M/S. GURUSWAMY & CO. ETC. versus STATE OF MYSORE & ORS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 26 September 1966 | [1967] 1 S.C.R. 548 | 1966 INSC 185
Key facts
- Decided
- 26 September 1966
- Bench
- K. SUBBA RAO*, M. HIDAYATULLAH*, RAGHUBAR DAYAL*, S.M. SIKRI, R.S. BACHAWAT
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 1580/1966
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1967] 1 S.C.R. 548
- Neutral citation
- 1966 INSC 185
Text of the judgment
A
M/S. GURUSWAMY & CO. ETC.
V.
STATE OF MYSORE & ORS.
September 26, 1966
(K. SUBBA RAO, C. J., M. HIDAYATULLAH, S. M. SIKRI, R. S.
.
B
BACHAWAT AND RAGHUBAR.DAYAL, JJ.)
Mysore Health Cess Act, 1962-Competence of the State Legislature
to levy health cess-Validity of Act-Cess whether excise duty under
lttm 1 of Schedule A of the Act.
Mysore Excise Act (Act S of 1901) s. 18, and Hyderabad Abkarl
Act (Act 1 of 1916 F)-Levy of duty on liquor by way of shop rentHighest bidder given exclusive right to sell-Such duty whether an excise
duty within meaning of Entry S 1 of List II of the Constitution.
The Mysore Health Cess Act 1962 provided in s. 3 for the levy and
collection of a health cess at the rate of nine naye paise in the rupee,
inter alia, on the items of the State revenue mentioned in Schedule A.
Item I of Schedule A mentioned duties of excise leviable by the State
under any law for the time being in force in any area of the State on
alcoholic liquors for human consumption (and opium etc.) manufactured
or produced in the State and for countervailing duties levied on similar
g?Ods manufactured or produced elsewhere. The Mysore Excise Act,
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1901 empowered the State Government to grant exclusive or other privi~
lege of selling by retail any country liquor or intoxicating drugs to any
person or persons on such conditions and for such period as it thought
fit. According to s. 18 of the Act the privilege of sale in a specified
shop was to be disposed of periodically by public auction held by the
exctse authorities. As a result of such public auctions held subject to
the terms and conditions notified by the Slate Government the appellant.!
were granted the exclusive privilege of selling country liquor in certain
arrack shops, beer tavcrcs and toddy shops in
consideration
of
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their
agreeing to pay specified 'shop rent' thereon at the rate of nine naye paise
in the rupee. The appellants challenged the levy of tho health cess on
the shop rent in writ petition before the High C-Oun and thereafter appealed to this Coun wirh the following contentions :
F
(I) That the Mysore Lcgisllture was not competenr to enact the
impugned Act because no entry in List II or List Ill authorities a tax on
tax or a health-tax and that if the inlention was to levy a surcharge on
existing items of revenue the State legislature could have easily used the
words "surch3rge' or 'additiol)al revenue'.
(2) Even if the impugned tax was valid the Act did nor empower the
levy of health cess on shop rent because shop rent was not an excise duty
falling within Schedule A of the impugned Act or Entry 51 of List II.
HELD: Per Subba Rao, C. J., Sikri and Dayal, JJ. (i) By the
impugned Act the State Legislature was levying a health cess on a number of items of State revenue or tax and it adopted the form of calling it
a cess and prescribed the rate of nine naye paise in the rupee on the
State revenue or tax. Section 4 of the impugned Act makes it quite.
clear that the cess is Ieviable and recoverable in the same manner u 1
items of land revenue, State revenue or tax. In the context, the word 1
'on' in s. 3 does not indicate that the subject matter of taxation is land
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revenue or State Revenue but that 9% of the land revenue or Stato
revenue is to be. levied and collected, the subject matter remaining the
same as in the law imposing liµ1d revenue or any duty or tax. .It wo
read ss. 3 and 4 together the fact that the words 'stircbarge' or 'additional
duty' bav~ not been mentioned does not detract from the real substance
of the legislation, Accordingly the Mysore Legislature was com.Potent to
enact the law under the various entries of List II which enable 1t to !en:
land revenue or the duties of excise or the other taxes mentioned
s. 3(iii) of the impugned Act. [560 A-CJ
m
(ii) For a duty to be a duty of excise it must be shown that the duty
bas Leen levied on goods which have been produced or manufai:tured,
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the taxable event being production or manufacture of goods. However,
it is not easy to decide in a particular case whether the particular levy is
a levy in respect of manufacture or production of ~oods. This question
bas to be decided on the facts of each case but Ill deciding it certain
principles must be borne in mind. First, one of the essential ·characteristics of an excise duty is uniformity of incidence. Secondly, the duty
inust be closely related to production or manufacture of goods. It does
not matter if the levy is made not at the moment of production or manufacture but at a later stage. If a duty has been levied on an excisable
article but this duty is collected from a retailer it does not necessarily
cease to be an excise duty. Thirdly, if a levy is made for the privilege
of selling an excisable article and the excisable article has already borne
the duty and the duty has been paid, there must be clear terms in the
chargin~ section to indicate that what is being levied for the Pll!JlOSe of
the privilege of sale is in fact a duty of excise. [562 E-F; 563 HJ
There is no presumption that if no othe·r taxable event has intervened, the levy must be treated to be connected with production or manu..
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facture.
The levy in the present case was a payment for the exclusive privilege
of selling today from certain shops. The licencee paid what he considered to be equivalent to the value of the right. Secondly, it had no close
relation to the production or manufacture of toddy. Thirdly, the only
relation it had to the production or manufacture of toddy, was that 1t
enabled the licencee to seU it. But he might sell little, less .or more than
he anticipated, depending on various factors. Fourthly, toddy had already paid one excise duty in the form of tree tax, but he need not tap
himself. Fifthly, the duty was not uniform in incidence because the
amount collected had no relation to the quantity or quality of the produce but bad only relation to what the petitioner thought be could recoup by the ·sale of the excisable articles. What be recouped would depend upon the amount of sales and the conditions prevailing during the
licensing year. Sixthly, thete were no express words showing that what
was being realised by the appellants was an excise duty. Seventhly the
privilege of selling was auctioned well before the goods came into
existence. [564 B-E]
H
For the above reasons the duty was not an excise duty within the
meaning of item (i) of Schedule A of the Health Cess Act or Entry 51
of List II of the Constitution. The State of My>ore bad therefore no
authority to levy and collect health cess on shop rent [567 0-H]
·Per Bachawat J (concurring) :
A chaige for licence to sell an
excisable article may be a fee or a tax: If it is a tax, it can satisfy the
test of a duty of excise when it is so connected with the manufacture o:r
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production of an article as to be in effect a tax on the manufacture or
production. Otherwise such a tax does not fall within the c1assificatiou
of a duty of excise. In the present case the sh~p rent was not connect-
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SUPRl!MB COURT REPORTS
[1967] I S.C.R.
ed with the production or manufacture of arrack, beer or toddy and was
therefore not a duty of excise. The State Legislature was not compe·
tent to make a law levying a surcharge on the shop rent under Enrry 51,
List ll. [584 C-Fl
Per Hidayatullah, I. (dissenting) : The persons who bid at these auc.
tions were themselves the producers or manufacturers. They bid for the
exclusive priviJegc or selling. which in so far as Government was con..
cemcd was a means of collecting the anticipated excise duty at one go
from a producer or manufacturer before the goods became a part of tho
general stock of goods in the country. Jn other words the person who
was charged was the producer or manufacturer and the duty was levied
from him before he could sell or obtain liquor which had not borne
excise duly so far. The duty was therefore clearly a duty of excise
whether the matter was considered in the light of economic theory, legislative practice or judicial authority. [572 0-E]
Case law considered.
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 1580-
1588 and 1590-1600 of 1966.
Appeals from the judgment and order dated November 17,
1965 of the Mysore High Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 295 to 300,
453 and 914/63, 1076, 1175 to 1175, 2053 and 2076/64 and 1132,
1260, 1420 and 1321165.
D.R. Venkatesa Iyer, 0. C. Mathur, J. B. Dadachanji and
Ravinder Narain, for "the appellants (in C. As. Nos. 1580-1586
and 1588 of 1966).
M. K. Nambyar, D. R. Venkatesa Iyer, 0. C. Mathur, J. B·
Dadachanji and Ravinder Narain, for the appellants (in C. As.
Nos. 1590-1594, 1596 and 1599-1600 of 1966).
M. C. Setalvad, D. R. Venkatesa Iyer, 0. C. Mathur, J. B.
Dadachanji and Ravinder Narain, for the appellants (in C. As.
Nos. 1597 and 1598 of 1966).
K. R. Chaudhuri, S. P. Satyanarayana Rao and K. Rajendra
Chaudhuri, for the appellant (in C. A. No: 1595 of 1966).
R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents (in C. As. Nos. 1580-1586,
1588 and 1595 of 1966).
H. R. Gokhale, B. R. L. Iyengar and R. H. Dhebar, for the
respondents (in C. As. Nos. 1590-1600 of 1966).
The Judgment of SUBBA RAO, C.J. and SIKRI and RAGHUBAR
DAYAL, JJ. was delivered by SIKRI, J. HIDAYATULLAH, J. delivered
a dissenting Opinion. BACHAWAT, J. delivered a separate concurring
Opinion
Sikri, J. These appeals are directed against the judgment of
the High Court of Mysore, dated November 17, 1965, disposing
of 49 petitions filed under art. 226 of the Constitution. The High
Court disposed of the petitions by one common judgment as
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identical questions of law were involved in all of them. We will
also dispose of these appeals by this judgment because they raise
substantially identical questions of law. These appeals may, however, be divided into two groups; one dealing With the licences for
the sale of Toddy and the other dealing with the licences for the
sale of arrack.
·
We may give the facts in one appeal, Civil Appeal No. 1590
of 1966, arising out of Writ Petition No. 1076 of 1964. The appellant, M/s Guruswami & Co.-hereinafter referred to as the peti- ·
tioner-filed writ petition alleging that the firm was a licensed
Excise contractor with its principal office at Bangalore, and that
<it had been the licensee of the Bangalore Urban group of 26 shops
f!;ir the year July 1, 1963 to June30, 1964. Thepetitionercontinued
to be the licensee for the same group of shops with five more new
shops to be opened for two more years, viz., 1964-65 and 1965-66.
The petitioner paid shop rent or the 'kist' for this group of toddy
shops amounting to Rs. 3,61,116 a month during the year 1963-64
and Rs. 4,41,216 a month for the next two years. This kist amount
was determined at the tender-cum-auction sale of the exclusive
privilege of vending toddy in the shops of this group during the
relevant period. The petitioner paid amount equal to two months
kist as initial and security dep_osit for each of these years. It was
further stated that notice was given under the notification dated
April 20, 1963, that the exclusive privilege of selling country liquors
during the twelve months, beginning from July l, 1963, and ending
with June 30, 1964, in the shops or groups of shops specified in
Schedules I and II of the notification, situated in th.e district of
Bangalore will be disposed of by tender-cum-auction by the Deputy
Commissioners of the respective districts or other officers specially
empowered by the Deputy Commissioners for the purpose. _The
notification, in para 16, mentioned rates of duty, price, efo. on the
several kinds of excisable articles. For instance, on molasses arrack
35° U.P. the duty was Rs. 2 ·73 per litre, price Rs. 0 · 55 per litre
and the minimum retail selling price Rs. 0·61 per decilitre. Under
the head Toddy is given:
. Tree tax per tree
"
l. Date . ,.
·Rs. 7·50
2. Coconut
Rs. 8·50
· (per each half-year
ending December
and June)."
Then the. minimum selling price of toddy is prescribed. It was
further stated in para 25 of the notification as follows :
"25. For the shops of Bangalore North and South
Taluks, City and Civil Area, tapping may be allowed
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SUPRBMB COURT REPORTS
[1967] l S.C.R.
in such areas of Tumkur and Hassan Districts or other
Districts as may be notified by the Excise Commissioner
and the areas so notified may at any time be ·altered by
notification by the Excise Commissioner.
For .shops of Taluks of Bangalore, Rural District,
similar facilities may be given if found necessary."
A
B
Para 18 of the notification further provides that "sales tax and
octroi at the prescribed rates and other taxes that may be levied
under any other law shall also be payable."
The petitioner further alleged that he was paying tree rent
to the owners of toddy-yielding trees for allowing him to draw
today from the trees. The petitioner also paid education and health
cess at the prescribed rates in pursuance of the condition in para
No. I 7 of the aforesaid notification.
A similar notification was issued on April 27, 1964, for the
sale of excise privileges for 1964-65, and alternatively for 1965-66.
It was mentioned in para 18 of this notification that health cess
at the rate of nine naye paise per rupee shall also be payable on
the shop rent and tree tax on toddy and other duties of extjse levied
on the following articles in accordance with the Mysore Health
Cess Act (Mysore Act No. 28 of 1962), hereinafter referred to
as the impugned Act, namely, (I) Mandya made Special Liquor;
(2) I.M.F.L.; (3) arrack; and (4) beer. The petitioner alleged that
as a result of the impugned Act it would have to pay Rs. 86,518
more as health cess for the year 1964-65.
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The petitioner then challenged the impugned Act as ultra
vires on various grounds which need not be mentioned at this stage.
The petitioner claimed the following reliefs:
(a) to declare that the State of Mysore has no authority
to levy and collect 'health cess' under the Mysore
Health Cess Act 1962, and its predecessor Act of
1951 on shop-rent, tree-tax, tree-rent or any other
item of revenue payable by the petitioner in respect
of its business in toddy;
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(b) to issue a writ, order or direction quashing condition No. 18 in the notification dated April 27, 1964,
which relates to the levy of health cess on their business of toddy;
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(c) to issue a writ of prohibition or order or direction
in the nature of a writ restraining all or any of the
respondents from enforcing the above impugned condition or by any other similar demand for payment
of health cess under the Health Cess Act; and
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(d) to issue a writ of mandamus directing refund of
health cess illegally collected from the petitioner or
any other consequential order and direction as may
meet the ends of justice, for refund of Health Cess
already collected under the provisions of the Health
Cess Act of 1962 and 1951 in respect of toddy.
B
We may mention that before the High Court a number of
points were raised which have not been debated before us. Before·
the High Court it was agreed by all the parties that. the levy made
under the impugned Act was a tax though called a cess. In view of
this concession, the High Court considered it unnecessary to examine
the nature of the levy made under the Act. The High Court held
C that the impugned Act, except the Explanation to Clause I of
Schedule A, was valid and it accordingly allowed the petition
· only to the. extent of striking down the Explanation.
D
I
Mr. Nambyar, who appears for the appellants, in the appeals
connected with sale of toddy, has taken two main points before
us :
(a) That the Mysore Legislature was not competent to enact
the impugned Act because (a) the health cess under the iinpugned
Act was in reality a tax and not a mere cess; (b) the State Legislature had no competence to levy a health ~ax; and (c) the levy was
in suootance a tax on tax not pernlissible under the Constitution.
(2) If the impugned Act was valid, the Act did not empower
the levy of health cess on shop rent because shop rent did not fall
within Schedule A of the impugned Act or Entry 51 of Llst II.
We may mention that he conceded that the tree-tax was
ali excise duty and he confined his case to shop rent or kist.
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Before we deal with the points raised by the learned counsel,
it is necessary to set out the relevant provisions of the Mysore
Excise Act (Act V of 1901) and the impugned Act. We may .mention that in some appeals the relevant law is the Hyderabad Abkari
Act No. 1 of 1316 Fasli, and not the Mysore Excise Act, but it
is common ground between the parties that there is no materia:.
difference between the provisions contained in the Mysore Excise
Act and the Abkari Act. The Mysore Excise Act was eiyicted
in 1901. Jn· s. 3(1) it defined "excise revenue" to mean "revenue
derived or derivable from any duty, fee, tax, rent, fine or confiscation
imposed or ordered under the provisions of this Act or of any
other law for the time being in force relating to liquor or intoxicating drugs". There was no defiilition of the words "excise duty"
in this Act at all. This Act substantially . followed the Madras
Abkari Act, 1886 (Madras Act I of 1886). It is interesting to note
that the Madras Abkari Act was amended by. the Adaptation of
554
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[1967] l S.C.R.
Indian Laws Order, 1937, and clause (22) was inserted in the definition section, s. 3, as follows :
"(22) "excise duty" and "countervailing duty" mean
any such excise duty or countervailing duty, as the case
may be, as is mentioned in item 40 of List II in the Seventh
Schedule to the Government of India, Act 1935."••
But the definition of "abkari-revenue" continued to exist in the
Madras Abkari Act even after the Adaptation of Indian Laws
Order, 1937. Clause (14) of s. 3 of the Mysore Excise Act defined
"sale" or "selling" as including any transfer otherwise than by
way of gift. Clause (18) defined "manufacture" as including every
process, whether natural or artificial, by which any fermented,
spirituous or intoxicating liquor or intoxicating drug is produced or
prepared, and also re-distillation and every process for the rectification of liquor. Section 12 provides as under :
"12. No liquor or intoxicating drug shall be manufactured; no hemp plant (Cannobis Sati1•a or lndica) or
coca plant (Erythroxylum coca) shall be cultivated; no
toddy-producing trees shall be tapped; no toddy
shall be drawn from any tree; no portion of the
hemp or coca plant from which any intoxicating drug can
be manufactured shall be collected; no distillery or brewery
shall be constructed or worked;
no liqour shall be bottled for sale; and no person shall
.use, keep, or have in his possession any materials, still,
utensil, implement or apparatus whatsoever for the
purpose of manufacturing any liquor other than toddy or
any intoxicating drug except under the authority and
subject to the terms and conditions of a license granted
by the Deputy Commissioner in that behalf, or under
the provisions of Section 21:
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Provided that the Government may, by notification,
direct that in any local area it shall not be necessary to
take out a license for the manufacture of liquor for bona
fide home consumption.
Licenses granted under this section shall extend to and
include servants and other persons employed by the
licensees and acting on their behalf."
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•• We have seen various acts which were in force in some of the erstwhile
provinces of British lndiB and similar definition was inserted in all these
Acts; e.g.
(I) Tho Pul\iab Excise Act (Punjab 'Act·l of 1914)
(2) Tho Bombay Abkari Act (Bombay Act S of 1878)
(3) The Bengal Excise Act (Bengal Act S of 19D9)
(4) The United Provinces Excise Act (U.P. Act 6 of 1910)
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In short, the section prohibits the manufacture of liquor or
intoxicating drugs except under the provisions of the Act.
Section 15 prohibits the sale of liquor and intoxicating drugs without license, and gives power to exempt sale of toddy. Section
16 reads thus :
"It shall be lawful for the Government to grant to
any person or persons on such conditions and for such
period as may seem fit the exclusive or other privilege(!) of manufacruring or supplying by wholesale, or
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(2) of selling by retail, or
(3) of manufacturing or supplying by wholesale and selling by retail, any country liquor or
intoxicating drugs within any local area.
No grantee of any privilege under this section shall exercise
the same until he has received a license in that behalf from
the Deputy Commissis:mer.
In such cases, if the Governn\ent shall, by notification,
so direct, the provisions of section 12 relating to toddy
and toddy-producing trees shall not apply."
E
The notifications set out above may be taken to have been issued
under s;· 16 for the purpose of giving a privilege of selling by retail
[see s. 16(2)). Sections 17 and 18 may be set out in full :
"17. A duty shall, if the Government so direct, be
levied on all liquor and intoxicating drugs(a) permitted to be imported under section 6;
'
or
(b) permitted to be exported under section 7;
or
(c) manufactured under any license granted under
section 12; or
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(d) manufactured at any distillery established
under section 14; or
(e) permitted under section 11 to be transported;
(ee) issued from a distillery or warehouse licensed
or established under section 12 or section 14; or
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(f) sold in any part of Mysore;
of such amount as the Government may, from time to
time. prescribe."
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"18. Such duty may be levied in one or more of
the following ways :(a) by duty ofexcise to be charged in the case
of spirits or beer either on the quantity produced
in or passed out of a distillery, brewery or warehouse licensed or established under section 12
or section 14 as the case may be; or in accordance
with such scale of equivalents, calculated on the
quantity of materials used or by the degree of
attenuation of the wash or wort, as the case may
be, as· the Government may prescribe;
(b) in the case of intoxicating drugs, by a
duty to be rateably cilarged on the quantity
produced or manufactured or sold by wholesale
or issued from a warehouse licensed or established
under section 14;
(c)· by payment of a sum in consideration of
the grant of any exclusive or other privilege(!) of manufacturing or supplying by wholesale; or
(2) of selling by retail, or
(3) of manufacturing or supplying by wholesale and selling by retail any country liquor
or intoxicating drug in any local area and for
any specified period of time;
(d) by fees on licensed for manufacture or of
sale;
(e) in the case of toddy, or spirits manufactured frpm toddy, by a tax on each tree from
which toddy is drawn, to be paid in such
instalments and for such period as the Government
may direct; or
(f) by import, export or transport-duties
assessed in such manner as the Government may
direct.
Provided that when there is a difference of duty as
between two license periods such difference may be collected in respect of all stocks of country liquor or intoxi.
eating drugs held by licensees at the close of the former
period."
.
It would be noticed that the words "a duty" OCCilr in s. 17 and in
s. 18{a) the words "duty of excise" occur. In the Madras Abkari
Act, J886, s. l7, before the Adaptation Order, 1937, was also in
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similar terms, but after the Adaptation· Order the opening part of
s. 17 read as follows :
~
"An excise duty or countervailing .duty of such
:imount . as tJ:te State G?vernment may prescribe shall,
if they so direct, be levied on all excisable articles."
B
We may mention that "excisable article" was defined in s. 3(23)
or the Madras Abkari Act to mean (a) any alcoholic liquor for
human consumption; or (b) any intoxicating drug. Section 28 of
the Mysore Excise Act is also relevant and the relevant part reads
as follows :
"All duties, taxes, fines and fees payable to the Government direct under any of the provisions of this Act or
of any license or permit issued under it, and all amounts
due to the Government by any grantee of a privilege
or by any farmer under this Act or by any person on
account of any contract relating to the Excise revenue,
may be recovered from the person primarily liable to
pay the same, or from his surety (if any), as if they were
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arrears of land revenue ...... "
Section 29 enables rules to be made and the rules throw some
light on the conditions of the license and the privilege obtained
by the petitioner. Section V of the Mysore Rules regulating sales
of Excise Privileges prescribes the conditions applicable to toddy
E licenses. Condition No. 2 reads as follows :
"For the supply of toddy to his shops, the licensee
shall have the privilege of obtaining subject to tree-tax
rules, toddy-yielding trees in the groves assigned to his
shops or groups of shops, and he shall be at liberty to
manufacture toddy from the trees in private lands under
private arrangements, between himself and the owners
of such lands ...... "
Condition No. 2 further enables the Deputy Commissioner to
refuse to grant license for tapping certain trees. Licensees are
entitled to purchase toddy from any licensed toddy shop-keeper
on application to the Inspector or Assistant Inspector who will
G grant the required permits on proof of the necessity for the same
in certain cases. Condition No. 4 reads as follows :
"l'he licensee shall be responsible to Government for
all payments of instalments of fees due on account of
tree-tapping licenses granted on his application in his own
name or in the names of his nominees under the conditions
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set forth therein and in the rules relating thereto."
Condition No. 7 provides for tree rent at Rs. 0-8-0 per tree on
Government trees sought to be tapped. Condition No. 8 prescribes
558
SUPREME COUllT llBPORTS
(1967) I S.C.R.
conditions for tapping the trees. Condition No. 17 enables treetapping licenses to be given to the licensed toddy shop-keepers.
Let us first examine the above provisions of the Mysore Excise
Act, and the rules and notifications made under it. It appears to
us that by ss. 12 and 15 of the Act manufacture and sale of toddy
is prohibited, but s. 16 enables the government to grant an exclusive or other privilege, illler alia, of manufacturing or selling
by retail. It is the latter privilege which was auctioned under the
two notifications mentioned above. Section 17 is the charging
section and it is quite clear that the word 'duty' in the opening
sentence docs not mean only excise duty. If an import duty or
export duty is levied under s. 17 it would not be an excise duty
within Entry 51 List II. Section 18 prescribes the modes of levy
Qf the duti¥. We are concerned with the mode mentioned in s.
18(c) (2), i.e. by payment of a sum in consideration of the grant of
exclusive or other privileges of selling by retail. It is noteworthy
that s. 28 distinguishes amount due to the government by any
grantee of a privilege from duties, taxes and fees.
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Mr. Setalvad, who appears for the appellants in arrack appeals
draws our attention to the existence of the words "duty of acise"
in s. 18(a) and the absence of the word "excise" in s. IS(b), and
contends that apart from the duties collected under s. 18(a) no
other duty was excise duty. We are unable to accept this contention because some at least of the duties collected under s. 18(b)
would be excise duties. However, this much may be conceded
that the Mysore Excise Act not only does not expressly call the duty
collected under s. 18(c) (2) an excise duty, but in s. 28 seems to
mention it differently.
The licences granted to the petitioner were governed by detailed
regulatory provisions regarding sale, but condition No. 2 makes
it clear that the license is in the main for selling. Further if he
taps toddy he has to obtain toddy-tapping licenses and pay fees.
A
B
c
D
'
We have already mentioned that the petitioner obtained thAi
privilege of selling toddy at certain shops by bidding at auctions
held in pursuance of the two notifications mentioned above.
We may now notice the provisions of the Mysore Health
Cess Act, 1962. Sectim;1 3 is the charging soction and reads as
follows :
"3. Levy of health cess-There shall be levied and
collected a health cess at the rate of nine naye paise in
the rupee on,(i) all items of land revenue;
(ii) the items of State Revenue mentioned in
Schedule A;. and
G
B
-
GURUSWAMY & CO. v. MYSORE
A
(Sikri, J.)
559
(iii) the items of taxes mentioned in Schedule B
levied under any law for the time being in
force by a local authority."
B
c
Section 4 reads thus :
"4. Recovery of health cess-The health cess payable
under section 3 shall be levied, assessed and recovered
alongwith the items of land revenue, State revenue or
tax on which such cess is levied, and the provisions of the
law and the rules, orders and notifications made or issued
thereunder for the time being in force, shall apply to the
levy, assessment and recovery of the health cess as they
apply in respect of the levy, assessment and recovery of
the said items of land revenue, State revenue or tax."
We are concerned with s. 3(ii), i.e. items of State revenue mentioned
in Schedule A, and these items in Schedule A are as follows :
D
E
'
"SCHEDULE A.
I. Duties of excise leviable by the State under any law
for the time being in force in any area of the State, on the
following goods manufactured or produced in the State
and countervailing duties levied on similar goods manufactured or produced elsewhere :(a) Alcoholic liquors for human consumption;
(b) Opium, Indian hemp and other narcotic drugs
and narcotics.
Explanation.-The duty of excise leviable under this
item includes the duties, payments, fees and other amounts
payable under section 18 of the Mysore Excise Act, 1901,
and similar impost or payment by whatever name called
payable under any other law in force in any area of the
State of Mysore."
We have already mentioned that the Explanation has been held
by the High Court to be ultra vires. It will be noted that the remain-
G
H
ing part of Item I in Schedule A is in substance a reproduction of
entry 51 of List II of the Constitution.
VYe may now take up the points raised by Mr. Nambyar. Regarding the first point, he says that it is a tax on a tax and as no entry
in List II or List III mentions a tax on a tax, or health tax, the
impugned Act is invalid. He further says that if it was the intention
to levy a surcharge on existing items of revenue, the legislature
could '1ave easily used the words 'surcharge' or 'additional duty'
in a,,;ordance with the existing legislative practice. He says that it
:Is not open to us to add or omit any words and that the nature
or identity of thL subject-matter can only be gathered from s. 3
560
SuPUMB COtlaT. ltBPOl.TS
(1967] I S.C.R.
which is the charging section. We are, however, not impressed
by any of these- arguments. It seems to us clear that the legislature was levying a health cess on a number of items of State revenue
or tax and it adopted the form of calling it a cess and prescribed
the rate of nine naye paise in the rupee on the State revenue or
tax. Section 4 of the impugned Act makes it quite clear that the cess
is leviable and recoverable in the same manner as items of land
revenue, State revenue or tax. ·In the context, the word 'on' in
s. 3 does not indicate that the subject-matter of taxation is land
revenue or State revenue, but that 9 % of the land revenue or State
revenue is to be levied and collected, the subject-matter remaining
the same as in ,the law imposing land revenue or any duty or tax.
If we read ss. 3 and 4 together the fact that the words "surcharge"
or "additional duty" have not been mentioned does not detract
from the real substance of the legislation. Accordingly we hold
that the Mysore Legislature was competent to enact the law under
the various entries of List II which enable it to levy land revenue or
the duties of excise, or the other taxes mentioned in s. 3(iii) of the
impugned Act.
This takes us to the second point raised by the learned counsel.
He says that the shop rent is not a duty of excise and does not fall
within Entry 51 of List II, or Schedule A of the Act. We have
already mentioned that he has conceded that the tree-tax is an excise
duty and we need not consider the question of tree-tax at all. His
argument in brief is as follows :
The duty of excise is primarily a duty levied on manufacture
or production of goods, the taxable event being the manufacture
or production. He says that the .taxable event in this case is not
manufacture or production. He further says that the shop rent
is the price given by the petitioner for the privilege of selling toddy,
i.e., for the privilege of carrying on a business. 1bis privilege of
selling, he says, had no relation to production or manufacture of
toddy because the production or manufacture of toddy was complete
before· the petitioner started to sell toddy in his shops. He further
says that the petitioner pays tree-tax which is an excise duty. He
also contrasts the language of ss. 17 and 18 of the Mysore Excise
Act and says that the words "excise duty" are used in s. 18(a) and
not in s. 18(c). He has relied on a number of cases which we will
presently consider.
Mr. Gokhale, the learned counsel for the State, controvcru
these arguments, but we may mention that he has not sought to
sustain the levy on shop rent on any other entry apart from· entry
51 of List II. Therefore, we should not be taken to have expressed
any opinion on the point whether· levy on shop rent or kist can be
justified under any other entry in List II. The point was e~pressly
put to him and he said that he relied only on Entry 51, List ll.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
GURUSWAMY & CO. V. MYSORE (Sikri; J.)
A
B
561
Mr. Gokhale. relies strongly on A. B. Abdulkadir v. The State
of Kera/a('), and says that the. appeal cannot be decided against
him without dissenting from the decision in that case. Mr. Gokhale
has put two propositions before us. He says: (1) that every duty
on goods produced or manufactured is excise duty unless it is
established that it is some other duty; and (2) that, at any rate,
if it is a levy made from the stage of production to the stage of
consumption it is an excise duty. If in this period no other taxable
event has intervened then the levy must be treated to be connected
with production or manufacture and the method by which the
levy is collected is not decisive.
c
The nature of excise duty has been considered by the Federal
Court, the Privy Council and this Court on a number of occasions,
and it will serve no useful purpose to reproduce the relevant portions
of the judgments in these cases. It will suffice if we mention two
decisions of this Court and the language employed by this Court
in those cases.
~
D
In R. C.Jall v. Union of India(2), Subba Rao, J., as he then
was, speaking for the Court, after noticing In re the Central Provinces and Berar Act No. XIV of 1938,(3) The Province of Madras
v. Boddu Paidanna & Sons,(4) and Governor-General in Council v.
Province of Madras(•) observed as follows :
E
F
G
H
"With great respect, we accept the principles laid down
by the said three decisions, in the matter of levy of an
excise duty and the machinery for collection thereof.
Excise duty is primarily a duty on the production or
manufacture of goods produced or manufactured within
the country. It is an indirect duty which the manufacturer or producer passes on to the ultimate consumer, that
is, its ultimate incidence will always be on the consumer.
Therefore,_ subject always to the legislative competence
of the taxing authority, the said tax can be levied at a
convenient stage so long as the character of the impost,
that is, it is a duty on the manufacture or production,
is not lost. The method of collection does not affect the
essence of the duty, but only relates to the machinery of
collection for administrative convenience. Whether in a
particular case the tax ceases to be iri essence an excise
duty, and the rational connection between the duty and the
person on whom it is imposed ceased to exist, is to be
decided on a fair · construction of the provisions of a
particular Act."
(I) (1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 741.
(3) (1939] F.C.R. 18.
(2) [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 436.
(4) [1942] F.C.R. 90.
(5) 72 I.A. 91.
SUPREME COUllT REPOllTS
562
(1967) l S.C.R.
Sinha, C. J., speaking for the Full Court in In re The bill to
amends. 20 of the Sea Customs Act l 878 etc.(') quoted with
approval the passage set out above and added:
"This will show that the taxable event in the case
of duties of excise is.the manufacture of goods and the duty
is not directly on the goods but on the manufacture thereof. We may in this connection contrast sales tax which
is also imposed with reference to goods sold, where
the taxable event is the act of sale. Therefore, though
both excise duty and sales-tax are levied with reference
to goods, the two are very different imposts; in one case
the imposition is on the act of manufacture or production
while in the other it is on the act of sale. In neither case
therefore can it be said that the excise duty or sales tax
is a tax directly on the goods for in that event they will
really become the same tax. It would thus appear that
duties of excise partake of the nature of indirect taxes
as known to standard works on economics and are to be
distinguished from direct taxes like taxes on property and
income."
A
B
c
D
These cases establish that in order to be an excise duty (a) the
levy must be upon 'goods' and (b) the taxable event must be the
manufacture or production of goods. Further the levy need not
be imposed at the stage of production or manufacture but may be
imposed later.
But it is not easy to decide in a particular case whether the
particular levy is a levy in respect of manufacture or production
of goods. It appears ,to us that this question has to be decided on
the facts of each case, but in deciding the question certain principles
must be borne in mind. First, one of the essential characteristics
of an excise duty is unifonnity of incidence. This characteristic
was mentioned by the Privy Council in Governor-Genera/ in Council
v. Proyinci: of Madras(2) in these terms :
"The tax imposed by the Madras Act is not a duty of
excise in the cloak of a tax on sales. Lacking the characteristic features of a duty of excise, such as uniformity of
incidence and discrimination in subject-matter, it is in
the general scope and in its detailed provisions a "tax on
sales."
G
This also seems to follow from the wording of the en try
itself. Entry 51 List II reads thus :
"Duties of excise on the following goods manufacturcd or produced in the State and countervailing
(t) [t964j 3 S.C.R. 787
(2) 119451 F.C.R. 179.
H
\
GURUSWAMY & CO. V. MYSORE (Sikri, J.)
B
C
563
duties at the same or lower ptes on similar goods manufactured or produced elsewhere in India :(a) alcoholic liquors for human consumption;
(b) opium, Indian hemp and other narcotic drugs
and narcotics;
but not including medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol or any substance included in sub-paragraph
(b) of this entry."
It is difficult to see how the State can fix countervailing duties
at the same or lower rates unless the rate of excise as such is known
or can be ascertained. Similarly, s. 64A of the Indian Sale of Goods
Act, 1950, contemplates a uniformity of incidence and reads thus :
"64. A. In contracts of sale amount of increased or
decreased duty to be added or deducted.
D
B
II'
a
B
In the event of any duty of customs or excise on any
goods being imposed, increased, decreased or remitted after
the making of any contract for the sale of such· goods
without stipulation as to the payment of duty where duty
was not chargeable at the time of the making of the contract, or for the sale of such goods duty paid where duty
was chargeable at that time,(a) if such imposition or increase so takes effect
that the duty or increased duty, as the case may
be, or any part thereo~ is paid, the seller may
add so much to the contract price as will be
equivalent to the amount paid in respect of such
duty or increase of duty, and he shall be entitled to
be paid and to sue for and recover such addition,
and
(b) if such decrease or remission so takes effect that
the decreased duty only or no duty, as the case
may be, is paid, the buyer may deduct so much
from the contract price as will be equivalent to
the decrease of duty or remitted duty and he shall
not be liable to pay, or be sued for ·or in respect
of such deduction."
Secondly, the duty must be closely related to production or manufacture of goods. It does not matter if the levy is made not at the
moment of production or manufacture but at a later stage. If a
duty has been levied on an excisable article but this duty is collected
from a retailer it would not necessarily cease to be an excise duty.
Thirdly> if a levy is made for the privilege of selling an excisable
article and the excisable article has already borne the duty and
the duly has been paid, there must be clear terms in the charging
564
SUPRBMB COURT REPORTS
(1967] l S.C.R.
section to .indicate that what is being levied for the purpose of
privilege of sale is in fact a duty of excise.
What is the true character or nature of the levy in this case?
First, it is a payment for the ex~lusive privilege of selling toddy
from certain shops. The licensee pays what he considers to be
equivalent to the value of the right. Secondly, it has no close relation to the production or manufacture of toddy. Thirdly, the B
only reiatioll it has to the production or manufacture of toddy
is that it enables the licensee to sell it. But he may sell little, less
or more than he anticipated, depending on various factors. Fourthly, toddy has already paid one excise duty in the form of treetax. If the petitioner taps toddy he pays tree tax, but he need not
tap himself. Fifthly, the duty is not uniform in incidence because c
the amount collected has no relation to the quantity or quality of
the product but has only relation to what the petitioner thought
he could recoup by the sale of the excisable articles. What he
recoups would depend upon the amount of sales and the conditions prevailing during the licensing year. Sixthly, there are no
express words showing that what is being realised from the peti- D
tioner is an excise duty. In fact what s. 16 of the Mysore Excise
Act says is that a privilege has been granted to him for selling by
retail. Section 28 refers specifically to an amount due to the Government by any grantee of the privilege and the legislature apparently
did not think that this amount would be covered by the expression
"aJI duties, taxes, fines and fees payable to the Government" occurring in s. 28. Seventhly, the privilege of selling is auctioned well II
before the goods come into existence. In this case it would be noticed
that the second notification Jated April 27, 1964, was for the sale
during the next two years.
· In view of these characteristics, can it be said to be an excise
duty? In our opinion answer is in the negative. The taxable event
is not the manufacture or production of goods but the acceptance
of the license to sell. In other words, the levy is in respect of the
business of carrying on the sale of toddy. There is no connection
of any part of the levy with any manufacture or production of
any goods. To accept the contention of the State would mean
expanding the definition. of "excise duty" to include a levy which
bas close relation to the sale of excisable goods. It is now too
late in the day to do so.
'
G
Our conclusion is supported by the observations of Gwyer,
C. J., in In re the Central Provinces and Berar Act XW of 1938:(')
"But here again after examining various provincial
Acts relating to the control of alcohol, I have been unable to find any case of excise duties payable otherwise
(I) [1939) P.C.R. 18, 54.
H
GURUSWAMY & CO. v. MYSORE
A
B
c
(Sikri, J.)
565
than by the producers or manufacturers or persons corresponding to them; I am speaking of course only of alcohol
manufactured or produced in the Province itself. The
Advocate-General of India referred us to an act of the
Central· Provinces (Central P,rovinces Excise (Act No.
II of 1915) which was said to make provision for the
imposition of· an excise duty on retail sales. I have
been unable to find any such provision in the Act; it
provides, it is true, as do other provincial Acts, for lump
sum payments in certain cases by manufacturers and
retailers, which may be described as payments either for
the privilege of selling alcohol, or as consideration for
the temporary grant of a monopoly; but these are clearly
not excise duties or anything like them. Provis.ion was also
made in most provincial Acts for the payment of licence
fees in connection with the production or sale of alcohol
in the Province; but these fees are mentioned in the Devolution Rules entry in addition to excise duties and are
therefore something different from them."
D
Mr. Gokhale also relies on the legislative practice existing
before the Government of India Act, 1935, came into force and
his contention is that all the acts existing before the Government
of India Act, 1935, imposed excise duties and collected them by
auctioning the privilege of sale or manufacture. The legislative
practice is not of any assistance because all duties collected under
E these Acts were not excise duties. We are not concerned here
with the case of manufacture or the privilege of manufacture, and
it is not necessary for us to decide whether Chief Justice Gwyer
was right in so far as the auction of the ppvilege of manufacturing
excisable articles is concerned. But it is interesting to note that even
in Australia where a very wide meaning has been given to the word
F "excise", a fee for a mere licence to engage in business even if it
be indirectly connected with production or manufacture has not
been held to be an excise duty. The High Court of Australia
held in Peterswald v. Bartley(') that the State Act imposing a licence
fee upon brewers as a condition precedent to the carrying on of their
business and punishing non-compliance with its provisions was
G not opposed to s. 90 of the Australian Constitution. It may be
that Chief Justice Gwyer had this case in mind when he made the
observations reproduced above. Recently in Dennis Hotels Pty
Ltd. V· Victoria,(2) the High Court of Australia, by majority, held
that s. 19(1)(a) of the Licensing Act, 1958 (Vic.) which imposed
fees for a Victualler's licence calculated at "equal to the sum of
six per ceritum of the gross amount (including any duties thereon)
H paid or payable for all liquors which during the 12 months ended
on the last day of June preceding the date of application for the
(I) I
C.L.R. 497.
(2) 33 A.t.1.R. 470.
566
SUPREME COURT R.BPOR.TS
(1967) I S.C.ll.
grant or renewal of the licence was purchased for the premises"
was valid as it did not impose any excise duty within s. 90 of the
Australian Constitution.
It is now necessary to consider the decision of this Court in
A. B. Abdulkadir v. The State of Kera/a.( 1) This decision is of course
binding on us, but, in our opinion, this case is distinguishable.
The question before the Court was whether Cochin Tobacco Act,
1084 (Cochin Act VII of 1084 M.E.) and Travancore Tobacco
Regulation, 1087 (Travancore I of 1087 M.E.) were laws corresponding to the Central Excise Act, and within ss. 11 (I) and 13(2}
of the Finance Act, 1950. The Court was not concerned with the
question whether the levies being made under these acts were
strictly excise duties within item 51 List II, and this is quite apparent
from the fact that even though these acts also imposed import
duties, these were held in substance to be acts corresponding to
the Central Excise Act. Further the only system in force for the
collection of tobacco revenue was to auction what was called A
class and B class shops. There was no other duty levied on tobacco
at all. As we have already said, it depends on the facts of each
case whether in view of the scheme of the act and the various
provisions and the rules the revenue being obtained is an excise
duty or not. It is true that Wanchoo, J., referred to the practice
of public auctions of the right to possess and sell excisable goods,
but what he said was that the amount realised from these auctions
was excise revenue; he did not say that the amount realized was
excise duty as such in the strict sense of the term.
We may now deal with the propositions submitted by Mr.
Gokhale. The first point taken by Mr. Gokhale is not sound.
It is contrary to what has been consistently laid down by this Court:
that it must be shown in every case that the duty has been levied
on goods which have been produced or manufactured, the taxable
event being production or manufacture of goods.
We also consider that his second proposition is not sound.
There is no presumption that if no other taxable event has intervened, the levy must be treated to be connected with production
or manufacture. This, as we have said above, must depend upon
the facts of each case. But it must be positively shown that the
taxable event for the duty which has been levied is manufacture
or production of the article. We agree with his contention that the
method of its collection is not decisive but, in our opinion, in
cases of doubt it may throw some light on this question.
Mr. Setalvad, who appears in the appeals concerned with
licenses for arrack points out that para 29(a) of the General Conditions applicable to all excise and opium licenses specifically provides that the manufacturers of arrack and other country spirits
(I) [19621 Supp. 2 S.C.R. 741.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
GURUSWAMY & CO. V. MYSORE (Sikri, J.)
A
B
c
D
E
567
as well as the licenses of arrack Bonded Depots are prohibited
from h~lding any interest in the retail vend of arrack or in the vend
of other country spirits and from employing any person who has
such interest. He says that this strengthens his case because the
money realised by the sale of licenses for vending arrack can have
no relation to the manufacture or production of arrack. There
is force in his contention.
Jn the result we hold that the health cess sought to be levied
under the impugned act on shop rent does not fall within item I of
Schedule A of the impugned act or entry 51 List II of the Constitution.
In W.P. No. 1076 of 1964 and in some other petitions in the
High Court the petitioners have challenged the validity of the
Mysore Health Cess Act, 1951. This Act was not referred to in the
course of arguments. Section 3 of the Health Cess Act, 1951,
reads thus:
"3. (1) There shall be levied and collected a health cess
at the rate of six pies .in the rupee on all items of land
revenue and at such rate not exceeding one anna in the rupee
as may be specified by Government by notification on all
other items of revenue on which education cess is leviable.
(2) The Government may by notification levy health
cess at such rate not exceeding one anna in the rupee as may
be specified in the said notification on such other items of
revenue as they deem fit."
No notification or notifications issued under s. 3 were placed before us. We are, therefore, unable to say whether the levy of the
Health Cess under the Act of 1951 stands on the same basis. Further
F no particulars are given in the petitions. as to the dates of payments
·and no reason is given why the levy of Health Cess under the Act
of 1951 was not challenged earlier. In the circumstances we decline
to adjudge on the validity of the Health Cess Act, 1951, and the
notifications issued under it. The petitioners will, however,
· be at liberty to file suits, if so advised, to recover the amounts
alleged to have been paid by them under the Health Cess Act, 1951.
G
H
In the result the appeals are allowed and it is declared that
the State of Mysore had no authority to levy and collect health
cess under the Mysore Health Cess Act, 1962, on shop rent, and
an order or direction in the nature of writ of mandamus be issued
restraining" the respondents from enforcing the demand for payment
of health cess under the impugned Act, and further an order be
issued directing the respondents to refund the health cess illegally
collected under the Health Cess Act, 1962. There would be no
order as to costs.
Ml6Sup.CI/66-8
568
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1967] 1 S.C.R.
Hidayatullab, J. I regret I do not agree. I shall not trouble
myself with reciting the fact~ of these simple cases. They will
find ample mention in the judgment as I deal with them. I shall,
therefore, pass on at once to the legal question on which I find
myself in disagreement.
A
The Mysore Legislature passed the Mysore Health Cess Act,
I 962 (Act 28 of 1962) on September 22, 1962 levying retrospectively B
a health cess in the State of Mysore from the 1st day of April,
1962. This cess is levied at the rate of 9 paisc per rupee, on (a)
all items of land revenue, (b) the items of State Revenues specified
in the Act, in a Schedule numbered A and (c) on all items of taxes
levied, under any law for the time being in force, by a local authority
and specified in Schedule B. The first of the three items in Schedule c
A reads:
"I. Duties of excise leviable by the State under any
law for the time being in force in any area of the State, on
the following goods manufactured or produced in the
State and countervailing duties levied on similar goods
D
manufactured or producP,d elsewhere:(a) Alcoholic liquors for human consumption;
(b) Opium, Indian hemp and other narcotic drugs
and narcotics.
Explanation-The duty of excise leviable under this
item includes the duties, payments, fees and other amounts
E
payable under section 18 of the Mysore Excise Act, 1901,
and similar impost or payment by whatever name called
payable under any other law in force in any area of the State
of Mysore.
The other two items in Schedule A are water rate and tax on cinematograph shows. In Schedule· B arc mentioned taxes on (a) lands F
and buildings, (b) vehicles, (c) professions, trades, callings and
employments, and (d) advertisements. We are concerned with
Schedule A(i) quoted above. Tho cess collected on that item
is said by the appellants, for various reasons, to be an illegal impost. They challenged it by petitions under Arts. 226/227 of the
Constitution before the High Court of Mysore, but the High Court
after striking out the Explanation upheld the cess and hence these G
appeals.
The appeals can be divided into two groups. Some arc concerned with toddy which is tapped from palm trees and the others
with arrak which is prepared from molasses. Both are country
liquors and the difference in the kind of liquor makes no difference
to the questions of law and we may forget it. These liquors are
subject to excise laws in force in the Mysore State but as different
parts of the State are governed by different Acts we have for consi-
H
GURUSWAMY & co. v. MYSORE
A
(Hidayatullah, I.)
569
deration the Mysore Excise Act passed as for back as 1901 by the
Ruler of the former Mysore State (Act No. V of 1901) and the
Hyderabad Abkari Act (No. 1 of 1316 F). The two Acts are
so alike in their provisions that no point depending on any difference was made before us and I shall, therefore, .refer to the Mysore
Act throughout. What I say about it will apply, with suitable
B adaptation to the Hyderabad Act.
Under the Mysore Excise Act import, export and transport
of liquor is banned except under a permit and on payment of duty,
if any, to which the liquor may be made liable under the Act.· The
Act also bans the manufacture of liquor, the tapping of toddyproducing trees, the drawing of toddy from trees, the ·construction
c of a brewery or distillery, the bottling of· liquor for sale, except
under the authority or subject to the terms and conditions of a
license granted by the Deputy Commissioner or by a person to
whom the exclusive privilege of manufacturing toddy has been
granted. Sale of liquor except under a license is prohibited. The
Act, however, makes it lawful for the Government to grant to any
D person or persons on such conditions and for such period as
may deem fit the exclusive or other privilege of manufacturing or
supplying by wholesale, or selling by retail or of manufacturing
or supplying by wholesale and selling by retail, any country liquor
within a local area. But such grantee must obtain a license from
the Deputy Commissioner (s. 16). A duty, if Government so
directs, is leviable on all liquor imported or exported or manufacE tured under a license or manufactured at a distillery or permitted
to be transported or issued from a licensed distillery or a licensed
warehouse or sold in any part Of Mysore; of such amount as the
Government may from time to time, prescribe (s. 17). There are
various ways of levying the duty. These are described in s. 18.
which may be reproduced here:
F
"18. How duty may be imposed.
Such duty may be levied in one or more of the
following ways:(a) by duty of excise to be charged in the case of spirits
or beer either on the quantity produced in or passed out of a
distillery, brewery or warehouse licensed or established
G
under section 12 or section 14 (b) as the case may
be; or in accordance with such scale of equivalents, calculated on quantity of materials used or by the degree of
attenuation of the wash or wort, as the case may be, as the
Government .may prescribe;
(b) in the case of intoxicating drugs, by a duty to be
ff
rateably charged on the quantity produced or manufactured
or sold by wholesale or issued from a warehouse licensed
or established under section 14;
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[1961] l S.C.R.
(c) by payment of a sum in consideration of the grant
of any exclusive or other privilege(!) of manufacturing or supplying by wholesale, or
(2) of selling by retail, or
(3) of manufacturing or supplying by wholesale
and selling by retail any country liquor or intoxicating drug in any local area and for any specified
period of ti me;
(d) by fees on licenses for manufacture or sale;
(e) in the case of toddy, or spirits manufactured from
toddy, by a tax on each tree from which toddy is
drawn, to be paid in such instalments and for such
period as the Government may direct; or
(f) by import, export or transport-duties assessed in
such manner as the Government may direct.
Provided that when there is a difference of duty
as between two license periods such difference may be collected in respect of all stock of country liquor or intoxicating
drugs held by licensees at the close of the former
period."
We are concerned mainly with (c) and (e) above and one of the
questions is whether these fall within item (1) of Schedule A of the
Act already set out in full.
The appellants are licensed excise contractors who have purchased in auction the exclusive privilege to sell liquor at liquor
shops at fixed places. They have obtained the exclusive right
for 1-2 years and are paying the amount of their bid by monthly
instalments which are popularly known as shop rent, although th&
instalment has no element of rent in it. I shall avoid the term
shop rent because it raises an image which takes the mind away
from the auction of the exclusive privilege to sell liquor. The
notification calling for tenders before the auction specified the price
per litre at which liquor may be sold and the amount of duty per
litre payable. In this way the duty which may be passed on to the
consumer is fixed. The advantage of the auction system is that
Government collects the duty at once and the contractor buys the
privilege and is not concerned to pay the duty as be manufactures
-0r sells his manufactured goods. He also hopes to make a profit,
and often does, although he may sometime suffer a loss. This
is really taking a composition amount as duty without having to go
to the trouble of calculating the duty or recovering it as manufacture or sales proceed. The system has been in vogue as long as
Abkari Laws .have existed in India and the Acts passed are uniformly the same. For the excise contractor it is in a sense specu-
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lative venture. In addition to this there is leviable a tree tax for
the ri~t to tap toddy from trees and tree rent is also payable to
the owner of toddy trees.
The Health Cess is not a new levy. . It existed as far back as
1951 and was at first at the rate of one anna per rupee. The health
tax is made payable with the monthly kist above-mentioned, the
tree tax and other duties of excise. The appellants do not object
to the payment of the health cess levied· on the trc:e tax but raise
objections to its being levied on the amount of the kist. It may
be mentioned here that every e)!:cise contractor who obtain8 this
privilege by auction is assigned tree groves earmarked for the shop
and is entitled to tap or draw toddy <Uld, if he obtain an arrak shop,
also to manufacture arrak. In fact, he sells at the shops bis own
produce or manufacture and pays a tax on the tapping of trees,
the amount bid by him for the privilege of selling and in addi,
tion pays the health cess on both· these sums at nine paise per
rupee. Where he sells beer or such other liquor he obtains bis supplies from breweries and distilleries at fixed prices which do not
include excise duty.
Now the health <;ess is first assailed on the ground that there
is no entry 'health cess' as such in the legislative entries. 'I)le word
'cess' is used in Ireland and is still in use in India although the word
rate has replaced it in England. It means a tax and is generally
used when the levy is for some special administrative expense
which the name (health cess, education cess, · road cess etc.) indicates. When levied as an increment to an existing tax, the name
matters -not for the validity of the cess must be judged of in the
same way as the. validity of the tax to which it 1s ·an increment.
By Schedule A(!) read with s. 3 of the Act, it is collected as an
additional levy with a tax, which, as described in Schedule A, is
undoubtedly one within the powers of the State Legislature and has
been so even prior to the Constitution. The question, however,
is whether the amount paid for the exclusive privilege of selling
liquor is an excise duty for if it is not then the health cess is also
not an excise duty and however immune the original impost .may be
from attack, because of the protection the Constitution gives to
old taxes, the new addition will not .be equally protected, unless
it can justify itself under the Constitution. To that question
which is the core of this case I shall address myself after dealing
with another minor objection which need not detain us long.
It is contended that the Legislature had no jurisdiction to
impose the cess retrospectively from a prior date. This contention
has no substance. Excise duty may be increased or decreased.
This is to be found in almost all parts of the Commonwealth.
English examples are the Finance Acts of 1894 (57 & 58 Viet. c. 30),
1900 (63 & 64 Viet. c. 27). 1901 (1 Edw. VII c. 7), 1902 (2 .Edw.
572
(1967] l S.C.R.
VII c. 7), 1927 (17 & 18 Geo V c. 10) and several others. In Australia the Excise Tariff 1921-23, 1936, 1921-48 increased the excise
duty retrospectively. In Canada Customs Tariff Act (18 & 19
Geo V c. 17), I Edw VIII c. 37, 3 Geo VI c. 43 are examples. In
India the Tariff Act formerly contained provisions enabling change
of duty retrospectively. Now they are found in the Sale of Goods
Act (s. 64A). The validity of such retrospective levy has been
upheld in Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel and Co. v. The Union of India
and Another.(') It must be remembered that Parliament when it
imposes taxes has many ancillary powers, and can interfere with
vested rights by validating past unlawful collections and by making
retrospective laws.
This brings me to the mrun question whether the amount for
which the exclusive privilege of selling liquor is sold by auction can
be said to be a duty of excise. In this connection I must bring to
the fore and emphasise certain matters which must not be lost
sight of. The persons who bid at these auctions are themselves
the producers and manufacturers. They bid for the exclusive privilege of selling which in so far as Government is concerned, is
a means of collecting the anticipated excise duty at one go from a
producer or manufacturer before the goods become a part of
the general stock of goods in the country. In other words, the
person who is charged in the producer and manufacturer and the
duty is levied from him before he can sell or obtains liquor which
has not borne excise duty so far. The ~hort question is: Is lhis a
duty of excise? My emphatic answer is that it is, whether the
matter is considered in the light of economic theory, legislative
practice or judicial authority. I shall examine the question from
these three angles.
Before I deal with the economic theory I must say that I am
aware that the economists' definitions were not treated as conclusive by the Privy Council in Toro/lfo v. l.amba(2) and by Sulaiman
J. in In re C.P. & Berar Act No. XIV of 1938(3) although in the first
case Lord Hobhouse commended reference to works on Economics
and Lord Thankerton in Attorney General v. Kingcome Navigation
Co.(4) actually used Mill's definition of direct and indirect taxes.
In this connection it is not necessary to refer to many books. Jn
the Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences "Excise" is described as
a tax on commodities of domestic manufacture levied either at
some stage of manufacture or before sale to home consumers.
It is also pointed out that the excise duty may he levied on the raw
material or the finished article or it may attach to an intermediate
stage of the production process. This is also endorsed by Findlay
Shirras Science of Public Finance (1936) Vol. II Chapter XXVII.
It will thus appear that excise duty does not cease to he an excise
(I) (1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. I.
(3) 11939] F.C.R. 18 at 58.
(2) (1887) 12 A.C. 515, 581, 582.
(4) [1934] A.C. 45 at 51.
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duty when it is levied at any stage from raw material to finished
article before sale to consumer. As Gwyer C. J. observed in the
In re·The C.P. & Berar case(') its primary and.fundamental meaning
i.s that of a tax on articles produced or manufactured in the taxing
country for home consumption. In the economist's view therefore,
a tax on toddy, arrak, tavern beer or 'spirits distilled in India for
home consumption is an excise duty and it can be levied from the
stage of raw material to finished goods or at any intermediate stage.
In economic theory the manner of collection does not enter into the
discussion provided the tax is in respect of the home produced
goods destined for home consumption.
Turning now to the legislative practice I find that excise duties
were collected by auction of the exclusive privilege to sell excisable
articles, in every State of India and as far back as the first Abkari
Act. In fact the method is so universal that Findlay Shirras makes
a special mention of the c6ntract system under which rights to
manufacture or vend spirit or liquor is disposed of by tender or
sale. In view of the existing practice which had grown hoary
by then, the Devolution Rules while including Excise in the Provincial Subjects (Rule 3 Sch~dule I Part II) framed entry NQ. 16 as
follows:"16. Excise, that is to say, the control of production,
manufacture, possession, ·transport, purchase and sale of
alcoholic liquor and intoxicating drugs, and the levying of
excise duties and license fees on or in relation to such articles,
but excluding, in the case of opium, control of cultivation,
manufacture and sale for export".
It will be noticed that this entry follows closely the provisions
of the Abkari Acts which are in their turn copied by s. 17 of the
Mysore Act. These statutes, as I have said already, existed for
several decades. Excise duty was thus considered leviable by the
auction system and special constitutional recognition was given
by the Government of India Act and the Devolution Rules. The
Government of India Act, 1935 did not repeat the Devo!Ution Rule
entry in one place. It put the entire subject of intoxicating liquors
within the legislative competence of the Provinces. by entry
31 in List II. The power to levy excise duties was divided between
the Centre and the States. By entry 45. of the Central List in
the 7th Schedule duties of excise on tobacco and goods manfactured
or produced in India, other than those mentioned in the Provincial
List, were given to the Centre. The Provincial List by entry 40
included excise duty on alcoholic liquors for human consumption
manufactured or produced in the Province and countervailing
duties at the same or lower rates on similar goods manufactured
or produced elsewhere in India. The whole of the power to levy
excise duty on alcoholic liquors for human comsumption was
(l) (1939] F.C.R. 18 at 58.
574
SUPIUIMB COUllT llBPOllTS
[1967] 1 S.C.R.
passed on to the Provinoes. The subject of excise duties was thus
plenary in so far as alcoholic liquors were concerned and this
power was no whit less than the power conferred by the Devolution
Rules and no limitation could be read into it. Excise duty on
alcoholic liquors could be collected at all stages from production
till they were parted with to the consumer. The present Constitution has repeated the entries and the same classification of excise
duties as in the Constitution Act of 1935 except for a few changes
with which we are not c,mcerned. It would thus appear that the
legislative practice is entirely in support of collection of excise
duty by the contract system. I am reminded of the dictum of Lord
Blackburn in Trustees of Clyde Navigation v. Laird & Sons(') in which
a departmental practice extending there over 18 years was said to
raise a strong prima facie ground for thinking that there must be
some legal ground on which it could be rested. Here the practice
is over a century old and has not been questioned under three
different constitutional documents till today.
The judicial interpretation of the relevant entries has not
militated against the above practice but has r athcr supported
it. In Governor General in Council v. The Province of Madras(l)
Lord Simonds observed that "the term 'duty of excise' is a somewhat flexible one: it may, no doubt, cover a tax on first and, perhaps,
on other sales: it may in a proper context have an even wider
meaning." After approving the definition of 'excise' given by
the Federal Court in the In re C.P. & Bcrar case, Lord Simods
observes:
" ...... Consistently with this decision their Lordships
arc of opinion that a duty of excise is primarily a duty
levied on a manufacturer or producer in respect of the
commodity manufactured or produced. It is a tax on goods
not on sales or the proceeds of sale of goods.· Here
again, their Lordships find themselves in complete
accord with the reasoning and conclusions of the
Federal Court in the Boddu Paidanna case.(') The
two taxes, the one levied on a manufacturer in respect
of his goods, the other on a vendor in respect of his
sales, may, as is there pointed out, in one sense overlap.
But in law there is no overlapping. The taxes are separate
and distinct imposts. If in fact they overlap, that may be
because the taxing authority imposing a duty of excise,
finds it convenient to impose that duty at the moment
wher: the excisable article leaves the factory or workshop
for the first time on the occasion of its sale. But that
method of collecting the tax is an accident of administra(2) 721 I.A. 91.
(1) (1883) 8 A.C. 658.
(3) 119421 F.C.R. 9\J.
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tion; it is not of the essence of the duty of excise, which
is attracted by the manufacture itself.' That this is so is
clearly examplified in those excepted cases in which the
Provincial, not the Federal,' legislature has power to impose
a duty of excise. In such cases there appears to be no
reason why the Provincial legislature should not impose
a duty of excise in respect of the commodity manufactured
and then a tax on first or other ~ales of the same commodity. Whether or not such a course is followed appears
to be merely a matter of administrative convenience. So,
by parity of reasoning may the Federal legislature impose
a duty of excise on the manufacture of excisable goods and
the Provincial legislature impose a tax on the sale of the
same goods when manufactured.
The above passage clearly shows that where the power to
levy sales-tax as well as excise duty resides in the same legislature,
the levy of excise duty may be made at some earlier stage but so
long as the tax is levied in respect of manufacture there carr be no
objection that it was not levied at the stage when the goods left the
manufacturei: for the first time.
Fine distinctions were drawn in the Federal Court case because
the Act considered there was concerned with sales-tax, not on·
alcoholic liquors but on petroleum and lubricants, which were·
excisable by the Centre. The question, therefore, arose whether
the tax which the Central Provinces . and Berar Legislature was
levying was an excise duty within the power of the Federal Legislature of sales-tax within the powers 0f the Provincial Legislature
of the Province. Under that constitutional system, which allowed
the levy of Duty of excise to the Centre and the levy of sales-tax on
the same goods to the Provinces, the line had to be drawn at a point
where the goods left the producer or the manufacturer. The·
Centre then would be on the right side of the line so long as it
taxed the goods with the producer or the manufacturer and the tax
was related to the production of manufacture of the goods and the
Provinces on their side of the line if they taxed the sale. But if
the Centre put the tax on the sale it would clash with the powers
of the Provincial Legislature and vice-versa. Such a contingency
does not arise here when the same legislature has all the powers
in respect of the goods from production to consumption. Such
a legislature ma)' collect the excise duty as excise duty at any stage
so long as the tax is not purely a sales tax on the sale of goods.
Short of this, excise duty can be collected in any way the legislature
thinks convenient.
In R. C. Jallv. Union of India(') the following observations are·
found:(I) [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 436.
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(1967] I S.C.R.
"With great respect, we accept the principles laid down
by the said three decisions in the matter oflevy of an excise
duty and the machinery for collection thereof. Excise
duty is primarily a duty on the production or manufacture
of goods produced or manufactured within the country.
It is an indirect duty which the manufacturer or producer
passes on to the ultimate consumer, that is, its ultimate
incidence will always be on the consumer. Therefore,
subject always to the legislative competence of the taxing
authority, the said tax can be levied at a convenient stage
so long as the character of the impost, that is, it is a duty
on the manufacture or production, is not lost. The
method of collection does not affect the essence of the duty,
but only relates to the machinery of collection for administrative convenience. Whether in a particular case the tax
ceases to be in essence an excise duty, and the rational
connection between the duty and the person on whom it is
imposed ceased to exist, is to be decided on a fair construction of the provisions of a particular Act."
There is a slight difference between the Privy Council case and
the case of this Court. In the former excise duty was said to be
primarily a duty levied on a manufacturer or producer in respect
of the commodity manufactured or produced while in the Supreme
Court case it was said to be primarily a duty on the production
or manufacture of goods produced or manufactured within the
country. It is useless to enter into a discussion which of the two
is the proper way to describe a duty of excise since the Supreme
Court case is binding on me and the description there given has
again been applied in In re The Bill to Amend s. 20 of the Sea
Customs Act, 1878, ands. 3 of the Central Excises and Salt Art,
I 944(•) although without fresh discussion.
But even if the tax is treated as a duty on production, it is
clear that the goods which were taxed were produced or manufactured in India and were not to bear the tax for any other reason.
As the. tax was in relation to the production or manufacture of
goods it was clearly a duty of excise. As Gwycr C. J. said in the
Jn re C.P. & Berar(') case:
"The ultimate incidence of an excise duty. a typical
indirect tax, must always be on the consumer, who pays
as he consumes or expends; and it continues to be an excise
duty, that is, a duty on home-produced or home-manufactured goods, no matter at what stage it is collected. The
definition of excise duties is therefore of little assistance
in determining the extent of the legislative power to impose
804, 822.
(2) (1939] F.C..R. 18.
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them; for the duty imposed by a restricted legislative power
does not differ in essence from the duty imposed by an
extended one."
In fact Gwyer C. J. cited with approval Patton v. Brady(') where
it was observed:
"Within the scope of the various definitions we have
quoted, there can be no doubt that the power to excise continues while the consumable articles are in the hands of the
manufacturer or any inten:p.ediate dealer, and until they
reach the consumer. Our conclusion then is that it is within
the power of Congress to increase an excise, as well as a
property tax, and that such an increase may be made at
least while the property is held for sale and before it has
passed into the hands of the consumer".
The learned Chief Justice pointed out. that this was true when
there was no competing legislature and observed in another passage
as follows:"The expression 'duties of excise', taken by itself, conveys no suggestion with regard to-the time or place of their
collection. Only the context in which the expression
is used can tell us whether any reference to the time or
manner of collection is to be implied. It is not denied that
laws are to be found which impose duties of excise at
stages subsequent to manufacture or production; but,
as far as I am aware, in none of the cases in which any question with regard to such a law has arisen was it nece~sary
to consider the existence of a competing legislative
power."
Referring to the Australian case of Commonwealth Oil Refineries
Ltd. v. South Australia(2) the Chief Justice observed:~
"But a closer examination of the judgments delivered
shows that the majority of the Judges took the view that
the duty on the first sale of the commodity was in fact a tax
on the producer and for that reason a duty of excise without doubt".
He thus approved of these cases, as he says, by relating the duty
back to the stage of production, even though the person made
liable for payment was not (and indeed could seldom have been)
the original producer himself". (p. 52).
All these observations have my respectful concurrence and
in my judgment they are a true exposition of the width of the expression "duty of excise" when it is used in a context in which
it has not to compete with the exercis~ of a rival power. Looked
(I} (1901) 184 U.S. 608, at 623.
(2) (1926) 38 C.L.R. 408.
578
SUPDMB OOUllT UPOllTS
[1967) l S.C.ll.
at in this way the tree tax and the composition amount obtained
by the auction of the right to bring to sale home produced alcohol
: is a proper excise duty. It certainly is not shop rent even if the
! amount is payable by monthly instalments and Is described loosely
as rental, or Baithak or shop rent.
A
The objections to the views I have propounded here may be
noted. It was argued that there is no close relation of the tax
or levy to production or manufacture and it is related to the ability
to sell, that the duty is. not uniform because it has no relation to
quantity or quality, that the collection of the duty is before the
excisable goods
come into existence, and that there is already
a tree tax which is of the nature of excis~ duty. It is also said
that if the right is auctioned how can countervailing duties at the
same or lower rates be charged. I think none of them is a valid
argument. Firstly, we must recognize the ambit of the entry and
the fact that we are dealing with a legislature which enjoys plenary
powers. Next we must bear in mind that goods on which excise
duty is being demanded are produced or manufactured in the
State and the State can legitimately subject them to a payment
of excise duty. The levy is thus in respect of goods produced or
manufactured in the State and is on production or manufacture.
The method of collection does not change the nature of the tax
or run counter to any legislative power, rival or other. The duty
is uniform. Each notification fixes the amount of duty payable
and the sale price including the duty. Where goods have first
to be obtained from breweries or distilleries the prioe at which they
can be got (which price does not include excise duty) is also fixed.
The excise contractor who bids at the auction knows the fixed
sale prioe, the amount of duty which his bid would represent and
then estimates the likely sales and bids for the privilege. The
right to collect excise duties is thus farmed to him for
a Jump payment which the State takes as the excise duty in final
settlement. As I said the business of excise contractors is a speculative business. Government is not concerned with whether they
sell more or less. The Government fixes the upset price for such
auctions based on statistics of sales and consumptions available
to it and is quite satisfied when the highest bid is satisfactory. To
say that such a collection of excise duty renders the levy into a rent
for a shop is to miss the reality.
B
Nor do I see any difficulty in the matter of countervailing
duties. The rate of duties is fixed and the duty may be collected
at that rate on liquor produced elsewhere in India without infringine the Constitution. In all such matters a broad view of the
matter has to be taken. Machinery sections do not enter into the
rate but only the charging section does. If the privilege to sell
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liquor produced in the State and that produced elsewhere in India
are both auctioned on the condition that the duty on both kinds
of liquor is the same, the requirements of the constitutional provision as to countervailing duties would be amply satisfied. It
would be making a fetish of equal rates if one wanted absolute
equality not only in rates but in everything. Further imposition
of countervailing duties is not compulsory. The legislature need
not impose them if it cannot make them equal.
The view I have taken is fortified by two cases of this Court
which are precedents to follow in the decision of the case in hand.
In CooverjeB B. Bharucha v. The Excise Commissioner, Ajmer and
others(') in dealing with Excise Regulation I of 1915, the amounts
raised by public auction and described as fees were held to be more
in the nature of taxes than fees. Revenue was collected by the
grant of contracts to carry on trade in liquors and these contracts
were sold by auction. The grantee was given a license on payment
of the auction price. If this was treated not as a fee but as a tax
it could only be justified as an excise duty. The power to raise
excise revenue was exercisable only through the imposition of excise duties and it is obvious that the levy was regarded as a duty
of excise. There was otherwise no other power under which. revenue could be raised. Describing the tax Mahajan C. J. made
the following observations:"The pith and substance of the regulation is that it
raises excise revenue by imposing duties on liquor and
intoxicating drugs by different methods and it also regulates the import, export, transport, manufacture, sale and
possession of intoxicating liquors.
Section 18 says that the Chief Commissioner may
lease to any person, on such conditions and for such
period as he may think fit, the right of manufacturing of
supplying -by wholesale, or of both, or of selling hy
wholesale or. by retail, or of manufacuturing or of supplying
by whole, or of both and of selling by retail any country liquor or intoxicating drug within any specified area ...... "
The second case A. B. Abdulkadir and other v. The State of
Kera/a and another(2) is even clearer. There a system of auctions for
H
the collection of tobacco revenue was in force in TravancoreCochin: After the coming into force of the Constitution the
Finance Act, 1950 (25 of 1950) extended the Central Excises and
Salt Act, 1944 to Travancore-Cochin State. A question arose
whether this levy on tobacco corresponded to the excise duty
(I) (1954] S.C.R. 873,877,878.
(2) [1962] Sup. 2 S.C.R. 741,754,755.
580
SUPllEMB COUil! llEPOl.TS
(1967] I S.C.R.
11nder the Finance Act, because if it did, then by s. 13(2) of the
Finance Act the State law stood repealed. It was held that the
amounts realized by the auctions were what would be duty under
s. 3 of the Central Act. This Court observed :
"We have already indicated that the essence of the
duty of excise as held by the Federal Court and the Privy
Council is that it is a duty on the goods manufactured
or produced in the taxing country. Further as generally
the duty is on the goods produced or manufactured it is paid
by the producer or manufacturer, though as in the case
of all indirect taxes it is passed on eventually to the consumer
in the shape of being included in the price and is thus really
borne by the consumer. Further the cases on which reliance has been placed on behalf of the State also show
that laws are to be found which impose duty of excise at
stages subsequent to manufacture or production. As a
matter of fact, even in British India before 1935 there used
to be public auctions of the right to po~sess and sell excisable goods like country liquor, ga11ja and bhang and the
amount realised was excise revenue
. . It seems under the circumstances that the auction
system which was in force was only a method of realising
duty through the grant of licences to those who made the
highest bid at the auctions."
It is argued that the words used here are "excise revenue"
and not "excise duty". It is hardly a question of semantics. The
distinction sought to be made is without a difference. Wanchoo J.
had discussed the nature of excise duty before proceeding to compare the auction money with duties of excise and he found that
sale of the privilege to the highest bidder was a method of realising "duty" and he obviously meant excise duty.
These two cases are binding .. I was a party to the second
case and on reconsidering it in the light of arguments now advanced
I find that it furnishes a complete answer and is indistinguishable
on the slender ground that the expression "excise revenue" or
"duty" have been used and not the expression "excise duty". To
hold otherwise is to depart from this and the earlier case and to
overrule them.
I am, therefore, of the opinion that the so called shop-rent
was only a means of collecting excise duty and the health cess
which was an additional levy along with the excise duty was perfectly valid. Being a new tax it cannot be described as a tax on
tax. The earlier tax only furnished a measure. I would accordingly confirm the decision of the High Court and dismiss the
aiJpeals with costs.
B
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G
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GURUSWAMY & co. v. MYSORE (Bachawat, J.)
A
B
SIU
'Bacbawat, J. The Mysore Health Cess Act, 1962 (Mysore
Act No. 2& of 1962) levied a ·health cess at the rate of nine
naya paise in the rupee on (1) all items of land revenue,
(2) the items of State Revenues mentioned in Schedule A and (3)
the .items of taxes levied by any local authority and mentioned in
Schedule .B. The Act, on its true construction, levied a surchargeand increased the amounts of the existing imposts. There was no
levy of a new head of tax or of a tax on a tax.
The Act .levied a health cess inter a/ia on the following item of
State Revenue mentioned in Schedule A:
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G
"(!) Duties of excise leviable by the State under
any law for the time-being in force in any .area of the
State, on the following goods manufactured or produced
in the State and countervailing duties levied on similar
goods manufactured or produced elsewhere:--·
(a) Alcoholic liquors for human consumption.
(b) Opium, Indian hemp and other narcotic drugs and
narcotics.
"Explanation-The duty of excise leviable under
this item includes the duties, payments, fees and other
amounts payable under section 18 of the Mysore Excise Act, 1901, and similar impost or payment by
whatever name called payable under any other law in
force in any area of.the State of M~sore."
The Explanation to item 1, Schedule A was struck down by the
High Court. There is no appeal by the State, and this part of the
order of the High Court has become final.
The Mysore Excise Act, 1901 (Mysore Act No. S of 1901) is
in force in the old Mysore area of the Mysore State. Section 16
empowers the State Government to grant exclusive or other privilege of selling by retail any country. liquor or intoxicating drugs
to any person or persons on such conditions and for such period as it
thinks fit. The privilege of sale in a specified shop is disposed of
periodically as a result of a public auction held by the excise authorities. The amount paid for the grant of this privilege is called the
shop rent. Sections 17 and 18 show that this payment is the levy
of a duty. It is common case that similar law and practice prevail
in the old Hyderabad area of the State, where the Hyderabad
Abkari Act (No. 1of1316 Fasli) is in force., Both the Acts continue
to be in force by virtue of Art. 372 of the Constitution.
As a result of public auctions held subject to the terms and
'u conditions
notified by the State Government, the appellant.s were
granted the exclusive privileges of selling liquor in certain arrack
shops, beer taverns and toddy shops in consideration of their agree-
582
SUPIBME COURT 11.EPORTS
(1967] l S.C.R.
ing to pay specified shop rents and health ccss thereon at the rate
of nine naya paise in the rupee.
Counsel for the State submitted that shop rent is a duty of excise,
the Mysore Cess Act, 1962 levied a surcharge on this duty and the
State Legislature was competent to make this levlf, havjng regard
.to Entry 51, List 11 of Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.
The subject of duties of excis~ and fees in connectKin therewith is divided between the Union and the States, see Entries 84
and 96, List I and Entries 51 and 66, List II. The power to make
laws with respect to duties of excise carries with it the ancillary
power to make licensing laws for preventing the evasion of the
.duty. See Chaturbhai M. Patel v. The Union of India('). The
subject of intoxicating liquors, that is to say, their production
manufacture, possession, transport, purchase and sale is exclusively
assigned to the States under List II, Entry 8. In this back2round
the expression "excise" is often used to denote the entire subject
of the control of production, manufacture, possession, transport
purchase and sale of alcoholic liquor and intoxicating drugs and the
levying of excise duties and license fees on and in relation to such
articles, and it was used in that sense in Entry 16 in the list of provincial subjects in the Devolution Rules of 1920. Though an excise
law may contain provisions for the control of production, manufacture, possession, transport, purchase and sale of the excisable
commodity, it does not follow that a lax on these several activities
is a duty of excise.
What then is a duty of excise on goods manufactured or produced locally? It is not a tax on property, sec In re Sea Customs
Act(2), nor is it a tax on sales, In re The Cemral Provinces and
Berar Act No. XIV of 1938(') nor a tax on .the first sale of goops,
-Governor-General in Council v. Province of Madras(4). The language of the Entries in List I, Entry 84 and Entry 51, list II is necessarily qualified by the language of other Entries covering other
fields of .taxation.
Likewise, a duty of excise is not a tax on income or on professions, trades, callings and employments. It is not a tax on the capital
value, nor is it a duty on the export, import, transport, carriage or
entry of goods.
Shortly put, the duty of excise is a tax in respect of the manufacture o~ production of goods. There can be no controversy that
a tax levied on a manufacturer or producer with reference to the
qua~tity. or value of t~e article produced at the moment of its pro.cl uctton 1s a duty of excise. But the levy may be made in other ways,
(I) (1963) 2 S.C.R. 362.
(2) [1964] 3 S.C.R. 787, 804, S22.
<3) (1939) F.C.R. 18.
(4) [1945) F.C.R. 179,
A
B
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GURUSWAMY &
B
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co. v. MYSORE (Bachawat; /.)
583
and it may then become necessary to ascertain the real chttracter of
the tax. In determining whether the tax is a duty of excise; several
tests niay .be suggested. Is the ·tax levied on the manufacturer or
producer? Is it levied with reference to the value, quantity, weight or
volume of the goods? Does it affect the goods as subjects of manufacture or production? Is it a levy at the stage of or in connection
with the manufacture or production? None of these tests is conclusive or decisive. A duty of excise may be collected at such time,
in such manner and on such person as may be convenient or beneficial
to the revenue, e.g. by a levy on the producer with reference to the
quantity or value of the article produced, when it leaves the factory,
see Governor-General in Council v. Province of Madras ( 1) at p. 193
by a levy on the producer of toddy with reference to the toddy producing tree, or by a levy on the consignee of coal despatched from
the colliery by means of a surcharge on freight, R. C. Jail v. Union of
India (1). The Court examines the substance of the levy. If it is
a tax in respect of the manufacture or production of goods, it
is a duty of excise, however it may have been collected or realised.
If the duty of excise is levied with reference to the quantity,
volume, weight or value. of the goods, each unit will bear the same
amount of tax. But the incidence of the duty on the goods will
not necessarily be uniform, where the levy is by a rate on each toddy
producing tree, see s. 18(e) of the Mysore Excise Act, 1901, or on
each acre of hemp producing land, see s.26(1) of the C.P. & Berar
Excise Act, 1915. Every tree and every acre of land may not produce the same quantity, volume, weight or value of the excisable
commodity. Normally, the ultimate incidence of the tax is on the
consumer, but the producer may not be able to pass on the
tax to the consumer in. all cases, see ChhotabhaiJethabhai Patetv.
The Union of India(').
F
The question is whether the revenue realised at a public auction
of the privilege to sell an excisable commodity is a duty of excise.
This method of raising revenue is specifically authorised by .many
Provincial Acts and laws of Princely States. In Cooverjee B. Bharucha v. The Excise Commissione.r and the Chief Commissioner, Ajmer
and others (4) this Court held that the price realised at such
G
H
public auction held under the Ajmer Excise Regulation I of 19~5
was more in the nature of a tax than a license fee. In A. B. Abdulkadir v. The State of Kera/a (S), Wanchoo, J. said that such an
auction under the Coclrin Tobacco Act, 1084 M.E. and .tl).e
Travancore Tobacco Regulation, 1087 M.E. was a method of
realising duty on tobacco and the substantial part of. the income
from the auction was in the nature of excise duty. These laws
(!) [194S] F.C.R. 179.
(2) [1962} Supp. 3 S.C.R. 436.
(4) [19S4] S.C.R. 873, 882•.. i 1
(S) (1962] Slipp.. 2 S.C.R. 741.
(3) [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. I.
Ml6Sup. C.I/66-9
584
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[!967] I S.C.R.
were passed by law-makers whose powers were not fettered by
legislative lists, and the question whether the levies were duties
of excise within Entry 84, list I and Entry 51, List II did not arise
for decision in the two cases. Section 18 of the C.P. and Berar
Excise Act, 1915 empowered the State Government to lease the
right of selling liquor or intoxicating drug to any person on such
conditions and for such period as it might think fit. In re The
Central Province and Berar Act No. XIV of 1938 ( 1) at p. 54,
Gwyer, C. J. observed that the lump sum payments for the
privilege of selling alcohol under the aforesaid Act were clearly
not excise duties or anything like them.
A
B
My conclusion may be slated briefly. A charge for a license
to sell an excisable article may be a fee or a tax. If it is a tax, it
can satisfy the test of a duty of excise, when it is so connected with
the manufacture or production of the article as to be, in effect, a
tax on the manufacture or production. Otherwise, such a tax does
not fall within the classification of a duty of excise.
c
The arrack license gives the privilege of sale of arrack distilled
in a Government distillery. The licensee is not a producer of
arrack. He obtains the arrack on payment of the price and the
prescribed duty per litre. He has no connection with the production of the liquor. Likewise, the beer license gives the privilege of
sale of country beer or porter in beer taverns. The beer is brewed
elsewhere. There is a prescribed duty per bulk litre of beer. The
charge paid for the license to sell either arrack or beer has no connection with the production of the liquor. The todC:y license gives
the privilege of sale of toddy. The licensee is not necessarily a
producer of toddy. If he produces toddy, he pays tax at the prescribed rate on each tree from which toddy is drawn. As a producer of toddy he pays the tree tax.
The charge for the toddy
license has no connection with the production of toddy. The shop
rent or the charge for the license to sell arrack, beer or toddy does
not satisfy the test of a duty of excise.
D
As the shop rent is not a duty of excise, the state legislature is
not competent to make a law levying a surcharge on the shop rent
under Entry 51, List II. The Mysore Health Cess Act, 1962, in
so far as it purports to levy a surcharge on the shop rent cannot be
sustained under Entry 51, List II. I express no opinion on the
question whether this levy under the Mysore Health Cess Act,
1962 can he justified under some other Entry in List II,
But as counsel for the State did not seek to justify the levy
under any other Entry, I am bound to hold that the Act, so far as
it makes this levy, is unconstitutional.
--------·---
(1) [1939) r.C.R. 18.
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GURUSWAMY & co. V. MYSORE
A
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(Bachawat, J.)
585
In their writ petitions, the appellants claimed refund of the
health cess collected from them under the Mysore Health Cess Act,
1962 and the Mysore Health Cess Act, 1951. Counsel for none of
the parties addressed aµy argument on the question of refund or
on the question of the validity of the Mysore Health Cess Act,
1951. The entire records of all the tenders-cum-auctions are not
before us. It is not quite clear whether the surcharge of nine
naya paise in the rupee on the shop rent, though called a health cess,
can be justified independently of the Health Cess Act 1962. Under
the Mysore Excise Act and the Hyderabad Abkari Act, the State
Government could grant the exclusive privileges of sale of liquor
on such terms and conditions as it thought fit. It could impose the
condition that the grantees would pay a fixed shop rent and a surcharge of nine naya paise in the rupee thereon. A charge of Rs:500/as shop rent and. a surcharge of nine naya paise in the rupee thereon
are, in effect, a charge of Rs. 545/- for shop rent. The appellants can
,not claim refund of the surcharge called the health cess on shop
Tent, if it was or could be collected by the State Government by
virtue of its powers under the existing excise Acts. On the other
hand, the State Government is liable to refund the surcharge if it
was and could be collected under the Mysore Health Cess Act 1962
.only. In the absence of arguments and fuller materials, the point
is left open.
In the result, the appeals are allowed in part, it is declared
that the Mysore Health Cess Act, 1962, so far as it makes a levy
of health cess on shop rent is beyond the powers of the State legislature and is invalid. The question whether the Mysore Health
Cess Act, 1951 is valid as also the question whether the appellants
are entitled to refund of the health cess collected from there are left
open, and they are relegated to a suit.
ORDER
F
In accordance with the Opinion of the majority the appeals are
allowed. There would be no order as to costs.
G.C.
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