THE BARIUM CHEMICALS LTD. AND ANR. versus THE COMPANY LAW BOARD AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 4 May 1966 | [1966] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 311 | 1966 INSC 116
Key facts
- Decided
- 4 May 1966
- Bench
- A.K. SARKAR*, M. HIDAYATULLAH*, J.R. MUDHOLKAR*, R.S. BACHAWAT, J.M. SHELAT
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 381/1966
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1966] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 311
- Neutral citation
- 1966 INSC 116
Text of the judgment
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THE BARIUM CHE.l\'IICALS L'.J.'D. AND ANR.
v.
THE COMPANY LAW BOARD AND· OTHERS
May 4, 1966
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[A. K. SARKAR, C.J., M. HIDAYATULLAH, J. R. MUDHOilKAR,
R. S. BACHAWAT AND J. M. SHELAT, JJ.]
Companies Act, 1956, ss. lOE, 234, 235, 236 and 237-scope OfWhether s. 237(b) violative of Articles 14 and 19(1) (g) of the Constitution.
T~ Company Law Board was constituted under Section 10E
of the Companies Aet, 1956, and the Central Government delegated
some of its powers under the Act, including those under Section 237,
to•the lil<Mrd. The Government also framed rules under Section 642(1)
ritatl with. Section 1QE(5) called the Company Law Board (Procedure)
Rules lml4 Rule 3 of which empowered the Chairman of the Board to
distribute the business of the Board among himself and other member
or members and to specify the cases or classes of cases which were
to be considered jointly by the Board. On February 6, 1954, nnder
the power vested in him by Rule 3 the Chairman passed an ordev
s)!>eci]y!ng the cases that had to be considered jointly by himself
and the only other member of the Board and distributing the remaining business betwee;-i h'mself and the member. Under this
ol'der the business od' ordering investigations under Sections 235 and
23'7 was allotted to himself to be performed by him singly,
Oh May 19, 1965 an order was issued on behalf of the Company
Law Board under Section 237(b) of the Compan'es Act, appointing
four inspectors to investigate the affairs of the appellant company,
on the ground that the Board was of the opinion that there were
circumstances suggesting that the business of the appellant company
waB being condu·cted with intent to defraud its creditors, members or
any other persons and that the persons concerned in the management
of the affuirs of the company had in connection therewith been guilty
of fraud, misfeasence and other misconduct towards the company
and its members.
Soon afterwards the appellants filed a petition under Art. 22'6 of
the Constitution for the issue of a wtit quashing the order of the
Board on the grounds, inter alia, that the order had been iS5ued
ma/a fide that there was no material on which such an order could
have been made, etc.
0ne of the affidavits filed in reply to the petition was by the
Chl!ir'.lhan of the Company Law Board, in which it was contended,
inter alia, that there was material on the basis of which the impugned order was issued and he had himself examined this material and
formed the necessary opinion within the meaning of sec. 237(b) bef0re the issue of the order; and that it was not competent for the
court to go into the question of the adequacy or otherwise of such
materi'al. In the course of replying to some of the allegations in the
petition it was stated in paragraph 14 of the affidavit, however, that
ft.Om memorand:a received from some ex-directors of the company
and other exammation it appeared, inter aliu, that there had been
del'ay, bungling and faulty planning of the company's ma.in project
re~ulting_ in double expenditure; that.the company had incurred hui!e
losses; there had been a sharp fall m the price of the cdtnJ)any's
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sUPR&llE OOURT REPORTS
(1966) BUPP. S.C.R.
shares; and some eminent persons had resigned from the Board of
D!rectors of the company because of differences with the Managing
Director on account of the manner in which the affairs of the company were being conducted.
The appellant's petition was dismissed by the High Court.
In the appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellants:
(I) That the order was made made fide on account of the competing interests of a firm in which the Mmister in charge of the department was interested and also because of his personal hostility
against the second petitioner who was the managing director of the
company; that the High Court had erred in deciding the petition on
the footing that the first respondent Board was an independent authority and that it was its Chairman who on his own had formed
the requisite opinion and passed the order and therefore the motive
or the evil eye of the Minister was irrelevant; the High Court also
erred in failing to appreciate that even though the impugned order
was by the Chairman, as under s. 10E(6) it had to receive and in
fact received the Minister's agreement, if the Minister's mala fidea
were established, that would vitiate the order; furthermore, in the
circumstances of the case. the High Court ought to have allowed
the appellants an opportunity to establish their case of mala fide by
the cross-examination of the Minister and the Chairman, both of
whom had flied affidavits.
(2) That clause (b) of Section 237 required two things: (i) the requisite opinion of the Central Government, in the present case, of the
Board, and (ii) the existence of circumstances iuggesting that the
company's business was being conducted as laid down in sub-clause
(i) or that the persons mentioned in sub-clause (ii) were guilty of
fraud, misfeasance or misconduct towards the company or any of its
members; though the opinion to be formed is subjective, the existence of circumstances set out In cl. (b) is a condition precedent to the
formation of such opinion and therefore even if the impui;ned order
were to contain a recital of the existence of those circumstances, the
court can go behind that recital and determine whether they did in
fact exist, that even taking the circumstances said to have been
found by the respondent Board, they were extraneous to sec. 237(b)
and could not constitute a basis for the impugned order.
(3) That the impugned order was in fact made on the basis of
allegations contained in memoranda submitted by four ex-directorw
of the company who continued to be shareholders; and by ordering
an investigation unde.r s. 237(b) the respondent Board had in effec'I
enabled these shareholders to circumvent the provisions of s. 235 &nd
s. 236. On this ground also the impugned order was therefore made
mala fide or was otherwise invalid.
(4) That the impugned order was in any case bad as it was passed by the Chairman of the Respondent Board &lone acting under
rules under which such a power was conferred in contravention of
the provisions of Section lOE. The power under s. 237 was delegated
by the Central Government to the Board as a whole and could not
in turn be sub-delegated to the Chairman alone in the absence of a
provision such as sub-sec. (4A) added to sec. lOE after the impugned
order was issued, and which now enabled the solidarity of the Board
to be broken. Such sub-delegation could not be done in accordance
with rules made under s. 10E(5) which merely enabled the procedure of the Board to be regulated.
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BARIUM CIIEM!CALS v. COMP. LAW BD. (Mudholkar, J.)
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(5) That the impugned order was bad because Section 237(b)
itself was bad as offending against Arts. 14 and 19 of the Constitution.
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HELD: (By Hidayatullah, Bachawat and Shelat, JJ., Sarkar C.J.
and Mudholkar J. dissenting): The impugned order must be set aside.
(1) (By the Court): The respondents had failed to show that the
impugned order was passed ma!a fide. [330 E; 335 B-C; 342 F; 354 F-G].
(Per Sarkar C.J. and Mudholkar J.3: The decision to order the
investigation was taken by the Chairman of the respondent Board
and there was nothing to indicate that in arriving at that decision
he was influenced by the Minister. If the decision arrived at by the
Chairman was an independent one, it could not be said to have been
rendered mala fide because it was later approved by the Minister.
[320 D].
In a proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution, the normal
rule is, as pointed out by this Conrt in The State of Bombay v. Pur·
shottam Jog Naik [19541 S.C.R. 674, to decide disputed ciuestions on
the basis of affidavits and that it is within the discretion of the High
Conrt whether to allow a person who has sworn an affidavit before
it to be cross-examined or not. The H.gh Conrt having refused permission for the cross-examination, it would not be appropriate for
this Conrt, while hearing an appeal. by special leave, to interfere
lightly with the exercise of its d,scretion. [320 G-H; 321 A].
(Per Shelat J.): The allegations of mala fides in the petition
were not grounded on any knowledge but only on "reasons to believe11. Even for their reasons to believe, the appellants had not dis-closed any informaton on which they were founded. No particulars
of the main allegations were given. Although in a case of this kind
it would be difficult for a petitioner to have persona! knowledge in
regard to an averment of ma!a fides, where such knowledge is wanting, he must disclose his source of information so that the other side
gets a fair c.hance to verify it and make an effective answer. In the
absence of tangible materials, the only answer which the respondents
could array against the allegations as to ma!a fides would be one of
general denial. [352 D-H].
In a petition under Art. 226, there is undoubtedly ample power
in the High Court to order attendance of a deponent in court for
being cross-examined. Where it is not possible for the court to arrive
at a definite conclusion on account of there being affidavits on either
side containing allegations and counter-allegations, it would not
only be desirable but in the interest of justice the duty also of the
court to summon a deponent for cross-examination in order to arrive at the truth. However, the High Court was rightly of the view
that in the present case even if the tv.)o deponents were to be called for cross-examination, they could in the absence of particllars
of allegations of mala fides and the other circumstances of the case,
only repeat their denials in the affidavits of the allegations in the
petition and therefore such cross-examination would not take the
court any further than the affidavits. [353 D-H].
(2) (Per Hidayatullah, Bachawat and Shela! JJ. Sarkar, C. J.
and Mudholkar J. dissenting,): The circumstances d'sclosed in paragraph H of the. affidavit must be regarded as the only materials on
the basis of which the respondent Board formed the opinion before
ordering an investigatiun under Section 237(b). These circumstances cuuld not reasonably suggest that the business of the company
was being conducted to defraud the creditors, members or other
L/llliSCI-22(•)
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[1966] 8UPP.
S.C.I\.
persons or that the management wa' guilty of fraud towards the
company and its members; tW..y were therefore extraneous to the
matters mentioned in s. 237(b) and the impugned order was ultra
viTes the Section. [339 A-D, G-H; 340 A; 342 G-H: 343 A~· 365 D-E
367 A.C].
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(Per Hidayatullah J.): The
power-under Section 2:fl(b)
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dia:ret1onacy power and the first requirement for its exercise is the
hGnest formation of an opinion that an investigation is necESSary.
Th.e next requirement is that ''there arc circumstances suggesting"
the inferences set out in the Section, An action, not based on circumstances suggestmg an inference of the enumerated k•nd will not be
valid. No doubt the formation of opm>on is subjective but the existence of circumstances relevant to the inference as the sine qua non
for action must be demonstrable, If their existence is questioned, it
has to be proved at least prima facie. It is not sufficient to assert, that
the circumstances exist and give no clue to what they are, because
the aircwnstances must be such M to lead to conclusions of certain dcfini1leness. The conclusions must relate to an intent to defraud, a
fraudulent or unlawful purpose, fraud or misconduct or the withhobiing of information of a particular kind. [335 F-H; 3S6 G-H].
An examination of the affidavit filed by the Chairman of the
r~mrent Board showed that the material examined by the Chairman merely indicated the need for a deeper probe. This was not
suftlc'.ent. 'l'he material must suggest certain inferences and not the
need for "a deeper probt.:". The former is a definite conclusion the
lat:ter a mere fishing expedition. [338 E-H].
(Pe'!' She lat J .) : Althouugh the formation of opinion i:iy central Government is a purely subjective process c:.nd such an cipiniun
canuot be challenged m a court on the ground of propnety, reasonableness or sufficiency, the Authurity concerned is nevertheless required to arrive at such an opinion from circumstances suggesting
what is set out in sulrelauscs (i), (Ii) or (iii) of s. 237(bJ. The expresision uclrcurnstances suggesting" cannot support the construction that
even the existence of circumstances is a matter of subjective opinion. It is hard to contemplate that the legislature cou;d have left to
the· subjective process both the formation of opinion and also the existence of circumstances on which it is to be founded. It is also not
reasonable to say that the clause permitted the Authority to say that
it has formed the opinion on circumstances which in its opinion
exjst and which in its opm:on suggest an intent to defraud or a fraudulent or unlawful purpose. If it ls shown that the circumstances do
not exist or that they are sach that it is imposs:ible for any one to form
an opinion th.arefrom sugge:-.t:We of the matters f'numer.ated in s. 237
(b) the opinion is challenge.1ble on the ground of non-ai;plicat:on of
mind or perversity or on the ground that it was formed on collateral
grounds and was beyond the scope of the statut<>. I 362 H; 363 A-G].
Wer Sarkar C.J., and Mudholkar J., dissenting): An examination of section 23'1 would show that cl. (b) thereof confers a diser&
tion upon the Board to appoint an Inspector to investigate the
aft'ains of a company. The words "in the opinion or' govern the
word "there are circumstances suggesting" and not the words "may
do so". The words 'circumstances' and 'suggesting' cannot be dis..c;ociated without making it impossible for the Board to form an 'opinion'
at all. The formation of an opinion must, therefore, be as to whether there are circ:umstances suggesting the existence of one or
more of the matters in sub-els. (i) to (iii) and not about anything
else. The opinion must of course nat have been arrived at mala /idi!.
To say that the opinion to be formed must be as to the neeeseit.y
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(M.uilholi'f'lr, J.)
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of making an investigation would be making a clear depRrture from
the language in which s. 237 (b) is couched. It is only after the f~
mation of certain opinion by the Board that the stage for exercising the discretion conferred by the provision is reached. The discretion conferred to order an investigation is administrative and not
judicial since its exercise one way or the other does not affect the
rights of a company nor does it lead to any serious consequences
as, for instance, hampering the business of the company. As has
been pointed out by this c·ourt in Raja Narayanalal Bansilal v.
Maned< Phiroz Mistry and Anr. fl9611 1 S.C.R. 412, the investigation undertaken under this provision is for ascertaining facts and
is thus merely exploratory. The scope for judicial review of the action of the Board must, therefore be strictly limited. If it can be
shown that the Board had in fact not formed an opinion its order
could be ooccessfully challenged. There is a difference between not
forming an opinion at all and forming an opinion upon grounds,
which, if a court could go into that question at all, could be regarded as inapt or insufficient or irrelevant.
The circumstances set out in paragraph 14 of the affidavit of tba
Chairman of the respondent Board were nothing more than certain
conclusions drawn by the Board from some of the material which it
had ·before it. Moreover, the express:on "inter aria" used bv the Chairman v,i<ould show that the conclusions set out by him specifically were
nm the only ones which could be drawn from the material before
the Board. It would not therefore be right to construe the affidavit
to mean that the only conclusions emerging from the material before the Board were those set out in paragraph 14. [352 A-El
(3) (Per Sarkar C. J. and Mudholkar J.): As it could not be
said that the investigation had been ordered either at the instance
of 4 ex-directors of the company or on the sole basis of the memoranda· submitted by: them. there was no contravention of the provisions of Sections 235 and 236 of the Act. f328 C, El.
(4) (Per Sarkar C. J., Mudholkar and Bachawat JJ., Hidayatullall. and Shelat JJ., dissenting): Rule 3 of the Company Law Board
(Procedure) Rules. 1964, ancl the order dated April 6, 1964 made pm-suant thereto distributing the business of the Board, were both valid.
The impugned order was not therefore invalid because it was made
by the Chairman alone and not by the Board. [33() C. D; 342 BcC].
(Per Sarkar C.J. and Mudholkar J.): Bearing in mind the fact
that the power conferred by Section 237(b) is merely administrative,
the allocati<>n of the business of the Board relating· to the exercise .of
such power must be regarded as a matter of procedure. Strictly sp""king the Chairman to whom the businass of the Board is allocated
does not become a delegate of the Board at all. He acts in the name
of the Board and is no more than its agent. But even if he is looked
upon as a delei<ate of the Board and, therefore, sub-delegate vis-avis the ·Central Government, he would be as much subject to the control of the Central Government as the Board itself, for sub-s. (6) of
s. lOE orovides that the Board shall, in the exercise of the powers delegated to it, be subject to the control od' the Central ·Government and
the order distributing the ·business was made with permission of tfie
Central Govermnent. Beating in mind that the maxim delegatus non
wtest delega.re sets out what is merely a rule of construction, subdelegation can be sustained if permitted by an express provisicm or
by nec~ss.ary i_mplication. Where, as here, i.vhat is sub~delegated is
an adm1n1strat1ve power and control over its exercise is retained by
tbe. nominee of Parliament, that is. here tbe Central Government, the
power to make a delegatio" may be inferred. f329 F-H; 330 A-C].
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
·. [1966)
SUPP. S.C.R.
' , . (Per Bachwat J.): The function under s. 237(b) irivolves-tl·e exercise of a discretion. Prima facie all the members of the Board act-
A
ing together were required to discharge this function and they could
not delegate their duty to the Chairman. However,. under ss. 10E(5)
and 642(1), the Central Government may frame rules regulating the
procedure of the Board and generally to carry out the purpose of
the Act. In the context of s. lOE, the rule making power should be
construed liberally. The Central Government has power to consti- B
tute the Company Law Board, to delegate its function to the Board
and to control the Board in the exercise of its delegated functions.
In this background, by conferring on the Central Government the
additlonaJ power of framing rules regulating the procedure of the
Board and generally to carry out the purposes of s. lOE, Parliament
must have intended that the internal organisation of the Board and
the mode and manner of transacting its business should be regulated ent'.rely by rules framed by the Government. The Government
had, therefore. power to frame the Company Law Board (Procedure) ·
Rules. 1964 authorising the Chairman to distribute the business of the
Board .. In the exercise of the power conferred by this rule, the Chairman· assiJ?ned the. business under s. 237 to himself. The Chairman
alone could, therefore, pass the impugned order. [341 F-H; 342 .A-Cl(Per' Hida'yatullah J.): The new sub-section 4A ~f Section lOE,
which was not there when the impugned order was made. enables the
D
work of the Board to be distributed among members, while sub-s. (5)
merely enables the procedure of the Board to be regulated. These are
two verv different things. One provides for di<tribution of work in
such a wav that each constituent part of the Board. properlv authorised. becomes the Board. The other provides for the procedure of
the Board. What is the Board is not a question which admits of solu~
tion bv nrocedural rules but bv the enactment of a substantive provic:;ion ::illowlnr{ for a different ifeli:>i::r::ition. Snrh an
en~ctment
has
been framed in relation to the Tribunal constituted under s. !OB and
has nnw bPen framed under s. lOE ::i lso. ThP- new sub-se-ction involvPS
a dPleg::ition of the powers of. the Central Government to a member
E
of the Board which the Act nreviously allowed to be made .to the
Board onlv. The statute, as it was formerly, gave no authority to delegat.> if differentlv or. to another nerson or persons. When it spoke of
procedure in sub-section (5) it spoke of the procedure of the Board
;:ic::
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ronstitnterl. Thi:> lacnn~ in thp Art mu~t h::ivp h,,.,,...., .f',..,lt; otherwise
there was no need to enact sub-section (4A), [334 B-E].
<PeT Shel at ·..T.l: Th~ statut,, hairi~.i nermitterl -the rleleitat;on of
powers to the Board only as the statutory Authority the powers so
dele<rated have to be exercised by the Board and not bv its comoonents. To authorise .its Chairman to hand over those functions and
pow rs to the Board onlv as the statutorv Authoritv. tl-e powers so
bv the Act. The efl'0 ct of r. 3 and the order of distribution of work
made in PUrsuance thereof wac:; not laving dowri a procedure but au-
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and making. a sub..aele"ation in favour of the
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The only procedure which the Government could prescribe was the
pro<'Pdure in ·rel:Jtion to Bo~rd. the manner in which it should
discharge and exercise the functions and pawers delegated to it, but
it canlrl not make_ a nrovi~inn which under the cloak of procedure authorfred sub-dele1tation. r3R9 F-H; 370 A, Bl.
(5) (By the Court): The provisions of Section 2:J71b) were not
,,;,,JoHve of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. f328 E-G; 342 D-F;
371 H].
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SecF'>ns ?"4. 2~5. 236 onn 2371b) l!av<> nower to different authnrities i.e. the Registrar and the Government, provided powers which
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RARIIJ~! CHEMICAL~ v. COMP. I.AW l!D. (Mudholkar, J.)
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are different in extent and nature, exercisable in sets of circumstances and in a manner different from one an?ther. Therefore,
there is no question of discriminatory power having been vested
in the Government under these Sections to pick and choose between
rone company and the other. [370 G, H].
When investigation is ordered, there would be inco11venience
in the carrying on of the business of the company. It might also perhaps shake the credit of a dompany. But an investigation directed
under section 237(b) is essentially of an exploratory character and
it is not as if any restriction is placed on the right of the concerned
company to carry on its business and no restrictions are imposed on
those who carry on the company's affairs. Even if it is regarded as
a restriction, it is not possible to say that it is not protected as a
reasonable restriction under Clause 6 of Art. 19(1). r371 B-D].
Case Jaw referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 381 of
1966.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
October 7, 1965 of. the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench) at
Delhi in Civil Writ No. 1626-C of 1965.
M. C. Setalvad, R. K. Garg and S. C. Agarwala, for the
appellants.
C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, B. R. L. Iyengar, R. K. P.
Shankardass and R. H. Dhebar, for respondents Nos. 1 and 3 to
7.
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S. Mohan Kumaramangalam, C. Ramakrishna and A. V. V.
Nair, for respondent No. 2.
The dissenting Opinion of SARKAR, CJ. and MUDHOLKAR, J.
was delivered by MUDHOLKAR, J HIDAYATULLAH, BACHAWAT and
SHE LAT JJ. delivered separate judgments allowing the Appeal.
Mudholkar, J. On May 19, 1965 Mr. D. S. Dang, Secretary
of the Company Law Board issued an order on behalf
of the Company Law Board made under s. 237 (b) of the Companies Act, 1956 appointing 4 persons as Inspectors for investigat·
ing the affairs of the Barium Chemicals Ltd., appellant No. I
before us, since its incorporation in the year 1961 and to report to
the Company Law Board inter a/ia "all the irregularities and contravention in respect of the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956
or of any other law for the time being in force and the person or
persons responsible for such irregularities and contraventions."
The order was made by the Chairman of the Board, Mr. R. C. Dutt
on behalf of the Board by virtue of the powers conferred on him
by certain rules to which we shall refer later. On June 4, 1965 the
Company preferred a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the Punjab High Omrt for the issue of a writ of mandamus
or other appropriate writ, direction or order quashing the order of
the Board dated May 19, 1965. The Managing Director, Mr. Balasubramanian joined in the petition as petitioner No. 2. The writ
petition is directed against 7 respondents, the first of which is the
SIB
RUPRJ!lll: COURT IY'JPORTS
(Hl6CJ SUl'P. B.0.R,
Company Law Board. 1'he second rospondMt 1s Mr. T" T.
Ktishnamac.hari, whc> was at that time Minister for Finance in the
Government of India. The Inspectors a.ppointed are respondents 3
to 6 and Mr. Dang 1s the 7th respondent. Apart from the relief of
quashin~ the order of May 19, 1965 the appellants sought the issue
of a writ restrammg the Company Law Board and the Jnspei:ton
Cr~ giving effect to the order dated May 19, 1%5 and also so14fbt
~Q81et-Other incideaw.I reliefs: The order of the Board \V'.tS challe11ged
011 5 grounds which are briefly as follows:
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m that the order was made ma/a fide;
(2) tbat in making the ordi:r the
Board hd acted on
material extraneous to the matters mentioned in
s 237(b) of the Companies Act:
(3) that the order having in fact been made at the instance of the shareholders is invalid and on a true
construction of s. 2~7 this could not be done;
(4) that the order was invalid because it was made by
the Chairman of the Board and not hy the Board;
a.nd
(5) that the provisions of s. 237(b) arc void as offending
Arts. 14 and 19(1) ~) of the Coastitution.
The allegations of ma/a (ides were denied on behalf of the
They dbputeil thl: validity of aU th!: other grounds
raised by the petitioners. The High Court rejcded the contentio!l6
urged before it on behalf of the appellants and dismissed the writ
petitic:m. The appellants thereafter sought to obtain a certificate of
fitness for appeal to this Court; but the High Court refused to grant
such a certificate. They have now come up to this Court by s~cial
leave.
!
r.cspo.nd~n\S.
In order to apprcci:ue tbe argument' ao..lressed OOfore us. a
hr.iel statement of the rnlevant facts would be nec~ury. The Company was registered in the ye111 1%1 and md an <Wtborised capital
of Rs, 1 crQCe divided into 100.000 shares of Rs. 100 ea1::h. Ju
pJimary object wa.s to carry 011 business of 1uamuactwing all type~
of. bariu111 c_ornp.olUl<ls. Appc.lla.nt No. 2 wa~ appointed M~
Oir~~tor of the Company from December 5, 196) <U1d his appointment· ao.d remuneration were. approved by the Central G1ive<nruent on July 30, 1962. The erection of the plant was unde!'taken
by M/s. L. A. Mitchell Ltd., of Manchc~ler in pursuance of a
C9lla.bQiatioo agre.ement be.tween it and the cnlllµoi.ny eiitercd ~
Octob~r. 1961 and approved by the Cc.ntral Government in NovOlllbi:r of that year. Thereafter a permit for importing the requisi.te
machinery was granted to the CO,!Dpany. The issued capitaJ of the
O>mpa.oy was Rs. 5.0.00.000 aw the public was invited lo s~
scribe for shares in the Company. It is sakl that the issue w.a6 .O"fi·
s11bscribe4 by MarC'Jl li. 1962,.
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It would seem that soon after the collaboration agreement was
cntere.cl into MI s. L. A. Mitchell Ltd., was taken over by a financial group (MI s. Pearson & Co. Ltd.), to which a pers.011 nam.ed
Lvrd. Poole belonged. It would appear that as the work of setting
up of the plant was being delayed the Company sent a notice to
M/s. Mitohell Ltd., on April 2, 1965 in which the Company sta.ted
that if the plant was not completely installed and got into mnuing
ord.er by June I, 1965 the Company will have to make aJternatiye
arrangements and that it would hold MI s. L. A. Mitchell Ltd.,
liable to pay damages to the Company for the loss suffered by it.
As a result of the notice Lord Poole visited India in April/May,
1965. In his opinion the design of the plant was defective. Certain
negotiations took place between the Company and Lord Poole in
the co.ursc of which an undertaking was given by Lord Poole on
be.half of the collaborators that the work would be completed with
necessary alterations and modifications in accordance with the
report of M/s. Humphrey & Co., and that the collaborators wouJd
spend an additional amount upto £250,000 as may be required for
the purpose. It is said that the p'ant was producing at that time
only 25 per cent of its installed capacity but that according to the
assurance given by Lord Poole it would yield full production by
April, 1966.
According to the appellants, before entering into a collaboration agreement with MI s. L. A. Mitchell Ltd., the appellant No.. 2
Balasubramanian was negotiating with a German firm named.Kali
Chemie A. G. of Hanover for obtaining their collaborat\on. It is
said that the firm of MI s. T. T. Krishnamachari & Sons were and
still are the sole agents in India for some of the products of Kali
Chemie. The firm of T. T. Krishnamachari & Sons appro.ached
appellant No. 2 for the grant of sole selling agency of the products
of the plant to be established in collaboration with Kali Chemie.
Appellant No. 2 did not agree to this with the result that the
c.oinpany's negotiations with Kali Chemie broke down. The appellants also say that T. T. Krishnamachari & Sons were later also
granted a licence to set up a plant for manufacturing barium
chemicals but that on appellant No. 2 bringing certain facts to th.e
notice of Mr. Nehru the licence in favour of T. T. Krishnamachari
& Sons was revoked. The relevance of these facts is in connection with the plea of ma/a {ides. On this part of the case the
appellant's contention is that the Chairman of the Company Law
Board Mr. R. C. Dutt made the order for investigation into the
affairs of a.ppellant No. I at the instance of Mr. T. T. Krishll;!machari, the then Finance Minister and also because of his bias
against appellant No. 2. The suggestion is that as the licence
of M/s. T. T. Krishnamachari & Sons was revoked and as they
were not even given sole selling agency for the sale of the products
of barium chemicals Mr. T. T. Krishnamachari wanted action
to be taken under this nrovision either for penalising appellant
No. 1 or putting pressure on it.
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A lengthy argument was addressed belore us by Mr. Setalvad
bearing on the question of ma/a fides in tbe course of which he
referred us to certain documents. He also wanted us to bear in
mind the sequence in which certain events occurred and said that
these would indicate that the former Finance Minister must have
been instrumental in having an order under s. 237(b) made by the
Chairman of the Board. We were, however, not impressed by this
argument. Our learned brother Shelat has dealt with this aspect
of the matter fully in his judgment and as we agree with him it is
not necessary to say much on the point. We would, however, like
to refer to and deal with one aspect of the argument bearing on
the question of ma/a fides. Mr. Setalvad points out that the Company Law Board had decided in December 1964 to take action
against appellant No. 1 under s. 237(b) and had actually obtained
approval of Mr. T. T. Krishnamachari to the proposed action.
Therefore, according to him tbe real order is of Mr. Krishnamachari even though the order is expressed in the name of the Board.
We find no substance in the argument. The decision to take action was already taken by the Chairman and there is nothing to
indicate that in arriving at that decision he was influenced by the
Finance Minister. If the decision arrived at by the Chairman
was an independent one it cannot be said to have been rendered
ma/a fide because it was later approved by Mr. Krishnamachari
whose sons undoubtedly constitute the partnership firm of M/s.
T. T. Krishnamachari & Sons.
It is also suggested by Mr.
Setalvad that the action approved of in December, 1964 was delayed till May, 1965 because in the interval some negotiations with
Kali Chemie had been started and had they ended fruitfully M /s.
T.T. Krishnamachari & Sons would have got the sole selling agency
of the products of barium chemicals. Now it docs seem from
certain material brought to our notice that negotiations with Kali
Chemic were revived by appellant No. 2 because of the difficulties
which were being experienced in the working of the collaboration
agreement with M/s. L. A. Mitchell Ltd. No material. however,
is placed before us from which it could be reasonably inferred that
had the negotiations with Kali Chemie fructified M / s. T. T.
Krishnamachari & Sons would have secured the sole monopoly
for sale of the products of barium chemicals. One more point was
urged in connection with this aspect of the argument and it is that
the appellants were not given an opportunity to cross-examine
Mr. T. T. Krishnamachari and Mr. Dutt. In our opinion, in a proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution the normal rule is, as
pointed out by this Court in The State of Bombay v. Purshottam Jog
Naik to decide disputed questions on the basis of affidavits and
that it is within the discretion of the High Court whether to allow
a person who has sworn an affidavit before it-as indeed Mr.
Krishnamachari and Mr. Dutt have-to be cross-examined or not
to permit it. In exercise of its discretion the High Court has re-
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fused permission to cross-examine them. In such a case it would
not be appropriate for this Court while hearing an appeal by special leave to interfere lightly with the exercise of that discretion.
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Mr. Setalvad said that as the appellants had made out a
prima facie case of ma/a fides in their affidavits, and as these allegations had been denied by the respondents, the High Court was
in error in refusing permission to the appellants to cross-examine
the persons who swore the affidavits on the side of the respondents.
We are not aware of the rule on which Mr. Setalvad bases himself. There is nothing to show that the High Court thought that
a prima facie case of ma/a fides had been made out. Even in such
a case a court might well hold that it has been demolished by
the affidavits in answer. The court has to find the facts and if it
finds that it can do so without cross-examination it is not compelled to permit cross-examination. We have no reason to think
that the High Court could not have ascertained the facts on the
affidavits themselves.
Coming to the second point, it would be desirable to reproduce s. 237 which reads thus:
"Without prejudice to its powers under section 235
the Central Government(a) shall appoint one or more competent persons as
inspectors to investigate the affairs of a company and to
report thereon in such manner as the Central Government
may direct, if(i) the company, by special resolution, or
(ii) the Court, by order,
declares that the affairs of the company ought to be investigated
by an inspector appointed by the Central Government; and
(b) may do so if, in the opinion of the Central
Government, there are circumstances suggesting(i) that the business of the company is being
conducted with intent to defraud its creditors, members or any other persons, or otherwise for a fraudulent or unlawful purpose, or in a manner oppressive of any of its members, or that the company was
formed for any fraudulent or unlawful purpose; or
(ii) that persons concerned in the formation of
the company or the management of its affairs have
in connection therewith been guilty of fraud, misfeasance or other misconduct towards the company or
towards any of its members; or
(iii) that the members of the company have not
been given all the information with respect to its
li966) SUPP.
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atfairs which they might reai;onably expect, including information relating to the calculation of the
commission payable to a managing or other director,
the managing agent. the secretaries and treasurers,
or the manager of the company."
In view of the fact that the Central Government, by virtue
of the (l<Dwers conferred by ss. 10-E and 637 delegated its powers
llll<ller s. 237 to the Company Law Board we shall read s. 237 as
ii. in place of the WPrds "Central Government"' there arc the words
"Company Law Board" Of for brt!vity 'Board'. According to Mr.
Setalvad. cl. (b) of s. 237 requires two things: (I) the opinion of
the Board and (2) the existence of circumstances suggesting one
~ more of the matters specified in sub-els. (i) to (iiil. He oontends
tllllt th1>ugh the opinion of the Board is subjective the existence
of. circumstances set out in the sub-els. (i) to (iii) is a conditio11
precedent to the formation of the opinion. Therefore, according
to him. the Court ;, entitled to a.<ccrt;,in whether in f:tct any of
those circumstances exists. The Attorney-General disputes this
construction and contends that the clause is incapable of a dichotomy and that the subjective process embraces the formation of an
opinion that circumstances suggestive of any of the matters comprised in sub-els. (i) to <iii! exist.
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Once it is conceded that the formation of an opinion by the
Board is intended to be subjective-and if the provision is consti- E!
tutional which in our view it is -the question would arise: what
is that about which the Board is entitled to form an opinion? The
opinion must necessarily concern the existence or non-existence
of' facts suggesting the things ment 'oncd in the several sub-clauses
of cl. (b). An examination of the section would show that ol. <b)
theroof confers a discretion upon the Board to appoint an Inspcc·
tor to investigate the affairs of a company. The words "in the Fl
opinion of" govern the words "there arc circumstances suggesting"
and oot the words "may do so". The words 'circumstances' and
'suggesting' cannot he dissociated without making it impossible
for the Board to form an 'opinion' at all. The formation of an
opinion must. therefore. be as to whether there are circumstances
suggesting the existence of one or more of the matters in sub-els.
(j) to (iii) and not about anything else. The opinion must of a,
course not have been axrivcd at mala fide. Tu ·say that the opinion
to be forme<I must be as to the necessity of making an investigation would be makinµ a clear departure from the language in which
s. 237<bl is couched. It is only after the formation of certain
opinion by the Board that the stage for exercising the discretion H
conferred by the provision. is reached. The discretion conferred
to order an investig.~tion is administrative and not judicial since
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its exercise one way or the other does not alfect the rights of a company nor does it lead to any serious consequences as, for .instance,
hampering the business of the company. As has been pomted out
by this Court in Raja Narayanalal Bansilal v. Maneck Phiroz
Mistry & Anr.(') the investigc.tion undertaken under this provision
is for ascertaining facts and is thus merely exploratory. The scope
for judicial review of the action of the Board must, therefore, be
strictly limited. Now, if it can be shown that the Board had in
fact not formed an opinion its order could be successfully challenged. This is what was sa'd by the Federal Court in Emperor
v. Sliibnath Banerjee(') and approved later by the Privy Council.
Quite obviously there is a difference between not forming an
opinion at all and forming an opinion upon grounds, which, if a
court could go into that question at all, could be regarded as inapt
or insufficient or irrelevant. It is nol disputed that a court cannot go into the question of the aptness or sufficiency of the grounds
4pon which the subjective satisfaction of an authority is based.
But, Mr. Setalvad says, since the grounds have in fact been disclosed in the affidavit of Mr. Dutt upon which his subjective
satisfaction was based it is open to the court to consider whether
those grounds are relevant or are irrelevant because they are
extraneous to the question as to the existence or otherwbe of any
of the matters referred to in sub-els. (i) to (iii).
Let us now examine the affidavit of Mr. Dutt. Since this
affidavit is in answer to the allegations made in the writ petition
the two should be considered together. In paragraphs 1 to 19 of
the writ petition certain facts and figures concerning the formation, registration etc. of the company, the activities of the company
and other related matters have been set out. These wern admitted
by Mr. Dutt in paragraph 14 of the counter'affidavit. Paragraph
20 onwards of the writ petition deals with the action taken by the
Board and the varimrn grou!'lds on which according to the appellants the action of the Board is open to challenge. The first 4
paragraphs of the counter-affidavit deal with certain formal matters. In paragraph 5 Mr. Dutt has set out that the petition is
liable to be dismissed summarily being grounded on facts which
are false, speculative and lacking in material particulars. Thereafter he has set out what, according to him, are the true facts. In
paragraphs 6 to 8 he has dealt with the legal aspects of the case.
The 8th paragraph is the most important amongst them. Here Mr.
Dutt has stated that it was not competent to the Court to go into
the question of adequacy or otherwise of the material on the basis
of which orders uunder s. 2J7lb) are passed by the Board. Then
he stated·: 'However, if in spite of what has been stated and contrary to the submissions above, this Hon'ble Court still holds that
it is necessary for the Court to examine the relevant material in
(') [rn61J 1 s.c.R. 417.
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SUl'REllE OOURT REPORTS
[1960] BUPP. l.C,R.
order to do justice, then the Board would have no objection to A
producing the same for the Court's perusal provided it is not shown
to the petitil)ners." It may be mentioned that the Court did not
call for this material at all nor did the appellants seek its production. In paragraph 9 Mr. Dutt has categorically stated that the
order of May 19, 1965 was passed after careful and independent
examination of the material by the Chairman and that it was issued B
in proper exercise of the powers conferred upon it. He has specifically denied that it was issued at the instance of the second respondent.
In paragraph 10 Mr. Dutt has taken the plea that the petition was
liable to be dismissed as it had not been made bona fide but for
extraneous reasons and to create prejudice with a view to thwart
statutory investigation. Then he has set out the circumstances upon c
which his contention is based. In paragraph 13 he has stated
that without prejudice to his submissions in the earlier paragraphs
he would reply to allegations contained in the various paragraphs
of the writ petition. Then follows paragraph 14 upon which
Mr. Setalvad has founded an argument that the grounds disclosed
therein being extraneous the order is invalid. In this paragraph
Mr. Dutt has admitted some of the facts stated in paragraphs I to D
19. He has also said that the Board was aware of the fact that
the company had entered into collaboration with M/s. L. A.
Mitchell Ltd. He has then added: " ...... but it has no information
of any of the other matters and/or negotiations with M/s. L. A.
Mitchell Ltd., Manchester. However, from the Memoranda
received by the Board referred to in paragraph 5 and other exami·
nation it appeared inter alia that:
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(i) that there had been delay, bungling and faulty plan·
ning of this project, resulting in double expenditure,
for which the collaborators had put the responsi·
bility upon the Managing Director, Petitioner
No. 2:
(ii) Since its floatation the company has been continuously showing losses and nearly I/ 3rd of its share
capital has been wiped off;
(iii) that the shares of the company which to start with
were at a premium were being quoted on the Stock
Exchange at half their face value; and
(iv) some eminent persons who had initially accepted
seats on the Board of Directors of the company had
subsequently severed their connections with it due
to differences with Petitioner No. 2 on account of
the manner in which the affairs of the company were
being conducted."
In paragraph 5 it may be recalled Mr. Dutt has set out the
grounds on which the writ petition deserved to be summarily
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rejected. It will thus be clear that what are characterised by
Mr. Setalvad as the grounds upon which the order of the Board
is based are nothing more than certain conclusions drawn by the
Board from some of the material which it had before it. Moreover the expression "inter alia" used by Mr. Dutt would show
that the conclusions set out by him specifically are not the only
ones which could be drawn from the material referred to by him
in paragraph 5 of his affidavit.
Turning to paragraph 16 of the affidavit we find that Mr. Dutt
has clearly reiterated that there was ample material before the
Board on which it could and did form the opinion that there were
circumstances suggesting that as stated in the order of May, 19,
1965, the business of the company was being conducted with intent to defraud creditors, members and other persons and further
that the persons concerned in the management of the affaqs of
the company had in connection therewith been guilty of fraud,
misfeasance and other misconduct towards the company and its
members. This paragraph is in answer to paragraph 21 of the
writ petition. It is in that paragraph alone that the appellants had
specifically raised the contention that the recital in the order as
to the existence of material is not correct and that in point of fact
there was no material before the Board to form the said opinion.
In this state of pleadings it would not be right to construe the affidavit of Mr. Dutt to mean that the only conclusions emerging from
the material before the Board are those that are set out in paragraph 14 of his affidavit.
Apart from this we do not think that the conclusions set out
in paragraph 14 are extraneous to the matters indicated in the
order of May 19, 1965. What is said therein is that there are
circumstances suggesting that the business of the appellants is
being conducted with intent to defraud its creditors, members and
others, and that the persons concerned with the management of
the affairs of the company have been guilty of fraud, misfeasance
and other misconduct towards the company and its members. It
has to be borne in mind that what the Board is to be satisfied
about is whether the circumstances suggest any of these things and
not whether they establish any of these things. Now, the first of
its conclusion is to the effect that the materials show that there was
delay, bungling, faulty planning of the project and that this resulted in double expenditure for which the collaborators had put the
responsibility upon the Managing Director, that is, appellant No.
2. Would it be farfetched to say that these circumstances could
reasonably suggest to the Board that these happenings were not
just pieces of careless conduct but were deliberate acts or omissions
of appellant No. 2 done with the ulterior motive of earning profit
for himself? Similarly could not the fact that the company was
continuously showing losses since its floatation and that 1I3rd of its
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[1966] >t:1·r. s.c.n.
mare eapital had been wiped out could have biien suggestive of .a
fnll!tl to the Board?
tn this connection. we think it right to point out that the
spirit of the section must be kept in mind in determining its interpretation. The section was enacted to prevent the Management
Gf a company from acting in a manner prejudicial to the interesls B
elf the shareholdi:rs for whom it was difficult to get together anti
take steps for the protection of their interests jointly. It was this
ditlkully of the shareholders-which is a reality-which had led
le the enactment of the =tion. There is no doubt that few sharellelders have the means or ability to act against the Management.
it would furthermore be difficult for the shareholders to find out
!lie fac1s leading to the poor financial condition of a company. c
Tiie G:Jovernment thought it right to take power to step in where
there.was reason to suspect that the ~anagement may not have been
aioting in the interests of the shareholders-who would not be able
1" take the steps against a powerful body like the Managementalld to take steps for protection of such interests. As we have
said, the section g~ves the exploratory power only. Its object is
to find out the facts, a suspicion having been entertained that all D
weo; not well with the company. The powers are exercised for
as-taining facts and, therefore. before they are finally known,
ail that is necessary for the exercise of the powers is the opinion
of the lloard that there ~re circumstances which suggest to it that
fr.aud and other kinds of mismanagement mentioned in sub-els.
(i) to (iii) of cl. (b) of the section may have been committed. ff
the facts do reasonably suggest any of these things to the Board, E
the power can be exer4ised, though another individual might think
that the facts suggest otherwise. It cannot be said that from a
huge 1085 ineun:ed by a C<>mpany and the working of the company
in a digorganised and un•businesslike way, the only conclusion
pet1Sible is that it was due to lat?k of capability. It is reasonably
(f.Onceivable that the result had been produced by fraud and other F
"8rieties of dishonesty or miQcasance. The order does not
amount to a finding of fraud. It is to find out what kind of wrong
aatien has led to the company's ill-fate that the powers under the
!lseiion.are gwen. The anquiry may reveal that there was no fraud
l)f other similar kind of malfeasance.
It would be destroying the
bolleficial and effective u'e of the powers given by the section to
say that lite Board mui;t first show that a fraud can clearly be said 0
to ha¥e been committed. It is enough that the facts show that it
can' oo reasonably thought that the company's unfortunate positfon mislJt have been caused by fraud and other species of dislwliest action. In our opinion, therefore, the argument of Mr.
Satawad about the circumstances being extraneous cannot be
aooepted.
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Coming to the third point of Mr. Setalvad pointed out that
four ~.Dir.eeto~s of the Company who had resignel:I submitted n
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memorandum to Mr. T. T. Krishnamachari while he was holding
the office of Finance Minister in which grave allegations were
made concerning the affairs of the Company and the management
of the Company by the second appellant. The investigation, according to Mr. Setalvad, was the outcome of this memorandum
and that by ordering it the Board has in effect enabled the exDirectors who continue to be shareholders to circumvent the provisions of ss. 235 and 236 of the Companies Act. Section 235 deals
with "Investigation of affairs of company on application by members or report by Registrar". Clause (a) of this section provides
that in the case of a company having a share capital the investigation can be ordered either on the application of not less than 200
members or of members holding not less than one-tenth of the
total voting power therein. We are not concerned with els. (b)
and (c). Apparently the four ex-Directors were not holding 10%
of the voting power of the Company. At any rate the case was
argued on this footing. Section 236 provides that such application has to be supported by such evidence as the Board (reading
'Board' for 'Central Government') may require. It also empowers
the Board to require the applicants to furnish security for such
amount, not exceeding one thousand rupees as it may think fit, for
the payment of the costs of the investigation. The contention is
that though the Board acted upon the memorandum submitted by
four ex-Directors it did not even require them to comply with the
provisions of s. 236. The contention is that the order of the
Board appointing Inspectors is invalid. In other words the argument amounts to this that the provisions of s. 237(b) have been
utilised by the Board as a cloak for taking action under the provisions of s. 235. In other words this is an argument that the order
was made ma/a fide.
It is true that a memorandum was presented to Mr. Krishnamachari by four ex-Directors containing grave allegations against
the two appellants. But it was not solely on the basis of this
memorandum that action was taken by the Board. It is clear from
the counter-affidavit of Mr. Dutt and particularly from paragraph
5 thereof that the Board had before it not only two sets of memoranda dated May 30, 1964 and July 9, 1964 respectively from four
ex-Directors of the Company alleging serious irregularities and
illegalities in the conduct of the affairs of the Company but also
other materials. The Board points out that over a long period
beginning from September 1961 the Department had been receiving various complaints in regard to the conduct of the affairs of
the Company. One complaint had also been received by the Special Police Establishment and forwarded by it to the Department
in November, 1963. The matter was enquired into by the Regional Director of the Board at Madras and he, in his report, sent
to the Board in September 1964 suggested an urgent and comprehensive investigation into the affairs of the Company. In his
l/SPS0!-23
328
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(1966) BUPP. S.C.R.
affidavit the Chairman of the Board Mr. Dutt has stated further
in paragraph 5(b) as follows:
"The material on the file was further examined in
the light of the Regional Director's recommendation by
the two Under Secretaries of the Board (Sarvashri M. K.
Banerjee C. S. S. and K. C. Chand, I. R. S. at the headquarters of the Board in New Delhi and both of them
endorsed the recommendation of the Regional Directer
to order an investigation. The matter was then considered
by the Secretary of the Company Law Board in charge
of investigation (Shri D. S. Dang, I.A.SJ and he also expressed his agreement that there was need for a deeper
probe into the affairs of the company."
Then again in paragraph 5(c) he has stated as follows:
"Accordingly, the matter was put up to me at the
end of November 1964 and after consideration of all the
material on record, I formed the opinion that there were
circumstances suggesting the need for action under section 237(b) of the Companies Act, 1956".
ll is abundantly clear from all this that the investigation cannot
be said to have been ordered either at the instance of the four
ex-Directors or on the sole basis of the memoranda submitted by
them. There is, therefore, no contravention of the provisions of
ss. 235 and 236 of the Act. As a corollary to this it would follow
that the order was not made ma/a fide or is otherwise invalid.
As already stated the appellant had challenged the provisions
of s. 237(b) on the ground that they are violative of the fundamental rights under Arts. 14 and 19(l)(g) of the Constitution. Our
brother Shch1t has dealt with this attack on the provisions fully
and we agree generally with what he has said while dealing with
the contentions. We would, however, like to add that the company being an artificial legal person cannot, as held by this Court
in 1'he State Trading Corporation of India Ltd .. v. Commercial Tax
Officer Visakhapatnam & Ors.('),claim the benefit of the provisions of Art. 19(1)(g\ though appellant No. 2 Balasubramanian
can do so. We agree with our learned brother that the action proposed under s. 237(b\ being merely exploratory in character the
fundamental right of Balasubramanian to carry on business is not
affected thereby. Since that is so, the question whether the provisions of the aforesaid section arc a reasonable restriction on the
exercise of the right under Art. 19(1)(g) does not arise for consideration. In the circumstances, therefore, we do not think that
there is anything more that we need say.
The last question is whether it was not competent to Mr. Dutt
alone to take the decision that an investigation be ordered against
the company. In taking the decision Mr. Dutt acted under a rule
(') [ lllMJ < 8.C.R. 911.
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of procedure prescribed in the order dated February 6, 1964. The
validity of this rule is challenged by Mr. Setalvad on the ground
that this amounts to sub-delegation of a delegated power and 1s
ultra vires the Act. Clause (a) of sub-s. (!) of s. 637 read with
s. 1O(E)(!) empower the Central Government to delegate its
powers under s. 237 to the Company Law Board. By notification
dated February I, 1964 the Central Government has delegated,
amongst other powers and functions, those conferred upon it by s.
237 upon the Company Law Board. By another notification of
the same date the Central Government has made and published
rules made by it in exercise of its powers under s. 642(1) read with
s. IOE(5) rule 3 of which reads thus :
"Distribution of business;-The Chairman may, with
the previous approval of the Central Government, by
order in writing, distribute the business of the Board,
among himself and the other member or members, and
specify the cases or classes of cases which shall be considered jointly by the Board."
By order dated February 6, 1964 the Chairman of the Company
Law Board specified the cases and classes of cases to be considered jointly by the Board and distributed the remaining business between himself and other members of the Board. Amongst the
matters allocated to the Chairman is the appointment of an Inspector under s. 237 to investigate the affairs of a company. This,
Mr. Setalvad says, could not be done in the absence of an express
provision in the Act. In this connection he has referred us to
sub-s. 4A of s. JOE which was subsequently added-but not made
retrospective-by an amendment of the Act which confers an ex·
press power on the Central Government to enable the Chairman
to distribute the powers and functions of the Board. According
to the learned Attorney-General this provision was enacted only
to make what was implicit in s. JOE(5) read with s. 642(1) clear
and that the distribution of the work of the Board being merely
a matter of procedure the order of the Chairman allocating the
power under s. 237(b) to himself did not amount to sub-delegation
of the power of the Board.
Bearing in mind the fact that the power conferred by s. 237(b)
is merely administrative it is difficult to appreciate how the allocation of business of the Board relating to the exercis.e of such power
can be anything other than a matter of procedure. Strictly speaking
the Chairman to whom the business of the Board is allocated does
not become a delegate of the Board at all. He acts in the name
of the Board and is no more than its agent. But even if he is
looked upon as a delegate of the Board and, therefore, a subdelegate vis-a-vis the Central Government he would be as much
subject to the control of the Central Government as the Board
itself. For sub-s. (6) of s. JOE provides that the Board shall, in
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the exercise of the powers delegated to it, be subject to the control
of the Central Government and the order distributing the business
was made with the permission of the Central Government. Bearing
in mind that the maxim delegatus 11011 po/est de/egare sets out
what is merely a rule of construction, sub-delegation can be sustained if permitted by an express provision or by necessary implication. Where, as here, what is sub-delegated is an administrative
power and control over its exercise is retained by the nominee of
Parliament, that is, here the Central Government, the power to
make a delegation may be inferred. We are, therefore, of the
view that the order made by the Chairman on behalf of the Board
is not in val id.
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To sum up, then, our conclusions may be stated thus: The
discretion conferred on the Central Government by s. 237(b) to
order an investigation and delegated by it to the Company Law
Board is administrative, that it could be validly exercised by the
Chairman of the Board by an order made in pursuance of a rule
enacted by the Central Government under s. 642(!) read with s.
10E(5J, that the exercise of the power does not violate any fundamental right of the company, that the opinion to be formed under
s. 237(b) is subjective and that if the grounds are disclosed by the
Board the Court can examine them for considering whether they
are relevant. In the case before us they appear to be relevant in
the context of the matter mentioned in sub-ds. (i) to (iii) of s. 237(b).
Though the order could successfully be challenged if it were made
ma/a fide, it has not been shown to have been so made. The attack
on the order thus fails and the appeal is dismissed with costs.
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Hidayatullah, J. We are concerned in this appeal with the
legality of an order of the Chairman, Company Law Board, May
19, 1965, (purporting to be under s. 237(b) of the Companies Act.
1956) declaring that the affairs of the Barium Chemicals Ltd. be
investigated. As a consequence Inspectors have been appointed
and searches have been made. The Company and its Managing J
Director ftled a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the
High Court of Punjab seeking to quash the order and on failure
there, have filed this appeal by special leave of this Court. The
action of the Chairman was and is challenged on diverse grounds
but those which were presented before us were few and clear cut.
The action is challenged as without jurisdiction because not the G
Board but the Chairman alone acted, as ma/a fide because no
honest opinion was formed on the matters which under the section
give rise to the power but on irrelevant and extraneous material,
and further because the order was passed under the influence and
malice of a Minister of Cabinet who was interested in another Company belonging to his sons and sought this means to oust a rival.
B
The facts have been stated already in some detail by my
brother Shelat and I need not take time in restating them. My
BAR!Ulll CHEM!C.,LS V. COMP. LAW Bn. (Hidayatullah, 1.)
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brother Shelat has quashed the order and I agree with him i.n the
order proposed by him but as I view the matter a little differently
on some of the aspects of the case, I wish to record my reasons
briefly.
Under the Companies Act 1956, a power of superintendence
over the affairs of Companies is retained by the Central Government in much the same way as the Board of Trade in England exercise over Companies in that country. This power is of
two kinds (a) calling for information or explanation from the Company and (b) ordering an investigation into the affairs of the Company by appointment of Inspectors for inspection, investigation
and report. The power is not only varied but is capable of being
exercised variously. The power to c<1ll for information is conferred on the Regisrar in two different ways. Firstly, jurisdiction
is conferred on the Registrar by s. 234 to call for information or
explanation in relation to any document submitted to him, which
information or explanation must be furnished on pain of penalties.
If the information or explanation is not furnished or is unsatisfactory the Registrar can report to the Central Government for
action. Secondly, if a contr;butory, creditor br other person interested places materials before the Registrar (a) that the business of
the Company is being carried on in fraud of its creditors or of
persons dealing with the Company or (b) otherwise for a fraudulent or unlawful purpose, the Registrar can, after hearing the Company, call upon it to furnish any information or explanation. A
further power is conferred after December 28, 1960, on the
Registrar, who may, after being authorised by a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate First Class, enter any place, search and seize
any document relating to the Company, its managing agents, or
Secretaries and treasurers or managing director or manager, if he
has reason to believe that it may be destroyed or tampered with.
Sections 235-251 provide for investigation of the affairs of a
company and for sundry matters related to such investigations.
They follow the scheme of ss. 164-175 of the English Act of 1948.
Section 235 enables the Central Government to appoint inspectors
for investigation and report generally if the Registrar reports
under s. 234 and also if a stated number of shareholders or shareholders possessing a stated voting power apply. When members
apply they must support their application by evidence and give
security for costs of investigation. Jn the present case no action
under any of the sections noted so far was taken but it was taken
under s. 237. This section is in two parts. The first part which
is (a) compels the Central Government to appoint inspectors to
investigate and report if the company by a special resolution or
the court by order declares that the affairs be investigated. The
second part which is (b) gives a discretionary power. As this dis-
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cretionary power was in fact exercised this is a convenient place to
read part (b) of s. 237. It reads:
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"237. Without prejudice to its powers under section
235, the Central Government- (a)
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(b) may do so <i.e. appoint one or more competent persons as inspectors to investigate etc.) if, in the opinion of the Central Government, there are circumstances suggesting(i) that the business of the company is being conducted with intent to defraud its creditors, members or any other persons. or otherwise for a
fraudulent or unlawful purpose, or in a manner
bppressive of any of its members, or that the
company was formed for any fraudulent or unlawful purpose;
(ii) that persons concerned in the formation of the
company or the management of its affairs have
in connection therewith been guilty of fraud.
misfeasance or other misconduct towards the
company or towards any of its members; or
(iii) that the members of the company have not been
given all the information with respect to its
affairs which they might reasonably expect. including information relating to the calculation
of the commission payable to a managing or
other director. the managing agent, the secretaries and treasurers, or the manager, of the company."
By s. 237(b) the power is conferred on the Central Government
but under the Companies (Amendment) Act, 1963 a Board of
Company Law Administration consisting of a Chairman and a
member has been set up. This Board is constituted under s. 1OE
which has been introduced in the parent Act. The section may be
read here:
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"!OE. Constitution of Board of Company Law Administration.
(I) As soon as may be after the commencement of
the Companies (Amendment\ Act. 1963. the Central
Government shall. by notification in the Official Gazette,
constitute a Board to be called the Board of Company
Law Administration to exercise and discharge such
powers and functions conferred on the Central Government by or under this Act or any other law as may be
delegated to it by that Government.
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(2) The Company Law Board shall consist of such
number of members, not exceeding five, as the Central
Government deems fit, to be appointed by that Government by notification in the Official Gazette .
(3) One of ~he members shall be appointed by the
Central Government to be the chairman of the Company
Law Board.
(4) No act done by the Company Law Board shall be
called in question on the ground only of any defect in the
constitution of, or the existence of any vacancy in, the
Company Law Board.
(5) The procedure of the Company Law Board shall
be such as may be prescribed.
(6) In the exercise of its powers and discharge of its
functions, the Company Law Board shall be subject to
the control of the Central Government.
The Board was constituted on February l, 1964 by a notification
and by a notification of even date in exercise of the powers conferred by cl. (a) of sub-s. (1) of s. 637 read with sub-s. (1) of s. !OE
of the Companies Act, the Central Government delegated its
powers and functions to the Board under s. 237(b) among others.
Simultaneously acting in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-s.
(I) of s. 642 read with sub-s. (5) of s. !OE the Central Government
made the Company Law Board (Procedure) Rules, 1964 and one
such rule dealt with distribution of business to the following effect:
"3. Distribution of business-The Chairman may,
with the previous approval of the Central Government.
by order in writing, distribute the business of the Board
among himself and the other member or members, and
specify the cases or classes of cases which shall be considered jointly by the Board."
The Chairman by an order dated February 6, 1964 specified the
cases or classes of cases which are to be considered jointly by the
Board and distributed the remaining business of the Board between the Chairman and the member each acting individually. The
power under s. 237 was placed among the powers exercisable by
the Chairman singly. That is how action was taken in the name
of the Board but by the Chairman and is the subject of challenge
for the reason that a power delegated to the Board as a whole
cannot be delegated to an individual member in the absence of a
provision such as sub-s. (4A) added recently to s. lOE enabling
the solidarity of the Board to be broken. Sub-section (4A) of s.
!OE, which has been added by an amending Act of 1965, after the
events in this case, reads :
"!OE. (4A). The Board with the previous approval
of the Central Government, may, by order in writing,
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s.o.a.
authorise the chairman or any of its other members or its
principal officer (whether known as secretary or by any
other name) to exercise and discharge, subject to such
conditions and limitations, if any, as may be specified in
the order, such of its powers and functions as it may think
fit; and every order made or act done in the exercise of
such powers or discharge of such functions shall be
deemed to be the order or act. as the case may be. of the
Board."
This sub-section enables the work of the Board to be distributed
among members while sub-s. (5) merely enables the procedure of
the Board to be regulated. These arc two very different things .
One provides for distribution of work in such a way that each
constituent part of the Board properly authorised, becomes the
Board. The other provides for the procedure of the Board. What
is the Board, is not a question which admits of solution by procedural rules but by the enactment of a substantive provision allowing for a different delegation. Such an enactment has been framed
in relation to the Tribunal constituted under s. JOB and has now
been framed under s. JOE also. The new sub-section involves a
delegation of the powers of the Central Government to a member
of the Board which the Act previously allowed to be made to the
Board only. The statute, as it was formerly, gave no authority
to delegate it differently or to another person or persons. When it
spoke of procedure in sub-section (5) it spoke of the procedure of
the Board as constituted. The lacuna in the Act must have been
felt, otherwise there was no need to enact sub-section (4A). The
argument of the learned Attorney-General that sub-s. (4A> was not
needed at all. does not appeal to me. It is quite clear that its
absence would give rise to the argument accepted by me, which
argument is unanswerable in the absence of a provision such as
the new sub-section. My brother Shelat has dealt with this aspect
of the case fully and I cannot add anything useful to what he has
said. I agree with him entirely on this point.
I shall now consider the question of ma/a {ides. This uises
in two different ways. There is first ma/a fides attributed to the
chairman because he is said to have acted under the behest of a
Minister of Cabinet interested in another rival Company. It is
not necessary to go into it. The Chairman obtained the opinion
of quite a few of his assistants (perhaps more than was altogether
necessary) and this fact is stated to establish his fairness to and
honest dealing with the Company. There is nothing lo show that
this was done on purpose to cover up a conspiracy to do ham1 to
the Company. On the other hand I cannot overlook the fact that
the rival Company itself had obtained a licence to manufacture
Barium Chemicals which it allowed to lapse. This shows that
rivalry between two manufacturing concerns was not the prime
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motive. No doubt the rival Company had tried to obtain the sole
selling rights of, and even a share in, this Company. This might
have weighed with me but for the fact that the Company itself
had done nothing even before action was taken, to establish itself.
The whole project had hung fire and capital was eaten into a rapid
rate because there were technical defects in the setting up of the
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plant and machinery. There was not much hope of profits as a
sole selling agent or even as a partner. In these circumstances, I
cannot go by the allegations made against the Chairman of the
Board personally or those made against the Minister, and I find no
evidence to hold that dishonesty on the part of the one or malice
on the part of the other lies at the root of this action.
c
This brings me to the third and the last question, namely,
whether ma/a [ides or the ultra vires nature of the action has been
established in this case to merit interference at our hands. In view
of my decision on the question of delegation it is hardly n~cessary
to decide this question but since contradictory opinions have been
expressed on it by my brethren Mudholkar and Shelat. I must
give my views on this matter. The question naturally divides itself
D into two parts. The first is whether there was any personal bias,
oblique motive or ulterior purpose in the act of the chairman. The
~econ'.! is what are the powers of the Board in this behalf and
whether they have been exercised contrary to the requirements of
the Act. The first ground has already been dealt with in part when
I considered the malice and influence of the Minister. It may be
said at once, that "part from that allegation, nothing has been said
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attributing to the Chairman any personal bias, grudge, oblique
motive or ulterior purpose. Even in the arguments it was not suggested that the Chairman acted from improper motives. Therefore,
all that r have to consider is whether the action of the Chairman
can be challenged as done either contrary to the provisions empowering him or beyond those provisions.
In dealing with this problem the first point to notice is that
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the power is discretionary and its exercise depends upon the honest
formation of an opinion that an investigation is necessary. The
words "in the opinion of the Central Government" indicate that
the opinion must be formed by the Central Government and it is
of course implicit that the opinion must be an honest opinion. The
next requirement is that "there are circumstances suggesting etc."
G These words indicate that before the Central Government forms its
opinion it must have before it circumstances suggesting certain
inferences. These inferences are of many kinds and it will be useful
to make a mention of them here in a tabular form:
(a) that the business is being conducted with intent to
defraudH
(i) creditors of the company,
or (ii) members,
836
II966) BUPP. 8.C.I.
or (iiiJ any other person;
A
(b) that the business is being conducted(i) for a fraudulent purpose
or (ii) for an unlawful purpose;
that persons who formed the company or manage
its affairs have been guilty of (j) fraud
or (ii) misfeasance or other misconducttowards the company or towards any of its
members.
(c)
(d) That information has been withheld from the members about its affairs which might reasonably be expected including calculation of commission payable
to(iJ managing or other director.
(ii) managing agent.
<iiil the secretaries and treasurers.
(iv) the managers.
These grounds limit the jurisdiction of the Central Government. No jurisdiction, outside the section which empowers the
initiation of investigation, can be exercised. An action, not based
on circumstances suggesting an inference of the enumerated kind
will not be valid. In other words, the enumeration of the inferences
which may be drawn from the circumstances. postulates the absence of a general discretion to go on a fishing expedition to find
evidence. No doubt the formation of opinion is subjective but the
existence of circumstances relevant to the inference as the sine qua
non for action must be demonstrable. If the action is questioned
on the ground that no circumstance leading to an inference of the
kind contemplated by the section exists. the action might be exposcJ to interference unless the existence of the circumstances is
made out. As my brother Shel at has put it trenchantly:
"It is not reasonable to say that the clause permitted
the Government to say that it has formed the opinion
"
on circumstances which it thinks exist...
Since the existence of "circumstanc~s" is a conditian fundamental
to the making of an opinion. the existence of the circumstances,
if questioned, has to be proved at least prima facie. It is not sufficient to assert that the circumstances exist and give no clue to
what they are because the circumstances must be such as to lead
to conclusions of certain definiteness. The conclusions must relate
to an intent to defraud, a fraudulent or unlawful purpose, fraud
or misconduct or the withholding of information of a particular
kind. We have to see whether the Chairman in his affidavit has
shown the existence of circwnstances leading to such tentative
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conclusions. If he has, his action cannot be questioned because the
i:1ference is to be drawn subjectively and even if this Court would
not have drawn a similar inference that fact would be irrelevant.
But if the circumstances pointed out are such that no inference of
the kind stated in s. 237(b) can at all be drawn the action would
be ultra vires the Act and void.
Now the Chairman in his affidavit referred to two memoranda
dated May 30, 1964 and July 4, 1964 presented by certain exdirectors and also stated that from September 1961 complaints
were being received in regard to the conduct of the affairs of the
Company, and one such complaint was received from Special
Police Establishment in November 1963. The nature of the complaints was not disclosed but in reference to the memoranda it
was stated that "irregularities" and "illegalities" in the conduct
of the affairs of the Company was alleged therein. It was also
stated that the memoranda "were supported by documentary evidence and details of the impugned transactions and the signatories
offered to produce witnesses with knowledge of these transactions". This was followed by an enquiry by the Regional Director
of the Board at Madras (Shri R. S. Ramamurthi. I.A.S.) who made
a report in September 1964. The report was next considered by
two Under Secretaries and by the Secretary of the Company Law
Board who all agreed "that there was need for a deeper probe into
the affairs of the Company". The matter was then placed before
the Chairman who formed the opinion that there were circumstances suggesting the need for action under s. 237(b). None of the
reports was produced. Nor was there any indication in the affidavit what their drift was. There was considerable delay in taking
up the matter and this was explained as occasioned by the language
riots, and other more pressing occupation. It appears that in the
High Court an offer was made to place the reports etc. in the
hands of the Court provided they were not shown to the other
side, but no such offer was made in this Court. The High Court
did not look into the documents.
Had the matter rested there it would have been a question
whether this Court should interfere with a subjective opinion, when
the affidavit showed that there were materials for consideration.
It would then have been a question whether this Court could or
should go behind the affidavit. I leave that question to be decided
in another case where it arises. In this case it is not necessary to
decide it because the affidavit goes on to state:
" ......... However from the Memoranda received by
the Board referred to in paragraph 5 and other examination it appeared inter alia that:
(i) there had been delay, bungling and faulty planning
of this project, resulting in double expenditure, for
which the collaborators had put the responsibility
upon the Managing Director, Petitioner No. 2;
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[ 1966] SUPP. S.0.B,
(ii) Since its floatation the company has been continu-
ously showing losses and nearly I/ 3rd of its share
capital has been wiped off;
(iii) that the shares of the company which to start with
were at a premium were being quoted on the Stock
Exchange at half their face value; and
(iv) some eminent persons who had initially accepted
seats on the Board of directors of the company had
subsequently severed their connections with it due
to difference' with Petitioner No. 2 on account of the
manner in which the affairs of the company were being
conducted."
Paragraph 14 of the affidavit).
It may be mentioned .hat in paragraph 16 of the affidavit the
Chairman also stated:
"With reference to paragraph 21 of the petition, I
have already stated above that there was ample material
before the Board on which it could and did form the
opinion that there were circumstances suggesting that the
business of the company was being conducted with intent
to defraud its creditors, members and other pers·Jns and
further that the persons concerned in the management of
the affairs of the company had in connection therewith
been guilty of fraud, misfeasance and other misconduct
towards the company and its members."
The question thus arises what has the Chairman placed before
the Court to indicate that his action was within the four corners
of his own powers? Here it must be noticed that members are
ordinarily expected to take recourse to the Registrar because there
they have to be in a certain number or command a certain proportion of the voting power. They are also required to give evidence
and the Company gets an opportunity to explain its actions. If
s. 237(b) is used by members. as an alternative to s. 236, the
evidence must unerringly point to the grounds on which alone
action can be founded. In my opinion there is nothing to show that
the reports which were being received from September 1961, or
the report of the Special Police Establishment indicated fraud.
illegality or action or actions with intent to defraud. as contem' plated by the section. The affidavit merely says that these reports
indicated the need for a deeper probe. This is not sufficient. The
material must suggest certain inferences and not the need for "a
deeper probe". The former is a definite conclusion the latter a
mere fishing expedition. A straight-forward affidavit that there
were circumstances suggesting any of these inferences was at least
necessary. There is no such affidavit and the reason is that the
Chairman completely misunderstood his own powers. This is indicated by the enumerntion of the four circumstances I have ex·
tracted from his affidavit and I proceed to analyse them.
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The first circumstance is "delay, bungling and faulty planning" resulting in "double expenditure" for which the collaborators had put the responsibility on the second appellant. None of
these shows an intent to defraud by which phrase is meant something to induce another to act to his disadvantage. The circumstances mentioned show mismanagement and inefficiency which is
not the same thing as fraud or mis-conduct. The second and the
third circumstance merely establish that there was loss in making
this project work and that a part of capital had been lost. This
was admitted by the appellants who pointed out that after considerable negotiations they induced Lord Poole, the President of
the collaborating firm, to invest a further sum of £25,000. This
shows that the appellants were in a position to dictate to the
collaborating company which they would not have been able to
do if they were guilty of fraudulent conduct. The last circumstance
does not also bear upon the subject of fraud and acts done with
intend to defraud. That some directors have resigned does not
establish fraud or misconduct. There may be other reasons for the
resignation.
In the other part of the affidavit the Chairman has merely
repeated s. 237(b) but has not stated how he came to the conclusion and on what material. In other words, he has not disGlosed
anything from which it can be said that the inference which he
has drawn that the Company was being conducted with intent to
defraud its creditors, members and other persons or persons concerned in the management of the affairs of the Company were guilty
of fraud, mis-feasance and misconduct towards the company and
its members was based on circumstances present before him. In
fact, paragraph 16 is no more than a mechanical repetition of the
words of the section.
Coming now to the affidavit of Mr. Dang I find that he merely
repeats what was stated in the affidavit of the Chairman. He also
said that he had seen the papers and agreed with his two Under
Secretaries and the Regional Director that a "deeper probe" was
necessary. There is no hint even in this affidavit that the circumstances were such as to suggest fraud, intent to defraud or misconduct, this is to say, circumstances under which investigation
can be ordered. The other affidavits also run the same way and
it is not, therefore, necessary to refer to them. We are concerned
really with the affidavits of the Chairman and Mr. Dang in relation
to the exercise of the power conferred by s. 237(b). Neither proves
the existence of circumstances under which the power could be
exercised. In my opinion, therefore, the action has not been proved
to be justified. No doubt. the section confers a discretion but it
sets its own limits upon the discretion by stating clearly what must
be looked for in the shape of evidence before the drastic act of
investigation into the affairs of a company can be taken. The
affidavits which were filed in answer to the petition do not disclose
340
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even the prima facie existence of these circumstances. On the
other hand, they emphasise only that there was mis-management
and losses which necessitated a "deeper probe". In other words,
the act of the Chairman was in the nature of a tishing expedition
and not after satisfaction that the affairs of the Company were
being carried on even prima facie with the intent to defraud or
that the persons incharge were guilty of fraud or other misconduct.
As to the constitutionality of s. 237<bJ I agree with my brethren
Bachawat and Shelat and have nothing to add. I. therefore. agree
with my brother Shelat that the appeal must be allowed. There will
be no order about costs.
Bachawat, J.
The order dated May 19, 1965 was µassed
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the Chairman of the Company Law Iloard Mr. Setalvad submitted
that only the Board could pass an order under s. 237, the Central
Government could delegate its function under s. 237 to the Board
but it had no power to authorise the Chairman to sub·delegate this
function to himself and consequently, the Company Law Board
(Procedure) Rules, 1964 made by the Central Government on
February I. 1964 and the Chairman's order of distribution of business dated February 6, 1964 delegating the function of the Board
under s. 237 to the Chairman are ultra vires the Companies Act and
the impugned order is invalid. The learned Attorney-General disputed these submissions.
As a general rule, whatever a person has power lo do himself,
he may do by means of an agent. This broad rule is limited by the
operation of the principle that a delegated authority cannot be redelegated, delegatus non palest clelegare. The n.1ming of " delegate
to do an act involving a discretion indicates that the delegate was
selected because of his peculiar skill and the confidence reposed
in him, and there is a presumption that he i.- required to do the act
himself and cannot re-delegate his authority. As a general rule, "if
the statute directs that certain acts shall be ~nn0 in a specified
manner or by certain persons, their performance in any other
manner than that specified or by any other person th"n one of
those named is impliedly prohibited." See Crawford on Hatutory
Construction, 1940 Edn., art. 195, p. 335. Normally, a discretion
entrusted by Parliament to an administrative organ must be exercised by that organ itself. If a statute entrusts an administrative
function involving the exercise of a discretion to a Board consisting of two or more persons it is to be presumed that each member
of the Board should exercise his individual judgment on the matter
and all the members of the Board should act together and arrive at
a joint decision. Prima facic, the Board must act as a whole and
cannot delegate its function to one of its members.
The learned Attorney-General submitted that a distribution of
business among the members of the Company Law Board is not a
delegation of its authority, and the maxim has no application in
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such a case. I cannot accept this submission. In Cook v. Ward('),
the Court held that where a drainage board constituted by an Act
of Parliament was authorised by it to delegate its powers to a committee, the powers so delegated to the committee must be exercised
by them acting in concert and it was not competent to them to
apportion those powers amongst themselves and one of them acting
alone, pursuant to such apportionment, could not justify his acts
under the statute. Lord Coleridge, C. J. said at p. 262: "It was
not competent to them to delegate powers. which required the
united action of the three, to be exercised according to the unaided judgment of one of them." Again, in Vine v. National Dock
Labour Board('), the House of Lords. held that a local board mt
up under the scheme embodied in the schedule to the Dock Workers
(Regulation of Employment) Order, 1947 had no power to assign
its disciplinary function under els. 15(4) and 16(2) of the scheme to
a committee and the purported dismissal of a worker by the committee was a nullity. Jn my opinion, the distribution of the business
of the Board among its members is a delegation of its authority.
But the maxim "delegatus non potest delegare" must not be
pushed too far. The maxim does not embody a rule of law. It indicates a rule of construction of a statute or other instrument conferring an authority. Prima facie, a discretion conferred by a
statute on any authority is intended to be exercised by that authority and by no other. But the intention may be negatived by
any contrary indications in the language, scope or object of the
statute. The construction that would best achieve the purpose and
object of the statute should be adopted.
Under ss. JOE(!) and 637(1)(a), the Central Government has
power to constitute a Company Law Board and to delegate its
functions to the Board. The Board can consist of such number of
persons not exceeding five as the Government thinks fit. One of
the members of the Board has to be appointed a Chairman and
this necessarily implies that the Board shall consist of at least two
members. As a matter of fact, the Government constituted a Board
consisting of two members and appointed one of them as Chairman .
To this Board the Government delegated its function under s. 237.
Section 637 shows that the function under s. 237 can be delegated
to the Board and to no other authority. The function under
s. 237(b) involves the exercise of a discretion. Prima facie, all the
members of the Board acting together were required to discharge
this function and they could not delegate their duty to the Chairman. However, under ss. 10E(5) and 642(1), the Central Government may frame rules regulating the procedure of the Board and
generally to carry out the purposes of the Act. In the context of
s. !OE, I am inclined to construe this rule-making power liberally.
The Central Government has power to constitute the Company
Law Board, to delegate its functions to the Board and to control
(') [1877) L.R. 2 C.P.D. 2M.
(') [1957] A.C. 488.
[Hl66]
S1'l'P.
s.O.B.
the Board in the exercise of its delegated functions. In this back· A
ground, by conferring on the Central Government the additional
power of framing rules regulating the procedure of the Board and
generally lo carry out the purp.:>ses of s. 1OE, the Parliament must
have intended that the internal organisation of the Board and the
mode and manner of transacting its business should be regulated
entirely by rules framed by the Government. The Government had, JI
therefore, power to frame the Company Law B0ard (Procedure)
Rules, 1964 authorising the Chairman to distribute the business
of the Board. In the exercise of the power conferred by this rule,
the Chairman assigned the business under s. 237 to himself. The
Chairman alone could, therefore. pass the impugned order. Act
No. 31 of 1965 has now inserted sub-s. (4A) in s. IOE authorising
the Board lo delegate its powers and functions to its Chairman or
other members or principal officer. The power under sub·s. f4AJ
may be exercised by the Board independently of any rules framed
by the Central Government. We find, however. that the Central
Government had under ss. IOE(5) and 642(1) ample power to frame
rules authorising the Chairman to distribute the business of the
Board. The wide amhit of this rule-making power is not cut down
D
by the subsequent insertion of sub-s. \4A) in s. 1OE.
Sections 235, 237(a) and 237(b) enable the Central Government to make an order appointing an inspector to investigate the
affairs of a company in different sets of circumstances. and the contention that s. 237(bl is discriminatory and is violative of Art. 14
must fail. I also think thats. 237(b) is not violative of Arts. 19(1)(0
and l 9(l)(g) of the Constitution. The company is not a citizen and
E
has no fundamental right under Art. 19. Appellant No. 2 who is
the managing director of the company is not a ci1i1cn. but even
assuming that s. 237(b) imposes restrictions on his right of property
or his right to carry on his occupation as managing director, those
restrictions are reasonable and are imposed in the interests of the
general public.
On the question of ma/a (Ides, I am indineJ lo think that the
Chairman passed the order dated May 19, 1965 independently of
and without any pressure from the Minister. I am all the more
persuaded to come to this conclusion having regard to the fact that
in paragraph 14 of his affidavit the Chaimian has disclosed the
circumstances which he took into account in passing the order. In
paragraJ?hs 5, 8 an? 16 of his affid_avit, the.Chairman stated that he
had var10us materials on the basis of which he pa,sed the order.
0
But, on reading this affidavit as a whole and the affidavit of Mr.
Dang I am satisfied that in paragraph 14 of his affidavit the Chairman bas set out all the material circumstances which had emerged
on an examination of the various materials before him. Briefly
put, those circumstances are delay. bungling and faulty pbnning
by the management resulting in double expenditure. huge losses, H
sharp fall in the price of the Company's ~hares and_ the ~es_ignati?n
of some of the directors on account of differences m opinion with
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the managing director. I think that these circumstances, without
more, cannot reasonably suggest that the business of the company
was being conducted to defraud the creditors, members and other
persons or that the management was guilty of fraud towards the
company and its members. No reasonable person who had given
proper consideration to these circumstances could have formed the
B opinion that they suggested any fraud as mentioned in the order
dated May 19, 1965. Had the Chairman applied his mind to the
relevant facts. he could not have formed this opinion. I am, therefore, inclined to think that he formed Lhe opinion without applying
his mind to the facts. An opinion so formed by him is in excess of
his powers and cannot support an order under s. 237(b). The
appeal is allowed. and the impugned order is set aside. I concur in
c the
order which Shclat, J. proposes to pass.
Shelat J. The appellant company is a public limited con;pany
registered on July 28, 1961 having its registered office at Ramavaram
in Andhra Pradesh and the second appellant was at all material
times and is still its managing director.
On August 25, J959 and September 23, I 960 appel1ant No. 2 obD tained two licences for the manufacture of 2500 and 1900 tonnes
of b:1riurn chemicals per ye if in the name cf Transworld Traders
of which he was the proprietor. He then started negotiations with
Kali Chem'.e of Hannover, West Germany to collaborate with him
in setting up a plant. While he was so negotiating, MI s, IT'. T.
Krishnamachari & Co .. who were the sole selling agents of the said
German Company. approached the 2nd appellant for the scle selling agency of barium products of the plant proposed to be put up
E
by the 2nd appellant. The 2nd appellant did not agree. On December 5, 1960 M/s. T. T. K. & Co., applied for a licence for manufacture of barium chemicals. On December 23, 1960 the 2nd appel·
!ant wrote a letter to the Minister of Commerce and Industry objecting to the grant cf a licence to Ml s. T. T. K. & Co. Both were
considered by the Licc:osing Committee. The Committee rejected
F the application of Mis. T. T. K. & Co .. but advised them to apply
again after six months. On a representdtion by M f s. T. T. K. & Co.,
the Committee reconsidered the matter and recommended the grant
of licence to M ls. T. T. K. Chemicals Private Limited. The second
appellant once more protested, this time ta the Prime Minister but
that was rejected.
On July 28. 1961. an a:;recmcnt between the appellant comG pany and L.A. Mitchell Ltd .. of Manchester was signed whercunder
the latter agreed to put up the plant on the appellant company
agreeing to pay them £184.500. On November 27. 1961, the Government granted a licence to the company for the import of machinery., In the mean time, respondent No. 2 was appointed a,
Minister without portfolio and rejoined lhe Cabinet which he had left
H
earlier owing to certain circumstances which are not relevant for
the present. From January, J 962 to March, J 963, he continued a• a
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Minister without portfolio but from March, 1963 to September, 1963,
he became the Minister for Defence and Economic Co·ordination
and thereafter the Finance Minister. On August 30, 1962, the licence
granted to Mis. T. T. K. Chemicals Ltd. was revoked as the company had decided to surrender it.
A
It would seem that the appellant company was not faring as B
well as was hoped and though it had been incorporated as early as
July, 1961 producfon had not commenced. There arcse also disputes among its directors. On May 30. 1964 and July 9, 1964 four
of its directors submitted two memoranda alleging irregularit;es
and even illegalities in the conduct of the company's affairs to the
Company Law Board. According to the second appellant, the four
directors were disgrunt1ed directors, hostile to him and the comc
pany. The company was not able to start work in full capacity not
because of any irregularities but because of the faulty planning and
designing by the collaborators. The company realised this fact only
in June, 1964 when it received a survey report after the breakdown
of the plant during that month from Mis. Humphreys and Glascow
(Overseas) Ltd., Bombay. In September. 1964, a meeting was arranged in London between the company"s representatives and the re- D
prescntatives of L.A. MitcheLl Ltd .. of which Lord Pcolc was the
Chairman. It was agreed that L. A. Mitchell Ltd .. should depute
MI s. Humphreys and Glascow Ltd .. London, to go through the
designs etc., and to make a report showing the causes of the repeated failures of the plant and suggesting remedies therefor. Lord
Poole also agreed that the factory would be commissioned without
any further delay and that L.A. Mitchell Ltd .. would carry out the E
necessary repairs at their cost. While these negotiations were going
on. representatives of Mis. Kali Chemie of Hannover arrived in
India to negotiate a collaboration agreement with the company.
On April 4. 1965. a meeting of the company's directors was held
in New Delhi which was attended by one Kriegstcin. a representative of Kali Chemie and also by the General Manager of M Is.
T. T. K. & Co. Certain proposals were discussed and it was decided
r
that the company should give notice to L. A. Mitchell Ltd. cancelling the agreement with them. Accordingly. by a notice dated
April 2. 1965 the agreement with the said L. A. Mitchell Ltd , was
C<Jncelled. On May 7, 1965 representatives of the appellant company and of Kali Chemie met at Stuttgart when propc,suls for an
agreement were discussed. One of these proposals was that the company should be reorganised and its share capital should be distributG
cd in the following proportions: 49 per cent to the appellant company. 26 per cent to Kali Chem;e and 25 per cent to M; s. T. T. K.
& Co. It was also proposed that Kali Chemic should take over the
responsibilit~· on the production side. the appellant company would
be responsible for the management and Mis. T.T.K. & Co. should
take over s 1les promotion. Before however these negotiations H
could take concrete shape. Lord Poole came over to India. A meeting was held on May 10, 1965 between him and the directors of the
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appellant company. Lord Poole agreed that the British company
would put in £250,000 in addition to the amount already invested
by it and that production would commence from June, 1965. On May
11, 1965 another meeting took place when it was decided that without prejudice to what was stated in the notice of April 4, 1965, the
appellant company should withdraw para 9 thereof whereby the
agreement between them was terminated. By May 11, 1965, the
position therefore was that the collaboration agreement between
the company and L. A. Mitchell Ltd. was agreed to be continued and
consequently the negotiations with the German company and M/s.
T. T. K. & Co., were not to proceed further.
On May 19, 1965 the first respondent passed the impugned
order which inter alia stated: "In the opinion of the Company Law Board there are
circumstances suggesting that the business of MI s . Barium
Chemicals Ltd .......... is being conducted with intent to defraud its creditors, members and other persons; and forther
that the persons concerned in the management of the dfairs
of the company have in connection therewith been guilty of
fraud, misfeasance and other misconduct towards the company
and its members.
Therefore, in exercise of the powers vested by clause (b)
of section 237 of the Companies Act 1956 (Act, 1 of 1956.> read
with the Government of India, Department of Revenue Notification No. GSR 178 dated the 1st February 1964, the Company Law Board hereby appoint.. ................................ ..
. .. .. . .. . . . . . . . . . .. .. .. .. .. . . . . . . . . .. . .. .. .. . . .. as Inspectors to ic vestigate the affairs of the company since its incorporation in 1961
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On May 25, 1965 search warrants were obtained by respondents 3 to 10 and accordingly search was carried out at the office
of the company at Ramavaram and at the residence of the second
appellant and several documents and files were seized. On May 28,
1965, the second appellant submitted a representation to the ( hair·
man of the first respondent Board. He explained that out cf the
company's paid up capital of Rs. 50 lacs, shares of the vabe of
about Rs. 47 lacs were owned by members of the public, th:•t the
ccmpany was the first of its kind in India, that it could not go into
proJuction soon because of the defective planning by the co'laborators, that as a result of recent negotiations, the collaborators had
agreed to invest£ 2,50,000 more and that the company's factory had
now commenced prctluction from April 1964, that the Board appeared to have acted on the complaints filed by the said four directors who resented the second appellant's refusal to purchase their
holdings at.a price above par demanded by them; that though those
complaints were lodged some two years ago and were not acted
L/S5SCI-24(a)
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[1966]
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s.c.i\.
upon, they were sought now lo be made the basis of the impugned
order on account of trade rivalry between the company and MI s.
T. T. K. & Co .. that the order was ma/a fide and that it was made <ln
grounds extraneous to the provisions of s. 237(b) and at the instance
of the second respondent. On receipt of this representation, the
Chainnan of the first respomlcnt Board contacted the second respondent and at the latter's instance the Prime Minister by an order
dated May 31, 1965 transferred the case to the Home Minister.
It was against Ihe backgraund of these allegations that the
appellants filed a petition in the Punjab High Court under Art. 226
for having the impugned order qu<1shed and for certain other reliefs.
The appellant> alleged therein that the impugned order W<JS ma/a
fide and passed at the inst<Jnce of the 2nd respondent who was unfavourably disposed towards them. that it was made under Rules
which were illegal. and last'y. that it was also illegal as it was passed
under provisions violative of Art. 14 and Art. 19( [) (gl of the Constitution. On June 11, 1965, the appellants applied to the High
Court for production of certain documents. That application was
dismissed. On September 7, 1965. they filed another application
for cross-examination of the 2nd respondent and production of two
letters. One dated March 15, 1961 by one Schemidtmann and the
other dated July 27. 1965 by Andhra Bank Ltd. to the Reserve
Bank of India. The High Court did not pass any separate order
on this application but dismissed it in the course d its judgment on
the main petition on the ground that it "as not necessary to take
additional evidence and that tl1e allidavits fi'ed by the parties were
enough for the disposal of the petition. On October 7. 1965, the
High Court dismissed the petition observing that the appellants
had
failed to establish their allegation as to ma/a fide.1·
and accepted the respondents' contention that the decision
to order investigation was arrived at in December. 1964
but could not be crystaliscd into a formal Jrder till May
19, 1965 owing t<> 1angu;:ge strikes in Madras and other
administrative dilliculties and that the fact that the order was ultimately passed on May 19. 1965 soon after the said meetings of the
10th and I I th May 1965 was a mere coincidence. The High Court
was also of the view that even assum;ng that the second respondent
had retained his interest in Mis. T. T. K. & Co .. and that firm was
interested in the production of barium chemicals or for being
appointed as sole selling a~·ents or otherwise, the first respondent,
its chairm.:n and officials were not sh~wn to have been aware of the
second respondent's interest in Mis. T. T. K. & Co. and therefore
in the abicnce of any allegation of personal malice against them
the alle2ation as to mal<z {ides failed. The High Court also rejected
the contention that s. 237(b\ was ultra vires Arts. 14 and 19(1 )(gl
or that the procedure laid down under power conferred hy the
Rules or the Rules 1hemscl\'es were invalid.
On behalf of the appellants, the following four contentions
were ratsed: (I) that the impugned order dated May 19, 1965 was
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mala fide, that the High Court erred in failing to give due weight
to the persona,• hostility of the 2nd respondent against the appellants and deciding the petition on the footing that the first respondent was an independent authority and that it was its Chairman
who on his own had formed the requisite opinion and passed the
order and therefore the motive or the evil eye of the second respondent was irrelevant. The High Court also erred in failing to
appreciate that even though the impugned order was by the Chairman, jt had to receive and in fact received the second respondent's
agreement and therefore if the second respondent's ma/a fides
were established they would vitiate the order. Therefore, the High
Court ought to have taken additional evidence and allowed the
production of documents as prayed for by the appellants; (2) that
even taking the circumstances said to have been found by the first
respondent, they were extraneous to s. 237(b) and could not constitute a basis for the impugned order and the order therefore was
ultra vires the section; (3) that the impugned order was in any case
bad as it was passed by the Chairman alone acting under Rule's
under which such a power was conferred in contravention of the
provisions of s. JOE; and (41 that the impugned order was bad
because s. 237(b) itself was bad as offending against Arts. 14 and
19(1)(g).
Before these contentions are dealt with it is necessary first lo
consider the relevant provisions of the Act, the Rules made thereunder and the order of distribution of work passed by the Chairman
oif the Board in pursuance of these Rules.
Section 234 empowers the Registrar to call for information or
explanation. Sub-section 1 provides that if on perusing any document which a company is required to submit to him under the Act,
the Registrar is of opinion that any information or explanation is
necessary with respect to a matter to which such document purports to relate, he may call on the company to furnish the said information or explanation. If that is done it is the duty of the company and its officers to furnish information or explanation. If such
information or explanation is not furnished or is inadequate, the
Registrar has the power to order production of such books and
papers he thinks necessary for his inspection and thereupon it is
the duty of the company and its officers to produce such books and
papers. Sub-section 4 provides for penal consequences for failure
to furnish information or explanation or to produce the books and
papers. Sub-section 6 provides that if the said information or explanation is not furnished within the speoified time or if on perusal
of such informotion or explanation etc., furnished or produced
under sub-s. 3A or 4 the Registrar is of opinion that the document
referred to in sub-s. 1 tdgether with such information or explanation to be furnished as aforesaid discloses an unsatisfactory state of
affairs, he has to report the case to the Central Government. Subsection 7 provides that if it is represented to the Registrar on materials placed before him by a contributory or a creditor or any other
348
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(1966] Sl.'PP.
s.c.R.
person interested that (i) the business of the company is being carried on in fraud of its creditors or of persons dealing with the company or (ii) otherwise for a fraudulent or unlawful purpose. he may
call upon the company to furnish any information or explanation
on matters specified in the order after giving the company an opportunity of being heard. The said representation must be by a
contributory or creditor or a person interested and it must be on
materials showing that the business of the company is being carried on in fraud of creditors or members or other persons dealing
with the company or otherwise for a fraudulent or unlawful purpose. If he is satisfied that the representation is frivolous or vexatious he has to disclose the identity of such informant to the company, presumably, to enable the company to take such action against
him as it thinks fit. Section 234A deals with the seizure of documents by the Registrar in the circumstances set out therein. While
s. 234 deals with the Registrar's power to call for information or
product;on of documents and papers, section 235 and onwards
deal with investigation. Section 235 empowers the Central Government to appoint inspectors to investigate the affairs of a company
(a) on an application of not less than 200 members or by members
holding not less than l / IOth of the voting power, or (b) on an application. in the case of a company not having a share capital, or not
less than I I 5th in number of persons on the company's register of
members, or (c) on a report by the Registrar under sul>-secs. 6 or 7
read with sub-sec. 3 of s. 234. Section 236 provides that an application by members under cl. (a) or (b) has to be supported by such
evidence as the Central Government may require. Thus both
under s. 234 and s. 235 before action is taken certain conditions
have to be complied with. under s. 234, an opportunity of being
heard and under s. 235 the application has to be not only by a certain number of members but has to be accompanied by evidence.
Section 237(a) authorises the government to appoint investigators if the company by a special resolution· or the Court by an order
declares that the company's affairs should be investigated. Clause
(b) empowers the government to do so if in its opinion there are
circumstances suggesting (i) that the business of the company is
being conducted with intent to defraud its creditors. members or
any other persons or otherwise for a fraudulent or unlawful purpose or in a manner oppressive of any of its members or (ii) that the
company or the management of its affairs have in connection therewith been guilty of fraud, misfeasance or other misconduct towards
the company or any of its members. Sub-cl. (iii) is not relevant and
therefore need not be cited.
Thus the consideration on which action is permissible under
s. 234 and the kind of action taken thereunder are different from
those under s. 237. It is true that the authority to take action under
s. 23'i is the government and the action authorised thereunder is
investigation b-ut action can be taken thereunder not suo moto but
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only on an app!ication by a certain number of members or by members with a certain amount of voting power or on the Registrar's
report. Section 234, besides, has nothing to do with investigation as
s. 235 and s. 237 have, though on a report under s. 234, the government can institute investigation under cl. (e) of s. 235 .. Section lOE
was inserted in the Act by Act LIU of 1963 and deals with the
constitution of the Company Law Board. The Board constituted
under this section consists of a Chairman and members. By a notification G. S. R. 176 dated February 1, 1964 the Central Gdvernment constituted the Company Law Board under s. lOE. By another
N0tiftcation No. G.S.R. 178 it delegated some of its powers under
the Act including those under s. 237 to the Board. On the same
day, it also published Rules under s. 642(1) read with s. 10E(5)
called the Company Law Board (Procedure) Rules, 1964. Rule 3
empowers the Chairman of the Board to distribute the business of
the Board among himself and the other member or members and
to specify the cases or classes of cases which shall be considered
jointly by the Board. On February 6, 1964, the Chairman, under
the power vested in him by r. 3 passed an order distributing the
business of the Board between himself, the other member and the
Board. Under this order the business of ordering investigation
under sections 235 and 237 was allotted to himself to be performed
by him singly.
Reverting now to the contentions urged by Mr. Setalvad, the
first was that the impugned order though passed by the Chairman
of the Board was really the order of the second respondent and was
actuated by malice and hostility which he bore towards the appellants. In the alternative, it was urged that if the order were held
to be the order of the Chairman, it was passed at the 2nd respondent's instance, the Board and its Chairman being under his control
and the order in fact having also been passed after he had agreed
to it. The order in either event was mala fide and in fraud of the
statute, it being actuated by the hostility which the 2nd respondent
bore against the appellants. The mala {ides alleged against the 2nd
respondent fall under two heads; (!) the trade rivalry between the
anpellant company on the one hand and MI s. T. T. K. & Co .• on
the other in which the 2nd respondent continued to retain interest
in spite of his having apparently gone out as a partner, and (2) the
personal hostility, political and otherwise which existed between
t11e 2nd respondent and the appellants which actuated the 2nd respondent to have the impugned order passed with a view to ruin
the company and the 2nd appellant.
As regards the first head of mala fides, Mr. Setalvad relied on
certain documentary evidence, and argued that the second respondent exploiting his position as a Minister tried to further the interests of MI s. T. T. K. & Co., in which he continued to have interest
in one way or the other and that his stand that he went out of the
firm long before he became the Minister and had nothing to do
350
.-it:PRI'ME
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(1966]
SUPP.
B.C.J!
with it thereafter ~as not true. The registration of the firm on December 21, 19-13 shpw, that the 2nd res-pondent was a p.:rtner therein aJ,mg with his 'on Narasimhan and one G. Veeraghavan. It
appears that in 19-17 there w;1s a change in the !inn's constitution.
The registration on April 18, 1947 shows th:1t the 2nd respondent
ceased to b~ a partner. h;s two sons. T. T. Narashimham and T. T.
Rangaswami were henceforth the partners and in his place was
substituted his minor son. T. T. Vasu. entitled to the benefits of the
firm. the minor son being represented by the 2nd respondent as his
fother and guardian. The said minor son attained majority on April
27. 1947 but he gave notice of election to become a partner only
on April 5. 1952. It was said that this fact indicated that the 2nd
respondent maintained his interest till April, 1952. According to
the 2nd appellant, the 2nd respondent's active interest in the firm
did not cca'e even after 1952. Mr. Sctalvad pointed out a letter
dated M:irch 30, 1965 from Kali Chemie to the Manager of the
firm in which the German concern acknowledged their gratitude
towards the 2nd respondent in the following terms: "Moreover. we thank you for your good suggestion
and reminder ;;s to the next step to be taken; the production partly to he taken up in India; We owe special thanks
to Mr. T. T. Krishnamachari for his readiness to put up
the ncceS>ary plant. We gave you previously the assurance
to consider such a question a 1ways favourably and we rcpe;' t that assurance."
The letter further suggested that the installation of the plant
referred to therein should not be rushed through "unless there arc
other reasons. for instance import policy for certain preparations
and/or equipment fpr pharmaceutical products." Reliance was also
placed on a letter dated March 15. 1961 by one Schmidtmann. the
appcilants' representative in Hannover to the 2nd appellant in
which it was stated that Kali Chemic were expecting a. visit there
by the 2nd respon<lent and were confident that "an arrangement
can be reached in the matter proposed by you," presumably a collabmation agreement between the appellant company and the
German company. The submiss;on was that these and other such
documents established that the 2nd respondent had all throughout
retained interest in M /s. T. T. K. & Co., that there was on that
account trade rivalrv between him and the appellant company and
that due to his sustained intere;t in the !inn. apart from his three
sons being the partners therein. it was hardly to be expected that
the 2nd respondent would permit the appellant company to go on
with its project. On the question of personal animosity. it was pointed out that soon after the 2nd respondent became the Commerce
and Industries Minister in 1952. he was instrumental in getting a
licence issued to Madras Motors Ltd. in Decemher 1953 for the
manufacture of motor cycle. In March 1955, another manufacturing concern, the Ideal Motors of Bombay. applied fur a similar
licence. But thot application was rejected as the Standing Committee
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351
on Automobile Industry decided that there was no scope for manufacture of more than one make of motor cycles and scooters. After
the 2nd respondent ceased to be a Minister in 1958, the 2nd appel.ant made a representation to the then Minister of Ccn,merce
and Industries against what he called manipulations in the policy
of manufacture of motor cycles in favour of the said Madras conB
cern with which he alleged the 2nd respondent was on friendly
terms. The case of the 2nd appellant was that it was due to his
efforts that the government revised its policy in 1959, invited applications from other persons interested in the manufacture and on
April 9, 1960 granted a licence to the Ideal Motors of Bombay for
manufacture of motor cycles. It was also pointed out that in the
General Elections of 1957, the 2nd appellant supported the candic dature of one Balasubramania Mudaliar, the rival of the second
respondent.
Mr. Setalvad argued that these facts established at least prima
facie case of (i) the 2nd respondent's continued interest in M/s.
T.T.K. & Co. in spite of his denial, (ii) the trade rivalry between the
appellant company and M/s. T.T.K. & Co., (iii) the attempt of
that firm to have control or at least a substantial interest in the
D
appellant company through a collaboration agreement with the
German company and (iv) of personal animosity. He contended
that with this background the appellant company should have been
afforded an opportunity to establish its case of mala fide by being
allowed to cross-examine the 2nd respondent and the Chairman of
the Board and of adducing further documentary evidence by compelling
the respondents to produce such documents as were requirE
ed by the appellants to establish their case. His contention was that
the High Court erred in turning down the applications for crossexamination and production of documents. He also argued that
under s. 1OE(!) the first respondent Board was only a delegate of
the Central Government and therefore the impugned order, though
passed by the Board, was the order of the government and the 2nd ·
respondent being the head of the Department, that fact coupled
F
with his agreement of that order, made the impugned order both
in fact and in law his order.
In this connection reliance was placed on Roopchand v. State
of Punjab('). This decision cannot assist the appellants for the question decided there was that where power is delegated to an authority and the delegate passes an order under such delegated power,
G the order is the order of the government and the government cannot interfere with it in its revisional jurisdiction. In the present
case we are not concerned with the question of the power of revision by the government. Though the impugned order was passed
under a power delegated to the Board, factually it was passed by
the Chairman and not by the 2nd respondent. The appellants' case
H was that though the four directors, who had resigned, had submitted their memoranda, the Board had declined to take any action.
(') [1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 539.
852
Sl:l'FE'.llE CO\:RT REPnRTS
[!MG] S\;PP ~ c.n
The allegation was that one Sabanathan, one of the four directors
and one Somasundaram, who were the friends of the 2nd respondent and his sons. had thereafter discussed the matter of the appellant company with the 2nd respondent, that at the instance of the
2nd respondent they sent a petition to the Board and then the 2nd
respondent directed the 7th respondent to prepare the impugned
order. The case there stated is that the order was "prepared by
respondent No. 7 in accordance with the aforesaid directions given
by respondent No. 2 without obtaining the prior approval of the
members of the Company Law Board and the members of the
Company Law Board never applied their mind to the material
before the passing of the order." Thus the appellants' case as to
ma/a {ides was that the impuh'!led order was not really the order of
the Board but that it was made at the 2nd respondent's dictate and
that though it was issued formally by the Board it was in truth that
of the 2nd respondent who manoeuvred to have it passed.
The question then is: What were the materials placed hy the
appellants in support of this case which the respondents had to
answer'? According to para 27 of the petition. the proximate cause
for the issuance of the order was the discussion that the
two friends of the 2nd respondent had with him, the petition
which they filed at his instance and the direction which
the 2nd respondent gave to respondent No. 7. But these
allegations are not grounded on any knowledge but only
on "reasons to believe". Even for their reasons to believe, the appellants do not disclose any information on which they were
founded. No particulars as to the alleged discussion with the 2nd
respondent. or of the petition which the said two friends were said
to have made, such as its contents, its time or to which authority
it was made are forthcoming. It is true that in a case of this kind it
would be difficult for a petitioner to have personal knowledge in
regard to an avcrment of ma/a {ides, but then where such knowledge is wanting he has to disclose his source of information so that
the other side gets a fair chance to verify it and make an effecrve
answer. In such a situation, this Court had to observe in the State
of Bombay v. P11r11s/1011am Naik(') that as sEpshod verifications
of affidavits might lead to their rejection, they should be modelled
tm the lines of O.XfX r. 3 of the Civil Procedure Code and that
where an averment is not based on personal knowledge, the source
of information should be clearly deposed. In making these observations this Court endorsed the remarks as regards verification made
in the Calcutto decision in Padmabati Dasi v. Dhar 1.'l. Apart from
this consideration it is clear that in the absence of tangib1e materials, the only nnswer which the respondents could array against
the allegntion as to ma/a (ides could be one of general denial. The
affidavits of the respondents however do not rest with a mere
denial. They contain positive averments to the effect that the impugned order was passed in exercise of the power conferred on th!'
(') [ 1952] S.C.Il. 674,
(1)
l.L.R. 37 Cal. 259.
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BARIUM CHEMICALS ~). COMP. LA\Y BD.
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(Shelat, J.)
353
Board, that the order was independently made by the Chairman
on materials before him and that the 2nd respondent had nothing
to do with the making of it. Putting it in a somewhat different way,
what was it that the respondents were expected to explain in their
answer? The answer which they were expected to make was
against the allegation that the order was not independently made
by the Board, that it was made at the instance of the 2nd respondent in consequence of the discussions he had with his said two
friends who were made to file a petition and that the Board had
mechanically issued it in obedience to the 2nd respondent's behest
without applying its mind to any materials before it. It is obvious
that in the absence of any particulars about the alleged discussion
or the alleged petition or the alleged direction given by the 2nd
respondent or the sources of information on which the appellants
had reasons to believe these things, the only answer which the
respondents could give was a general answer that these allegations
were not true and that the order was independently made by the
Board and as recited therein it was passed by the Board as in its
opinion the conditions of s. 237(b) were existent.
Can the High Court in these circumstances be said to have
failed to exercise its discretion when it refused to take evidence in
addition to the affidavit evidence by permitting the appellants to
cross-examine the 2nd respondent and the Chairman of the Board
and to compel production of documents which they desired to
have produced? In a petition under Art. 226, there is undoubtedly
ample power in the High Court to order attendance of a deponent
in court for being cross-examined. Where it is not possible for the
Court to arrive at a definite conclusion on account of there being
affidavits on either side containing allegations and counter-allegations, it would not only be desirable but in the interest of justice
the duty also of the court to summon a deponent for cross-examination in order to arrive at the truth. As observed in A.P.S.R.T.
Corporation v. Satyanarayan Transports('), if the evidence led by
the parties is tested by cross-examination it becomes easier to determine where the truth lies. In B. Venkatarathnam v. Registrar of
Co-operative Societies, A ndhra Pradesh(') where allegations similar
to the ones made in the present case were made, this Court recognised the right of a party to apply for cross-examination. But the
position in the present case is not as it was in that case. The appellants no doubt applied for cross-examination and production of
certain documents, but the High Court felt that this was not a case
where it should exercise its discretion as the cross-examination of
the two deponents would not serve any useful purpose. The view
of the High Court was that even if the two deponents were to be
called they could in the circumstances of the case only report their
denials in the affidavits in answer to the allegations made in the
petition and the affidavit in rejoinder and therefore such crossexamination would not take the court any further than the affidavits. In view of the fact that the appellants were not in a position
(') A.I.R. 1965 S.C:l303 atp. 1307. (') C.A. No. 321of1965 decided on 6.5.1965.
354
f-:l.PHFME CO\IRT REPORTS
[l96G] Sl'l'P. ~.C.I'.
lo give particulars of the allegations made by them, the gcneraliiy
of those allcgalions and particularly of the allegation that the
impugned order was passed at the behe.<t of the 2nd respondent,
the only recourse left lo the Chairman of the Board would have
been to repeal in equally general terms what he had already stated
in his affid:1\'it, l'i;: .. that it was his own order made independently
of the 2nd respondent and that it was founded on the opinion
formed by him on the materials before him. Even at the stage when
the appellants made the <1pplication for cross-examination they d;d
not state that they had any additional materials to face the deponents. In these circumstances it is not possible lo say that the High
Court erroneously exercised its discretion. Nor is it possible to say
that its conclusion, that whatever motives and animosity the 2nd
respondent might ha\e had towards the appellants, the appellants
had failed to establish that the order was not independently made
by the Chairman or that it was an order made at the instance or
instigation of the second respondent, was erroneous. This is particularly so. as, except the allegation that the Chairman and the 7th
respondent acted as the tools of the 2nd respondent. no ma/a ficle1·
or evil intent have been urged against them. It may be that certain
circumstances such as the timing of the order, might create suspicion, perhaps a strong suspic'.on but it is trite to say that suspicion,
however grave, cannot substitute evidence. It is true as observed in
Pan11alal Bi11jraj v. Union of lnclia(') that in a case where
want of bona /ides in the authority passing the impugned order is
alleged, the burden of proof, though on the party alleging it.
is to the extent of its being shown as reasonably probable. But the
allegation made in the present case is that the impugned order was
in fact the order of the 2nd respondent either because he directed
the 7th respondent to make it or because he agreed to it or that it
was passed by the Authority not on his own but at the behest of
the second respondent. In the present case the court is not directly
concerned with the alleged malice the 2nd respondent might have
against the appellants. The Board is a statutory authority. has an
independent existence and the absence of bo11a fides with which the
Court in such a ca'c is concerned is that of the Board and not of
the 2nd respondent. As observed in Pratap Shzgh v. State of Pu11jabl') <in allegation as to bad faith or indirect motive or purpose
cannot be held established except on clear proof thereof. In the
absence of any materials re1ating to the ma/a fides of the Board.
and in particular, of materials to show that the order was passed at
the dictate of the 2nd respondent, this part of the appellants' case
must fail.
(1957) s.c.n. 23.1 nt p. 2w.
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But the contention which calls for a more 'erious considera·
tion is that the circumstances disclosed in para 14 of the Chairman's affidavit and on which he is said to have formed his opinion
were circumstances extraneous to s. 237(bl and hence the order was H
l'l
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v. COMP. LA'V BD.
(Shelat J.)
355
A
ultra vires the section. The contention was a two-fold one, (!) that
though under cl. (b) the opinion of the authority is subjective there
must exist circumstances set out in the clause which are conditions
precedent for the formation of the opinion, and (2) that assuming
that this is not so, since the Chairman has disclosed the circumstances on which he forms the opinion, the court can examine them
B and see if they are relevant for an opinion as to fraud or an intent
to defraud. Reliance was placed on paras 14 and 16 of the Chairman's affidavit to show that the circumstances there stated show
that in passing the crder, matters totally extraneous to the section
were taken into account rendering the order ultra vires cl. (b) of
s. 237. The other affidavits do not matter much as they only repeat
what the Chairman has stated in his affidavit. The construction of
C cl. (b) suggested by Mr. Setalvad was that the clause requires two
things, (]) the opinion of the Central Government, in the present
case of the Board, and (2) the existence of circumstances
suggesting that the company's business was being conducted
as laid down in sub-cl. (l) or that the persons mentioned in
sub-cl. (ii) were guilty of fraud, misfeasance or misconduct towards
the company or any of its members. According to this construction,
D
though the opinion is subjective the existence of circumstances set
out in cl. (b) is a condition precedent to the formation of such
opinion and therefore even if the impugned order were to contain
a recital of the existence of those circumstances the court can go
behind that recital and determine whether they did in fact exist.
The learned Attorney-General opposed this construction and argued
that the clause was incapable of such dichotomy, that not only the
E opinion was subjective but that the entire clause was made dependent on such opinion, for, what the clause lays down is that the
authority must come to an opinion on materials before it that there
exisl circumstances suggesting fraud, or intend to defraud etc.
Such dichotomy, according to him, is impossible and not reasonable because it cannot be that the authority must first ascertain by
holding an inquiry that there are circumstances suggesting fraud or
F intent to defraud etc. and then form a subjective opinion that those
circumstances are such as to suggest those very things. He emphasised that the words "opinion" and "suggesting" were clear
indications that the entire function was subjective, that the opinion
which the authority has to form is that circumstances suggesting
what is set ont in sub-els. (i) and (ii) exist and therefore the existence of those circumstances is by itself a matter of subjective
G opinion. The legislature having entrusted that function to the
authority, the Court cannot go behind its opinion and ascertain
whether the relevant circumstances existed or not.
H
The question is which of the two constructions is correct? In
Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee(') one of the questions which arose
was with regard to the interpretation of the words "the Central
{')
(1944) ~'.C.R. I.
SL'PR>;~IE
COl'RT RV.PORTS
(J966] SUPP. S.C.R.
Government or the Provincial Government, if it is satisfied with A
respect to a particular person" in r. 26 of the Defence of India
Rules, 1939. What was questioned there was the correctness of the
recital in the detention order that the Governor was satisfied that
with a view to preveming the detenu from acting in a certain
manner certain action was necessary. It was held that though the
Court could not be invited to investigate the sufficiency of the B
material or the reasonableness of the grounds on which the Governor was satisfied, if the contention was that the Governor never
applied his mind and therefore he could not have been satisfied.
the court could enter into that question, the ingredient of satisfaction being a condition precedent to the exercise of power notwithstanding the satisfaction being subjective and there being a recital
as to the satisfaction in the order. Referring to Liversidge v. Ander- C
son(') and Greene v. Secretary of State(') it was observed:
"If the ground of challenge against the orders thus
sought to be impugned had been that the cases had never
been p'aced before the Secretary of State at all, so that he
never had any opportunity of exercising his mind with
respect to them. we have not the slightest doubt that this
would have been a proper ground for challenge in a court
of law."
j
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Again at p. 42, the observations are: "The presence of the recital in the order will place a
difficult burden on the detenu to produce admissible evidence sufficient to establish even a prima facie case that
the recital is not accurate. If, however, in any case a
detcnu can produce admissible evidence to that effect, in
my judgment, the mere existence of the recital in the
order cannot prevent the court considering such evidence
and if it thinks fit. coming to a conclusion that the recital
E
is inaccurate."
These observations were r,1adc on the footing that though the satis- F
faction was subjective. it was a condition precedent to the exercise
of power and therefore the order was open to a challenge that it
was not in conformity with the power. In appeal this view was
endorsed by the Privy Council King Emperor v. Sibi:athn. In
Machinder v. The King(') the Federal Court dealing with similar
words in s. 2 of the Central Provinces and Berar Public Safety Act.
1948 again held that the Court can examine the grounds disclosed c;
by the government hi sec if they are relevant to the object which
the legislature had in view. vi~ .. the prevention of acts prejudicial
to public safety and tranquillity, for. satisfaction in this connection
must be grounded on materials which arc of rationally probative
value. In 'this case. the statute no doubt required that the grounds
should be disclosed but that makes no difference to the principle 'fl.
- - - - - - - - - -\1)-[1942] A.C. !?34.
(')
[1942] A.C. 206.
l'l
72 1.A. 241, 268.
(')
[195U] F.C.R. 227,
..
BARIUM CHEMICALS V. COMP. LAW BD. (Sheklt, J.)
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357
that though the satisfaction was exclusively of the executive authority, it was nonethe:~ss, a condition precedent to the exercise of
the power. In Atmaram Vaidya's case('), this court while dealing
with s. 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 observed that
though the satisfaction necessary thereunder was that of the Central
or the State Government and the question of satisfaction could not
be challenged except on the ground of mala fides, the grounds on
which it was founded must have a rational connection with the
objects which were to be prevented from being attained. At p. 176
it is stated : "If, therefore, the grounds on which it is stated that
the Central Government or the State Government was
satisfied are such as a rational human being can consider
connected in some manner with the objects which were
to be prevented from being attained, the question of satisfaction except on the ground of mala fides cannot be
challenged in a court."
This v:ew was again emphasised in Shibban Lal Saksena's case(')
where it was said that the power of detention being entirely dependent on the satisfaction of the appropriate authority, the question
of sufficiency of the grounds on which such satisfaction is based
cannot be gone into provided they have a rational probative value
and are not extraneous to the scope and pvrpose of the statute.
This principle is not exclusively applicable to cases under such
measures as the Defence of India Act or the Preventive Detention
Act and has been applied also in the case of other statutes.
Thus in the State of Bombay v. K. P. Krishnan(') while dealing
with the discretion of the State Government to make or refuse to
;nake a reference under s. 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947. Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) Epoke for the court in
these words: "The order passed by the Government under s. l2(5) may
be an administrative order and the reasons recorded by it may
not be justiciable in the sense that their propriety, adequacy or
satisfactory character may not be open to judicial scrutiny;
. nevertheless if the court is
satisfied that the reasons given by the Government for refusing to make a reference are extraneous and not germane, then
the court can issue and would be justified in issuing a writ
of mandamas even in respect of such an administrative order."
In Dr. A kshaibar Lal v. Vice-Chancellor(') the question was with
reference to termination of services of some of its employees by the
University. The University in exercise of its power to terminate the
services of its employees under Ordinance No. 6 passed the impugned order notwithstanding its having already taken action
under Statute 30 under which the cases of the appellant and others
1
( )
[1951] S.C.R. Hi7.
(')
[1961] 1 S.C.R. 227,
(') [1054] S.C.R. 418.
(') [1961] 3 S.C.R. 386.
[1966] oUPI'. S.C.lt,
were referred to the Solicitor-General who made his report to the
Reviewing Committee on his finding that there was a prima facie
case. The contention was that the resolution of the Univci,,ity
lacked ho11a /ides and was therefore invalid. The Cnivcrsity cuntende<l that its powers were cumulative and that it could resort to
either of the two remedies open to it. The action adopted by the
University was executive. Yet, this Court, held that though the
University possessed both the powers and could exercise one or the
other of them, the action as held in the State of Kera/a v. G. M.
Francis & Co.('1 could still be challenged on the ground of its being
11/tra l'ire1. Hidayatullah J. said that proof of alien or irrelevant
motive is only an example of the ultra l'ir,,.1· character of the action.
The Cniversity having adopted action under Statute 30 it was not
possible to undo cl'erything and rely upon other powers which were
not available in the special circumstances which led to action under
the statute and that though the University had the discretion to
adopt either of the tl'•O courses, the discretion could not be read
m the abstract but had to be read within the four corners of
Statute 30 and not outsi,le it. In this sense action on matters
extraneous to the sl<1 lute conferring power is a specie of the vice of
ultra vires. These two arc sometimes inter-related and slide into
each other. When a power is exercised for a purpose or with an
intention beyonJ the scope of or is not justified by the instrument
creating it, it would be a case of fraud on power, though no corrupt
motive or bargain is imputed. In this sense. if it could be shown
that an auihority exercising power has taken into account, it may
even be bona fide an<l with the best of intentions, as a relevant
factor something which it could not properly take into account in
deciding whether or not to exercise the power or the manner or
extent to which it should be exercised. the exercise of the power
woulJ be bad. Sec Pratap Sin!ih v. State of Ptmiab('). Thus apart
from an authority acting in bad faith or from corrupt motives it
may also be possible to 'how that "an act of the public body.
though performed in good faith and without any taint of corruption, was so clearly founded on alien and irrelevant grounds as to
be outside the aulhority conferred upon that body and therefore
inoperative. It is difficult to suggest any act which would be ultra
vires under this head thou;h performed bona fide," per Warrington
A
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L.J. in Short v. P<)olc CorpnrationC1. Sirnilar obscrv;;1tions are also
to b~ found in Rameshwar v. District Magistrate('), a case under
the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, where this Court held that
though the satisfaction of the relevant authority was subjective. a
detenu would be entitled to challenge the validity of his detention
on the ground ,.,f maia /ides and in support of his pica urge rhat
along with other facts which show ma/a fie/es the court should also
consider his grievance that the grounds served en him cannot po'<sihly or rationally support the other. The challenge would be that the
order was beyond the scope of the power as its exercise was on
( 1)
( 31
fHt61) I s.c.r.. 2~i.
[IU26] Ch. 66, 20.
(')
(1)
[IH{i·l] 4 ~.C.R. 73.1.
A.I.It. 1964 8.C. 334, [l\161} 4 8.C.l~.021.
,
G
B
llARlTTM CHEMICALS V. COMP. LAW DD. (She/at, J.)
A
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359
grounds irrelevant to the purpose and intention of the power. In
Estate and Trust Agencies Ltd. v. Singapore Improvement Trust(')
a declaration made by the Improvement Trust under s. 57 of the
Singapore Improvement Ordinance 1927 that the appellants' property was in an insanitary condition and therefore liable to be
demolished was challenged. The Privy Council set aside the declaB ration on two grounds; (1) that though it was made in exercise of
an administrative function and in good faith, the power was limited by the terms of the said Ordinance and therefore the declaration
was liable to a challenge if the authority stepped beyond those
terms and (2) that the ground on which it was made was other
than the one set out in the Ordinance. In Ross Clunis v. Papadopou!los(') the challenge was to an order of collective fine passed
c under Regulation 3 of the Cyprus Emergency Powers (Collective
Punishment) Regulations, 1955 which provided that if an offence
was committed within any area of the colony and the Commissioner "has reason to believe" that all or any of the inhabitants of
that area failed to take reasonable steps to prevent it to render
assistance to discover the offender or offenders it would be lawful
for the Commissioner with the approval of the Governor to levy
D a collective fine after holding an inquiry in such manner as he
thinks proper subject to satisfying himself that the inhabitants of
the area had been given an adequate opportunity of understanding
the subject-matter of the inquiry and making representations
thereon. The contention was that the only duty cast on the Commissioner was to satisfy himself of the facts set out in the RegulaE tion, that the test was a subjective one and that the statement as to
that satisfaction in his affidavit was a complete answer to the contention of the respondents. Rejecting the contention the Privy
Council observed: "Their Lordships feel the force of the argument, but
they think if it could be shown that there were no grounds
upon which the Commissioner could be so satisfied, a
F
court might infer either that he did not honestly form that
view or that in forming it he could not have applied his
mind to the relevant facts."
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Though an order passed in exercise of power under a statute cannot be challenged on the ground of propriety or sufficiency, it is
liable to be quashed on the ground of mala {ides, dishonesty or
corrupt purpose. Even if it is passed in good faith and with the
best of intention to further the purpose of the legislation which
confers the power. since the Authority has to act in accordance
with and within the limits of that legislation, its order can also be
challenged if it is beyond those limits or is passed on grounds extraneous to the legislation or if there are no grounds at all for
passing it or if the grounds are such that no one can reasonably
(!) [ 1937 J A.O. 898.
(2) r 1958] I. w. &. R. 5rn.
LIS5SCI-25
360
~UPRl<ME
CCURT REPORTS
(1966 SUPP. 8.C.11.
arrive at the opinion or satisfaction requisite under the legislation.
In any one of these situations it can well be said that the authority
did not honestly form its opinion or that in forming it. it did not
apply its mind to the relevant facts.
Bearing in mind these principles the provisions of s. 237(b)
may now be examined. The clause empowers the Central Government and by reason of delegation of its powers the Board to ap·
point inspectors to investigate the affairs of the company. if "in the
opinion of the Central Government" (now the Board) there arc
circumstances "suggesting" what is stated in the three sub·clauses.
The power is executive and the opinion requisite before an order
can be made is of the Central Government or the Board as the
case may be and not of a court. Therefore the court cannot substitute its own opinion for the opinion of the Authority. But the
aucstion is. whether the entire action under the section is subjective?
In Nakkuda Ali v. Jayaralne(') the Privy Council had to construe the words "where the controller has reasonable grounds to
believe that any dealer is unfit to be allowed to continue as a
dealer" occurring in Regulation 62 of the Defence (Control of
Textiles) Regulations, 1945. Lord Radcliffe who spoke for the
Board first considered the construction given to similar words in
l.iversidge v. Anderson(') and said:"Their Lordships do not adopt a similar construction
of the words in Reg. 62 which are now before them. Indeed, it would be a very unfortunate thing if the decision
in Liversidge's case came to be regarded as laying down
any general rule as to the construction of such phrases
when they appear in statutory enactments. It is an authority for the proposition that the words "if AB. has rea~onablc cause to believe" are capable of meaning. "If
AB. honestlv thinks that he has reasonable cause to
believe". and· that in the context and attendant circum·
stances of Defence Regulations 188. they did in fact
mean just that."
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Having confined that construction to that case only. he proceeded
observe: "After all. words such as these are commonly found
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when a legislature or law making authority confers powers
on a minister or official. However read. they must be intended to serve in some sense as a condition limiting the
exercise of an otherwise arbitrary power. But if the question whether the condition has been satisfied is to be
conclusively decided by the man who wields the power
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the value of the intended restraint is in effect nothinj?.
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1!1 [ 191H] A.C. 66.
(2) [ 19{2] A.O. 206.
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No doubt he must not exercise the power in bad faith; but
the field in which this kind of question arises is such that
the reservation for the case of bad faith is hardly more
than a formality."
The Privy Council held that the aforesaid words in Reg. 62 imposed a condition that there must in fact exist such reasonable
B
grounds known to the controller before he could validly exercise the
power of cancellation. Therefore, though the belief of the Controller that the dealer was unfit was subjective, existence of
reasonable grounds on which the belief could be founded was objective and a limitation on his power. In Ridge v. Baldwin(')
Lord Reid suggested the same construction of similar words occurc ring now-a-days in several statutes. Speaking about the rules of
natural justice not having been abandoned as a sacrifice which war
conditions required, he observed:
"And I would draw the same conclusion from another fact. In many regulations there was set out an
alternative safeguard more practicable in war time-the
objective test that the officer must have reasonable cause
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to believe whatever was the crucial matter. (I leave out of
account the very peculiar decision of this House in
Liversidge v. Anderson)."
The words "reasonable grounds to believe" were considered thus
to be a restraint on administrative power just as compliance of the
rules of natural justice in a quasi-judicial power which otherwise
would render the power arbitrary. A recent decision in VellukunE nel v. The Reserve Bank of India(') is in point in this connection.
Section 38(3)(b)(iii) of the Banking Companies Act, 1949 was
assailed there as being discriminatory and an unreasonable restriction. The impugned clause provided that the High Court shall
order the winding up of a banking company on the Reserve Bank
making an application for winding up "if in the opinion of the
Reserve Bank ......... (iii) the continuance of the banking company
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is prejudicial to the interests of the depositors." The learned
Attorney-General rightly pointed out that the question there was
not so much on the meaning of the words "in the opinion of" as
whether a law which requires the High Court to order winding up
because the Reserve Bank is of that opinion is constitutional. But
it is not without significance that the divergence of opinion in this
G Court was that according to the minority opinion the vice of the
impugned provision lay in the power vested in the Reserve Bank
to apply to the High Court for a winding up order exercisable
solely on its subjective satisfaction while according to the majority
opinion the power did not rest solely on the subjective satisfaction
and that what the impugned clause did was to leave the determinaH tion of an issue to an expert body, viz .. whether the continuance
(1) [ 1964] A.O. 46, 73.
M/S5SCI-25 (a)
(2) [ 1962] Supp. 3 S.C. R 632.
362
SUPRE'.\O·: COUP.T P.EP'JP.T<;
(J96n) SUPP. S.C.F.
of the Banking company in question was detrimental to the interests
of the depositors. In support of this view llidayatullah J. speaking
for the majority made the following significant observation: "It is enough to say that the Reserve Bank in its dealings with banking companies docs not act on suspicion but
on proved facts."
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And again at p. 672 he observed: "But this seems certain that the action (winding upl
would not be taken up without scrutinising all the evidence and checking and re-checking all the findings."
Distinguishing a case arising from a statute like the Banking Companies Act from cases of detention and associations declared unlawful. he emphasised the fact that "the factual background will not
be one of suspicion. and action will be based on concrete facts."
The 1.1ajority view thus vindicated the validity of the provision on
the ground that under the power conferred thereby, the Reserve
Bank had to determine. albeit instead of the court, the issue whether the continuance of a particular banking company was detrimental to the depositors' interests. Though the words used were
"in the opinion of', the opinion, though exclusively of the Reserve
Bank, was dependent on the determination by it of the aforesaid
issue. Therefore, the words. "reason to believe" or "in the opinion
of" do not always lead to the construction that the process or
entertaining "reason to believe" or "the opinion" is an altogether
subjective process not lending itself even to a limited scrutiny by
the court that such "a reason to believe" or "opinion" was not
formed on relevant facts or within the limits or as Lord RedclifTe
and Lord Reid called the restraints of the statute as an alternative
safeguard to rules of natural justice where the function is administrative.
The object of ~- 237 is to safeguard the interests of those dealing with a company by providing for an investigation where the
management is so conducted as to jeopardize those interests or
where a company is floated for a fraudulent or an unlawful
object. Oausc (a) docs not create any difficulty as investigation is
instituted either at the wishes of the company itself expressed
through a special resolution or through an order of the court where
a judicial process intervenes. Clause (b), on the other hand, !raves
directing an ;nvcstigation to the subjective opinion of the rovernment or the Board. Since the legislature enacted s. 637 (i)(~) it
knew that government would entrust to the Board its pov1er under
s. 237(bl. Could the legislature have left without any rcstrnints or
limitations the entire power of ordering an investigation to the
subjective decision of the Government or the Board? There is no
doubt that the formation of opinion by the Central Government is
a purely subjective process. There can also be no doubt that since
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the legislature has provided for the opinion of the government and
not of the court such an opinion is not subject to a challenge on
the ground of propriety, reasonableness or sufficiency. But the
Authority is required to arrive at such an opinion from circumstances suggesting what is set out in sub-clauses (i), (ii) or (iii). If
these circumstances were not to exist, can the government still say
B that in its opinion they exist or can the Government say the same
thing where the circumstances relevant to the clause do not exist?
The legislature no doubt has used the expression "circumstances
suggesting". But that expression means that the circumstances
need not be such as would conclusively establish an intent to defraud or a fraudulent or illegal purpose. The proof of such an
intent or purpose is still to be adduced through an investigation.
c But the expression "circumstances suggesting" cannot support the
construction that even the existence of circumstances is a matter
of subjective opinion. That expression points out that there must
exist circumstances from which the Authority forms an opinion
that they are suggestive of the crucial matters set out in the three
sub-clauses. It is hard to contemplate that the legislature could
have left to the subjective process both the formation of opinion
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and also the existence of circumstances on which it is to be
founded. It is also not reasonable to say that the clause permitted
the Authority to say that it has formed the opinion on circumstances
which in its opinion exist and which in its opinion suggest an intent to defraud.or a fraudulent or unlawful purpose. It is equally
unreasonable to think that the legislature could have abandoned
even the small safeguard of requiring the opinion to be founded on
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existent circumstances which suggest the things for which an investigation can be ordered and left the opinion and even the existence
of circumstances from which it is to be formed to a subjective process. This analysis finds support in Gower's Modern Company
Law (2nd Ed.) p. 547 where the learned author, while dealing with
s. !65(b) of the English Act observes that "the Board of Trade will
F always exercise its discretionary power in the light of specified
grounds for an appointment on their own motion" and that "they
may be trusted not to appoint unless the circumstances warrant it
but they will test the need on the basis of public and commercial
morality." There must therefore exist circumstances which in the
opinion of the Authority suggest what has been set out in subclauses (i), (ii) or (iii). If it is shown that the circumstances do
G not exist or that they are such that it is impossible for any one to
form an opinion therefrom suggestive of the aforesaid things, the
opinion is challengeablc on the ground of non-application of mind
or perversity or on the ground that it was formed on collateral
grounds and was beyond the scope of the statute.
H
Even assuming that the entire cl. (b) is subjective and that the
clause does not necessitate disclosure of circumstances, the circumstances have in the present case been disclosed in the affidavits ot
SUP&F.ME COURT RRl'OBTS
(1966] SUPP. SC ll.
the Chairman and the other officials. Once they are disclosed, the
Court can consider whether they are relevant circwnstances from
which the Board could have formed the opinion that they were
iuggestive of the things set out in cl. (b). Paragraph 14 of the
Chainnan's affidavit sets out the following:"(i) there had been delay, bungling and faulty planning of this project, re,ulting in double expenditure for
which the collaborators, had put the responsibility upon
the Managing Director, Petitioner No. 2;
(ii) since its floatation the company has been continuously showing losses and nearly I/ 3rd of its share
capital has been wiped off;
(iii) that the shares of the company which to start with
were at a premium were being quoted on the stock exchange at half their face value; and
(iv) some eminent persons who had initially accepted
seats on the Board of directors of the company had subsequently severed their connections with it due to ditkrences with Petitioner No. 2 on account of the manner in
which the affairs of the company were being conducted."
No doubt the words "inter alia" occur in this paragraph but that
expression means no more than that those which are set out were
among others. But those others would be of the same category,
for if they were of other category they would naturally be stated.
The deponent would not be content by using the expression "inter
alia" unless he meant that the things contained in that phrase were
of the same type as those expressly set out. Paragraph 16 is in
reply to para. 21 of the Petition which alleges that there was no
material from which the Board could form the opinion and that no
such opinion was in fact formed. In that para the Chairman has
stated as follows: "With reference to paragraph 21 of the Petition I
have already stated above (which means para 14) that
there was ample material before the Board on which it
could and had formed the opinion that there were circum-
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stances suggesting" etc ..
The "ample material" referred to in this para is obviously the
material from which the circumstances stated in para 14 of his
affidavit were deduced. But the learned Attorney-General argued
that para 14 was an answer to paras I to 19 of the petition where
the petitioners claimed the soundness of the company and secondly
that if para 14 were to be construed as disclosing the circumstances,
it must be read along with para 16 and that if so read they were
capable of showing that there were materials suggesting intent to
defraud, misfeasance, misconduct etc. Paragraph 14 no doubt
states that it is in reply to paras I to 19 of the Petition. In this
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para, the facts stated in paras I to 19 are admitted as .being s~b
stantially correct except as regards the fact that while seekmg
approval of the government to his appointment as the Managing
Director, the 2nd appellant had stated that there was no formal
agreement between him and the company. The para then sets out
the facts that the company held the licence, that it had made an
agreement with the British Company but that the Chairman had
no information with regard to the other facts stated in paras 1 to 19
of the petition. There the reply to paras 1 to 19 of the petition
ends. Then follows the statement which is an independent averment, viz.,
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"However from the memoranda received by the Board
referred to in paragraph 5 and other examination it appeared inter alia that."
Then follows the four circumstances already set out earlier. Paragraph 16, though a reply to para 21 of the petition, refers back to
para 14 and relies on the statements made therein for an answer
to the allegation in para 21 of the petition that there were no materials and therefore no opinion as required by s. 237(b) was ever
D formed. From the language and scheme of paras 14 and 16 it is
thus impossible to escape the conclusion that between them they
disclose and were meant to disclose all the materials from which
the Board formed the opinion. In para 8 of his affidavit, the
Chairman no doubt refers to other materials which he says he was
agreeable to disclose to the Court though not to the appellants.
But those materials, assuming they were before him, cannot help,
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for they would not disclose any circumstances other than those formulated in para 14. This is clear from the fact that as stated
there, those circumstances were deduced from the said memoranda
and 'other examination' meaning the examination of all the materails before him. The question is: are the materials formulated in
para. 14 circumstances suggestive of the things set out in cl. (b)?
F The learned Attorney-General contended that on the assumption
that para 14 disclosed the circumstances, they would suggest an
intent to defraud, fraudulent management, misfeasance and misconduct; and that even if delay, bungling and faulty planning of
the project might not suggest the relevant intent or purpose, they
together with the facts that one-third of the subscribed share capital
was wiped off, the shares of the company being quoted at half of
G their face value and of some eminent persons having severed their
connection with the company would suggest that all was not well
with the company or its management and that its management was
conducted with the intent to defraud. He argued that in any event
they would suggest that those responsible for it were guilty of at
least misfeasance or misconduct.
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The expression "with intent to defraud" connotes an intention
to deprive by deceit. Construing s. 165 of the Companies Act,
366
St:l'Rt:ME C-OUR"f_.RHO.RTS
[1966] surr. R.c.n.
1862, Buckley J. In re London and Globe Fina11ce Corporation
Ltd.,(') distinguished deception and fraud as follows: "To deceive is I apprehend, to induce a man to believe that a thing is true which is false and which the
person practising the deceit knows or believes to be false.
To defraud is to deprive by deceit: it is by decCJt to induce
a man to act to his injury. More tersely it may be put,
that to deceive is by falsehood to induce a state of mind to
defraud is by deceit to induce a course of action."'
Lord Esher also said much the same thing in le Licvre v.
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Gould(').
"A charge of fraud is such a terrible thing lo bring
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against a man that it cannot be maintained in any court
unless it is shown that he had a wicked mind. That is the
effect of Derry vs. Peck 04 App. Cases 337>. What is
meant by a wicked mind'? If a man tells a wilful falsehood,
with the intention that it shall be acted upon by the person
to whom he tells it, his mind is plainly wicked. and he
must be said to be acting fraudulently. Again, <l man
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must also be said to have a fraudulent mind if he rccl·lessly
makes a statement intending it to be acted upon, and not
caring whether it is true br false. I do not hesitate to
say that a man who thus acts must have a wicked mind.
But negligence however great, does not of itself constitute
fraud."
In Re William C. Leitch Bros.(') Maugham J. held.
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"If a company continues to carry on business and to
incur debts at a time when there is to the knowledge of
the director no reasonable prospect of the creditor ever
receiving payment or those debts, it is in general a proper
inference that the company is carrying on business with
intent to defr.md."
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There is no such suggestion in the present case. The same
learned Judge in Re Patrick a11d Lyon(') observed that the tcnns
"defraud" and "fraudulent purpose" connote actual dishonesty
involving, according to current notions of fair trading amongst
~ommcrcial men. real moral blame." However much the Court
may disapprove of a perrnnal conduct it must consider whether he
has been guilty of dishonesty. Misfeasance results from an
act or conduct in the nature of a breach of trust or an act resulting
in loss to the company. Misconduct of promoters or directors as
understood in the Companies Act means not misconduct of every
kind but such as has produced pecuniary loss to the company by
misapplication of its assets or other act. (cf. Re Ki11gston Cotton
Mill Co. (No. 2)(') and Cm•endish-Bc11tinck v. Fc1111.(").
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(!) ( 1003] I Cb. 728, 73".
(4) [ 1033] Cb. 786.
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(2) [ 189311 Q. B. 49·. (:I) [ 11132) 2 Ch. 71.
(6) [ 1896 J 2 Ch. 279.
(6) [ 1887 1 12 Ai'P· Ca.,,062.
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Are the allegations set out in para 14 of the Chairman's affidavit capable of suggesting an intent to defraud or a fraudulent or
unlawful purpose either in the formation or conduct of the company or misfeasance or misconduct towards the company or its
members? Delay, bungling and fraulty planning of the project entailing double expenditure, continuous losses resulting in 1I3rd of
the share capital being wiped out, shares being quoted at half their
face value and severance of their connection by some eminent persons cannot by themselves suggest an intent to defraud or fradulent
management. As regards misfeasance or misconduct, it is not suggested in any of the affidavits, though the Board had before it the
memoranda of the four directors, that the circumstances set out in
paragraph 14 of the Chairman's affidavit had arisen as a result of
any traud or dishonesty on the part of the second appellant or that
it was his act which had caused pecuniary losses to the company.
Mere bungling or faulty pianning cannot constitute either misfeasance or misconduct. But assuming that these circumstances were to
be treated as suggestive of misfeasance and/ or misconduct, the impugned order is an integral and indivisible order and the investigation ordered thereunder is not and by the very nature of it cannot
be confined to finding out only misfeasance and/or misconduct. In
this view, the order must be held as being beyond the scope of
clause (b) and cannot be sustained.
The next challenge is that the order contemplated by section
237(b) being the order of the Central Government or the Board it
must be that of the Board and not of its Chairman. The contention was that the powers and functions under section 237 having
been delegated to the Board and not to my individual member,
the Board alone could pass the order, that the Chairman had no
competence to pass it and that Rule 3 and the said order of the
Chairman to the extent that it purported to distribute the work
individually to the Chairman and the other member were ultra
vires section lOE(l). The .learned Attorney-General, on the other
hand, argued that section !OE not only empowered the government
to constitute the Board but also simultaneously authorised it to
prescribe its procedure under sub-section 5. What Rule 3 did was
to enable the Chairman to rationally divide amongst ihe Board its
work under different sections of the Act. Under such division,
whether a particular work is done by one member or jointly by
the Board, it is the Board which does that work and the orders so
passed are by and of the Board. Such distribution is nothing but
procedure because procedure must involve the manner in which the
Board would work and is not contrary either to s. 637(1) (a) which
empowers the Government to delegate its power to the Board or to
s. !OE. While delegating its power the government may say that the
Board shall exercise its delegated power by one of them or by the
Board as a whole, but notwithstanding such distribution, it is the
Board which acts. As an analogy he relied on s. I OA and s. I OB
368
Sl'PREMl l't.llRf REPORTS
[1966] SUPP. s.c.l!.
under which the Company Tribunal is constituted and which enable
its Chairman to form Benches which discharge the functions entrusted to the Tribunal. to >. 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
and to Art. 145 and the orders passed by this Court delegating
certain powers to the Registrar to show that procedure might differ
from Act to Act according to the legislative understanding of the
word procedure. Therefore, he argued, the expression "procedurc" must not be construed in any inflexible sense. When a particular procedure permits allocation of work for the smooth discharge
or exercise of a function or power, it is not tantamount to subdelegation but is simply distribution.
However wide a connotation of the word "procedure" one may
accept there is a sharp cleavage between power and procedure. Section 1OE which provides for the constitution of the Board nowhere
provides for the splitting up of the Board into benches as is expressly done in the case of the Tribunal under s. 1OB nor docs it
provide for the distribution of work entrusted to the Board. lt is
true that sub-s. 5 confers power on the government to prescribe
procedure. But that procedure is of the Board. If the legislature
intended that the Board should act by dividing its work amongst
the members. there was no obstacle in its way to provide for benches
as is done under s. IOB. Section 637(J)(a) empowers the government to delegate its power to the Board, no doubt, under such
conditions. restrictions, or limitations as may be specified in the
not.ification delegating such power. But the notification by which
the government delegated its power contains no conditions, limitations or restrictions. A provision enabling the Chairman to distribute the powers and functions delegated to the Board is not a
provision prescribing conditions. limitations or restrictions. Section
637(1)(a) which authorises the government to delegate its power
clearly lays down that such delegation is to be made to the Board
and no one else. Under sub-section 2 of section 637 certain
J:'Owers and functions therein set out cannot be delegated to ;my
other authority. The section thus contains both a positive and a
negative mandate that the power under s. 237 shall not be delegated
to any other authority except the Board as constituted under section
JOE. Section 637 thus makes it clear that the legislature wanted
the powers under s. 237 to be exercised by the Board and did not
intend that they should be exercised singly hy members constituting
it. This conclusion is supported by the insertion of s. 4A in s. I OE
by Act 31 of 1965 whereby the legislature has permitted the Board
to authorise its Chairman or any other member or its principal
officer to exercise and discharge such of its powers and functions
as it may think lit. lf the learned Attorney-General was right that
the Government could under its power of prescribing procedure
under sub-sec. 5 authorise the Chairman to distribute the Board's
work there was no necessity of enacting sub-sec. 4A at all. That
contention, if correct, would render sub-sec. 4A a superfluity. Since
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sub-s. 4A is not retrospective, any distribution of powers and functions made by the Chairman would be valid if made after and not
before the enactment of Act 31 of 1965. No assistance can also
be had from the provisions and Acts relied upon by the learned
Attorney-General, such as s. lOA or s. !OB of the Act or s. 6 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure or Art. 145 of the Constitution. Under
the first, there is an express provision providing for the constitution
of benches of the Tribunal which was absent in s. !OE till subsection 4A was enacted; under the second the Code provides for
setting up of different kinds of courts with varying jurisdiction.
Such an arrangement can bear no analogy as it is not distribution
of power of one body to its components. The third illustration
also gives no assistance for it relates not to procedure but to entrustment of certain functions to the Registrar of this Court. Such
power is there in Art. 145 which is an inclusive Article.
It was however argued that under s. 165(b) of the English
Companies Act, 1948 a power similar to the one under s. 237(b)
has been conferred on the Board of Trade. Reliance was placed
on a passage in Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edition) Vol. Vll
at p. 421 where it is stated that the Board of Trade never meets
and for all practical purposes the President is the Board of Trade
It appears from this very passage that the Board was constituted .
by an order-in-council dated August 23, 1786 and consisted of the
President and the holders of certain offices therein specified. But
it is the President who takes the oath of allegiance and the official
oath and it is he alone for all practical purposes who constitutes the
Board. In point of fact certain statutes and orders in council have
empowered the President who is a senior Minister or one of the
junior ministers to act on beha.'f of the Board.('). That being so,
there is no question of distribution of work or delegation of power
by the Board to the President. The statute conferring power on
the Board of Trade itself has authorised the President to act on
behalf of the Board. The Board set up under s. !OE therefore
cannot bear analogy with the Board of Trade. Nor does that section or s. 637 empower, as is the case with the Board of Trade, the
Chairman to exercise or discharge the Board's powers and functions. The statute having permitted the delegation of powers to
the Board only as the statutory Authority, the powers so delegated
have to be exercised by the Board and not by its components. To
authorise its Chairman to hand over those functions and powers
is not procedure but sub-delegation which is not authorised by the
Act. The effect of r. 3 and the order of distribution cf work made
in pursuance thereof was not laying down a procedure but authorising and making a sub-delegation in favour of the members. The
only procedure which the Government could prescribe was the procedure in relation to the Board, the manner in which it should
(1)
001 Phillips: Constutional and Administrative Law: 3rd EU. 331,
370
ScPJ<EllE COURT RUORT8
[1966] Sl:FP. s.c..a.
discharge and exercise the functions and powers delegated to it but
it could not make a provision which under the cloak of procedure
authorised sub-delegation. Both r. 3 and the order dated April 6,
J964 made pursuant thereto are thus invalid and the impugned
order made m pursuance of the power conferred under the said
Ruic and the said order arc incompetent and invalid.
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Laslly, the order was attacked on the ground that s. 2371b)
which empowers the making of such an order was violative of
Arts. 14 and 19(l)(g). The challenge was raised on behalf of the
2nd appellant only. The contention under the hea<l of Art. 14
was that the Act provided three different ways by which the
Government can take action, under s. 234 or s. 235 and '· 236 and C
lastly under s. 237(b), that the power wntained under s. 23'/(b) w;is
more drastic than under the former sections and that these sections
enabled the Government to discriminate between companies and
companies and pick and choose any one of them at its pleasure for
action under s. 237tb1. In support oi this contention reliance was
placed on Suraj Mall Mohta & Co., v. A.V. Vishwanatha Sastri(')
wheres. 5(4) of the Taxation on Income <Investigation Commission) D
Act, 1947 was declared discriminatory legislation and Meenakshi
Mills Lttl. v. A. V. Vishwanatha Sastrit·) where s. 8(1) of the Act
was struck down after the Income Tax tAmendmentl Act XXXIII
of 1964 was enacted. These decisions, however, cannot avail the
petitioners for the reasons for which these provi;ions were struck
down arc lacking in the present case. No question of discrimination arises in regard to the powers under s. 234 and s. 237. Section E
234 only empowers the Registrar to call for information or explanation and to take action where such information or explanation
is not forthcoming. Under section 234 there is no power to order
investigation either in the Registrar or the Government. Under
s. 235, no doubt, the Government can appoint inspectors but it can
do so under the three specified cases set out therein. What ss. 235
and 236 do is to give power to shareholders on the one hand and r
the Registrar through a report on the other hand to move the
government to take action. These sections do not authorise the
Government to appoint inspectors s110 moto as in the case of
s. 237(b). The discretionary power directing an investigation is
contained in s. 237(b). Therefore s. 234, s. 235 and s. 236 and
s. 237tb) give powers to different authorities vi~ .. the Rcgi,trar and
the Government, pnwide powers which are different in c~:tcnt and G
nature. exercisable in sets of circumstances and in a manner different from one another. Therefore. there is no question of discriminatory power having been vested in the government under these
sections to pick an<l choose between one company and the other.
The challenge under Art. 14 therefore must fail.
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(I) [ JVC.:;) I S.C.R. H8.
(21 [ lu;;r, JI SC.I~. 787,
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BARIUM CHE:dICALS II. CO,IP. LAW FD. (-~he!af, J.J
371
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directing an investigation is a restriction and if so, is it a reasonable
restriction. Mr. Setalvad tried to seek assistance from the decision
in Saghir Ahmad v. The State of U.P.(') but that decision cannot
assist him for in that case the U.P. Road Transport Act 1951 deprived the petitioner of his right to carry on his business of plying
B stage carriages on public highways and the impugned statute was
passed before the enactment of clause 6 of Art. 19(1). It is true in
a sense that when investigation is ordered, there would be inconvenience in the carrying on of the business of the company. It
might also perhaps shake the credit of the company. The investi·
gators have also the power to seize papers and their report is made
in evidence as opinion evidence under s. 246. But an
c admissible
investigation directed under s. 237(b) is essentially of an exploratory
character. When it is directed, it is not as if any restriction is
placed on the right of the concerned company to carry on its business and no restrictions are imposed on those who carry on the
company's affairs. Even if it is regarded as a restriction, it is not
possible to say that it is not protected under cl. 6 of Art. 19(1). As
stated
in Narayan/al Bansilal v. Manek Phiroz Mstry(') though the
D
Companies Act on the one hand throws open to all citizens the
privilege of carrying on business with limited liability, on the other
hand, since the company's business has to be conducted through
human agency irregularities and even malpraetices in the management of the company's affairs sometimes arise:
E
F
G
"If persons in charge of the management of companies abuse their position and make personal profit at the
cost of the creditors, contributories and others interested
in the company, that raises a problem which is very much
different from the problem of ordinary misappropriation
or breach of trust. The interest of the company is the
interest of several persons who constitute the company,
and thus persons in management of affairs of such companies can be classed by themselves as distinct from other
individual citizens. A citizen can and may protect his own
interest but where the financial interest of a large number
of citizens is left in charge of persons who manage the
affairs of the companies it would be legitimate to treat
such companies and their managers as a class by t.hemselves and to provide for necessary safeguards and checks
against a possible abuse of power vesting in the managers."
H
If ss. 234 to 237 are viewed from this point of view there would
be no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that there is neither
the violation of Art. 14 nor of Art. 19(1)(g). To these observations
(I) [ 1955] S.C.R 707.
(2) [ 1961] I S.C.R. 417 at p. 445.
3i2
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[IOOGJ SUPP. S.C R.
may be added the observations of the Company Law Committee
in their report of 1952 where the Committee have noted that the
ne~d for a provision for investigation was generally recognized.
while recognising that in some cases the use of the powers of in·
spection and investigation may shake the credit of the company and
affect its competitive position the committee observed that such a
risk "should not, however, deter us from considering the desirability
of conferring adequate powers on an appropriate authority to
investigate the affairs of a company where such investigation is
prima facie called for." Similar observations are also to be found
in the Report of the Company Law Committee presented to the
British P~rliament in June 1962 in regard to a similar power of
investigation under s. 165(b) of the English Act. In the context of
the rapid pace at which industrialisation is taking place in the
country and companies are floated with share capital of the size
and volume not conceived of only a few years ago, chances of misuse of power. maladministration and malpractices have consider·
ably increased. A safeguard such as a power of investigation
becomes not only necessary but also inevitable for the protection
of an increasing number of shareholders, creditors and other persons interested in such large companies. Considered from this
angle there would be no difficulty in holding that even if the provision as to investigation amounts to a restriction. it is a reasonable
restriction, especially so when the power under s. 237(b) as stated
earlier can only be exercised on an opinion fanned on the objective
test of the evistence of circumstances suggesting things set out in
cl. (b) of s. 237. It is not therefore possible to uphold the challenge
to the clause under either of these two heads.
Though the contentions regarding ma/a /ides and the constitutional invalidity of s. 237(b) arc not upheld. the appellant succeed
in the other two contentions. The appeal is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. Since the appellants have partly succeeded and partly failed. there will be no order as to costs.
ORDER
In accordance with the opinion of the majority the appeal is
allowed but there will be no order as to costs.
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