in the General Clauses Act means the President of India. Thus the
injunc1ion iri Art. 13(2) is against the whole force of the State acting
either in its executive or legislative capacity. [866 E-HJ
, vi) 1: i~ wrong to invoke. the Directive Principles as if there is ~ome
i'1ntinomy belween them and the Fundamental R;ghls. The Directive
Principles Jay down the routes of Stale aclion but 5uch action must avoid
the res·rictions staled in the Fundamental Rights. It cannot be conceived
that i'l. follov.·ing the Directive Principles the Fundamental Rights can be
ignored. [867 G, 868 BJ
(vii) Our Cons!i!ulion has given a g1Jaranteed right to the person.I
who<ie fundamental rights are affcc'ed to move the Court. The guaran~
tee is worthless if the rights arc capable of being taken away. This
makes our C_.onslitution unique and the American or olher foreign
precedents cannot be of much a<sistance. [875 HJ
A
a
c
D
.•
E
Ho//ings\\'Orth v. Virginia, 3 Dall. 378, Leser v. Game//, 258 U.S.
130, Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 and Te:K v. White, 7 Wall, 700,
referred to.
,~.
"':l!I
\-!
le is not that Fundamental Rights are not suhjcct to any change or
mocrfication. The Constitution perm: 1 s ~ curtailment of the- exercise of
most of the Fundamental Rights by stating the limits of that curtailment.
It permits the Fundamental Rights to be controlled but prohibits their
erasure. [878 BJ
(viii) Parliament today is not 1he constituent body as the const:tucnt
assembly was but a co11.s1ituted body v.·hich must hear true allegiance to
the. Constilution as by lav.· eslablished. To chanjlc the Fundan1ental Part
of the individual's ;ibcrty is a usurpation of 1he constituent function'
because they have been placed outside the scope of the power of the
con,•ituted Parliament. [870 B-DJ
l1
Constitution like sC'me others has kept certain matters outside the
amcna..tory procc~"S so that the people's interest may not be betrayed by
1heir representative-;;. In Art. 35 the opening \vor<ls are more than ~ nonobstanre cl;•.use. They exclude Art. 168 and even amend1nen1 of that
Article under the proviso. It is therefore a ,l!reat error :o th;nk of Art.
168 a.; a code or as omnicompclcnt. [901 C-E; 902 A-BJ
G
H
•
769
®LAKNATH V. PUNJAB
A
Garnishee case, 46 C.L.R. 155, referred to.
Article 368 cannot directly be amended by Parliament to confer power
on itself over the fundamental rights. It would be against Art. 13 (2).
Parliament cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly. [878 HJ
B
c
(ix) If it is desired to abridge the Fundamental Right.s the legal
method is that the State must reproduce the power "h1ch It has chosen
to put under restraint. Parlhment must amend Art. 368 to convoke
another constituent assembly, pass a law under item 97 of the· List I
of Schedule 7 to call a constituent assembly, and then that assembly
may be able to abridge or take away the fundamental r;ghts. Any other
method must be rega·rded as revolutionary. [878 D-E; 879 Bl
(x) The various amendments that have been made by Parliament
in Arts. 15, 16 and 19 did not abridge fundamen~l rights and were therefore valid. [879 C, 883 BJ
(xi) Our Constitution accepted the theory that Right of Property is
a fundamental right though perhaps it was an error to do so if sociali•ation was desired. It treated property rights as inviolable except through
law for public good and on payment of compensation. However the
various amendments have significantly changed the position.
D
As a result
of them, except for land within the prescribed ceiling, all other land can
be acquired or rights therein extinguished or modified wi'hout compensation and no i:hallenge to the law can be made under Arts. 14, 19 or 31
of· the Constitution. [887 B; 888 B.C; 896 F-G]
As there is apprehension that the erosion of the right to
property
may be ·practised against other fundamental rights it is necess::i.ry to call
a halt. An attempt to abridge or take away Fundamental Righ10 h)' a
E
F
constituted Parliament even through an amendment of the Constitution
c;in be declared void. This Court has the power and the jurisdiction to
do so.
The opposite view express«! in Sajjan Singh's case was wrong.
[898 B-CJ
(xii) The First, Founh and Seventh amendments of the Constitution
cannot now be challenged because of long acquiescence. It is good sense
and sound policy for the courts to decline to take up an amendment for
consider1tion after a \:onsiderabie )apse of time whe.n it was not chaHenged
before or was sustained on an earlier occasion after challenge. [893 G, H;
90~ D-El
Lt~"
v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922), referred to.
(xiii) In the Seventeenth Amendment, the extension of the definition
G
H
of 'estate' to include ryotwari and agricultural lands is an inroad into the
Fundamen 1al Rights bu! it can_not be questioned in view of the existence
of Art. 31A(l)(a) whose validity cannot now be challenged. The new
definition of estate introduced by the amendment i< beyond the reach of
the Courts .not because it is not law but because it is "law" and falls within
that word in Art. 31(1)(2)(2A) and Art. 31-A(l). [899 C-GJ
The third section of the Act is however invulid. It adds 44 State
Acts to the ninth sch•dule. The Schedule is be;ng used to give advance
protection to legislation which is known or apprehended to derogate from
the Fundamental Rights. The power under Art. 368 was nc>t meant to
;;ive protection to S'ate statute, which offend the Constitution. The intent
here is to silence the· courts and not to amend the Constitution. [900 A-DJ
770
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1967] 2 S.C.R'
(xiv) The two impugned Acts namely the Punjab Security of Land
Tenures Act, 1953 and the Mysore Land Reforms Act, 1962 as amended
A
are valid under the Constitution not- because they are inc.iudc<l in Schedule
9 of the Constitution but because they are protected by Art. 3 l-A and the
President's a;sent. [902 G-H]
Per Wanchoo, Bachaw~t, Ramaswami, Bhargava and Mitter, JJ. (dissenting): Article 368 carries t1'·· power to amend all parts of the Constitution including the fundamental rights in Part III of the Constitution.
An amendment is not 'law· for the purpose of Art. 13(2) and cannot be
tested under that Article.
8
Sri Svnkari Pr{lsacl Singh Dea v. Union of India, [1952] S.C.R. 89 and
Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, [1965] 1 S.C.R. 933, reaffirmed.
Pe1 Wanchoo, Bhargava and Mitter, JJ.-til The Constitution
pro-
vides a separate part headed 'Amendment of the Constitution' and
Art.
c
368 is the only article in that Part. There can,. therefore, be no doubt
that the power to amend the Constitution must be contained in Art. 368.
lf there was any doubt in the matter it is resolved by the words, namely,
"the Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of
the bill". These words can only mean that the power is there to amend
the Constitution after the procedure has been followed. [826 A-DJ
(ii) While there is a whole part devoted to the amendment of the
D
Constitution there is no specific mention of the amendment of the Consti·
tution in Art. 248 or in any entry of List I. It would in the circumstances
be more appropriate to read the power in Art. 368 than in Art. 248 read
with item 97 of List I. [826 H-827 A]
The original intention C'f the Constitution makers \Vas to give residuary
power to the States. The mere fact that during the passage of the
Constitution by the Constituent Assembly residuary power was finally
·ve:;ted in the Union would not therefore mean that it includes the power
E
...
to amend the Constitution. J\{oreover residuary power cannot be used to
change the fundamentul la\• of the Constitution because aU legislation is
under Art. 245 "subject to the provisions of this Constitution". [827 B,
HJ
Mere accident of similarity of procedure provided in Art. 368 to that
prnvi<led for ordinary legislation cannot obliterate the basic difference
r'
between constitutional law and ordinary law. It is the quality and nature
l 1f wh<lt is done under Art. 368 and not its similarity to other procedure
that should be stressed. What emerges after the procedure in Art. 3(,.:J
has been followed is not ordinary law but fundamental law. [829 D· ~30
C-D~
.
'
.
. (iii) The procedure under the pmviso to Art. 111 cannot apply to a
bill to amend the Constitution. If the President ref,"ed to give his assent
to such a hill. the proposed amendment falls. In thiS respect at any rate
the procedure under Art. 368 differs from the ordinary legislative process
[831 B·El
.
(iv) The word 'law• has been avoided apparently with great care in
Art. 368. What emerges after the procedure has been followed is not an
Act but Tilt Constitution stands omended. After that the courts can o~ly
soe whether the procedure in Art. 368 was followed. If it has been
followed th~re is no question of testing the amendment of the Constitution
on .the anvil. of _fundamental rights or in any other way as in the case of
·ordinary leg1slat1on. [83? A-G]
G
H
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB
A
771
(v) To say that 'amendment' in law only means a change which
results in· improven1ent \\'.Ould make ame·ndment impossible for \Vhat is
improvement is a matter of opinion. [834 BJ ·
It may be open to doubt whether the power of amendment contained
in. Art. 368 goes to the extent of completely abrogating the pre.sent
Constitution and substituting it by an entirely new one. But short of that
t):le power to amend includes the powe·r to a<ld any provision to !he
B
C.Onstitution to . alter any provision and substitute any other provision ia
its place or to delete. any provision. [834 F-0]
The 'Seventeenth amendment is merely in exercise of the power of
amendment as indicated above and cannot be struck down on the ground
that ii- goes beyond the power conferred by Parliament to amend the
Constitution by Art. 368. [834 HJ
c
D
E
(vi) There is no express limitation on power of amendment in Art.
368 and no. limitation can or should be implied therein. If the Constitution makers intended certain basic provisions in the Constitution, and
Part 111 in particular~, to be not amendable there is no reason why it was
not so staid in Art: 368. The acceptance of the p·rinciple that theM is an
implied bar to amendment of basic features of the Constitution would
lead to the position- that any amendment tc any article would be liable to
challenge before the courts on the ground thaf it amounted tc amendment
of a basic feature. Constituent power like that in Art. 368 can only be
subject to expteSs limitations so far as the substance of the l'l.mendments
is concerned. [835 A; 836 D, G]
(vii) For interpreting Art. 368 it is not permif•ible to read the
speeches made in the Con'Stituent Assembly. Historical facts namely
,what was accepted or ythat was not accepted or what was avoided in the
€onstituent ~\ssembly can be looked into; but in conntction with Art. 368
no help can be got from the historical material .vailable. [838 CJ
Administrator General of Bengal v. Prem Lal Mullick, ( 1895) XXII
1,A. 107, Baxter v. CommiS!(oner of Taxation, ( 1907) 4 C.L.R. 1"087,
A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madrcs t1950] S.C.R. 88 and The Automobile
Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, [1963] 1 S.C.R. 491,
referred to.
F
(viii) The preamble to the Constitution cannot prohibit or control in
any way or impose any im!J1ied restriction-s or limitations on the power
to amend .the Constitution contained in Art. 368. [838 P.]
In re the Berubari Union and Exchange of Enclaves, [1960] 3 S.C.R.
· 250, referred to.
G
.-
(ix) The word 'law' in Ait. 13(1) d0"5 not include any law in the
nature of a com:tirutional provision for no such law remained in view of
Art. 395 which provided that "the Indian Independence Act, 1947 and the
Government of India Act, 1935, together with all enactments amending
or supplementing the latter Act, but not including the Abolition of Privy
Council Jurisdiction Act, 1949, ore hereby repealed". There is no reason
why if the word 'law' in Art. 13 (I) relating to past laws does not include
any constitutional provision the word 'law' in cl. (2) would take in an
amendment of the Constitution for it would be reasonable to read th~
word in the same sense in both the clauses. [839 D-F]
Article 13(2). when it talks of the State making any law, refers to the·
law made under the provisions contained in Ch. I of Pait XI of the
Con!titution beginning ·with Art. 245. It .can have no reference to the
7 i '2
SGPRDIE COURT REPORTS
[1967) 2 S.C.R.
t_~onsti1t1~nt pLl\\'Cf of ~1n1l!ndmcnt under 1\rl. 368. For it is somewhat
contrJdictory th:tt in Art. 368 p0Y.~r should hav.c been given to amend
;\ny p:o...-ision of the Cun~titution \\'iihout <iny limitations but indrrcctly
th:it pV\\Cr shouh.I hi.; lim:tc~! by u~ing: vtords. o[ doubtful import in .r\rt.
I )(2\. [841 CJ
·rhe pO\\er conferred by the \\'ordc; of Art. 368 being unfettered, in·
consiqcncv bct\\·ccr· that power and the provision in Art. 13(2) must be
Jvoidcd. ·Therefore in kccpir...: Ytitl1 the unfettered power in Art. 368 the
\vord 'lonv' in Art. 13(~) niust he read a.; meaning law passed under the
ordinary legisl.itivc pO\\'Cr and not a constitutional
amendment. The
wmds in Arr. 13(2) are not •pcc1fic and clear enough to be regarded as
.. n express l:m1taticn on Art. 368. [842 G-HJ
(x) f\ferch· hccausc there ,,.·:is some indirect effect on Art. 226 it
have been
also been
dircc:lv afTectc<l by the· sa:d Act and no ratification "·as required on this
ground either. 1845 G-H, 846 CJ
\~·Js not nccl'~~a: v that the Scvcntecn!h Amendment shc:.uld
ralifi~d un<lcr the. proviso to 1\rl. 368. Ari. 245 had not
(xi) The law< added to the Ninth Schedule by the Seventeenth
Amendment Aot hld already been pa'Sed by the State Legislatures and it
\V;i' their constilutionJI infirmity, if any. •vhich was being cured by the
device adopted in Art. 31 B read wilh the Ninth Schedule, the ame..Jmcut hcing only of the rclcv<1nt provi~ions of Part III which were com·
pcndiously put in one place in Art. 31 B. Parliament could alone do it under
Art. ~68 and there "'as no ncccssi:y for any raffication under the or<>viso, for amendment of Part Ill is not entrenched in the proviso. [847 BJ
In curing the infirmity of the said ]a'W'S Parliament was not encroacb.
ing on the exclu~ivc leg:stative powers of the States because only Parlia·
mcnt cou!d cure the infirmity. For the same reason the fal!t that the
laws in question \i.·crc State laws did not make ratification obligatory.
[847 GJ
A
B
C
D
E
A limited meaning cannot be given to Art. 368 because of the possibility of abuse of the power. The check is not in the courts Lo• 'J the people
who elect members of Parliament. [848 F]
The pov.:cr of ;1mcndment contained in a Mitlen federal constitution
a safety valve "'hich to a large extent provides for stable growth and
n1akes violent revolution more or less unnecessary. The fact that in the
lac;t ~ixtecn years a large ncmber of amendment<; could be made and
have hcen made i~ due to the accident that one party h~"' been returned
by electors in sufficient strength to be able to cpmmand s;ccial majorities
v:hich are required in Art. 368, not onlv at the Centre but in aU the
States. But that is :to grou'ld lor limiting the clea( words of Art. 368.
[850 C-D. E]
i~
(xii) Though the period for which Sankari Prasad'.r case has stood
unchallenged is not long. the effects "·hich have fotloi...·cd on the passing
of S'ate la\vc; on the faith of that decic;ion, are so overwhelmine that the
decision should not be disturbed, othcrvdse chaos will follow. 1'his is the
fillclit OO'\sihlc case in which the principle of stare decisis should be
applied. [851 GI
Kes!1av Mills Compa11y, LM. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1965)
2 S.C.R. 908, referred to.
(xiii) The doctrine of prospective overruling cannot be accepted in
this country ... The doctrine accepted here is that courts declare law and
that a declaration made by a court is the law of the land and talces effect
F
G
H
773
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB
A
from the date the law came into force. It. would be unde•irable to give
up that doctrine and superseae it with the doCtrine of prospective overruling. [852 D-FJ
Moreover a law contravening Art. 13(2) is voirl ab initio as held by
this Court in Deep Chand's case and Mahendra Lal Jaini's case. In the
face of these decisions it is impossible to apply the doctrine of prospec-
B
tive overruling to ordinary laws. If constitutional law is to be treated
as ordinary law the same principle applies. If however it is not treated
as 'law' under Art. 13(2) then there is no necessity of applying the principle of prospective overruling for in that case the amendment under
Art. 368 does not have to be tested under A:rt. 13(2). [852 G-H; 853 BJ
c
D
Deep Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 8 and
Mahendra Lal Jaini v. State of U1tar Pradesh, [1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 912,
referred to.
.Per Bachawat J.-(i) Article 368 not only prescribes the procedure
but also gives the power of amendment.
It is because the power to
amend is given by the article that by following its procedure the Constitution stands amended. The proviso is enacted on the assum?tion that
the several articles mentioned in it are amendable; but for the proviso
they would have been amendable under the main part. There is no
other provision. in the Constitution wider which these articles can be
amended. [904 DI
Articles 4, 169, Fifth Schedule Part 1J and Sixth Schedule Para 21
E
empo.wer the Parliament to make amendments to certain parts of the
Constitution by law, and by express provision such law is deemed not to
be amendment for .the purpose of Art. 368. All other provisions of the
Constitution can be amended by recourse to Art. 368 only. No other
article confers the power of amending the Constitution. [904 E-F]
(ii) The power to amend the Com;titulion cannot be said to reside
in Art. 248 and List I, item 97 because if amendment could be made by
ordinary legislative process Art. 368 would be meaningless. Under the
residual power the Parliament has no competence to make any law with
F
·resp<ct to any matter enumerated in Lists II and III of the 7th Schedule,
but under Art. 368 even Lists II and Iii can be amended. Moreover a
law passed by residual power is passed by virtue of Art. 245 and must be
subject to the provisions of the Conc;titution so that it ·cannot
from the Constitution or amend it.
derOitate
Such a law would be vo;d. [905 C-F]
G
(iiil Article 368 gives the power of amending 'this Constitution'.
This Constitution means every part of the Constitut:~n including Part III
and Art. 13(2). Thus Art. 13(2) is also within the reach of the amending oower. Instead of controlling Art. 368 it is controlled by that Article.
[906 C-D; HJ
H
(iv) The contention that a constitutional amen..:ment under Art. 368
is a law within the meaning of Art. 13 must be rejected. The distinction
between the Constitution and law is so fundamental that the Constitu·
tion is not regarded as a law or a legislative act. The Constitution means
the Constitution as amended. An -amendment made in 1,;onformity with
Art. 368 is a Tiart of the Constitution and is likewise not law. Save as
exoressly provided in Arts. 4, I 69 Fifth
Schedule
Part D
and Sixt~
Schedule para 21 no law can amend the Constitution and a law which
purports to make such an amendment is void. It is for this reason that
Art. , 368 avoids all reference to law meking by the Parliament. There
LJ Sup. Cl/67-4
.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
774
[l 967] 2 S.C.R.
are also n1at;rial differences between the ordinary laW making procedure
and the procedure under the Article. [907 B-F; 908 D-HJ
If a constitution::il amendment creating a new fundamental ·right and
incorporating it in Part III were a law, it would m>t be open to the
Parliament by a subsequent am~ndment to abrogate the new fundamental
right for such an amendment \.\'ould be rcpugn:..1nt to Part III. But the
ctJnclusion is absurd for the body which enacted the right can surely
take it away by the same process. [909 E]
A
B
Me1rhury v. Madison, (1803) 1 Cranch 137: 2 L.Ed. 60 and Riley v.•
Carter, 88 A.L.R. 1008, referred to.
(v) There is no conflict between Arts. 13(2) and 368. The two
articles operate in different fields, the former in the field of law, the
lat,ter in that of constitutional amendment. [910 BJ
(vi) The 11011-ohsrante clause in Art. 35 does not show that the • C
article is not amendable.
The non-oh'itante clause is to be found also in
Arts. 258( I),, 364, 369. 370 and 371A. No one has suggested that these
articles arc not amen~,able. [910 DJ
(vii) The words· 'fundamental' used ;. regard to rights in Part III
and the word 'guaranteed' in Art. 32 do not mean that the said rights
cannot be amended. The Constitu:ion is never at rest~ it change3- with.
the progress of time. The scale of values in Parts Ill and IV is not
immo'!tal and the~-e· P:lrts being parts of the Constitution are not immune
D
from amendment under Art. 368. [910 F-GJ
The impugned amendments to be Constitution w~re made to meet the
situations created by decisions of this Court and to carry out urgent agra·
rian reforms. If it is held that the rights conferred by Part III cannot
be abridged or taken away by constitutional amendments, all these
amendments wou]d be invalid.
The Constitufion makers could not have
intended that the rights conferred by Part III could not be altered for
giving effect to the policy of Part IV. Nor was it inte11ded that defects
in P"rt Ill could not be cured or that oossible errors in judicial interpretations of Pan 111 could not be rectified by oonstitutiot)td1 amendments.
[913 D-E]
(viii) It cailnot be said that the people in cxcrci<-:e of thei·r sovereign
power have placed the fundamental rights beyond the reach of the
amending power. The people acting through the Constituent Assembly
reserved for themielves certain rights and liberties and o·rJained that
they shall not be. curtailed by ordinary legislation. But the people by
the same Constitution also authorised the Parliarner\ to m·ake amendments to the Constitution.
In exercise
of
the
amending power
E
the
Parliament has amole anthoritv to abridge or take away ,the fundamental
tights under Part 111. [915 B-CJ
Merely because of possibility of abuso, the power cannot be denied.
[916 HJ
Webb v. Owrim, [1907j A.C. 81 and An1a/gamated Societv of Eni?ineers v. The Adelaide Steonirhlp Company Limited & Ors. 18 C.L.R. 129,
G
referred to.
(ix) The main part of Art 368 gives the power to amend or make
chang<>s in the Constitution.
A change is
aot necessarily an. improve-
ment. Normally the change is made with the object of making an im- H
provement but the experiment may fail to achieve the purpose. [916 A]
Livermore v. E. G. Waite, 102 Cal. 113-25 LR.A. 312 and Nationo(
J•rohihitia~ ca.W'.
253 ·U.S. 350, referred to.
-
GOLAKNATH V. PUNJAB
775
A
(x) The best exposition of the Constitution is that which it has re·
ceived from contemporaneous judicial decisions and enactments. No one
in Parliament doubted the proposition that fundamental rights could be
amended, when the First Amendment Act of 1951 was passed. The concept of amend.ability was upheld in S. Krishnan & Ors. v. State of Madras
(1951) S.C.R. 621 decided in 1951, in Sankari Prasad decided in 1952 and
Sajjan Singh decided in 1964. [918 C-D]
B
(xi) There is no provision in the Constitution for cal.ling a convention for its revision or for submission of any proposaJ for amendment to
the referendum. [918 G)
(xii) The impugned amendments affected Arts. 226 and 245 only
indirectly and did not require ratification under the proviso to Art. 368.
[919 D-HJ
c
Jn validating the impugned laws Parliament was not encroaching
on the State List. Jt was only validating the said laws and such constitutional validation was within its competenct>. [920 C-E]
(xiii) The ·abolition of Zamindari was a necessary reform. It is the
First Constitution Amendment Act that made this reform possible. No
legal argument can restore the outmoded feudal Zamindari system. What
has been done cannot be undone. The battle for the past is lost. (921
B.C]
D
(xiv) Jf the First, Fourth, Sixteenth & Seventeenth Amendment Acts
are void they do not legally exist from their inception. They cannot be
valid from 1951 to 1967 and invalid thereafter. To say that they were
valid in the past and will be invaJid in the future is to amend .the Const!·
tution. Such a naked power of amendment is not given to the Judges
and e""erefore the doctrine of prospective overruling cannot be adopted.
[921 D-EJ
It is not possible to s&y that the First and Fourth Amend"1cnts though
otiginally valid have now been validated by acquiescence. If they in·
fringe Art. 13(2) they were void from their inception. If these amend,
mcnts are validated by acquiescence the Scve11tccnth Amendment i">
equally validated. [921 F; 922 BJ
(xv) The contention that Dr. Ambcdkar did not regard the fundamental rights as amendable is not supported by the speeches in the
Constituent Assembly. [922 C-DJ
0
E
F
G
H
Per Ramaswami J.-(i) In a written Constitution the amendment of
the Constitutiof'I is a substantive constituent act which is made i'l the
exercise of the sovereign power through a predesigned procedure uncon·
nected witn ordinary legislation. The amending power in Art. 36S is
hence sui generis and cannot be compared to the law making power of
Parliament pursuant to Art. 246 read with Lists II and Ill. It follows
that the expression 'law' in Art. 13 ( 2) cannot he construed as including
an amendment of the. Constitution which is achieved by Parliament in
exerciSe of its sovereign constituent power, but must mean law made by
Parliament in its legislative capacity under Art. 246 read with List I and
lII of the 7th Schedule. It is also clear on the same line of reasoning
that law. in Art. 13(2) cannot be construed so as to include 'law' made
by Parliament under Arts. 4, 169, 392. 5th Schedule Part D and 6th
Schedule para 21. The amending power of Parliament exercised under
these Articles stands on the same pedc~tal as the constitutional amend·
men! made under Art. 368 so far as Ar\. 13(2) is concerned. [930 H931 EJ
(ii) The language of Art. 368 is perfectly general and cmpowe1>1
Parliament to amend the Constitution without ;;iny exception whatsoe\'er.
Sul'REME COURT REPORTS
(1967] 2 S.C.R.
The use of the word 'fundameatal' to de<eribe the rights in Part Ill and
the word 'guaranteecl' in Art. 32 cannot lift the fundamental rights above
the Con.stitution itself. [931 F, HJ
A
(ili) It is unrea.,onable to suggest that what Art. 368 provides is only
the mechanics of the procedure for amendment and not the power to
amend. The significant fact that a separate part has been devoted in the
Constitution for "amendment of the Constitution" and there is only one
Article in that Part shows that both the power and the procedure to
amend are enacted in Art. 368. Again the words "the Constitution shall
stand amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill" in Art. 368
clearly contemplate and provide for the power to amend after the re·
qui jte procehre has been followed. [932 C-EJ
(iv) The power of constitutional amendment cannot 'all within Arts.
246 and 248 read wirh item 97 of List I bei:ause it is illogical and a COD·
tradiction in terms to say that the amending po· "/Cr can be exercised
"subject to the provisions of the Constitution" as the power under these
articles must be. [933 BJ
c
(v) There is no room for an implication in the construction of Art.
368. If the Constitution makers wanted certain basic f°"tures t<' be
un=endable they would have said so. [933 G·HJ
State of West Bengal v. Union of India. [1964J I S.C.R. 371 and ln
re The Berubari Union and Exchange of Enclaves [1960J 3 S.C.R. 250,
D
referred to.
The concepts cf liberty and equality arc changing and dynamic and
hence the notion of j)Cnnanency or immutability cannot be attached to
any of the fund>mental rights. The adjustment between freedom and
compulsion, between the rights of individuals and the social interest and
welfare must necessarily be a matter for changing needs and conditions.
The proper aDproach is therefore to look upon the fundamental rights of
lbe individual as conditioned by social responsibility, by the necessi·
tics of the society, by the balancing of interests and not as pre-ordained
and untvuchable private rights. [934 E-935 CJ
(vi) It must not be forgotten that neither the rights in Art. 31 nor
those in Art. 19 are absolute. The purposes for which fundamental
rights can be regulated which arc specified in els. (2) to (6) could not
have been assumed by the Constitution makers to be static and incapable
of expansion. It cannot be a.~umed that the Constitution makers in·
!ended to forge a polit!::al strait-jacket for generations to come. Today
at a time when absolutes arc discredited, it must not be too readily assum·
cd that there are basic features of the Constitution w~'~h shackle the
amending power and which take orecedence over the general welfare of
the nation and the need for agrarian and social reform. [936 B·93 7 CJ
E
F
(vii) In construing Art. 368 it is essential to r..:membcr the nature
ond subject matter of that Article and to interpret it subj<ctat mattrks.
lbe pow<-'r of amendment is in point of quality an adjunct of sovereignty.
It is in truth the exercise of the highest sovereign oo\vcr in the State. If
the 1mending power ic; an adjunct of sovereignty it does not admit of
a.ay 'mitaticns. [93 7 DJ
G
t·nii) If the fundamental rights arc uoamcndable and if Art. 368
does not include any such power it follows that the amendment of, say,
Art. 31 by in,.rtions of Arts. :;JA and 318 can only be made by a
violent revolution. It is doubtful if the proceedings of a new Constituent Assembly that may be called will have any legal validity for if the
H
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB
A
777
Constitution provides its own method of amendment any other method
will be unconstitutional and void. [490 A-Bl
George S. Hawke v. Harvey C. Smith, 64 L.Ed. 871 and Feigmspan
v. Bodine, 264 Fed. 186, referred to.
B
(ix) It is not permissible in the first place to assume that in a matter
of constitutional amendment there will be abuse of power and then
utilise it a. a test for finding out the scope of the amending power. In
the last analysis political machinery and anificial limitations will not protect the people from themselves. (941 F-G]
State of West Bengal v. Union of India, [1964] l S.C.R. 371 and
American Federation of Labour v. American Sash & Door Co. 335 U.S.
538, referred to.
c
(x) What the ·impugned Act
purpons to do is not to make
any
land legislation but to protect and validate the legislative measures passed
by dilferC!!t State legislatures. This was within the legislative compe-
tence of Parliament. (942 FJ
Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, National Prohibition Cases,. 253
U.S. 350 and United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, referred to.
D
E
Articles 226 and 245 were not directly affected by the impugned Act
and therefore no ratification by the St•t• Legislatures was necessary. {942
D-H; 945 DJ
A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, [195CJ S.C.R. 88, Ram Singh &
Ors. v. State of Delhi & Anr., [1951] S.C.R. 451, Express Newspapers
(Pvt.) Ltd. v. Union of India, (19591 S.C.R. 12, Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd.
v. State of Assam, [19611 I S.C.R. 809 and Naresh Slzridhar Mlrajkar v.
State of Maharashtra [1966] 3 S.C.R. 744, referred to.
(xi) Even on the assumption that the impugned Act is unconstitt>tional thr principle of stare decisis must be applied to the present case
and the plea made by the petitioners for reconsideration of Sankar/
Prasad's case and Sa/Jan Singh's case must be rejected. (948 D-EJ
On the findings it was not necessary to express an opinion
doctrine of prospective overruling of legislation. [948 G-H]
F
on the
Writ Petition No. 153 of 1966.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of
the Fundamental Rights)
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION:
And
G
Writ Petition No. 202 of 1966.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of the Fundamental Rights)
And
H
Writ Petition No. 205 of 1966.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement
of the Fundamental Rights)
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
778
[1967] 2 S.C.R.
/11 Writ l'etitio11 No. 153 of 1966.
;.
R. V. S. Mani. S. K. Meflta and K. L. Mehta, for the Petitioners.
Niren De, Additional Solicitor-General of India, and R. N
Sachthey, for the Respondents.
Niren De, Additional Solicitor-General of India, G. R. Rajagopal, and R. H. Dhcbar, for Intervener No. I.
B
S. D. Banerjee, Adl'Ocate-Gencral for the State of West Bengal,
B. S~1. and /'. K. Bose, for Intervener No. 7..
Lal Narain Sinlla, Advocate-General for tlie State of Bihar,
Bajrani: Sa/za, M. M. Gajadhar, K. M; K. Nair, D. P. Singh,
.W. K. Ramanwrt/1i, R. K. Garg, S. C. Aganva/a and G.D. Gupta.
for Intervener No. 3.
Mohan Kumaramangalam. Advocate-Genera/ for 1/1e State of
Madras, B. Ramanwrthi and A. V. Rangam, for Intervener
~o. 4.
V. D. Mahajan and R. H. Dhebar, for Intervener No. 5.
C
D
K. L. Mis/mt, Advocate-Ge11eral for the State of Uttar Pradesh,
and 0. P. Rana, for Intervener No. 6.
V. A. Seyid Muhamad, A dvocatc-General for tlie State of
Kera/a, B. R. L. Iyengar, A. G. Pudissery, fo~ Intervener No. 7.
E.
Na1111i1 Lal, for Intervener No. 8.
I(_
B. Mehta, for Intervener No. 9.
P. Ram Reddy and T. V. R. Tataclwri, for Intervener No. 10.
M. C. Stea/rad, 11. R. L. Iyengar and R.H. Dhebar, for Intcr\'encr No. 1 I.
R. Thiagarajai:, for Intervener No. 12.
D. N. Mukherje.:, for Intcrv.:ners Nos. 13 a'1d 19 to 21.
E. Udayaramam, S. S. Dalal and D. D. Sharma, for Inter\'Cner~ Nos. 14 and IS.
R. K. Garg, D. P. Singh, M. K. Ramamurthi, S. C. Aganva/a,
G. n. Gupta and K. M. K. Nair, for Intervener No. 16.
} . Parasara11 and K. R. Chaudhuri, for Intervener No. 17.
IJasudev Prasad, K. Parasaran
Intervener No. 18.
and
G
K. R. Chaudhuri, for
Basudev Prasad, K. Rajendra Chaudhuri, K. R. Chaudhuri
and S. N. Prasad, for Interveners Nos. 22 to 24.
H
GOI:AKNATH V. PUNJAB
A
B
In Writ Petition No. 202 of 1966.
M. K. Nambyar, K. B. Jinaraja Hegde, N. A. Subramaniam,
Bhuvanesh Kumari, 0. C. Mathur, J. B. Dadachanji and Ravinder Narain, for the Petitioner.
H. R. Gokhale, B. R. G. K. Achar, R. H. JJhebar, R. N.
Sachthey and S. P.. Nayyar, for Respondent No. I.
Niren De, Additional So/:citor-Genera/, N. S. Bindm and
· R. N. Sachthey, for Respondent No. 2.
A. K. Sen, F. S. Nariman, M. L. Bhakte, S. I. Thakere, J.B.
Daclachanji, 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for l11tervener
No. I.
N. A. Palkhiwala, F. S. Nariman, M. L. Bhakte, D. M. Popat,
0. P. Malhotra, J. B. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder
Na rain, for Intervener No. 2.
D. M. Parulekar, B. Dutta. J. B. Dadacha11ji, 0. C. Mathur
and Ravinder Narain, for Intervener No. 3.
D
E
F
G
H
in Writ Petition No. 205 of 1966.
M. K. Nambyar, K. B. Jinaraja Hegde, N. A. Subramaniam,
Bhuvanesh Kumari, 0. C. Mathur, J. B. Dadachanji and Ravinder Narain, for the Petitioner.
H. R. Gokhale, B. R. G. K. Achar, R.H. Dhebar and S. P.
Na;vyar, for Respondent No. I.
S. G. Patwardhan, D. M. Paru/ekar, B. Dutta, S. K. Dhelika,
J. B. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for th~
Intervener.
[The Judgment of SUBBA RAo, C.J., SHAH, SIKRI, SHELAT
and VAIDIALINGAM, JJ. was delivered by Su1!BA RAO, C.J.
According to this Judgment-(i) the power to amend the Co-stitution is not to be found in Art. 368 but in '\rts. 245, 246 and
248 read with Entry 97 of List I; (ii) the amending power cannot be used to abridge or take away the fundamental rights
guaran~eed in Part III of the Constitution; (iii) a law amending
the Constitution is "Law" within the meaning of Art. 13(2) and
(iv) the First, Fourth and Seventeenth Amendments though
they abridged fundamental righ's were valid in the past on the
bas:s of earlier decisions of this Court and continue to be valid
for the future. On the application of the doctrine of "prospective
over-ruling", as enunciated in the judinnent, the decision will have
only prospective operation and Parliament will have no power
to abridge or take away Fundamental Rights from the date of the
judgment.
The Judgment of WANCHOO, BHARGAVA and MITTER, JJ. was
delivered by WANCHOO, J. According to this Judgment (i) the
780
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1967] 2 S.C.R.
power of amending the Constitution resides in Art. 368 and not
in Arts. 245, ~46 and 248, read with Entry 97 of List I; (ii) there
are no restrictions on tne power if the procedure in Art. 368 is
followed and all the Parts of the Constitution including Part III
can be amended, (iii) an amendment of the Constitution is not
"law" under Art. 13(2); and (iv) the doctrine of "prospective
overruling" cannot be applied in India.
HIDAYATULLAH, J. delivered a separate judgment agreeing
with SUBBA RAO, CJ. on the following two points: (i) that the
power to amend the Constitulion cannot be used to abridge or
take away fundamental rights; and (ii) that a law amending the
Constitution is "law" under Art. 13 (2). He agrees with WANCHOO,
J. that the power to amend does not reside in Arts. 245 and 248
read wi!h Entry 97 of List I.
Art. 368, according to him, is sui generis and procedural and
the procedure when correctly followed, results in an
.imendment. He does not rely on the doctrine of "prospecti"e
overruling". As regards the First, Fourth and Seventh Amendments, these having long enured and been acquiesced in, he does
no! treat the question of their validity as being before him. As
regards the Seventeenth Amendment he finds sufficient support for
it in the Constitution as amended by the First, Fourth and Seventh
Amendments and holds that the new definition of "estate", introduced by the Amendment, though it is "law" under Ari. 13 (2)
and is an inroad into fundamental rights, is beyond the reach of
the courts because it fal.Is within the word "law" in Arts. 31 ( 1),
(2), 2A and 31A(I ). He, however, declares sec'.ion 3 of the
Seventeenth Amendment Act ultra vires the amendin 6 process as
an ille:;itimate exercise of the amending power.
BACHAWAT and RAMASWAMt, JJ. delivered separate judgments concurring with WANCHOO, J.]
A
B
c
D
E
F'
Subbarao, C.J. These three writ petitions raise ·he important
question of the validity of the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964.
Writ Pe!ition No. 153 of 1966, is filed by the petitioners
therein against the State of Punjab and the Financial Commissioner, Punjab. The petitioners are the son, daughter and granddaughters of one Henry Golak Nath. who died on July 30, 1953.
The Financial Commissioner, in revision against the order made
by the Addi'ional Commissioner, Jullundur Division, held by an
order dated January 22, 1962 that an area of 418 standard acres
and 9! units was surplus in the hands of the petitioners under the
provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act X of 1953,
read with s. I 0-B thereof. The pe!itioners, alleging that the relevant provisions of the said Act whcreunder the said area was
G
II
GOLAKNATH
B
c
v. PUNJAB (Subba Rao, C.J.)
781
declared surplus were void on the ground that they infringed their
rights under els. ( f) and ( g) of Art. 19 and Art. 14 of the Constitution, filed a writ in this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution for a direction that the Constitution (First Amendment) Act,
1951, Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, Constitution
(Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, insofar as they affected
their fundamental rights were unconstitutional and inoperative
and for a direction that s. 10-B of the said Act X of 1953 was
void as violative of Arts. 14 and 19( 1 )(f) and (g) of the Constitution.
Writ Petitions Nos. 202 and 203 of 1966 were filed by different petitioners under Art. 32 of the Constitution for a declaration
that the Mysore Land Reforms Act (Act 10 of 1962) as amended by Act 14 of 1965, which fixed ceilings on land holdings and
conferred ownership, of surplus lands on ter.ants infringed Arts.
14, 19 and 31 c.f the Constitution and, therefore, was unconstitutional and void.
The States of Punjab and Mysore, inter alia, contended that
the said Acts were saved from attack on the ground that they in. fringed the fundamental rights of the petitioners by reason of the
Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, which, by
amending Art. 31-A of the Constitution and including the said
two Acts in the 9th Schedule thereto, had placed them beyond
attack.
In Writ Petition No. 153 of 1966, 7 parties intervened. In
E
Writ Petition No. 202 of 1966 one party intervened. In addition, in the first petition, notice was given to the Advocates General of various States. All the learned rounsel appearing for the
parties, the Advocates General appearing for the States and the
learned . counsel for the interveners have placed their respective
We are indebted '.o all of
F viewpoints exhaustively before us.
them for their thorough preparation a,d clear exposition of the
difficult questions of law that were raised in the said petitions.
D
At the outset it would be convenient to place briefly the resJ.!ctive contentions under different heads : ( 1) The Constitution is
intended to be permanent and, therefore, it cannot be amended in
G a way which would injure, maim or destroy its indestructible
· character. (2) The word "amendment" implies such an addition
or change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect
an improvement or better carry out the purpose for which it wa'
framed and it cannot be so construed as to enable the Parliament
to destroy the permanent character of the Constitution. (3) The
fundamental rights are a part of the basic structure of the ConstiH
tution and, therefore, the said power ca": be exercised only to
preserve rather than destroy the essence of those rig!its. ( 4) The
limits on the power to amend are implied in Art. 368, for the
782
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
( 196 7] 2 S.C.R.
expression "amend" has a limited meaning. The wide phraseo- A
logy used in the Constitution in other Articles, such as "repeal"
ilnd "re-enact" indicates that art. 368 only enables a modification
of the Articles within the framework of the Constitution and not
a destruction of them. ( 5) The debates in the Constituent Assembly, particularly the spc~ch <.l Mr. Jawahar Lal Nehru, the first
Prime Minister of India, and the reply of Dr. Ambedkar, who B
piloted the Bill disclose ~!early that it wa' never the intention of
the makers of the Comlitution by putting in Art. 368 to enable
the Parliament lo repeal the fundamental rights; the circumstances
under which the ame11dment moved by Mr. H. V. Karnath, one of
the members of Constituent Assembly, was withdrawn and An. 368
was finally adopted. support th.z contention that amendment of c
Part III is outside tlie scope of Ar'. 368. ( 6) Part III of the
Constitution is a self-contained Code and its provisions are ~las
ric enough to m~et all reasonable requirements of changing situations. ( 7 i The power to amend is sought to be derived 1. Jm
three •ources. name!\', ( i) bv implication under Art. 368 it~elf;
the procedure to amend culmina'ing in the amendment of the
Constitu· ion necessarily implie> that power. (ii) the power and D
the limits of the power to amend arc implied in the Articles sought
to be amended, and (iii) Art. 368 only lays down the procedure
to amer.d, but the power to amend is only the legislative power
conferred on the Parliament under Arts. 245, 246 and 248 of the
_Constitu!ion. ( 8) The definition of "law" in Art. 13 ( 2) of the
Constitu'.ion includes every branch of law, statutory, constitu- E
tional, etc., and therefore, the power to amend in whichever
branch it may be classilie:I, if it takes away or abridges fundamental rights would be void thereunder. (9) Ti.e impugned
amendment detracts from the jurisdiction of tlie High Court under
An. 226 of the Constitution and also the legislative powers of the
S.tates and therefore it falls within the scope of the proviso to An.
~68.
Th.~ said summary. though not exhaustive. broadly gives the
various nuances of the conter.tions raised by the learned counsel,
who question the validity of the 17th Amendment. We have not
noticed the other arguments of Mr. Nambiar, which are p<-.culiar
to the Writ Petition No. 153 of 1966 as those questions do not
arise for decision. in lhe view we are taking on the common
question>.
On behalf of the Union and the States the following points
were pres!'ed : (I ) A Constitutional amendment is made in exercise of the soverei1m pow~r and not legislative power of Parliament and. therefore. it partakes the quality and character of the
Constitution itself. (2) The real distinction is between a rigid
and a flexible Constitution. The distinction is ba~d upon the
express limits of the amending power. (3) The provisions of Art.
F
G
H
•
GOLAKNATH
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
v. PUNJAB (Subba Rao, C.J.)
783
368 are clear and unequivocal and there is no scope. for invoking
implied limitations on that power: further the doctrine of implied
power has been rejected by the American courts and jurists. ( 4)
The object of the amending clause in a flexible Consetitution is to
enable the Parliament to amend the Constitution in order to
express the will of the people according to the changing course
of events and if &mending power is restricted by implied limitations, the Constitution itself might be destroyed by revolution.
Indeed, it is a ;afety valve and an alternative for a violent change
by revolution. (5) There are no basic and non-basic features of
the Constitution; everything in the Constitution is basic and it can
be amended in order to help the future growth and progress of
the country. ( 6) Debates in the Constituent Assembly cannot be
relied upon for construing Art. 368 of the Constitution and even
if they can be, there is nothing in the debates to prove positively
that fundamental rights were excluded from amen 'ment. (7) Most
of the amendments are made out of political necessity: they in·volve questions, such as, how to exercise power, how to make the
lot of the citizens better and the like and, therefore, not being
judicial questions, they are outside the court's jurisdiction. (8)
The language of Art. 368 is clear, categorical, imperative and
universal; on the other hand, the language of Art. 13(2) is such
as to admit qualifications or limitations and, therefore, the Court
must construe them in such a manner as that Article could not
control Art. 368. (9) In order to enforce the Directive Principles
the Constitution was amended from time to time and the great
fabric of the Indian Union has been built since 1950 on the basis
that the Constitution could be amended and, therefore, any reversal of the previous decisions would introduce economic chaos in
our country and that, therefore, the burden is very heavy upon
the petitioners to establish that the fundamental rights cannot
be amended under Art. 368 of the Constitution. ( 10) Art. 31-A
and the 9th Schedule do not affect the power of the High Court
under Art. 226 or the legislative power of the States though the
area of their operation is limited and, therefore, they do not fall
within the scope of the proviso to Art. 368.
The aforesaid contentions only repre,ent a brief summary of
the elaborate arguments advanced by :earned counsel. We shall
deal in appropriate context with the other points mooted b.efore·
ils.
H
It will be convenient to read the material provisions of the
Constitu'ion at this stage.
Article 13(1)
( 2) The State shall not make any law which takes
away ar abridges the rights conferred by this part and
any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to
the extent of the contravention, be void.
784
SUPREMF. COliRT REPORTS
(3) In this article,
rcqmres,-
[1967] 2 S.CR.
unless the context otherwise
( a) "law" includes any Ordinance, order, bye-law,
rule regulation, notification, custom or usage
having in the territory of India the force of law.
A rticlc 3 I-A( l). Notwithstanding anything cont;_ined in
article 13, no law providing for,
A
B
(a) the acquisition by the State of any estate or
of any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of any such· rights,
c
shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it b
inconsistent with, or takes away or <.;,ridges any of the
rights conferred by article 14, article 19 or article 31.
(2) (a) the expression "estate" shall, in relation to
any local area, have the same meaning as
that expression or its local equivalent has
in the existing law relating to land tenure
in force in that area and shall also include,
D
(ii) any land held under ryotwari settlement,
(iii) any land held or let for purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto ..... .
Article 31-B. Without prejudice to the generality
of the provisions contained in article 31-A, none of the
Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule
nor any of the provisions thereof shall be deemed to be
void, or ever to have become void, on the ground that
such Act. Regulation or provision is inconsistent with,
or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred
by, any provhions of this Part, and notwith9tanding any
judgment decree or order of any court or tribunal to the
contrary, each of the said Acts and Regulations shall,
subj~ct to the power of any compe'.ent Legislature to
repeal or amend it, continue in force.
In the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution the Mysore Land
Reforms Act, 1961, (Mysore Act IO of 1962) is included as
item 51 and the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953
(Punjab Act 10 of 1953) is included as item 54. The definition
of "estate" was amended and the Ninth Schedule was amended
by includinq therein the said two Acts by the Constitution
(Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964.
E
F
G
H
OOLAKMATH
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
v. PUNJAB (Subba Rao, C.J.)
785
The result of the said amendments is that both the said Acts
dealing with estates, within their wide definition introduced by
the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, having
been included in the Ninth Schedule, are placed beyond any
attack on the ground that their provisions are inconsistent with
or take away or abridge any of the rights conferred by Part Ill
of the Constitution. It is common case that if the Constitution
(Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, was constitutionally valid,
the said Acts could not be impugned on any of the said grounds.
The question of the amendability of the fundamental rights
was considered by this Court earlier in two decisions, namely.
Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India and State of
Bi.liar(') and in Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan(').
In the former the validity of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, which inserted, inter alia, Arts. 31-A and 31-B
in the Constitution, was questioned. That amendment was made
under Art. 368 of the Constitution by the Provisional Parliament.
This Court held that Parliament had power to amend Part III of
the Constitution. The Court came to that conclusion on two
grounds, namely, ( 1) the word "law" in Art. 13 (2) was one
made in exercise of legislative power and not constitutional law
made in exercise of constituent power; and {ii) there were two
articles (Arts. 13(2) and 368) each of which was widely phrased
and, therefore, harmonious construction required that one should
be so read as to be controlled iind qualified by the other, and
having regard to the circumstances mentioned in the judgment
Art. 13 must be read subject to Art. 368. A careful p~rusal of
the judgment indicates that the whole decision turned upon an
assumption that the expression "law" in Art. 13(2) does. not
include constitutional law and on that assumption an attempt
was made to harmonise Article 13 (2) and 368 of the Constitution.
The decision in Sajjan Singh's case(') was given in the context of the question of the valid" y of the Cons•itution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964. Two questions arose in that
c~se: ( 1) Whether the amendment Act insofar it purported to
take away or abridge the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution fell within the prohibition of Art. 13(2) and (2)
Whether Articles 11-A and 31-B sought to make chane-es in
Arts. 132, 136 or 226 or in any of the lists in the Seventh Schedule
and therefore the requirements of the proviso to Article 368 had
to be satisfied. Both the Chief Jus~ice and Mudholkar. J. made
it clear that the first coPtention was not raised before the Court.
The learned counsel appearing for both the parties accepted the
correctness of the decision in Sankari Prasad's case(') in that
(l) [1952] S.C.R. 89. 105.
(2) [1965] I S.C.R. 933. 946, 950, 959, 961, 963
786
(1967] 2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
reg_ard. Yet Gajendragadkar, C.J. speaking for the majority
agreed with the reasons given in Sa11kari Prasart.i' case(') on the
tirst question and Hidayatullah and Mudholkar, JJ. expressed
their dissent from the said view. Bue all of them agreed, though
for different reasons on the second question. Gajendragadkar,
C.J. speaking for himself, Wanchoo and Raghubar Dayal, JJ.
rejected the contention that Art. :168 did not confer power on
Parliament to take away the fundamental rights guaranteed oy
Part Ill. When a ;uggestion was made that the decision in the
aforesaid case should be reconsidered and reviewed, the learned
Chief Justice though he conceded that in a case where a decision
had a significant impact on the fundamental rights of citizens, the
Court would be inclined to review its earlier decision in the inte·
rests of tt.e public good, he did not find considerations of sub·
stantial and compelling character to do so in that case. But after
referring to the reasoning given in Sa11kari Pra«ad's case( 1 ) the
learned Chief Justice observed :
A
B
c
"In our opinion, che expression "am.~ndment of the
Constitution" plainly and unambiguously means amend·
men! of all the provisio1is of the Constitution."
D
Referring to Art. 13 ( 2), he restated tl:e same reasoning found in
the earlier decision and added that if it was the intention of the
Constitution-makers to save fundamental rights from the amending process they should have taken the precaution of making a
clear provision in that regard. Jn short, the majority, speaking
through Gajendragadkar, C.J. agreed that no case had been
made out for reviewing the earlier decision and practically
accepted the reasons given in the earlier decision. Hidayatullah
J .. speaking for himself, observed:
E
"But I make it clear that I must not be understood
to have subscribed to the view that the word "law" in
Art. 13(2) does not control constitutional amendments.
I reserve my opinion on that case for I apprehend that
it depends on how wide is the word "law" in that Article."
F
'After giving his reasons for doubting t~1e correctness of the reasoning given in Sa11kari
concluded thus :
Prasad's
case('),
the
learned
Judge
"I would require stronger reasons than those given
in Sa11kari Prasad's case ( 1 ) to make me accept the
view that Fundamental Rights were not really funda·
mental but were intended to be within the powers of
amendment in common with the other parts of the Con·
stitution and v:ithout the concurrence of the States."
111 (19l!) S.C.R. R9.
G
II
OOLAKNATH
v.
PUNJAB
(Subba Rao, C.J.)
787
The I.earned Judge continued :
A
"The Constitution gives so many assurances in Part
Ill that it would be difficult to think that they were the
playthings of a special majority."
Mudholkar, J. was positive that the result of a legislative action of
a legislature could not be other than "law" and, therefore, it
seemed to him that the fact that th.~ legislation dealt with the
amendment of a provision of the Constitution would not make
its results anytheless a "law". He further pointed out that Art. 368
did not say tha'. whenever Parliament made an amendment to the
Constitution it assumed a different capacity from that of a constic tuent body. He also brought out other defects in the line of
reasoning adopted in Sankari Prasad's case('). It will, there·
fore, be seen that the correctness of the decision in Sankari Prasad's case(') was not questioned in Sajjan Singh's case( 2 ).
Though it was not questioned, three of the learned Judges agreed
with the view expressed therein, but two learned Judges were
inclined to take a different view. But, as that question was not
D raised, th.e minority agreed with the conclusion arrived at by the
majority· on the question ·whether the Seventeenth Amendment
Act was covered by the proviso to Art. 368 of the Constitution.
The conflict between the majority and the minority in Sajjan
Singh's case( 2 ) falls to be resolved in this case. The said conflict
and the great importance of the question raised is the justification
E for the.Constitution of the larger Bench. The decision in Sankari
Prasad's case(') was assumed to be correct in subsequent decisions
of this Court. See S. Krishnan v. State of Madras( 3 ), The State
of West Bengal v. Anwar All Sarkar(') and Basheshar Nath v. The
Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi and Rajasthan('). But nothing turns upon that fact, as the correctness of the decision was not
F questioned in those cases.
B
G
H
A correct appreciation of the scope and the place of fµnda- ./
mental rights in our Constitution will give us the right perspective
for solving the problem presented before us. Its scope cannot be
appreciated unless we have a conspectus of the Constitution, its
objects and its machinery to achieve those objects. The objective
sought to be achieved by the Constitution is declared in sonorous
terms in its preamble which reads :
"We the people of India having solemnly resolved to
constitute India into a Sovernign, Democratic, Republic
and to secure to all its citizens justice .. liberty .. equality .. and fraternity .. "
(I) [1952J S.C.R. 89
(2) [1965! I S.C.R.933.
(3) [1951] S.C.R. 621 at page 652.
(4) [1952] S.C.R. 284, 366.
(5) [1959] Supp, I S.C.R. 528, 563.
788
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1967] 2 S.C.R
It con'.ains m a nutshell. its ideals and its aspirations. The 1'reamble is not a platitude bu~ the mode of its realisation is worked
out in detail in the Constitution. The Consti'.utlon brings imo
existence different constitutional entities, namely, the Union, the
States and the Un:on T~rritories. It creates three major ins:rnments of power, namely. the Legislature. the Executive and the
Judiciary. It demarcates their jurisdiction minutely and expects
them to exercise their respective powers without overstepping
their limits. They should function within the spheres ailotred to
them. . Some powers overlap and some are supers, ded during
emergencies. The mode of resolution of conflicts and conditions
for supcrsession are also prescribed. In short, the scope of the
power and the manner of its exercise are regula'ed by law. No
authority created under the Constitution is supreme; the Constitution is supreme; and all the authorities function under
the supreme law of the land. The rule of Jaw under
the Constitution has a glorious content. It embed.es the
modem concept of law evolved over the centuries. It empowers
the Legislatures to make laws in respect of :na'ters enumerated
in the 3 Lists annexed to Schedule VII. In Part IV of the Constitution. the Directive Principles of State Policy are laid down. It
enjoins it to bring about a social order in which justice, social,
economic and political-shall inform all the in'titutions of
national life. It directs it to work for an egaJ:tarian society where
there is no concentrat'on of wealth, where there is plenty, where
there is equal opportunity for all. to education, to work, to livelihood. and wh.~re there is social justice. Bi". having regard to the
past history of our country, it could not imp 1icitly believe the
representatives of the peonle. for uncontrolled and unrestrict~d
power might lead to an authoritarian State. It, therefore, preserves the natural rights against the State encroachmt.mt and constitutes the higher judiciarv of the State as the sentinel of the said
rights and the balancing wheel between the rights. subject to
social control. In shor'. the fundamental rights, subject to social
control, have been incorporated in the rule of law. That is
brought about bv an interesting proce<s. In the implementation
of the Directive Princioles. Parliament or •he Legislature of a
State makes laws in respect of matter or matters al'otted to it.
But •he higher Judiciary test< their validity on certain objective
criteria. namely. (i) whether the appropriate Legislature has the
Ie.2islative competency to make the law; (ii) whether the said law
infringes any of the fundamental rights: (iii) even if it infringes
the fr.~edoms under Art. 19. whether the infringement only
amounts to "reasonable restriction" on such rights in "public
interest." Bv this oroc.:ss of scruti~y. the cour' maintains the
validity of onlv such laws as keep a just balance between freedoms
and social control. The dutv of reconciling fundamental rights
in Art. 19 and the laws of social control is cast upon the courts
A
B
c
D
E
II
G
H
GOLAKNATH V. PUNJAB
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
'
(Subba Rao, C.l.)
789
and the touchstone or the standard is contained in the said two
expressions. The standard is an elastic one; it varies with time,
space and condition. What is reasonable under certain circumstances may not be so under different circumstances. The
constitutional philosophy of law is reflected in Parts III and IV
of the Constitution. The rule of law under the Constitution
serves the needs of the people without unduly infringing their
rights. It recognizes the social reality and tries to adjust itself
to it from time to time avoiding the authoritarian path. Eve::y
institution or political party that functions under the Constitution
must accept it; otherwise it has no place under the Constitution.
Now, what are the fundamental rights ? They are embodied
in Part III of the Constitution and they may be classified thus :
(i) right to equality, (ii) right to freedom, (iii)right against exploitation, (iv) right to freedom of religion, (v) cultural and
educational rights, (vi) right to property, and (vii) right to constitutional remedies. They are the rights of the people preserved
by our Constitution. "Fundamental rights" are the modern name
for what have been traditionally known as "natural rights". As
one author puts : "they are moral rights which every human being
everywhere at all times ought to have simply because of the fact
that in contradistinction with other beings, he is rational and
moral." They are the primordial rights necessary for the development of human personality. They are the rights which enable a
man to chalk out his own life in the manner he likes best. Our
Constitution, in addition to the well-known fundamental rights,
also included the rights of the minorities, untouchables and other
backward communities, in such rights.
After having declared the fundamental rights, our Constitution
says that all laws in force in the territory. of India immediately
before the commencement of the Constitution, insofar
as they are inconsistent with the said rights, are, to the
extent of such inconsistency, void. The Constitution also enjoins
the State not to make any law which takes away or abridges the
said rights and declares such laws, to the extent of such inconsistency, to be void. As we have stated earlier, the only limitation
on the freedom enshrined in Art. 19 of the Constitution is that
imposed by a valid law operating as a reasonable restriction in
the interests of the public.
It will, therefore, be seen that fundamental rights are given
a transcendental position under our Constitution and are kept
beyond the reach of Parliament. At the same· time Parts III and
IV constituted an integrated scheme forming a self-contained
code. The scheme is made so elastic that all the Directive Principles of State Policy can reasonably be enforced without taking
L 3 Sup. CJ/67-5
79()
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1961J 2 S.C.R.
away or abridging the fundamental rights. While recognizing
the immutability of fundamental rights, subject to social control,
the Constitution itself provides for the suspension or the modification of fundamental rights under specific circumstances, for
instance, Art. 33 empowers Parli;unent to modify ihe rights conferred by Pan III in their application to the members of t!Je armed
forces, Art. 34 enables it to impose restrictions on the rights conkrred by the said parts while martial law is in force in an area,
Art. 35 confers the power on it to make laws with respect to an/
of the matters which under clause (3) of Art. 16, Clause (3) of
Art. 32, Art. 33 and Art. 34 may be provided for
by law.
The 11011-obstante clause with which the last
article opcm makes it clear that all th~ other provisions of the
Constitution arc subject to this provision. Article 32 makes the
right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for
the enforcement of the rights conferred by the said Parts a guaranteed right. Even during grave emergencies Art. 358 only
'uspends the provisions of Art. 19; and Art. 359 enables the
President by order to declare the right to move any court for the
enforcement of such of the rights conferred by Part III as may be
mentioned in that order to be suspended; that is to say, even during
emergency. only Art. 19 is suspended temporarily and all other
rights arc untouched except those specifically suspended by the
President.
In the Uook "'Indian Constitution~):.'merstone of a Nation"
by Granville Austin, the scope, origin and the object of fundamental rights have been graphically stated. Therein the learned
author says :
" ...... the core of the commitment to the social
revolution lies in Parts III and IV, in the Fundamental
Rights and in the Directive Principles of State Policy.
These arc the conscience of th.:: Constitution."
A
8
c
D
E
F
Adverting to the necessity for incorporating fundamental rights in
a Constitution, the learned author says :
"That a declaration of rights had assumed such importance was not surprising; India was a land of communities, of minorities, racial, religious, linguistic, social
and caste. For India to become a state, these minorities
had to agree to be governed both at the centre and in the
provinces l:y fellow Indfan-members, perhaps, of
another minority-and not by a mediatory third power.
the British. On both psychological and political
11rounds, therefore, the demand for writteli righls--liince
nghts would provide tangible safeguards, against oppression-proved overwhelming."
H
GOLAKNATH
A
B
c
D
E
F
v. PUNJAB (Subba Rao, C.I.)
Motilal Nehru, who presided over the Committee called for by
the Madras Congress resolution, in May, 1928 observed in his
report:
"It is obvious that our first care should be to have
our Fundamental Rights guaranteed in a manner whicl'.
will not permit their withdrawal under any circumstances ...• Another reason why great importance attached to a Declaration of Rights is the unfortunate existence of communal differences in the country. Certain
safeguards are necessary to create and establish a sense
of security among those who look upon each other with
distrust and suspicion. We could not, better secure the
full enjoyment of religious and communal rights to all
communities than by including them among the basic
principles of the Constitution."
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehr , on April 30, 1947 in proposing for
the adoption of the Interim Report on Fundamental Rights, said
thus:
"A fundamental right should be looked upon, not
from the point of view of any particular difficulty of
the moment, but as something that you want to make
permanent in the Constitution. The other matter should
be looked upon-however important it might be-not
from this permanent and fundamental point of view,
but from the more temporary point of view."
P~ndit J awaharlal Nehru, who was Prime Minister at that time
and who must have had an effective voice in the framing of the
Constitution, made this disinction beween fundamnetal rights
and other provisions of the Constitution, namely, the former
were permanent and the latter were amendable. On September
18, 1949 Dr. Ambedkar in speaking on the amendment proposerl
by Mr. Karnath to Art. 304 of the Draft Constitution corresponding to the present Art. 368, namely, "Any provision of this Constitution may be amended, whether by way of variation, addition
or repeal, in the manner provided in this article", said thus :
G
H
791
"Now, what is it we do? We divide the articles of
the Constitution under three categories. The first category is the one which consists of articles which can be
amended by Parliament by a bare majority. The second
set of articles are articles which require two-thirds
majority. If the future Parliament wishes to amend any
particular article which is not mentioned in Part III
or article 304, all that is necessary for them is to have
two-thirds majority. Then they can amend it."
792
SUPREME COURT RBPOB.TS
[1967) 2 S C.R.
Therefore, m Dr. Ambedkar"s view the fundamcn:al rights were
~o important that :hey could not he amended in Ille manner provided by Art. 304 of the Draft Constitution, which correspond'
to lhe present Art. 368.
We have referred lO :he speeches of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru
and Dr. Ambedkar nol with a view to interpret the provisions
of Art. 368, which we propose to do on its own tenns, but only
to notice the transcendental character given to the fundamental
rights by two of the important architects of the Constitution.
This Court also no:iccd the paramountcy of the fundamental
rights in many decisions. In A. K. Gopa/an v. Staie of Madriu( 1 ) they are described as "paramount", in State of Madras v.
Sm1. Champakam Dorairajan(2) as "sacro-sanci'', in Pandit
M. S. M. Sharma v. Shri Sri Krishna Sinha( 8 ) as "rights reserved
by the people", in Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of VIiar Pradesh(') as
"inalienable and inviolable" and in other cases as "transcendental". The minorities regarded them as the hf'drock of their political
existence a11d the majority considered them as a guarantee for
their way of life. This, however, does not mean that the problem
is one of mere dialectics. The Constitution has given by its
scheme a place of permanence to the fundament .. l freedoms. In
giving to themselves the Constitution, the people have reserved
the fundamental freedoms to themselves. Article 13 merely incorporates that reservation. That Article is however not the
source of the protection o[ fundamenal righ's but the expression
of the reservation. The importance attached to the fundamental
freedoms is so transcendental that a biil enacted by a unanimous
vote of all the members of both the Houses is ineffective to derogate from its guaranteed exercise. It is not what the Parliament
regards at a given moment as conducive to the public benefit. but
what Part III declares pro•ected, which determines the ambit of
the freedom. The incapacity of the Parliament therefore in e~er
cise of its amending power to modify, restrict or impair fundamental freedoms in Part III arises from the scheme of the Consti!ulion and the nature of the freedoms.
Briefly stated, the Constitution declares certain rights as fundamental rights, makes all the laws infringing the said rights
void, preserves only the laws of social control infringing the said
rights and expressly confers power on Parliament and the
President to amend or suspend them in specified circumstances;
if the decisions in Sankari Prasad's case(') and Sajjan Singh's
case(') laid down the correct law, it enables the same Parliament
to abrogate them with one stroke. provided the party in power
~inely or in cor.1bination with other parties commands the neces(t) [195<1] S.C.R. 88, 198.
(l) [1959] Supp, I S.C.R. 806.
(5) [1952) S.C.R. 89, JOS.
(2) (1951) S.C.R. 525.
(4) [1963] I SC.R. 778
(6) (1965] S. C.R. 933.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
GOLAKNATH
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
v. PUNJAB (Subba Rao, C.I.)
793
sary majori:y. While articles of less significance would require
consent of the majority of the States, fundamental rights can be
dropped without such consent. While a single fundamental right
cannot be abridged or taken away by the entire Parliament unanimously voting to that effect, a two-thirds' majority can do away
with all the fundamental rights. The entire super structure built
with precision and high ideals may crumble at one false step.
Such a conclusion would attribute unreasonableness to the makers
of the Constitution, for, in that event they would be speaking in
two voices. Such an intention cannot be attributed to the makers
of the Constitution unless the provisions of the Constitution compel us to do so.
With this background Jet us proceed to consider the provisions
of Art. 368, vis-a-vis Art. 13(2) of the Constitution.
The first question is whether amendment of the Constitution
under Art. 368 is "law" within the meaning of Art. 13(2). The
marginal no'e to Art. 368 describes that article as one prescril>ing the procedure for amendment. The article m terms only
pre~cribcs various procedural steps in the maiter of amendment:
it shall be initiated by the introduction of a bill in either House of
Parliament; it shall be passed by the prescribed majority in both
the Houses; it shall then be presented to the President for his
assent; and upon such assent the Constitution shall stand amended. The article assumes the power to amend found elsewhere
and 'ays that it shall be exercised in the manner laid down therein. The argument that the completion of the procedural steps
culminates in the exercise of the power to amend may be subtle
bui does not carry conviction. If that was the intention of the
provisions, nothing prevented the makers of the Constitution from
stating that the Constitution may be amended in the manner
suggested. Indeed, whenever the Constitution sought to confer a
special power to amend on any authority it expressly said so :
(See Art~. 4 and 392). The alternativ~ contention that the said
power shall be implied either from Art. 368 or from the nature
of the articles sought to be amended cannot be accepted, for the
simple reason that the doctrine of necessary implication cannot
be invoked if there is an express provision or unless but for such
implication the article will become otiose or nugatory. There is
no ne:essity to imply any such power, as Parliament has the
plenary power to make any law, including the law to amend the
Constitution subject to the limitations laid down therein.
Uninfluenced by any foreign doctrines let us look at the provisions of our Constitution. Under Art. 245, "subject to the
provisions of the Constitution, Parliament may make laws for
the whole or any part of the territory of India ...... " Article 246
demarcates the matters in respect of which Parliament and State
794
SUPREME COURT RBPOllTS
(1967] 2 S.C.R.
Legislatures may make laws. In the field reserved for Parliament
there is Entry 97 which empowers it to make laws in respect of
"any other matter not enumerated in Lists II and ill including
any tax not mentioned in either of those lists." Article 248 Cllprc&Sly states that Parliament has exclusive power to make any law
with respect to any matter not enumerated in the Concurrent List
or State List. It is, therefore, clear that the residuary power of
legislation is vested in Parliament. Subject to the argument
based upon the alleged nature of the amending power as understood by jurists in other countries, which we shall consider at a
later stage, it cannot be contended, anJ indeed, it was not contended, that the Cons!ituent Assembly, if it were so
minded, could no: have conferred· an express legislative
power on Parliament to amend the Consutution by ordinary legislative process. Articles 4 and 169, and para 7
of the 5th Schedule and para 21 of the 6th Schedule have
expressly conferred such power. There is, therefore, no inherent
inconsistency between legislative process and the amending one.
Whether in the field of • constitutional law or statutory Jaw
amendment can be brought about only by law. The residuary
p<'Wer of Parliament, unless there is anything contrary in the
Constitution, certainly takes in the power to amend the Constitution. It is said that two Articles indicate the contrary intention.
As Art. 245, the argument proceeds, is subject to the provisions
of the Constitution, every Jaw of amendment will necessarily be
inconsistent with the articles sought to be amended. This is !In
argument in a circle. Can it be said reasonably that a law amending an article is inconsistent with the article amended ? If an
article of the Constitution expressly says that it cannot be amended, a law cannot be made amending it, as the power of Parliament to make a law is subject to the said Article. It may well
be that in a given case such a limitation may also necessarily be
implied. The limitation in Art. 245 is in respect of the power to
make a Jaw and not of the content of the Jaw made within the scope
of its power. The second criticism is based upon Art. 392 of
the Constitution. That provision confers power on the President
to temove difficulties; in the circumstances mentioned in that
provision, he can by order direct that the Constitution shall durmg such period as may be specified in that order have effect subject to such adaptations, whether by way of modification, addition
or omission, as he may deem to be necessary or Cllpedient The
argument is that the President's power, though confined to a
temporary period, is co-extensive with legislative power and if
the power to amend is a legislative power it would have to be
held that the President can amend the Constitution in terms of
Art. 368. Apart from the limited scope of Art. 392, which is
intended only for the purpose of removing difficulties and for
bringing about a smooth transition, an order made by the Presi-
A
B
c
D
I'
c
H
GOLAKNATH
v. PUNJAB (Subba Rao, C.l.)
795
dent cannot attract Art. 368, as the amendment contemplated by
that provision can be initiated only by the introduction of a bill
in the Parliament. There is no force in either of the two criticisms.
Further, there is intemal evidence in the Constit\ltion itself
which indicates that amendment to the Constitution is a "law"
B within the meaning of Art. 245. Now, what is "law" under the
Constitution? It is not denied that in its comprehensive sense it
'.:icludes constitutional law and the law amending the Constitution is constitutional law. But Art. 13 (2) for the purpose of
that Article gives an inclusive definition. It does not exclude
Constitutional law. It prima facie takes in constitutional law.
Article 368 itself gives the necessary clue to the. problem. The
c amendment can be initiated by the introduction of a bill; it shall
be passed by the two Houses; it shall receive the assent of the
President. These are well-known procedural steps in the process
of law-making : Indeed this Court in Sankari Prasad's case(')
brought out this idea in clear terms. It said "in the first place,
it is provided that the amendment must be initiated by the inD iroduction of. a "bill in either House of Parliament" a familiar
feature of Parliament procedure (of Article 107 (I) which says
•A bill may originate in either House of Parliament"). Then, the
bill must be "passed in each House,"-just what Parliament does
when it is called upon to exercise its normal legisfative function
[Article 107(2)1; and finally, the bill thus passed must be "presented to the President" for his "assent", again a parliamentary
E process through which every bill must pass before it can reach the
statute-book, (Article 111). We thus find that each of the component units of Parliament is to play its allotted part in bringing
about an amendment to the Constitution. We have already seen
that Parliament effects ainendments of the first class mentioned
above by going through the same three-fold procedure but with
F a simple majority. The fact that a different majority in the same
body is required for effecting the second and third categories of
amendments make the amending agency a different body."
In the same decision it is pointed out that Art. 368 is not
a complete code in respect of the procedure. This Court said
"There are gaps in the procedure as to how and after what notice
a bill is to be introduced, how it is to be passed by each House
G
and how the President's assent is to be obtained. Having provided for the Constitution of a Parliament and prescribed a certain procedure for the conduct of its ordinary legislative busine~s
to be supplemented by rules made by each House {Article 118),
the makers of the Constitution must be taken to have intended
Parliament to follow that procedure, so far as they may be appli·
H
cable consistently with the express provision of Art. 368,
when they have entrusted to it the power of amending the Con-
A
ti) [1952) S. C.R. 89.
796
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1967] 2 S.C.R.
>titution.'' The Hous.i oi the People made rules providing procedure for amendments, the same as for other Bills with the
addition of certain special provisions viz., Rules 155, 156, 157
and 158. If amendment is intended to be something other than
law, the constitutional insistenc.: on the sai~ legislative process is
unneces.~ary.
In short, amendment cannot be made otherwise
than by following the legislative process. The fact that there are
other cenditions, such as, a larger majority and in the ca>e of
articles mentioned in the proviso a ratification by Legislatures is
provide<l. does not make the amendment anytheless a law. The
imposition of further conditions is only a safeguard against hasty
action or 3 protection to the States, but does not change the
Legislative character of the amendment.
This conclusion is reinforced by the other articles of the
Constitution. Article 3 enables Parliament by law to form new
States and alter areas. boundaries or tho names of existing States.
The proviso to that Article imposed two further conditions,
namely, (iJ the recommendation of the President, and (ii) in
the> circumstances mentioned therein, the views expressed by the
Legislatures. Notwithstanding the said conditions it cannot be
suggested that the expression "law" under the said Article is not
one made by the Legislative process. Under Art. 4, such a law
can contain provisions for amendment of Schedules I and IV
indicating thereby that amendments are only made by Legislalative process. What is more, cl. (2) thereof introduces a fiction
to the affect that such a law shall not be deemed t.> be an amend·
mcnt to the Constitution. This shows that the amendment is law
and that but for the fiction it would bo an amendment within the
meaning of Art. 368. Article 169 which empowers Parliament
by law to abolish or crea:e Legislative Councils in States, para 7
of the 5th Sch,~dule and para 21 of the 6th Schedule which enable
Parliament by law to amend the said Schedules, also bring out
the two ideas that the amendment is law made by legislative proce~s and that but for the fiction introduced it would attract Article
368. That apart amendments under the said provisions can be
made by the Union Parliament by simple majority. That an
amendment is made only by legislative process with or without
conditions will be clear if two decisions of the Privy Council arc
considered ir. juxta-position. They are McCawley v. Thi!
King(') and The Bribery Commissioner v. Pedrick Rana·
singhe(').
The facts in McCaw/ey v. The King(') were these: In 1859
Queensland had been granted a Constitution in the term~ of an
Order in Council made on June 6 of that year under powers
derived by Her Majesty from the Imperial Statute, 18 & 19 Viet.
(I) 119201A.C.691.
(2) [1964] 2 W.L.R. 1301.
A
B
c
D
'
G
H
GOLAKNATH
A
B
c
D
v.
PUNJAB
(Subba Rao, C.J.)
797
c. 54. The Order in Council had set up a legislature for the
territory, consisting of the Queen, a Legislative Council and a
Legislative Assembly, and the law-making power was vested in
Her Majesty acting with the advice and consent of the Council
and Assembly. Any laws could be made for the "peace, welfare
and good government of the Colony". The said legislature of
Queensland ;n the year 18 67 passed the Constitution Act of
that year. Under that Act power was given to the said legislature to make laws for "peace, welfare and good Government of
rhe Colony in all cases whatsoever". But, under s. 9 thereof a
two-thirds majority of the Council and of the Assembly was
required as a condition precedent to the validity of legislation
altering the constitution of the Council. The Legislature, therefore. had, except in the case covered by s. 9 of the Act, an unres'.ricted power to make laws. The Legislature passed a law
which conflicted with one of the existing terms of the Constitution
Act. Lord Birkenhead, L.C., upheld the law, as the Constitution Act conferred an absolute power upon the legislature to pass
any law by majority even though it, in substance, amended the
terms of the Constitution Act.
Jn The Bribery Commissioner v. Pedrick Ranasinghe( 1 ), the
K
,
G
H
ta.;ls are these : By section 29 of the Ceylon (Constitution) Order
in Council, 1946, Parliament shall have power to make laws for
tbe "peace, order and good government" of the Island and in the
exercise of its power under the said section it may amend or
repeal any of the provisions of the Order in its application to the
Island. The proviso to that section says that no Bill for the
amendment or repeal of any of the provisions of the Order shall
be presented for the Royal assent unless it has endorsed on it a
certificate under the hand of the Speaker that the number of
v(ltes cast in favour thereof in the House of Representatives
amounted to not less than two-thirds of the whole numb.:!r of
members of the House. Under s. 55 of the said Order t'1e appointment of Judicial ·Officers was vested in the Judicial Service Commission. But the Parliament under s. 41 of the Bribery Amendment Act, 1958. provided for ihe appointment of the personnel
of the Bribery Tribunals hy the Governor-General 0n the advice
of the Mini,;ter of Justice. The said Amendment Act was in
conflict with the said s. 55 of the Order and it was passed without
complying with the terms of the proviso to s. 29 of the Order.
The Privy Council held thai the Amendment Act was void.
Lord Pearce, after considering McCaw/ey's case(') made th~
following observations, at p. 1310:
" ...... a legislature has no power to ignore the
conditions of law-making that are imposed by the
(2) [!920] A.C. 691.
798
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1967] 2 S.C.R.
instrument which itself regulates its power to make law.
question
whether the legislature is sovereign, as is the legislature
of Ceylon, or whether the Constitution is "uncontrolled", as the Board held the Constitution of Queensland
to be. Such a Constitution can, indeed, be altered or
amended by the legislature, if the regulating instrument
so provides and if the terms of tbo;e provisions are
complied with ...... "
This restriction exists independently of the
It will be ;een from the said judgments that an amendment
of the Constitution is made only by legislative process with ordinary majority or with special majority. as the case may be. Therefore, amendments either under Art. 368 or under other Articles
a1e made only by Parliament by following the legislative process
adopted by it in making other Jaw. In the premises, an amendment
of the Constitution can be nothing but "Jaw".
A comparative study of other Constitutions indicates I°.: 1t no
particular pattern is followed. All the Constitutions confer an
express power to amend, most of them provide for legislative
procedure with special majority, referendum, convention, etc., and
a few with simple majority. Indeed, Parliament of England, which
Ls a 'upreme body, can amend the constitution like any other
'tatute. As none of the Constitutions contains provisions similar
lo Art. 368 and Art. 13(2), neither the said Constitution5 nor
the decisions given by courts thereon would be of any assistance
in construing the scope of Art. 368 of our Constitution.
A brief survey of the nature of the amending process adopted
by various constitutions will bring out the futility of any attempt
to draw inspiration from the said opinions or decisions on the
~aid constitutions. The nature of the amending power in differ·
ent constitutions generally depends on the nautre of. the polity
created by the constitution, namely, whether it is federal or
unitary constitution or on the fact whether it is a "Titlen .or un
unwritten constitution or on tho circumstances whether it is a
rigid or a flexible constitution. Particularly the difference can
be traced to the "spirit and ~enius of the nation in which a particular comtitution bas its birth". The following articles of the
Constitution of the different countries are brought to our notice
by one or other of the counsel that apprared before us. Art. 5 of
the Constitution of the United States of America, /,rts. 125 and
I 28 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, Art. 92
(I ) of the British North American Act, s. 152 of the South
African Act, Art. 217 of the Constitution of the United States oi
Brazil, Section 46 of the Constitution of Ireland, 1937, Arts. 207,
208 and 209 of the Constitution of the Union of Burma, Art. 88
of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Denmark Act, Art. 90 of
I
c
D
E
F
JI
GOLAKNATH
A
B
v. PUNJAB (Subba Rao, C.J.)
799
the Constitution of the French Republic, 1954, Art. 135 of the
United States of Mexico, Art. 96 of the Constitution of Japan,
Art. 112 of the Constitution of Norway, Art. 85 of the Constitution of the Kingpom of Sweden, Arts. 118, 119, 120, 121, 122
and 123 of the Constitution of the Swiss Federation, Arts. 140,
141 and 142 of the Constitution of Venezuela, and Art. 146 of
the Constitution of the Union .,; Soviet Socialist Republics, 1936
and s. 29 ( 4) of Ceylon Constitution Order in Council, 1946.
Broadly speaking amendments can be made by four methods :
(i) by ordinary legislative process with or without restrictions,
(ii) by the people through referendum, (iii) by majority of all
the
of a federal State; and (iv) by a special convention.
c The units
first method can be in four different ways, namely, (i) by
the ordinary course of legislation by absolute majority or by
special majority, (See Section 92(1) of the British North America
Act, sub-section 152 South African Act, whereunder except sections 35, 137 and 152, other provisions could be an1ended by
ordinary legislative process by absolute majority. Many constiD tutions provide for special majorities.); (ii) ·by a fixed quorum
of members for the consideration of the proposed amendment and
a special majority for its passage; (see the defunct Constitution
of Rumania), (iii) by dissolution and general election on a particular issue; (see the Constitutions of Belgium, Holland, Denmark
and Norway), and (iv) by a majority of two Houses of Parliament in joint session a~ in the Constitution of the South Afr'.ca.
The second method demands a popular vote, referendum or
plebiscite as in Switzerland, Australia, Ireland, Italy, France and
Denmark. The third method is by an agreement in some form
or -other of either of the majority or of all the federating units as
in Switzerland, Australia and the United States of America. The
fourth
method is generally by creation of a special body ad hoc
p
for the purpose of constitution revision as in Latin America.
Lastly, some constitutions inlpose express linlitation on the power
to amend. (See Art. 5 of the United States Constitution and the
Constitution of the Fourth French Republic). A more elaborate discussion of this topic may be found n the American political Constitution by Strong. It will, therefore, be seen that the
CJ power to amend and the procedure to amend radically differ from
State to Stae; it is left to tM consiitution-makers to prescribe the
scope of the power and the method of amendment having regard
to the requirements of the particular State. There is no article in
any of the constitutions referred to us similar to article 13(2) of
our Constitution. India adonted a different system altogether: it
empowered the Parliament to amend the Constitution by the
legislaiive process subject to fundamental rights. The Indian
Constitut'.on has made the amending process comparatively flexible, but it is made subject to fundamental rights.
•
(1967] 2 S.C. R
'
Now let us consider the argument that the power lo amend is
a sovereign power, that the said power is supreme to the legislative power, that it does not permit any implied limitations and
that amendments made in exercise of that power ihvolve political
q:iestions and that, therefore, they arc outside judicial review.
This wide proposition is sought to be supported on the basis of
opinions of jurist; and judicial decisions. Long extracts have
been read to us irom the book "The Amending of the Federal
Constitution ( l 942)" by Lester Bernhardt Orfield, and particular
reference was made to the following pa<;Sages :
,,
800
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
"At the point it may be well to note that when the
Congress is engaged in the amending process it is not
legislating. It is exercising a peculiar power bestowed
upon it by Article Five. This Article for the most part
controls the process; and other provisions of the Constitution, such as those relating to the passage of legislation, having but little bearing."
Adverting to the Bill of Rights, the learned author remarks that
they may be repealed just as any other amendment and that they
are no ~ore sacred from a legal standpoint than any other part of
the Constitution. Dealing with the doctrine of implied limitations, he says that it is clearly untenable. Posing the question
"ls !her a law about the amending power of the Constitution?",
he answers, "there is none". He would even go to the extent
of saying that the sovereignty, if it can be said to exist at all, is
located in the amending body. The author is certainly a strong
advocate of the supremacy of the amending power and an oponent of the doctrine of implied limitations. His opinion li; based
upon the terms of Art. 5 of the Constitution of the United States
of America and his interpretati0n of the decisions of the Supreme
Court of America. Even such an extreme exponent of the doctrdie
does not say that a pa1ticular constitution cannot expressly impore
res•rictions on the power to amend or that a court cannot reconcile the articles couched in unlimited phraseology. Jnderd Art.
5 of the American Constitution imposes express limita1ior.: on the
amending power. Some passage-; from the book "Political
Science and Government" bv James Wilford Garner are cited.
'
Garner points out :
R
c
D
.....
II
G
"Ar unamcndablc constitution, said Mulford, is the
"worst tyranny of time, or rather the very tyTanny of
time"."
.... ut he also notices :
"The provision for amendment should be neither
s6 rigid as to make needed changes practically impossible nor so flexible a~ to encourage frequent and
H
'
GOLAKNATH
A
v. PUNJAB (Subba Rao, C.J.)
801
unnecessary changes and thereby lower the authority of
che Constitution."
Munro in his book "The Government of the United States", 5th
Edition, l.ses strong words when he says :
B
c
D
'
G
H
" ...... it is impossible to conceive of an unamendable constitution as anything but a contradiction in
terms."
The learned author says that such a constitution would constitute "government by the graveyards." Hugh Evancfer Willis in
his book "Constitutional Law of the United States" avers that the
doctrine of amendability of th~ Constitution is grounded in the
doctrine of the sovereignty of the people and that it has no such
implied limitations as that an amendment shall not contain a new
grant of power or change the dual form of government or change
the protection of the Bill of Rights, or make any other change in
the Constitution. Herman Finer in his book "The Theory and
Practice of Modem Government" defines "constitution" as its
process of amendment, for, in his view, to amend is to deconstitute and reconstitute. The learned author concludes that the
amendnig clause is so fundamental to a constitutfon that he is
tempted to call it the constitution itself. But the learned author
recogniiies that difficulty in amendment certainly products circumstances and makes impossible the surreptitious abrogation
of rights guaranteed in the constitution. William S. Livingston
in "FeCleralism and Constitutional Change" says :
"The formal procedure of amendment is of greater
importance than the informal processes, because it
constitutes a higher authority to which appeal lies on
any question that may arise."
But there are equally eminent authors who express a different
view. In "American Jurisprudence", 2nd Edition, Vol. 16, it is
stated that a statute and a constitution though of unequal dignity
are both laws. Another calls the constitution of a State as one
of the laws of the State. Cooley in hi£ book on :·constitutional
Law" opines that changes in the fundamental laws of the State
must be indicated by the people themselves. He further, implies
limitations to the a!llending power from the belief in the constitution itself, such as, the republican form of Government cannot
be abolished as it would be revolutionary in its character. In the
same book it is further said that the power to amend the constitution by legislative action does not confer the power to break it
any more than it confers the power to legislate on any other
subject contrary to the prohibitions. C. · F. Strong in his book
"Modem Poliical Constitutions", 1963 edition, does not accept
the theory of absolute sovereignty of the amending power which
does not brook any limit~tions, .or he says :
802
SUP!ll!MI! COUllT REPORTS
(1967} 2 S.C.ll.
"In short, it attempts to arrange for tho re-creation
of a constituent assembly whenever such matters are
in future to be considered, even though that assembly
be nothing more than tho ordinary legislature acting
under certain restrictions. At tho same time, there may
be some elements of the constitution which the constituent assembly wants to remain unalterable by the
action of any authority whatsoever. These elements are
to be distinguished from the rest, and generally come
under the heading of fundamental law. Thus, for
example, the American Constitution, the oldest of the
existing Constitutions, asserts that '.Jy no process of
amendment shall any State, without its own consent, be
deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate, while
among the Constitutions more recently promulgated,
those of the Republics of France and Italy, each containing a clause stating that the republican fonn of
government cannot be the subject of an amending
proposal."
B
c
D
It ;, not ncc~ssary to multiply citations from text-books.
A catena of American decisions have been cited before us in
support of the contentioa that the amending power is a supreme
power or that it involves political issues which are not justiciable. It would be futile to consider them at length, for after
going through them carefully we find that there are no consider
ed j•1dgments of the American Courts. which would have a \>Cr~uasive effect in that regard.
In the Constitution of the United
States of America, prepared by Edwards S. Corwin, Legislative
Reference Service. Library of Congress, ( 1953 edn.), the following summary under the heading "Judicial Review under Article
Y" is given:
"Prior to 1939, the Supreme Court had ll>k~n cogni1.ance of a number of diverse objections to ihc validity
of specific amendments. Apart from holding that official notice of ratification by the several States was conclusive upon the Courts, it had treated these questions
as justiciable, although it had unifom1ly rejected them
on the merits. In that year. however. the whole subject
was thrown into confusion by the inconclusive decision
•:1 Coleman v. Miller. This case came up on a writ of
L ·tiorari to the Supreme Court of Kansas to review the
c.e:lial of a writ of ma11damm to compel the Secretary
of the Kansas Senate to erase an endorsement on a resolution ratifying the proposed child labour amendment
to the Co~titution to the effect that it had been adopted
by the Kansas Senate. The attempted ratification was
G
H
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB
(Subba Rao, C.J.)
803
assailed . on three grounds : ( 1) that the amendment
had been previously rejected by. the State Legislature;
B
c:
D
r
G
( 2) that it was no longer open to ratification because
an unreasonable period of time, thirteen years, had
elapsed since its submission to the States, and (3) that
the lieutenant governor had no right to cast the decidin~ vote in the Senate in favour of ratification. Four
opmions were written in the Supreme Court, no one of
which commanded the support of more than four members of the Court. The majority ruled that the plaintiffs, members of the Kansas State Senate, had a su.llicient interest in the controversy to give the federal
courts jurisdiction to review the case. Without agreement as to the grounds for their decision, a different
majority affirm~ the judgment of the Kansas court
denying the relief sought. Four members who concurred in the result had voted to dismiss the writ on the
ground that the amending process "is politicw" in its
entirety, from submission until an amendment becomes
part of the Constitution, and is not subject to judicial
guidance, control or interference at any point." Whether
the contention that the lieutenant governor should have
been permitted to cast the deciding vote in favour of
ratification presented a justiciable controversy was left
undecided, the court being equally divided on the point.
In an opinion reported as "the opinion of the Court"
but in which it appears that only three Justices concurred, Chief Jusitce Hughes declared that the writ of
mandamus was properly denied because the question as
to the effect of the previous rejection of the amendment
and the lapse. of time since it was submitted to the
States were political questions which sho,.Jd be left to
Congress. On the same day, the Court dismissed a
writ of certiorari to review a decision of the. Kentucky
Court of Appeals declaring the action of the Kentucky
General Assembly purporting to ratifyin:: the child
labour amendment illegal and void. Inasmuch as the
governor had forwarded the certified copy of the resolution to the Secretary of State before being served
with a copy of the restraining order issued by the State
Court, the Supreme Court found that there · was no
longer a controversy susceptible of judicial detennination."
H
This passage, in our view, correctly summarises the American
law on the subject. It will be clear therefrom that prior io 1939
the Supreme Court of America had treated the objections to the
validity of sj!ecific amendments as justici;ible and that only in
1939 it rejected them in an inconclusive judgment without
804
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1<167] 2 S.C.R.
discussion. In this state of affairs we cannot usefully draw much
from the judicial wisdom of th~ Judges of the Supreme Court
nf America.
One need not cavil at the description of an amending power
as sovereign power, for i'. is sovereign only within tile scope of
the power conferred by a particular constitution. All the author.
also agree, that a particular constitution can expressly limit the
power of amendment, both substantive and procedural. The only
conflict lies in the fact t,hat some authors do not pennit implied
limitations when the power of amendment is expressed in general
words. But others countenance such limitations by construction or othllrwise: But none of the authors goes to the
extent of saying, which is the problem before us, ihat when there
are conflicting articles couched in widest terms, the court has no
jurisdiction to construe and hannonize them. If some of the
authors meant to say that-in our view, they did not-,we cannot
agree with them, for, in that event this Court would not be discharging its duty.
A
B
c
D
Nor can we appreciate the arguments repeated l:efore us by
learned counsel for the respondents that the amending proces;
involves political questions which are, outside the swpe of judicial review. When a matter comes before the Court, its jurisdiction does not depend upon the nature of the question raised but
on the question whether the said matter is expressly or by necei;sary implication excluded from its jurisdiction. Secondly, it is not
possible to define what is a political question and what is not.
The character of a question depends upon the circum51ances and
the nature of a political society. To put it differently, the court
does not decide any political question at all in the ordinary sense
of the tem1, but only ascertains whether Parliament is acting
within the scope of the amending power. It may be that Parliament seeks to amend the Constitution fo1 political reasons, but
the Court in denying that power will not be dt<eiding on political
questions, but will only be holding that Parliament has no power
to amend particular articles of the tonstitution for any purpose
whatsoever, be it political or otherwise. We, therefore, hold that
there is nothing in the nature of the amending power which enables Parliament to override all the express or implied limitations imposed on that power. As we have pointed out earlier,
our Constitution adopted a novel method in the sense that Parliament makes the amendm.~nt by legislative process subject to
certain restrictions and that the amendment so made being
F
.. \'dw" i> subject to Art. 13(2).
H
The next argument ~ based upon the expression ''amendment"
in Art. 368 of the Constitution and it is contended that the said
E
G
GOLAKNATll I'. PUNJAB
B
c
D
(S11bba Rao, C.J.)
sos
expression lvas a positive and a negative content and that in
exercise of the power of amendment Parliament caflnot destroy
the structure of the Constitution, but it can only modify the provisions thereof within the framework of the original instrument
for its better effectuation. If the fundamentals would be amenable to the ordinary process of amendment with a special majority, the argument proceeds, the institutions of the President can
be abolished, the parliamentary executive can be removed, the
fundamental rights can be abrogated, the concept of federalism
can be obliterated and in short the sovereign democratic republk
can be converted into a totalitarian system of government. There
is considerable force in this argument. Learned and lengthy
arguments are advanced to sustain it or to reject it. But we are
relieved of the necessity to express our opinion on this :ill important question as, so far as the fundamental rights are concerned, the question raised can be answered on a narrower basi~.
This question may arise for consideration only if Parliament seeks
to destroy the struc.ture of the Constitution embodied in the provisions other than in Part !II of the Constitution. We do not,
therefore, propose to express our opinion in that regard.
ln the view we have taken on the scope of Art. 368 vis-a-v:s
the fundamental rights, it is also unnecessary to express our
opinion on the question whether the amendment of the fundamental. rights is covered by the proviso to Art. 368.
It
G
H
The result is that the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment)
Act, 1964, inasmuch as it takes away or abridges the fundamental rights is void under Art. 13 ( 2) of the Constitution.
The next question is whether our decision should be given
retrospective operation. During the period between .1950 and
1967 i.e.. 17 years, as many as 20 am~ndments were made in
our Constitution. But in th·~ context or the present. petitions it
would be enough if we notice the amendments affecting fundamental right to property. The Constitution came into force on
January 26, 1950. The Constitution (First Amendme.it) Act.
1951, amended Arts. 15 and 19, anJ Arts. 31-A and 31-B
were inserted with retro>pective effect. The object of the amendment was said to be to validate the acquisition of zamindaric; or
the abolition of permanent settlemr.nt without interference lrom
courts. The occasion for the amendment was that the High
Court of Patna in Kameslnmi' Singh v. State of Bihar(') held
that the Bihar Land Reforms Act (30 of 1950) passed by the
State of Bihar was unconstitutional, while the High Courts of
All.aha~ad ~nd Nagpur upheld the validity of corresponding
leg1slat10ns m Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh respectively.
(I) A. I. R. 1951 Patna 91.
L3Sbp.C.T./67-6
806
SUPREMB COURT RBPOR.TS
(1967] 2 S.C.Jl.
The amendment was made when the 11ppeals from those decisiom
were pending in the Supreme Court. In Sankari Prasad's case(')
the constitutionality of the said amendment was questioned but
the amendment was upheld. It may be noticed that the said
amendment was not made on the basis of the power to amend
fundamental rights recognized by this Court, but only in
view of the conflicting decisions of High Courts and without
waiting for the final decision from this Court. Article 31-A was
again amended by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act,
1955. Under that amendment cl. (2) of Art. 31 was amended
and cl. ( 2-A) was inserted therein. While in the original article
31-A the general expression "any prqvisions of his Part" was
found, in the amended article the scope was restricted only to
the violation of Arts. 14, 19 and 31 and 4 other clauses were included, namely, clauses providing for (a) taking over the m!lllage~nt of any property by the State for a limited period; (b) amalgamation of two or more corporations; ( c) extinguishment or
modification of rights of persons interested in corporations; and
( d) extinguishment or modification of rights accruing under ·ny
agreement, lease or licence relating to minerals, and the definition
of "estate" was enlarged in order to include the interests of
raiyats and under-raiyats. The expressed object of the amendment was to carry out important social welfare legislations o~ the
desired lines, to improve the national ec.inomy of the State and to
avoid serious difficulties raised by courts in that regard. Article
3 lA has further been amended by the Constitution (Fourth
Amendment) Act, 1955. By the said amendment in the Ninth
Schedule to the Constitution entries 14 to 20 were added. The
main objects of this amending Act was to distinguish the power
of compulsory acquisition or requisitioning of private property and
the dP.privation of property and to extend the scope of Art. 31-A
to cover different categones of social welfare legislalions and to
enable monopolies in particular trade or busmess to be created in
favour of tlie State. Amended Art. 31 (2) makes the adequacy
of compensation not justiciabll'. It may be said tbat the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955 was made by Parliament
as this Court recognized the power of Parliament to amend· Part
Ill of the Constitution; but it can also be said with some plausibility that, as Parliament had exercised the power even before the
decision of this Court in Sankari Prasad's case('), it would
have amended the Constitution even if the said decision was not
given by this Court. The Seventeenth Amendment Act was made
on June 20, 1964. The occasion for this amendment was the
decision of this Court in Karimbil Kunhikoman v. State of
Kera/a( 2 ), which struck down the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act
IV of 1961 relating to ryotwari lands. Under that amendment
the definition of the expression .. estate" was enlarged so as to take
- (l)[i9s21s.C.R. 89, IOS
--- · - - - - (2)11962]Supp. I S.C.R. 829
A
B
c
D
F
G
H
GOLAKNAlH v. PUNJAB
(Subba Rao, C./.)
807
A
in any land held under ryotwari settlement and any held or let
for purposes of agriculture or for purp0ses ancillary thereto,
including waste land, forest land, land for pasture or sites of
buildings and other structures occupied by cultivators of land,
agricultural labourers and village artisans. In the Ninth Schedule the amendment included items 21 <o 65. In the c-bjects and
reasons it was stated that the definition "estate/' was not wide
enough, that the courts had struck down many land refo1m Acts
and that, therefore, in order to give them pro!ection th.:- amendment was made. The validity of the Seventeenth Amendment
Act was questioned in this Court and was held to be valid in
Safjail Singh's case('). From the history of these amendments, two things appear, namely, unconstitutional laws were
c made and they were protected by the amendment of the Constitution or the amendments were made in order to protect the future
laws which would be void but for the amendments. But the fact
remains that this Court held as early .as in 1951 that Parliament
had power to amend the fundamental rights. It may, therefore,
be said that the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955,
D al'ld the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, were
based upon the scope of the power to amend recognized by this
Court. Further the Seventeenth Amendment Act was also
approved by this Court.
Between 1950 and 1967 the Legislatures of various States
mack· laws bringing about an agrarian revolution in our country
-·zamindaries, inams and other intermediarv estates were abolished, vested rights were created in tenants, consolidation of holdings of villages was made, ceilings were fixed and the surplus
lands transferred to tenants. All these were done on the basis of
the correctness of the decisions in Sankari Prasad's case ( 2 ) and
Sajian Singh's case('), namely, that Parliament had the power
to amend the fundamental rights and that Acts in regard to
estateS were outside judicial scrutiny on the ground
they infringed the said rights. The agrarian structure of our
country has been revolutionised on the basis of the said laws.
Should we now give retrospectivity to our decision, it would introduce chaos and unsettle the conditions in our country. Should
we hold that because of the said consequences Parliament had
G power to take away fundamental rights, a time might come when
we would gradually and imperceptibly pass under a totalitorian
rule. Learned counsel for the petitioners as well as those for the
respondents placed us on the horns of this diTemrna, for they have
taken extreme positions-learned counsel for •he petitioners want
us to reach the logical position bv holding that all the said Jaws
are void an{! the learned counsel for the respondents persuade ~s
H
to hold that Parliament has unlimited power and, if it chooses,
it can do away with fundamental rights. We do not think that
,
(l) [1965) 1 S. C.R. ~33.
(2) [19S2j S.CR. 89,
808
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1%7] 2 S.C.R
1his Court is so helpless. As the highest Court in the land we
must evolve .some reasonable principle to meet this extraordinary
situation. There is an essential distinction between Constitution
and statutes. Comparatively speaking, Constitutio'l is permanent; it j5 qn organic statute; it grows by its own inherent force.
The cons!itutional concepts are couched in elastic terms. Courts
are expected to and indeed should interpret, its terms without
doing violence to the language to suit the expanding needs of the
'ociety. In this process and in a real sense they make laws. Though
it is not admitted, the said role of this Court is effective and
~annot be ignored. Even in the realm of ordinary statutes, the
'ubtle working of the process is apparent though the approach is
more conservative and inhibitive. In the constitutional field,
therefore, to meet the present extraordinary situation that may be
.:aused by our decision, we must evolve some doctrine which has
roots in reason and prrcedents so that the past may be preserved
:md the future protected.
l11ere are two doctrines familiar to American Jurisprudence,
is described as Blackstonian theory and the other as "prospective over-ruling ... which may have some relevance to the present enqui:y Blach<onc in his Commentaries, 69 (15th edn.,
1809) stated the common law rule that the duty of the Court
was "not to pronounce a new rule but to maintain and expound
the old one". It means the Judge does not make law but only
discovers or finds the true law. The law has always been tJ1e same.
If a subsequent decision changes the earlier one, the latter deci'ion does not make law hut only discovers the correct principle of
law. The result of this view is that it is necessarily re'.tospective
operation. But Jurists, George F. Canfield, Robert Hill Freeman,
John Henry Wigmore and Cardozo, have expounded the doctrine
of "prospective over-ruling" and suggested it as "a ~sefui judicial
tool". !n the words of Canfield the said expressio.i means :
•)Ile
" ...... a court should recognize a duty to announce a new and better rule for future transaction:,
·.vhenever the court has reached the conviction that an
old rule (as established by the precedents) is unsound
even though feeling compelled by stare decisis to apply
the old and condemned rule to the instant case and
to transactions which had already taken place."
A
B
c
D
E
G
Cardozo. before he became a Judge of the Supreme Court of
the ll11itcd States of America, when he was the Chief Justfce
of New York State addressing the Bar Association said thus :
1\w ru\e. (the Blackstonian rnle) tb.at we are a~ll.ed
to apply is out of tune with the life about us. It has
bten made discordant by the forces that generate a
H
-
GOLAKNATH
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
v.
PUNJAB
(Subba Rao, C.J.)
809
living law. We apJ,JIY it to this case because the repeal
might work hardship to those who have trusted to its
existence. We give notice however that any one trusting to it hereafter will do at his peril."
The Sltprome Court of the United States of America, in the year
1932 after Cardozo became an Associate Justice of' that Court
in Great Northern Railway v. S1111b11rst Oll & Ref. Co.,( 1 )
applied the said doctrine to the facts of that case. In that case
the Montana Court had adhered to its previous construction of
the statute in question but had announced that that interpretation wolud not be followed i.1 the future. It was contended
before the Supreme Court of the United States of America that a
decision of a court over-ruling earlier decision and not giving iis
ruling retro-active operation violated the due process clause of the
14th Amendment. Rejecting that plea, Cardozo said :
"This is not a case where a Court in overruling an
earlier decision has come to .the new ruling of retroactive dealing and thereby has made invalid what was
followd in the doing. Even that may often be done
though litigants not infrequently have argued to the
contrary .... This is a case where a Court has refused
to make its ruling retro-active, and 1he novel stand is
taken that the Constitution of the United States is infringed by the refusal. We think that tht Federal Constitution has no voice upon the subject. A state in defining the elements of adherence to precedent may make
a choice for itself between the princi pie of forward
operation and that of relation backward. It may be so
that the decision of the highest courts, though later
over-ruled, was Jaw nonetheless for intermediate transactions .... On the other hand, it may hold to the
ancient dogma that the Jaw declared by its Courts. had
a platonic or ideal existence before the act of declaration, in which event, the discredited declaration will be
viewed as if it had never been and to reconsider declaration as law from the beginning .... The choice for
any state may be determined by the juristic philosophy
of the Judges of her Courts, their considerations of
Jaw. its origin and nature."
The opinion of Cardozo tried to harmonize the doctrine of prospective over-ruling with that of stare decisis.
H
Jn 1940, Hughes, C.J., in Chicot County Drainage District v.
Baxter State Bank(') stated thus :
(1) (\9~2! 287 U.S. 358. 366·. 17 L. Ed. 360.
(2) (1940) 308 U.S. 371.
810
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1%7] 2 S.C.R
"The law prior to the determination of unconstitutionality is an op~rative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration."
In Griffin v. /ll!onis(') the Supr~me Court of America reaffirmed the doctrine laid down in Sunburst's case('). There, a
statute required defendants to submit bills of exceptions as a
pre requisite to an appeal from a conv· ;tion; the Act was held
unconsl :tutional in tha: it provided no means whereby indigent
dcfcnd~rt.1 <:ould sc~~re a copy of the record for this purpose.
Frankfun~r. J., in that context observed :
" ...... in arriving at a new principle, the judicial
process is not important to define its scope and limits.
Adjudication is not a mechanical exercise nor does it
compel 'either/or' determination."
In Waif v. Colorado(') a majority of the Supreme Court held
that ia a prosecutio:i in a State Court for a state crime, the 14th
Amendment did not forbid the admission of evidence obtained
by an unreasonable search and seizure. But in Mapp. v. Ohio(')
the Supreme Court reversed that decision and held that all evidence obtained by searches and seizure in violation of the 4th
Amendment of the Federa! Constitution was, by virtue of the
due process clause of the 14th Amendment guaranteeing the
right to privacy free from unreasonable State instrusion, inadmissible in a State ccurt. In Linkierrer v. Walker(') the question arose whether the exclusion of the rule enunciated in Mapp
v. Ohio(') did not apply to State Court convictions which
had become final before the date of that judgment. Mr. Justice
Clarke, speaking for the majority observed :
"We believe that the existence of the Wolf doctrine
prior to Mapp is 'an operative' fact and may have
consequences whkh cannot justly be ignored. The
past cannot always be ..:rascd by a new judicial declaration."
"Mapp had --·; ils prima purpose the enfor~ement of
the Fourth Amendment through the inclusion of the
exclusionary rule wi'.hin its rights ............. .
We cannot say that th's purpose would be advanced
:-; making the rule retrospective. The misconduct vf
1he police prior to Mapp has already occurred and will
-··-------
!1956J 351 U.S. 12. 2 .
f2) (1932) 287 U. S .1;1,366: 77 L rd l60.
(4)(19G6J 367 U.S. 643: 6 L. Ed.
(3)(1948-49] 338 U.S. 25: 193 L.Ed. 872.
(5) [1%5] 38> U.S. 618.
(2nd Edn) lli81.
(!)
A
R
c
D
F
G
H
GOLAKNATH
B
c
D
v. PUNJAB (Subba Rao, C.J.)
811
not be corrected by releasing the prisoMrs ;nv.Jlvecl ....
On the other hand, the States relied on Wolf and followed its command. · Final judgments of conviction
were entered prior to Mapp, Again and again the Courr
refused to reconsider Wolf and gave its implicit approval to hundreds of cases in their application of its rule.
In rejecting the Wolf doctrine as to the exG!usiom.ry
rule the purpose was to deter the lawless action of the
police and to effectively enforce the Fourth Amendment.
That purpose will not at this late date be served by the
wholesale release of the guilty yictims."
"Finally, there are interests in the administration of
justice and the integrity of the judicial process to consider. To make the rule of Mapp retrospective would
tax the administration of justice to the utmost. Hearings
would have to be held on the exciudability of evidence
long since destroyed, misplaced or deteriorated. lf it is
excluded, the witness availab!e at the time of the original
trial will not be available or if located their memory
will be dimmed. To thus legitimate such an extraordinary procedural weapon that has no bearing on
guilt would S'!riously disrupt the administration of
justice."
E
F
G
H
This case ha.• reaffirmed the doctrine of prospective overruling
and has taken a pragmatic approach in refusing to give it retroactivity. In short, in America the doctrine of prospective overruling is now accepted in all branch.es of law, including constiiutional law.· But the carving of the limits of :etrospectivity of
the new rule is left to courts to be done, having regard to the
requirements of jus•ice. Even in England the Blackstonian theory
was criticized by Bentham and Austin. In Austin's Jurispru·
dence, 4th Ed., at page 65, the learned author says :
"What hindered Bfackstone was 'the childish fiction'
employed by our judges, that judiciary or common
law is not made by them, b1". is a miraculous something made. by nobody, existing, I suppose, from eternity, and merely declared from time to time by the
Judges."
Though English Courts in the past accepted the Blackstoilian
theory and though the House of Lords stnctly acthered to the
doctrine of 'precedent' in the earlier years, both the doc'rines
were practically given up by the "Practice Statement (Judicial
Precedent)" issued by the House of Lords recorded in (1966) 1
W.L.R. 1234. Lord Gardiner L.C., speaking for the House of
Lords made the following observations.:
St;PRBll: COt:l\T RErORTS
81~
[1967] ~ S.CR
"'Thdr Lordship, nC\'crthelcss recognise that too rigid
adherence to precedent may lead to injustice in a
particular case and al.;o unduly restrict the proper
development of the Jaw. They propose, therefore. to
modify their pre,cm practice and. while treating former
decisions of this House as normally binding. to depart
fro_1_n a previous decision when it appears right to do
B
so.
Jn th'.·; connection they \\ill bear in mind the danger
ol disturbing rctro;pcctively the basis on which contracts. settlements of property and fiscal arrangements
h:ivc been entered into and also the especial need for
certainty as to the criminal Jaw."
c
Thi' :tnnouncement is not intended to affect the
u'c of precedent elsewhere than in this House."
It '~ill be seen from this passage that the House of Lords hereafter in appropriate cases may depart from its p;evious decision
when it appears right to do so and in so dcpaning will bear in
mind the danger of giving effect to the said decisiou retroactivity.
We consider that what the House of Lords means by this statement is that in differing from the precedents it will do w only
without interefering with the transactions that had taken place on
the basis of earlier decisiow. TI1is decision, to a large extent,
modifies the Blackstonian theory and accepts, though not expressly but by necessary implication the doctrine of "prospective
overruling."
Let us now consider some of the objections ro this doctrine.
The objections arc: (I) the doctrine involved Legislation by
courts; (2) it would not encourage parties to prefer appeals as
they would not get any benefit therefrom; (3) the declaration for
the future would only be obiter; '. 4) it is not a desirable change;
and ( 5) the doctrine of retroactivity serves as a brake on court'
which otherwise might be tempted to be so fascilc in overruling.
But in our view, tnese objections arc not insurmountable. If a
court can over-rule its earlier decision--there cannot be any dispute now that the court can do so--.~herc cannot be any valid
reason why it should not restrict it~ ruling to the future and not
to the past. Even if the party filing an appeal may not be benctited by it. in similar appeals which he may file after the change
in the law he will have the benefit. The decision cannot be obiter
for what the court in effect does is to declare the law but on the
basis of another doctrine restricts its scope. Stability in bw doe,,
not mean that injustice shall be perpetuated. An illuminatini:
article on the subject is found in Pennsylvania law Review [Vol.
I 10 p. 650].
D
'
H
GOLAKNATH \'. PUNJAII
A
8
c
D
F
G
H
(Subba Rao, C./.)
813
It is a modern doctrine suitable for a fast moving society. It
does not do away with the doctrine of siare decisis, but confine-,
it to past transactions. I.t is true that in one sense the court only
declares the law, either customary or statutory or personal law.
While in strict theory it may be said that the doctrine involves
making of law, what the court really docs is to declare the la~v
but refuses to give rctroactivity to it. It is really a pragmatic
solution reconciling the two conflicting doctrines, namely, that a
coun finds law and that it docs make law. It finds law but restricts its operation to the future. It enables the court to bring
about a smooth transition by correcting its errors without disturbing the impact of those errors on the past transactions. It is left
to the discretion of the court to prescribe the limits of the retrcactivity and thereby it enable' it to mould the relief to meet the
ends of justice.
In India there is no statutory prohibition against thl! court
refusing to give retroactivity to the law declared by it. lnd~~d,
the doc!rine of res judicata precludes any scope for retroactlVlty
in respect of a subject-matter that has been finally decided between the parties. Further, Indian court by interpretation reject
retroactivity to statutory provisions though ccuched in general
terms on the ground that they affect Vc>ted rights. The present
case only attempts a further extension of the said rule against
retroactivity.
Our Constitution does not expressly or by necessary implicarion speak against the doctrine of prospective over-ruling. Indeed, Arts. 32, 141 and 142 are couched in such wide and elastic
terms as to enable this Court to fonnulate legal doctrines to
meet the ends of justice. The only limitation thereon is reason,
restraint and injustice. Under Art. 32, for the enforcement of
the fundamental rights the Supreme Court has the power to issue
suitable directions or orders or writs. Article 141 says that the
law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts;
and Ar:. 142 enables it in the exercise of its jurisdiction to pass
such decree or make such order a, is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it. These
articles are designedly made comprehensive to enable the
Supreme Court to declare law and to give such dire lions or pass
such orders as are necessary to do complete justice. The expression "declared'' is wider than the words "found or made''. To
declare is to announce opinion. Indeed, the latter involves· the
process. while the former expresses result. Interpretation, ascertaiament and evolution are parts of the process, while that interpreted. ascertained or evolved is declared as law. The law declared by the Supreme Court is the law of the land. If so, we do not
see any acceptable reason why it, in declaring the law in superses-
814
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1967] 2 S.C.R..
sion of the law declared by it earlier, could not restrict the operation of the law as declared to future and save the transactions,
whether statutory or otherwise that were effected on the basis of
the earlier law. To deny this power to the Supreme Court on
the basis of some outmoded theory that the Court only finds law
but does not make it is to make ineffective the powerful instrument of justice placed in the hands of the highest judiciary of this
country.
As this Court for the first time has been called upon to
apply the doctrine evolved in a different country under difierent
ci1 c1Jmstances, we would like to move warily in the beginning.
We would lay down the following propositions : ( 1) The doctrine
of p~ospective over-ruling can be invol(ed only in matters arising
under our Constitution; (2) it can be applied only by the highest
court of the country, i.e., the Supreme Court as it has the constitutional jurisdiction to deciare J••v binding on all the courts in
India; (3) the scope of the retroactive operation of the law
declared by the Supreme Court superseding its earlier decisions
is left to its discretion to be moulded in accordance with the
j1.1stice of the cause or matter before it.
We have arrived at two conclusions, namely, (I) Parliament
has no power to amend Part III of the Constitution so as
to take away or abridge the fundamen!al rights; and (2) this is a
tit case to invoke and apply the doctrine of prospective overruling. What then is the effect of our conclusion on the instant
case ? Having regard to the history of the amendments, their
impact on the social and economic affairs of our country and the
chaotic situati0n that may be brought about by the sudc!en withdrawal at this stage of the amendments from the Constitution, we
think that considerable judicial restraint is called for. We, therefore, declare that our decision will not affect the validi•v of the
Cons:itution (Sevemeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, or other
amendments made to the Constitution taking away or abridging
the fundamental rights. We further declare that in future Parliament will have no power to amend Part III of the Con~titution so as to take away or abridge the fundamental rights. In this
case we do not prop.:>se to express our opinion on the question of
the scope of the amendability of the provisions of e:te Constitution other than the fundamentai rights, as it does not arise for
consideration before us. Nor arc we called upon to express out
opin'on on the question regarding the scope of the amend;•hili1y of Pan Ill of the Constitution o'.herwise than by taking
awJy or abridging the fundamental rights. We will not also indicatc our view one way or other whether any of the Aces uuestioncd cm be sustained under the provisions of the Constilution
wilhout !he aid cf Aris. 31A, 31B and the 9th Schedule.
A
B
c
D
E
F
C
H
(
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB (Subba Rao,
•
C.J.)
815
The aforesaid discussion leads to the following results :
( 1) The power of the Parliament to amend the
Constitution is derived from Arts. 245, 246 and 248
of ·the Constitution and not from Art. 368 thereof
which only deals with procedure. Amendment is a
legislative process.
(2) Amendment is 'law' within the meaning of
Art. 13 of the Constitution and, therefore, if it takes
away or abridges the rights conferred by Part HI
thereof, it is void.
(3) The Coristitution (First Amendment) Act,
1951, Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955,
and the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act.
c
1964, abridge the scope of the fundamental rights. But,
on the basis of earlier decisions of this Court, tiJ.ey were
valid.
( 4) On th. application of the doctrine of 'prospective over-ruling', as explained by us earlier, our decision
will have only prospective operation and, therefore. the
D
said amen.dments will continue to be valid.
( 5) We declare that the Parliament will have no
power from the date of this decision to amend any of
the provisions of Part III of the Constitution so as to
take away or abridge the fundamental rights enshrined
therein.
E
( 6) As the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment)
Act holds the field, .the validity of the two impugned
Acts, namely, the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act
X of 1953, and the Mysore Land Reforms Act X of
1962, as amendec1 by Act XIV of 1965, cannot be
questioned on the ground that they offend Arts. 13,
r
14 or 31 of the Constitution.
Before we close, it would be necessary to advert to an argument advanced on emotional plane. It was said that if the provisions of the Constitution could not be amended it would lead to
revolution. We have not ~aid that the provisions of the Constitution cannot be amended but what we have said is that they canG not be amuded so as to taKe away or abridge the fundamental
rights. Nor can we appreciate the argument that all the agrarian
reforms which the Parliament in power wants to effectuate cannot
be brought about without amending the fundamental rights. It
was exactly to prevent this attitude and to project the rights of
·the people that the fundamental rights were inserted in the Consiitu'ion. If it is the duty of the Parliament to enfor~e the directive
H
principles, it jg equally its dutv to enforce them without infringing the fundamental rights. The Constitution-m'lkers thought·
tlcat it could be done and we also think that the direc'.ive prin-
~ 16
SUPREME COUR r REPORTS
[1967] 2 S.C.R
ciplcs can rca,onably !>.! enforced within the sclf.·rcgulator} A
machinay provided b)' Pan Ill. Indeed both Parts Ill and JV
<'f the Cothtitution form an integrated scheme and is cla:;tic
enough to rc,pond to the changing need> of the ;o.:icty. The
verdict of the Parliament on the scope of tilt.! law ol social con·
trol of fund:.1mental rights is not final. but justiciable. If not ~
the whole scheme of the Constitution will break. Wh;tt we can- a
not understand is how Jhc enforcement of the provisions c.f :he
Constitution can bring about a revolution. History shows that
revolutions arc b'.·ought about not by the majorities but by the
minorities and some time by military coups. The existence of
an all comprehensive <lmending power cannot prcvcn1 revolution.'.
if there is chaos in the country brought about by mis-rule or C
<tbusc of power. On tJ1e o·her hand. such a restrictive power give»
stability t0 the country and prevents it from passing under a totalitarian or dictatorial regime. We cannot obviously ba.<e our
decision on such hypoJhctical or extraordinary situations which
may be brought a[Xlut with or withoul amendments. Indeed, a
Constitution is only pennancnt and not eternal. There is nothinj!
co choose be". ween <lest ruction by amendment or by revolution. I>
the former " brought about by totalitarian rule, wi1ich cannot
hrook con51it1,tional check> and the other by the discontentment
hrought about hy mis-rule. If either happens, the constitution
will be a scrap of paper. S•ich considerations arc out of place in
construing the provisions of the Constitution by a courl of law.
Nor arc "c in:;Jresscd by the argument chat if th<: power of C
amendmcm is not all comprehensive there will be no way to
change the 'tructure of our Constitution or abridge the fundamental rights even if the whole country demands for such a
change. Firstly, this visualizes an extremely unforeseeable and
extravagant demand: but even if such a contingency arises, the
residuary power of the Parlia1aent may be relied upon to call for r
a Constitu.~nt Assembly for making a new Constitution or radically chang.inj! it. The recent Act providing for a poll in Goa.
Daman and Diu is an instance of analogous exercise of such
residuary power by the Parliament. We do no~ express our final
opinion on this important question.
A final appeal is made to us that we shall not take a different
view as the decision in Sankari Prasad's case(') held thc field for G
many years. While ordinarily this Court will be reluctant to
rcver.>e its previous decision, it is its duty in the .constitutional
field to correct itself as early as possible, for otherwise the future
progress .of the country and the happiness of the people will be at
stake. As we are convinced that the decision in Sankari Pra.~ud's
case(') is wrong, it is pre-eminently a typical case where this Court H
'houid over-rule it. The longer ii holds the field the greater will
(11[1952]SC.R 89.105
GOLAKNATH I'. PUNJAB (Wanchoo, !.)
A
B
c
D
It
'
G
H
817
be the scope for erosion of fundamental rights. As it contains
the seeds of destruction of the cherished rights of the people the
'iOOner it is over-ruled the better for the country.
This argument is answered by the remarks made by this
Coui;t in the recent judgment in The Superillfendent and Legal
Remembranc<'t State of West Bengal v: The Corporation of
Calcutta (1).
·The third contention need not detain us for it has
been rejected by this Court in T/1e Benlf(ll Immunity
Company limited v. The State of Bihar('). There a
Bench of 7 Judp.es unanimously held that there was
nothing in the Constitution that prevented the Supreme
Court from departing from a previous decision of its
own if it was satisfied of its error and of i's baneful
effect on the general int~rest of the public. If the aforesaid rule of construction accepted by this Court is inconsistent with the legal philosophy of our Constitution,
it is our Juty to correct ourselves and Jay down the
right rule. In constitutional matters which affect the
evolution of our polity, we must more readily do so
than in other branches of law, as perpetuation of a mistake will be harmful to public interests. While continuity
and consistency are conducive to the smoo'h evolution
of the rule of Jaw. hesitancy to set right deviation will
retard its growth. Jn this case, as we are satisfied that
the said rule of construction is inconsistent with our
republican polity and, if accepted, bristles with ;rnomalies. we have no hesitation to reconsider our earlier
decision."
In the result the petitions are dismissed. but in the circum'tances wihout costs.
Wanchoo, J. This Special Bench of eleven Judges of this Court
has been constituted to consider the correctness of the decision of
this Court in Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India( 3 )
which was accepted as correct by the majority in Saijan Singh v.
S/IJte of Rajasthan(').
The reference has been made in three petitions challenging
the constitutionality of the Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution. In one of the petitions. the inclusion of the Punjab
Security of Land Tenures Act, (No. X of 1953) in the Nintl1
Schedule, which makes it immune from attack under any provisions contained in Part III of the Constitution, has been attacked
on the ground that the SeYemeenth Amendment is in. itself unconstitutional. In the other two petitions, the inclusion of the
Mysore Land Refonus Act, (No. 10 of 1962) has been attacked
on the same grounds. . It is not necessary to set out the facts in
-(i)i1967J fi:<::Jl.:170.176(2) [1955] 2 S.C.R.603.
(3) [t952] S.C.R. 89,
(4) [1965) l.C.S.R. 933.
\
818
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1967] 2 s.c.R.
the three petitions for nresenl purposes. The main· argument in
all the three petitions has been as to the scope and effect of Art.
368 o( the Constitution and the power conferred thereby to amend
the Constitution.
Before we com~ to th'e specific points rJised in the present petitions, we may indicate the circumstances in which Sa11kari Prasad'.~
case( 1 ) as well as Sajja11 Si11g/z"s case(') came to be decided and
"hat they actually decided. The Comtitution came into force
on January 26. 1950. It provides in Part Ill for certain fundamental· rights. Article 31 which i in Part III, as it originally
,;tood, provided for compulsory acquisition of property. By
clause (I) it provided that '"no person shall be deprived of his
property save by authority of law". Clause (2) thereof provided
that any law authorising taking of possession or acquisition of property must provide for compensation therefor and either fix the
amount c{ compensation or specify thr. principles on which, and the
manner in which, the compensaticm was to be determined and
paid. Clause ( 4) made a special provision to the effect that if
any Bill pending at the commencement of the Constitution in the
Legislature of a State had. after it had been passed by such Legislature, been reserved for the consideration of the President and bad
•eceived his assent, then such law would net be called in question
thoui;h it contravened the provisions of cl. ( 2) relating to compensation. Clause ( 6) provided that any law of the State enacted
not more than eighteen months before the Constitution might be
submitted to the President for his certification, and if so certified,
it could not be called in question on the ground that it contravened the provision of cl. (2) of Art. 31 relating to compensation.
These two clauses of Art. 31 were meant lo safeguard legislation which either bad been passed by Provincial or State legislatures or which was on the anvil of State legislatures for the purpose of agrarian reforms. One such piece of legislation was the
Bihar Land Refonns Act, which was passed in 1950. That Act
received the assent of the President a~ required under cl. (6) of
Art. 31. It was however challenged before the Patna High Court
and was struck down by that court on the ground that it violated
Art. 14 of the Constitution. Then there was an appeal before
this Court, but while that appeal was pending, the First Amendment to the Constitution was made.
A
B
0
We may briefly refer to what the First Amendment provided
for. It was the First Amendment which was challenged and was
upheld in Sankari Prasad's case('). The First Amendment contained a number or provisions; but it is necessary for present pur·
poses only to refer to those provisions which made changes in
Part III of the Constitution. These changes related to Arts. 15
(!} [19S21 S.C.R. 69.
(2) [196SJ I S.C.R. 933
c
r
G
fl
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB (Wanchoo, /.)
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
819
and 19 and in addition, provided for inse~tion of two . Articles
numbered 31-A and 31-B in Part Ill. Article 31-A provided that
no law providing for the acquisition by the State of an~ estate or
of any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of any
such rights shall be ... Jemed to be void on the ground that it was
inconsistent with, or took away or abridged any of the rights
conferred by any provision in part III. The word "es~ate" was
also defined for the purpose of Art. 31-A. Further Article 31-B
provided for validation of certain Acts and Regulations and specified such Acts and Regulations in the Ninth Sc.hedule, which was
for the first time added to the Constitution. The Ninth Schedule
then contained 13 Acts, all relating to estates, passed by various
legislatures of the Provinces or States. It laid down that those
Acts and Regulations would not be deemed to be void or ever to
have become. void, on the ground that they were inconsistent with
or took away or abridged any of the rights conferred by any provision of Part III. It further provided that notwithstanding any
judgment. decree or order of any cou1t or tribunal to the contrary, all such Acts and Regulations subject to the power of any
competent legislature to repeal or amend them, continue in force.
This amendment, and in particular Arts. 31-A and 31-B were
immediately challenged by various writ petitions in this Court and
these came to be decided on October 5, 1951 in Sankari Prasad's
case('). The attack on the validity of the First Amendment was
made on various grounds; but three main grounds wb'.ch were
taken were, firstly, that amendments to the Constitution made under
Art. 368 were liable to be tested under Art. 13(2); secondly
that in any case as Arts. 31-A and 31-B inserted in the Constitution by the First Amendment affected the power of the
High Court under Art. 226 and of this Court under Articles
132 and 136, the amendment required ratification under the
proviso to Art. 368; and, thirdly, that Arts. 31-A and 31-B were
invalid on the ground that they related to matters covered by the
State List. namely, item 18 of List H, and could not therefore be
passed by Parliament. This Court rejected all the three contentions. It held that although "law" would ordinarily include constitutional law, there was a clear dcmar~ation ·between ordinary
law made in the exercise of legislative power and constitutional
law made in the exercise of constituent power, and in the context
of Art. 13, "law" must be taken to mean rules or regulations made
in exercise of ordinary legislative power and not amendments to
the Constitution made in the exercise of constituent power; in
consequence Art. 13 ( 2) did not affect amendments made under
Art. 368. It further held that Arts. 31-A and 31-B did not curtail the power of the High Court under Art. 226 or of this court
nnder Arts. 132 and 136 and did not require ratification under the
(1) (1952] S.C.R. 89
$:.!U
[I 91> 7] 2 S.CR
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
provi'o contained in Ar:. 368. Finalh. 11 wa' held lhal Art>.
•31-A and 31-B were esscntiaily amendments 10 the Constitution
and Parliament as such had the power to enact such am~~dments.
In consequence. the First Amendment to the Con,~itution wa~
upheld as valid.
After this decision. !here follo1\·cd sixteen more amendment'
Amendment.
which was passed on June 20, 1964. There docs not seem to have
been challenge to any amendment up to the Sixteenth Amendment, even though two of them. namely, the Fourth Amendment
and the Sixteenth Amendment. contained changes in the provi'ions of Part III of the Constitution. Further the nature of these
amendments was to add to, or ahcr or delete various other provi'ions of the Constitution contamed in Part Ill thereof. On
December 5, 1961 came the decision of this Court by which the
Kerala Agrarain Reforms Act (No. -l of 1961 ), passed by the
Kerala legislature. wa' struck down, among other grounds. for the
reason that ryotwari lands in South India \\ere not estates within
the meaning of At t. 31-A and therefore 1cquisition of ryotwari
land was not protected under Art. 31-A of the Constitution : [see
Karimbil K11nhikoma11 v. State of Kera/a(' )I. This decision was
followed by the Seventeenth Amendment on June. 20, 1964. Dy
this amendment, changes were made in Art. 31-A of the Consti·
1ution and 44 Acts were included in the Ninth Schedule to g:vc
them complete protection from attack under any provision of Part
Ill of the Constitution. Practically all these Acts related to land
tenures and were concerned with agrarian reforms. This amendment was challenged before this Court i11 Sajjan Sing/i's case{°).
The points then urged were that as Art. 226 was likely to be
affected by the Seventeenth Amendment, it required ratification
under 'he proviso to Art. 368 and that the decision in Sankari
Pramd"s case(') which had negatived this contention required reconsideration. It was also urged that the Seventeenth Amendment
was legi,lation with re,pcct to land and Parliament had no right
to legislate in that behalf, and further that as the Seventeenth
Amendment provided that the Acts put in lhe ~inth Schedule
would be valid in spite of the decision of lhe Courts. it was unconstitutional. This Court by a majority of 3 to 2 upheld the
correctness of the decision in Sankari Prasad's case( 8 ). It
further held unanimously that the Seventeenth Amendment did nol
require ratification under the proviso to Art. 368 because of its
indirect effect on Art. 226, and that Parliament in enacting the
Amendment was not legislating with respect to land and that it
was open to Parliament to validate legislation which had be<:n
declared invalid by courts. Finally this Court held by majority
B
10 the Constitution till we come to the Scvenieenth
(2) 11965] I S.C.R. 933.
(I) (19621 Supp. l S.C.R. 829.
(3) (1952] S.C.R. 89.
c
D
E
F
G
H
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB· (Wanchoo, J.)
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
821"
that the power conferred by Art. 368 included the power to take
awa; fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III and that the
power to amend was a very wide power and could not be controlled by the literal dictionary meaning of the •....:>rd "amend",
and that the word "law" in Art. 13(2) did not include an amendment of the Constitution made in pursuance of Art. 368. The
minority however doubted the correctness of the view taken in
Sankari Prasad's case(') to the effect that the word "law" in Art.
13 ( 2) did not include amendment to. the Constitution made under
Art. 368 and therefore doubted the competence of Parliament to
make any amendment to Part III of the Constitution. One of
the learned Judges further doubted whether making a charige in
the basic features of the Constitution could be regarded merely as
an amendment or would, in effect, be re -writing a part of the
Constitution, and if so, whether it could be done under Art. 368.
It was because of this doubt thrown on the correctness of the view
taken in Sankari Prasad's case(') that the present reference has
been made to this Special Bench.
As the question referred to this Bench is of great constitutional
importance and affected legislation passed by various States,
notice was issued to the Advocates General of all States and they
have appeared and intervened before us. Further a number of
persons who were also affected by the Seventeenth Amendment
have been permitted to intervene. The arguments on behalf .of
the petitioners and the interveners who support them may now be
briefly summarised.
It is urged that Art. 368 when it provides for the amendment
of the Constitution merely contains the procedure for doing SO'
and that the power to make amendment has to be found in Art
248 read with item 97 o~ List I. It is further urged that the
word "amendment" in Art. 368 means that the provisions in the
Constitution can be changed so as to improve upon them and that
this power is of a limited character and does not authorise Parliament to make any addition to, alteration of or deletion of any
provision of the Constitution, including the provision contained in
Part III. So Art. 368 authorises only those amendments which
have the effect of imprQving the Constitution. Then it is urged
that amendment permissible under Art. 368 is subject to certain
implied limitations and these limitations are that basic features of
the Constitution cannot be amended at all. An attempt was made
to indicate some of these basic features, as, for example, the pro~
visions in Part m, the federal structure, the republican character
of the. State, elected Parliament and State Legislatures on the basis
of adult suffrage, control by the judiciary and so on, and it is said
that an amendment under Art. 368 is sub_iect to the implied limi(I) [1952] S.C.R. 89.
L3Sup.C'l/67· -·7
S22
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1967] 2 S.C.R.
tations that these basic features and others of the kind cannot be
changed. Thus in effect the argument is that t'1ere is a very
limited power of amendment under the Constitution.
It is further urged that apart from these implied limitation.~.
there is an express limitation under Art. 13 ( 2) and the word
"law" in that Article includes an amendment of the Constitution.
lbe argument thus in the alternative is that as the word "law" in
Art. 13(2) includes a constitutional amendment, no amendment
<:an be made in Part III under Art. 368 which would actually take
away or abridge the rights guaranteed under that Part. In effect.
it is said that even if there are no implied limitations to amend the
Constitution under Art. 368, Art. 13(2) is an express limitation
insofar as the power to amend Part Ill is concerned and by virtue
of Art. 13 ( 2) the rights guaranteed under Part III cannot be
taken away or abridged under Art. 368, though it is conceded
that Part III may be amended by way of enlarging the rights
con•ained therein.
Another line of argument is that in any case it was necessary
to take action under the proviso to Art. 368 and as that was not
done the Seventeenth Amendment is not valid. It is urged that
Art. 226 is seriously aftected by the provisions contained in the
Seventeenth Amendment and that amounts to an amendmnt of
Art. 226 and in con.~uence action under the proviso was neces·
sary. It is also urged that Art. 245 was c:qually affected by the
addition of a number of Acts in the Ninth Schedule read with Art.
13(2) and therefore also it was necessary to take action under
the prqviso. It is further urged that it was not competent for
Parliament to amend the Constitution by putting a largo number
of Acts in the Ninth Schedule as the power to legislate with respect to land is solely within the competence of State Legislatures
and that is another reason why the addition to the Ninth Schedule
read with Art. 31-B should be struck down.
Lastly an argument had been advanced, which we may call
the argument o~ fear. It is said that if Art. 368 is held to confer
full powor to amend each and every part of the Constitution as
has been held in Sankari Prasad's case('). Parliament may do all
kinds of things, which were never intended, under this unfettered
power and may, for example, abolish elected legislatures, abolish
the President or change the present form of Government into a
Presidential type like the United States Constitution or do away
with the federal structure altogether. So it is urged that we
should interpret Art. 368 in such a way that Parliament may not
be able to do all these things. In effect this argument of fear has
'been put forward to reinforce the contention that this Coult should
ii 1 [195~1 S.C.R. 19.
A
B
c
D
•
G
GOLAKNATB v. PUNJAB (Wanchoo, J.)
A
823
hold that there are some implied limitations on the amending
power and these implied limitations should be that there is no
power any where in the Constitution to change the basic features
of the Constitution to which reference has already been made.
This is in brief the subntlssio111 on behalf of the petitioners and the
interveners who support them.
B
c
D
'
G
H
The subntlssion on behalf of the Union of India_ and the States
may now be summarised. It is urged that Art. 368 not only pro·
vides procedure for amendment but also contains in it the power
to amend the Constitution. It is further urged that the word
"'amendment" in law does not merely mean making such changes
in the Constitution as would improve it but includes the power to
make any addition to the Constitution, any alteration of any of the
existing provisions and its substitution by another provision, and
any deletion of any particular provision of the Constitution. In
effect, it is urged that even if the word "amendment" used in Art.
368 does not take in the power to abrogate the "11tire Constitu·
tion and replace it by another new Constitution, it certainly
means that any provisions of the Constitution may be changed and
this change can be in the form of addition to, alteration of or
deletion of any provision of the Constitution. So long therefore
as the Constitution is not entirely abrogated and replaced by a new
Constitution 11t onei stroke, the power of amendment would enable
Parliament to make all changes in the existing Constitution by
addition;- alteration or deletion. Subject only to complete repeal
being not p0ssible, the power of amendment contained in Art.
368 is unfettered. It is further urged that there can be no implied
limitations on the power to amend and the limitations if any on
this power must be found in express terms in the Article providing
for amendment. It is conceded that there may be an express lintl·
tation not merely in the Article providing for amendment but ia
some other part of the Constitution. But it is said that if that is
so, there must be a clear provision to that effect. In the absence
of express lintltations, therefore, there can be no implied lintltations
on the power to amend the Constitution contained in Art. 368
atid that power will take in all changes whether by way of addition, alteration or deletion, subject only to this that the power of
amendment may not contain the power to lbrogate and repeal the
entire Constitution and substitute it wit:n a new one. _
lt is then urged that there is no express provision in Art 368
itself so far as any amendment relating to the substance of the
amending power is concerned; the only limitations in Art. 368 are
as to procedure and courts can only see that the procedure as
indicated in Art. 368 is followed before an amendment can be
said to be valid. It is further urged that the word "law" in Art.
I 3 does not include an amendment of the Constitution and only
82~
SUPRl!MI! COURT REPORTS
[ 1967] 2 S.C.R.
means Jaw as made under the legislative provisions contained in
Chapter l of Part XI read with Chapters II and lll of Part V of
the Constitution and Chapters Ill and V of Part VI thereof. In
effect it is a law which is made under the Constitution which is
included in the word "law" in Art. 13(2) and not an amendment
to the Constitution under Art. 368.
As to Articles 226 and 245 and the necessity of taking action
under the proviso to Art. 368, it is urged that there is no change
in Arts. 226 and 245 on account of any provision in the Seventeenth Amendment and therefore no action under the proviso was
necessary. It is only direct change in Arts. 226 and 245 which
would require following the procedure as to ratificaticn or at any
rate such change in other Articles which would have the effect of
directly compelling change in Ans 226 and 245 and that in the
present case no such direct compulsion arises.
Lastly as to the argument of fear it is urged that there is always
a provision with respect to amendment in written federal Constitutions. Such a provision may be rigid or flexible. In our
Constitution Art. 1368 provides for a comparatively flexible provision for amendment and there is no reason to make it rigid by
implying any limitations on that power. Further there is no
reason to suppose that all those things will be done by Parliament
which are being urged to deny the power under Art. 368 which
flows naturally from its terms.
Besides the above. reliance is also placed on behalf of the
Union of lndid and the States on the doctrine of stare decisis. It
is urged that since the decision of this Court in Sankari Prasad's
case('), sixteen further amendments have been made by Parliament on the faith of that decision involving over 200 Articles of
the Constitution. The amendments relating to Part III have been
mainly with respect to agrarian reforms resulting in transfers of
title of millions of acres of land in favour of millions of people.
Therefore, even though Sankari Prasad's case(') has stood only
for fifteen years there has been a vast agrarian revolution effected
on the faith of that decision and this Court should not now go
back on what was decided in that case. Further, bc'..:des the
argument based on state decisis, it is urged on the basis nr ~enain
decisions of this Court that the unanimous decision in Sankari
Prasad's case(') which had stood practically unchallenged for
about 15 years till the decision in Sajjan Singh's case('), should
not be over-ruled unless it is found to be incorrect by a large
majority of the Judges constituting this Special &nch. It is urged
that if the present Bench is more or less evenly divided it should
not over-rule the unanimous decision in Sankari Prasnd'.1· ca~e( 1 )
by a majority of one.
(ll f19'2J S.CR
~9.
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB (Wanchoo, J.)
A
•
B
c
D
F
G
H
825
We shall first take Art. 368. It i,<; found in Part XX of the
Constitution which is headed "Amendment of the Constitution"
and is the only Article in that Part. That Part thus provides
specifically for the amendment of the Constitution, and the first
question that arises is whether it provides power for the amendment of the Constitution as well as the procedure for doing so. It
is not disput~d that the procedure for amendment of the
Constitution is to be found in Art. 368, but what is in
dispute is whether Art. 368 confers power also in that behalf.
Now the procedure for the amendment of the Constitution is this.
The amendment is initiated by the introduction of a Bill in either
House of Parliament. The .Bill has to be passed in each House
by a l!'ajority of the total membership of that House and by a
majority of not less twocthirds of the members of that House present and voting. After it is so passed, it has to be presented to
the President for his assent. On such presentation if the President assents to the Bill, Art. 368 provides that the Constitution
shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill.
Further there is a proviso for ratification with respect to certain
Articles and other provisions of ihe Constitution including Art.
368, and those matters can only be amended if the Bill passed by
the two Houses by necessary majority ~ ratified by the legislatures
of not less than one-half of the States by resolutions to that effect.
In such a case the Bill cannot be presented for his assent to the
President until necessary ratification is available. But when the
necessary ratification has been made, the Bill with respect to these
matters is then presented to the President and on his assent being
given, the Constitution stands· amended in accordance · with the
terms of the Bill.
The argument is that there is no express provision in terms in
Art. 368 conferring power on Parliament to amend the Constitution, and in this connection our attention has been invited to an
analogous provision in the Constitution of Ireland in Art. 46,
where cl. 1 provides that any provision of the Constitution may
be. amended in the manner provided in that Article, and then follows the procedure for amendment in clauses 2 to 5. Reference is
also made to similar provisions in other constitutions, but it is
Unnecessary to refer to them. It is urged that as Art. 368 has
nothing comparable to cL 1 of Art. 46 of the Irish Constitution,
the power to amend the Constitution is not in Art. 368 and must
be found elsewhere. We are not prepared to accept this argument. The fact that Art. 368 i~ not in two part~. the fi'rst part
indicating that the Constitution shall be amended in the manner
provided theteafter, and the second part indicating the procedtire
for amendment, does not mean that the power to amend the Comtitution is not contained in Art. 368 itself. The very fact that a
826
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1967] 2 S.C.R,
separate Part has been devoted in the Constitution for amendment
thereof and there is cnly one Article in that Part shows that both
the power to amend and the procedure for amendment are to be
iound in Art. 368. Besides, the words "the Constitution shall
stand amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill" in An.
368 clearly in our opinion provide for the power to amend after
the procedure has been followed. It appears that our Constitution-makers were apparently thinking of economy of words and
elegance of language in enacting Art. 368 in the terms in which
it appears and that is why it is not in two parts on the model of
Art. 46 of the Irish Constitution. But there can in. our opinion
be no doubt, when a separate Part was provided headed "Amend~
ment of the Constitution" that the power to amend the· Constitution must also be contained in Art. 368 which is the only Article
in that Part. If there was any doubt about the matter, that· doubt
in our opi.iion is resolved by the words to which we, have already
referred, namely, "the. Constitution shall stand amended in
accordance with the terms of the Bill". These words can only
mean tha_t the power is there to amend the Constitution after the
procedure has been followed.
•
c
D
It is however urged that t'1e power to amend the Constitution
is not to be found in Art. 368 but is contained in the residuary
power of Parliament in Art. 248 read with item 97 of List I. It
is true that Art. 248 reRd with item 97 of List I, insofar as it
provides for residuary power of legislation, is very wide in itli
scope, and the a,rgument that the power to amend the Constitution
is contained in this provision appears prima facie attractive in
view of the width of the residuary power. But we fail to see why
when there is a whole Part devoted to the amendment of the Constitution the power to amend should not be found in that Part, if
it can be reasonably found there and why Art. 368 should only be
confined to providing for procedure for amendment. It is true
that the marginal note to Art. 368 is "procedure for amendment
of the Constitution", but the marginal note. cannot control the
meaning of the words in the Article itself, and we have no doubt
that the words "the Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill" to be found in Art. 368 confer
the power of amendment. If we were to compare the language G
of els. 2 to 5 of Art. 46 of the Irish Constitution which prescribes
the prnccdure for amendment, wc find no words therein comparable to these words in Art. 368. These words clearly are comparable to ·cl. 1 of Art. 46 of the Irish Constitution and must be
read as conferring power on Parliament to amend the Constitution.
Besides it is remarkable in contrast that Art. 248 read with List If
I does not in terms mention the amendment of the Constitution.
While therefore there is a whole Part devoted to the amendment
of the Constitution, we do not find any specific mention of the
'
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB (Wanchoo, /.)
B
c
D
827
amendment of the Constitution in Art. 248 or in ;my entry of List
I. It would in the circumstances be more appropriate to read
the power in Art. 368 in view of the words which we have already
referred to than in Art. 248 read with item 97 of List I. Besides
it is a historical fact to which we can refer that originally the intention was to vest residuary power in States, and if that intention
had been eventually carried out, it would have been impossible
for any one to argue that the power to amend the Constitution
was to be found in the residuary power if it had been vested in the
States and not in the Union. The mere fact that during the
pas8age of the Constitution by the Constituent Assembly,
residuary power was finally vested in the Union would
not therefore mean that it includes the power to amend the Constitution. On a comparison of the scheme of the words in Art.
368 and the scheme of the words in Art. 248 read with item 97
of List I, therefore, there is no doubt in our mind that both the
procedure and power to amend the Constitution are to be found
in Art. 368 and they are not to be found in Art. 248 read with
item 97 of List I which provides for residuary legislative power of
Parliament.
There is in our opinion another reason why the power to
amend the Constitution cannot be found in Art. 248 read with
item 97 of List I. The Constitution is the fundamental law and
no law passed under mere legislative power conferred by the
Constitution can affect any change in the Constitution unless there
E is an express power to that effect given in the Constitution itself.
But subject to such express power given by the Constitution itself.
the fundamental law, namely the Constitution, cannot be changed
by a law passed under the legislative provisions contained in the
Constitution as all legislative acts passed under the power conferred by the Constitution must conform to the Constitution can
F make no change therein. There are a number of Articles in the
Constitution, which expressly provide for amendment by law, as,
for example, 3, 4, 10, 59(3), 65(3), 73(2), 97, 98(3), 106,
120(2), 135, 137, 142(1), 146(2), 148(3), 149, 169,
171(2), 186, 187(3), 189(3), 194(3), 195, 210(2), 221 (2),
225, 22~(2), 239(1), 241(3), 283(1) and (2), 285(2),
287, 300(1), 313, 345. 373, Sch. V, c!. 7 and Sch. VI, cl. 21;
G and so far as these Articles are concerned they can be amended by
Parliament by ordinary law-making process. But so far as the
other Articles are c0ncerned they can only b0 amended by amendment of the Constitution under Art. 368. Now Aft. 245 which
gives power to make Jaw for the whole or any part of the territory
of India by Parliament is "subject to the provisions of this Constiff tution" and any law made by Parliament whether under Art. 246
read with List I or under Art. 248 read with item 97 of List I
must be subject to the provisions of the Constitution. If there·fore the power to amend the Constitution is contained in Art. 248
828
SUPllEMB COUllT llBPOllTS
(1967) 2 S.C.R.
read with item 97 of List I, that power has to be exercised subject
to the provisions of the Constitution and canhot be used to cLange
the tundamental Jaw (namely, the Constitution) itself. But it
is argued that Art. 368 which provides a special procedure for
amendment of the Constitution should be read along with Arts.
245 and 248, and so read it would be open to amend any provision of the Constitution by law passed under Art. 248 on the
ground that Art. 248 is subject to Art. 368 and therefore the two
together give Power to Parliament to pass a law under Art. 248
which will amend even those provisions of the Constitution which
are not expressly made amendable by law passed under the legislative power of Parliament. This in our opinion is arguing in a
circle. If the fundamental Jaw (i.e. the Constitution) cannot be
changed by any law passed under the legislative powers contained
there!n, for legislation so passed must conform to the fundamental law, we fail to see how a law passed under the residuary
power, which is nothing more than legi.,lative power conferred on
Parliament under the Constitution, can change the Constitution
(namely, the fundamental Jaw) itself.
We may in this connection refer to the follawing passage in
The Law and the Constitution by W. Ivor Jennings ( 1933 Ed.)
at p. 51 onwards : "A written constitution is thus the fundamental law
of a country, the express embodiment of the doctrine
of the reign of Jaw. All public authorities-legislative,
administrative and judicial-take their powers directly
or indirectly from it. ....... whatever the nature of
t!1e written constitution it is clear that there
"'is a fundamental distinction between constitutional law
and the rest of the law ........ There is a clear separation, therefore, between the constitutional Jaw and
.he rest of the law."
It is because of this difference between the fundamental law
(namely, the Constitution) and the law pa•sed under the legislative
provisions of the Constitution that it is not possible in the absence
of an express provision to that effect in the fundamental law to
change the fundamental law by ordinary legislation passed thereunder, for such ordinary legislation must always conform 10 the
fundamental law (i.e. the Constitution). If the power to amend
the Constitution is to be found in Art. 248 read with item 97
of List I, it will mean that ordinary legislation passed under the
fundamental law would amend that law and this cannot be done
•nless there is express provision a• in Art. 3 etc. to that effect
In the absence of such express provision any law passed under the
legiSlative powers granted under the fundamental law cannot
amend it. So if we were to hold that the pawer to amend the
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
11
..
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB (Wanchoo, J.)
A
c
D
F
G
H
82il
Constitution is comprised in Art. 248, that would mean that no
amendment of the Constitution would be possible at all except to
the extent expressly provided in various Articles to which we have
referre<: already, for the power to legislate under Art. 245 read
Therefore,
with Art. 248 is itself subject to the Constitution.
reading Art. 368 and considering the scheme of the legislative
powers conferred by Articles 245 and 248 read with item 97 of
List I, this to our mind is clear, firstly that the power to amend
the Constitution is to be found in Art. 368 itself, and secondly,
that the power to amend the Constitution can never reside in Art.
245 and Art. 248 read with item 97 of List I, for that would make
any amendment of the Constitution impossible except with respect
to the express provisions contained in certain Articles thereof for
amendment by Jaw.
We may in this connection add that all this argument that
power to amend the Constitution is to be found in Art. 245 and
Art. 248 read with item 97 of List I has been based on one accidental circumstance, and that accidental circumstance is that the
procedure for amendment of the Constitution contained in Art.
368 is more or less assimilated to the procedure for making ordinary Jaws under the Constitution. The argument is that constitutional amendment is also pa%ed by the two Houses of Parliament, and is assented to by the Pre3ident like ordinary legislation,
with this difference that a special majority is required for certain
purposes and a special majority plus ratification is required for
certain other purposes. It may be admitted that the procedure
for amendment under Art. 368 is somewhat similar to the procedure for passing ordinary legislation under the Constitution.
Even so, as pointed out by Sir Ivor Jennings in the passage already
quoted, there is a clear separation between constitutional law
and the rest of the law and that must never be forgotten. An
amendment to the Constitution is a constitutional law and as observed in Sankari Prasad's case(') is in exercise of constituent
power; passing of ordinary law is in exercise of ordinary legislative power and is clearly different from the power to amend the
Constitution. We may in this connection refer, for example, to
Art. V of the U.S. Constitution, which provides for the amendment thereof. It will be clearly seen that the power contained in
Art. V of the U.S. Constitution is not ordinary legislative power
and no one can possibly call it ordinary legislative power, because
the procedure provided for the amendment of the Constitution in
Art. V differs radically from the procedure provided for ordinary
legislation, for example, the President's assent is not required for
constitutional amendment under Art. V of the U.S. Constitution.
Now if Art. 368 also had made a similar departure from the procedure provided for ordinary legislation, it could never have been
{') [l9j! I S.C. R 89.
830
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1967] 2 S.C.R·
said that Art. 368 merely contained the procedure for amendment and that what emerges after that procedure is followed is
ordinary law o[ the same quality and nature as emerges after
following the procedure for passing ordinary law. If, for example,
the assent of the President which is to be found in Art. 368 ha.cl
not been there and the Constitution would hav,: stood amended
after the Bill had been passed by the two Houses by li""'es"ai:·
majority and after ratification by not less than one-half of the·
States where so required, it could never have been argued that
lite power to amend the Constitution was contained in Arts. 245
and 248 read with item 97 of List I and Art. 368 merely contained the procedure.
We aJe however of opinion that we should look at the quality
and nature of what is done under Art. 368 and not lay so much
stress on the similarity of the procedure contained in Art. 368
with the procedure for ordinary law-making. If we thus look at
the quality and nature of what is done under Art. 368, we find·
that it is the exercise of constituent power for the purpose of
amending the Constitution itself and is very different from the
exercise of ordinary legislative power for passing laws which must
be in conformity with the Constitution and cannot go against any
provision thereof, unle>s there is e'prcss provision to that effect
to which we have already reierred. If we thus refer to the nature
and quality of what is done under Art. 368, we immediately see
that what emcrg~s after the procedure in Art. 368 is gone through
is not ordinary law which emerges after the legislative procedure
contained in the Con>titution is gone through. Thus Art. 368
provides for the coming into existence of what may be called the
fundamental law in the fonn of an amendment of the Constitution
and therefore what emerges after the procedure under Art. 368 is
gone through is not ordinary legislation but an amendment of the
Constitution which becomes a part of the fundamental law itself,
by virtue of the words contained in Art. 368 to the effect that
the Constitution shall stand amcnJcd in accordance with the terms
of the Bill.
It is urged in this connection on behalf o( the Union of India
that even though the assent of the Pres;dent is required under Art.
368, the President must assent thereto and cannot withhold his
assent as is possible in the case of ordinary l~w in view of Art. 111
of the Constitution, for the words "that he withholds assent therefrom" found in Art. 111 are not to be founrl in Art. 368. It is
however difficult to accept the argument on behalf of the Union
that the President cannot withhold his assent when a Bill for
amendment of the Constitution is presented to him. Article 368
provides that a Bill for the amendment of the Constitution shall
be presented to the President for his assent. It further provides·
c
I)
It
r
G
H
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB (Wanchoo, I.)
A
B
c
D
Ii'
G
B
831
that upon such assent by the President, the C0nstitution shall
stand amended. That in our opinion postulates that if assent is
not given, the Cohstitution cannot be amended. Whether a President will ever withhold his assent in our form of Government is a
different matter alto!(ether, but as we read Art. 368 we cannot
-hold that the President is bound to assent and cannot withhold
his assent when a Bill for amendment of the Constitution is presented to him. We are of opinion that the President can refuse
to give his assent when a Bill for amendment of the Constitution
is presented to him, the result being that the Bill altogether falls,
for there is no specific provision for anything further to be done
about the Bill in Art. 368 as there is in Art. 111. We may in this
connection refer to the different language used iii cl. s· of Art. 46
of the Irish Constitution which says that "a Bill .containing a proposal for the amendment of this Constitution_ shall be signed by
the Pres~dent forthwith upon his being satisfied that the provisions
of this Article have been complied with in respect thereof". It
will be seen therefore that if the intention under Art. 368 had been
that the President cannot withhold his assent, we would have
found language similar in terms to that in cl. 5 of Art. 46 of the
lrish Constitution.
We thus see that in one respect at any rate Art. 358 even on
its present terms differs from the power of the President in connection with ordinary legislation under the Constitution and that is
if the President withholds his assent the Bill for amendment of
the Constitution immediately falls. We cannot accept that the
procedure provided under the proviso to Art. 111 can apply in
such a case, for this much cannot be disputed that so far as the
procedure for amendment of the Constitution is concerned we
mt!st look to Art. 368 only and nothing else. In any case the
mere fact that tlie procedure in Art. 368 is very much assimilated
to the progedure for p?ssing ordinary legislation is no reason for
holding that wkt emerges after the procedure under Art. J68 is
followed is ordinary law and no more. We repeat that we must
look at the quality and nature of what is done· under Art. 368,
and that is, the amendment of the Constitution. If we look at
that we must hold that What emerges is not ordinary law passed
under the Constitution but something which has the effect of
amending the fundamental law itself which could not be done by
ordinary legislative process under the Constitution unless there is
express provision to that effect. We have already referred to
such express provisions in various Articles, but Art. 368 cannot
be treated as such an Article, for it deals specifically with the
amendment of the Constitution as a whole.
It is also· remarkable to note in this connection that the word
"Jaw" which has been used in so many Articles of the Consti-
832
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1967) 2 S.CR.
tution has been avoided apparently with great care in Art. 368.
We again refer to the concluding words of the main part of Art.
36~ which says that the .. Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill''. t\ow It is "'ell-known that
in the case of ordinary legislation as soon as the Bill is passed by
t>Oth Houses .and has received the assent of the Prcsidznt it becomes an Act. But Art. 368 provides that as soon as the Bill
for amendment of the Constitution has l :en passed in accordance
with the procedure provided therein the Constitution shall stan~
amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill. These words
i~ our opinion have significance of their own.
It is also remarkable that these words clc:irly 'how the difference between the
quality of what emerges after the procedure under Art. 368 is
followed and what happens when ordinary law-making procedure
is folk.~cd. Under Art. 11 J, in the case of ordinary Jaw-making
whCTJ a Hill is passed by the two Houses of P;ir!iament it is prcscntc<l to the P ·esic'ent an<l the Pre"ident shall declare either that
he assents to the Bill or that he withholds assent therefrom. But
it is remarkable that Art. 111 docs not ;>rovidc that when the
Bill has been assented to by the President it hccomes an :\ct.
The reason for this is that the Bill a"cntcd to ty the President
though it mly become law is st<ll not declared by Art. 111 to
be a law, for such law is open to challenge in courts on various
grounds, namely, on the ground that it violates any fundamental
rights, or on the ground that Parliament was not competent to
pass it or on the ground that it is in breach of any provision of
the Constit:ition. On the other hand we find that when a Bill
for the amendment of the Constitution is passed by requisite
majorily and assented tu by the President, the Constitution itself
declares that the Constitution shall stand amended in accordance
with the terms of the Bill. Thereafter what courts can see is
whether the procedure provided in Art. 368 has been followed, for
if tl'.at is not done, the Constitution cannot stand amended in
accordance with the terms of the Bill. But if the procedure ha'
been followed, the Constitution siands amended, and there is no
question of testing the amendment of the Constitution thereafter
on the anvil of fundamental rights or in any· other way as in
the case of ordinary legislation. Jn view of all this we have no
doubt that even though by accident the procedure provided in the
Constitution for amendment thereof is very akin <o the procedure
for passing ordinary legislation, the power contained in Art. 368
is still not ordinary legislative power but constituent power for the
'I' ·ific purpose of amendment of the Consti,ution; and it is the
qu • .ity of that power which determines the nature of what emerges
after t!1e procedure in Art. 368 has been followed and what thus
emerges is not ordinary legislation but fundamental law which
cannot be tested, for example, under Art. 13 (2) of the Consti:ution or under any other provision of the Constitution.
B
c
D
E
F
G
•
II
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB (Wanchoo, J.)
533,
We may briefly refer to an argument on behalf of the Union
of India that the amending power contained in Art. 368 is the
same sovereign power which was possessed by the Constituent
Assembly when it made the Constitution and therefore it is not
subject to any fetters of any kind. We do not thin!' it necessary
to enter into .the academic question as to where sovereignty resides and whether legal sovereignty is in the people and political
B
sovereignty in the body which has the power to amend the Constitution and vice versa. In our view the words of Art. 368 clearly
confer the power to amend the Constitution and also provide the
procedure for doing so, and that in 0ur opinion is enough for the
purpose of deciding whether th-> Seventeenth Amendment is valid
or not. Further as we have already stated, the power conferred
c under A1t. 368 is constituent power to change the fundamental
law i.e. the Constitution, and is distinct and different from the
ordinary legislative power conferred on Parliament by various
other provisions in the Constitution. So long as this distinction is
kept in mind Parliament would have the power under Art. 368 to
amend the Constitution and what Parliament does under Art. 368
D is not ordinary law-making which is subject to Art. 13(2) or any
other Article of the Constitution. What is the extent of the power
c.onferred on Parliament and whether there are any limitations
on it'--express or implied-will be considered by us presently.
Bnt we have no doubt, without entering into the question of sovereignty and of whether Art. 368 confers the same sovereign power
on Parliament as the Constituent Assembly had when framing the
E Constitution, that Art. 368 does confer power on Parliament subject t0 the procedure provided therein for amendment of any
provision of the Constitution.
This brings us to the scope and extent of the power conferred
for amendment under Art. 368. It is urged that Art. 368 only
gives power to amend the Constitution. Recourse is had on behalf of the petitioners to the dictionary meaning of the word
"amendment". It is said that amendment implies and means im'
provement in detail and cannot take in any change in the basic
features of the Constitution. Reference in this connection may be
made to the following meaning of the word "amend" in the Oxford
English Dictionary, namely, "to make professed improvements in
G a measure before Parliament; formally, to alter in detail, though
practically it may be to alter its principle, so as to thwart it". This
meaning at any rate does not support the case of the petitioners
that amendment merely means such change as results in improvement in detail. It shows that in law, though amendment may
professedly be intended to make improvements and to alter only
H in detail, in r;:ality, it may make a radical change in the provision
which is amended. In any case. as was pointed out in Sajjan
Singh's case(') the word "amend" or "amendment" is well under-
A
'
----
(I I [1%5] I S.C.R. 933.
~34
SUPREME C()URT REPORTS
! 1967] 2 S.C.R
stood in law and will certainly include any change whether by way
of addition or alteration or deletion of any provision in the Constitution. There is no reason to suppose that when the word
"amendment" of the Constitution wa> bcmg used in Art. 368, the
intention wa' to give any meaning le;, than what we have stated
above. To say that "amendment" in law only means a change
which results in improvement would make amendments imp<lssible, for Y.hat is improvr.ment of an existing law is a matter of
opinion and what, for example, the legislature may consider an
improvem~nt may not be so considered by others.
It is therefore
in our opinion impossible to introduce in the concept of amendment as used in Art. 368 any idea of improvement as to details
of the Constitution. The word "amendment" used in Art. 368
must therefore be given its full meaning as used in law and that
means that by amendment an existing Constitution or law can be
changed, and this change can take the form either of addition to
the existing provisions, or alteration of existing provision> and
their substitution by others or deletion of certain provisions altogether. In this connection reference has been made to contra.>!
certain other provisions of the Constitution, where, for example.
the word "amend" has been followed by such words as "by way of
addition. variance or repeal" (~e Sixth Schedule, paragraph 21)
and more or less similar expressions in other Articles of the Constitution. It is very difficult to say why this was done. But the
fact that no such words appear in Art. 363 does not in our mind
make any difference, for the meaning of the word "amendment"
in law is clearly as indicated above by us and the presence or absence of 1!xplanatory words of the nature indicated above do not
in our opinion make any difference.
A
B
C
D
E
The question whether the power r,f amendment given by Art
368 also includes the power to abrogate the Constitution completely and to replace it by an entire new Constitution, does not F
really arise in the present ca~. for the Seventeenth Amendment
h<l' not done any such thing a1. :l need not be considered. It ;,
-.·rough to say that it may be open to doubt whether the power of
amendment contained in Art. 368 goes to the extent of completely
abrogating the present Constitution and substituting it b,· an ootirely new one. But short of that, we are of opinion that the G
power to ~n~cnd includes the power to add any provision to the
Constitution, to alter any provision and substitute any C1the~ provisim. in its place and to delete any provision. 1ne Seve~tcenlh
Ame nent is merely i~ exercise of the power of amendment as
indica~~d above and cannot be struck down on the ground that
it goc' beyond the power conferred on Parliament to :tme,,,1 the
Om,tituti-.n by Art. 368.
H
Tr.e next question that arises ;, whether there i' any limi·tation on the rn\\'er of amendment as explained by l'S above.
.
.
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
(Wanclwo, ], )
S~l5
Limitations may be of two kinds. namely, express or implied.
So far as express limitations are concerned, there are none such in
Art. 368. When it speaks of the "amendment of this Constitution" it obviously and clearly refers to amendment of any provision thereof, including the provisions contained in Part Ill relating to fundamental rights. Whether Art. 13 ( 2) is an express
limitation on the power of amendment will be considered by u.<
later, but so far as Art. 368 is concerned there are no limitation"
whatsoever in the matter of substance on the amending power and
any provision of the Constitution, be it in Part III and any other
Part, can be amended under Art. 368.
The next question is whether there are any implied limitations on the power of amendment contained in Art. 368, and
this brings us to the argument that there are certain basic features
of the Constitution which cannot be amended at all and there is
an implied limitation on the power of amendment contained in
Art. 368 so far as these basic features are concerned. We mav
in this connection refer to the view prevailing amongst jurists in
the United States of America as to whether there are any implied limitations on the power of amendment contained in Art. V
of the U.S. Constitution. There are two lines of though~ in this
matter in the United States. Some jurists take the view that
there are certain implied limitations on the power to amend contained in Art. V of the U.S. Constit!ltion. These are said to be
with respect to certain basic features, like, the republican character
of Government, the federal structure etc. On the other hand,
it appears that the more prevalent view amongst .iurists in the
United States :s that there are no implied limitations on the score
of the amending power in Art. V of the U.S. Constitution.
Willis on the Constitutional Law of the United States of America
(1936 Edition) says that probably the correct position is that the
amending power embraces everything; in other words there are
no legal limitations whatever on the power of amend".lent, except what is expressly provided in Art. V : (see discussion on pp.
122 to 127). Even with respect to these express limitations.
Munro in The Government of the United States (Fifth Edition) at
p. 77 says that even these express limitations can be reroved and
one of the ways of doing so is "to remove the exception by a
preliminary amendment and thus clear the way for further action··.
Besides, as a matter of fact there is no decision of the SuprP.mc
Coon of the United States holding that there are implied limitations on the power of amendment contained in Art. V of the
U.S. Constitution and all amendments so far made in the United
States have been upheld by the Supreme Court there in the few
cases that have been taken to it for testing the validity of the
amendments.
836
SUPRBMB COURT REPORTS
(1967] 2 S.CR.
We have given careful consideration to the argument that
certain basic features of our Constituiton can;iot be amended
under Art. 368 and ha\'' colile to the conclusion that no limitations can be and should be implied upon the power of amendment under Art. 368. One reason for coming to this conclusion is
that if we were to accept that certain basic features of the Constitution cannot be amended under Art. 368, ·it will lead to the
position that any amendment made to any Article of the Con·
stitution would be liable to challenge before courts on the ground
that it amounts to amendment of a basic feature. Parliament
would thus never be able to know what amendments it can mak:
in the Constitution and what it cannot; for, till a complete catalogue of basic features of the Constitution is available, it would
be impossible to make any amendmC11t under Art. 368 with • ,1y
certainty that it would be upheld by courts. If such an implied
limitation were to be put on the power of amendment contained
in Art. 368, it would only be the courts which would have the
pow'r to decide what are basic features of the Constitution and
then to declare whether a particular amendment is valid or not
on the ground that it amends a particular basic feature or not. The
~ult would be that every amendment made in the Constitution
would provide a harvest of legal wrangles so much so that Parliament may never know what provisions can be amended and what
cannot. The power to amend being a constituent uower cannot
in our opinion for these reasons be held subject to any imnlied
limitations thereon on the ground that certain basic features o[
the Constitution cannot be amended. We fail to see why if there
was any intention to make any part of the Constitution unamendable, the Constituent Assembly failed to indicate it expresslv in
Art. 368. If, for example, the Constitution-makers ;ntc-.jed certain provisions in the Constitution, and Part III in particular,
to be not amendable, we can see no reason why it was not so
stated in Art. 368. On the clear words of Art. 368 which provides for amendment of the Constitution which means any provision thereof, we cannot infer any implied limitations on the
power of amendment of an; provision of the Con~tituion, be it
basic or otherwise. Our conclusion is that constituent power. like
that contained in Art. 368, can only be subject to express limitations and not to any imnlied limitations so far as substance of the
amendments are concerned and in the absence of anything in Art.
368 making any provision of the Constitution unamendable, it
must be held that the Power to amend in Art. 368 reaches every
provision of the Constitution and can be used to amend anv orovision thereof. provided the procedure indicated in Art. '.168 is
followed.
Copious references were made durin,!! the course of argumen~s
to dchatcs in r·arliamcnt and it is urgc(J that it is open· to th;s
A
B
c
E
JI
G
If
GOLAKNATH v. l'UNJAB (Wanchoo, J.)
837
Court to look into the debates in order to interpret Art. 368 to
find out the inten ion of the Constitution-makers. We are of
opinion that we cannot and should not look into the debates that
took place in the Constituen: A>Sembly to determine the interpretation of A, t. 368 and the scope and extent of the provision
contained therein. it may be conceded that his:orical background
and perhaps what was accepted or what was rejected by the Constituent Assembly while the Constitu:ion was being frarried, may
be taken into account in finding out the scope and extent of Art.
368. But we have no doubt that what was spoken in the debates
in the Constituent Assembly cannot and should not be looked
into in order to interpret Art. 368. Craies on Stamte Law· (Sixth
Edition) at p. 128 say~ that "it is not permissible in discussing
the meaning of an obscure enactment, to refer to 'parliamentary
history' of a statute, in the sense of the debates which took place
in Parliament when the statute was under consideration", and
supports his view with reference to a large number of English
cases. The same is the view in Maxwell on Interpretation of
Statutes, (11th Edition) p. 26. Crawford on Statutory Construction (1940 Edition) at p. 340 says that resort may not be had
to debates to ascertain legislative intent, though historical background in which the legislation came to be passed, can be taken
into consideration.
A
B
c
D
In Administrator General of Bengal v. Prem [,al Mullick('),
the Privy Council held that "proceedings of the legislature cannot
be referred to as legitimate aids to the construction of the Act in
which they result."
In Baxter v. Commissioner of Taxation('\, it was said that
reference to historical facts can be made in order to interpret a
statute. There was however no reference to the debates in order
to arrive at the meaning of a particular provision of the Constitution there in dispute.
F
G
H
In A. K. Gopalan v. the State of Madras( 3 ), Kania C.J. refer6ng to the debates and reports of the Drafting Committee of
the Constituent Assembly in respect of the words of Art. 21
observed at p. 110 that they might not be read to control the
meaning of the Article. In that case all that was accepted was
that "due process of law" which was a term used in the U.S.
Constitution, was not accepted for the purpose of Art. 21 which
used the words "the procedure established by ;dw". Patanjali
Sastri J. (at p. 202) also refused to look at the debates and
particularly the speeches made in order to determine the meaning
of Art. 21. Faz! Ali, J. (at p. 158) was of opinion that the pro(I) [189S] 221.A. 107.
(2) (1907] 4 C.L.R. J087.
(3) [1950) S.C.R. 88.
LJSup.CI/67-8
au
SUPltliME COUltT llBPOll.TS
(1967] 2 S.C.R
cecclings and discussiom in the Constituent Assembly were not
relevant for the purpose of construing the expressions used in
Art. 21.
Again in The Automobile Transport (P..ajastha11) Limited v.
the Stale of Rajasthan('), this Coun looked into the historical
background but refused t<,> look into the debates in order to determine the meaning of the provisions of the Constitution in dispute
in that case.
We are therefore of opinion that it is not possible to read the
speeches made in the Constituent Assembly in order to interpret
Art. 368 or 4l define its extent and scope and to determine what
it. takes in and what it does not. As to the historical facts, namely.
what was accepted or what was avoided in the Constituent Assem•
bly in co;..nection with Art. 368, it is enou~,h to say that we have
not been able to find any help from the material relating to this.
There were proposals for restricting the power of amendment
under An. 368 and making fundamental rights immune therefrom and there were counter proposals before the Consthuent
Assembly for making the power of amendment all-embracing.
They were all either dropped or negatived and iii the circumstances are of no help in determining the interpretation of Art. 368
which mYSt be interpreted on the words thereof as they finally
found place in the Constitution, and on those words we have no
docbt that there are no implied limitations of any kind on the
power to amend given therein.
An argument is also raised that limitations on the power to
amend the Constitution can be found in the preamble to the Constitution. As to that we may refer only 4l in re: iirl! Berubari
Union and Exclnnge of Enclaves(') with respect to the value of
the preamble to the Constitution and its importance therein. It
was observed in that case unanimously by a Bench of nine J udgcs
thz.t "although it may be correct to describe the preamble as a
key to the mind of the Constitution-makers, it forms no part of
the Constitution and cannot be regarded as th., source of any
substantive power which the body of the Constitution alone can
confer on the Government, expressly or by implication. This is
equally true to prohibitions and limitationsn. The Court there
was considering whether the preatnble could in any way limit
the power of Parliament to cede any pan of the national territory
and held that it was not correct to say that "the preamble could
ill any way limit the power of Par!iament to cede parts c>f the
national territory". On a parity of reasoning we are of opinion
that the preamble cannot prohibit or control in any way or impose
any implied prohibitions or limitations on the power to amend
the Constitution contained in Art. 368.
(t) (1963] I S.C.R. 491.
(2) (£960] 3 S.C.R. 250.
A
8
c
D
E
F
G
H
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB (Wa11choo, J.)
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
tH
839
This brings us to the question whether the word "law" in Art.
13 ( 2) includes an amendment of the Constitution, and therefore
there is an express provision in Art. 13 ( 2) which at least limits
the power of amendment under Art. 368 to this extent that by
such amendment· fundamental rights guaranteed by Part Ill cannot be taken away or abridged. We have already pointed out
that in Sankari Prasad's case(') as well as Sujjan Si11gh's case('),
it has already been held, in one case unanimously and in the
other by majority, that the word "law" in An. 13(2) does not
include an amendment of the Constitution, and it is the correctnes~ of this view which is being impugned before this Bench.
Article 13 is in three parts. The first part lays down that "all
laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the
commencement of this Constitution, insofar as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall, to the extent of such
inconsistency, be void". Further all previous constitutional provhions were repealed by Art. 395 which provided that "the
Indian Independence Act, 1947, and the Government of India
Act, 1935, together with all enactments amending or supplementing the latter Act, but not including the Abolition of Privy
Council Jurisdiction Act, 1949, are hereby repealed." Thus it
is clear that the word "law" in Art. 13 (l) does not inciudo any
law in the nature of a constitutional provision, for no such law remained after the repeal in Art. 395.
Then comes the second part of Art. 13, which says that "the
State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the
rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention
of Ibis clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void".
The third part defines the word "law" for the purpose of Art. .13;
the definition is inclusive and not exhaustive. It is because of the
definition in cl. ( 3) of Art. 13 being inclusive that it is urged that
the word "law" in Art. 13(2) includes an amendment of the
Constitution also. Now we see no reason why if the word "law"
in Art. 13 ( 1) relating to past laws does not include any constitutional provision the word "law" in cl. (2) would take in an
amendment of the Constitution, for it would be reasonable to read
the word "law" in Art. 13 (2) includes an amendment of the
13. But apart from this consideration, we are of opinion that the
word "law" in Art. 13(2) could never have been intended to
take in an amendment of the Constitution. What Art. 13(2)
means is that a law made under the constitutional provisions
would be tested on the anvil of Part :m and if it takes away or
abridges rights conferred by Part Ill it v;ould be void to the extent of the contravention. There are many Articles in the Constitution which provide directly for making law in addition to
Articles 245, 246, 248, etc. ~nd the three Lists and Art. 13(2)
(I) [1~52] S.C.R. 89.
(2) [1965] I S.C.R. 913.
840
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1967) 2 S.C R.
prohibits the State fr' .n making any law under these provisions.
W:~ sec no difliculty in the circumstances in holding that Art. 13
(2) when it taiks of the State making any law, refers to the law
made under the provisions contained in Ch. I of Part XI of the
Cons:itution beginning with Art. 245 and also other prov;sions
already referred to earlier. Article 246 provides that Parliament
may make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India
and t~ legislature ot a State may make laws for the whole or any
part of the State. Article 246( I) gives exclusive power to
P~rliament lo make laws with respect to subjects enumerated in
List I. Article 246 ( 3) gives exclusive power to State lcgisiaturcs
to make laws with respect to List II. Article 248 (I) gives exclusive power to Parliament to make laws with respect to any
matter not enumerated in the Concurrent List or the State List.
We are referring to these provisions merely to show that the
various provisions in Chapter I of Part XI provide for making
laws, and these IJws are all laws which are made under the legislative power conferred on Parliament or on State legislatures
unc!er !he Constitution. Therefore when in Art. 13 (2) it is
said that the S1a·e shall not make any law (Stale there including
Parliament and legislature of each State), its meaning could only
take in laws made by Parliament and Stale legislatures under the
powers conferred under Chap'.er I of Part XI and also other provisions already rcferr.::d to earlier. We have already held that
the power to amend the Constitution is to be found in Art. 368
along with the procedure and that such power is no: to be found
in Art. 248 read item 97 of List I. Therefore an amendmcn: of
the Constitution is not an ordinary law made under the powers
conferred under Chapter I of Part Xl of the Constitution and
cannot be subject to Art. 13(2) where the word "law" n.ust be
read as meaning law made under the ordinary legislative power.
We have already referred to a large number of Articles where
Parliament is given the power to make law with respect to those
Articles. So far as this power of Parliamen• is concerned it is ordinary legislat1ve power and it will certainly be subject to Art. 13
(2). But there can in our opinion be no doubt that when Art.
13(2) prohibits the State from makir.r; any Jaw which takes
away or abridges righ~s conferred by Part Ill, it is only referring
to ordinary legislative power conferred on Parliament and legislatures of States and cannot have any reference to the constituent
power for amendment of the Constitution contained in Art. 368.
'Ve have already pointed out that there are no implied limitat ,11s on the power to amend under Art. 368 and it is open to
Parliament under that Article to amend any part of the Constitution, inclt!ding Part Ill. It is worth remembering that a whole
Part XX is devoted by the Constitution-makers to the subject of
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
u
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB (Wanchoo, J.)
A
841
amendment of the Constitution. If it was their intention that Part
III of the Constitution will not be liable to amendment by way
of abridgeme.1t or 0tbrogation under the amending power contained in Art. 368 we see no reason why an express provision to
tl>at r.ffect was not made in Art. 368. We cannot see what prevented the Constituent Assembly from making that clear by an
B express provision in Art. 368. lt is however said that it was not
necessary to say so in Art. 368, because the provision was already
made in Art. 13.(2). We are unable to accept this contention,
for we have no doubt that Art. 13 (2), when it refers to making
of Jaws is only referring to the ordinary legislative power and not
to the constituent power which results in amendment of the ConIn any case it seems to us somewhat contradictory that
c stitution.
in Art. 368 power should have been. given to amend any provision of the Constitution without any limitations but indirectly
that p0w.er is limited by using words of doubtful import in Art.
13(2). It is remarKable that in Art. 13(2) there is no express
pru~ision that ar:icndmcnt of the Constitution, under Art. 368,
would be subject thereto_ It seems strange indeed that no express
D provision was made in Part XX in this matter and even in Art.
J 3(2) no express provision is made to this effect, and in both
places the matter is left in a state of uncertainty. It is also remarkable tha'. in Art. 368 the word "law", which we find so often
used in so many Articles of the Constitution is conspicuously
avoided, and it is specifically provided that after the procedure
E has oeen gone through the Constitution shall stand amended in
accordance with the terms ot the Bill. This language of Art. 368
is very significant and ciearly makes a distinction between a constitutional Amendment and an ordinary law passed as an Amending Act. The validity of a law has to be determined at the time
when the Bill actually matures into an Act and not at the stage
while it is still a Bill. The provision in Art. 368 has the effect
F that when a Bill amending the Constitution receives the assent of
the President, the Constitution stands amended in accordance
with the terms of the Bill. The Constitution thus stands amended
in terms nf the Bill if the Bill has been introduced, passed and
assented to by the President in accordance with the procedure
laid down in Art. 368 and not as a result of the Bill becoming
G an Amendment Act introducing amendment in the Constitution.
Tl'e provision that the Con8titution shall stand amended in terms
of the Bill was thus c1early intended to indicate that the amendment of the Constitution is not dependent on the Bill being treated as a law or an Act duly passed by Parliament. Thus it is clear
that by indicating that the Constitution is to stand amended in
H accordance with the terms of the Bill, Art. 368 clearly envisage~
that the r.ower of amendment of the Constitution stands on an entirely different footing from an Jrdinary law made by Parliament
fo exercise of its legislative power.
842
SUPllliMB COUll.T REPORTS
(1967) 2 S.C.R.
If we keep in mind this difference bctw!Al a constitutional
amendment or constitutional. law and an ordinary amending
Acl or law, it should not be difficult to hold that when Art. 13
(2) speaks of the State making a law, it is referring to ordinary
law made under the powers conferred by Art. 245 etc read with
various Lists and various provisions of the Constitution where ~
press provfr · ,n to that effect has been made and is not referring
Lo the amendment of the Conslilution which is made under the
constituent power. Once it is held that the power to amend is
found in Art. 368 .ind 1s not to be fou.i.d in Art. 248 read with
i1tm 97 of List I, it must follow that the power to amend the
Comtitution under Art. 368 is a different power (namely, constituent power) and when Art. 13(2) speaks of making !aw, it
can only refer to making ordinary law, particularly when we
compare the words of Art. 13(2) (namely, the State shall not
make any law) and the words of Arts. 245, 248, and 2SO
(which all speak of Parliament making law. State-legislatures
making law, and so on).
Lastly, as the power to amend is in Art. 368 and on the
words, as <hey stand in that Article, that power is unfettered and
tncludes Lhe power to amend Part Ill, it is strange that that power
should be limited by putting an interpretation on the word "law"
in An. 13(2), which would include constitutional law also.
There i·; nothing to suggest this even in the inclusive definition of
the words "law" and "laws in force" in Art. 13(3). Besides it
is conceded on behalf of the petitioners that Ar:, 368 gives power
to amend Part III, but that power is only to amend one way,
namely, towards enlargement of the rights contained therein, and
net the other way, namely, for abridging or taking away the rights
contained therein. We must say that it would require a very
clear provision in the Constitution to read the power to amend
the Constitution relating to Part m in thL~ mannti'. We cannot
find that clear provision in Art. 13(2). We repeat !hat when the
Constituent Assembly was taking the trouble of providing a whcle
P~rt for amendment of the Constitution a11d •·1hen the words in
Art. 368 clearly give the power to amend the Constitution and
are subject to no implied limitations and contain no express liinirntions, it is strange indeed that it should have omitted to provide
iu that very Article that Part 1:1 is not liable to amendment thcreu~dcr. Jn any c~sc if the power of amendment confened by the
wonis of Art. 368 is unfe"cred, we must avoid any inconsistency
bern""n that power and the provision contained in Art. 13(2).
We avoid that in keeping with the unfettered power in Art. 368
by reading the word "law" in Art. 13(2) as meaning law passed
under ordinary legislative power ?.nd thus not including an
amendment of the Comtitution therein. The words in Art. 13
('.!) are in our opinion not ~pccific and clear enough to take in
8
c
D
E
G
H
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB (Wanchoo, J.)
A
843
t)J.e power of amendment under Art. 368 and must be confined
ohly to the power of ordinary law-ma'.king contained in Arts. 245
etc., and other provisions of the Constitution read with various
Lists. We have therefore no hesitation in agreeing with the view
taken in Sankari Prasad' s case ( 1 ) which was upheld by the
majority in Sajjan Singh's case(').
B
The next argument is that action under the proviso to Art.
368 is necessary as the Seventeenth Amendment afiects the power
of the High Court contained in Art. 226. I~ is said that by
including various Acts in the Ninth Schedule and making them
immune from challenge under the provisions contained in Part
III, the power of the High Court under Art. 226 is affected inasc much as the High Court cannot strike down any of the Acts
included in the Ninth Schedule on the ground that they take
away or abridge the rights conferred by Part III. So it is said
that there has been a change in Art. 226 and it was necessary ·
that the Seventeenth Amendment should have been ratified by
more than half the States under the proviso. A similar argument
1
D was raised in Sankari Prasad' s case ( ) and was turned down
unanimously.· The same argument was again raised· in Sajjan
Singh's case( 2 ) and was also turned down. Now ratification
is required under the proviso if the amendment seeks to make an~
change in various .provisions mentioned therein and one such
provision is Art. 226. The question therefore is whetber the
Seventeenth Amendment makes any change in Art. 226 and
E
whether this change has to be a direct change in the words
of Art. 226 or whether merely because the1e may be some effect
by the Seventeenth Amendment on the content of the power in
Art. 226 it will amount to change in Art. 226. We are of
opinion that when the proviso lays down that there must be ratification when there is any change in the entrenched provisions,
F including Art. 226, it means that there must be actPal change
in the tenns of the provision concerned. If there · is no actual
change directly in the entrenched provision, no ratification is
required, even if any am~ndmen! of any other provision of the
Constitution may have some effect indirectly on the entrenched
provisions mentioned in the proviso. But it is urgeu that there
G, may be such a change in some other provision as would seriously
afiect an entrenched provision, and in such a case ratification
should be necessary. This argument was also dealt with ;, the
majority judgment in Sajjan Singh's case\ 2 ) where the doctrine
of pith and substance was applied and it was held that where the
amendment in any other Article so affects the entrenched Article
as to amount to an amendment therein, then ratification may be
H
necessary, even though the entrenehed Article may not be direct.
ly touched. Perhaps the use of the doctrine of pith and substance
(1) [!952] S. C.R. 89.
(2) [1965] I S.C.R. 933.
844
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Ii%"] 2 S.CR.
:o sµch a case is not quite apt. But what was meant in Sajjan
A
s;,,~h·s
case( 1 ) was that if there is such an amendment of an
uncntrcnc:hed Article that it will directly affect an entr~nchcd
1\riiclc and nc<.:~'.'-~itat~ a ci1angc therein, then recourse n1ust be
had to ratification under the proviso. We may illustrate this
hy t1vo cxamp!es. Article 226 lays down inter a/1a t\1at the High
Court shall have pow~r to isrnc writs for the enforcement of any
of the rights conferred by Part Ill and for any other purpose.
Now as1ume that Part Ill is completely deleted by amendment
of the Constitution. If that takes place, it will necessitate an
amendment of Art. 226 ~lso and deletion therefrom of the words
"for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III".
We have no doubt thut if such a contingency ever happens and
Part Ill is completely deleted, Parliament will amend Art. 226
also and that will necessitate ratification under the proviso. But
suppose Parliament merely deletes Part Ill and docs not make the
necessary consequential amendment in Art. 226, it can then
be said that de let ion of Part Ill necessitates change in Art. 226
also, and therefore in such a case ratification is necessary. even
though Parliament may not have in fact provided for amendment
of Art. 226.
Take another example. Article 54 is 2;i entrenched Article
and provides for the election of the President. So is Art. 55
which provides for the manner of election. Article 52 which
lays down that there shall be a President i> on the other hand
not an entrenched Article. It is said that Art. 52 may be altered
and something else may be substituted in its place and that would
not require ratification in terms as Art. 52 is not among the
entrenched Articles. But we are of opinion that if Parliament
amends Art. 52, it is bound to make consequential amendments
in Arts. 54 and 55 which deal with the election of the President
and the manner thereof and if it is so the entire amendment must
be submitted for ratification. But suppose Parliament merely
amends Art. 52 and makes no rhange in Arts. 5,· and 55 (a
supposition which is impossible to visualise).. In that case it
would in our opinion be right to hold that Art. 52 could not be
altered by abolition of the cffice of the President without nec~ssi
tating a change in Arts. 54 and 55 and in such a case if Art. 52
alone is altered by Parliament, to abolish the office of President,
it will require ratification.
These two examples will show where alteration or deletion
of an unentrenched Article would necessitate amendment of an
entrenched Article, and in such a case if Parliamrnt ta1'.es the incredible course of amending only the un~ntrenched Article and
not amcnciing the enrrenched Article, courts can say that ratifi---·--·-
···-··
(I) [1965) t S.C.R. 933.
B
c
D
F
G
H
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB (Wanchao, /.)
845
A
cation is necessary even for amending the unentrenched Art!cle,
for it directly necessitates a change in an entrenched Article.
But short of that we are of opinion that merely because there is
some effect indirectly on an entrenched Article by amendment
of an une11trenched Article it is not necessary that there should be
ratification in such circumstances also.
B
Besides, let us consider what would happen if the argument
on behalf of the petitioners is accepted that ratification is necessary whenever there is even indirect effect on an entrenched
Article by amending an unentrenched Article. Take the case of
Art. 226 itself. It gives power to the High Com t not only to
issue writs for the enforcement of fundamental rights but .to
issue them for any other purpose. Writs have thus been issued
by High Courts for enforcing other rights conferred by ordinary
laws as well as under other provisions of the Constitution, like
Arts. 301 and 311. On this argument if any change is made in
Arts. 30 I and 3 I I there is bound to be an effect on Art. 226 and
therefore ratification would be necessary, even though both Arts.
301 and 3I1 are not entrenched in the proviso. Further, take
an ordinary law which confers certain rights and it is amended
and those rights are taken away. Article 226 would be clearly
affected. Before the amendment those rights may be enforced
through Art. 226 while after the amendment the rights having
disappeared there can be no enforcement thereof. Therefore, on
this -argument even if there is amendment of ordinary law there
would be an effec• on Art. 226 and it must therefore be amended
every time even when ordinary Jaw is changed and the entire
procedure under Art. 368 must be gone through including ratification under the proviso. It is however said that when ordinary law is amended, rights disappear and therefore there is no
question of enforcement thereof; if that is correct with respect to
ordinary Jaw, it is in our opinion equally correct with respect to
the amendment of an unentrenched provision of the Co:i;.titution. The answer given in Sankari Pri:zsad's case(') to this argument was that Art. 226 remained just the same as it was before,
and only a certain class of cases had been excluded from the
purview of Part III and the cr:mrts could no lonf?er interfere, not
because their powers were curtailtd in any manner or to any extent, but because there would be no occasion thereafter for the
exercise of their power in such cases. We respectfully agree with
these observations and are of opinion that merelv because there
is some indirect effect on Art. 226 it was not _1ecessary that the
Seventeenth Amendment shoi;;d have been ratified bv more than
one half of the States. It is only in the extreme case, ihe examples
of which we have given above, that an amendmen• of an unentrenched Article without amendn.ent of entrenched Article
c
D
E
H
-(I) [1952] S.C.R. 89.
SUPllEME COURT ltl!PORTS
(1967] 2 s.c.R.
might be had for want of ratification, and this is what was intended by the majority judgment in Sajjan Singh's case( 1), when
it applied the doctrine of pith and substance in these circumstances. The argument that ratification is necessary as Art. 226
is indirectly affected !:as therefore no force and must be rejected.
This is equally true with respect to the power of this Court under
Arts. 132 and 136.
Then it is urged that Art. 24S is enlarged by the Seventeenth
Amendment inasmuch as State legislatures and Parliament were
freed from the control of Part III in the matter of certain laws
affecting, for example, ryotwari lands, :µid therefore as Art. 24S
is an entrenched Article there should have been ratification under
the proviso. This argument in our opinion is of the same type
as the argument with respect to the effect on Art. 226 and our
answer is the same, namely, that there is no direct effect on Art.
24S by the amendment and the indirect effect, if any, does not
require that there should have been ratification in the present
C8Se.
A
B
c
D
It is then urged that ratiucation is necessary as Art. 31-B
deals with State legislation and in any case Parliament cannot
make any law with respect to Acts which were put in the Ninth
Schedule and therefore Parliament could not amend the Constitution in the manner in which it was done by making additions
in the Ninth Schedule, both for want of ratification and for want
of legislative competence. The answer to this argument was
given in Sankari Prasad's case(') and it was observed there that"Article 31-A and 31-B really seek to save a certain class of laws and certain specified laws already
passed from the combined operation of Art. 13 read
with olhcr relevant Articles of Part III. The new
Articles being t.hus essentially amendments of the Constirmion, Parliament had the power of enacti".tg them.
That laws thus saved relate lo matters covered by List
II does nor in any way affect the position. It was said
that P~rliament could not validate a law which it had
no power to enact. Tho proposition holds good where
the validity of the impul!ned orovision turns on whether the subject matter, falls within or without the jurisdiction of the legislature which passed it. But to make
a law which con:ravenes the Constitution. constitutionally valid is a maller of constitutional amendment
and a• such it falls within the exclusive power of
Parliament.''
(I) Jl96l) 1 SC.R.933.
(2) rJ952J S.C.R. 89.
E
F
G
H
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB (Wanchoo, J.)
A
B
c
D
E
847
We respectfully agree with these observations. · They succinctly
put the legal aild constitutional position with respect to the validity of Arts, 31-A and 31-B. It seems to us that Art. 31-B in
particular is a legislative drafting device which compendiously
puts in one place amendments which would otherwise have been
added to the Constitution under various Articles in Part ill.
The laws in the Ninth Schedule have by the device of Art. 31-B
been excepted from the various provisions in Part III, which
affected them and this exception could only be made by Parliament. The infumity in the Acts put in the Ninth Schedule was
apprehended to be a constitutional infirmity on the ground that
those laws might take away or abridge rights conferred by Part
ill. Such a constitutional infinnity could not be cured by State
legislatures in ant way and could only be cured by Parliament
by constitutional amendment. What Parliament in fact did by
including various Acts in the Ninth Schedule read with Art. 31-B
was to amend the various provisions iJ Part Ill, which affected
these Acts by making them an exception to those provisions in
Part III. This could only be done by Parliament under the
constituent power it had under Art. 368 and there was no question
of the application of the proviso in such a case, for Parliament
was amending Part III only with respect to these laws. The laws
jlad already been passed by State legislatures and it was their
constitutional infirmity, if any, which was being cured by the
de\ice adopted in Art. 31-B read with the Ninth Schedule, the
amendment being only of the relevant provisions of Part ill
which was compendiously put in one place in Art. 31-B. Parliament could alone do it under Art. 368 and there was no nece5sity for any ratification under the proviso, for amendment of
Part ill is not entrenched in the proviso.
Nor is there any force in the argument that Parliament could
not validate those laws by curing the constitutional infirmity because they dealt with land which is in List II of the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution over which State Legislatures have
exclusive legislative power. The laws had already been passed
by State legislatures under ·their exclusive powers; what has been
done by the Seventeenth Amen<lment is to cure the constitutional
G infirmity, if any, in these la>:s 1n relation to Part ill. That could
only be done by Parliament and in so doing Parliament was not
encroaching on the exclusive legislative power of the State. The
States had already passed the laws and all that was done by the
Seventeenth Amendment was to cure any constitutional infirmity
in the laws by including them in the Ninth Schedule read with
Art. 31-B. We must therefore reject the argument that the
H
Seventeenth Amendment required ratification because laws put in
the Ninth Schedule were State laws. We must equally reject
the argument that as these laws dealt with land, which is in the·
F
848
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1967] 2 S.CR.
exclusive legislative power of State legislature, Parliament could
not cure the constitutional infirrnilv, if any, in these laws by
putting them in the Ninth Schedule:
We now come to what may be called the argument of fear.
It is urged that if Art. 368 confers complete power to amend
each and every provision of the Cc~1stitution-as we have held
that it does-frightful consequences will follow on such an interpretation. If Parliament is clothed with such a power to amend
the Constitution it may proceed to do away with fundamental
rights altogether, it may abolish elected legislatures, it may
change the present form of Government, it may do away with
the federal structuFe and create ci unitary state instead, and so
on. It is therefore argued that y;e should give a limited interpretation to the power of amendment contained in Art. 368, as
otherwise we shall be givin3 pt!!wer 'to Parliament to destroy the
Constitution itself.
A
B
c
This argument is really a political argument and cannot be D
taken into account in interpreting Art. 368 when its meaning to
our mind is clear. But as -the argument was urged with a good
deal of force on behalf of the petitioners and was met with equal
force on behalf of the Union and the States, we propose to deal
with it briefly. Now, if this argument means that Parliament may
abuse its power of amendment conferred by Art. 368, all that
need he Said in reply is that mere possibility of abuse cannot E
result in ceurts' withholding the power if the Constitution grants
it. It is well-settled so far as ordinary laws are concerned that
mere possibilLy of abuse will not induce courts to hold that the
"power is not.there. if the law is valid and its terms clearly confer
the power. · The same principle in our opinion applies to the
F
Constitu~ion. If the Constitution gives a certain power and its
terms are clear, there is no reason why that power should be
withheld simply because of possibility of abuse. If we may say
so, possibility of abuse of any power granted. to any authority is
always there; and if possibility of abuse is a reason for withholding the power, no power whatever can ever be conferred on
any authority, be it executive. legislative or even judicial. There- G
fore, the so-called fear of frightful consequences, which has been
urged on behalf of the· oetitioners (if we hold, as we do. that the
power to amend the Constitution is unfettered by any imolied
limitations), is no ground for withholding the oower, for we have
no reason to suppose that Parliament on whom such power is
conferred will abuse it. Further even if it abuses the power of H
constitutional amendment under Art. 368 the check in such
circumstances is not in courts but is in the people who elect
members of Parliament. The argument for givin;i; a limited
.,.
GOLAKNATH )'. PUNJAB
'
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
(Wanchoo, J.)
849
.
meaning to Art. ~68 because of possibility of abuse must there ..
fore be rejected.
The other aspect of this argument of fear is that we should
not make the Constitution too flexible so that it may be open
to the requisite majority with the requisite ratification to make
changes too frequently in the Constitution. It is said that the
Constitution is an organic document for the governance of the
country and it is expected to endure and give stability to the
institution which it provides. That is undoubtedly so and this is
very true of a written federal Constitution. But a perusal of
various Constitutions of the world shows that there are usually
proviw!ls for amendment of the Constitution in the Constitution
itself. This power to amend a Constitution may be rigid or
flexible in varying degrees. Jurists have felt that where the power
to amend the Constitution is made too rigid and the people
outgrow a particular Constitution and feel that it should be
amended but cannot do so because of the rigidity of the Constitution, they break the Constitution, and this breakinl!: is more
often than not by violent revolution. It is admitted by even those
writers on the United States Constitution who are of the view
that there are certain basic features which cannot be amended and
who would thus make the U. S. Constitution even more rigid
than it is, that howsoever rigid t'ie Constitution may be its rigidity
will not stop the people from breaking it if they have outgrown
it and this breaking is, generally speaking, by violent revolution.
So, making our Constitution rigid by putting the in'terpretation
which the petitioners want us to put on it will not stop the frightfulness which is conjured up before us on behalf of the petitioners.
If anything, an interpretation which will make our Constitution
rigid in the manner in which the petitioner want the amending
power in Art. 368 to be interpreted will make a violent revolution, followed by frightfulness of which the petitioners are afraid,
a nearer possibility than an interpretation which will make it
flexible.
It is clear that our Constitution-makers wanted to avoid
making the Constitution too rigid. It is equally clear that they
did not want to make an amendment of the Constitution too
easy. They preferred an intermediate course which would make
the Constitution flexible and would still not allow it to be amended too easily. That is why Art. 368 provides for special majorities of, .the two Houses for the purpose of amendment of the ·
Constitution. Besides it also provides for ratification by more
than half the States in case of entrenched provisions in the proviso. Subject to these limitations, the Constitution has been
made moderately flexible to allow any change when the people
feel that cha'1ge is necessary. The necessity for special majorities
850
SUPlUIMIE COURT REPORTS
[I 96 7] 2 S.C.R.
in eacll House separately and the necessi,J for ratification by
more than half the States in certain cases appear to us to be
s•fficient safeguards to prevent too easy change in the Constitution without making it too rigid. But it is said that in the last
sixteen years, a large number of amendments have been made
to the Constitution and that shows that the power to amend is
much too easy and should be restricted by judicial interpretation.
Now, judicial interpretation cannot restrict the power on the basis
of a political argument. It has to interpret the Constitution as it
finds it on the basis of well-known canons of co:istruction and on
the terms of Art. 368 in particular. If on those terms it is
clear--as we think it is-that power to amend is subject to no
limitations except those to be expressly found in the Constitution,
courts must give effect to that. The fact that in the last sixteen
years a large number of amendments could be made and have
bt'cn made is in our opinion due to the accident that one party
has been returned by electors in sufficient strength to be able to
command the special majorities which are required under Art.
368, not only at the Centre but also in all the States. It is
because of this c;rcumstance that we have had so many amendments in the course of the !Jst sixteen years. But that in our
opinion is no ground for limiting the clear words of Art. 368.
The power of amendment contained in a written federal Constitution is a safety valve which to a large extent provides for
stable growth and makes violent revolution more or less unnecessary. It has been said by t-:ixt-book writers that the power
of amendment, though it allow< for change, also makes a Constitution long-lived and stable and serves the needs of the people
from time to time. If this power to amend is made too rigid it
loses its value as a safety valve. The more rigid a Constitution
tho more likely it is that people will outgrow it and throw it
over-board violently. On the other hand, if the Constitution is
llexible (though it may not be made too easy to modify it) the
power of amendment provides for stability of the Constitution
itself and for ordered progress of the nation. If therefore there
had to be a choice between giving an interpretation to Art. 368
which would make our Constitution rigid and giving an interpretation which would make it flexible, we would prefer to make it
flexible, so that it may endure for a long period of time and may,
if necessary, be amended from time to time in accordan~e with
the pr'.lgress in the idea~ of the people for whom it is meant.
But we feel that it is not necessary to go 'to this extent, for that
would be entering into the field of poEtics. As we see the terms
of Art. 368, we are clearly of opinion that the Constitutionmakers wanted te make our Constitution reasonably nexible and
·that the ,interpretation that we have ~iven to Art. 368 is in
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
GOLAKNATH V. PUNJAB (Wanchoo, J.)
A
&51
consonance with the terms thereof and the intention of those who
made it. We therefore reject the argument of fear altogether.
This brings us to the argument of starB decisis raised on behalf
The argument is put thus.
After tho decision of the Patna High Court invalidating the Bihar
ll Land Reforms Act, 1950, Parliament passed the First Amendment to the Constitution. That Amendment was challenged in
this Court by a number of writ petitions and was upheld in Sank<Jri Prasad's case( 1 ) in 1951. That case practically stood unchallenged till Sajjan Slngh's case(') in 1964 after the Seventeenth
Amendment was passed. Thus in the course of these fifteen years
c or so a large number of State Acts were passed on the basis of
the First Amendment by which in particular Arts. 31-A and
31-B were introduced in the Constitution. It is said that though
Sankari Prasad's case ( 1 ) has stood for less than 15 years there
have been so many laws dealing with agrarian reforms passed on
the basis of the First Amendment which was upheld by this Court
that the short period for which that case has stood should not
D stand in the way of this Court acting on the principle of stare
decisis. The reason for ·this is that an agrarian revolution has
taken place all over the colllltry after the First Amendment by
State laws passed on the faith of the decision of this Court in
Sankari Prasad's case('). This agrarian revolution has led to
millions of acres of land having changed hands and millions
E of new titles having been created. So it is urged that the unanimous decision in Sankari Prasad's case (1 ), which was challenged when the Seventi;enth Amendment was passed and was
upheld by majority in Sajjan Singh'3 case( 2 ) should not now be
disturbed as its disturbance would create chaos in the country,
pacticularly in the agrarian sector which constitutes the vast
F majority of the population in this country.
cf the Union of India and the States.
G
H
We arc of opinion that there is force in this argument. Though
the period for which Sankari Prasad's casc( 1 ) has stood unchallenged is not long, the effects which have followed in the
passing of State laws on the faith of that decision, are so overwhelming that we should not disturb the decision in that case.
It is not disputed that millions of acres of land have changed
hands and millions of new titles in agricultural lands have been
created .and the State laws dealing with agricultural land which
have been passed in the course of the last fifteen years after the
decision in Sankari Prasad's case ( 1 ) have brougbt about an
agrarian revolution. Agricultural population constitutes a vast
majority of the population in this country. In these circumstances it would in our opinion be wrong to hold now that
(I} [1952) S.C'.R. 89.
(!) [1965] I S.C'.R. '33.
852
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(196i] 2 SCR
Sankari Prasad's case ( 1 ) was not correctly decided and thus disturb all that has been done during the last fifteen years and create
chaos ihto lhe lives of million~ of our countrymen who have
bcnetited by these laws relating lo agrarian reforms. We would
in the circumstances accept the argument on behalf of the llnion
of India and lhe States that this is the tinest possible case in
which the principle of stare decisis should be applied. On this
basis also, apart from our view that Sankari Prasad'.1· case ( 1 )
was in facl rightly decided, we would not interfere with that
decision now.
But it is urged that instead of following the principle of
stare decisis which would make the decision in Sankari Prasad's
case (') .good for all times, we should follow the doctrine of prospective · over-ruling, which has been evolved by some United
Stale~ courts so that everything that has been done up to now,
including the Seventeenth Amendment would be ~eld good but in
future it would nol be open to Parliament to ameno Part III hy
taking away or abridging any of the rights conferred thereby and,
if the argument as to implied limitations on the power to amend
is accepted. further limit the power of Parliament to amend what
may be called basic features of the Consti1ution. We must say
that we arc not prepared to accept the doclrinc of pro;peclivc
over-ruling. We do not know whether this doctrine which it is
urged should be ap)'llicd to constilutional amendment would also
be applied to amendments of ordinary laws. We find it difficult
to visualise what would be the effect of this do~trine if it is applied to ;unendment of ordinary laws. We have so far been
following in this country the well-known doctrine 1hat courts
declare law and that a declaration made by a court is the law
of the land and takes effect from the date the law came into
force. We would on principle be loath to change that wcllknown doctrine and supersede it by the doctrine of prospcclive
over-ruling. Further it seems to us that in view of the provisions of Art. 13 (2) it would be impossible to apply the doctrine
of prospective over-ruling in our counlry, pa.1icularly where a
law infringe> fundamental rights. Article 13(2) lays down that
all laws taking away or abridging fundamental rights would be
void to the extent of contravention. It has been held by lhis
Court in Deep Chand v. The Stare of Uttar Pradesh( 2 ) that a law
made after the Constituiton came into force which infringes
fundamental rights is a still-born Jaw and that the prohibition
contained in Art. I 3(2) went to the root of the Slate power of
legislation and any law made in contravention of that provision
was void ab inirio. This case has been followed in Mahrndra
Lal laini v. The Stare of Uttar Pradesh('). In the face of these
(1) (1952) S.C.R. 89.
(2) [1959) Supp. 2 S.C R. 8.
(3) (1963) Supp. I. S.C.R. 912.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB (Wanch~o. I.)
853
A
decisions it is impossible to apply the principle of p.-ospective
over-ruling in this country so far as ordinary laws arc concerned.
Further, if the word "law" in Art. 13(2) includes an amendment of the Constitution, the same pr;ncipfo will apply, for that
amendment wou Id be still-born if it infringes any fundamental
rights wntaineci in Part III. In these circumstances, it would be
B. ;mpossible to apply the principle of prospective over-ruling to
oonstitutional amendments also. On the other hand, if the word
•'·Jaw"' in Art. 13(2) does not include an amendment of the Con:;titution. then there is no necessity of applying the principle of
prospective over-ruling, for in that ca>e unless some limitation~
on the power of amendment of the Constitution are implied the
under Art. 368 would not be liable to be tested under
c amendment
Art. 13(2). We are therefore unable to apply the doctrine of
prospective over-ruling in the circum'stances. Further as we are
of opinion that this is the fittest possible case in which the principle of stare decisis applies, we must uphold Sankari Prasad's
case(') for this reason also.
Lastly we would refer to the following observations in
Sajjan Singh's case( 2 ) (at pp. 947-48) with respect to over-ruling
earlier judgments of this Court and specially those which arc
unanimous, like Sankari Prasad's case(') : -
E
F
G
H
"It is true that the Constitution does not place any
restriction on our powers to review our earlier decisions
·Of even to depart from them and there can be no doubt
ih\lt in matters relating to the decision of constitutional
points which have a significant impact on the funda-,
mental rights of citizens, we would be prepared to
review our earlier decisions in the interest of public
good ............. Even so, the normal principle that
"judgments pronounced by this Court would be final,
cannot be ignoreq and unless considerat'ons of a substantial ~~~ compelling character make it necessary to
do so, we should 'be slow to doubt the correctness of
previous dccis'ions or· to depart from them.
"It is universally recognised that in regard to a
large number of. co.nstjtutional problems which are
brought before this Court for its decision. complex and
difficult questions arise and on many of such questions two views are possible. Therefore, if one
view has been taken by this Court after mat11re
deliberat;'.1n. the fact that another Bench is in~lined
to take a differ~nt view may not justify the Court in reconsidering the earlier decision or in departing from
it. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Even so, the Court should be re-
il I [1952) S.C.R. R9.
L3Sup. CJ 167 - _1)
(1) [1965] I S.CR 933
•
854
SuPUMB COURT UPOl.TS
(1967] 2 S.C..t
h.1ctant to accede to the suggestion that its earlier decisions should· be light-heartedly reviewed and departed
from. In such a case the test should be : is it absolutely
necessary and essential that the question already decided
should be reopened ? The answer to this question
would depend on the nature of the infirmity alleged in
the. c.arlier decision. its impact on public good, and the
vahd1ty and compelling character ot the considerations
urged in support of the contrary view. If the said decision has been followed in a large number of cases,
that again is a factor which must be taken into account."
A
A similar view was taken in the Kesha-1 Mills Company
Limited v. Commissioner of Income-tax,(') where it was observed that" ...... before a previous decision is pronounced
to be plainly erroneous, the Court must be satisfied
with a fair amount of unanimity amongst its members
that a revision of the said view is fully justified."
c
These principles were applied in Saiian Singh's case(') and it
was observed that if Sankari Prasad's case(') were to be overruled, "it would lead to the inevitable consequence that
the
amendments made in the Constitution both in 1951 and 1955
would be rendered invalid and a large aur. .ber of decisions dealing with the validity of the Acts included in :he Ninth Schedule
which have been pronounced by different High Courts ever since
the decision of this Court in Sankari Prasad's case(') was declared, would also be exposed to serious jeopardy."
The majority in that case therefore was not in favour of
reviewing Sankari Prasad' s case(') even so in view of the argument raised and the importance of the question it considered
the arguments against that decision and came to the conclusiO!I
itself that that case was rightly decided. We may add that besides
ao many cases in the High Courts there have been a large number
of cases in this Court to which it is unn=ary to refer where
on the faith of various amendments made in the Constitution,
particularly the First, the Fourth and the Sixteenth, amending
fundamental rights, this Court has upheld the validity of various
Acts on the basis of these amendments. Further we would be
very reluctant to over-rule the unanimous decision in Sankari
Prasatfs case(') or any other unanlmous decision by the slender
majority of- one in a larger Bench constituted for the purpose.
We say this with great respect and would hold that apart from
the pnnciple of stare decisis we should not say that the
(1) (1965) 2-S.C.R. 908.
(2) [t96SJ t S.C.R. 933
(3) [t952] S.C.R. 89
B
D
E
F
G
H
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB
A
B
c
(Hidayatullah, /.)
855
unanimous judgment in Sankari Prasad's case(') was wrongly
decided b}' such a slender majority in this Special Bench.
We therefore hold that Sankari Prasad's case(') was correct!)·
decided and that the majority in Sajjan Singh's cast:( 2 ) was corttiet in following that decision. We would follow the decision
in Sankari Prasad's case(') even now as in our opinion it was
correctly decided. Following that decision we hold that the
Seventeenth Amendment is good.
In view of this decision it is unnecessary to refer to other
arguments raised with respect to the two petitions challenging the
Mysore Land Reforms Act.
In our view therefore all the three petitions should fail and
we would dismiss them. In the circumstances we would pass no
order as to costs.
D
E
F
G
H
Hidayatullah, J. In these three writ petitions, the facts of
which appear in the two judgments just delivered, the validity
of the Punjab Security of Land Tenure.~ Act, 1953 an~ the
Mysorr Land Reforms Act, 1953, is principally involved. Since
these Acts are protected by the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, the validity of the constitutional amen.dment i'
also questioned. l11crcfore, a much larger field must be iraversed
because of the claim of the State that no part of the Constitution
from the Preamble to the Ninth Schedule, is beyond the provision for amendment contained in Art. 368. The article forms
the Twentieth Part of the Constitution and is said to be a code
by itself in which reposes a sovereign power, transcending, anything elsewhere in the Constitution. The State submits ' that
(except as stated in the article) there are no limitations on the
amending power and denies that there arc any implied restrictions. It claims, therefore, that an amendment of the Constitution
or of any of its part can never be a justiciable issue if the procedure for amendment has been duly followed. In this claim no
cxcPution is made-the Preamble, the Fundamental Rights, the
guaranteed remedy to uphold them all of them severally and together are said to be capable of being partially or wholly abrogated
by an amendment Looked at from this point of view the Seventeenth Amendment Act not only must be valid but also beyond
the power of the courts to question. The petitionc ;, on the other
hand, contend that this is to deny the real importance and inviol~bility of the Fundamental Rights which the Constitution itsell.
through certain articles, has made paramount even to Art. 368.
lt is these question.~ which fall for consideration, before we can
decide whether the two State Act~ are valid or not.
(I) !1952] S.C.R, R9.
(ll [1965] I S.C.R. 931.
85h
SUPl.EME COUllT l.BPOl.TS
[1967) 2 S.C.I..
The same questions were: before this Court on two earlier
<>ccasions. They arose for the first time immediately after the
Constitution (~iN Amendment) Act, 1951 was adopted and bec.ame the ~uh1ec~ of a decision of this Court reported in .~ri
.~111/;t:n Prasad .S111g'1 Dco v. Unt'on of India('). There Patanjali
~istn J. spcakmg tor lf:irilat K:mb C.J., Mukherjca, Das and
Chandrasekhara Aiyar, JJ. and himself upholds the First Amendment on the grounds that the power rnnfcrred by Part XX is
COt1'titucnt, para1110unt and sovereign :md is. therefore, not subjc-:t to Art. 13(2) which prohibits the making '1f ordinary laws
tending to abridge or take away Fund:uncnt:d Rights.
The
4uestions were again before the Court in Sajju11 Singh v. State of
/l,1jastha11 (') when the Seventeenth Amcndmer,, was impugned.
The authority of Sairkari Prasad's case(') was the mainstay of
the argument in support of the validity of the new amendment.
This time the Court was not unanimous although the Court as a
whole did not strike down tht Act. Three opi.nions were <.klivered : by Gajendragadhr. C.J. on b;:half of Wanchoo and
Raghubar Dayal. JJ. and himsdf, by Mudholkar, J. and by me.
I found the reasoning in Sankari Prasad'.• case(') to be unacceptable, although for rcas-ons which I shall give. I refrained from
expressing a- final opinion. Mudholkar. i: in his opinion supported me with addit<onal and forceful reasons but he aim did
not express himscl[ finally on the broader question. I closed
my opinion with the following obscrvatiom : "I would require stronger reasons than those given
in Sankari Prasad'.1· case( 1 ) to make me accept the view
that Fundamental Rights were nor really fundamental
but were intended to be within the powers of amendment
in common with the other parts of the Constitution
anc! without the concurrence of the State,. No doubt
Art. 19 by clauses numbered 2 to 6 allows a curtailment
of rights in the puhtic interest. This shows that Part
III is not static. It visualises changes and progress
but at the same time it preserves the individual rights.
There is har:lly any measure of reform which cannot be
introduced reasonably. the guarantee of individual
liberty notwithstanding. Even the agrarian reforms
could have been partly carried out without Article
31-A and 31-B but they would have cost more to the
public exchequer. The rights of society arc made paramount and they arc placed above those of the individual.
This is as it should be. But restricting the
Fundamental Rights hy resort to els. 2 to 6 of Art. 19 is
11 l [!952J S.C.R. 89.
(2) [19651 t S.C.R. 933.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
...
H
. GOLAKNATH .v. PUNJAB
A
(Hidayatul/ah, J.)
~Si
one thing and removing the rights from the Constitution
or debilitating them by an amendment is quite another.
This is the implication of Sankari Prasad's case('). It
is true that such things would never be, but one is concerned to know if such a doing would be possible."
B
"The Constitution gives so many assurances in
Part III that it would ho difficult to think that they were
the playthings of a special majority. To hold this
would mean prima facie that the most solei..n parts of
our Constitution stand on the same footing as any other
provision and even on a less firm ground than one on
which the articles mentioned in the proviso stand.
The anomaly that Art. 226 should be somewhat protected but not Art. 32 must give us pause. Article 32
does not erect a shield against private conduct but
against state conduct including the legislatures (Sec Art.
12). Can the legislature take away this shield?
Perhaps by adopting a liberal construction of Art. 368
one can say !hat. But I am not inclined to play a
gran11narian 's role. As at present advised T can only
say that the power to make amendments ought not ordinarily to be a means of escape from absolute constitutional restrictions."
c
lili
F
G
H
My opposition (lest one misunderstar.ds its veridical character) appears to be cautious and even timid but this was becaus,:
it was attended by an uneasy feeling that I might have missed
some immanent truth beyond what was said in Sankari Prasad's
case('). The arguments then were extremely brief. After hearing full arguments in this case, which have not added to the
reasoning of the earlie!· cases, I am nc: satisfied that the reasons
arc cogent enough for me to accept them. I say it with respect
that I felt then, as I do so even more strongly now, that in the
two earlier cases, the result was reached by a mechanical jurisprudence in which harmonious construction was taken to mean
that unless Art. 368 itself made an exception the existence of
any other provision indicative of an implied limitation on the
amending power, could not be considered. This was really to
refuse to consider ·any argument which did not square with the
a pnori view of the omnicompetence of Art. 368. Such reasoning appears to me to be a kind of doctrinaire conceptualism based
on an arid textual approach supplemented by one concept that
an amendment of the Constitution is not an exercise of legislative
(I)
[1952] S.C.R. 89.
858
SUPl.BMB C:O~T IUIPOJ.TS
[1967] ~ S.C.R.
power but of constituent power and. therefore. "n amendment o{
the Constitution is not law at all as contemplated by Art. 13(2).
I am reminded of the words of Justice Holmes that "we must
think things and not words". The true prinrip!c is that if there
arc two provisicns in the Ccnstitution which seem to be hostile,
iuridical hermeneutics requires the Court to interpret them by
combining them and not ry destroying one with the aid of the
other. No part in a Constitution is superior to another part
unless the Constitution i•sclf says so and there is no accession
of strength to any provision by calling it a code. Portalis, the
great French Jurist (who helped in the making of the Code
Napoleon) supplied the correct principle when he said that it is
the context of the leg3J proYisions which serves to illustrate the
meaning of the different parts, so that among them and between
them there should be correspondence and harmony.
We ha\'e two provisions to reconcih Article 368 which says
that the Constitution may be amended by followi.1g this and this
procedure, and Art. 13(2) which ~ays, the State shall not make any
law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by Part III
and that any law made in contravention of the clause •iall, to
the extent of the contravention. he void. The question, therefore,
is: docs this create any limitation upon the amending process?
On the answer to this question depends the solution of all the
problems in this case>.
It is an error to view our Constitution as ;r it were a mere
organisational docum~nt by which the people established the
structure and the mechanism of their Government. Our Constitution is intended to he much more because it aims at being a
wcial document in which the relationship of society to the individual and of Government to both and the rights of the minorities
and the backward classes arc clearly laid down. This social
document is headed hv a Preamble* which epitomizes the principles on which the Government is intended to function and these
principles arc later e~"andcd into Fundamental Rights in Part ill
and the Directive Princinlcs of Policy in Part IV. The former
are protected but the latter arc not. The former represent the
---
----..~PREAMBLE- -WE. THF pcopt E OF l~DIA. h:\vinq solemnly rc-so1Vt'd to
eonstitut< Ind;, into a SOVrREIGN DEMOCRATIC R[PUBL!C and to
secu ..c <\II its citii:rns:
JUSTICE, snci:>I, economic :tnd political;
LIBERTY "r thl)ugh~. rxp rssion. belief, faith and wo;ship:
EQU.\L'TY ,,f status :ind of opp:J~tunity; and to promote among them all
FRATERNI ;y assu;ing the dignity of the individual and the unity ot
Nation:
IN OUR C'O'<STITUrNT ASSEMBLY this twcnty-s;xth day of
Novembo , 949, d, H 0 'l. c.,y ADOPT, ENACT AND GIVE T·J OURSELVES THIS CONSTITUTION."
A
B
c
D
JI
G
H
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB
A
B
c
D
E.
F
G
......
H
(Hidayatul/ah, J.)
H59
limits of State action and the latter are the obligations and the
duties of the Government as a good and social Government
Why· was it necessary to have the Fundamental Rights at all
and make them justiciable ? As we seem to be forgetting our
own history so soon let me si:y that the answer lies there: The
Nationalist Movement and the birth of the Indian National Congress in 1885 were the direct result of the discriminatory treatment of the Indians in their own country. The demand for the
guarantee of Fundamental Rights had unfortunately to be made
then to a foreign ruler and it appeared in the Constitution of India
Bill framed by the Indian National Congress ten years later. All
that is valuable to an Individual in civilized society, including
free speech, imprisonment only by a competent authority, free
state education, etc. were claimed therein. Resolutions of the
Congress since then reiterated this demand and the securing of
Fundamental Rights in any future Constitution became one of the
articles of faith. To cut the narration short, the main steps may
only be mentioned. Mrs. Besant's Commonwealth of India Bill
1925 with its seven fundamental rights (the precursor of Art. 19),
the Madras Congress Resolution of 1927-"a constitution on the
basis of declaration of rights"-, the Nehru Report-"it is obvious
that our first care should be to have the Fundamental Rights
guaranteed in a manner which will not permit their withdrawal
in any circ~mstances"-, the draft article in the Nehru Constitution-"No person shall be deprived of his liberty, nor shall his
dwelling or property be entered, requisitioned or confiscated save
in accordance with law"-, the Independence Resolution of 26th
January, 1930--"We believe that it is the inalienable right of
the Indian people, as of any other people, to have freedom and
to enioy the fruits of their toil and have the necessities of life, 90
that they may have full opportunities of growth"-. the Karachi
Resolution on Fundamental Rights, Economic and Social Change
(1911), the Sapru Report (1945) which for the f.rst time distinguislied between justiciable and non-justiciable rights, the suggestion of the Cabiqet Mission for the constitution of an Advisory
Committee on Fundamental and Minority Rights, and, lastly the
Committee on Fundamental Rights of the Consdtuent Assembly,
are just a few of the steps to be remembered. The Fundamental
Rights and the Directive Principles were the result.
Fundamental laws are needed to nake a Government of laws
and not of men and the Directive Principles are needed to Jay down
the objectives of a good Government. Our Constitution was not
"the cause but the result of political and personal freedom". Since
Dicev had said that "the proclamation in a Constitution or Charter
of the right to personal freedom, or indeed of any other right,
gives of itself but slight security that the right has more than a
(1967) 2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
,
nominal exis.tence",(1) provision hat! to be made for guaranteeing
them and to make them justiciable and enf.orceable. This result
is reachefl. by mean,s of Arts. 12, 13, 32, 136, 141, 144 and 2T6.
The High' GQ)lrts .and finally this Court h~ve been, made the
Judges of whetlier any legislative or executive action on the part
of the State considered as comprehensively as is possible, offends
the Fundamental .n.ight' and Art. 13(2) declares that leg~slation
which so offends is to be deemed to be void. It is thus that
Parliament cannot today abridg~ or t_a~-~!!Y- a single Fundamenta) R1ghr even by a unanimous vote m both the r:hambers,
But 'on the argwnent of the State it has only 'to change the title
of the same Act lo an Amendment of the Constitution Act :t)lc'.
then a majority of the total strength and a 2/3rds majority of tb"
members p1escnt ,and voting in each House may remove not only
any of the Fundamet)tal Rights but the whole Chapter giving
them. And this is said to be _possible because of Art. 368 and its
gen:ral langti:tf!~ which .. it is claimed, makes no exception in its
text and. therefore, no ~xception can be implied. It. is obvious
that if an /\ct amending the Constitution is treated as r1 law i1
must also be subject to the provisions of Art. 13(2). Si11ce the
'definition of the word 'law', makes no exception a strenuou::,
effort i~ n1ade on the basis of ar~un1cnt und authority to \.!Stab1!s};i
that a constituent power does not re$trlt in a law in the ordinaf.y
sense. Distinction 'is thus made between laws made ordinarily
that is to say. froin day to day by ordinary majority and' Jaw•··
made occasionally for the amendment of the, Constitution by "
slightly cnhanc,cd majority. In our Constitution this distinction
is not valid in the eye' of Art. 13(2).·
860
It is not es.sential. of course, that a difference must alwayf·
exi$t in the procc'dtire for the exercise of constituent and ordinary
legislative power One has not to go far to find the example of
a country in whir'· constitutional law as such may be made by the
same agency whirh makes ordinary Jaws. The most 01,1tstanding.
example is that of England about which de Tocqupville observed :
"the Parliament has an. acknowledged right to
modify the Constitution; as. therefore, the Constitution
may undergo perpetual changes, it does not in reality
exist; the Parliament is at once a legislative and a constituent :issembly:"( 2 )
,\
B
c
t
c
I
F
I
G
Of courBe, the dictum of de Tocqueville that the En!;lish Con.stitution "el!e n'•xi<te •·oint" (it does not exist) is far from accu(1)
(2)
-----------
Dic.:y: _"la'w of tl1e ro1rstilution" t.lth F,dn. p. 2 17.
lntrod11c1io11 to th'! 3tudy of the L(-111 .. of the Constitution by A.'./. n;c•:y?
Tenth Edp. P- ~8 q•1')ti'1:~ f·o1n o~l!Vr'S compl·~tcs (14th ed:, 1864) Ve-I. x
.
(Den1ocrat(e en Arn--riqttel, pp. 166, 167.
.I
H
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB
A
B
c
D
E
G
(Hidayatu/lah, J.)
861
rate. There is a vast body of constitutional laws. in England
which is written and statutory but it is not all found in one place
and arranged as a written Constitution usually is. The Act of
Settlement (1701), the Act of Union with Scotland (1707), the
Act of Union with Ireland (1800), the Parliament Act (1911),
the Representation of the Peoples Acts of 1832, 1867, 1884,
1918, 1928 and 1948, the Ballot Act (1872), the Judicature Acts
1873, 1875 and 1925, the Incitement to Disaffection Act (1934),
His Majesty's Declaration of Abdication Act (1936), the Regency
Act (1937) and the various Acts setting up different ministries are
examples of what will pass for constitutional law under our system('). The Bill of Rights (1689) lays down the fundamentalrule
in England that taxation may not be levied without the consent of
Pai:Jiament which in our Constitution has its counterpart in Arf.
265. In our Constitution also the laws relating to delimitation
of constituencies er allotment of seats to such constituencies made
or purporting to be made under Art. 327 or Art. 328, by reason
of the exclusion of the powers of the courts to question them, are
rendered constitutional instruments. Other examples nf constitutions which, in addition to consti'ution. proper, contain certain
ordinary legislation having constitutional qualities, also exist.(')
What then is the real distinction between ordinary law and
the law made in the exercise of constituent power., I would
say under the 'ehcme of our Con,tilution none al all. Thb
distinction has been attempted to be worked out by 'everal
authors. It is not necessary ·to quote them. Taking the result>
obtained by Willoughby(") it may be said that the fact that "
Constitution is written as a Constitution is no distinction because
in Britain constitutional law is of both kinds and both parts coexist. The test that the Constitution requires a different kind of
procedure for amendment, also fails because in Britain Parliament by a simple ma;ority ma:Ces Jaws and also amends constitutional statutes. In our Constitution too, in spite of t.hc claim
that Art. 368 is a code (whatever is meant by the word "code"
here), Arts. 4, 11 and 169 show that the amendment of the Constitution can be by the ordinary Jaw making procedure. By this
method one of the legislative limbs in a State can be removed or
created. This destroys at one stroke the claim that Art. 368 is
a code and also that any special method of amendment of the
Constitution is fundamentally necessary.
---------------(1) The list is raken from K. C. Wh•'are's: "The Stqtttte of JVestminster and
Do1ni11ion Status" (4th Edn) p. 8. Diec)' and others give di°ffcrcnt list.
(2)
H
Sec Constitutions or Austria, Honduras. Nic8.ragu~. Peru, Spain and Sweden
rnnong oth'.~fS. The Constitution nr Spain in particular is in S"Vcrnr
ln~tn1mcn 1 s. The Cons•itution of Ausiria (A"t. 149) n1ak•·s special
n1cntio~ of these cnn<:;titutional inst· uincnts.
(3) Tagore Law Lcc!urcs (1924) p. 83.
862
SUPllBMB COUJlT llEPOllTS
(1967) 2 S.C.ll.
The next test that the courts must apply the Constitution in
preference to the ordinary law may also be rejected on the anal~
of the British practice. There, every statull" has equal standing.
Therefore, the only diffe;ence can be said to arise from the fact
that constitutional laws are generally amendable undrr a process
which in varying degrees, is more difficult or elaborate. This may
give a distinct character to the law of the Constitution but it
does not serve to distinguish it from the other laws of the land for
purposes of Art. 13(2). Another difference is that in the v.-:itten
constitutions the form and power of Government alone are to he
found and not rules of private law as is the ease with ordinary
laws. But this is also not an invariable rule. The American
Constitution and our Constitution itself are outstanding examples.
There are certain other differences of degree, such as that ordinary legislation may be tentative or temporary, more detailed
or secondary, while the Constitution is intended to be pcrr.:1anent,
general and primary. Because it creates limitations on the ordinary legislative power, constitutional law in a sense is fundamental law, but if the legislative and constituent processes can
become one, is there any reason why the result should be regarded
as law in the one case 1nd not in the other 7 On the whole,
therefore, a~ observed in the American Juljjspruden.:e--
B
c
..
•
D
"It should be noticed however that a statute and a
constitution, though of unequal dignity are both laws
and each rests on the will of the people ........ "(')
A Constitution is law which is intended to be for all time and is
difficult to change so that it may not be-subject to "impulses of
majority" "temporary excitement and popular caprice or passion".(').
I agree with the authors cited before us that the power of
amendment must be possessed by the State. I do not take a
narrow view of the word "amendment" as including only minor
changes within the general framework. By an amend!'llent new
mal!er may be added, old matter removed or altered. I also
concede that the reason for the amendment of the ':onstitution
is a political matter although I do not go as far as some Justices
of the Supreme Court of the United States did in Coleman v.
Mi/ler,( 1 ) that the wLole process is "political in its entirely from
suhmission until an amendment becomes part of the Constitution
and is not subject to judicial guidance, control or interference at
any point." There are fundamental differences between our ConAmer/canJurisprurence Vo!. 11 s~ction 3.
Amendment is cxn-essly called a legislative process in the Constitutions of
Colombia. Costa Ric1, Hungary, Panama and Peru. In Portugal the ordinary
legislatures enjoy constituent powers every JO years.
(3) 3 l7 U.S. 443 (83 L. I'd. 138S).
F
G
j
(t)
(2)
I
h
OOLAKNAm v. PUNJAB
B
c
D
E
F
G
(Hidayatullah, /.)
863
stitution and the Constitution of the United States of America.
Indeed this dictum of the four I ustices based upon the case of
Luther v. Borden ( 1 ) has lost some of its force after Baker v.
Carr(').
A R~ublic must, as says Story, ( •) possess the means for
altering and improving the fabric of tne Governmt:nt so as. to
promote the happiness and safety of the people. The power is
also needed to disarm opposition and prevent factions over the
Constitution. The power, however; is not intended to be used
for experiments or as an escape from restrictions against undue
state action enacted in the Constitution itself. Nor is the power
of amendment available for the purpose of removing express or
implied restrictions against the State.
Here I make a difference between Government and State
which I shall explain presently. As Willoughby(') points out
·constitutional law ordinarily limits Government but not the State
because a constitutional law is the creation of the State for its
own purpose. But there is nothing to prevent the State from
limiting itself. . The rights and duties of the individual and the
manner in which such rights are to be exercised and enforced
are ordinarily to be· found in the laws though some of the Cons. titutions also fix them, It. is now customary to have such rights
guaranteed in the COnstitution. Peaslee,(") writing in 1956 says
that about 88% of the national Constitutions contain clauses
respecting individual liberty and fair legal process; 83% respectirig freedom of speech and the press; 82 % respecting property
right; 80% respecting rights of assembly and association;
80% respecting rights of conscience and religion; 79% respecting secrecy of correspondence and inviolability of domicile; 78% respecting education; 73% respecting eau1lity;
64% respecting righ! to petition; 56% respecting laoour; 51 %
respecting social security; 47% respecting rights of movement
within, and to and from the nation; 47% respecting health 1nd
motherhood; and 35 % respecting the non-retroactivity e>f laws.
In some of the Constitutions there is an attempt to put a restriction against the State seeking to whittle down the rights conf"rroo
on the individuals. Our Constitution is the most outstanding
eumple of this restriction which is to be found in Art. 13(2).
The State is no doubt legally supreme but in the supremacy of its
powers it may create impediments on its own sovereignty. Government is always bound by the restrictions created in favour of
Fundamental Rights but the State may or may not be. Am ndment may be open to the State ~ccording to the procedu• lqid
0
0
H
(I) 7 How. I (12 L. Ed. 58).
(2) 369 U. S. 186 (7 l. Ed. 2d '-331.
(3) C<Jmmentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1833) Vol f"'! pp.
6116-687.
.
(') Tagore Law Lectures, p. 84.
(') Constitutions of Nations, Vol. !(2nd Edn.) p. 7.
864
SUPREME COURT Rl!POll.TS
[I967J 2 s.c.11..
down by the Constitution. There· is· nothing, however, to prevent
the Sta.:e from placing certain matters outside the amendi}lg procedure ('). Examples of this exist irl several Constitutions of
the world : see Art. 5 of the American Constitution; Art. 95 of
the Constitution of Frar.~e; Art. 95 of the Constitution of Finland;
Art. 97 .of the Constitution of Cambodia; Art. 183 of the C<>nstitution of Greece; Art. 97 of the Japanese Constitution; Art. 13'!.
of the Italian Constitution, to mention only a few.
.., 1 • ·:" ~
When this happens the ordinary procedure of aniendment
ceases to apply. The unlimited cqmpetence (the kompetenz.kompetenz of the Germans) does not flow from the amendatory
process. Amendmeqt can then be by .a fresh constituent body.
To attempt to do this otherwise is to attempt a revolution. I dq
not known why the word "revolution". which I have used before.
should evoke in some persons an image of violence and subversion. The whole America:i Constitution was the result of a
bloodless revolution and in a sense so was ours. The adoption
of the whole Constitution and the adoption of an amendment to
the Constitution have much in common'. An amendment of the
Constitution· has been aptly called a Constitution in little and the
same question arises whether it is by a legal process or by revo]u'.
'tion. There is no :bird alternative. An amendment, which repeals the earlier Constitution, unless legal, is achieved by revolution. As stated in the American Jurisprudence :
B
c
IF.
· "An attempt by the majority to change the fundamental law in violation of self-imposed restrictions is
unconstitutional and revolutionary", (2)
There are illegal and viol~1t revolutions' and illegal and peaceful
revolutions. Modification of Constitution can only be by the.
operation of a certain number of wills acting on other wills. The
pressure runs through a broad spectrum, harsh at . one cn.J and
gentle at the other. But whatever the pressure may be, kind or
cruel, the revolution is always there if the change is not legal. The
difference is orie of method, not of kind. Political thinking start~
from the few at th·e top and works downward ·more often than in
the reverse direction. It is wrong to think that masses alone.
called "the people" after Mazini, or "the proletariate" after Marx.
begin a revolutionary change. Political changes are always preceded l'>y changes in. thought in a few. They may be out~ide the
(!) In t'1-; C'll•ti~1t'i ''l of Hlndu-u ... p·lrtia! ~u11cnt.l1ncnt vnly ls possible. Fe)!"
a compT,.t·· rimcndin.'nt n. Constituent Assembly hns 10 b~ convokrd. ln
th•! C'ln<;litHti'ln of B: lzil, th·: C\1ns!itution cannQ,t be :.nnr.nded wh..::r.
then· i!' a S!J\t·: or S"igc (our en,crg~ncy). [11 T11rkt:y :1n a1n•:ndn1cTH ,.;A..rtick [ ca!1not even be p ·oposcd.
t
('l Vol. 12. &cti~n 25 pp. 629-6'.JO.
F
G
J
~
Ii
GOLAKNATH v; PUNJAB
A
B
c
D
F
(Hidayatullah, J.)
86S
Government or in it. It is a revolution nevertheless, if an attempt
is made to alter the will of the people in an illegal manner. A
revolution is successful only if there is consent and acquiescence
and a failure if there is not. Courts can interfere to nullify the
revolution~.ry change because in all cases of revolutiOn there is
infraction of existing legality. It is wrong to rlassify as revolution some thing coming from outside the Government and an
illegality corrnritted by the Government against the Constitution
as evolution. I am mindful ·of the observations of Justice Holmes
that"We need education in the obvious to learn to
transcend -our own convictions and to leave room for
hold dear to be done away with short of
much that
revolution, by the orderly change of law."{ 1 )
we
But the problem we are faced with is not an orderly change of
law but of a claim to a revolution·ary- change against the vitals of
the Constitution. In such a case the apprehension is that democracy may ~ lost if there is no liberty based on law and law based
on equality. The protection of.the Fundamental Rights is necessary so that we may not walk in fear of democracy itself.
· Having assumed the distinction between Government and
State let me now explain what I mean by that distinction and what
the force of Art. 13(2)" in that-context is. I shall begin first by
reading the pertinent article. Article 13 ( 2), which I quoted
earlier, may again be read here :
"13.
(2) Tue· State shall not mak.e any law whil::h takes
away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and
any law made in contravention of this clause shall. to
the extent of contravention, be void."
The definition of the State in Art. 12 reads :
G
H
".12. In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires, "the State" includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature
of each of the States and all local or other authorities .
within the territory. of India or under the control of the
Government of India."
The State is the sum total of all the agencies which are also individually mentioned in Art. 12 and by the definition all the parts
severally are also included in the prohibiticn. Now see how 'lnw'
i• rlefined :"13.
(I) The Mind anJ Fu.1th of .h1-.ticc llohncs 'P· 1CJO.
'
&66
SUPJlEMB OOUllT UPOllTS
(1967) 2 S.C.ll.
(3) In this article, unless the context otherwise
requires,-
A
( a) "law" includes any ordinance, order, bye-law,
rute, regulation, notification, custom er usage
having in the territory of India the force of :aw;"
In Sajjan Singh's case( 1 ) I said that 1f am_.ndments of the B
Constitution were meant to be excluded from the word "law" it
was the easiest thing to add to the definition the further words
"1-ut shall not include an amendment of the Constitution". It is
argued now before us that this was not necessary because Art. 368
does not make any exception. This argument came at all stages
like a refrain and is the real cause of the obfuscation in the oppo-, c
site view. Those who entertain this thought do not pause to
consider : why make a prohibition against the State ? As Cooley
said:
"there never was a republican Constitution which
delegated to functionaries all the latent powers which
lie dormant in every nation and are boundless in extent
and incapable of definition."
lf the State wields more power than the functionaries there must
be a difference between the State and its agencies such as Government, Parliament, the Legislatures of the States and the local and
other authorities. Obviously, the State means more than any of
these or all of them put together. By making the State subject
to Fundamental Rights it is clearly stated in Art. 13 (2) that any
of the agencies acting alone or all the agencies acting together are
not above the Fundamental Rights. Therefore, when t!Je House
of the People or the Council of States introduces a Bill for the
abridgement of the Fundamental Rights, it ignores the injunction
against it and even if the two Houses pass the Bill •J1e injunction
is next operative against the President since .he expression
"Govemmen< of India" in the General Oauses Act means the
President of India. This is equally true of ordinary laws and
laws seekin~ to amend the Constitution. The meaning of the
word "State' will become clear if 1 draw attention at this stage to
Art. 325 of the Constitution of Nicargua, which reads as
follows:-
D
E
F
G
"325. The agencies of the Government, jointly or
separately, are forbidden to suspend the Constitution or
to restrict the rights granted by it, except in the cases
provided therein."
In our Constitution the agencies of the State are controlled jointly
and separately and the prohibition is against the whole force of
- - · - · -···----·-(!)
(1965] I S.C.R. 933·
H
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJ'AB
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
(Hidayatullah, /.)
867
r/re State acting either in its executive or legislative capacity. The
control of the Executive is more important than even the Legislature. In modern politics run on parliamentarj democracy the
Cabinet attains a position of dominance over the Legislature. The
Executive, therefore, can use the Legislature as a means of securing changes in the laws which it desires. It happened in Germany
under Hitler. The fact has been noticed by numerous writers for
example, Wade and Philips('), Sir Ivor Jennings('), Dawson('),
Keith(') and Ramsay Muir(•). Dawson in particular said that
a Cabinet is no longer responsible to the Commons but the Commons has become instead responsible to the Government lvor
Jennings added that if a Government had majority it could always
secure the legislation. The others pointed out that the position
of the Cabinet towards Parliament tends to assume more or less
dictatorial powers and that was why people blamed Government.
this is to say, the Cabineli rather than Parliament for ineffective
and harsh laws.
This is true of our country also regarding administration and
legislation. Fortunately, this is avoided at least in so far as the
Fundamental Rights are concerned. Absolute, arbitrary power
in defiance of Fundamental Rights exist nowhere under our
Constitution, not even in the largest majority. The people's representative!' have, of course, inalienable and undisputable right
to alter, reform or abolish the Government in any manner they
think fit, but the declarations of the Fundamental Rights of the
citizens are the inalienable rights of the people. The extent of
the power of the rulers at any time is measured by the Fundamental Rights. It is wrong to think of them as rights within the Parliament's giving or taking. Our Constitution enables an individual to oppose successfully the whole community and the State
and claim his rights. This is because the Fundamental Rights
are so safe-guarded that within the limits set by the Constitution
they are inviolate. The Constitution has itself_said what protection has been created round the person and prope_rty of the citizens and to what extent this protection may give way to the general good. It is wrong to invoke the Directive Principles as if
there is some antinomy .between them and the Fundamental
Rights. The Directive Principles Jay down the routes of State
action but such action must avoid the restrictions stated in the
Fundamental Rights. Prof. Anderson ( 8 ) taking .he constitutional amendments, as they have teen in our country, considered
the Directive Principles to be more potent than the Fundamental
(1) Constitutional Law, 6th Edn. p. 27.
(2) Parliament (1957) pp. 11-12.
(3) Government of Canada (1952) Chapter XIX.
(4) An Introduction to British Constitutional Law (1931),p,48.
(S) How Britain is Governed p. 5, 6.
(6) Changing Law in Developing Countries, pp. 88, 89.
868
SUPREME COURT 11.EPOJ.TS
(1967] 2 S.C.R.
Rights. That they arc not, is clear when one takes the Fundamental Rights with the guaranteed remedies. The Directive
Principles arc not justiciable but . the Fundamental Rights are
made justici:ible. This gives a judicial control and check over
State action cve11 within the four corners ot the Directive Principles. lt cannot be conceived that in following the . Directive
Principles the Fundamental Rights (say for example. the equality
clause I can be ignored. If it is attempted. then the action is
CGpabk of being struck. dow!1. In the same way, if an amendment ,,f the Constitution is law, for the reasons explained by me,
such an amendment is also open to challenge under ArL 32, if it
o!Icnds against the Fundamental Rights by abridging or taking
-\hem away. Of course, it is always qpen to better Fundamental
Rights. A law or amendment of the Constitution would offend
the Fundamental Rights only when it attempts to abridge or take
them away.
The impllrtancc of Fundamental Ri;;ht> in the world.of today
cannot be lost si2ht of. On December J0, I 948, the General
A>Scmbly ·of the "unit.:d Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights without a dissent. This draft was made
after the Third Committee of the United Nations had devoted 85
meetings to it. The Declaration represents the· civil. political
and religious liberties for which men have struggled through the
centuries and those new social and economic ri!!hts of the Individual which the Nations arc increasingly recognising in their ConstitutionS. Some of these were proclaimed during the French
Revolution . and arc included in the declarations of Nations
taking pride in the dirmity and liberty of the Individual. They
arc epitomi1cd in thu Prcambk and more fully expressed in Part~
III and IV of our Constitution. These Declarations wherever
found are intended to give a key to social pro!(rcss by envisagin!!
rights to work. to education and io social insurance: ·
The Nations of the world arc now in the second sial!e, where
Covenants are being signed on the part of the States tO respect
such rights. United Nations Human Rights Commission has
worked to produce two drafts--0nc dealing with civil and political
right' and the other with economic. social and cultural rights.
The third stage is still in its infancy in which it is hoped to provide
for the enforcement of these ril!hts on an international basis. The
Rc~ional Charter of the Human Rights under which there is
established already a European Commission of Human Rights to
invcstig11te and report on violations of Human Rights. is a siimifiCant. Step in that direction. After 1955 the European CommisSion Ila~ become competent to receive complaints from individual'
although the enforceability of· ~uman Rights on an internation~l
b~.sfa i~ ,:;till far from being achieved. Tf one compares the lTlll-
A
•
c
-D
JI
•
G
H
f
' GOLAKNATH V. PUNJAJI
B
c
D
It
(HidayaJul/ah, J.)
8051
versal"Declaration with Parts Ill and IV of our.Constitution one
finds remarhble similarity in the two. It is significant th'lt our
Committee on Fundamental Rights was deliberating when the
Third Committee of the United Nati'ons was deliberating:on the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Both are manifestos of
man's inviolable and fundamental freedoms.
: :
While the world is anxious to secure Fundamental Rights internationally, it· is a little surprising that some intellectua.ls in our
country, whom we. may call "classe non classe" after flegcl, think
of the Directive Principles in our Constitution as if they were
s~perior to Fundamental Rights. As a modern prulosopher(>)
said such people 'do lip service' to freedom thinking all the time
in. terms of social justice "with 'freedom' as a by-product"'. Therefore, in their scheme of things Fundamental Rights ·become only
an epitheton ornans. One does not know what they believe in ;
the communistic millennium of Marr or the individualistic Utopia
Of Bastiat. To them an amendment of the Fundamental Rights
is permissible if it can be said to be within a scheme of a supposu:!
socio-economic reform, however, much the danger to liberty,
digfiity and freedom· of the Individual. There are others who
hold to liberty and freedom of the Individual under all conditions.
Compare the attitude of Middleton Murray wh6 would have Communism provided "there was universal freedom of speech, of association, of elections and of Parliament" ! to such the liberty and
dignity of the Individual are invioJable. Of course, the liberty of
the individual under our Constitution, though meant to be fundamental, is. subject to such restrictions as the needs of . society
dictate. These are expressly mentioned in the Constitution itself
in the hope that no further limitations would require to .be imposed
at any time.
F
I do not for a moment suggest that the question about reasonableness, expediency or desirability of the amendments of the
Constitution from a political angle is to be considered by the
courts. But what I do say .is that the possession of the necessary
majority does not put any party above the constitutional limitatioas implicit in the Constitution. It is obvious that the Consti.tuent Assembly in making the Fundamental Rights justiciabie
G was not ·satisfied Wit11 reliance on the seru: of self-restraint or
public opinion( 2 ) ori wh:ch the majority in Sajjan Singh's(')
case does. This is not an argument of fear .. The question to ask
is : can a party, which enjoys 2/3rds majority today, before it
(l) Benedetto Croce.
H
(2) Sir Robert ~eel call~ it "that- great compound of. fo1Jy, weakne~s.
prejudice, wrone 'feeling, right reeling, . obstinacy and ncwiuaper
paragraphs!'•
(3). [!96S] I S.C.R. 9:;3.
"13SupCl/6'7-!0
870
SUP.RBMJI C:Ol.11.T lU!POllTS
(1967) 2 S.C.L
loses it, amend An. 368 in such wise that a simple majority
would be sufficient for the future amendments of tbe Constitution ?
Suppose it did so, would ti.ere be any difference between the
constitutional and the ordinary laws made thcrcaftcr ?
The liberty of the Individual has to be fundamental and it has
been so declared by the people. Parliament today is not the
constituent body a~ the Constitueut Assembly was, but is a constituted body \''hich must bear true allegiance to the Constitution
as by law established. To change the Fundamental part of ,the
Individual's liberty is a usurpation oT constituent functions because they have been placed outside the scope of the power of
constituted Parliament. It is obvious that Parliament need not
now legislate at all. It has spread the umbrella of Art. 31-B and
has only to add a clause that all legislation involving Fundamental
Rights would be deemed to be within that protection hereafter.
Thus the :>nly palladium against legislative dictator.;hip may be
r~moved by a 2/3rds majority not only in praesanti but defuturo.
This can hardly be open to a constituted Parliament.
Having established that there is no difference between the
ordinary legislative and the amending processes in so far as cl. (2)
of Art. 13 is concerned, because both being laws in their true
character, come within the orohibition created by that clause
against tl1e State and that the Directive Principles cannot be invoked to gestroy Fundamental Rights, I proceed now to examine
whether the English and American precedents lay down any principle applicable to amendments of our Constitution. I ri Britain
the question whether a constitutional amendment is valid or not
cannot :irise because the courts .are !'Owerless. Parliamentary
Sovereignty under the English Constitution means that Parliament
enjoys the right to make or unmake any law whatever and no
person or body has any right to question the legislation. The
utmost and absolute despotic power belongs to Parliament. It
can "make, confirm, enlarge, restrain, abrogate, repeal, revise and
expand law concerning matters of all possible denominations",
What Parliament does, no authority on earth can undo. The
Queen, each House of Parliament, the constitaencies and the law
courts have in the past claimed independent legislative powers but
these claims are unfounded. It is impossible to compare the
Indian Parliament with the British Parliament as the former concededly in the ordinary legislation, is subject to judicial review,
both on the ground of competence arising from a federal structure
and the existence of Fundamental Rights. The question of competence in the matter of amendment of the Constitution depends
upon, firstly, compliance with the procedure laid down in Art.
368 and, secondly, upon the question whether the process is in
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
GOLAKNATH v. PUN.JAB
A
(Hidayatullah, J.)
871
any manner restricted by the Fundam~ntal Rights. Such questions
cannot obviously arise in the British Parliament(').
The example of the Constitution of the United States cannot
also serve any purpose although the greatest amount of support
was sought to be derived from the decisions of the Supreme Court
and the institutional writings in the United States. The power of
B
amendment in the United States Constitution flows from
Art. V.('). It must be noticed that the power is clearly not
made equal to ordinary legislative process. One salient point of
diJle;ence is that the Presi<)ent is nowhere in this· scheme because
his negative-does not run.( 3 ) The amend1t1ent is thus not of the
same quality as ordinary legislation.
c
The ~upreme Court of the United States has no doubt brushed
aside objections to amendments of the Constitution on the score
of incompetence, but has refrained from giving any reasons. In
the most important of them, which questioned the 18th Amendment, the Court only stated its conclusions. After recalling the
texts of the Article under which Amendments may be made and
D of the 18th Amendment proposed by the Congress in 1917 and
proclaimed as ratified by the States in 1919, the Court
announced:
"4. 'The prohibition of the manufacture, sale, transportation, importation, and exportation of intoxicating
liquors for beverage purposes, as embodied in the 18th
amendment,
is within the power to amend reserved
E
b.v Art. 5 of the Constitution." (emphasis supplied)(')
One would have very much liked to know why this proposition was laid down in the terms emphasised above if the effective
exercise of t!J.e power depended upon a particular procedure which
was immaculately followed. The silence of the Court about its
reasons lias been noticed in the same judgment by Mr. Justice
F
G
H
(1) Dicey gives thr-:e supposed limitations on the p9wer af Parliament. Of
thc'Se one that language has been used in Acts of Parliament which implies
that one ParHament can make Jaws which C11nnot be touched by any subsequent Parliament, is not true. The best examples are Act of treaties w_ith
Scotland and Ireland but these same Acts have been amended Jater.
Francis Bacon found this c:aim to be untenable. Se.e Dicey 'The Law of
the Constitution' pp, 64, 65.
(2) Article V. The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both houses shall deem
it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or~ on the
application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall
call a conventi_on fC\r proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall
be valid to all intfnts and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when
ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States, or by
conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of
ratification may be proposed by the Congress, provided that no amendment which may be made prior to the year one thousand eight hundred
and eight shall in any manner affect the first and f.ourth clauses in the
ninth secijon of the first article; and tha( no State, without its consent,
shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate.'~
(3) Hollingsworth v. Virginia 3 Dal1. 378.
(4) National Prohibition.. Cases, 253 U.S. 350.
372
SUPRBME COURT JlEPORTS
(1967] 2 S.C.R.
Mckenna. In Leser v. Garnell(') the Court was hardly more
expressive. The only question considered by the Court wa,, : '"The first contention is that the power of amendmelll conferred by lhe Federal Cor.stitution, and sought
to be exercised, docs not extend to this Amendment,
because of its character." (emphasis supplied).
This was repelled by Brandeis, J. on behalf of the unanimous court
on the ground that the Amendment was in character and phraseology similar to the 15th Amendment and was adopted by followrnc the same method. As the 15th Amendment had been accepted for half a century the suggestion that it was not in accordance
with law, but as a war measure validated by acquiescence was not
accepted.
It i.s significant, however, that at the time of the 18th Amendment, the arguments were (a) that 'amendment' ~as limited to
the correction of error in the framing of the Constitution, (b)
Article V did not comprehend the adoption of additional or supplementary provisions, ( c) ordinary legislation could not be
embodied in the constitutional amendment, and ( d) Congress
could not propose amendment whi~h pared the sovereign power
of the Slates. None of these arguments was accepted. At the
time of the 19th Amendment, which increased the franchise in
the States, the narrow ground was that a State which had not ratified the Amendment would be deprived of its equal suffrage in the
Senate because its representatives in that body would be persons
not of its choosing, i.e. persons chosen by voters whom the State
itself had not authorised to vote for Senators. This argument
was rejected. However, in Dillion v. Gloss(') the Supreme Court
held that Congress had the power to impose a time limit .for ratification because Art. V implied that "ratification must be within
some reasonable time after the proposal". The fixation of 7 years
was held by the Court to be reasonable.
In 1939 came the case of Coleman v. Miller(') which dealt
with the Child Labour Amendment. Such a law was earlier rejected by the Kansas Legislature. Later the State ratified the
amendment after a lapse of 13 years by the casting vote of the
Lt. Governor. Mandam/IS was asked against the Sr~retary of
Kai. ;as Senate to erase the endorsement of ratification from its
. rec. ~ and it was denied. The Supreme Court of K~nsas refused
to 1 ,,·iew this denial on certiorari. The Supreme Court of the
United States in an opinion, in which not more th.m 4 Justices
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
JI
(2)256 U.S. 368.
(I) 2S8 U.S. 130.
(3) 307 U.S. 443.
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
(Hidayatullah, J.)
873
took any .particular view, declined to interfere. Majority affirmed
the dec1s10n of Supreme Court of Kansas. Four Justices considered that the question was political from start to finish and three
Justices that. the previous rejection of the law and the extraordinary time taken to ratify were political questions.
~!though the Supreme Court has scrupulously refrained from
passmg on the ambit of Art. V it has nowhere said that it will not
take jurisdiction in any case involving the amending process. ( 1 )
In Hollingsworth v. Virginia(') the Supreme Court assumed that
the question was legal. The Attorney General did not even raise
an objectio1_1. In Luther v. Borden('; the matter was finally held
to be polilical which opinion prevailed unimpaired till some
doubts have arisen after Baker v. Carr('). In the case the Court
remarked"We conclude ...... that the non-justiciability of
claims resting on the guarantee dause which arises
from the embodiment of questions that were thought
'political' can have no bearing upon the justiciability of
the equal protection claim presented in this case ..... .
We emphasise that it is the involvement in guarantee
clause claims of the elements thought to define "political
questions" and ·no other feature, which could render
. them non-justiciable. Specifically, we have said that
such claims are not held non-justiciable because they
touch matters of State governmental organisation .... "
It would aLJear that the Equal Protection Clause was held to
supply a guide for examination of apportionment methods better
than the Guarantee Clause.
Although there is no clear pronouncement, a great controversy exists whether questions of substance can ever come before
the Court and whether there are any implied limitations upon the
amendatory power. In the cases above noted, the other articles
(particularly the Bill of Rights) were not read as limitations and
no limitation outside the amending clause was implied. In the
two cases in which the express limitation of Equal Suffrage Clause
was involved the Court did not enter the question. Thus the 15th
and, on its strength, the 19th Amendments were upheld. In
Coleman v. Miller(') the political question doctrine brought the
support of only four Justices and in Baker v. Carr(') the Federal
Courts were held to have jurisdiction to scrutinise the fairness
of legislative apportionment, under the 14th Amendment and to
take steps to assure that serious inequities were wiped out. The
(1) See Rottschaeffer: Handbook of American (.onstitutionaJ law (1939) pp, 397,
398, though the author's opinion is that it will deny jt:risdiction.
(2) 3 Dall. 378.
(4) 369 U.S. Iii.
•
(3) 12 L. Ed. 58.
(S) 307 U. S. 443
SUPREME COURT 11.EPORTS
874
[1967] 2 S.C.R.
courts have thus entered tlie 'political thicket'. The question of
delimitation of constituencies cannot, of course, arise before
courts under our Constitution because of Art. 329.
BakPr v. Carr(') makes the Court sit in judgment over the
possession and distribution of political power which is an essential
part of a Constitution. The magical formula of "political question" is losing ground and it is to be hoped that a change may be
soon coming. Many of the attacks on the amendm'!nts were the
result o; a misunders~anding that the Constitution was a compact
bc1wecn States and that the allocation of powers was not to be
changed at all. This was finally decided by Texas v. Whice(')
as for back as 1869.
The main question of implied limitations has evoked a spate
of writings. Bryce('), Weaver('), Mathews('), Burdick(').
Willoughby('), Willis('), Rottshaefer('), Orfield('') (to name
only a few) arc of the opinion that !hr.re are no implied limitations, although, as Cooley points out, "it is sometimes ex;:iressly
declared-what indeed is implied without the declaration-that
everything in the declaration of rights cvntained is excepted out
of the general powers of Government, and all laws contrary thereto shall be void(")." Express checks there arc only three. Two
temporary checks were operative till 1808 and dealt with interference with importation of slaves and the levying of a direct tax
without apportionment among the States, according to population.
Permanent check that now remains is equality of repre.scntation
of Stales in the Senate. Some writer5 suggest that this check
may also be removed in two moves. By the first the Article can
be amended and by the second the equality removed. When this
happens it will be seen whether the Supreme Court invoke~ any
doctrine such as achieving indirectly what cannot be done directly .
•
It will, of course, be completely out of place in a ji:dgmoot to
discuss the views of the several writers and so I shall conftne myself to the observation of Or!Jeld to whom again and again counsel for the State turned either for support or inspiration. Accordmg to him, there arc no implied limitations un/r.<s Che Cotirts adopt
---(!) 369
A
B
c
D
E
.-
-····---
u. s. 186.
(2) Wall. 700.
G
(3) The American Co1nmonwcalth Vol. I.
(4) Constitu!ional Law and il'i Administration (1946).
(~ American Con<;titutionaJ Systcn1 (2nd Edn.) p. 43-45.
((' ''he Law of the American Constitution (7th Imp.) p. 45
(7,. ~ :isor~ Law Lct;curc~ (1924).
(8) CoMtitutional Law of United States (1936).
(9) Jlandbook of American Constitutional Law.
(10) The Ar.·~nding of the Federal Constitution.
(11) Constitutional Limitations Vol. I, 8th Edn. pp. 95, 96.
H
GOLAKNA'DH v. PUN.JAB
A
c
D
E
F
G
H
(Hidayatul/ah, /.)
87 5
that view and therefore no limitations on the substance of the
amendments except the Equality Clause. His view is that when
Congress is engaged in the amending process it is not legislating
but exercising a peculiar power bestowed by Art. V. I have already shown that under our Constitution the amending process is
a legislative process, the only difference being a special majority
nd the existence of Art. 13(2). Orfield brushes aside the argument that this would destroy the very concept of the Union which,
as Chief Justice Marshall had said, was. indestructible. Orfield
faces boldly the question whether the whole Constitution can be
overthrown by an amendment and answers yes. But he says that
the amendment must not be in violation of the Equality Clause.
This seems to be a great concession. He makes this exception
but Munro('), who finds it difficult to conceive of an unamendable constitution suggests that it should be possible to begin with
that clause and then the door to amendments would be wide open.
Of course, the Supreme Court has not yet faced an amendment of
this character and it has not yet denied jurisdiction to itself. In
the United States the ConstitutiOn works because, as observed by
Willis, tl:te Supreme Court is allowed to do "the work of remolding
the Constitution to keep it abreast with r..ew conditions and new
times, and to allow the agencies expressly endowed with the
amending process to act orily in extraordinary emergencies or
when the general opinion disagrees with the opinion of the
Supreme Court." In our country amendments so far have been
made only with the object of negativing the Supreme Court decisions, but more of it later.
I have referred to Orfield although there are greater names
than his expounding the same views. I have refrained from referring to the opposite view which in the words of W1Joughby has
been "strenuously argued by reputable writers" although Willis
discourteously referred to them in his book. My reason for not
doing so is plainly this. The process of amendment in ihe united
States is clearly not a legislative process a11d there is no provision
like Art. 13 ( 2) under which "laws" abridging or taking away
Fundamental Rights can be declared void. Our liberal Constitution has given· to the Individual all that he should have-freedom
of speech, of association, of assembly, of religion, of motion and
locomotion, of property and trade and profession. In addition it
has made the State incapable of abridging or taking away these
rights to the extent guaranteed, and has itself shown how far the
enjoyment of those rights can be curtailed. It has given a
guaranteed right to the person affectec! to move the Court. The
guarantee is worthless if the rights are capable of being taken
away. This makes our Constitution unique and the American
precedents cannot be of much assistance.
(I) The Government of the United States (5th Edn.) p. 77.
176
SUPllE.Wa lX>UJ.T UP01TS
[1967] 2 S.C.R.
The Advocate General of Madra~ relied upon· Vedel.( 1 )
According to Vedel, a prohibition in the Constitution against its
own amendment has a oolitical but not juridical value, and from
the juridical point of view, a declaration of absolute constitutional
immutability cannot be imagined. The constituent power being
supreme, the State cannot be fettered even by it~clf. He notices,
however, that the Constitution of I 79 I limited the power of
amendment (revision) for a certain time and that of 1875 prohibited the alteration of the Republican form of Government. He
thinks that this hindrance can be removed by a two ~tep amendment. He concludes that the constituent of today cannot bind
the nation of tomorrow and no Constitution can prohibit its amendment i11 all aspects.
Of course, the French have experimented with over d dozen
Constitutions, all very much alike, while the British have slowly
changed th_eir entire structure from a monarchical executive to an
executive from Parliament and have reduced the power of the
House of Lords. Cambell-Bannerman, former Prime Minister of
England summed up the difference to Ambassador M. de Flcurian
thus:
A
B
c
D
" .... Quand nous faisons une Rlrolution, now ne ditruisoltJ
pas notre maison, nous en constrronJ avec so in la fafade, ti,
derriere cette farade, nouJ reconstrullons une nou1ellt maison.
Vous, Fra11rais, agissez autrement; •ow jetet baJ le •kil tdijice
et l'OUS reconstruisez la meme mai1on avet une autre fafade et
sous un nom different." (When we make a Rev'!lution we do
not destroy an house, we save with care tht facade and behind
construct a new house. You, Frenchmen, act differently.
Y~u throw down the old edifice and you reconstruct the
same house with a different faeade and under a different
name).
M. de Fleurian agreed that there was a lot of truth in it (JI ya du
E
,
vrai dans cette boutade)( 1 ).
But of course to a Frenchman brought up in a legal system in
which the Courts do not declare even an ordinary statute to be
invalid, the idea of the unconstitutionality of a constitutional
amendment does not even occur. France and Belgium have
created no machinery for questioning legislation and rely on moral
and politic_al sanctions. E\'en an English lawyer and Jes,, so an
American lawyer find it difficult to understand how the legality of
an amendment of the Constitution can ever be qu~tioned. It
(I) Mannual £/emtntaire da Droil Con.Jlitution•I (Sircy) p .. I 17.
(2) Recounted by M. de Flcuriau in the Prcface'to J. Magnan de 8.Jrnier, L'Empire
llrita1uUque, son ~t>olu~;on politique et t:.011.Jtilutionnelle p. 6, quo1cd :n Whcarc:
The Statute of Wcstrn1nstcr and Dominion ~'.atu··, p. 9-JO.
G
H
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB
B
D
E
F
G
H
(Hidayatullah, J.)
877
appears to them that the procedure for the amendment being gone
through there is no one to question and what emerges is the
Constitution as valid as the old Constitution and just as binding.
The matter, however, has to be looked at in this way. Where the
Constitution is overthrown and the Courts lose their position
under the old Constitution, they may not be able to pass on the
validity of the new Constitution. This is the result of a revolution pure and simple. Where: the new Constitution is not accepted and the people have not acquiesced in the change and the
courts under the old Constitution function, the courts can declare the new Constitution to be void. Perhaps even when the
people acquiesce and a new Government comes into being, the
courts may still declare the new Constitution to be invalid but
only if moved to do so. It is only when the courts begin to function under the new Constitution that they cannot consider the
vires of that Constitution because th~n they owe their existence
to it. I agree with Orfield in these observations taken from his
book. He, however, does not include amendments of the Constitution in these remarks· and expressly omits them. His opinion
seems to indicate that in the case of amendments courts are completely free to see that the prescribed constitutional mode of alteration is complied with and the alteration is within the permissive
limits to which the Constitution wishes the amendments to go.
This is true of all amendments but particularly of an amendment
seeking to repeal the courts' decision and being small in dimension, leaves the courts free to consider its validity. The courts
derive the power from the existing terms of the Constitution and
the amendment fails if it seeks to overbear some existing resu ·~lion
on legislation.
What I have said does not mean that Fundamental Rights are
not subject to change or modification. In the most inalienable of
such rights a distinction must be made between possession of a
right and its exercise. The first is fixed and the latter controlled
by justice and necessity. Take for example Art. 21 :
"No person shail be deprived of his life or personal
liberty except according to procedure established by
law".
Of all the rights, the right to one's life is the most valuable. This
article of the Constitution, therefore, makes the right fundamental.
But the inalienable right is curtailed by a murderer's conduct as
viewed under law. The deprivation, when it takes place, is not
of the right which was immutable but of the continued exercise of
the right. Take a Directive Principle which is not enforceable at
law but where the same result is reached. The right to employment is a dir~ctive princip1-:. Some countries even view it as a
FundamLntal Right. The exercise, however, of that right must
depend upon the capacity of Society to afford employment to all
878
SUl'lll!Mll COUKT 11.EPOJlTS
(1967] 2 S.C.Jl.
and sundry. The possession 9f this right also cannot be confused
with its exercise. One right here is positive and can be enforced
although its exercise can be curtailed or taken away, the
other is a rigln which the State must try to give but which cannot
be enforced. The Constitution p.!nnits a curtailment of the exercise of most of the Fundamental Rights by stating the limits of
that curtailment. But this power does not permit the State itself, 8
to take away or abridge the right beyond the limits set by the
Constitution. It must also be r~membered that the rights of one
individual are often opposed by the rights of another individual
and thus also become !imitative. The Constitution in this way
permits the Fundamental Rights to be controlled in their exercise
but prohibits their erasure.
c
It is argued that such approach makes Society static and robs
the State of its sovereignty. It is submitted that n leaves revolution as the only alternative if change is necessary. This is not
right. The whole Constitution is open to amendmem. Only
two dozen articles are outside the reach of Art. 368. That too
hecause the Consti!ution !:as made them fundamental. What is
being suggested by the counsel for the State is it~elf a revolution 0
because as things are that method of amendment is illegal. There
is a legal method. Parliament must act in a different way to
reach the Fundamental Rights. The State must reproduce the
power which it has chosen to put under a restraint. Just as the
French or the Japanese etc. cannot ch?nge tho articles of their
Constitution which are made free from the power of amendment E
and must call a convention or a constituent body, so also we in
India cannot abridge or take awa~· the Fundamental Rights by the
ordinary amending process. Parliament must amend Art. 368
to convoke another Constituent Assembly, pass .! law under item
97 of the First List of Schedule VII to call a Constituent Assembly
and then that assembly may be able to abridge or take away the
Fundamental Right~ if desired. It cannot be done otherwise. F
The majority in Sajjan Sing/i's case(') suggested bringing Art. 32
under the Proviso to improve protection to the Fundamental
Rights. Article 32 does not stand in need of thts protection. To
abridge or take away that article (and the same is true -of all other
Fundamental Rights) a constituent body and not a constituted
body is required. Parliament today is a constituted body with G
powers of le~islation which include amendments of the Constitution by a special majority but only so far as Art. 13(2) allows.
To bring into existenr.e a constituent body is not impossible as I
had ventured to suggest during the hearing and which I have now
more fully explained here. It may be said that this is not necessary becau'e Art. 368 can be amended by Parliament to confer on H
itself constituent powers over the Fundamental Rights. This would
be wrong and against Art. 13 (2). Parliament cannot increase it'
[1965] I 5 CR. 933.
GOLAJ:NATH v. PUN.JAB
A
II
c
D
E
F
G
H
(Hidayatullah, J.)
879·
powers in Ibis way and do indirectly which it is intended not to
do directly. The State does not lose its sovereignty but as it has
chosen to create self-imposed restrictions tl).rough one constituent
body, those restrtctions cannot be ignored by a constituted body
which makes laws. Laws so made can affect those parts of the
Constitution which are outside the restriction in Art..13 (2) but
any law (legislative or amendatory) passed by such a body must
conform to that article. To be able to abridge or take away the
Fundamental Rights which give so many assurances and guarantees
a fresh Constituent Assembly must be convoked. Without such
action ·the pro!ection of the Fundamental Rights must remain
immutable and any attempt to abridge or take them away in any
other way must be regarded as revolutionary.
I shall now consider the amendments of the Fundamental
Rights made since the adoption of the Constitution, with a view
to illustrating· iny meaning. Part III is divided under different
headings. They are (a) General (b) Right to Equality ( c) Right
to Freedom ( d) Right against exploitation ( e) Right to Freedom
of Religion (f) Cultural and Edu<;ational Rights (g) Right to
Property (h) Right to Constitutional Remedies. I shall first deal
with amendments of topics other than the topic (g)-Right to Property. The articles which are amended in the past are Arts. 15
and 19 by the 1st Amendment ( 18th June 19 51) and Art.' 16 by
the 7th Amendment (19th October 1956), The 16th Amendment
added the word~ "the sovereignty and integrity of India" to some
clauses. As that does not abridge or take away any Fundamental
Right, I shall not refer to the 16th Amendment hereafter. That
Amendment was. valid. The changes so made may be summarized. In Art. 15, which deals with prohibition of discrimination on the ground of religion, rac!l, caste, sex or place of birth,
clause (3) alloweil the State to make special provision for women
and -::hildren. A new clause was added which reads :
"( 4) Nothing in this article or in clause (2) of article 29 shall prevent the .late from making any special
provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes".
It fa argued by counsel for the State that by lifting the ban to make
special provision for backward classes of citizens, there is discrimination against the higher classes. This is the view which
classes in a privileged position who had discriminated against the
backward classes for centuries, might indeed take. But I cannot accept this contention. The Constitution is intended to secure to all citizens "Justice, social, economic and political" and
Equality of status and opportunity" ( vide the· Preamble) and the
Directive Principles include Art. 38 which provides :
880
[1967] 2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
"38. The State shall striv~ to promote the welfare of
the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it
may a social order in which justice, social, economic
and political, shall inform all the institutions of tne
national life."
To remove the effect of centuries of discriminatory treatment and
to raise the down-trodden to an equal status cannot be regarded
as discriminatory against any one. It is no doubt true that in
State of Madras v. Champa~am(') the reservation of seats for
Backward Classes, Scheduled Castes and Tribes in public educational institutions was considered invalid. Articles 16 ( 4) and
340 had already provided for special treatm~nt for these backward
classes and Art. 46 had providcJ that the State shall promote with
special care their educational anJ economic interests. With all
due respects the question of <focrimination hardly arose because
in view of these provisi1 ns any reasonable attempt to raise the
status of the backward cla>sc' could have been upheld on the
principle of classilication. In an~· event, the inclusion of this
clause to Art. 16 does not abridge or take away any one's Fundamental Rights unless the view be taken that the backward classe~
for ever must remain backward.
By the First Amendment the second and the sixth clauses of
Art. 19 were also amended. The original cl. (2) was substituted
by a new clause and certain words were added in clause ( 6). The
changes may be seen by comparing the unamended and the amended clauses side by side :
A
B
c
D
E
·• 19 ( 1) All citizens shall have the right(a) to freedom of speech and expression;
(After Amtndnwrtt)
Notb;ng in •ulxlau'e (a) of clause (I) No1hin1 in sulxlausc (a) of clause (t)
shall affect the operation of any existshall afcct th~ operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from
ing law in so far 8'.'i it relates to, or
mak:ng any law, in so far as such
prevent the Sta'.e from making uny
law imposts. reasonable restrictions on
law relating tJ libel, slandt!r, dcfama..
the exercise of tbe riaht conferred by
tion, contempt of Court or any mailer
the said sub-~laus'e in the interest of
which offends again$t decency or morathe ........ security of the State, fricnJjty or which undermines the security
endly relations with foreign States,
of. or tends to overthrow. the State.
publ:c order, decency or morality, or
in relation to contempt of court,
defamation or incitement to an offence.
(2) (Before Amtndmtnt)
F
G
"
The amendmem was necessary because in Ramesh Thapar v.
State of Madras(') it was held that di5turbances of public tranquallity did not come wi_~in the expression "undermines the secu(1) (1951) S.C.ll. 525.
(2) (t950J S.C.ll. 5514.
H
OOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
(Hidayatullah, J.)
rity of the State". Later the Supreme Court itself observed in
the State of Bihar v. Shailabala Devi(') that this Court did not
intend to lay down that an offence against public order could not
in any case come within that expression. The changes related to
(a) "friendly relations with foreign States", (b) "public order"
and ( c) "incitement to an offence" and the words "undermines the
security of .the State OF tends to overthrow the State" were replaced by the words "in the interests of the security of the State".
This change could be made in view of the existing provisions of
the clause as the later decision of this Court above cited clearly
show that "public order" and "incitement to offence" were already
comprehended. The amendment was within the permissible
limits as it did not abridge or take away an: Fundamental ~ght.
· The Amending Act passed by Parliament also included a sub-·
section which read :
"(2) No law fa force in the territory of India
immediately before the commencement of the Constitution which is consistent with-the provisions of article 19
of the Constitution as. amended by sub-section ( 1) of
this section shall be deemed to be void, or ever to have
become void, on the ground only that, being a law which
takes away or abridges the right conferred by sub-clause
(a) of clause (1 ) of the said article, its operation was
not saved by clause (2) of that article as originally
enacted.
Explanation.-In this sub-section, the expression
"law in force" has the same meaning as in clause ( 1) of
articie 13 of this Constitution".
This sub-section was not included in the Constitution. That device was followed in respect of certain State statutes dealing with
property rights by including them in a new Schedule. It did not
then occur to Parliament that the laws could be placed under a
special umbrella of constitutional pre· ection. Perhaps it was not
considered necess'.lry because At t. 19 ( 2) was retrospectively
changed, and the enactment of this sub-section was an ordinary
legislative action. If the amendment had failed, the second subsection of section 3 would not have availed at all.
Turning now to clause ( 6), we may read the original and theamended clause side by side :
"19 ( 1 ) All citizens shall have the righl-
H
881
(g) to practise any profession, or to carry on any
occupation, trade or. business.
(I) [1952] S.C.R. 654.
8 82
SUPREME COURT JU!FORTS
[1967] 2 S.C.R.
(6)
(Bt/ort Amtndmtnt)
<A/ttr Amtndmt'nl}
Nothing in ~ulxlausc (g) of the 5aid Nothing in ~~b-dau'.C (g) of the ~id
clauf.C shall affect the operation of any
existing law in so far as it imposes.
or prevent the State from making any
law imposing, in the intcrc.-sts of the:
general public, reasonable restrictions
on the cx1.:rci~c of the right conferred
by the ~aid sulK:Iausc, and, in particular nothing in the said sub<lausc,
shall aff.:ct the operation of any existing law in so far as it prescribes or
emJ'()wcrs any authority to pr~cribe.
or prevent the State from making any
law prescribing or empowering any
aulhority to prescribe, the professional
or technical qualifications necessary
for practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or busi-
clauc;c shall aff..:ct the Cf)l..:ration of any
cxi~ting Jaw in :so far a:; it impose6.
or prevent the Si ate from making any
Jaw im~ing, in the interests of the
general public, rcac;onabk restrictions
on 1hc exercise of the right conferred
by the said sub-clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sutKlausc,
shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or
previ!nt the State from making any
law relating to,-
nc:ss.
(ii) the carrying on by the State, or
a corparation owned or conirollcd
by tt.e State, of any tr.i.de, bu.c;iness, ind~try or ~rvicc, whether
to 1he exclusion, complete or
partial, of citizens or otherwise.
A
B
(i) the professional or technical quali·
fications necessary for practising
any profession or carrying on any
occupation, trade or buslnc~c;. ·or
The first change is in the verbiage and is not orie of substance. It
only removes some unnecessary words. The new sub-clause is
innocuous except where it provides for the exclusion of citizens.
It enables nationalisation of industries and trade. Sub-clause (g)
(to the generality of which the original clause ( 6) created some
exceptions) allowed the State to make Jaws imposing. in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise
of the right conferred by the sub-clause. A law creating restrictions can, of course, be made outside the Constitution or inside it.
If it was considered that this right in the state was required
in the interests of the general public, then the exercise of the right
to practise profession or to carry on an occupation, trade or business could be suitably curtailed. It cannot be said that nationalisati6n is never in the interest of the general public. This amendment was thus within the provision for restricting the exercise of
the Fundamental Right in sub-cl. (g) and was -perfectly in order.
The Seventh Amendment introduced certain words in Art.
16(3). Tha clauses may be compared:
"16.
(After Am<ndment)
(3)
(B<fo,.. Am<ndmenl)
Nothing in thio; article shall prevent Nothing in thi!\ aniclc sho.11 prevent
Parliament from makin« any law presParliament from making any Jaw pres·
cribing, in regard to a ch1.c;5 or classes
cribing. in regard to a class or clas.~cs
employment or appointment to
of employment or appointment to
an offK:c: under any State c;pcclficd in
an ofilce under the Government of,
or any local authority within, a State
the Fir..t Schedule or any local or
other authority within its territory, any
or U•ion territory, any requirement as
to rcsidonte within that State or Union
reqt.ircmcnt ac; to re5idencc within the
territory prior to such employment or
State prior tQ such cmployn1cnt •r
appointmcnl. 0
appC'lintmcnt.
c
D
E
F
G
or
H
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB
(Hidayatullah, J.)
883
A
The change is necessary to include a reference to Union territory.
It has no bearing upon Fundamental Rights and neither abridges
nor takes away any of them. In the result none of the amendments of the articles in parts other than that dealing with Right
to Property is outside the amending process because Art. 13(2)
is in no manm;r breached.
8
This brings me to the main question in this case. It is :
whether the amendments of the part Right to Property in Part III
of the Constitution were legally made or not. To understand
this part of the case I must first begin by discussing what property
rights mean and how they were safeguarded by the Constitution
as it was originally framed. "Right to Property" in Part III was
originally the subject of one article, namely, Art. 31. Today
there are three articles 31, 31-A and 31-B and the Ninth Sche"
dule. The original thirty-first article read :
c
"31. Compulsory acquisition of property.
o
E
F
G
H
( 1) No person shall be deprived of his property
save by authority of law.
(2) No propexty, movable or immovable, including
any interest in, or in any company owning, any commercial or industrial undertaking, shall be taken possession of or acquired for public purposes under any law
authorising the taking of such possession or such acquisition, unless the law provides for compensation for the
property taken possession of or acquired and either fixes
the amount of the compensation, or specifies the principle on which, and the manner in which, the compensation is to be determined and given.
(3) No such law -as is referred to in clause (2)
made by the Legislature of the State shall have effect
unless such law, having been ·reserved for the consideration of the Prciident, has received his assent.
( 4) If any Bill pending at the commencement of this
Constitution in the Legislature of a State has, after it
has been passed by such Legislature, been reserved for
the consideration of the President and has received his
assent, then, notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, the law so assented to shall not be called in
question in any court on the ground that it. contravenes
the provisions of clause (2).
( 5) Nothing in clause ( 2) shall affect( a) the provisions of any existing law other than a
law to which the provisions of clause ( 6) apply,
or
SUPltBMB. COURT ltBPOR.TS
(1967] 2 S.C.lt.
(h) the provisions of any law wl;ich the State may
hereafter make-
A
(i) for the purpose of imposing or levying any
tax or penalty, or
(ii) for the promotion of public health or the
prevention of danger to life or property, or
(iii) in pursuance of any agreement entered
into between the Government of the Dominion of India or the Government of Tndia
and the Government of any other country, or otherwise, with respect to property
declared by law to be evacuee property.
( 6) Any law of the State enacted not more than
eighteen months before the commencement of this Constitution may within three months from such commencement be submitted to the President for his certification; and thereupon, if the President by public
notification so certifies, it shall not be called in question
in any court on the ground that it contravenes the provisions of clause (2) of this article or has contravened
the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 299 of the
Government of India, Act, 1935".
The pro~·isions of this article are intended to be read with
Art. 19 ( 1 ) ( f) which reads :
B
c
D
E
"19 ( 1) All citizens shall have the rig' it(f) to acquire, hold and dispose of property".
Article 19(1)(f) is subject to clause (6) which I have already
set out elsewhere and considered. Ownership and exchange of
property are thus recognised by the article. The word "property"
is not defined and I shall presently consider what may be included
in 'property'. Whatever the nature of property, it is clear that
by the first clause of Art. 31 the right to property may be taken
away under authority of law. This was subject to one condition
under the original Art. 3 I, namely, that the law must either fix
the compensation for the deprivation or specify the principles on
which and the manner in which compensation was to be determined and given. This was the heart of the institution of property as understood by the Constituent Assembly. The rest of
the article only gave constitutional support against the second
clause, to legislation already on foot in the States. This created
a Fundamental Right in property. The question may now be
F
G
H
GOLAKNATH V. PUNJAB
(Hidayatullah, 1.),
A
885
asked : why was it necessary to make such a Fundamental Right
at all?
There is no natural right in property and as Burke said in his
Reflections, Government is not made in virtue of natural rights,
which may and do exist in total independence of it. Natural
rights embrace activity outside the status of citizen. Legal rights
B are required for free existence as a social being and the State
undertakes to protect them. Fundamental Rights are those rights
which the State enforces against itself. Looking at the matter
briefly but historically, it may be said that the Greeks were not
aware of these distinctions for as Gierke(') points out they did not
d1,tinguish between personality as a citizen and personality as a
c human being. For them the Individual was merged in the citizen
and the citizen in the State. There wa~ personal liberty and private law but there was no sharp division between the different
kinds of laws. The Romans evolved this gradually, not when the
Roman Republic existed, but when the notion of a Fiscus developed in the Empire and the legal personality of the Individual
was separated from his membership of the State. It was then
D
that the State began to recognize the rights of the Individual in
his dealings with the State. It was Cicero( 2 ) who was the first to
declare that the primary duty of the Governor of a State was to
secure to each individual in the possession of his property. Here
we may see a recognition of the ownership of property as a Fune
damental Right. This idea was so engrained in early social phiE losophy. that we find Locke opining in his 'Civil Government'
(Ch. 7) that "Government has no other end but the preservation
of property". The concepts of liberty, equality and religious
freedom were well-known. To them was added the concept of
property rights. Later the list included "equalitas, libertas ius
securitatis, ius defensionis and ius puniendi. The concept of proF perty right gained8 further sup:iort from Bentham and Spencer and
Kant and Hege1( ). The term property in its pristine meaning
embraced only land but it soon came to mean much more.
According to Noyes(')"Property is any protected right or bundle of rights
(interest or thing) with direct or indirect regard to any
external object (i.e. other than the person himself) which
G
is material or quasi material (i.e. a protected process)
and which the then and there organisation of Society
permits to be either private or public, which is connoted
by the legal concepts of occupying, possessing or
using".
H
(1) Das Dr.utsches Genosscnschaftrecht (Ill, 10).
(2) De Off. (The Offices) JI Ch. XXI (Everyman) p. 105.
(3) W. Friedmam : Legal Theory (4th Edn.) see pp. 373-376.
(4) The Institution of Property (1936) p. 436.
L3Sup Cl/67-11
8g6
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1967] 2 S.C.R.
The right. is enforced by excluding entry or interference by a person not legally entitled. The position of the State vis a vis the
individu~.l 1s the subject of Arts. 19 and 31, 31-A and 31-B.
Now in the enjoyment, the ultimate right may be an interest
which is connected to the object tlm:iugh a series of intermediaries
in which each 'holder' from the last to the first 'holds of' 'the
holder' before him. Time was when there was a lot of 'free property' which was open for appropriation. As Noyes ( 1 ) puts it, "all
physical manifestations capable of b~ing detected, localised and
identified" can be the objects of property. One exception now
made by all civilized nations is that humanbeings are no longer
appropriable. If any free property \Vas available then it could
be brought into possession and ownership by mere taking. It
has been Ycry aptly said that all private properly is a system of
monopolies and the right to monopolise lies at the foundation of
the institution of property. Pound(') in classifymg right in rem puts
private property along with personal integrity [right against injury
to life, body and health (bodily or mental). personal liberty (free
motion and locomotion)], Society and control of one's family and
dependents. An extremely valuable definition of ownership is to
be found in the Restatement of the Law of Property where it is
said :
"It is th~ totality of rights as to any specific objects
which are accorded by law, at any time and place, after
deducting social reservations".
)
B
c
D
E
This is the core from which some rights may be detached but to
which they must return when liberated.
The right to property in its primordial meaning involved the
acquisition of a free object by possession and conversion of this
possession into ownership by the protection of State or the ability
to exclude interference. As the notion of a State grew, the right
of property was strong or weak according to the force of political
opinion backing it or the legislative support of the State. The
English considered the right as the foundation of society.
Blackstone(") explained it on religious and social grounds claiming
universality for it and called it the right of the English people.
William Paley('). although he thought the institution paradoxical
and unnatural. found it full of advantages, and Mackintosh in his
famous diatribe against the French Revolution described it as the
"sheet-anchor of society''. This institution appeared in the Magna
Carta, in the American Declaration of Independence and the
French Declaration of Rights of Man. Later we find it in many
(I) The Institution of Proporty (1936) p. 438.
3) Co1n1nentarics.
(2) Readings; p. 420.
(4) Moral Philosophy.
F
G
H
( -
GOLAKNATH V. PUNJAB
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
(Hidayatullah, J.)
887
Constitutions described as Fundame11tal, general and guaranteed(').
Our Constitution accepted the theory that Right of Property
is a fundamental right. In my opinion it was an error to place it
in that category. Like the original Art. 16 of the Draft Bill of
the Constitution which assured freedom of trade, commerce and
intercourse within the territory of India as a fundamental right
but was later removed, the right of property should have been
placed in a different chapter. Of all the fundamental rights it is
the weakest. Even in the most democratic of Constitutions,
(namely, the \yest German Constitution of 1949) there was a
provision that lands, minerals and means of production might be
socialised or subjected to control. Art. 31, if it contemplated
socialization in the same way in India should not have insisted w
plainly upon payment of compensation. Several speakers warned
Pandit Nehru and others of the danger of the second .clause of
Art. 31, but it seems that the Constituent Assembly was quite
content that under it the Judiciary would have no say in the matter
of compensation. Perhaps the dead hartd of's. 299 of the Constitution Act of 1935 was upon the Con;Jtuent Assembly. Ignored
were the resolutions passed by the National Planning Committee
of the Congress (1941) which had advocated the co-operative
principle for exploitation of land, the Resolution of 1947 that land
with its mineral resources and all other means of production as
well as distribution and exchange must belong to and be regulated
by the Community, and the warning of Mahatma Gandhi that if
compensation had to be paid we would have to rob Peter to pay
Paul (2) ! In the Constituent Assembly, the Congress (which wielded the majority then, as it does today) was satisfied with the
Report of the Congress Agrarian Reforms Committee 1949 which
declared itself in favour of the elimination of all intermediaries
between the State and the tiller and imposition of prohibition
against subletting. The Abolition Bills were the result. Obviously
the Sardar Patel Committee on Fundamental Rights was not prepared to go. far. In the debates that followed, ma:ly amendment~ and suggestions to alter the draft article protecting property,
failed. The attitude was summed up by Sardar Patel. He conceded that land would be required for public purposes ·but hopefully added : "not only land but so many other things may have to
be acquired. And the State will acquire them after paying compensation and not expropriatf them". ( 3 )
(1) Under the Constitution of Norway the rights (Odels and Asaete rights) can·
not bC abolished but if the State requires the owner must s~1rrender the property
and he is· tornpensated.
(2) Gandhi : Constituent Asse1nbly Debates Vol. IX pp. 12()4.-06.
(3) Patel : Con~tituenfAssembly Debates Vol. Ip. 517.
888
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1967) 2 S.C.R.
What was then the theory about Right to Property accepted
by the Constituent Assembly ? Again I can only describe it historically. Grotius(') had treated the right as an acquired ri~ht
(ius quaesitum) and ownership (dominium) as either servmg
individual interests (v11/gare) or for the public good (eminens).
According to him, the acquired right had to give way to eminent
domain (ex vi auper-emi11entis dominii) but there must be public
interest (publica11tilitas) and if possible compensation. In the
social contract theory also the contract included protection of
property ·with recognition of the power of the ruler to act in the
public interest and emergency. Our constitutional theory treated
property rights as inviolable except through law for public good
and on payment of compensation. Our Constitution saw the
matter in the way of· Grotius but overlooked the possibility that
just compensation may not be possible. Ji follows almost literally
the German jurist Ulrich Zasius (except in one respect) : Princep.<
non potest auferee mihi rem mean sive lure gentium, sive civile sit
facta mea.
A
All would have beell' well if the Courts had construed Article
31 differently. However, the decisions of the High Courts and
the Supreme Court, interpre.:ng and expounding this philosophy
took a different view of compensation. I shall refer only to some
of them. First the Patna High Court in Kameshwar v. Bihar(')
applied Art. 14 to strike down the Reforms Act in Bihar holding
it to be discriminatory. This need not have occasioned an
a1Pendment because the matter could have been righted, as indeed
it was, by an appeal to the Supreme Court [see State of Bihar v.
Kameshwar(')]. The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951
followed. It left Art. 31 intact but added two fresh articles, Arts.
31·A and 31-B which are respectively headed "saving of laws
providing for acquisition of est!_ltes etc." and "Validation of certain
Acts and Regulations" and added a schedule (Ninth) to be read
with Art. 31-B naming therein thirteen Acts of the State Legislatures. Article 31-A was deemed always to have been inserted and
Art. 31-B wiped out retrospectively all decisions of the courts
which had declared any of the scheduled Acts to be invalid. The
texts of these new articles may now be seen :
D
"31A. Saving of laws providing for acquisition of
estates, etc.~
G
c
E
F
(I) Notwithstanding anything in foregoing provisions of this Part, no law providing for the acquisition
by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or for
(t) Grotius : De jurc Delli ac Pacis.
t4 § § 7 and 8.
(2) A.I.R. t95 I Patna 91.
(3) (1952) S.C.R. 889.
II c. 2 § 2 (5) § 6. l c. I § 6 and 11 c.
H
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
(Hidayatullah, J.)
H89
the extinguishment or modification of any such rights
shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or .takes away or abridges any of the
rights. conferred by, any provisions of this Part :
Provided that where such law is a law made by the
Legislature of a State, the provisions of this article shall
not apply thereto unless such law, having been reserved
for the consideration of the President, has received his
assent.
( 2) In this article,( a) the expression "estate" shall, in relation to any
local area, have the same meaning as that expression or its local equivalent has in the existing
law relating to land tenures in force in that area,
and shall also include any jagir, inam or muafi
or other similar grant;
(b) the expression "right" in relation to an e5tat<l
shall include any rights vesting in a proprietor,
sub-proprietor, tenure-holder or other intermediary and any rights or privileges in respect
of land revenue."
"31-B. Validation of certain Acts and Regulations.
Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions
contained in article 31A, none of the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule nor any of the
provisions thereof shall be deemed to be void, or ever
to have become void, on the ground that such Act,
Regulation or provision is inconsistent with, or takes
away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any
provision of this Part, and 'lotwithstanding any judg~
ment, decree or order of any court or tribunal to the
contrary, each of the said Acts and Reg'llations shall,
subject to the power of any competent Legislature to
repeal or amend it, continue in force."
Article 31-A has been a Protean article. It has changed its face
many times. Article 31-B has remained the same till today but
the Ninth Schedulr has grown. The Constitution (Fourth
Amendment) Act, 1955, took the number of the Scheduled
statutes to 20 and the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment)
Act, 1964 to 64 and a so-called explanation which saved. the
application of the Proviso in Art. 31-A, was also added. The
device [approved by Sankarl Prasad's case(1 )] was found so
(I) [1952) S.C.R. 89.
890
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1967] 2 S.C.R.
attractive that many more Acts were sought to be "included but
were dropped on second thoughts. Even so, one wonders how
the Railway Companies (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1951, The
West Bengal Land Development and P' 0mning Act and some
others could have been thought of in this connection. By this
device, which can be ext~nc.Jcc.J easily to other spheres, the Fundamental Rights can be wmpletely emasculated by a 2/3 majority,
even though they cannot be touched in the ordinary way by a
unanimous vote of the same body of men ! The State Legislatures
may drive a coach and pair through the Fundamental Rights and
the Parliament by 2/3 majority will then put them outside the
jurisdiction of the courts. Was it really intended that the restriction against the State in Arts. 13 ( 2) might be overcome by
the two agencies acting hand in hand ?
Article 31-A dealt with the acquisition by the State of an
'estate' or of any rights therein or the extinguishmcnt or modification of any such rights. A law of the State could do these with
the President's assent, although it took away or abridged any of
the rights conferred by any provisions of Part Ill. The words
'estate' and 'rights in relation to an estate' were defined. The
constitutional amendment was challenged in Sankari Prawd's
case ( 1 ) on various grounds but was uvneld mainly on two grounds
to which I objected in Sajjan Singh's case('). I have shown in this
judgment, for reasons which I need not repeat and which must be
read in addition to what I said on the earlier occasion, that I
disagree respectfully but strongly with the view of the Court in
those two cJses. This touches the first part of the amendment
which created Art. 31-A. I do not and cannot question Art. 31-A
because (a) it was not considered at the hearing of this case, and
(b) it has stood for a long time as part of the Constitution under
the decision of this Court and has been acquiesced in by the people. If I was free I should say that the amendment was not
legal and certainly not justified by the reasons given in the earlier
cases of this Court. Under the original Art. 31, compensation
had to be paid for acquisition by the State. This was the minimum requirement of Art. 31 (I) and (2) and no amendment could
be made by a constituted Parliament to avoid compensation. A
law made by a constitute:l Parliament had to conform to Art.
13 (2) and Art. 31 could not be ignored.
In 1954 the Supreme Court in a series of cases drew the distinction between Art. 19(1)(f) and Art. 31, particularly in West
Bengal v. Subodh Gopal('), Dwarkadas Srinivas v. Sho/apur Spinning Co.(•). In State of West Beni?al Y. Mrs. Bela Banerjee and
Others('), this Court held that compensation in Art. 31(2) meant
(2) (1965) I S.C,R. 933,
(4) 11954) S.C.R. 558.
(I) [1952) S.C.R. 89.
(3) [1954) S.C.R. 587.
(5) [1954) S.C.R. 678.
A
B
c
D
'
G
H
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB
A
B
•
c
D
E
F
G
-·
H
(Hidayatullah, I.)
89t
just equivalent, i.e. 'full and fair money equivalent' thus making
the adequacy of compensation justiciable.
The Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955 then
amended both Art. 31 and Art. 31-A. Clause (2) of Art. 31
was substituted by.. ( 2) No property shall be compulsorily acquired
or requisitioned save for a public purpose and save by
authority of a law which provides for compensation for
the property so acquired or requisitioned and either
fixes the amount of the compensation or specifies the
principles on which, and the manner in which, the compensation is to be detennined and given; and no such
law shall be called in question in any court on the
ground that the compensation provided by that law is not
adequate".
The opening words of the former second clause were modified to
make them more effective but the muzzling of courts in the faatter
of adequacy of the compensation was the important move. As
Basu says:
"It is evident that the 1955 an1endment of clause
(2) eats into the vitals of the constitutional mandate to
pay compensation and demonstrate a drift from the
moorings of the American concept of private property
and judicial review to which our Constitution was
hitherto tied, to that of socialism." ( 1 )
It is appropriate to recall here that as expounded by Professor
Beard(") (whose views offended Holmes and the Times of New
York but whi~h are now•being recognised after his.ftirther explanation(~) the Constitution of the United States is" an economic
document prepared by men who were wealthy or allied with property rights, that it is based on the concept that the fundamental·
rights of property are anterior to Government and morally beyond
the reach of popular majorities and that the Supreme Court of
the United States preserved the property rights till the New Deal
era. The threat at that time was to enlarge the Supreme Court
but not to amend the Constitution. . It appears that the Indian
Socialists charged with the idea of Marx, the Webbs, Green, Laski
and others viewed property rights in a different way. Pandit
Nehru once said that he had no property sense, meaning that he
did not value property ai all. The Constitution seems to have
changed its property sense significantly. In addition to avoiding
(1) Basu : Commentaries on the Constitution of India (5th Edn.) Vol. 2 p, 230.
(2) An Economic Interpretation of the United States Constitution.
(3) See Laski : The An1erican Democracy; Weaver : Consti~utional Law, Bro,vn :
Charles Beard and the Constitution; Willis Constitutional Law.
892
SUPIU!Mll COU&T JlBPO.lTS
[1961] 2 S.CJll
the concept of just compensation, the amendment added a new
clause (2A) as follows:- .
"(2A) Where a law does not provide for the transfer of the ownership or right to possession of any property to the State or to a corporation owned or controlled by the State, it shall not be deemed to provide for
the compulsory acquisition or requisitioning of property,
notwithstanding that it deprives any person of his
property."
B
This narrowed the field in which compensation was payable.
In
addition to this, clause ( 1) of Art. 31-A was substituted and was
deemed to be always substituted by a new clause which provided:
c
"(1 ) Notwithstanding anything contained in article
13, no iaw providing for( a) the acquisition by the State of any estate or of
any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of any sucb rights, or
D
(b) the taking over of the management of any properly by the State for a limited period either Ill
the public interest or in order to secure the
proper management of the property, or
(c) amalgamation of two or more corporations
either in the public interest or in order to secure
the proper management of any of the corporation, or
E
(d) the extinguishment or modification of any rights
of managing agents, secretaries and treasurers,
managing directors, Jirectors or managers of
corporations, or of any voting rights of shareholders thereof, or
p
( e) the extinguishment or modification of any rights
accruing by virtue of any agreement, lease or
licence for the purpose of searching for, or winning, any mineral or mineral oil, or the premature termination or cancellation of any such
agreement, lease or licence,
G
shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is
inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the
rights conferred by Art. 14, article 19 or article 31 :
Provided that where such law is a law made by the
Legislature of a State, the provisions of this article shall
not apply thereto unless such law, having been reserved
R
.-
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB
A
B
c
D
-·
E
F
..
G
H
(Hidayatul/ah, J.)
893
for the consideration of the President, has received his
assent."
In dause (2) (a) after the word 'grant', the words "and in any
State of Madras and Travancore Cochin, any Janmam right"
. were inserted and deemed always to have been inserted; and in
clause ( 2) ( b) after the words 'tenure-holder' the words "raiyat,
under raiyat" were inserted and deemed always to have been inserted. Once again the reach of the State towards private property was made l,mger and curiously enough it was done retrospectively from the time of the Constituent Assembly and, so to
speak, in its name. As to the retrospective operation of these
constitutional amendments I entertain considerable doubt. A
Constituent Assembly makes a new Constitution for itself. Parliament is not even a Constituent Assembly and to abridge fundamental rights in the name of the Constituent Assembly appears
anomalous. I am reminded of the conversation between Napoleon and Abe Sieyes, the great jurist whose ability to draw up
one Constitution after another has been recognised and none of
whose efforts lasted for long. When Napoleon asked him "what
has survived ?" Abe Sieyes answered "I have survived". I
wonder if the Constituent Assembly will be able to say the
~ame thing ! What it had written on the subject of property rights,
appears to have been written on water. The Fourth Amendment
served to do away with the distinction made by this Court between
Arts. 19 and 31 . and the theory of just compensation. The
Fourth Amendment has not been challenged before us. Nor was
.it challenged at any time before. For the reasons for which I
have declined to consider the First Amendment I refrain from
considering the validity of the Fourth Amendment. It may, however, be stated here that if I was free to consider it, I would have
found great difficulty in accepting tbat the constitutional guarantee
could be abridged in this way.
I may say here that the method I have followed in not reconsidering an amendment which has stood for a long time, was also
invoked by the Supreme Court of United States in Leser v.
Garnett('). A constitution works only because of universal recognition. This recognition may be voluntary or forced where
people have lost liberty of speech. But the acquiescence of the
people is necessary for the working of the Constitution. Tht'
examples of our neighbours, of Germany, of Rhodesia and others
illustrates· the recognition of Constitutions by acquiescence. It is
obvious that it is good sense and sound policy for the Courts to
decline to take up an amendment for consideration after a considerable lapse of time when it was not challenged before, or was
sustained on an earlier occasion after challenge.
(1) (1922) 258 U.S. 130.
894
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1967) 2 S.c.R.
It is necessary to pause here and see what the property rights
have become under the repeated and retrospective amendments of
the Constitution. I have already said that the Constitution started
with the concept of which Grotius may be said to be the author,
although his name is not particularly famous for theories of constitutional or mun[cipal laws. The socialistic tendencies which the
amendments now n1anifest take into consideration some later
theories about the institution of property. When the original Art.
31 was mowd by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, he hJd described it as
a compromise between various approaches to the question and
said that it did justice and equality not only to the individual but
also to the community. He accepted the principle of compensation but compensation as determined by the Legislature and not
the Judiciary. His words were :
"The law should do it. Parliament should do it.
There is no rderence in this to any judiciary coming
into the pic:ure. Much thought has been given to it
and there has been much debate as to.where the judiciary
comes in. Eminent lawyers have told us that on a proper construction of this clause, normally speaking the
judiciary should not come in. Parliament f:xes either
the compensal ion itself or the principle governing that
comrensation and 1hey should not be challenged except
for one reason. where it is thought that there has been a
gro>< abuse of the law. where, in fact, there has been a
fraud on the Constitution. Naturally the judiciary
comes in 10 sec if there has been a fraud on the Constitution or not."(')
He traced the evolution of property ancJ observed that property
was becomin~ a 4uc;rion of credit, of monopolies, that there were
two approaches, the approach of the Individual and the approach
of the community. He expressed himself for protection of the individual's ri2hts.(")
The :1llitude chan~ed at the time of the First
Amendmclu. Pandit Nehru prophes.ied that the basic problem
would come hefnre 1he llousc from time to time. That it has,
there is nn dn11ht. just as there is no doubt that each time the
individual's rights have sufforcd.
Of course. the ~rowlh of collectivist theories have made elsewhere considerable i11m.1us into the riµht of property. In Russia
there is no rrivate nwncrshiri of land and even in the Federal
Capital Territory nf Australia, the owne,,hip of land is with the
Crown and the individual can get a leasehold right only. Justification for this b found in the fai:t that the Stale must benefit from
A
•
c
'
D
'
G
0
-(1)-Consti1uenl
- - - -A<scmbly
- ----Debates Vol. IX pp. 119l-119S.
(2) Conslitucnt Assembly Debates Vol. IX p. l IJS.
B
'
GOLAKNATH V. PUNJAB
A
B
c
D
E
(Hidayatul/ah, J.)
89S
the, rise in the value of land. The paucity of land and o'. dwelling
houses have led to the control of urban properties and creation
of statutory tenancies. In our country a ceiling is put on agricultural land held by an individual. The Supreme Court, in spite'
of this, has not frustrated any genuine legislation for agraril!n reform. it has upheld the laws by which the lands from latifundia
have been disinbuted among the landless. It seems that as th~
Constitutions of Peru, Brazil, Poland, Latvia, Lethuania and
Mexico contain provisions for such reforms, mainly without payment of compensation, our Parliament has taken the same road.
Of course, the modern theory regards the institution of property on
a functional basis ( 1 ) which means that property to be productive
mu:,t be property distributed. As many writers have said property is now a duty more than a right and ownership of property
entails a social obligation. Although Duguit(2), who is ahead
of others, thinks that the institution of property has undergone a
revolution, the rights of the Individual are not quite gone, except
where Communism is firmly entrenched. The rights are qualified
but property belongs still to the owner. The Seventeenth Amendment, however, seems to take us far away from even this qualified
concept, at least in so far as "estates" as defined by Art. 31-A.
This is the culmination of a process.
Previous to the Constitution (Seventeenth Ainendment) Act
the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956 had given
power indirectly by altering entry No. 42 in List III. The entries
may be read side by side :
(Before Ai11e11dme11t)
(After Amendment)
Principle~ on which con1pcn->ation for Acquisition and requisitioning of propropcrty acquirltl or rcqui~itioned for
perty.
the purpo~c.) of th~ Union or of a
State or for any 01hcr public pprpose
is to b.:: di.:1cnnin.:d. ;ind the form and
the mann.~r in which such compensation is to be giv..:n."
"42.
F
This removed the last reference to compensation in respect of
acquisition and requisition. What this amendment began, the
Constilution ( Seventeenlh Amendment) Act, 1964 achieved in
full. The Fourth Amendment had added to the comprehensive
definition of 'riµht in relation to an estate, the rights of raiyats
and under-rai.'·uts. This time the expression 'estate' in Art. 31-A
was amended retrospectively by a new definition which reads :
H
"the expression "estate" shall, in relation to any
local area, .iave the same meaning as that expression or
its local equivalent has in the existing law relating to
(I) See G.W. Paton : Text .Book of Jurisprudencl: (l964) pp, 484-485.
f2) TranJforwations du droit prive.
896
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1967] 2 S.C.R.
land tenures in force in that area and shall also include-(i) any ;agir, inam or muafi or other similar grant
and in th·_ States of Madras and Kerala, any
;anmam right;
(ii) any land held un<'.:r r:•otwari settlemePt;
(iii) any land held or let for purposes of agriculture
or for purposes ancillary thereto, including waste
land, forest land, land for pasture or sites of
buildings and other structures occupied by cultivators of land, agricultural labourers and
village artisans;"
A
B
c
The only saving of compensation is now to be found in the second
proviso added to clause ( 1) of the article which reads : "Provided further that where any law makes any
provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate
and where any land comprised therein .is held by a person under his personal cultivation, it shall not be lawful
for the State to acquire anv portion of such land as is
within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any law
for the time being in force or any building or structure
standing thereon or appurtenant thereto, unless the law
relating to the acquisition of such land, building or structure, provides for payment of compensation at a rate
which shall not be less than the market value thereof."
There is also the provision for compensation introduced indirectly in an Explanation at the end of the Ninth Schedule, in respi,ct
of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. By this Explanation the
provisions of this Tenancy Act in con.flict with the proviso last
quoted are decl.ired to be void.
The sum total of this amendment is that except
for land within the ceiling, all other land can be acquir<:d or rights therein extinguished or mortified without compensation and no challenge to the law can be made under
Arts. 14, 19 or 31 of the Constitution. The same is also true of
the taking over of the management of a.-iy property by the S!atc
for a limited- period either in the public interest or in order to
secure the prop.er management of the property, or the amalt.amation 'lf two or more companies, or the extinguishment or mo<lificati(• . of any rights of managing agents, secretaries, treasurers,
managing directors, directors or managers, of corporations or of
any voting right, of shareholders thereof or of any rights by virtue
of any agreement, lease, or licence for the purpose of searching
for, or winning, any mineral or mineral oil, or of the prem~ture
D
E
F
G
H
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB (Hidayatul/ah, I.)
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
891
termination or cancellation of any such agreement, lease or
licence.
It will be noticed further that deprivation of property of any
person is not •.o be regarded as acquisition or requisiti.on unless
the benefit of the transfer of the ownership or right to possession
gOl'.s to the State or to a corporation owned or controlled by the
State. Acquisition or requisition in this limited sens~ alone
requires that it should be for public purpose and under authority
of law which fixes the compensation or lays down the principles
on which and the manner in which compensation is to be determined and given and the adequacy of the compensation cannot be
any ground of attack. Further still acquisition of estates and of
rights therein and the taking over of property, amalgamation of
corporations, extinguishment or modification of rights in companies and mines may be made regardless of Arts. 14, 19 and 31.
In addition 64 State Acts are given sp.ecial protection from the
courts regardless of their contents which may be in derogation of
the Fundamental Rignts.
This is the kind of amendment which has been upheld in
Sajjan Singh(') case on the theory of the omnipotence of Art.
368. The State had bound itself not to enact any law ~n derogation of Fundamental Rights. Is the Seventeenth Amendment a
law ? To this question my answer is a categoric yes. It is no
answer to say that this is an amendment and, therefore, not a law,
or that· it is passed by a special power of voting. It is the action
of the State all the same. The State had put restraints on itself
in law-making whether the laws were made without or within
the Constitution. It is a;so no answer to say that this Court in
a Bench of five Judges on one occasion and by a majority of 3 to
2 on another, has said the same thing. In a matter of the interpretation of the Constitution this Court must look at the functioning of the Constitution as a whole. The rules of res judicata and
stare decisis are not always appropriate in interpreting a Constitution, particularly when Art. 13(2) itself declares a law to be
void. The sanctity of a former judgment is for the matter then
decided. In Plessy v. Fergusson( 2 ), Harlan, J. alone dissented
against the "separate but equal" doctrine uttering the memorable
words that there was no caste and that the Constitution of the United States was 'colour blind'. This dissent
ma,'e some Southern Senators to oppose his grandson (Mr. Justice John Marshall Harlan) in 1954. It took fifty-eight years for
the words of Harlan, J.'s lone dissent (8 to 1) to become the law
0f the United States at least in respect of segregation in the public
schools [see Brown v. Board of Education(')]. As Mark Twain
(l) [1965) I S. C.R. 933.
(3) (1954) >47 u. s. 483.
(2) 163 u. s. 537.
898
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1967] 2 S.C.R.
said very truly-."Loyalty to a petrified opinion never yet broke a
chdin or freed a humail,soul !"
I am apprehensive tha.t th~ erosion of the right to property
may be practised against other Fundamental Rights. If .i halt is
to be called,· we must declare the right of Parliament w abridge
or take away Fundamental Rights. Small inroads lead !o larger
inroads and become as habitual as before our freedom was won..
The history of freedom is not only how freedom is achieved but
how it is preserved. I am of opinion that an attc;npt to abridge
or take away Fundamental Rights by a constituted Parliament
even through an amendment of the Constitution can be declared
void. This Court has the power and jurisdiction to make the
declaration. I dissent from the opposite view expressed in Sajjan
Si.•1r:li's1') case and I owrrule that decision.
It remains to consider what is the extent of contravention.
Herc I must make it clear that since the First, Fourth and Seventh
Amendments arc not befor•c me and I have not. therefore, questioned them. I mu-i start with the provisions of Arts. 31, 31-A,
31-B, Li<t Ill and the Nin'h Sch!!dule as they were imr.'lediately
preceding the Sevcntc:nth Amendment. I have elsewhere given
a summary of the inroads made into property rights of individuals
and Corporat;ons by these earlier amendments. ily this amend-.
ment the definition of 'estate' wa~ repeated for the most part but
was extended to include:
"(ii) any land held under ryotll'nri settlement;
(iii l any la1id held or let for purposes ancillary thereto, including waste land, forest land, land for
pasture or sites of buildings and other structures occupied by cultivators of land. agricultural labourers and village artisans."
Further rc:ich of acquisition or requisition without adequate compensation Jnd wi'.hout a challenge under Arts. : "-, 19 and 31 has
now been m:ide possible. Therl! is no kind of agricultural estate
or land which cannot be acquired by the State even though it
pays an illusory compensation. The only excepticn is the second
proviso added to Art. 31-A (I ) by which. lands ";thin the ceiling
limit applicable for the time being to a person personaily cultivating his land, 'llay be acquired only on paying compensation at
a rate .,,foch shall not be less than the market value. This may
prove .. be an illusory protection. The ceiling Jl'3Y b~ lowered
by lcgis ction. The. State may leave the person ~n owner in name
and acquire all his other rights. The latter question did c0rne
before this Court in two cases-Aiit Singh v. Stare of Punjab(')
Cl) 11965) t S. C.R. 933
(2) fl967) 2 S. C.R. 143.
B
c
D
E
F
G
ff
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB
A
B
(Hidayatullah, J.)
899
and Bhagat Ram and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors.(') decided
on December 2, 1966. My brother Shelat and 1 described the
device as a fraud upon this proviso but it is obvious that a law
lowering the ceiling to ahnost nothing cannot be declared a fraud
on the Constitution. In other words, the agricultural landholders hold land as tenants-at-will. To achieve this a large
number of Acts of the State Legislatures have Leer. added to the
Ninth Schedule to bring them under the umbrella of Art. 31-B.
This list may grow.
In my opinion the extension of the definition of 'estate' to
include ryotwari and agricultural lands is an inroad into the
C Fundamental Righ'.s but it cannot be questioned in view of the
existence of Art. 31-A(l)(a) as already amended. The constitutional amendment is a law and Art. 31 (1) permits the deprivation of property by authority of law. The law may be made outside the Constitution or within it. The word 'law' in this clause
includes both ordinary law or an amendment of the Cons:itution.
Since "no law providing for the acquisition by the State of any
D estate or of any rights therein or the cxtinguislunznt or modification of any such rights shall be deemed to be void on the ground
that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the
rights conf\:rred by Art. 14, Art. 19 or Art. 31"', the Sevenkenth
Amendment when it gives a new definition of the word 'estate'
cannot be questioned by reason of the Constitution as it exists.
E The new definition of estate introduced by the amendment is
beyond the reach of th.! courts not because it is not law but
because it is "law" and falls within that word in Art. 31(1)(2)
(2-A) and Art. 31-A(l). I, therefore, sustain the new definition,
not on the erroneous reasoning in Sajjan Sinl{h's case(2) but on
the true construction of the word 'law' as used in Arts. 13(2),
31(1)(2-A) aad 31-A{l). The above reason applies a fortiori
F to the inclusion of the proviso which preserves (for the time being)
the notion of compensation for deprivation of agricultural property. The proviso at least saves something. It prevents the
a~ricultural lands below t.'ie ceiling from beir1g appropriated
without payment of proper compensation. It is clear that the
proviso at least cannot be held to abridge or take away fundamt.:nG · ta! rights. In the result I uphold the second section of the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964.
H
This brings me to the third section of the Act.
That doe>
no more than add 44 State Acts to the Ninth Sctedule. The
object of Art. 31-B, when it was P'lacted, was to save certain
State Acts notwitr,tanding judicial decision to tl1e contrary. These
Acts were already protected by Art. 3 I. One can with difficulty
understand such a provision. Now the Schedule is being used to
(I) (1967] 2 S. C.R. 165.
(2) [1965] I S. C. R. 933.
900
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1967) 2 S.C.R.
give advance protection to legislation which is known or apprehended to derogate from the Fundamental Rights. The power
under Art. 368, whatever it may be, was given to amend the
Constitution. Giving protection to statutes of State Legislatures
which offend the Ccnstitution in its most fundamental part, can
hardly merit the dc·.cription amendment of the Constitution. Jn
fact 'in some case; it is not even known whether the statutes in
question stand in nceJ of such aid. The intent is to silence the
courts and not to arncnu the Constitution. If these Acts were
not included in the Sche.Juk they would have to face the Fundamental R;ghts and rely on Ar•'· 31 and 31-A to save them. By
this dG·.·ice protection for in excess of these articles is afforded
to them. This in my judgment is not a matter of amendment at
all. The power which is given is for the specific purpose of
amending the Constitution and not to confer validity on State
Acts against the rest of the Constitution. If the President's assent
did not do this, no more would this section. I consider s. 3 of the
Act to be invalid as an illegitimate exercise of the powers of
amendment however generous. Ours is the only Constitution in
the world which carries a long list of ordinary laws which it
protects against itself. In the result I declar.: s. 3 to be ultra vires
the amending process.
As stated by me in Sajjan Singh's case(') Art. 368 outlines a
process. which, if followed strictly, results in the amendment of
the Constitution. The article gives power lo no particular person or persons. All Ire named authorities have to act according
to the letter of th.~ ar'.icle to achieve the result. The procedure of
amendment, if it can be called a power at all is a legi•l•.:;vc power
but it is sui generis and outside the three lists in Schedule 7 of
the Ccnstitution. It does not have to depend upon any entry in
the lists.
Ordinarily there would be no limit to the extent of the
amendatory legislation but the Constitution it~lf n1akes distinctions. It states three methods and places certain bars. For some
amendments an ordinary majority is sufficient; for some others a
2/3rd majority of tbe members present and voting with a majority
of the total members, in each House is necessary; and for some
others in addition to the second requirement, ratification by at
least one half of the legislatures of the States must be forthcoming. Besides these methods, Art. 13(2) puts an embargo on the
legislative power of the State and consequently upon the agencies
of the State. By its means the boundaries of legislative action
of any kind including legislation to amend the Constitution have
been marked out
-(I)-[IS65)
- · -I S.-C.-R-933.
-
A
B
c
D
E
F
H
GOLAKNATH l'. PUNJAB
(Hidayat111/ah, J.)
90 I
A
I have attempted to show here that under our Constitution
revolution is not the only alternative to change of Constitution
under Art. 368. A Constitution can be changed by cor1sen1 or
revolution. Rodee, Anderson and Christo! ( 1 ) have shown the
sovereignty of the People is either electoral or constituent. When
the People elect the Parliament and the Legislatures they exercise
their electoral sovereignty. It includes some constituent sov~reignty
8
also but only in so far as conceded. The remaining comtituent
sovereignty which is contained in the Preamble and Part JU is in
abeyance because of the curb placed by the People on the State
under Art. 13(2). It is this power which can be reproduced. I
have indicated the method. Watson(") (quoting Ames-On
p. 1 note 2) points out that the idea that provision
c Amendments
should be made in the instrument of Government itself for the
method of its amendment is peculiarly American. But even in the
Constitution of the United States of America some matters were
kept away from the amcndatory process either temporarily or permanently. Our Constitution has done the same. Our Constitution provides for minorities, religions, socially and educationally
D backward peoples, for ameliorating the condition of depressed
classes, for removing class distinctions, titles, etc. This rc>crvation
was made so that ir. the words of Madison (3), men of factbus
tempers, of local prejudices, or sinister designs may not by intrigue, by corruption, or othef means, first obtain the suffrages and
then betray the interests of the people. Ft was to plug 'he loophole such as existed in s. 48 of the Weimar Constitution (')
that Art. 13(2) was adopted. Of course, as Story(') says, an
amendment process is a safety valve to let off all temporary effervescence and excitement, as an effective instrument to control and
adjust the movements of the machinery when out of order or in
danger of self-destruction but is not an open valve to let out
even that which was intended to be retained. In the words of
F
Wheare(") the people or a Constituent Assembly acting on their
behalf, has authority to enact a Constitution and by the same
token a portion of the Constitution placed outsicle the amendat£Jry
process by one Constituent body can only be amended by another
Constituent body. In the Commonwealth of Australia
Act the provisions of the last paragraph of s. 128 have been
regarded as mandatory and held to be clear limitations of the
G
power of amendment. Dr. Jethro Brown coi.sidered that the
amendment of the paragraph was logically impossible even by a
two step amendment. Similarly, s. 105-A has been judicially
(I) rntroduction to Political Science, p. 32 ct seq.
(2) Constitution, Its History, Application and Const1uction Vol. II (1910) p, 130(
H
(3) Federalist No. 10.
(4) S !C L'Juis L. Snyder: The \Vein1ar Constitution, p. 42 ct seq.
\5) Co1n1ncntarics on the Constitution of the United States (1833} Vol. II. p, 687.
(6) K. C. Whcarc: Modl.!rn Constitutions, p. 78.
1
LJ Sup Cl/67-12
902
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1967) 2 S.C.R.
considered in the Garnishee case(1) to be an exceptior. to the
power of amendment ins. 128 although Wynes(') does not agree.
I prefer the judicial view to that of Wynes. The same position
obtains under our Constitution in Art. 35 where the opening
words are more than a 11011-obstante clause. They exclude Art.
368 and even amendment of that article under the proviso. It
is, therefore. a grave error to think of Art. 368 as a code or
as omnicompetent. It is the duty of this Court to find the limits
which the Constitution has set on the amendatory power and to
enforce those limits. This is what I bave attempted to do in this
judgment.
M .v conclusions are :
'
ti) that the Fundamental Ri1rhts are outside the
amendatory proce;s if the amendment seeks to
abridge or take mray any of the rights;
(ii) that Sa11kari l'ra\'ild'.1· c:1se (and Sajjan Sing/1's
case which followed it) conceded the power of
amendment over Part HI of the Constitution on
an erroneous view of Arts. 13(2) and ;368;
(iii) that the First, Fourth and Sevent1*- Amendments being part of the Comtitution by acquiescence for a long time. cannot now be challeng··
ed and they con•ain authority for the Seventeenth Amendment:
(iv) that this Court having now laid down thnt'
Fundamental Rights cannot be abridged Qf taken
away hy the exercise of amendatory process in
Art. 368. any further inroad into these rights as
they exist today will be illegal and unconstitutional unless it complies wi'.h Part III in general
and Art. 13(2) in particular;
A
B
c
.....
F
F
(v) that for abridging or taking away Fundamental
Rights, a Constituent body will have to be convoked: and
(vi) that the two impugned Acts, namely, the Punjab
Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 (X of
1953) and the Mysore Land Reforms Act, 1961
(X of 1962) as amended by Act XIV of 1965
are valid under the Constitution not IY:cause
they are included in Schedule 9 of the Constitution but because they are protected by Art.
31 ·A, and the President's assent.
(I) 46 C. L. R. 155.
(2) Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers in Australia pp. 695-698.
c
H
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB (Bachawat, I.)
A
903
In. view of my decision the several petitions will be dismissed,
The State Acts.Nos. 21-64 in the NintiJ. Schedule will have to be tested under Part m with such protection IL~
Arts. 31 anll 31-A give to them.
Before parting with this case I only hope that the Fundamental
Rights will be ahle to withstand the pressure of textual readings
by "the depth and toughness of their roots".
Bachawat, J. The constitutionality. of the Constitution First,
Fourth and Seventeenth Amendment Acts is challenged on the
ground that the fundamental rights conferred by Part III are inviolable and immune from amendment. It· is said that art. 368
does not give any power of amendment and, in any event, the
amending power is limited expressly by art. 13(2) and impliedly
by the language of art. 368 and other articles as also the preamble.
It is then said that the power of amendment is abused and should
be subject to restrictions. The Acts are attacked also on the
ground that they made changes in arts. 226 and 245 and such
changes could not be made without complying with the proviso to
art. 368. Article 31-B is subjected to attack on several other
grounds.
The constitutionality of the First Amendment was upheld in
Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India and State of
Bihar('), and that of the Seventeenth amendment, in Sajjan Singh
v. State of Rajasthan( 2 ). The contention is that these cases were
wrongly decided.
Part XX of the Constitution specifically provides for its
amendment. It consists of a single article. Part XX is as
follows:-·
"PART XX.
Amendment of the Constitution
Procedure for amendment of the Constitution
368. An amendment of this Constitution may be initiated only
by the introduction of a Bill for the purpose in either House of
Parliament, and when the Bill is passed in each House by a majority of the total membership of that House a11d by a majority of
not Jess than two-thirds of the members of that House present and
voting, it shall .be presented to the President for his assent. and
upon such assent being given to the Bill, the Constitution shall
stand amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill :
Provided that if such amendment seeks to make any change
in(a) article 54, article 55, article 73, article 162 or
article 241, or
bu~ without costs.
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
(l) [l9S21 S C.R. 89.
(2) [196Sl I S.C.R. 933.
904
SUPllBMB COUllT llBPOllTS
[1967) 2 S.C.ll.
(b) Chapter IV of Part V, Chapter V of Part VI,
or Chapter I of Part XI, or
(c) any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule, or
( d) the representation of States in Parliament, or
( e) the provisions of this article,
A
the amendment shall also require to be ratified by the
Legislatures of nc;t less· than one-half of the States by
rc.mlutions to that effect passed by those Legislatures before the Bill making provision for such amendment is
prcsenlt'A to the President for assent.
B
The contention that article 368 prescribes only tne procedure of
amendment cannot t~ ·acccptzd. The article not only prescribes
the procedure but also gives the power of at.1endmcnt. If the
procedure of art. 368 is followed, the Constitution "shall stand
amended" in accordance w;th the terms of the bill. ii is because
the power to amend is given by the article that the Constitution
s:ands amended. The proviso is enacted on the assun1ption that
the several articles mentioned in it arc amendable. The object of
the proviso is to lay down a stricter procedure for amendment of
the articles which would otherwise have been amendable under the
easier procedure of '.he main part. There is no other provision in
the Constitution und•:r which these articles can be amended.
c
Arr;cics 4, 169, Fifth Schedule Part D, and Sixth Schedule
Para 21 empower the Parliament to pass laws amending the provisions of the Firs•, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Schedules and making
amendments of the Constitution consequential on the abclitton or
creation of the legislative councils in States, and by ex1lrcss provi~ion no such law is deemed to be an amendment of the Cons'.itution for the purposes of art. 368. All other provisions of the
Constitution can be amended by recourse to art. 368 only. No
other article confers the power of amending the Constitution.
Some articles are expressed to continue until provision is made
by lnw [sec articles 59(3), 65(3), 73(2), 97, 98(3), 106, 135,
142(1). 148(3), ll!9, 171(2) 186, 187(3), 18~:(3), l94(3),
195, 221(2), 283(1) and (2), 285, 313, 345, 372(1), 373].
Some articles continue unless provision is made otherwise by law
(see articles 120(2), 133(3), 210(2) and srme continue save
as 'therwise provided by law [see articles 239(1 ), 287]. Some
an ·~s are subject to the provisions of any law to be made [see
art1.:!~s 137, 146(2), 225, 229(2), 241(3), 300(1), 309), and
some are expressed not to derogate from the power of making
laws [see articles 5 to 11, 289(2)]. All these articles are transitory in nature and cease to operate when provision is made by law
on the subject. None of them can be regarded as conferring
D
E
F
(,
H
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
(Bachawat, /.)
905
the power of amendment of the Constitution. Most of these
articles continue until provision is made by law made by the
Parliament. But some of them con'.inue until or unless provision is made by the State Legislature (see articles 189(3), 194(3).
195, 210(2), 229(2), 300(1), 345) or by the appropriate legislature (see articles 225, 241 (3)); these articles do not confer a
power of amendmen'., for the State legislature cannot amend the
Constitution. Many of the above-mentioned articles and abo other
articles (see articles 22(7). 32(3 ), 33 to 35, 139, 140, 239A,
241, 245 to 250, 252, 253, 258(2), 286(2), 302, 307, 315(2).
~27, 369 delegate powers of making laws to the legislature. None
of these articles gives the power of amending. the Constitution.
It is said that art. 248 and List l item 97 of the 7th S~hedulc
read with art. 246 give the Parliament the power of amend;ng the
Consti'.ution. This argument does ,,,t bear scrutiny. Art; 248
and List I item 97 vest the residual power of legislation in the
Pariiamer.t. Like other powers of legislation, the residual power
of the Parliament to make laws is by virtue of art. 245 subject to
the provisions of the Constitution. No law made under the
residual power can derogate from the Constitution or amend it. If
such a law purports to amend the Constitution, it will he void.
Under the residual power of legislation, the Parliament has no
Power to make any law with respect to any matter enumerated
rn Lists IT and Ill of the 7th Schedule but under art. 368 even Lists
II and Ill can be amended. The procedure for constitutional
amendments under art. 368 is different from the legislative procedure for passing laws under the residual power of legislation. If
a constitutional amendment could be made by recourse to the
residual power of legislation and the ordinary legislative procedure,
art. 368 \"Ould be meaningless. The power of amending the Constitution is to be found in art. 368 and not in art. 248 and List I
item 97. Like other Constitutions, our Constitution makes express provisions for amending the Constitution.
The heading of art. 368 shows that it is a provision for amendment of the Constitution, the margimil note refers to the procedure
for amendment and the body shows that if the procedure is followed, the Constitution shall stand amended by the power of the
article.
Chapter VIII of the Australian Cons:itution consists of a
single section (S. 128). The heading is "Alteration of the Constitution". The marginal note is "Mode of altering the Constitution".
The body lays down the procedure for alteration. The opemng
words are ; "This Constitution shall not be altered except in the
foliowing manner". Nobody has doubted that the section give~ the
power of amending the Constitution. Wynes in his book on Legislative Executive and Jucjicial Powers in Australia, third edition,
906
SUPREME COUllT REPORTS
(1967] 7 S.C.R.
p. 695, stated "The power of amendment extends to alteration of
'this Constitution' which includes S. 128 itself. It is true that
S. 128 i' negative in form, but the power is implied by the terms
of the section."
Article 5 of the Unit• : States Constitution provides that a proposal for amendment of the Constitution by the Congress on being
ratified by three-fourths of the States "shall be valid to all intents
and purposes as part of this Constitution". The accepted .iew is
that "power to amend the Constitution was reserved by article 5",
per Van Devanter, J, in Rhode Island v. Palmer('). Art. 368
use> stronger words. On the passing qf the bill for amendment
under art. 368, "the Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the tenns of the bill".
Article 368 gives the power of amending "this Constitution".
This Constitution means any of the provisions of the Constitution.
No limitation on the amending power can be gathered from the
language of this article. Unless this power is restricted by some
other provision of the Constitution, each and every part of the
Constitution may be amended under art. 368. All the articles
men'.ioned in the proviso are necessarily within this amending
power. From time lo time major amendments have been made in
the articles mentioned in the proviso (see articles 80 to 82, I 24
(2A), 131, 214, 217(3), 222(2), 224A, 226(1A), 230, 231, 241
and Seventh Schedule) and other articles (sec articles I, 3, 66,
71, 85, 153, 158, 170, 174, 239, 239A, 240, 258A, 269, 280,
286, 290A, 291, 298, 305, 311, 316, 350A, 350B, 371, 371A,
372A, 376, 379 to 391, the first, third and fourth schedules), and
minor amendments have been made in innumerable articles. No
one has doubled so far that these articles are amendable. Part III
is a part of the Constitution and is equally amendable.
It is argued •hat a Constitution Amendment Act is a law and
therefore the power of amendment given by art. 368 is limited !>y
art. 13 (2). Art. 13 (2) is in these terms : -
A
B
c
D
F
"13 (I)
( 2) The State shall not make any law which takes
away or ab, idgcs the rights conferred by this Part and
any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to
the extent of the contravention, be void."
"fow art. 368 gives the power of amending each and every
pro· ion of the Constitution. Art. 13(2) is a part of the Constituti<,;, and is within the reach of the amending power. In olher
word~ art. 13(2) is subject to the overridin)! power of art. 368 and
is controlled by it. Art. 368 is not controlled by art, 13(2) and the
(I) 253 U.S. 350 : 64 L.E.d. 946.
G
H
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB
A
B
c
D
E
F
(Bachawat, J.)
prohibitory injunction in art. 13(2) is not directed agiinst the
amend mg power. Looked at from this broad angle, art. 13 ( 2)
docs not forbid the making of a constitutional amendment abriu~
mg or taking away any right conferred by Part III.
-Let us now view the matter from a narrower angle. The contention is that a constitutional amendment under art. 368 is a law
within the meaning of art. 13. I am inclined to think that this
narrow conten:ion must also be rejected.
In art. 13 unless the context otherwise provides 'law' includes
any· ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage having in the territory of India the force of law
[article 13 ( 3 )(a)]. The inclusive definition of law in art. 13
(3) (c) neither expressly excludes nor expressly includes the
Consti:ution or a constitutional amendment.
Now the term 'law' in its widest and generic sense includes the
Constitution and a constitutional amendment. But in the Constitution this term is employed to designate an ordinary statute or
legislative act in contradistinction to the Constitution or a constitutional amendment. The Constitution is the basic law providing
the framework of government and creating the organs for the making of the laws. The distinction between the Constitution and the
laws is so fundamental that the Constitution is not regarded as a
law or a legislative act. The Constitution means the Constitution as amended. An amendment made in conformity with art.
368 is a part of the Constitution and is likewise not a law.
The basic theory of our Constitution is that it cannot be
changed by a law or legislative Act. It is because spec!al provi·
sion is made by articles 4, 169, Fifth Schedule Part D and Sixth
Schedule para 21 that some parts of the Constitution are
amendable by ordinary laws. But by express provision no such
law is deemed to be a cons!itutional amendment. Save as <,,xpressly provided in articles 4, 169, Fifth Schedule Part D and Sixth
Schedule para 21, no law Cun amend the Constitution, and a law
which purports to make such an amendment is void.
Jn Marbury v. Madison('), Marshall, C. •., said:
"It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that
the Constitution controls any legislative Act repugnant
to it; or, that the legislature may alter the C<,,nstitution
by an ordinary Act.
H
GO 7
Between these alternatives there is no middle ground.
The Constitution is either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with
(I) !1803] l Cranch 137, 177: 2 L. Ed. 61, 73.
908
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1967] 2 S.C.R.
A
ordinary legislative Acts, and, like other Acts, is al!erable when the legislature shall please to alter it. If the
former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative
Act contrary to the Constitution is not law; if the latlf:r
part be true, then written constitutions are absurd
att1:mpts, on the part of the people, to limit a power in
its own nature illimitable.
B
Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental
and paramount law of the nation, and, consequently, the
theory of every such government must be, that an Act of
the Legislature, repugnant to the Constitution, is void.
This theory is essentially attached to a written constitution, and is consequently to be considered, by this court,
as one of the fundamental principles of our society."
c
It is because a Constitution Amendment Act can amend the
Constitution and is not a law that art. 368 avoids all reference to
law making by the Parliament. As soon as a bii! is passed in
conformity with art. 368 the Constitution stands amended in
accordance with the terms of the bill.
The power of amending the Constitution is not an ordinary
law making power. It is to be found in art. 368 and not in
articles 245, 246 and 248 and the Seventh Schedule.
Nor is the procedure for amending the Comtitution under art.
368 an ordinary law making procedure. The common featwc of
the amending process under art. 368 and the legislative procedure
is thtt a bill must be passed by each House of Parliament and
assented to by the President In other respects the amending proee.ss under art 368 is very different from the ordinary legi~lative
pr"Cess. A Co1'ls\-itl1tlon amendm~nt Act must be initiated by a
biJI introduced fortti~r purpose in either House of fl>arlbment. The
bill mu't foe passed in eaeh House by not less than two thirds of
the members present ctnd voting, the requisite quorum in each
House being a majority of ii$ total membership; and in c-ises coming under the proviso, the amendment must be ratified by the
legislature of not less than one half of the Stdlcs. Upon the
bill so passed being assented to by the President, the Constitution
stands amended in accordance with the terms of the bill. The
ordinary legislative process is much easier. A bill iniriatini:, a Jaw
may be passed by a majority of the members present and vo'ing
at a sitting of each House or at a joint sitting of the Houses, the
quorum for the meeting of either House being one tenth of t!Je
total number of members of the House. The bill so r~ssed on
beio& assented to by the President becomes a law. A bill though
pq:s.solljly aU..the members of both Houses cannot 'fli!;e effect :1
as
D
E
F
G
H
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB (Bachawat, J.)
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
909
Constitution amendment Act unless it is initiated for the express
purpose of amending the Constitution.
The essence of a written Constitution is that it cannot be
changed by an ordinary law. But most written Constitutions provid~ for their organic growth by constitutional amendments. The
roam m~thod of constitutional amendments are (l) by the ordinary Jeg1slatm e but under certain restrictions, ( 2) by the people
through a referendum, (3) by a majority of all the units of a
Federal State; ( 4) by .a special convocation, see C.F. Strong
Modern Pol1t1cal Inst1tutwns, 5th Edition, pp. 133-4,146. Our
Constitution has by article 368 chosen the first and a combination
of the first and the third methods.
The special' attributes of constitutional amendment under art.
368 indica'.e that it is not a law or a legislative act. Moreover it
will be seen presently that the Constitution makers could not have
intended that the term "law" in art. 13(2) would include a constitutional amendment under art. 368.
If a constitutional amendment creating a new fuudaroental
right and incorporating it in Part III were a Jaw, it would not be
open to the Parliament by a subsequent constitutional amendment
to abrogate the new fundamental right for such an amendment
would be repugnant to Part III. But the conclusion is absurd for
the body which created the right can surely take it away by the
same process.
Shri A. K. Sen relied upon a dec;sion of the Oklahoma Supreme
Court in Riley v. Carter(') where it was held that for some purposes the Constitution of a State wa~ one of the laws of the
State. But even in America, the term "law" docs 1ot ordinarily
include the Constitution or a coi.stitutional amendment. In this
connection, I will read the following passage in Corpus Juris Secimdum, Vol. XVI Title Constitutional Law Art. 1, p. 20:
"The term 'constitution' is ordinarily employed to designate lhe organic law in contradislinction to the term
'law'. which is generally used to designate statutes or
legislative enactments. Accordingly, the term 'law'
under this distinction does not include a constitutional
amendment. However. the term 'law' may, in accordance with the context in which it is used, comprehend
or included the constitution or a constitutional provision
or amendment. A statute and a constitution, although
of unequal dignity, are both 'laws', and rest 01: the will
of the people."
(I) 88 A.LR, 10<·8.
910
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1967) 2 S.C.R.
In our Cons1i1ution, the expression "law" does not include either
the consti1ution or a constitutional amendment. For all these reasons we must hold that a constitutional amendment under art. 36S
is n0t a law within the meaning of art. 13(2).
I find no c:>nflict between articles 13 (2) and 368. The two
articles operate in different fields. Art. 13 (2) operates on Jaws;
it makes no express exception regarding a constitutional amendment, because a constitutional amendment is not a law and is outside its purview. Art. 368 occupies the field of constitutional
ameni:lmer.ts. It does not particularly refer to the articles in Part
Ilf und many other articles. but on its true construction it gives
the power of amending each and every provision of the Constitu·
tion and necessarily takes in Part !II. Moreover, art. 368 gives
the power of amending itself, and if express power for amending
the provisions of Part Ill were needed, such a power could be
taken by an amendment of the article.
I c is sJid that the non-ohs•a111e clause in art. 35 shows that the
article is not amendable. No one has amended art. 35 and the
point does not arise. Moreover, the non-obstante clause rs to be
found in articles 258(1), 364. 369, 370 and 371A. No one has
suggested that these articles arc not amendable.
The next contention is that there are implied limitations on
the amending power. It is said that apart from art. 13 (2) there
are expressions in Part III which indicate that the amending power
cannot touch Part Id. Part III is headed "fundamental rights".
The right to move the Supreme Court for enforcement of the
rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed by art. 32 and cannot
be suspended except as otherwise provided for by the Constitution
-(art. 32( 4) ). It is said that the tenns "fundamental" and
"guarantee" indicate that the rights conferred by Part III are not
amendable. The argument overlooks the dynamic character of
the Constitution. While the Constitution is static. it b the fundamental law of the country. the rights conferred by Part Ill are
fundamental, the right under ar!. 32 is guaranteed, and the principles of State policy enshrined in Part IV are fundamental in the
governance of the country. But the Constitution is never at rest;
it changes with the progress of time. Art. 368 provides the means
for the dynamic changes in the Constitution. The scale cf valut"S
embodied in Parts III and IV is not immortal. Parts III and IV
being parts of the Constitution are not immune from amendment
under art. 368.
Demands for safeguards of the rights embodied in Part III and
IV may be traced to the Constitution of India Bill 1895, the Congress Resolutions between 1917 and 1919. Mrs. Beasaot's Commonwealth of India Bill of 1925, the Report of the Nehru Committee set up under the Congres~ Resolution in 1927, the Congress
1
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
-
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB
A
(Bachawat, ].)
911
Resolution of March 1931 and the Sapru Report of 1945. The
American bill of rights, the constitutions· of other countries, the
declaration of human rights by the United Nations and other declarations and charters gave impetus to the demand. Jn this background the Constituent Assembly embodied in preamble to the
Corutitution the resolution to secure to all citizens social, economic
and political justice, liberty of thought, expression, belief,
B
faith and worship, equality of status and opportunity and fraternity
assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity of the nation
and incorporated safeguards as to some human rights in Parts III
and IV of the Constitution after separating them into two parts on
the Irish model. Part III contains the passive obligations of the
State;. It enshrines the right of life, personal liberty, expression, ·
c assembly, movement, residence, avocation, property, culture and
education, constitutional remedies, and protection against exploitation and obnoxious penal laws. The State shall not deny these
rights save as provided in the Constitution. Part IV contains the
active obligations of the State. The State shall secure a social
order in which social, economic and political justice shall inform
D all the institutions of national life. Wealth and its source of pro·
duction shall ·not be concen! ated in the hands of the few but
~hall be distributed so as to subserve the common good, and I here
shall be adequate means of livelihood for all and equal pay for
equal work. The State shall endeavoi:r to secure the health and
strer.gth of workers, the right to work, to education and to assistance in cases of want, just and humane conditions of work, a
E living wage for workers, a uniform civil code, free and compulsory education for childre>;: The State shall take steps to organize
village panchayats, promote the educational and economic interests of the weaker $ections of the people, raise the level of nutrition and standard of living, improve public health. organize agricultural and animal husbandry separate the judiciary from exeF cutive and promote international peace and security.
The active obligations of the State under Part IV are not
justiciable. If a law made by the State in accordance with the
fundamental directives of. Part IV comes in conflict with the
fundamental rights embodied in Part III, the Jaw to the extent of
repugnancy is void. Soon after the Constitution came into force,
G it became apparent that Jaws for agrarian and other refon:is for
implementing the directives of Part IV were liable to be. struck
down as they infringed the provisions of Part III. From time to
time constitutional ar. ~ndments were proposed with the professed
object of validating these laws, superseding certain judicial interpretations of the Constitution and curing defects in the 01iginal
Constitution. The First, Fourth, Sixteenth and Seventeenth
H
Amendments made important changes in the fundamental rights.
The First amendment introduced cl. ( 4) in art. 15 enabling the
State to make specia~ provisions for the benefit of the socially and
!112
SUPRBMB COURT REPORTS
(1967] 2 S.C R.
educationally backward class of citizens, the scheduled castes and
the scheduled tribes in derogation of articles 15 and 29 (2)
with a view to implement art. 46 and to supersede the decision in
State of Madras v. Clwmpakam('), substituted a new cl. (2)
i11 art. 19 with retrospec:ive effect chiefly with a view to bring
in public order within the permissible restrictions and to supersede
the decis;ons in Ramesh Thappar v. Stare of Madras("). Brij
lll111.1ha11 v. State of Delhi('), amended cl. (6) of art. 19 with
a view ta free state trading monopoly from lhe test of reasonable
ncss and tn supersede the.deci>ion in Moii Lal v. Govemmellf of
State vf U11ar Prade.111(' )·. Under the stress of the First amend:ncn, it is now suggested that Champakam's case('), Ro111<?sl1
Tha[Jpar's case(') and.Motila/'s(') case were wrongly decided, and
the Jmendmcnts of articles 15 and 19 were in harmony with the
original Constitution and made no real change in it. It is to be.
noticed however that before the First amendment no attempt was
made to overrule 1:.cse cases, and but for the amendments, these
judicial interpretations of the Constitution would have continued
to be the law of the land. The Zamindari Abolition Acts were the
subject of bitt~r attack by the zamindars. The Bihar Act though
protected by cl. 6 of art. 31 from attack under art. 31 was struck
down as violathe of art. 14 by the Patna High Court (sec the
Stare of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraj Sri Kameshwar Singh('),
while the Uttar Pradesh Act (see Raja Surya Pal Singh v. The
State of U.P.) (") and the Madhya Pradesh Act (see Visweslrwar
Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh('), though upheld by the High
Courts were under challenge in this Court. The First amendment therefore introduced art. 31A, 31B and the Ninth Schedule
with a view to give effect to the policy of agrarian reforms, to
secure distribution of large blocks of land in the hands of the
zarnindars in conformity with art. 39, and to immunize sp~cial
ly 13 State Acts form attack under Part III. The validity of the
First Am:ndment was upheld in Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo'<
case\ •j. The Fourth amendment changed art. 31 (2) with a
view to supersede the decision in Stare of West Rengai v. Bda
Banerjee(') and to provide that the adequacy 'of compensdtion
for property compulsorily acquired would no! be justiciable, inserted Cl. ( 2A) in art. 31 with a view to supersede the decisi<'ns
in the Stare of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose(' 0 ). Dwarka
Das Shrinivas v. Sh'l/apur Spinning and Weaving Co, Ltd.,("),
(I) [1951] 6.C.R. 525.
(3) [1"52] S.C.R. 654.
(5) (l\.S2] S.C.R. 389 (A.l.R. 1951 Pot. 91 J.
(1) 11952] S.C.R. 11!20.
(8) (1952] S.C.R. 89.
(JO) (1954] S.C.R. 587.
(2\ (195'] S.C.R. 605.
(4) l.L.R. [1951] I All. 269.
(61 [1952] S.C.R. !056 (AJ.R. 1961).
All. 674.)
(91 [1954) S.C.R. 558.
(11) [1954] S.C.R. 674.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
,.
GOLAKNATH
v.• PUNJAB (Bachawat, J.)
913
A
Saghir Ahmad"v. The State of Uttar Pradesh,(') and -to make it
clear that clauses ( 1) and (2) of art. 31 relate to different subj~cl
matters and a deprivation of property shor.t of transference of
ownership or right to possession to the State should not be treated ~s compulsory acquisition of property. The Fourth amend·
ment also amended art. 3 lA with a view to protect certain laws
other than agrarian laws and to give effect -to the policy of fixing
8
ceiling limi'.s on land holdings and included seven more Acts in
the Ninth Schedule. One of the Acts (item 17) though upheld
in Jupiter General Insurance Co. v. Rajgopalan(') was !he subje.:t
of criticism in Dwarka Das's case('). The Sixteenth amendment
amended clauses ( 2), ( 3) and ( 4) of art. 19 to enable the imC positio,1 of reasonable restrictions in the interest of the sovereignty
. and integrity of India. The Seventeenth amendment amended the
definition of estate in art. 3 IA with a view to supersede the decisions in Karimbil Kunhikoman v. State of Kera/a(') and A. P.
Krishnaswami Naidu v. State of Madras(') and added a proviso
to art. 3 lA and included 44 mor-e Acts in the Ninth Schedqle, as
some of the Acts had been struck down as unconstitutional. The
D validity of the Seventeen'.h amendment was upheld in Sajja11
Singh's case('). Since 1951, numerous decisions of this Coe.rt
have recognised the validity of the First, Fourth and Seventeenth
amc:idments. Jf the rights conferred by Part TU cannot be
abridged or taken away by constitutional amendments, all these
amendments would be invalid. The Constitution makers could
not have intended that the rights conferred by Part 1H could not
E
be altered for giving effect to the policy of Part IV. Nor was it
intended that defects in Part III could not be cured or that possible errors in judicial interpretations of Part III could not be rectified by constitutional amendments.
G
There are other indications in the Constitution that the fundamental rights are not intenC: ,d to be inviolable. Some of the
articles make express provision for abridgem.'!nt of some .of the
fundamental rights by law (see articles 16(3), 19(1) to (6),
22(3), 23(2), 25(2). 28(2), 31(4) to (6), 33, 34). Articles
358 and 359 enable the suspension of fundamental rights during
emergency. Likewise, art. 368 enables amendment of the Constitution including all the provisions of Part III.
If
It is argued that the preamble secures the liberties grouped
the preamble cannot be amended,
Part III is not amendable. The argument overlooks that the
preamble is mirrored in the entire Constitution., If the rest of
the Constitution is amendable, Part III cannot st:~nd on a h•gher
F
rogeth.~r in Part JIT and as
(1) [1954] S.C.R. 1218.
(3) [1954] S.C.R.' 674,706.
(5) [196417 S.C.R. 82.
(2) A.I.R. 1952 Pun. 9.
(4) [1962] Supp. I S.C.R. 829.
(6) [1965] I S.C.R. 933.
914
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1967] 2 S.C.R.
foot:ng. The objective of the prean1ble is secured not only by
Pan Ill but also by Part IV and art. 368. The dynamic charactc.r of Part IV may require dra~tic amendments of Part III by
r0course to art. 3.68.· Moreover the preamble cannot control the
unambiguous language or the articles of the Constitution, see
Wyhes, Legislative Executive and Judicial Powen in Australi'l.
third edition, .pp. 694-5; ·in Re Benibari Uni(J/I & £xc!ta11ge of
l'.ncl<1ves( 1 J. ·Tile· last case decided that the Parliament can
under. art: 368 amend art. 1 of the· Constitution So as to enable
the cession of a part of the national tercitmy to a fo•·eii;n oowc:.
The Court bnlsh.ed aside the a?gument that "in the transfer of
the areas of Berubar! to Pakistan the fundament~ rights of
thous)nds of pe~sons are involved."· The case is an authority
for ti1e proposition that the Parliament can lawfully make a constitutional amendment under art. 368 auhorising ~ession of a part
of the national territory and thereby destroying the fundamental
rights of the citizens of the affected territory, and tl11s pcw~r
under art. 368 is not limited' by the preamble.
lt is next argued that the people of India in exercbc of their
sovereign power have placed the fundamental rights beyond the
reach of the amending power. Relia!)ce is place on the following
passage in the judgment of Pat11njali Sastri, J., in A. K. Gopalan
v. The State of Madras(') !
·
"'.her.e can be no doubt that the people of India
have, in exercise of their sovereign will as expressed
in the PreamMe. adopted the democratic ideal which
3ssures to the citizen the dignity of the individual and
other cherished human values as a means to the fµll
evolution and expression of his personality, and in delegating to the Legisl.ature the executive and the Judiciary
their respective powers in the Constitution, res.erved to
themselves certain fundamental rights, so-called, I
apprehend. because they have been retained by the
people and made paramount .to the delegated powers,
as in the American Model."
I find nothing in the passage contrary to the view -unequivocally
expressed by the same learned Judge in Sri Sankart Prasad Singh
Dr.o's(') case that the fundamental rights are amendable, The
power to fram!' the Constitution was vested in the Constituent
AssemO!y bys. 8(1) of the Indian lndepenqence Act, 1947. The
Constitution though legal in its origin was revolutionary in
character and accordingly the Constituent Assembly exercised its
powers of framing the ·Constitution in the name of the ~ple. The
objective resolution of the Assembly passed on January 22, 1947,
(!) [1960] 3 S.C.R. 250, 261-2, 281
(3) [1952] S.C.R.·89.
(2). [1950] S.C.R: 88, 98.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
GOLAKNAT!i v. PUNJAB
A
B
c
(Bachawat, !.)
915·
solemnly declared that all power and authority of sovereign independent India, its constituent parts, and organs aod the Go-;emment were derived from the people. The preamble to the Constitution declares that the people of India adopts, enacts and gives
to themselves the Constitution. In form and in substance the
Constitution emanates from the people. By the Constitution
the people cons.'.ituted themselves into a republic. Under
the republic all pubLc power is derived from the people and
is exercise"d by functionaries chosen either directly or indirectly
by the people. The Parliament can exercise only such powers
as are delega'.ed to it under the Constitution. The people acting
through the Constituent Assembly reserved for themselves certain rights and liberties and ordained that they shall not be curtailed by ordinary legislation. But the people by the same Constitution also authorised the Parliament to make amendments lo
the Constitution. In •he exercise of the amending power the Parliament has ample authority to abridge or take away the fundamental rights under Part JU.
D
It is urged tha'. the word 'amend' imposes the limitation that
an amendment must be an improvement of the Cons•itution. Re!i. ance is placed on the dictum in Livermore v. E. C. Waite('): "On
the other hand, the significance of the term 'amendment' implies
such an addition or change within the Iir.es of the original i11strument as will effect an improvement, or better carry out the purpose
1: for which it was framed." Now an attack on the eighteenth
amendment of the U.S. Constitution based on this passage was
brushed aside by the U.S. Supreme Court in the decision in the
National Prohibition ( 2 ) case. The decision totally negatived the
contention that ''an amendment must be confined in its scope to
an alteration or improvement of that which is already contained
F in the Constitution and cannot chan~e its basic structure. include
new grants of power to the FederaY Government nor relinquish
in the State those which already have been granted to it". ~ee
Cooley on Constitutional Law, Chapter ITI, Art. 5. pp. 46 & 47.
I may al;o read a passage from Corpus Juris Secundum Vol. XVI.
title 'Constitutional Law, p. 26 thus : "The term 'amendment' a'
med in the constitutional article giving Congress a power of proG posal includes additions to, as well as corrections of, matters
already treated, and there is nothing there which suggests that it
is used in a restricted sense."
H
Article 368 indicates that the term "amend" means "change''.
The proviso is expressed to apply to amendments which seek to
make any "change" in certain articles. The main part of art. 368
(I} I 02 Cal. 113-25 L.R.A. 312.
(2) Rhode Island v. Palmer-253 U.S. 350 : 64 L. ed. 947, 960, 978.
916
SUPREME coua-. lll!PORTS
[1967) 2 S CR.
thus gives the power 10 amend or to make changes in the Constitution. A change is not necessarily an improvement. Normally
the change is made with the object of making an improvement,
but the experiment may fail to achieve the purpose. Even tl.c
plain dictionary meaning o[ the word "amend'' docs not support
the contention that an amendment must take an imp~owment. >ec
Oxford English Dictionary where the word "amend" is ddintd
thus : "4. to make professed improvements (in a measure before
Parli.imcnt); formally to alter in de:ail, though practically it may
be to alter its principle so as to thwart it." The I st. 4th, 16th
and 17th Amendmea• Act; made change> in Part I II of the
Constitution. All the changes arc authorized by art. 36~.
.\
It is argued that under the amending power. the basic feature'
of the Constitution cannot be amended. toun<cl ~aid 1h<rt the,·
could not give an exhaustive catalogue of the b:1sic features, bt~·l
sovereignty, the republican form of government the feJeral structure and the fundamental rights were some of the features. The
Seventeenth Amendment has not derogated from the sovrrci~my,
the republican form of government and the federal structure, and
the question whether they can be touched by amendment docs not
arise for decision. For the purposes of these cases, it is su~krcut
to say that the fundamental rights arc within the reach of tire
amending power.
C
It is said that in the course of the last 16 years there have been
numc1ou; amendments in our Constitution whereas there tiav~
been very few amendments of the American Constitution durin~
the last 175 years. Our condition is not comparable ,\·ith the
American. The dynamics of the social revolution in our country
may require more rapid changes. Moreov~r every part of onr
Constitution is more e:isily amendable than the Amcr.ican. Alan
Gledhill in his book "The Republic of India", 1951 Ldit;Jn.
pp. 74 & 75, said :
"The Indian Founding Fathers were kss dcten11incd
than were their American predecessor; to impose rigidity on their Constitution .................... The
Indian Constitution assigns different degrees of rigidity
to its different parts, but any part of it can be more
easily amended than the American Constitnt'on."
It is said that the Parliament is abusing it' p'.)wer of amendment by making too m:iny frequent changes. IC th• Pdr!iament
has the power to make the amendments, the choice of making ~ny
particular amendment must be left to it. Oucstillns ,,f poEcy cannot be debated in this Court. The possibility of abuse of a power
is not the test of its existence. In WP/>/> v. 0111rim ( ') Lord
-(t)-[1907)
·A.C. 81.
11
D
E
F
G
ll
_,
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
(Bachawat, J.)
917
Hobhouse said, "If they find that on the clue construction of the
Act a legislative power falls within s. 92, it would he quice wr<>ng
of them to deny its existence because by some possibility it may
be abused, or limit the range which otherwise would be open to
the Dominion Parliament". With reference to the doctrine of
implied prohibition against the exercise of power ascertained in
accordance with ordinary rules of construction, Knox C.J., in the
Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. The Adelaide Steamship
Company Limited and others( 1 ) said, "It means the necessity of
protection against the aggression of some <lUtside and possibly
h0stile body. It is based on distrust, lest po"''rs. 1f once .:onccded
to the lea't degree, might be abused to the pilint of destruction.
But possible abuse of powers is no reaso~ in lk:i>h law for limiting the natural force of the language creating them".
The historical background in which the Constitution was
framed shows that the ideas embodied in Pa rt Ill were not intended to be immutable. The Constituent As<embly was composed
of representatives of the provinces elected l:>v the members of the
lower houses of the .provmcial legislatures and rep~esentatives of
the Indian States elected by electoral colleges constituted by the
rules. The draft Constitution was relt?ased on February 26, 1948.
While the Constitution was on the anvil, it was envisaged that
future Parliaments would be elected on the basis of adult suffrage.
Such a provision was later incorporated in art. 326 of the Constitution. In a special article written on August 15, 1948, Sir
B. N. Rau remarked:
"It seems rather illogical that a constitution should
be seuled by a simple majority by an Jssembly elected
indirectly on a very limited franchise and that it should
not be capable of being amended in the same way by a
Parliament elected-and perhaps for the most oart
elected directly by adult suffrage", (see B. N. Rau,
lndi.i's Constitution in the making, 2nd Edition p. 394).
The conditions in India were rapidly changing and the country
was in a state of flux politically and economicall•1. Sir B. N. Rau
therefore recommended that the Parliament ~hould be empowered
to amend the Constitution by its ordinary law makinl( process for
at least the first five years. Earlier, para 8 of the 5uggestions of
the Indian National Congress of May 12, 1946 and para 15 of
the Proposal of the Cabinet Mission of Mav I 6. 1946 had recommended similar powers of revision by the Parliament during the
initial years or at stated intervals. The Constituent Assembly
did not accept these recommendations. On Sentember 17, 1949
an amendment (No. 304) moved by Dr. Deshmukh providing
--····-~-
(!) 28 C.L.R. 129, 151.
L3Sup.Cl/67-13
918
SUP:amDI CO'Ul.T UPOllTS
(1967) 2 S.C.ll.
for amendment of the Constitution at any time by a clear majority
in each house of Parliament was negatived. The Assembly was
conscious that future Parliaments elected on the basis of adult
suftrage would be more representative, but they took the view
tlaat art. 368 provided a sufficiently fh:xible machinery for amending all parts of the Constitution. The Assembly never entertained
the proposal that any part of the Constitution including Part ID
diould be beyond the reach of the amending po~r. As a matter
of fact, Dr. Deshmukh proposed an amendment (No. 212) prohibiting any amendment of the rights with respect to property or
otherwise but on September 17, 1949 he withdrew this proposal
(Ne Constituent Assembly Debates V?I. IV pp. 1642-43).
The best exposition of the Constitution is that which it has
received from contemporaneous judicial decisions and enactments.
We find a rare unanimity of view among JUdj!cs and legislatocs
from the very commencement of the Constitntion that the fundamcnial rights are within the reach of the amending power. No
one in the Parliament doubted this proposition when the Constitution First Amendment Act of 1951 was passed. It is remarkable
that most of the members of this Parliamtnt were also LJCIJlbers
of the Constituent Assembly. In S. Krislur<111 a'ld Others v. Tiie
Slllle of Madras('), a case decided on Ml'/ 7, 1951, Bose, 1. said:
"My concept of a fundamental right is something
which Parliament cannot touch save by an amendment
of the Constitution".
In Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo':r <:asc( 1 ), decided on October 5,
195 l, this Court expressly decided that fundamental rights could
bo abridged by a constitutional amendment. This view was acted
upon in all the subsequent decisions and was rcaflirmed in Sa/ian
Singh's ca,;e('). 'l'wo learned Judges then exp~ some doubt
but even they agreed with the rest of the Court in upholding the
A
B
c
D
E
F
validity of the amendmenta.
A static system of laws is the worst tyranny that any coostiwtion can impose upon a country. An unamendable constitution
means that all reform and progress are at a stand-still. If Parliament cannot amend Part m of the Co!.lStitution even by recourse
art. 368, no other power can do so. There Is no provision in
the Constitution for calling a convention for its revision or for
'°
llUbmission of any proposal for amendment to the referendu114.
Ew:n if power to call a convention or to submit a proposal to the
referendum be taken by amendment of art. 368, Part ill would
still remain unamendable on the assumption that a constitutional
amendment is a law. Not ~ the uiianlmous vote of the SOO
(1) (1951) S.C.lL 621, 652.
(2) (1952) S. C. R. 89.
(3) (1!165) I S. C. lL 933.
G
H
GOLAKNATH V. PUNJAB (Bachawat, J.)
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
919
million citizens or their representatives at a special convocation
could amend nan· III. The deadlock could be resolved by revolution only. Such a consequence was riot intended by the framers
of the Constitution. The Constitution is meant to endure.
It has been sugge8ted that the Parliament may provide for
another Constituent Assembly by amending the Constitution and
that Assembly can amend Part III and take away or abridge the
fundamental rights. Now if this proposition is correct, a suitable
amendment <if the ·constitution may provide that the Parliament
will be the Constituent Assembly and thereupon the Parliament
may amend Part III. If so, I do not see why under the Constitution as it stands now, the Parliament cannot be regarded as a
rec1.;ation of the Constituent Assembly for the special p:irpose of
making constitutional . amendments under art. 368, and why the
amending power cannot be regarded as a constituent power as
was held in Sri Sankari Prasad' Singh Deo's (') case.
The contention that the constitutional amendments of Part ID
had the effect of changing articles 226 and 245 and could not be
passed without complying with the proviso to art. 368 is not
tenable. A constitutional amendment which does not profess to
amend art. 226 directly or by inserting or striking words therein
cannot be regarded as seeking to make any change in it and thus
falling within the constitutional inhibition of the proviso. Art. 226
gives power to the Hi >b Court throughout the territories in relation
to which it exercises jurisdiction to issue to any person or authority
within those territories directions, orders and writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part"III and for any other
purpose. The Seventeenth Amendment made no direct change
in art. 226. It made changes in Part III and abridged or took
away some of the rights conferred by that Part. As a result of
the changes, some of those rights no longer exist and as the High
Court cannot issue writs for the enforcement of those rights its
power under art. 226 is affected incidentally. But an alteration
in the area of its territories or in the number of persons or :mthorities within those territories or in the number of enforceable rights
under Part III or other rights incidentally affecting the power of
the High Court under art. 226 cannot be regarded as an amendmen! of that article.
Art. 245 empowers the Parliament and the Legislatures of the
States to make laws subject to the provisions of the Constitution.
This power to make laws is subject to the limitations imposed by
Part III. The abridgement of the rights conferred by Part III by
the Seventeenth Amendment necessarily enlarged the scope of the
legislative power, and thus affected art. 245 indirectly. But the
Seventeenth mendment mace no direct change in art. 245 and
did not amend it.
-(I) [1952j-S:C]t-;-s9-.- - -
920
SUPREME COURT IU!PORTS
(1967] 2 S.C.R.
Art. 3 IB retrospectively validated the Acts mentioned in the
Ninth lchedule notwithstanding any judgment decree or order
of any court though they take away or abridge the rights conferred
by Part III. It is said that the Acts are still-born and cannot be
validated. But by force of Art. :; lB the Acts are deemed never
to hav_e become void and must be regarded as valid from their
inception. The power to amend the Co1t,titution carries with
it the power to make a retrospective amendment. rt is said that
art. 3IB amends art. 141 a' it alters the Jaw declared by this
Court on the validity cf the Acts. This argument is baseless.
As the Constitution is amended retrospectively, the basis upon
which the judgments of. this Court were pronounced no longer
exists, and the law declared by this Court can have no application.
It is said that art. 3.1 B is a law with respec~ to land and other
matters within the competen-:e of the State Legislature, and the
Padiament has no power to enact such a Jaw. The argument
is based on a misconception. The Parliament has not passed
any of the Acts mentioned in the Ninth Schedule. Art. 31 B
removed the constitutional bar on the making of the Acts. Only
the Parliament could remove the bar by the Constitution amendment. It has done so by art. 3 IB. The Parliament could ame; ~
each article in Part Ill separately and. provide that the Acts would
be protected from attack unde; each article. Instead of amending each Jrticle separately, the Parliament has by art. 31 B made
a comprehensive amendment of all the articles by providing that
the Acts shall not be deemed to be void on the ground that they
are inconsist ;nt with any of them. The Acts as they stood on
the date of the Constitution Amendments arc validated. By the
last part of Art. 31 B the competent legislatures will continue to
retain the power to repeal or amend the Acts. The subsequent
repeals and amendments are not validated. If in future the competent legislature passes a repealing or amending Act which is
inconsistent with Part m it will be void.
·I have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the First, Fourth,
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Amendments are constitutional and
are not void. If so, it is common ground that these petitions must
be dismissed.
For the last 16 years the validity of constitutional amendments
of fundamental rights have been recognized by the people and all
the organs of the government including the legislature, the judiciary and the executive. Revolutionary, social and economic
changes have taken place on the strength of the First, Fourth and
Seventeenth Amendments. Even if two views were possible on
the question of the validity. of the amendments, we should not
now reverse our previous decisions and pronounce them to be
invalid. Having heard lengthy arguments on the question I have
A
B
c
D
E
'
G
H
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB
A
-·
B
c
D
I'
G
H
(Bachawat, J.)
921
come to the conclusion that the validity of the constitutional amendments was rightly upheld in Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo's( 1 )
and Sajjan Singh's(') cases and I find no reason for over-ruling
them.
The First, Fourth and Seventeenth amendment Acts are subjected to bitter attacks because they ·strike at the entrenched property rights. But the abolition of the zemindari was a necessary
reform. It is the First Constitution Amendment Act that made
this reform possible. No legal argument can restore the outmoded
feudal zemindari system. What has been done cannot be undone.
The battle for the past is lost. The legal argument necessarily
shifts. The proposition now is that the Constitution Amendment
Acts must be recognized to be valid in the past but they must
be struck down for the future. The argument leans on the ready
made American doctrine of prospective overruling.
Now the First, Fourth, Sixteenth and Seventeenth Amendment
Acts take away and abridge the rights conferred by Part III. If
they are iaws they are necessarily rendered void by art. 13 ( 2). Ti
they are void, they do not legally exist from their very inception.
They cannot be valid from 1951 to 1967 and invalid thereafter.
To say that they were valid in ,11e past and will be invalid in the
future is to amend the Constitution. Such a naked power of
amendment of the Constitution is not given to the Judges. The
argument for the petitioners suffers from a double fallacy, the
first that the Parliament has no power to amend Part ill so as to
abridge or take away the entrenclied property rights, and the
second that the Judges have the power to make such an amendment.
I may add that if the First and the Fourth ame11dments are
valid, the Senventeenth must necessarily be valid. It is not possible to say that the First and Fourth amendments though originally
invalid .have now been validated by acquiescence. H they infringed
art. 13(2),t they were void from their inception. Referring to
the 19th amendment of the U.S. Constitution,· Brandeis, J. said
in Leser v. Garnett(") :
"This Amendment is in character and phraseology
precisely similar to the 15th. For each the same method
of adoption was pursued. One cannot be valid and the
other invalid. That th!l 15th is valid, although rejected
by six states, inclut!ing Maryland, has been recognized
and acted on fo~ hdlf a century.... . . . . . . The suggestion that the 15th was incorporated in the Constitution,
(1) [1952] S.C.R. 89.
(2) [1965] I S.C.R. 933.
\3) 258 US 130: 66 L.Ed .. SOS, Sil.
922
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1967] 2 S.C.R.
not in accordance with law, but practically as a war
measure, which has been validated by acquiescence,
.:aimot be entertained."
Moreover the Seventeenth amendment has been acted upon
and its validity has been upheld by this Court in Sanan Singh's
case. If the First and the Fourth Amendments are validated by
acquiescence, the Seventeenth is equally validated.
Before concluding this judgment I must refer to some of the
speeches made by the members of the Constituent As;embly in
the course of debates on the draft Constitution. T~ese speeches
cannot be used as aids for interpreting J1c Constituiton. See
State of Travancore-Cochin and others v. The Bombay Co.
Ltd.( 1 ). Accordingly, I do not rely on them as a.ids to construction. But I propose to refer to them, as Shri A. K. Sen relied
heavily on the speeches of Dr. B. R. Ambedkar. According to
him, the speeches of Dr. Ambedkar show that he did not regard
the fundamental rights as amenoatlc. This contention is not
supported by the speeches. Sri Sen relied on the following passage in the speech of Dr. Ambedkar on September 17, 1949 : "We divide the articles of the Constitution uncler
three categories. The first category is the one which
consists of articles which can be amended by Parliament by a bare majority. The second set of articles
are articles which require two-thirds majority. If the
future Parliamer.: wishes to amend any particular article
which is not mentioned in Part III or art. 304, all that
is necessary for them is to have two-thirds majority.
They can amend it.
Mr. President : Of Members present.
Yr:s. Now, we have no doubt put articles in a third
category where for the purposes of amendment the
mechanism is somewhat different or double. It requires
two-thirds majority plus ratification by the States."(')
I unders!<ind this passage to mean that according to Dr. Ambedbr an amendment of the articles mentioned in Part ill and
368 requires two-thirds majority plus ratification by the States
He •'!em~ to have assumed (as reported) that the provision> of
Part TU fall within the proviso to art. 368. But he never said
that Part III was not amendale. He maintained consistently
that all the articles of the Constitution arn amendable under art.
368 On November 4. 1948, he said :
"The second means adopted to avoid rigidity and
legalism is the provision for facility with which the
- - · - · - - - - ·(!) (1952] S.C.R. 1112.
(2) Constituent Assembly Debates Vol. IX. p 1661.
B
c
D
F
G
H
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB
A
B
(Ramaswami, J.)
Constitution could be amended. The provisions of the
Constitution relating to the amendment of the Constitu•
tion diVide the Articles of the Constitution into two
groups. In the one group are placed Articles relating
to (a) the distribution of legislative powers between the
Centre and the States, (b) the representation of the
States in Parliament, and ( c) the powers of the Courts.
AU other Articles are placed in another group. Articles
placed in the second group cover a very large part of
the Constitution and can be amended by Parliament by
double majority, namely, a majority of not less than
two-thirds of the members of each House present and
voting and by a majority of the total membership of
each House. The amendment of these Articles does
not require ratification by the States. It is only in those
Articles which are placed in group one that an additional safeguard of ratification by the States is .introduced. One can therefore safely say that the Indian
Federation will not suffer from the faults of rigidicy or
legalism. Its distinguishing feature is that it is a flexible
Federation.
a
c
D
E
F
G
H
The provisions relating to amendment of the Constitution have come in for a virulent attack at the hands
of the critics of the Draft Constitution. It is said that
the provisions contained in the Draft make amendment
difficult. It is proposed that the Constitution should be
amendable by a simple majority at least for some
yi:ars. The argument is subtle and ingenious. It is said
that thiii Constituent Assembly is not elected on adult
suffrage while the future Parliament will be elected on
adult suffrage and yet the former has been given the
right to pass the Constitution by a simple majority while
the latter has been denied the same right. It is paraded
as one of the absurdities of the Draft Constitution. I
flllist repudiate the charge because it ~without foilnda·
tion. To know how simple are the provisions· of the
Draft Constitution in respect of amending the Constitution one has only to study the provisions for amendinent
c0ntained in the American and Australian Constitutions. Compared to them those contained in the Draft
Constirution will be found to be tbe simplest. The Draft
Constitution has· eliminated the elaborate and difficult
procedures such & a decision ·by a convention or a referendum. The Powers of amendment are left with the
Legislatures Central and Provincial. It is only for
amendments or specific matters--and they are only few,
that the ratification of the State Legislatures is required.
9%3
924
SVPREME COURT Rl!PORTS
(196 7] 2 S.C.R.
All other Articles of the Constitution are left to be
amended by Parliament. The only limitation is that it
shall be done by a majority of not less than two-thirds
of the. members of each House present and voting and a
maionty of the total membership of each House. It is
difficult to conceive a simpler method of amenwng
the Constitution."(')
A
B
On December 9, 1948, Dr. Ambedkar said with reference to art.
32:
"The Constitution has invested the Supreme Court
with these rights and these writs could not be taken
away unless and until the Constitution itself is amended
by means left open to the legislature."(')
c
On Nnv~mb.:1 25, 1949. Dr. Amhedkar strongly refuted the suggestion that fundamental rights should be absolute and unalterable. He said.
"The condemnation of the Constitution largely
comes from two quarters, the Communist Party and the
Socialist Party. . . . . . . . . . The second thing that the
Socialists want is that the Fundamental Rights mentioned in the Constitution must be absolute and without
any limitations so that if their Party comes into power,
they would have the unfettered freedom not merely to
criticize, but also to overthrow the State ........... .
Jefferson, the great American statesman· who played so
great a part in the making of the American Constitution,
has expressed some very weighty views which makers of
Constitution can never afford to ignore. In one place,
he has said:- 'We may consider each generation as a
·distinct nation. with a right, by the will of the majority,
to bind themselves, but none to bind the succeeding
generation, more than the inhabitants of another
country. In another place, he has said: 'The idea that
institutions established for the use of the nation cannot
be touched or modified, even to make them answer
their end, because of rights gratuitously supposed in
those employed to manage the min the trust for the public, may perhaos be a salutarv orovision a!?ainst the
abuses of a monarch, but is most absurd against the
nation itself. Yet our lawyers and oriests generally inculcate this doctrine, and supoose that preceding generations held the earth more freely than we do; had a
ne:ht to imoose laws on us, unalterable by ourselves, and
(I) Constituent A•.,.mbty D<-htcs Vol. 7, pp. 35-6. 43-4.
(2) Con~titucnt A:nembty Dtbat('s Vol. 7, 953.
D
E
F
G
H
GflLAKNATH v. PUNJAB
B
c
'
D
(Ramaswami, J.)
925
that we. in the like manner, can make Taws and impose
burdem .on future generations, which they will have no.
right to lllter; in fine, that the earth belongs to the dead
and not the living. I admit that what Jefferson has said
is not merely true, but is absolutely true. There can be
no question about it Had the Constituent Assembly
departed from this principle laid down by Jefferson
it would certainly be liable to blame, even to condemnation. But I ask, has it? Quite the contrary. One has
only to examine the provision relating to the amendment of the Constitution. The Assembly has not only
refrained from putting a seal of finality and infallibility
upon this Constitution by denying to the people the right
to amend the Constitution as in Canada or by making
the amendment of the CollStitution subject to the fulfil~
ment of extraordinary. terms and conditions as in America
of Australia but has provided a most facile procedure for
amending the Constitution. I challenge any of the
critics of the Constitution to prove that any Constituent
Assembly anywhere in the world has, in the circumstances in which this country finds itself, provided such
a facile procedure for the amend'llent of the Constitu•
lien. If those who are dissatisfied with the Constitu.
tion have only to obtain a 2/3 majority and .if they
cannot obtain even a two-thirds majodty in the parliament elected on adult franchise in their favour, their
dissatisfaction with the Constitution cannot be deemed
to be shared by the general public." ( 1 )
On November 11, 1948, Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru said:
'
G
"And remember this, that while we want th,is Consti.
tution to be as solid and as permanent a struct~ as
we can make it, nevertheless there is no permanence in
Constitutions. Th.ere ~h~uld be a certafu illlltll>ility.
If y~u make anything ngid and permanent, you stov a
Nation's growth, the growth of living vital organic
people. Therefore it has to be flexible." ( 2)
,
The views of Jellerson ethoed by Ambedkar and
Nehru were more powerful expressed by Thomas
Paine in 1791 :
H
"There never did, there never will, and there ne~
can, exisi ~ parliament•. or any description of men, or
any generatton of men, m any country, possessed of tb8
(I) Constituent Assembly Del>ates Vol. 11, pp. 97S·6.
(2) Constituent Assembly Debates Vol. 7, p. 322.
926
SUPRBMI! COURT REPORTS
(1967] 2 S.C.R.
right er the power of binding and controuling posterity
to the 'end of time', or of commanding for ever how the
world shall be governed, or who shall govern it; and
therefore all such clauses, acts or declarations by which
the makers of them attempt to do what they have neither
the right nor the power to do, nor take power to execute,
are in themselves null and void. Every age and generation must be as free to act for itself in all cases as the
ages and generations which preceded it. The vanity
and presumption of governing beyond the grave is the
mo't ridiculous and insolent of all tyrannies. Man has
no property in man; neither has any generation a property in the generations which arc- to follow. The parliament of the people of 1688 or of any other period, had
no more right to dispose of the people of the present
day, or to bind or to controul them in any shape what·
ever, than the parliament or the people of the present
day have to dispose of, bind or controul those who are
to live a hundred or a thousand years hence. Every
generation is, and must be, competent to all th~ purposes which it~ occasions require. It is the living, and
not the dead, that are to Le accommodated. When man
ceases to be, his power and his wants cease with him;
and having no longer any participation in the concerns
of this world, he has no longer any authority in directing
who shall be its governors, or how its government shall
be organized, or how administered." (See 'Rights of
Man' by Thomas Paine, unabridged edition by H. B.
Bonner. pp. 3 & 4).
For the reasons given above. I agree with Wanchoo, J.
that the writ petitions must be dismissed.
A
~.·,
'
'.
B
•
,,
c
D
p
In the result, the writ petitions are oismissed without costs.
Ramaswami, J. I have perused the judgment of my learned
Brother Wanchoo, I. and I agree with his conclusion that the
Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act. 1964 is legally
valid. but in view of the importance of the constitutional issues
raised in this case I would prefer to state my own rca~ons in a
separate judgment.
In these petitions which have been filed under Art. 32 of the
Constitution a common question arises for determination. vi~ ..
whether the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964
which amends Art. 31-A and 31-B of the Constitution is ultra
vires and unconstitutional.
'
~
G
·~
,,,,
F
H
GOLAKNATH v. PUN.JAB
A
'.
B
(Ramaswami, I.)
921·
The petitioners are affected either by the Punjab Security of
Land Tenures Act, 1954 (Act X qf 1953) or by the Mysore
Land Reforms Act (Act 10 of 1962) as amended by Act 14 of
1965 which were added to the 9th Schedule of the Constitution
by the impugned Act and their contention is that the impugned
Act being nnconstitutional and invalid, the validity of the two Acts
by which they arc affected cannot be saved.
The impugned Act consists of three sections. The first section
gives its short title. Section 2 ( i) adds a proviso to cl. ( 1) of Art.
31-A after the existing proviso. This proviso reads thus:
c
D
·~
''Provided further that where any law makes any
provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate
.and where any land comprised therein is held by a person under his personal cultivation, it shall not be lawful
for the State to acquire any portion of such land as is
within the ceiling limit applfcao1e to him under any law
for the time being in force or any building or structure
standing thereon or appurtenant thereto, unless the law
relating to the acquisition of such land, building or structure, provides for payment of compensation at a rate
which shall not be less than the market value thereof."
Section 2(ii) substitute'.' the following sub-clause for sub-cl. (a)
of cl. (2) of Art. 31-A : -
I
"(a) the expression 'estate' shall, in relation to any
local area, have the same meaning as that expression
or its local equivalent has in the existing law relating
to land tenures in force in that area and shall also include( i) any jagir, inam or muafi or other similar
grant and in the States of Madras and Kerala, any
janmam right;
(ii) any land held under ryotwari settlement;
(iii) any land held or let for purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto, including
waste land, forest land, land for pasture or sites of
buildings and other structures occupied by cultivators
of land, agricultural labourers and village artisans;"
Section 3 amends the 9th Schedule by adding 44 entries to it.
In dealing with the question about the validity of the impugned Act, it is necessary to consider the scope and effect of
the provisions contained in Art. 368 of the Constitution, because·
the ma;, controversy in the present applications turns upon the·
928
SUPllBNE COUllT llEPORTS
(1967] 2 S.C.R.
decision of the question as to what is the construction of that
Article. Article 368 reads a, follows:
"An amendment of this Constitutioi. may be initiated only by the introduction of a Bill for the purpose in
either House of Parliament, and when the Bill is passed
in each House by a majority of the total membership of
that House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds
of the members of that House present and voting, it
shall be presented to the President for his assent and
upon such assent being given to the Bill, the Constitution
shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of
the Bill .
B
c
Provided that if such amendment seeks to make any change
in(a) Article 5, article 55, article 73, article 162 or
article 241, o.>r
(b) Chapter JV of Part V, Chapter V of Part VI,
or Chapter I of Part XI, or
D
( c) any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule, or
( d) the representation of States in Parliament, or
( e) the provisions of this article,
the amendment shall also require to be ratified by the
Legislatures of not less than one-half of the States hy
resolutions to that effect pas~ed by those Legislatrres
before the Bili making provision for such amendment
is presented to the President for assent."
It is nccess<i.-y at this stage to set out b• aelly the history of Arts.
31-A and 31-B. These Articles were added to the Constitution
with retrospective effect by s. 4 of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951. Soon after the promulgation of the Constitution, the political party in power, commanding M it did a majority of votes in the several State legislatures as well as in Parliament, carried out radical measures of agrarian reform in Bihar,
Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh by enacting legislation which
may be referred to as Zamindary Abolition Acis. Certain zamindars, feeling themselves aggrieved, attacked the validity of those
Acts in courts of !aw on the ground that they contravened the
fund· nental r!ghts conferred on them by Part ill of the C:>nstitution. The High Court of Patna held that the Act pa~sed in B1har
was unconstitutional while the High Courts of Allahabad and
Nagpur upheld the validity of the corresponding legislation in
Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh respectively (See Kameshwar
¥
'1
H
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB
(Bachawat, J.)
929
v. State of Bihar( 1 ) and Surya Pal v. U.P. Government)("). The
parties aggrieved by these respective decisions had fil!!d appeals
by special leave before this Court. At the sa..1e time, peuuons
had also been preferred before this Court under Art. 32 by certain
other zamindars, seeking the determination of the same issues.
It was at this stage that the Union Government, with a view to
B put an end to all this litigation and to remedy what they considered
to be certain defects brought to light in the working of the Constitution, brought forward a bill to amend the Constitution, which,
after undergoing amendments in various particulars, was passed
by the requisite majority as the Constitution (First Amendment)
Act, 1951 by which Arts. 31-A and 31-B were added to the
Constitution. That was the first step taken by Parliament to
c assist the process of legislation to bring about '\@tarian reform
by introducing A11icles 31-A and 31-B. The se.::6ild step in the
same direction was taken by Parliament in 1955 by amending
Art. 31-A by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955.
The object of this a'."'lendment was to widen the scope of agrarian
reform and to confer on the legislative measures adopted in that
D behalf immunity from a possible attack. that they contravened
the fundamental rights of citizens. In other words, the amendment
protectcrl the legislative measures in respect of certain othe·· items
of agrarian and social welfare legislation, which affectP.d the proprietary rights of certain citizens. At the time when the first amendment was made, Art. 31-B expressly provided that. none- of the
E Acts and Regulations specified in the 9th Schedule, nor any of
the provisions thereof, shall be deemed to be void or ever to have
become void on the ground that they were inconsistent with or
took away or abridged any of the rights conferred by Part ID,
and it added that notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order
of any Court or tribunal to the contrary, each of the said Acts
and Regulations shali subject to the power of any competent
legislature to repeal or amend, continue in force. At this time,
19 Acts were listed in Schedule 9, and they were thus effectively
validated. One more Act was added to this list by the Amendment Act of 195 5, so that as a result of the second amendment,
the Schedule contained 20 Acts which were validated.
A
.,
G
l\
It appears that notwithstanding these amendments, certain
other legislative measures adopted by different States for the purpose of giving effect to the agrarian policy of the party in power,
v.-ere effectively challenged. For instance. the Karimbil Kunhikoman v. State of Kerala( 8 ), the validity of the Kerala Agrarian
Relations Act (IV of 1961) was challenged by writ petitions filed
under Art. 32, and as a result of the majority decision of this
Court the whole Act was struck down.
The dedsion of this
(I) A.I.R. 1951 Pat. 91.
(21 A.LR. 1951 All. 674.
(3) [1962] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 829.
930
SUPREME COURT REPOllTS
[1967] 2 S.C.R.
Court was pronounced on December 5, 1961. In ·A, P. KrishnaswamiNaidu v. The State of Madras(') the constitutionality of
the Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act
(No. 58 of 1961) was the subject-matter of debate. and by the
decision of this Court pronounced on March 9, 1964. it was declared that the whole Act was invalid. It appears that the Rajasthan Tenancy Act lll of 1955 and the Maharashtra Agricultural
Lands (Ceiling and Hoidings) Act 27 of 1961 had been ,imilarly
declared invalid, · and in consequence, Parliament thought it
necessary to make a further amendment in Art. 31-B so as to
save the validity of these Acts which had been struck down and
of other similar Acts v.l11ich were likely to be challenged. with
that object in view, :he impugned Act has enacted s. 3 by which
44 Acts have been added to Schedale 9. It is th"refor-: clear
that the object" o1"the First, Fourth and the Seventeenth Amend·
ments of the Constitution was to help the State Legislatures to
give effect to measures of agrarian reform in a broad and comprehensive sense in the interests of a very large section of Indian
citizens ·whose social and economic welfare closely depends on
the pursuit of progressive agrarian policy.
The first question presented for determination in this case is
whether the impugned Act, in so far as it purports to tal::e away
or abridge any of the fund2lllental rights conferred by Part III
of the Constitution, falls within the prohibition of Art. 13(2)
which provides that "the State shall not mal::e any law which
takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any
law made in contravention of this clause shall to the extent of
contravention be void". In other words, the argument of
'the petitioners was th'.lt the Jaw to which Art. 13(2) applies.
would include a law passed by Parliament by virtue of its constituent power to amend the Constitution, and so, its validity will
have to be t;:sted by Art. 13(2) itself. It was contended that
"the State" includes Parliament within Art. 12. and "law" must
. include a constitutional amendment. It was said that it wa<; the
deliberate intention of the framers of the Constitution, who realised the sanctity of the fundamental rights conferred by Part Ill,
to make them immune from interference not only by ordinary
laws passed by the legislatures in the country but also from
constitutional amendments. In my opinion, there is no sul.stance in this argument. Although "law" must ordinarily include
constitutional law, there is a juristic distinction between ordinarv
law m'lde in exercise· of legislative power and constitutional la\v
whicl: · :, made in exercise of constituent power. In a written.
federal form of -;::onstitution there is a clear and well-knawn
distinction between the law of the Constitution and ordinary Jaw
made by the legislature on the basis of separation of powers and
A
B
)-
c
+
D
E
the
(I} ( 19i4] 7 S.C.R. 82.
F
G
H
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
(Ramaswami, J.)
931
o!
pursuant to th€'. power
law-making conf_err~ ~y the Constitution ( Sei: Dicey on Law of the Constitution , Tenth Bdn.
p. 110, Jennings, "Law and the Constitution' pp. 62-64, and
'American Jurisprudence", 2nd Edn., Vol. 16, p. 181) . . In s.uch
a written Constitution, the amendment of the Const1tut10n 1s a
substantive constituent act which is made in the exercise of the
sovereign .power which created the Constitution and which is
effected by a special means, namely, by a predesigned fundamental procedure unconnected with ordinary legislation. The
amending power under Art. 368 is hence sui gcneris and cannot
be compared to the law-making power of Parliament pursuant
to Art. 246 read with List 1 and Ill. It follows that the expression "law" in Art. 13(2) of the Constitution cannot be construed as including an amendment of the Constitution whici:t is
achieved by Parliament in exercise of its sovcrc;gn constituent
power, but must mean law made by Parliament in its legislative
capacity pursuant to the powers of Jaw-making given by the
Constitution itself under Art. 246 read with Lists I ar.d III of
the 7th Schedule. It is also clear, on .the same line of reasoning, that 'Jaw' in Art. 13 ( 2) cannot be construed so as to include
'Jaw' made by Parliament under A11s. 4, 169, 392, 5th Schedule
Part D and 6th Schedule para 21.
The amending power of
Parliament exercised under these A.rticles stands on the same
pedestal as the constitutional amendment made under Art. 368
so far as Art. 13(2) is concerned and does not fall within the
definition of 'law' within the meaning of this last article.
It is necessary to add that the definition of 'law' in A.rt.
13 ( 3) does not include in terms a constitutional amen·1ment,
though it includes "any Ordi'!ance, order, bye-law, rule, regalation, notification, custom or usage". It should be noticed that
the language of Art. 368 is perfectly general and empowers
Parliament to amend the Constitution withou. any exception
whatsoever. Had it been in•ended by the Constitution-makers
that the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III should be
completely outside the scope of Art. 368, it is rr1sonable to
assume that they would have made an express provision to that
effect. It was stressed by the petitioners during the course of
the argument that Part III is headed as "Fundamental Rights"
and that Art. 32 "guarantees" the right to move the Supreme
Court by appnpriate proceedings for enforcement of rights conferred by Part ill. But the expression "fundamental" in the phrase
"Fundamental Rights" means that such rights are fundamental
vis-a-vis the laws of the legislatures and the acts of the executive
authorities mentioned in Art. 12. It cannot be suggested that
the expr~ssion "fundamental". lifts the fundamental rights above
~e Constitution !itself. Similar:y, the expression "guaranteed"
m Art. 32(1) and 32(4) means that the rignt to move the Supreme Court for enforcement of fundamental rights without
932
SUPRl!ME COURT Jtl!PORTS
[1967] 2 s.c.R
exhausting the normal channels through the High Courts or the
lower courts is guaranteed. This expression also docs not place
the fundamental rights above the Constitution.
A
I proceed to consider the next question arising in this case,
viz., the scope of the amending power under Art. 368 of the Constitution. It is conten'.led on behalf of the petitioners that Art. B
368 merely lays down the procedure for amendment and does
not vest the amending power as such in any agency constituted
under that article. I am unable to accept this argument as correct Par! XX of the Constitution which contains only Art. 368
is described as a Part dealing with the Amendment of the Constitution; and Art. 368 which prescribes the procedure for amend- c
ment of the Constitution, begins by saying that an amendment
of this Constitution may be initiated in the manner therein indicated. In my opinion, the expression "amendment of the Constitution" in Art. 368 plainly and unambiguously means amendment of all the provisions of the Constitution. It is unreasonai>le
to suggest that what Art. 368 provides is only the mechanics of
the procedure to be followed in amending the Constitution without D
indicating which provisions of the Cons.itution can be amended
and which cannot. Such a restrictive construction of the substantive part of Art. 368 would be clear!) untenable. The significant fact that a separate Part has been devoted in the Constitution
for "amendment of the Constitution" and there is only one Article
in that Part shows that both the power to amend and the procedure to amend a1 ~ enacted in Art. 368. Again, the words "tile
Constitution shall stand amended in accordance wit!.- the terms
of the Bill" in Art. 368 clearly contemplate and provide for the
power to amend after the requisite procedure has been followed.
Besidt.s, the words used in the proviso unambiguously indicate
that the substantive part of the article applies to all the provisions F
of the Constitution. It is on dial basic assumption that the proviso prescribes a specific procedure in respect of the .1mendment of
the articles mc:ntioned in els. (a) to ( e) thereof. Therefore it
must be held that when Art. 368 confers on Parliament the right
to amend the Constitution the power in question can be exercised
over all the provisions of the Constitution. How the power should
be exercised, has to be determined by reference to the questiOL G
as to whether the proposed amendment falls under the substantive
part of Art. 368, or whether it attractJ the procedure contained
in the proviso.
It was suggested for the petitioners that the power of amendment is to be found in Arts. 246 and 248 of the Constitution read
With item 97 of List I of the 7th Schedule. I do not think that
it is possible to accept this argument. Article 246 states that
H
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB
A
B
(Ramaswami, I.)
933
Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to
matters enumerated in List I in the Seventh Schedule, and Art.
248, similarly, confers power on Parliament to make any law
with respect to any matter not enumerated in the Concurrent List
or State List. But the power of law-making in Arts. 246 and 248
is "su!>ject to the provisions of this Constitution". It is apparent
that the power of constitutional amendment cannot fall within
these Articles, because it is illogical and a contradiction in terms
to say that the amending power can be exercised and at the same
time it is "subject to the provisions of the Constitution".
It was. then submitted on behalf of the petitioners that the
amending power wider Art. 368 is .subject to the doctrine of
implied limitations. In oth1,1r words, it was contended that even
if Art. 368 confers the power of amendment, it was not a general
but restricted power confined only to the amendable provisions
of the Constitution, the amendability of such provision being determined by the nature and character of the respective provision.
D It was argued, for instance, that the amending power cannot be
·used to abolish the compact of the Union or to destroy the democratic charac~ of the Constitutiou guaranteeing individual and
minority rights. It was said that the Constitution was a permanent compact of the States, that the federal character of the Stal.Clll
was indissoluble, and that the existence of any of the States as
E part (>f the fedel'lll compact cannot be put an end to by the power
of amendment It was alsc said that the chapter of fundalll"ntal rights of the Constitution cannot be the subject-matter of
al!Y amendment under Art 368. It was contended that the preamble to the Constitution declaring that India was a sovereign
democratic republic was beyond the scope of the amending power.
It was suggested that other basic features of the Constitution were
f
the Articles relating to ditsribution of legislati\oe powers, the
Parliamentary form- of Government and the establishment
of
Supreme Court and the High Courts in the various States. I am
unable to accept this argum11nt :is correct If the Co:istltutionmakers considered that there were certain basic features of the
Constitution which were. pennanent it is most unlikely that they
G should not have expressly said in Art. 368 that these basic features
were not amendable... On t1:ie contq1ry, tLe Constitution-makers
have expressly provided t'iat Art. 368 itself should be amendable
by the process indicated in the proviso to that Article. This circumstance is significant and suggests that all the articles of the
Constitution are amendable either under •he proviso to Art. 368
H or under the main part 'Jf that Article. In my opinion, there is
no room for an implication in the comtrnction of Art. 368. So
far as the federal character of the Constitution is concerned.
it was held by this Court in State of West BenKal v. Union of
C
L3Sup.CI/67-14
934
SuPllBMll COURT llBPOl.D
(1967] 2 .c.R.
India(') that the federal structure is not an essential part of our
A
Constitution and there is no compact between the States and there
is no dual citizenship in India. It was pointed out in that case
that there was no constitutional guarantee against the alteration
of boundaries of the States. By Art. 3 the Parliament is by. law
authorised to form a new State by redistribution of the territory
of a S•ate ur by uniting two or more States or parts of States or B
by unitil1g any territory to a part of any State, to increase the area
of any State, to diminisl1 the area of any State, to alter the boundaries of any State, and to alter the name of any State. In In Re :
Tire Berubari Union and Exchange of Enclaves(') it was argued
that the Inda-Pakistan agreement wit~ regard to Berubari could
not be implemented even by legislation under An. 368 because c
of the limitation imposed by the preamble to the Constitution and
tha! such an agreement could not be implemented by a referendum. The argument was rejected by this ..::oun and it was held
that the preamble could not, in any way. limit the power of
Parliament to cede pans of the national krritory. On l:,ehalf
of the petitioners the argum~nt w~s srr~sscd that the chapter on
fundamental rights was the basic feature of the Constituiton and D
cannot be the subject of th~ ?.m~nding power under Art. 368. It
was argued that the freedoms of democratic life are secured
by the chapter on fundamental rights and the dignity of the individual cannot be preserved if any of the fundamental rights is
altered or diminished. It is not possible to accept this argument
as correct. The concepts of libertv and equality are changing E
and dynamic and hence the notion of nermanencv or immutability
cannot be attached to any of the f:mdamental rights. The Directive Principles of Part JV arc as fundrmcntal ~' th,, ~on•titutional
ri.,:l1•s cmbodi~d in Part IIT and '\r•. '>,7 'r'n'i.cs a ~nn<titutional
duty upon the States to ai:ply these principles in making laws.
Reference should in particular be made to Art. 39(b) which F
en joins upon the State to direct its policv towards securing that
1he ownrrshio and control of the material resou·ces of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good.
Arr. 38 imposes a duty upon the Slate to promote the welfare of
the ncopl~ by securin'! and nrotect•n~ as effectivelv as it mav,
a social order in which justice. social, economic and J)Olitical,
shall inform all the in<titutions of the national life. I have 111- G
reaclv said that the langu.1~c of Art. 368 is clrar anci unambiguous
in <unoort of the view that there is no implied limitation on the
amendin'! oower. In '1rinciole also it nnnears unrPasoMhle to
suQ~est that the Constitution-makers wanted to provide that the
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution should never
be touched bv wav of amendment. In modem democratic rhou!!ht H
there are two main trrnds-:he liberal idea of individual rights
(I} J19641IS.C.R.371.41lS.
(2) (196'113 S.C.R. 250.
GOLAKNATH v. PUNJAB (Ramaswami, J.)
A
935
protecting the individual and the democratic idea proper proclainiing the equality of rights and· popular soverignty.
The
gradual extension of the idea of equality from political to economic and social fields in the modern State has led to the problems
of social security, economic planning and industrial welfare legislation. The implementation and harmonisation of these son::eB what conflicting principles is a dynamic task. The adjustment
between freedom and compulsion, between the rights of individuals ard the social interest and welfare must necessarily be a
matter for changing needs and conditions. The proper approach
is therefore to look upon the fundamental rights of the individual
as conditioned by the social responsibility, by the necessities of the
Society,
by 'he balancing of interests and not as pre-ordained and
c untouchable
private rights.
As pointed out forcefully by Laski :
D
E
F
G
H
"The struggle for freedom is largely transferred from
the plane of political to that of economic rights. Men
become less interested in the abstract fragment of political power an individual can secure than in the use of
massed pressure of the groups to which they belong to
secure an increasing share of the social product.
Individualism gives way before socialism. The roots
of liberty are held to be in the ownership and control
of the instruments of production by the state, the latter
using its power to distribute the results of its regulation
with increasing approximation to equality. So long as
there is inequality, it is argued, there cannot be liberty.
The historic inevitability of this evolution was seen
a century ago by de Tocqueville. It is interesting to
compare his insisience that the democratization of
political power meant equality and that its absence
would be regarded by the masses as oppression with the
argument of Lord Acton that liberty and equality are
antitheses. To the latter liberty was esentially an autocratic ideal; democracy destroyed individuality, which
was the very pith of liberty, by seeking identity of conditions. The modern emphasis is rather toward the
principle that material equality is growing inescapable
and that the affirmation of personality must be effective
upon an immaterial plane. It is found that doing as one
likes, subject only to the demands of peace, is incompatible with either international or municipal necessities. We pass from contract to relation, as we have
passed from status to contract. Men are so involved in
intricate nei.vorks of relations that the place for their
SUPRllMB COUP.T llBPORTS
[1967] 2 S.C.R.
liberty is iu a sphere where their behaviour does not
impir!ge upon that .If-affirmation of others which is
liberty."
A
-{Encyclopaedia of the Soc.JI Sdenccs, Vol. IX, 445.;.
It must not be forgotten that the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 31, for instance, is not absolute. It should be
noticed that cl. (4) of that Article provides an exception to the
requirements of cl. (2). Clause (4) relates to Bills of a State
Legislature relating to public acquisition which were pending at
the commencement of the Constitution. If such a Bill has been
passed and assented to by the President, the Courts shall
have no jurisdiction to question the validity of such law on the c
ground of contravention of cl. (2), i.e., on the ground that it does
not provide for compensation or that it has been enacted without
a public purpose. Clause (6) of the Article is another exception
to cl. (2) and provide.\ for ouster of jurisdiction of the Courts.
While cl. (4) relates to Bills pending in the State Legislature at
the commencement of the Constitution, cl. ( 6) relates to Bills D
enacted by the State v.ithin 18 months before commencement of
the Constitution I.e., Acts providing for public acquisition which
were enacted not earlier than July 26, 1948. If the President
certifies such an Act within 3 months from the commencement
of the Constitution, the Courts shall have no jurisdiction to invalidate that Act on the grounc+ ,f conl!'avention of cl. (2) of that
Article. Similarly, the sch_.ile of Art. 19 indicates that the E
fundamental rights guaranteed by sulH:ls. (a) to (g) of cl. (I)
can be validly regulated in the light of the provisions contained
in els. (2) to (6) of Art. 19. In other words, the scheme of Art.
19 is two-fold; the fundamental rights of the citizens are of pa amount importance, but even the said fundamental rights can be
regulated to serve the interests of the general public or other F
objects mentioned respectively in els. (2) to (6) of Art. 19. It
is right to state that the purposes for .vhich ~uadamental rights
can be regulated which are specified in els. (2) to (6), could
not have been a\sumed by the Constitution-makers to be static
and incapable of e~pansion. It cannot be assumed that the
Constitution-makers intended to forge a political strn.it jacket G
for generations to come. The Constitution-makers must have
anticipated that in dealing with socio-economic problems which
the legislatures may have to face from time to time, the concepts
o( "'tblic interest and other important considerations which are
the vasis fJf els. (2) to (6), may change and may even expand.
As Holmes, J. has said in Abrams v. Unit id States(') : "the
Constitutipn is an experiment, as all life is an e:1Cperiment". It H
is therefore legitimate to assume that the Constitution-mlkers
-
(I) 250 U.~>. 616, 630.
GOLAKNATll V, PUNJAB
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
(Ramas\\'ami, .I.)
937
intended that Parliament should be competent to make amendments in these nghts so as to meet the challenge of the problems
which may arise in the course of socio-economic progress and
devebpment of the country. I find it therefore difficult to accept
the argument of the petitioners that the Constitution-makers contemplated that fundamental rights enshrined in Pan III were
finally and immutably settled and determined once and for all and
these rights are beyond the ambit of any future amendment.
Today at a time when absolutes are discredited, it must not be
too readily assumed that there are b~sic features of the Constitution which shackle the amending power and which take precedence over the general welfare of the nation and the need for
agrarian and social reform.
In construing Art. 368 it is moreover essential to remember
the nature and subject-matter of that Article and to interpret it
subjectae matcries.
The power of amendment is in point of
quality an adjunct of sovereignty. It is in truth the exercise of the
highest sovereign power in the State. If the amending power is
an adjunct of ~overeignty it does not admit of any limitations.
This view is expressed by Dicey in "Law of the Constitution",
I 0th Edn., at page 148 as follows :
"Hence the power of amending the constitution has
been placed, so to speak, outside the constitution. and
that the legal sovereignty of the United States resides in
the States' governments as forming one aggregate body
represented by three-fourths of the several States at anv
time belonging to the Union."
·
A similar view is stated by Lord Bryce in ''The American Commonwealth", Vol. I, ch. XXXII. page 366. Lester Bernhardt
Orfield states as follows in his book "The Amending of the Federal
Constitution" :
"In the las!: analysis. one is brought to the conclusion that sovereignty in the l1'.1ited States, if it can be
said to exist at all. is located in the amending body.
The amending body has often been referred to as the
sovereign, because it meets the fest of the location of
sovereignty. As Willoughby has said :
'In all those cases in which, owing to ihe distribution
of governing power, there is doubt as to the politica;
b~dy .in which the. Soyereignty rnsts, the test to be ap·
phed 1s the determmat1on of which authonty has, in the
last mstance, the legal v:iwer to :ieterminc its own competence as wcli as that of others'.
938
SUPllBMB COUllT R.BPOllTS
(1967] 2 s.c.R.
Applying the criteria of sovereignty which were laid
down at the beginning of this chapter, the amending
body is sovereign as a matter of both law and fact.
Article Five expressly creates the amending body. Yet
in a certain manner of speaking the amending body
may be said to exist as a matter of fact since it could
proceed to ·· lter Article Five or any other part of the
Constitution. While it is true that the sovereign cannot
act otherwise than in compliance with law, it is equally
truL that it creates the law in accordance with which
it is to act."
A
In his book ··constitutional Law of the United States", Hugh
Evander Willis says that the doctrine of amendability of the Constitution is based on the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people
and that it has no such implied limitations as that an amendment
shall not contain a new grant of power nor be in the form of
legislation, nor change "our dual form of government nor change
the protection of the Bill of Rights, nor make any other change in
the Constitution." James G. Randall also enunciates the proposition that when a constitutional ar.iendment is adopted "it is done
not by the 'general government,' but by the supreme sovereign
power of the nation i.e., the people, acting through State Legislatures or State conventions" and that "the amending power is
equivalent to the Constitution-making power and is wholly above
the authority of the Federal Govcrnment"-('Constitutional Pro·
bkms Under Lincoln', p. 395). The legal position is summarised
by Burdick at page 48 of his treaties "The Law of the· American
Constitution" as follows :
c
"The result of the National Prohibition Cases (253
U.S. 350) seems to be that there is no limit to the po•:,er
to amend the Constitution, except that a State may not
without its consent be deprived of its equal suffrage in
the Senate. To put the case most extremely, this means
that by astion of two-thirds of both Houses of Congress
and of the legislatures in three-fourths of the States
all of the powers of the national government could be
surrendered to the States, or all of the reserved powers
of the States could be transferred to the federal governmen•. It is only public opinion acting upon these
ager :es which places any cieck upon the amending
powc1 But the alternative to this result would be to
recognize the power of the Supreme Court to veto the
will of the people expressed in a constitutional amendment without any possibility of the reversal of
the
court"s action except through revolution."
B
D
••
G
H
(J~;LAK'.'l.HH
A
8
c
D
v. PUNJAB (Rm11asnw11i, J.)
939
The matter has been clearly put by George Vedel in Manuel
Elementaire De Droit Constitutionnel ( Recueil Sirey) at page 117
as follows :
'Truly speaking no constitution prohibits for ever its
amendment m its amendment in all its aspects.
But it can prohibit for example, the amendment
(revision) <luring a certain time (the Constitution of
1791) or it can prohibit the amendment (revision) on
this or that point (as in the Constitution of 1875)
which prohibits amendment of the republican form of
Government and the present Constitution follows the
same rule.
But this prohibition has only a political but no
juridical value. In truth from the juridical viewpoint
a declaration of absolute constitutional immutability
cannot be imagined. The Constituent power being the
supreme power in th~ state cannot be fettered, even by
itself. For example, article 95 of 0ur constitution stipulates, "The republican form of Government cannot be
the subject of a proposal for amendment.
But juridically the obstacle which this provision puts
in the way of an amendment of the republican form of
government can be lifted as foliows.
E
F
G
It is ·enough to abrogate by way of amendment
(revision) the article 95 cited above. After this, the
obstacle being removed, a second amendment can deal
with the republican form of Government.
In practice, this corresponds to the idea that the
constituent assembly of today cannot bind the nation of
tomorrow."
ln In Re : The Berubari Union and Exchange of Enclaves(') the
argument of implied limitation was advanced by Mr. N. C.
Chatterji and it was contended that item No. 3 o. the lndoPakistan Agreement providing fm a division of Berubari Union
between India and Pakistan was outside the power of constitutional amendment and that the preamble to the Constitu'.;on did
not permit the dismemberment of Indii. but preserved the integrity of the territory of India. The argument was rejected by this
Court and it was held that Parliament acting under Art. 368 can
make ·a Jaw to give effect to and implement the Agreement in
question or to pass a law amending Art. 3 so as to cover cases of
cession of the territory of India and thereafter make a law under
the amended Art. 3 to implement the Agreement.
(1) (196~) 3 S.C.R. 250.
9-10
SUPREME COURT Rl!PORTS
fl 967) c S.C.R.
There is also another aspect of the ma!!cr to be taken into
account. If the fundamental rights arc unamcndablc and if Art.
368 docs not include any such power it follows that the amendment of, say, Art. 31 by insertion of Arts: 31-A and 31-B can
only be made by a violent revolution. It was suggested for the
petitioners that an alteration of fundamental rights could be made
by convening a new Constituent Assembly outside the frame-work
of the present Constitution, but it is doubtful if the proceedings
of the new Constituent Assembly will have any legal validity,
for the reason is that if the Con.;titution provides its own method
of amendment, any other method of amendment of the Constitution will be unconstitutional and void. For instance, in
George S. Hawke v. Harvey C. Smith, a~ Secretary of State of
Olrio(') it was held by the Supreme Court of the U.S.A. that Referendum orovisions of State Constitutions and statutes cannot
be api>lied in the ratification or rejection of amendments to the
Federal Constitution without violating the requirements of Article
5 of such Constitution and that such ratification shall be by the
legislatures of the several states, or by conventions therein, as
Congress shall decide. It was held in that case that the injunction was properly issued against the calling of a referendum
election on the act of the legislature of ~. state ratifying an amendment to the Federal Constitution. If, therefore, the petitioners arc
right in their contention that Art. 31 is not amendable within
the frame-work of the present Constitution, the only other recourse for making the amendment would, a< I have already said,
be by revolution and not through peaceful means. It canno.t be
reasonably supposed that the Constitution· makers contemplated
that Art. 31 or any other article on fundamental rights <hould be
altered by a violent revolution and not by peaceful change. It
was observed in Fei~~nspan v. Bodine(') :
"If the plaintiff is right in its contention of lack of
power to insert the Eighteenth Amendment into the
United States Constitution because of its subject-matter.
it follows that there is no way to incorporate it a. :d others
of like character into the national organic law, c~cepl
through revolution. This, the plaintiff concedes, is the
inevitable conclusion of its contention. This is so startling a proposition that the judicial mind may be pardoned
for not readily acceding to it, and for insisting that only
the most convincing reasons will justify its acceptance."
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
I am, therefore, of the opinion that the petitioners are unable
to make good their argument on this aspect of the case.
It was then contended for the petitioners that there would be
anomalies if Art. 368 is interpreted to have no impliecl limita(ll 64 l. F<l. 871.
(2) 264 f't:d. 186.
H
liOLAKNATH
A
v. PUNJAB (Ramaswami, J.)
941
tions. It was said that the more important articles of the Constitution can be amended by the procedure mention~d in the
substantive part of Art. 368 but the less important articles would
require ratification by the legislatures of not less than half of the
States under the proviso to that Article. It was argueJ tl1at the
fundamental rights and also Art. 3 2 could be amended by the
B majority of two-thirds of the members of Parliament but Art. 226
cannot be amended unless there was ratification of the legislatures
of not less than half of the States. It was pointed out that Arts.
54 and 55 were more difficult to amend but not Art. 52. Similarly, Art. 162 required ratification of the States but not Art. 163
which related to the Council of Ministers to aid and advise the
Governor in the exercise of his functions. In my opinion the
c argument
proceeds on a misconception. The scheme of Art. 368
is not to divide the Articles of the Constitution into two categories,
viz., important and not so important Article. It was oontemplated by the Constitution-makers that the amending power in the
main part of Art. 368 should extend to each arid every article of
the Constitution but in the case of such articles which related to
D the federal principles or the relation of the States with the Union,
the ratification of the legislatures of at least half the States shoulu
be obtained for any amendment. It was also contended that if
Art. 368 was construed without any implied limitation the amending power under that Article could b~ used for subverting the
Constitution. Both Mr. Asoke Sen and Mr. Palkhiwala resorted
E to th~ method of reJuctio ad absurdem in pointing out the abuses
that might occur if there were no limitations on the power to
amend. It was suggested that Parliament may, by a constitutional
amendment, abolish the parliamentary system of government or
repeal the chapter of fu;:idamental rights or divide India into two
States, or even reintroduce the rule of a monarch. It is inconceivable
that Parliament should utilise the amending power for
F
bringing about any of these contingencies. It is. howevP.r, not
permissible, in the first place, to assume that in a matter of
constitutional amendment there will be abuse of power and then
utilise it as a test for finding out the scope of the amending power.
This Court has declared repeatedly that the !JOssibility of abuse
is not to be used as a test of <he existence or extent of a legal
G
power [See for example, St.ite of West Bengal v. Union of
India('), at page 407). In the second place, the amending power
is a power of an altogether different kind from the ordinary governmental power and if an abuse occurs, it -iccurs at the hands
of Parliament and the State Legislatures representing an extraordinary majority of the people. so that for all practical purposes
H
it may be said to be the people, or at least the highe" ! agent of the
It is therefore
people, and one exercising sovere:gn powers.
(I) [1964] I S.C.R. 371.
942
SUPREMI! COURT llEPO!lTS
[1967) 2 S.C.R.
anomalous to speak of 'abuse' of a power of this des~ription. In
the last analysis, political machinery and artificial limitations will
not protect the people from themselves. The perpetuity of our
democratic institutions will depend not upon special mechanisms
or devices, nor even upon any particular legislation, but rather
upon the character and intelligence and the good conscience of our
people themselves. As observed by Frankfurter, J. in American
Federation of Labour v. American Sash & Door Co.( 1 ) :
"But a democracy need rely on the courts to save it
from it1 own unwisdom. If it is alert-and without alertness by the people there can be no enduring democracy
-unwise or unfair legislation can readily be removed
from the statute books. It is by such vigilance over its
representatives that democracy proves ·it1elf."
I pass on to consider the next objection of th~ petitioners that
the true purpose and object of the impugned Act was to legislate
in respect of land and ti.at legislation ill respec. of Ia.1d falls
within the jurisdiction of State legislatures under Entry 18 of
List II, and the argument was that since the State Legislatur~.,;
alone can make laws in respect of land, Parliament had no right
to pass the impugned Act. The argument was based on the assumption that the impugned Act purports to be, and in fact is, 3
piece of land legislation. It was urged that the scheme of Arts.
245 and 246 of the Constitution clearly shows that Parliament
has no riglit to make a law in respect of land, and since the
impugned Act is a legislative mea1ure in relation to land, it is
invalid. In my opinion, the argument i~ based upr '.1 a misconception. What the impugned Act purports to do i,- not to make any
l~nd legislation but to protect and validate the legislative measures
in respect of agrarian reforms pa;scd by the different State Legislatures in the country by granting them immunity from attack
baied on the plea that they contravene fundamental rights. The
impugned Act was passed by Parliament in ex.: ·cise of the amending power conferred by Art. 368 and it is impossible to accept
the argument that the ~onstitutional power of amendment can be
fettered by Arts. 245 and 246 or by the legislative Lists. It was
argued for the petitioners that Parliament cannot validate a law
which it has no power to enact. The proposition holds good
where the validity of an impugned Act turns on whether the subject-matter falls within or without the jurisdiction of the legislature
which passed it. But to make a law which contravenes the Constitution constitutionally valid is a matter of constitutional amendment, and as such it falls within the exclusive ixiwcr of Parliament and within the amending power conferred by Art. 368. I
am accordingly of the opinion that the petitioner- arc unable to
(ll JJ\ tl.S.,138, '16.
B
c
r
D
E
F
G
H
GOLAKNATH
A
B
c
0
E
F
G
H
v. PUNHB (Ramoswami, J.)
943
substa!ltiate their argument on this aspect of the case. I should
like to add that in Lesser v. Gamett( 1), in National Prohibition
Cases(2) anr1 in United States v. Sprague("), a similar argument
was advanced to the effect that a constitutional amendment was
net valid if it was in the form of legislation. But the argument was
rejected- by the Supreme Court of the U.S.A. in all the three cases.
It remains to deal with the objection of the petitioners that
the newly inserted articles 31-A and 31-B require ratification of
the State legislatures under the proviso to Art. 368 of the Constitution because these articles deprive the High Courts of the power
to issue appropriate writs under Art. 226 of the Constitution.
J do not think there is any substance in this argument. The
impugned Act does not purport. to change the provisions of Art.
226 and it cannot be said even to have that effect directly or in
any substantial measure. It is manifest that the newly inserted
articles do not either in terms or in effect seek to maker any
change in Art. 226 of the Constitution. Article 31-A aims at
saving laws providing for the compu..ory acquisition by the State
of a certain kind of property from the operation of article 13 read
with other ·relevant articles in Part III, while article 31-B purports to validate certain specified Acts and Regulations already
pass00, which, but for such a provision, would be liable to be
impugned under Art. 13. It is therefore not correct to say that
the powers of High Courts to issue writs is, in any way, affected.
The jurisdiction of the High Courts remains just the same as it
was· before. Only a certain category of cases has been excluded
from the purview of Part III and the High Courts can no longer
intervene, not because their jurisdiction or powers have been curtailed in any manner or to any extent, but because there would
be no occasion hereafter for the exercise of their power in such
cases. As I have already said, the effect of the impugned Act on
the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Art. 22£ of the Constitution is not direct but only incidental in character and therefore the contention of the petitioners on this point against the
validity of the impugned Act must be rejected.
It is well-settled that in examining a constitutional question
of this character, it is legitimate to consider whether the impugned
legislation is a legislation di"ctly in respect of the subject-matter
coveroo ty any particular article ef the Constitution O\' whether it
touches the said article only incidentally or indirectly. In
A. K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras('), Kania, C.J., had occasion to consider the validity of the argument that the preventive
detention order resulted in the detention of the applicant in a
cell, and se, it contravened his fundamental rights guaranteed ,by
(1) 258 U.S. 131.
(3) 282 U.S. 716.
(2l 253 U.S. 350,
(41 (1950] S,C.R, 88, JOI.
SL'PRlME COURT Rll'UR IS
Art. 19(1 J(a), (b). (c), (d), (e) and lg). Rejecting this argument,
the learned Chief Ju,tice ohserl'ed that the true approach in dealing with such a question W<ls only 10 consider the directness of the
legislation and 1101 what will be the rcsul! of the detention otherwise valid, on the mode of the dctenu's life. On that ground
alone, he was inclined 10 reject the contention that the order of
detention contral'ened the tund<•rncntal rights guaranteed to the
petitioner under Art. 19(1). At page IOU of the report, Kania,
C.J., stated as follows :
"As the preventive detention order resuits in the
detention of the applicant in a cell it was contended on
bis behalf that the rights specified in Article 19(l)(a),
(b), (c), (d), (e) and (g) have been infringed. It
was argued that because of his detention he cannot have
a free right to speech as and where he desired and the
same argument was urged in respect o( the rest of the
rights mentioned in sub-clauses ( b), ( c), ( d), ( c) and
(g). Altho~gh this argument is advanced in a case
which deals with preventive detention, if correct, ii should
be applicable in !he case of punitive detention also to
any one sentcncecl to a term of imprisonment under the
relevant section of the Indian Penal Code. So considered, the argument must clearly be rejected. In spite of
the saving clauses (2) to ( 6), permitting abridgement
of the rights connected with each of them, punitive
dekntion under several sections of the Penal Code, i.e.,
fur theft, cheating. forgery and even ordinary assault,
will be illegal. Unless such conclusion necessarily
follows from the article, it is obvious that such constn1ction should be avoided. In my opinion, such result
is clearly not tlic outcome of the Constitution. The
ar:icle has to be read without any pre-conceived notions.
So read, it clearly means that the legislation to l;ie examined must be directly in respect of one of the rights me~
tioncd m the sub-clauses. If there is a legislati:,n directly
at1cmp1irog to control a citizen's freedom of speech or expression. or his right to assemble peaceably and without
arms, etc., the question whether that legislation is saved
by the relevant saving clause of article 19 will arise. If.
however, the legislation is not directly in respect of any
of these subjects, but as a result of the operation of other
legislation, for instance, for punitive or preventive detention, his right under any of these sub-clauses is abridged.
the que<tion of the application of article 19 does not
arise. The true approach is only to consider the directness of the le)!islation and not what will be !he result of
the detention otherwise valid, on the mode of the detenu',
A
B
c
D
E
'
G
H
VAAKNATH I', .PUNJAB
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
(Ramasirami, J.)
~· 5
life. On that short ground, in my opinion, ihis argument about the infringement of the rights mentioned in
article 19( 1) gt..nerally must fail. Any other construction put on the article, it seems to me, will be unreasonable."
It is true that the opinion thus expressed by Kania, C.J. in the case
of A. K. Gopa/an v. The State of Madras(') did not receive the
concurrence of the other learned Judges who heard the said case.
Subsequently, however, in Ram Singh & Others v. The State of
Delhi & Anr.(2) the said observations were cited with approval
by the Full Court. The same principle was accepted by this
Court in Express Newspapers (Pvt.) Ltd. v. The Union of
lndil;('), in the majority judgment in Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v.
The State of Assam('), and in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. The
State of Maharashtra('). Applying the same principle to the
present case, I
consider that
the effect of
the
impugned Act on the powers of the High Court under Art. 226
is indirect and incidental and not direct. I hold that the impugned
Act falls under the substantive part of Art. 368 because the object
of the impugned Act is to amend the relevant Articles in Part Ill
which confer fundamental rights on citizens and not to change the
power of the High Courts under Art. 226.
In this connection I should like to refer to another aspect of
the matter. The question about the validity of the Constitution
(First Amendment) Act has been considered by this Court in
Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India and State of
Bihar( 6 ). In that case, the validity of the said Amendment Act
was challenged, firstly, on the ground ihat the f'e'.'l!y. inserted
Arts. 31-A and 31-B sought to make changes in Arts. 132 and 136
in Ch. IV of Part V and Art. 226 in Ch. V of Part VI. The
second ground was that the amendment was invalid because it
related to legislation in respect of land. It was also urged, in the
third place, that though it may be open to Parliament to amend
the provisions in respect of fundamental rights contained in Part
TII, the amendment made in that behalf would have to be tested
in the light of provisions of Art. 13 (2) of the Constitution. The
argument was that the law to which Art. 13 (2) applied would
include a law pa%ed by Parliament by virtue of its constituent
power to amend the Constitution, and so, its validity will have to
be tested by Art. 13 (2) itself. All these arguments were rejected
by t11is Court and it was held in that case that the Constitution
(First Amendment) Act was legally valid. The same question
arose for consideration in Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan(')
with regard to the validity of the Constitution (Seventeenth
Amendment) Act. 1964. In that case, the petitioners in their
(Tj [1950) S.C.R. 88.
(3) [1959) S.C.R. 12. t20-3,,
15) (1966] 3 S.C.R. 744.
(7) (1965) 1 S.C.R. 9H
(2) [1951] S.C.R. 451. 456.
(4) (1961) 1 S.C.R. 809_, 864.
(6) (t952] S.C.R. 89.
946
SUPRBMB COURT REPORTS
[1907] 2 S.C.lc.
Writ PetiJions in this Coun contendetl that the Constitution
(Seventeenth Amendment) Act was constitutionally invalid since
the power~ prescribed by An. 226, which is in Ch. ,V, Part VI
of the Constitution, were likely to be affected by the Seventeenth
Amendment, and therefore the special procedure laid dowi. under
An. 368 should have been followed. It was further contended
in that case thut the decision of this Court in Sankari Prasad's(')
case should be reconsidered. Both the contentions were rerejected by this Court by a majority Judgment and it was held that
the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act amended the fundamental rights solely with the object of assisting the 3tate Legislatures to give effect to the socio-economic policy of the party in
power and its effect on Art. 226 was incidental and insignificant
and the impugned Act therefore fell under the substantive part of
Art. 368 and did not attract the proviso to that article. It was
further held by this Court that there was no justification for reconsidering Sankari Pravad's(') case. On behalf of the respondents
it was submitled by the Additional Solicitor-General that this was
a very strong case for the application of the principle of stare
Jecisis. In my opinion, this contention must be accepted as correct.
1f the argumr.nts urged by the petitioners are to prevail it would lead
to the inevitable consequence that th~ amendments made :o the
Constitution both ;n 1951 and in 1955 would be rendered invalid
and a large number of decisions dealing wi1h the validity of the
Acts inclucied in the 9th Schedule which were pronounced by this
Cour: ever since the decision in Sankari Prasad's(') case was declared, would also have to be overru!ed. !t was also pointed out
that Parliament. the Government and the neople have acted on
the faith of the decision of this Court in Sankar/ Prasad's(') case
and titles to property have been transferred, obligations have been
incurred and rights have been acquired in the implementation of
the legislation included in the 9th Schedule.
The effect of land refonn legislation has been clearly summarised in Ch. VIII of Draft Outline on Fourth Plan as follows :
"Fifteen years ajlO when the First Plan .,.as being
formulated, intennedtary tenures like zamindaris, jugin
and inarns covered more than 40 per cent of the area.
There were large disparities in the ownership or land
held under ryotwari tenure which covered the
60
per cent
area; and a substantial
other
portion of the land wa~ cultivated through tenants-atwill and share...:roppers who paid about on~half the
produce as rent. Most holdings were small and fragmented. Besides. there was a large population of landless agricultural labourers. In these conditions, the
principal measures recommended for securing the objec(ll Jl952J S.C'.R. 89.
A
B
c
D
E
'
G
H
Gf•LAKNATH
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
v. PUNJAB (Ramaswami, J.)
94'1"
tives of the land policy were the abolition of intermediary tenures, reform of the tenancy system, including
fixation of fair rent at one-fifth to one-fourth of the gross
produce, security of tenure for the U:nant, bringing
tenants into direct relationship with the State and investing in them ownership of land. A ceiling on land
holding was also recommended so that some surplus land
may be made available for redistribution to the landless
agricultural workers. Another important part of the
programme was consolidation of agricultural holdings
and increase in the size of the operational unit to an
economic scale through cooperative methods.
Abolition of Intermediaries.-During the past 15
years, progress has been made in several directions. The
programme for the abolition of intermediaries has been
carried out practically all over the country. About 20
million tenants of former intermediaries came into direct
relationship with the State and became owners of their
holdings. State Governments are now engaged in the
assessment and payment of compensation. There were
some initial delays but a considerable progress has been
made. in this direction in recent years and it is hoped
that the issue of compensatory bonds will be completed
in another two years.
Tenancy Reform.-To deal with the problem of
tenants-at-will in the ryotwari areas and of sub-tenants
in the zamindari areas, a good deal of legislation has
been enacted. Provisions for security of tenure, for
bringing them into direct relation with the State and
converting them into owners have been made in several
States. As a result, about 3 million tenants and sharecroppers have acquired ownership of more than 7
million acres.
Ceiling on Holdings.-Laws imposing ceiling on agricultural holdings have been enacted in all the States.
ln the former Punjab area, however, the State Government has the power to settle tenants on land in excess
of the permissible limit although it has pot set a ceiling
on ownership. According to available reoorts over
2 million acres of surplus areas in excess of the ceiling
limits have been declared or taken J)OSsession of by
Government."
It is true that the principle of stare declsis may not strictly aTJply to
a decision on ivconstitutional point. There is no restriction in the
Constitution itself which prevent~ this Court from reviewing its
earlier decisions or even to depart from them in the interest of
public good. It is true that the problem of construing constitutional provisions cannot be adequately solved by merely adopting
948
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1%7] 2 S.C.R.
the literal construction of the words used in the various articles.
The Constitution is an organic d0Cument and it is intended to serve
as a guid~ to the solution of changing problems which the Court
may have to face from time to time. It is manifest that in a
progressive and dynamic society the character of these problems
is bound to change with the inevitable consequence that the relevant words used in the Constitution may also change their meaning and significance. Even so, the Court is reluctant to accede
to the suggestion that its earlier decisions should be frequently
reviewed or departed from. In such a case the test should be :
what is the nat1Jre of the error alleged in the earlier decision, what
is its impact on the public good and what is the compelling character ot the considerations urged in support of the contrary view.
It is also a relevant factor that the earlier decision has been followed in a large number of cases. that Jitles to property have passed
and multitude of rights and obligations have been cre.1ted in
comcquence of the earlier decision. I have already dealt .vith
the merits of the contention of the petitioners with regard to the
validity of the impugned Act and I have given reasons for holding
that the impugned Act is constitutionally valid an<i the contentions
of the petitioners are unsound. Even on the assumption that it
is possible to take a different view and to hold that the impugned
Act is unconstitutional I am of opinion that the principle of
store decisis must be applied to the present case and the plea made
by the petitioners for reconsideration of Sankari Prasad'l( 1 ) case
and the decision in Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan(') is wholly
unjustified and must be rejected.
In Writ Petition No. 202 of I 966, it was contended by Mr.
Nambyar tl1at the continuance of the Proclamation of Emergency
under Art. 352 of the Constitution was a gross violation of power
beer.use the emergency had ceased to exist. It was also contended
that Art. 358 should he so construed as to confine its operation
Clnly to lel!islative or executive action relevant to the Proclamation
of Emergency. It was submitted that the Mysore :.;tate was not
~ border area and the land refom1 lc1?islation of that State had no
relevant connection with the Proclamation of Emergency and the
fundamental rights conferred by Art. 19 cannot be suspended so
far as the petitions are concerned. 1 do not think that it i' necessary to express any opinion on these point~ because the Writ
Petition must fail on the other grounds which I have already discussed above. It is also not necessary for me to express an
orir.ion on Jhe doctrine of prospective overruling of legislation.
For the reasons already r.xpressed I hold that all these petition'
fail and should he dismissed. but there will be no order a' to
costs.
G.C.
11°l'll952) S.C R-·R<i.(2) [196'i I S CR 933
Petitions tlis111i.'i-'~etl.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
Report an error or ask for masking: grievance@lawgrids.org