M. L. SETHI versus R. P. KAPUR & ANR.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 23 September 1966 | [1967] 1 S.C.R. 520 | 1966 INSC 184
Key facts
- Decided
- 23 September 1966
- Bench
- RAGHUBAR DAYAL*, V. RAMASWAMI, VISHISHTHA BHARGAVA
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 110/1965
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1967] 1 S.C.R. 520
- Neutral citation
- 1966 INSC 184
Text of the judgment
A
M. L. SETID
v.
R. P. KAPUR & ANR.
September 23, 1966
[V. RAMASWAMI, V. BHARGAVA
Al\D RAGHUDAR DAYAL,
JJ.J
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Code of Criminal Procedure (Act 5 of 1898), s. 195(1) (b)-Comp/aint to Magistrate of offence under s. 211, Indian Penal Code-CognJ.
ZIJ/ICe,
when barred.
The appellant lodged a report with the police charging the resP.Ondent
with certain cognizable offences on IOih December 1958. While the
police were investigating into the report the respondent filed a complaint
111 the Magistrate's Court, on II th April 1959 alleging that the appellant
had committed an offence under s. 211, Indian Penal Code, by falsely
charging the respondent with having committed an offence. The Magistrate took cognizance of the respondent's complaint under s. 190 Criminal
Procedure Code. At that stage. there were no proceedings in any court
nor any order by any Magisuate for arrest, remand or bail of the respon·
dent in connection with the appellant's report to the p<ilice. Later, on
18th July 1959 the police arrested the respondent in connectibn with the
appellant's report and filed a charge sheet against him, but the case ended in an order of discharge. Thereafter, the appellant applied to the
Magistrate's court praying that the court may not take cognizance of the
complaint to the court, filed by the respondent against the appellant, on
the ground that, cognizance of an offence under '· 211 l.P.C. could not
be taken in view of the provisions contained in s. 195(1)(b) Cr.P.C.
Tho Magistrate rejected the contention and the order was confirmed by
the Sessions Court and the High Court.
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In appeal to this Court,
HELD : The complaint filed by the respondent was competent and the
Magistrate was not barred from taking cognizance- of it by the provisions
of s. 195(l)(b) Cr.P.C.; and, in taking cognizance of it he only exercised
juri<diction rightly vested in him. [542 A-BJ
(i) When a Magistrate is taking cognizance under s. 190 Cr.P.C., he
must examine the facts of the complaint before him and determine wh<>ther bis power of taking cognizance under the section bas or has not
been taken away under s. 195(1) Cr.P.C. In the case of an offence
under s. 211 l.P.C., s. 195(l)(b). Cr.P.C., provides that no court shall
take cognizance of ir when such offence is alleged to have been commit-
F
ted in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any court,. except on the
oomplaint in writing of sucb court or of some other court to which !'uch
court is subordinate. That is. s. 195(1) (b) Cr.P.C. bars taking cogniz.
ance if all the following circumstances exist, namely, (i) that the offence
in respect of which the case r.. brought falls under s. 211 I.P.C. (ii) that
there should be a proceeding in a court, and (iii) that the allegation
should be that the offence under s. 211 l.P.C. was committed in, or in
ltlation to such. a proceeding.
there is any proceeding in
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When examining the question whether
any court, three situations can be
envisaged : (a) There may be no proceeding in any court at
all; · (b) a proceeding in a court may actually be pending when
cognizance is taken of the offence under s. 211 I.P.C., and (e) though
there may be no proceeding pending in a court, there may haVe been
a
procuding which had already concluded and the offence under s. 211 ·may
H
M. L. SETHI V •. R. P. KAPUR
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be alleged to have ·been committed in, or in ·reJatioli' to, that proceeding.
In cases (b) and (c), the bar to taking cognizanee under s. 195(1) (b)
Cr.P.C. ·would come into operation. In case (a), when there is no proceeding pending in any court at all at the time when the applicability of _
s. 195(1 )(b), Cr.P.C. has to be determined, nor has there !>een any earlier proceeding which may have been concluded,. the sub-section would not
apply, and in such a case, the Magistrate W?uld. ~ comp~ten! I? take
cognizance of the offence under s. 211 I.P.C., 1f his 1urisd1ct1on 1s 1nvoked
in the manner laid down in s. 190 of Criminal Procedure Code. [526
F-G; 527 B, G-H, 528. E-F; 529 C-E, G-Hl
Case law considered.
(ii) There is nothing in the language of the sub-section to indicate
that the Legislature also intended lei lay down this bar if a proceeding in
a court was still under contemplation and if and when the proceeding is
taken it may be found that the offence alleged to have been committed
was, in fact, committed in or in relation to, that proceeding. The Magistrate could not be expected to come to a decision whether any such proceeding in any court was under contemplation, and any interpretation of
law,. which will make i:s applicability dependent on a future decision to
be taken· by some person and thus introduce an element of uncertainty,
should be avoided. [530 B-F]
(iii) At the stage when the complaint was filed by the respondent
against the appellant the police were inquiring into the appellant's report.
In such a case, there may be no justification for the police to bring a
charge of false information being given to them until investigation is
completed. Similarly, a Magistrate has no jurisdiction to order a prosecution far making a false complaint, till the complaint was dismissed.
But there is no requirement anywhere in law that the person affected by
the false charge could not file his complaint in court until the police had
decided that the charge is false. [534 F-H; 535 A-Bl ·
Queen v. Subanna Goundan, (1862-63) 1 M.H.C.R. 30 and Gati
Mandal v. Emperor, 27 Cr. L.J. 1105, referred to.
(iv) The mere fact that, on a report being made IP the police of a
cogb.izable offence, the proceeding must, at a latter stage., end in a judicial order by the Magistrate, cannot, stand in the way of a private complaint being filed and of cognizance being taken by the coU'rl. Oll' its basis.
The scheme of the provisions relating to investigation in the Criminal
Procedure Code, requires that upon the completion of investigation, the·
investigating officer has to submit a report to the Magistrate under
•· 173 Cr.P.C. furnishing various details and stating whether it appe""
to him there is or is not sufficient evidence or reasonable ground fo·r plac.
ing the accused-on trial. At that stage there may be an intervention by
the Magistrate in his judicial capacity. But until some occasion arisco
for a Magistrate to make a judicial order in connection with the investigation of a co!l"izable offence by the police, no question can arise of the
Magistrate havmg the power of filing a complaint under s. 195(l)(b)
Cr.P.C. [540 D,, G-H; 541 B-C]
(v) It is not correct to say that s. 195 Cr.P.C. lays down that the
offences therein referred to· shall not be deemed to be any offences at
all, except on the .complaint of the persons or the courts therein specified.
An offence is constituted as soon as it is found that the facts which cons~
titute the offence have been committed by the person accused of ·the
offence, and it remains an offence whether it is triable by a court or not
[535 G-H]
Observations contra in Fakir Mohamed v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1927 Sind
10 overruled.
622
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1967] l s.c.R.
(vi) It was not necessary that the proceeding taken by the police
should terminate before the court could competently take cognizance of
the complaint filed by the respondent against the appellant. [537 HJ
(vii) In the case of s. 195 ( 1) (b) there is a limitation that private
prosecutions are barred only if the offcaces mentioned in that su~ection
were alleged to have been committed in. or 10 relation to any proceeding
in any court. If the offence was not commilled.. in, or in relation to,
any proceeding in any court, a private complaint is permissible. [537 0.E)
Ramaswaml Iyengar v. Panduranga Muda/iar, A.1.R. 1938 Mad. 173,
referred to.
(viii) It is true that if a private person is allowed to file a complaint
that the report to the police against him is false before investigation is
completed, 3nd the court takes cogruzance of it. there may be two trial!,
in one of which a person accused of an offence may be under trial, while
in the 01her, the r,rson who complained to the police may appear as a
person accused o an offence under s. 211 I.P.C. Bu~ there is no diflicully in dealing with such a possible anomalous situation, by trying both
case. together or one after the other. (541 CF]
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 110
of 1965.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated January 13, 1965
of the High Court at Allahabad in Criminal Revision No. 1318 of
1964.
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Frank Anthony, M. L. Sethi, J. C. Talwar and R. L. Kohli,
for the appellant.
R. P. Kapur, respondent No. 1, in person.
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O. P. Rana, for respondent No. 2.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Bbargava, J. This appeal filed under certificate granted by the
High Court at Allahabad is directed against an order passed by that
Court dismissing a revision application by which the appellant,
M. L. Sethi, desired the vacation of an order passed by the Sessions
Judge of Saharanpur upholding two orders of the Additional District
Magistrate (Judicial), Saharanpur, dated 6th August, 1963 and 5th
October, 1963. By these orders, the Magistrate dismissed two
applications presented by the appellant for dismissing a complaint
pending before him for commission of offences under sections 211,
204 and 385 of the Indian Penal Code. A further prayer was made
for an order by this Court quashing the proceedings pending in the
Court of that Magistrate.
111e facts necessary for deciding this appeal may be stated
briefly. On December 10. 1958, the appellant lodged a report with
the Inspector-General of Police, Chandigarh against R.P. Kapur
(hereinafter referred to as "the respondent") and his mother-in-law
charging them with commission of offences punishable under sections
420, 109, 114 and 120-B, l.P.C. It does not appear to be necessary
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to give the details of the allegatiops made in that report. The
charge in that First Information Report was based on the allegation
that the respondent and his mother-in-law, by conspiring together,
cheated the appell~nt and his wife of a sum of Rs. 20,000/- by persuading the appellant to take a sale-deed of some land on certain
false representations and on suppression of facts indicating that on
the date when the sale-deed by the respondent's mother-in-law was
executed in favour of the wife of the appellant, the title of the
former had already been extinguished, as the land had been acquired by the Government under the Land Acquisition Act. The offence
was registered as a cognizable offence and investigation was started.
On April 11, 1959, the respondent filed a complaint in the Court
of Judicial Magistrate, !st Class, Chandigarh, against the appellant
for commission of offences under sections 204, 21 I and 385 I.P.C.
In this complaint, the respondent alleged that the land was sold by
his mother-in-law to the appellant's wife as a favour to the appellant and that at that time, no misrepresentations at all were made in
respect of any facts. The complaint added that the appellant was
D fully aware of the land acquisition proceedings; but because of
fixation of low rate of compensation in the acquisition proceedings,
the appellant suffered a loss of nearly Rs. 13,000/-. The appellant,
being a clever criminal lawyer, went to the respondent's mother-inlaw, Smt. Kaushaliya Devi, and demanded the sum of Rs. 13,000/-,
and when she refused, he threatened her with dire consequences of
E criminal proceedings against her and her son-in-law, the respondent.
A similar threat of criminal proceedings was also later given to the
respondent himself by the appellant; and thereafter, the First Information Report was lodged with the Inspector-General of Police by
the appellant on December 10, 1958. The charge in the complaint
further was that the allegations made in the First Information Report
F by the appellant were false to his knowledge and were contradicted
by the appellant's own letters, writings and other correspondence.
It was also stated that the false report to the police was made with
the knowledge and intention of putting the respondent in fear of
injury to his fair name and reputation in service and otherWise and
of being put under arrest and harassment in a criminal trial and
thereby to induce him to deliver to the appellant Rs. 13,000/- and
G submit to other terms that the appellant may choose to impose. The
last allegation was that the appellant was guilty of the offence under
~. 204, I.P.<;:., for secreting five documents which were enumerated
in the complaint, and this offence was alleged to have been committed, because if these documents had been presented in time, the
Police would not have entertained the complaint which led to a
harassing
investigation against the respondent.
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This complaint filed by the respondent against the appellant,
lli well as the proceedings instituted by the Police on the basis of the
524
SUPREME
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[1967] I S.C.R.
First Information Report were transferred under the orders of this
Court to the Court of the Additional District Magistrate, Saharanpur. The case against the respondent and his mother-in-law based
on the First Information Report ended in an order of discharge passed by the High Court of Allahabad on December 10, 1962, when the
charge framed against the respondent and his mother-in-law by the
trying Magistrate was quashed. On the record, the material available relating to the proceedings based on the F.l.R. dated December
10, 1958, is that it was on July 18, 1959 for the first time that the
respondent was arrested in connection with that report and the
challan by the Police for trial of the respondent was presented to the
Court on July 25, 1959. There is no m:iterial to show that between
December 10, 1958, when the First Information Report was lodged,
and July 18, 1959 when the respondent was arrested in connection
with it, there was, at any stage, any order pa,sed by any Magistrate
in connection with the investigation that was going on.
As we have mentioned earlier, the revisions before the Sessions
J udg~. and the High Court, arose out of two orders made by the
Additional District Magistrate on August 6, 1963, and October 5,
1963. The first order was made on an application presented by the
appellant on May 6, 1963 in which he contended that no offence
was disclosed on the allegations made in the complaint and on the
statement of the complainant recorded by the Magistrate at Chandigarh, and, further, that, in any case, the trial was barred on account
of want of requisite previous sanction as provided in s. 195 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. It was also alleged that the facts
were so inter-mixed that the trial of any other offepce separate from
the offence under s. 211, l.P.C., was not permissible or possible,
so that the Magistrate was requested not to proceed with the trial
and to withdraw the order summoning the appellant; and in the
alternative, the prayer was that the appelhnt may be discharged
under s. 253, Cr. P.C., as the charge against him was groundless.
The second order of the Magistrate dg,ted 5th October, 1963,
was passed on the application of the appellant dated August 12,
1963, in which it was prayed that the Court may not take cognizance
of the complaint as instituted, and the trial under s. 252, Cr. P.C.
may not proceed. The prayer was again based on the ground that
cognizance of the offence under s.. 211, l.P.C. could not be taken in
view of the provisions ofs. 195(l)(a) &(b), Cr. P.C., under which the
Court was empowered to proceed in respect of that offence only
when there was a complaint in writing by the authority concerned.
The Additional District Magistrate by his two orders, rejected the
contention tl}at s. 195, Cr. P.C., barred this particular complaint
which had been filed against the appellant. The main ground for
these orders was that no proceedings were pending in any Court
when the compla,int against the appellant was filed in the Court of
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the Magistrate at· Chandigarh for the offences under sections. 204,
211, and 385, I.P.C. and consequently, s. 195, Cr. P.C., wa~ inapplicable. That is the view of the Addl. District Magistrate which has
been upheld both by the Sessions Judge and the ~gh Cour~; a11;d
consequently, the appellant has now come up to this Court in this
appeal.
On behalf of the appellant, the first submission made by his
counsel, Mr. Frank Anthony, was that the making of a report
of a cognizable offence with the police is both institution of a criminal proceeding as well as charging a person with having committed an offence, so that, in this case, when the appellant lodged his
First Information Report on December 10, 1958, with the InspectorGeneral of Police, it must be held that he had instituted a criminal
proceeding against the respondent, as well as he had charged him
with having committed the offences mentioned in that report within
the meaning of s. 211, l.P.C. 'In support of this proposition, learned
counsel relied on a Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court
in Karim Buksh v. The Queen-Empress(!), and a Full Bench decision
of the Kerala High Court in Alber!v. State of Kera/a and Another.(2)
It was urged that, on this interpretation, when the respondent filed
a complaint against the appellant under s. 211, I.P.C., together with
other offences, the provisions of s.195, Cr. P.C., became attracted.
It appears to us that in this case it is not at all necessary to
go into the question whether, whenever a complaint of a cognizaable offence is filed, it must be held that the complainant is instituting or causing to be instituted a criminal proceeding, or is merely
charging the person named in the report with having committed the
offences mentioned therein, because, during the course of argument
in the appeal before us, no contention was put forward that no
offerce under s. 211, 1.P.C., was made out and that the complaint
of the respondent against the appellant was wrongly being treated
as in respect of a charge under s. 211. Up to the stage of the revision
before the High Court, some attempt was made on behalf of the
appellant to plead that the facts alleged bythe respondent in his complaint to the Court did not constitute an offence under s. 211, I.P.C.
committed by the appellant; but, in this Court, Mr. Frank Anthony
on behalf of the appellaqt gave up this plea and, in fact,' proceeded
to urge before us that the complaint of the respondent against the
appellant did specifically include in it a charge under s. 211, 1.P.C•.
On behalf of the respondent and the State Government also there
was no suggestion that the complaint against the appellant was
not in respect of the offence under s. 211, l.P.C. It is consequently
unnecessary at this stage to go into the question whether the facts
given in the complaint, or the facts which may ultimately be found
proved after the trial, do or do not constitute an offence under s.
211, l.P.C. and if they do, whether those facts show that the
(!) l.L.R.17 Cal. 574.
(2) A.I.R. 1966 Kerala 11.
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[1967] l s.c.a.
appellant had instituted a criminal proceeding against the respondent
or had only charged him with having committed the offences mentioned in his report. That is a point which may have to be decided
at the conclusion of the trial of the appellant; and consequently,
we refrain from going into this question at this stage.
A
The only point that falls for determination by this Court is
whether, in this case, cognizance of the complaint, which included
an offence under s. 211, I.P.C., filed by the respondent against the
appellant, was rightly or wrongly taken by the Courts. The complaint, as we have mentioned earlier, was filed by the respondent in
the Court of the Judicial Magistrate at Chandigarh on April II,
1959, and on the same day, cognizance of the offence was taken by
that Magistrate under s. 190, Cr. P.C., whereafter that Magistrate
proceeded to record the statement of the respondent under s.
200, Cr. P.C. Before this cognizance was taken, the appellant
had already lodged his first Information Report against the respondent with the Inspector-General of Police on December I0, 1958.
In connection with that report, investigation by the Police must
have been going on, though none of the judgments of the lower
Courts mentioned what particular steps had been taken in that
investigation up to the I Ith April, 1959, when this complaint was
filed by the respondent against the appellant. The facts found only
mentioned that in connection with that First Information Report of
the appellant, the respondent was arrested on July 18, 1959, and
subsequently, the charge-sheet was submitted by the Police to the
Court of the Magistrate on July 25, 1959. This arrest and submission of the charge-sheet were both subsequent to the filing of the
complaint by the respondent. In these circumstances, we have· to
examine whether the Magistrate at Chandigarh was competent to
talce cognizance of this complaint on April 11, 1959, in view of the
provisions of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
B
In dealing with thi.s question of !aw, the important aspect that has
to be kept in view is that the point of time at which the legality of
the cognizance taken has to be judged is the time when cognizance
is actually taken under s. 190, Cr. P.C. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure which applies to tria'~ of such cases, the only provision
for taking cognizance is contained in s. 190. Section 195, which
follows that section, is, in fact, a limitation on the unfettered power
of a Magistrate to take cognizance under s.190. Under the latter
section cognizance of any offence can be taken by any Presidency
Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and
any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf (a) upon
receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence; (b)
upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer;
and (c) upon information received from any person other than a
police-officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such
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offence has been committed. In the present case, the Judicial
Magistrate at Chandigarh had before him the complaint filed by the
respondent, and ifs: 190 stood by itself, he was competent to take
cognizance of it under clau~e (a) of sub-s. (!) of that section.
This power of taking cognizance was, however, subject to the
subsequent provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure
including that' contained in s. 195. Sub-s. (!) of s. 195, which is
relevant for our purposes, is reproduced below :" 195(1). No Court shall take cognizance(a) of any offence punishable under sections 172 to
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188 of the Indian Penal Code, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned, or
of some 9ther public servant to whom he is subordinate;
(b) of any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the same Code, namely, sections 193,
194, 195, 196, 199, 200, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210,
211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have
been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding
in any; Court, except on the complaint in writing
of such Court or of some othet Court to which
such Court is subordinate; or
(c) ·of any offence described in seetion 463 or punishable
under section 471, section 475 or section 476 of the
same Code, when such offence is alleged to have
been committed by a partyto any proceeding in any
Court in respect of a document produced or given
in evidence in such proceeding, except on the com·
plaint in writing of such Court, or of some other
Court to which such Court is subordinate."
This sub-section thus bars any Court from taking cognizance of the
offences mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c), except when the conditions laid down in those clause~ are satisfied. In the case of an
offence punishable under s. 211, I.P:C., the mandatory direction
is that no Court shall take· cognizance of any offence punishable
under. this section, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in,relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on
the complaint in writing of such Court or of some other Court to
which such Court is subordinate. This provision in clause (b) of
sub-s. (l) of s. 195 is thus clearly a limitation on the power of the
Court to take cognizance under s. 190. Consequently, it is at the
stage when a Magistrate is taking cognizance under s. 190 that he
must examine the facts of the complaint before him and determine
whether his power of taking cognizance under s. 190 has or has not
been taken away by cl. (b) of sub-s. (!) of s. 195, Cr. P.C. In
528
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(1967] 1 S.C.R.
the present case, therefore, at the time when this complaint was
filed by the respondent in the' Court of the Judicial Magistrate at
Chandigarh, it was necessary and incumbent on that Magistrate to
examme whether his power of taking cognizance of the offence
was limited by the provisions of s. 195 (l)(b). He had, therefore,
to determine whether cognizance of this complaint charging the
appellant with commission of an offence under s. 211, I.P.C., could
not be. taken by·him, because that offence was alleged to have been
comm1ttcd in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, and if
he found that it was so, whether a complaint in writing by such
Court or some other Court to which such Court was subordinate
was necessary before he could take cognizance. Consequently,
in deciding this appeal, this Court has to examine whether on the
date when cognizance was taken by the Judicial Magistrate at
Chandigarh such cognizance was barred under s. 195(1)(b), Cr.
P.C., because the offence punishable under s. 211, I.P.C., included
in the complaint was alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court.
In the interpretation of this cl. (b) of sub-s. (I) of s. 195, con·
siderable emphasis has been laid before us on the expression "in•
or in relation to", and it has been urged that the use of the expression "in relation to" very considerably widens lhe scope of this
section and makes it applicable to cases where there can c~en in
future be a proceeding in any Court in relation to which the offence
under s. 211, I.P.C., may be alleged to have been committed. A
proper interpretation of this provision requires that each ingredient
in it be separately examined. This provision bars taking of cognizance if all the following circumstances exist, viz., (:) that the
offence in respect of which the case is brought falls under s. 211
I.P.C.; (2) that there should be a proceeding in any Court; and
(3) that the allegation should be that the offence under s. 211 was
committed in, or in relation to, such a proceeding. Unless all the
three ingredients exist, the bar under s. 195(l)(b) against taking
cognizance by the Magistrate, except on a complaint in writing of a
Court, will not come into operation. In the present case also,
therefore, we have to see whether all these three ingredients were in
existence at the time when the Judicial Magistrate at Chaadigarh
proceeded to take cognizance of the charge under s. 211, I.P.C.,
against the appellant.
There is, of course, no doubt that in the complaint before the
Magistrate a charge under s. 211. 1.P.C., against the appellant
was included, so that the first ingredient clearly existed. The question on which the decision in the present case hinges is whether
it can be held that any proceeding in any Court existed when that
Magistrate took cognizance. If any proceeding in any Court existed and the offence under s. 211, J.P.C., in the romplaint filed before
him was alleged to have been committed in such a proceeding, or in
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relation to any such proceeding, the Magistrate would have been
barred from taking cognizance of the offence. On the other hand,
if there was no proceeding in any Court at all in which, or in relation to which, the offence under s. 211 could have been alleged to
have been committed, this provision barring cognizance would not
be attracted at all.§
·
In this case, as we have already indicated when enumerating
the facts, the complaint of which cognizance was taken by the
Judicial Magistrate at ChandigarhwasfiledonApril 11, 1959,andat
that stage, the only proceeding that was going on was investigation
by the Police on the basis of the First Information Report lodged by
the appellant before the Inspector-General of Police on December
10, 1958. There is no mention at all that there was, at that stage,
any proceeding in any Court in respti_c.Lofthat F.l.R. When examining the question whether there is any proceeding in any Court,
there are three situations that can be envisaged. One is that there
may be no proceeding in any Court at all. The second is that a
proceeding in a Court may actually be pending at the point of time
when cognizance is sought to be taken of the offence under s. 211,
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I.P.C. The third.is that, though there may be no proceeding pending
in any Court in which, or in relation to which, the offence under
s. 211, I.P.C., could have been committed, there may have beena
proceeding which had already concluded and the offence under s. 2.11
may be alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, that
proceeding. It seems to us that in both the latter two circumstancE es envisaged above, the bar to taking cognizance under s. 195(l)(b)
would· come into operation. If tl;i.ere be a proceeding actually
pending in any Court and the offence under s. 211, l.P.C., is alleged
to have been committed in, or in relation to, that proceeding,
s. 195(n(b) would dearly apply. Even if there be a case where
there was, at one stage, a proceeding in any Court which may
have concluded by the time the question of applying the provisions
of s. 195(\)(b) arises, the bar under that provision would apply if
it is alleged that the offence under s. 211, I.P.C., was committed in,
or in relation to, that proceeding. The fact that the proceeding
had conclutled would be immaterial, because s. 195(l)(b) does not
require that the proceeding in any Court must actually be pending
·at the time when the question of applying this bar arises.
G
H
Cir
In the first circm:µstance envisaged above, when there is no
proceeding pending in any Court at all at the time when the applicability of s. 195(l)(b) has to be determined, nor has there been any
earlier proceeding which may have been coneluded, the provisions
of this sub-section would not be attracted, because the language
used in it requires that there must be a proceeding in some Court in,
or in relation to, which the offence under s. 211, I.P.C. is alleged to
have been committed. In such a case, a Magistrate would be competent to ta.ke cognizance of the offence under s. 211 I.P.C., if his
530
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[1967] l S.C.R
jurisdiction is invoked in th<! manner laid down in s. 190 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure.
Mr. Frank Anthony on behalf of the appellant urged before us
that even in those cases where there may be no pending proceeding
in any Court, nor any proceeding which has already concluded in
any Court, the bar of s. 195(1)(b) should be held to be applicable
if it is found that a subsequent proceeding in any Court is under
contemplation. We do not think that the language of cl. (b) of
sub-s. (I) of s. 195 can justify any such interpretation. A proceeding in contemplation cannot be said to be a proceeding in a Court.
When there is mere contemplation of starting a proceeding in
future, there is no certainty that the proceeding will come into
e:tistence. It will always be dependent on the decision to be taken
by the person who is contemplating that the proceeding be started;
and any interpretation of the law, which will make the applicability
dependent on a future decision to be taken by another person, would,
in our opinion, be totally incorrect. The applicability of this
.provision at the sweet will of the person contemplating the proceeding will introduce an element of uncertainty in the applicability of
the law; and such an interpretation must be avoided. In this case,
apart from this circumstance, the language used clearly lends itself to the interpretation that the bar has been placed by the Legislature only in those ca~es where the offence is alleged to have been
committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding actually pending
in any Court, or any proceeding which has already been taken in
any Court. There is nothing in the language to indicate that the
Legislature also intended to lay down this bar if a proceeding in a
Court was still under contemplation and if and when that proceeding is taken, it may be found that the offence alleged to have been
committed was, in fact, committed in, or in relation to, that proceeding. In this connection, the question of time when the applicability of this provision has to be determined, assumes importance.
It appears to us that at the time when in the present case the Judicial Magistrate at Chandigarh had to determine the applicability
of this bar, he could not be expected to come to. a decision whether
any proceeding in any Court was under contemplation in, or in
relation to, which the offence under s. 211, l.P.C., of which he was
asked to take cognizance, was alleged to have been committed. In
fact, it would be laying on the Magistrate a burden which he could
not be expected to discharge properly and judicially as no Magistrate could determine in advance of a proceeding in a Court whether
the offence under s. 211, l.P.C., of which he is required to 1ake
cognizance, will be an offence which will be found subsequently
to have been committed in relation to the contemplated proceeding
to be taken thereafter. This interpretation, sought to be placed on
this provision on behalf of the appellant, cannot, therefore, be
accepted.
A
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M. L, SETHI v. R. P. KAPUR (Bhargava, J.)
-
531
In this connection, reliance was placed by learned counsel .
for the appellant on a series of cases decided by various High Courts.
In Re Vasudeo Ramchandra Joshi(!), the ]iigh Court of Bombay
quashed proceedings for prosecution of a lawyer who had instigated some witnesses to give false evidence. It appears that a pleader
was defending an accused person in a proceeding pending before a
B Magistrate against. his client in respect of a charge under s. 401,
I.P.C. On April l, 1922, an application made by the pleader
on behalf of the accused for bail was refused. Then, .the statements
of three witnesses were recorded under s. 164, Cr. P.C., on April
18, 1922, and from these statements it appeared that on April 10,
these witnesses had an interview with the pleader who had instigated them to ,give false evidence. On April 15, another case against
c the
pleader's client in respect of a dacoity was sent up to the Magistrate, and the allegation against the pleader was that it was in
connection with this case of dacoity which was sent up to the Magistrate on April 15, that the pleader had instigated the witnesses
to give false evidence. On June 2, the, witnesses were actually
examined before the Magistrate in this dacoity case which was sent
D up on April 15; and then on June 7, a complaint was filed by the
Police Officer against the pleader charging him with having abetted
the giving of false evidence. It was in these circumstances that the
High Court held that the provisions of s. 195(1) (b), Cr. P.C., were
applicable and the case against the pleader on the charge filed by the
Police Officer was not maintainable when there was no sanction by
the Magistrate who was enquiring into the dacoity case in relation
to which the witnesses were instigated to give false evidence. On
the facts, it is clear that that case is distinguishable from the case
before us. In that case, the charge by the Police Officer was filed
on June 7, and on that date a proceeding was already pending before
the Magistrate in relation to which the witnesses had been instigated
to give false evidence. The provisions of s. 195(1)(b) were, thereF fore, clearly applicable. Dealing with this matter, one of the
learned Judges of the High Court held that "the words are very
general, and are wide enough, in my opinion, to cover a proceeding
in contemplation before a Criminal Court, though it may not have
begun at the date when the offence was committed. If that is so,
it is iilain that sanction was necessary in the present case, and,
G therefore, the proceedings which have been undertaken are null
and void without such sanction." These views expressed by
Crump, J., had been relied upon by learned counsel in support of
his proposition that even if an offence is committed in relation to
a proceeding which is in contemplation, the provisions of s. 195(1)
(b), Cr. P.C., are attracted. We do not think that any such general
proposition can be inferred from that decision. It is to be noted
H that in that case though it was held that the offence of instigation
of witnesses to give false evidence was committed when proceedings
(I) AI.R. 1923 Bom. 105.
532
SUPREME
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[1967) I S.C.R.
before a criminal Court were still under contemplation in which the
witnesses were to appear, the actual complaint for that instigation
was filed after the Magistrate was already seized of the proceeding
in which the witnesses were instigated to give false evidence. On
the date on which the complaint was filed by the Police Officer
charging the pleader with instigation of giviflg false evidence, there
was already a pending proceeding before the Court in relation to
which that offence had been committed. Consequently, the observations in that case should be interpreted as limited to laying down
that the provisions of s. 195(I)(b), Cr. P.C., will be attracted even
if the offence charged was corrunittcd while the proceeding was
in contemplation and that there was no decision by the Court
that the sanction under s. 195(l)(b) would be necessary even
in those cases where the proceeding is still under contemplation on the date when the complaint is filed before the
Court for commission of the offence mentioned in s.
195(l)(b).
B
c
In Ghulam Rasul v. Emperor(!), the Police investigated a report that a certain person had stolen the complainant's watch from D
his car, and in the investigation, the Police came to the conclusion
that the report was false and that the watch had been removed by
the complainant himself. The ca'e was accordingly reported to
the Magistrate for cancellation; and then the Police prosecuted the
complainant under ss. 193. and 211, I.P.C. The learned Judge
of the Lahore High Court-in dealing with the case held: "I am E
clear that the words in this sub-section 'in relation to any proceeding in any Court' apply to this case of a false report or a false state-·
ment made in an investigation by the police with the intention that
there shall; in consequence of this, be a trial in the Criminal Court,
and I find support for this view in the case of Chuhar Mal-Nihal
Mal v. Emperor(Z)." The decision in the words in which the learned Judge expressed himself appears to support the argument of
learned counsel for the appellant in the present case; but we think
that very likely in that case, the learned Judge was influenced by the
circumstance that the case had been reported by the Police to the
Magistrate for cancellation. He appears to have held the view
that the Magistrate having passed an order of cancellation, it was
necessary that the complaint should be filed by the Magistrate, G
because s. I 95(1)(b) had become applicable. If the learned Judge
intended to say that without any proceeding being taken by the
Magistrate in the case which was investigated by the Police it was
still essential that a complaint should be filed by the Magistrate
simply because a subsequent proceeding following the police investigation was contemplated, we consider that his decision cannot be H
accepted as correct.
'
I) A.l.R. 1936 Lah. 238.
(2) A.I.R t929 Sind 132.
..
M. L. SETHI v. R. P. KAPUR (Bhargava; J.)
B
c
533
In Balak Ram and Others v. Emperor('), it was held that a
person who sets the criminal law in motion by making a fafae charge
to the police of a cogniza 'ile offence by definitely charging a person
with having come to his house for the purpose of dacoity, and
insisting for investigation, institutes criminal proceedings within the
meaning of s. 211, and that criminal proceedings are just as much
instituted within the meaning of s. 211 when first information of a
cognizable offence is given to the Police under s. 154, Cr. P.C., as
when a complaint is made direct to a Magistrate under s. 200,
Cr. P.C. We do not think that these comments made in that case
can be interpreted as laying down that criminal proceedings instituted by lodging a First Information Report of a cognizable offence
to the Police amount to institution of a criminal proceeding in a
Court. What the Court in that case was deciding was that there
can be criminal proceedings apart from proceedings instituted by a
complaint in Court for purposes of s. 211, I.P.C. That decision
does not in any way attempt to lay down that a proceeding in investigation is a proceeding in a Court.
In Ramdeo v. The State and Another(2), the question arose
about the applicability of s. 195 to a complaint made for an offence
under s. 182, I.P.C., by a Police Officer for giving false information
to him in a report lodged by an informant. In that connection, the
Court considered the scope of s. 195 and held that an offence under
s. 2II, I.P.C., in connection with a false charge made before the
Police is an offence committed in relation to proceeilings in a Court
contemplated at the time of lodging information with the Police.
But in that case again the complaint by the Police was held to be
incompetent only on the further basis that the proceedings under
contemplation at the time when the offence under s. 211, I.P.C., was
committed by lodging the report, were actually instituted later.
This institution of that case took place before the Police lodged the
J complaint for the offence under s. 182, I.P.C. Thus, this was again
a case where a proceeiling' was actually peniling in a Court at the
time when cognizance of the offence under s. 182 was taken, and it
was held that the charge under s. 182 was covered by a charge under
s. 211, l.P.C. and that the latter offence had been committed in relation to the proceeding which had come into existence in the Court
at
the time of taking cognizance.
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In Har Prasad v. Hans Ram and Others(3), a private complaint
was filed before a Magistrate disclosing commission of offences
under ss. 467 and 471, l.P.C., at a time when there were no
proceedings pending in any Court. These offences were committed
for the purpose of using the forged documents in the Court of the
Tahslldar who was to deal with subsequent mutation proceedings
(1) A.LR. 1942 Oudh 100.
(2) A.I.R. 1962 Raj. 149.
(3) A.I.R. 1966 All.
124.
534
SUPREME
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[1967] l S.C.R.
and they were, in fact, so used subsequently. It was in these circumstances that the Court held that the words "in respect of" in
s. 195(l)(c) were wide enough to include even a document which
was prepared before the proceedings started in a Court of law but
was produced or given in evidence in that proceeding. It was further held that in this view of the matter, although the document was
fabricated before the proceedings started in Tahsildar's Court and B
although two of the opposite parties were not impleaded in the
mutation proceedings, it must be held that the cognizance of the
offence was barred bys. 195(l)(c). Once again, it will be noticed
that all that the Court disregarded was the fact that the substantive
offence mentioned ins. 195 was committed for a proceeding whidi'
was under contemplation, but the proceedings in Court for that c
offence were held barred by s. 195 only because subsequently,
proceedings in the Court of the Tahsildar were actually taken and
the documents concerned were used in it and were found to have
been forged in relation to those proceedings. On the date on which
the cognizance was taken, the proceeding, in relation to which the
offence had been committed, was already pending.
In The Queen v. Suhbanna Gawzdan and Others('), it was found
that some persons were convicted under s. 211, I.P.C., for falsely
charging the complainant with having committed the offence of
highway robbery, knowing that there was no just or lawful ground
for such charge. The charge had been preferred before an Inspector
of Police, who disbelieved and refused to act upon it. It was held
that to constitute the offence of preferring a false charge contemplated ins. 211, I.P.C.-, it was not.necessary that the charge should be
before a Magistrate. In that conn~tion, the Court further held
that it is enough in a case like that one if it appears that the charge
was still not pending and that an indictment for falsely charging could
not be sustained if the accusation were entertained and still remained
under proper legal enquiry. Reliance is placed on the last dictum
that an indictment for falsely charging, as in the present case,
cannot be sustained while the accusation made in that alleged false
charge is still under proper legal enquiry. In the present case,
there is no doubt that at the stage when the complaint was filed by
the respondent against the appellant for the offences under ss.
204, 211 and 385, I.P.C., enquiry on the First Information Report
lodged by the appellant was still being conducted by the Police.
In such a case, there may be no justification for the Police bringing
a charge of false information being given to it until the investig&tion
is completed. But we do not find any requirement anywhere in
law that the person affected by the false charge could not file his
complaint in Court until the Police had decided that the charge
was false. The discretion of the person affected by the false charge
was not to be fettered or tied down to the view taken by the Police.
(ll (1862 ct 1863) I Madras High Court Rcporll, 30.
D
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M. L. SETHI v. R. P. KAPUR (Bhargava, 1.)
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535
The case of Gati Manda/ v. The Emperor(') is again of no
help, b~cause in that case also the only principle that was laid dowli
was that a Magistrate had no jurisdiction to order a prosecution for
making a false complaint, till the complaint was dismissed. That
case does not relate to the right of a private person to file a complaint
at a stage when no case is pending in any Court against him and no
question of intervention of any Court under s. 195, Cr.P.C., arises.
In Fakir Mohamed v. Emperor(2), it was held that if there is
no complaint by a public servant as required by s. ·195, the defect
cannot be said to be an error, omission or irregularity in a complaint, because the complaint was never made. Before an error,
omission or irregularity in a complaint can be cured, the complaint
must exist, and consequently, the provisions of s. 537, Cr. P.C. cannot apply. In such a case, the trial without a complaint as required
by s. 195 would be void. These comments brought to our notice
do not have any particular bearing· on the question that we are called upon to examine. In the same case, the Additional Judicial
Commissioner of Sind interpreted the effect of s. 195, Cr. P.C. He
was of the view that "section 195, though it forms a part of
the Code of Procedure, in reality contains a provision of the substantive law of crimes. For s. 195 does not deal With the competency of the Courts, nor lays down which of several Courts shall,
in any particular matter, have jurisdiction to try the case; and yet
the language of s. 195 is apt to these matters, and it forms part of
the Chapter entitled 'of the jurisdiction of the Criminal Courts
in enquiries and trials'. Section 195 in reality lays down that the
offences therein referred to (or rather the acts constituting those
offences) shall not be deemed to be any offences at all, except on the
complaint of the persons or the Courts therein specified; it enhances
the connotation of those offences and limits the scope of their defini.tion. This limitation of the definition is brought about by saying that no Court shall take cognizance of the offences unless this
condition, requisite for initiation of proceedings, is satisfied".
Relying on these observations, learned counsel for the appellant
urged before us that in this case also, we should hold that no offence
under s. 211 could come into existence and no charge for that commission could be brought against the appellant, unless there was a
complaint by a Court under s. 195, Cr. P.C. We are unable to agree
with the view expressed by the learned Additional Judicial Commissioner that s. 195, Cr. P.C., really lays down that the offences
.therein referred to shall not be deemed to be any offences at all,
except on the complaint of the persons or the Courts therein specified. An offence is constituted as soon as it is found that the acts
which constitute that offence have been committed by the person
accused of the offence. It remains an offence whether it is triable
by a Cuurt or not. If a law prescribes punishment for that offence
(I) 27 Cr. L.J. lJOS.
M16upSC.I./66-6
A.I.R. 1927 Sind 10
'
536
SUPUKll OOtmT :UPOllTS
(1967] I S.C.R.
the fact that the trial of that offence can only be taken up by courts
after certain specified conditions are fulfilled docs not make that
offence any the less an offence. The limitation laid down by
s. 195, Cr. P.C., is, in fact, a limitation only on the power of Courts
to take cognizance of, and try, offences and does not in any way
have the effect of converting an act, which was an offence, into an
innocent act. We cannot, therefore, subscribe to the view expressed in that case. There is the further circumstance that in the case
before us we have held that the provision contained ins. 195(l)(b)
was not applicable at the time when the Judicial Magistrate at
Chandigarh took cogni1.ance .of the offence, and consequently,
this principle sought to be laid down by the Additional Judicial
Commissioner of Sind has no application.
B
c
In Gunamony Sapui v. Queen Empress('), the High Court of
. Calcutta dealt with a case in which a complaint had been lodged
by one Syambar, accompanied by Gunamony, charging certain
persons with murder and other offences. The Police, after investigation, made a report to the effect that the information was false,
and thereupon, the Magistrate directed proceedings to be taken D
against Syambar and Gunamony to show cause why they should not
be prosecuted. Syambar, who had made the report, then appeared
before the Magistrate, and repeating the information contained in
his report to the Police he asked for an enquiry, which was ordered
by the Magistrate. Once again, a report was made by the police
that the complaint was false. Thereupon, the Magistrate, without
putting and end to that complaint of Syambar by dismissing it under
s. 203, or passing any other order as he might thir1k fit, instituted
proceedings against Gunamony under s. 211, l.P.C. On these
facts, the High Court held that the proceedings against Gunamony
must be quashed, because there was no final order by the Magistrate on the complaint of Symabar dismissing his complaint, and that
complaint was still pending. On the analogy to this case, it was p
urged by learned counsel that in this case also, the proceedings
against the appellant should be quashed on the ground that, at the
stage when the respondent filed his complaint against the appellant,
the proceedings being taken by Police on the report of the appellant
had not come to an end. We do not think that the two cases
can be compared. In that case, the proceedings were in Court and G
the Court filed a complaint for bringing false charge or institution of false criminal proceedings without putting an end to those
proceedings. In the case before us, there were no proceedings before any Court on the basis of the report lodged by the appellant at
the time when the respondent filed his complaint. It was not
at all necessary that the proceedings being taken by the Police
should terminate before the Court could competently take cogni- R
zance of this complaint filed by the respondent against the appellant.
(I)
(1898-99) 3 C.W.N. 758.
M. L. SETHI v. R. P. KAPUR (Bhargava, 1.)
A
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537
In K. Ramaswami Iyengar v. K. V. Panduranga Mudaliar(l),
a learned Judge of the Madras High Court, dealing with the principle underlying s. 195, Cr. P.C. held: "Where an act amounts to the
offence of contempt of the lawful authority of public servants
(ss. 172-188, I.P.C.), or to an offence against public justice
such as giving false evidence (s. 193, et seq., l.P.C.), or to an
offence relating to documents actually used in a Court (s. 471 etc.),
private prosecutions are barred absolutely, and only the Court, in
relation to which the offence was committed, may initiate proceedings. This salutary rule of law is founded on commonsense. The
dignity and prestige of courts of law must be upheld by their presiding officers, and it would never do to leave it to parties aggrieved to achieve in one prosecution gratification of personal revenge
and vindication of a Court's honour and prestige. To allow this
would be to sacrifice deliberately the dispassionate and impartial
calm of tribunals and to allow a Court's prestige to he the sport of
personal passions." We are unable to interpret these views expressed by the Madras High Court as implying that private prosecutions for the offences mentioned in clauses (b) & (c) of sub-s. (1)
of s. 195, Cr. P.C., are barred absolutely and under no circumstances
can such offences be brought before courts by private persons.
In the case of cl. (b), there is the clear limitation that private prosecutions are barred only if the offence mentioned in that section was
alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court. If the offence was not committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, a private complaint is clearly
permissible. The question of upholding the dignity and prestig~
of courts of law only arises after there are proceedings in the Courts
and not at the stage when no such proceedings have been instituted
or have come into existence in any Court. In the present case, we
have already indicated that the cognizance of the complaint filed by
the respondent against the appellant was taken at a stage when there
was no proceeding in any Court of law, and consequently, at that
stage, there could be no question of dignity or prestige of a court
of law being upheld or of a private complaint being barred.
In Emperor v. Hardwar Pal (2), the complaint in question
was held to clearly constitute an offence under s. 182, I.P.C., but the
High Court accepted the view held in earlier cases that the facts in
the complaint also constituted an offence under the first part of
s. 211, I.P.C. The High Court was called upon to decide whether
in those circumstances cognizance of the complaint for the offence
under s. 182, 1.P.C., on the ·complaint of the Police Officer concerned could be competently taken when the case related to false information report made to the police on the basis of which a case was
sent up to Court and was tried by a Magistrate. The Court held
that the complaint under s. 182, l.P.C., could not be proceeded with,
(I) A.I.R. 1938 Mad. 173.
(2) I.LR. 34 AU. 522.
538
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1967) l S.C.R.
because, on the basis of the alleged false report, the Police made an
inquiry and sent up some accused for trial, and the offence, which
had been committed under the first paragraph of s. 211 by falsely
implicating an accused in the report, was one committed in relation
to a proceeding in court. It was held to be obvious that there was
considerable relation between the first report and the proceeding in
Court, for the latter was the result of the former. The report led
to the police inquiry and the inquiry to the proceeding in court.
Consequently, the offence committed was one under·s. 211 in relation to a proceeding in court and sanction of the Court was necessary. This case, again, does not, therefore, indicate that any view
was taken contrary to our opinion expressed above.
Two other cases brought to our notice are A. T. Krishnamachari v. Emperor,(') and Badri v. State (2). Jn the former case
a statement was recorded under s. 164, Cr. P.C. by a Magistrate in
relation to a case which was subsequently tried on that matter.
Even though the Court, which tried the case, had not recorded the
statement under s. 164, it was held that it was competent for that
Court, on an application under s. 476, to make a complaint against
the person in respect of a statement made by him to another Magistrate under s. 164, Cr. P.C. This was again a case where the statement
under s. 164, Cr. P.C., was found to relate to a proceeding that subsequently came into existence in a Court, and the question of filing the
complaint for the offence of making that false statement or of taking
cognizance in respect of that offence only arose after that· proceeding in Court had already come into existence.
In the case of Badri v. State(2), where an offence under s. 211,
I.P.C., was alleged to have been committed by the person making a
false report against the complainant and others to the Police, it was
held that it was an offence in relation to the remand proceeding
and the bail proceedings which were subsequently taken before a
Magistrate in connection with that report to the Police, arid, therefore, the case was governed by s. 195(l)(b), Cr. P.C., and no
cognizance of the offence could be taken except on a complaint by
the Magistrate who held the remand and bail proceedings. We
do not consider it necessary to express any opinion whether the
remand and bail proceedings before the Magistrate could be held to
be proceedings in a Court, nor need we consider the question
whether the charge of making of the false report could be rightly
held to be in relation to those proceedings. That aspect need not
detain us, because, in the case before us, the facts are different.
The complaint for the offence under s. 211, l.P.C. was taken cognizance of by the Judicial Magistrate at Chandigarh at a stage when
there had been no proceedings for arrest, remand or bail of the respondent and the case was still entirely in the hands of the Police.
(I) A.LR. (1933) Mad. 767.
(2) 1.L.R. [1963] 2 All. 359.
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M. L. SETHI v. R. P. KAPUR (Bhargava, J.)
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539
There was, in fact~ no order by any Magistrate in the proceedings
being taken by the Police on the report lodged by the appellant up
to tl;le stage when the question of applying the prnvisions of s. 195
(l)(b), Cr. P.C., arose. These two cases are also, therefore, of no
assistance to the appellant. On the same ground, the decision
of the Bombay High Court in J. D. Boywalla v. Sorab Rustomji
Engineer(') is also inapplicable, because in that case also orders were
passed by a Magistrate on the final report made by the Police after
investigation of the facts in the report in respect of which the complaint under s. 211, I.P.C., was sought to be filed.
In support of his proposition that no criminal complaint
under s. 211, l.P.C., can be filed by a private person if the First
Information Report is under investigation and relates to a cognizable offence, Mr. Anthony urged that we should examine the scheme
of the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to investigation contained in ss. 154 to 173 of that Code and should hold that this
scheme itself envisages that, invariably, the proceedings of investigation will terminate in a judicial order by a Magistrate, and while
such proceedings are pending, it should not be permissible for a
private person to file the .complaint on the ground that the report
under investigation was a false one. It is perfectly correct that when a
report of a cognizable offence is made, a duty is cast on the Police
Officer in charge of the station to investigate that case, and in certain cases of serious offences, immediate report has to be sent to the
Magistrate who has power to take cognizance of the offences.
There is, however, nothing in these sections to indicate that the
Magistrate is required to intervene in the investigation until the
inwstigation is completed and the investigating officer arrives at
some conclusion in accordance withs. 169 ors. l 7Q, Cr. P.C. After
arriving at this conclusion under either of those two sections, he
has to submit a report to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence under s. 173. If his conclusion is covered by the
provisions of s. 170, Cr. P.C., the report submitted by the investigating
officer will necessarily show that a cognizable offence has been committed and such a report will satisfy the requirements of s. 190(1)(b),
Cr. P.C. On that report, therefore, the Magistrate conceme.d can take
cognizance and proceed with the trial of the case. On the other hand,
if the report is based on conclusions envisaged ins .. 169, Cr. P.C., the
report will contain facts found by the Police Officer, and would
normally· indicate that no such offence was committed of which he
could recommend a trial by the Magistrate. Even on the receipt o,
such a report, the Magistrate is, of course, competent to take cog
nizance under s. 190(1)(b) if he is of the opinion that the facts
stated in the report of the Police constitute an offence. On the other
hand, if those facts do not constitute an offence, no cognizance of the
case can be taken by the Magistrate, though he can order further
(1) A.I.R. (1941) Bom. 294.
540
SUPRllMI! COURT REPORTS
(1967] I S.C.R.
investigation. If he does not choose to order further investigation,
all that the Magistrate has to do is to make an order under sub-s.
(3) of s. 173, Cr. P.C., discharging the bond if the accused has been
released by the Police on his bond.
This scheme of investigation and its termination contained
in these sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure came up for
consideration. in several cases. In Appa Ragho Bhogle and Others
v. Emperor(') it was held that a case which was investigated by the police under authority of a Magistrate under
s. 155, Cr. P. C., could not be disposed of without the order of
the Magistrate in some form or another after a report was submitted to him. In State v. Vipra Khimji Gangaram(2), it was held
that where information relating to the commission of a cognizable
offence is given to an officer in charge of a Police Station under s. 154
Cr. P. C., and is followed by investigation by him, he is bound under
s. 173(1) to forward his finJll report to a Magistrate empowered to
take cognizance of the offence on a police report. This Court also
in H. N. Rishbud and Jnder Singh v. The State of Delhi('), examined
the scheme of these provisions of the Code of Ctirninal Procedure
and held that upon the completion of investigation, the investigating officer has to submit a report to the Magistrate under s. 173,
Cr. P. C., in the prescribed form, furnishing various details, whether
it appears to him that there is no sufficient evidence or reasonable
ground, or whether he finds that there is sufficient evidence or
reasonable ground to place the accused on trial. Similar observations were made by the Bombay High Court in State and Others
v. Murlidhar Govard!tan and Others(•). In two of the.;e cases, viz.,
State v. Vipra Khimji Gangaram(2), and State & Ors. v. Mur/idhar
Govardha.'I & Ors.(•) the Courts further held that when a Magi
strate passes an order on the proceedings under s. 173, Cr.
P. C., that order is a judicial order made by him. For purposes
of considering the effect of these eases in the case before us, it is
not at all necessary to express any opinion on the correctness of the
view that the order passed under s. 173, Cr. P. C., by the Magistrate
is a judicial order when he either discharges the bond under sub-s.
(3) of s. 173 or takes cognizance under s. 190 (I) (b), Cr. P.C. Even
if it be accepted that the final orders to be made by the Magistrate are judicial orders, the only conclusion that follows is that at
the last stage, on receipt of the report under s. 173, the Magistrate
has to act in his judicial capacity. Until that stage is reached, there
is no intervention by the Magistrate in his judicial capacity or as a
Court. Consequently, until some occasion arises for a Magistrate
to make a judicial order in connection with an investigation of a
cognizable offence by the police, no question can arise of the
Magistrate having the power of filing a complaint under s. 195(1)(b),
(I) 16 Cr. L J. 161.
(3) !1955] L s.c.R. 1150.
(2) A.!.R. (1952) 5au. 67.
(4) A.LR. (1960) Dom. 240.
A
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I
B
c
D
I
G
H
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M. L. SETID v. R. P. KAPUR (Bhargava, J.)
541
•
A
B
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c
Cr. P. C. In such circumstances, if a private person, aggrieved by
the information given to the police, files a complaint for commission
of an offence under s. 211, I. P. C., at any stage before a judicial
order has been made by a Magistrate, there can be no question,
on the date on which cognizance of that complaint is taken by the
Court, of the provisions of s. 195(1) (b) being attracted, because, on
that date, there would be no proceeding in any Court in existence
in relation to which the offence unders. 211, I. P. C., can be said to
have been committed. The mere fact that on a report being made
to the police of a cognizable offence, the proceedings must, at some
later stage, end in a judicial order by a Magistrate, cannot, therefore, stand· in the way of a private complaint being filed and of
cognizance being taken by the Court on its basis .
The last submission made on behalf of the appellant was that
a very anomalous position can arise if a private person is aEowed to
file a complaint that the report to the police against him is false
before investigation is completed. It was urged that there can be
cases where a report may be lodged against a person for commission
D of a serious offence like murder, and while investigation is still
going on, the accused may file a complaint against the person, who
lodged the report, under s. 211, I. P. C., for making a false report.
Subsequently, when the police prosecute that accused, there would,
simultaneously, be two trials in one of which the person accused of
the murder would be under trial, while in the other case the person,
E who lodged the First Information Report, would appear as the
accused. It was suggested that a person accused of a serious
crime should not be given the aqvantage of putting his complainant
in jeopardy by instituting a case against him for the offence under
s. 211, I. P. C. We are unable to hold that it is necessary to interpret the law in such a way as to eecessarily avoid such a situation.
There appears to be no difficulty in both cases being tried together
F in the same Court or one after the other by different Courts. In
fact, even if we were to accept the submission made on behalf of the
appellant, a similar situation can still arise. There may be a case
where the police may report to the Magistrate that the First Information Report was false, and in such a case, according to the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant, the Magistrate
G receiving the report under s. 173, Cr. P. C., would be competent to
file a complaint against the informant for the offence under s. 211,
I. P. C., in exercise of his power under s.195(l)(b), Cr. P. C. At
the same time, there would be no bar to that informant filing a
complaint direct in the Court of the Magistrate on the basis of his
F. I. R., so that, again, there can be two trials in the Court in one of
H which the informant would be the accused, and in the other, the
person charged in the First Information Report would be the
accused. The situation will not, therefore, differ whether we accept
the submission made on behalf of the appellant, or do not do so •
,, •.
542
SUPREMB COURT REPORTS
[1957] 1 S.C.R.
. This aspect is, therefore, not at all helpful in interpreting the scope
of s. 195(1)(b), Cr. P. C. We, consequently, hold that in this case
tbe complaint, which was filed by the respondent, was competent
and the Judicial Magistrate at Chandigarh, in .taking cognizance of
tbe offence, only exercised jurisdiction rightly vested in him. He
was not barred from taking cognizance of the complaint by the
provisions of s. 195(1)(b), Cr. P. C.
A
B
In this case, one more point that was canvassed befoJe us was
that the two offences under sections 204 and 385, I. P. C., which
were included in the complaint of the respondent, were so inter-mixed
with the offence under s. 211, J.P. C., that a trial for those two offences
could not proceed if the trial for the offence under s. 211, I. P. C.
was barred bys. 195(l)(b), Cr. P. C. That question need not be·. C
dealt with by us in view of our decision that cognizance of the
offence under s. 211, I. P. C., has been rightly taken and the trial
for that offence is not vitiated. The appeal fails and is dismissed.
V. P.S.
Appeal dismissed.
'
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