KULATHIL MAMMU versus THE STATE OF KERALA
Supreme Court of India | Decided 2 March 1966 | [1966] 3 S.C.R. 706 | 1966 INSC 62
Key facts
- Decided
- 2 March 1966
- Bench
- P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*, K.N. WANCHOO*, M. HIDAYATULLAH*, J.C. SHAH, S.M. SIKRI, V. RAMASWAMI
- Bench size
- 6
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 24/1965
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1966] 3 S.C.R. 706
- Neutral citation
- 1966 INSC 62
Text of the judgment
KULATHIL MAMMU
v.
THE STATE OF KERALA
March 2, 1966
A
[P.B. GAJrnDRAGADKAR, C.J., K.N. WANCHOO,
M. HIDAYATULLAll, J.C. SHAH, S.M. SIKRI
AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.)
B
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Cons1itu#o11 of India Art. ?-'Migrated' 1neaning of-lYhether 111ere
nwrenient froni one place to anather constitutes 1nigratlon.
A was born in Kozhikode of parents who were both Indian citizens.
Tn 1948 at the age of 12 he went to Pakistan. Ho came to India for
some time in 1954 on a Pakisl3ni passport in which he wa.• described as
a Pakistani national. He again came for some time in 1956. After that
there was no record in Kozhikode of his movements but in 1964 he was
again found there without any valid travel documents. On action under
the Foreigners Act being taken against him a writ petition was filed in
the High Court and it was urged that he was an Indian citizen.
The
High Court held that he had 'migrated' to Pakistan within the meaning
of Art. 7 of the Constitution in 1948, and therefore was a foreigner.
With certificate the appellant came to this Court.
HELD: (per P.B. Gajendragadkar, C.J .. K. N. Waochoo, S. M. Sikri
and V. Ramaswami, JJ.)
(i) The word "migrated" is capable of two meanings : In its narrower
connotation it means going from one place to another with the intention
of residing permanently in the latter place; in its wider connotation ii
simply means going from one place to another whether or not with tho
intention of permanent r.,;idence in the latter place. In Art. 7 the word
is used in its wider sense, Shanno Devi's caso in which the narro\\·er
meaning was attribwed to the word was wrongly decided.
[709 C;
714 A)
SmJ. Shanno Devi v. Manga/ Sain, A.LR. 1961 S.C. 58, held wrongly
decided.
(ii) 'The non--0b.rtante clause with which Arts. 6 and 7 begin shows
that the concept of domicile found in Art. 5 is not to be brought into
these Articles. Moreover Arts. 6 aod 7 speak of migration after March
I, 1947 when panition had not yet taken place. At that time tho
question of change of domicile did not raise, and even after partition
people moved \vithout forming
definite intention as to their pennanent
place of abode. [712 D; 713 B
(iil) However, C\·en when used in the wider sense the word "migrated"
cannot take in movement which was involuntary or for a specific purpose
and for a short and limited period. [713 0-E!J
Per Hidayatullah J. (dissenting) :
11lc decision in Shanno Devi's case was correct. The word "migrate"
in the context of Arts. 6 and 7 cannot mean mere going fn.>rr. onl! pi.ace
lo another. Iust as domicile is a question of fact and intention, migration is also a question of fact and intention. The immediate requirement
ot intention in migration a.. used in tho Constitution is that tho person
intended to change his abode from one part of India to another. lf the
part to which he went came to be incorporated in the territory of Pakis-
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tan he had to return the manner prescribed in the proviso to Art. 7
or he would not be deemed to be a citizen of In&ia. [719 B-C; 718 F-Hl
Per Shah J.-The word "migrate'' is used in more senses than one
and the context must decide its meaning. In ascertaining the meaning of
that word in Arts. 6 and 7 the court would have regard to the scope and
obja:t of the .constitutional provisions examined ii:i the light of t~e. events
which were wunessed both before and after the birth of the dommtons of
India and Pakistan. Another matter that must be kept in mind is that
Arts. 6 and 7 deal with the status at the commencement of the Constitution. And if intention to take up permanent residence in one or the
other dominion, coupled with movement could alone justify a claim for
citizenship of the country into which the migrant has moved, a large
11umber of persons who migrated from the territory of Pakistan to India
would find themselves without citizenship of India. Therefore "migrated
from the territory of India" within the meaning of Art. 7 means moving
from one place to another but not necessarily with the intention of permanently residing in the country into which the person has moved. [720 F;
721 C; 723 A-Bl
Case law considered.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 24
of 1965.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated December 21, 1964,
of the Kerala High Court in O.P. No. 3077 of 1964.
O.P. Malhotra, S.N. Prasad, J.B. Dadachanji, O.C. Mathur
and Ravindra Narain, for the appellant.
Niren De, Additional Solicitor-General, A.G. Puddissery and
M.R.K. Pillai, for the respondents.
Niren De, Additional Solicitor-General, R. Ganapathy Iyer
and B.R.G.K. Achar, for the intervener.
The Judgment of GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., WANCHOO, SII(RI
AND RAMASWAMI, JJ. was delivered by WANCHOO J., HIDAYATULLAH
AND SHAH, JJ. delivered separate opinions.
Wanchoo, J.-The main question that arises in this appeal
on a certificate granted by the High Court of Kerala is the interpretation of the word "migrated" in Art. 7 of the Constitution. Aboobacker on whose behalf the writ petition from which this appeal
has arisen was filed in the High Court was born on March 5, 1936 in
the district of Kozhikode of parents who were both Indian citizens.
Aboobacker left India sometime in 1948 and went to Karachi in
Pakistan when he was a boy of 12 years of age. He remained in
Pakistan till 1954. On March 10, 1954, he obtained a Pakistani
passport and came to district Kozhikode in India on visa granted
to him in September 1954. On November 1, 1954, he again left
for Pakistan. In 1956 he came to India again with the same passport but on a fresh visa obtained in April 1956. He remained in
India till June 1956 when he returned again to Pakistan. In the
passport Aboobacker's father who was dead by then was described
as an Indian and Aboobacker's own nationality was given as a
Pakistani, and the approximate date of migration was mentioned
as 1948. There was no record in Kozhikode after June 1956 as
708 .
SUPllBllB COURT llBPOll'l'S
[1966) 3 S.C.R.
to the whereabouts of Aboobacker; but in October 1964 he was
found living in the district of Kozhikode and did not have any valid
travel documents. Consequently he was arrested and a case
under the Indian Passport Rules 1950 was registered against him.
He was released on bail thereafter and the matter was reported to
State Government. On this report the State Government passed
on order on November 5, 1964 under the Foreigners Act (No. 31
of 1946) requiring him not to remain in India. As Aboobacker was
unwilling to comply with the order he was arrested and detained.
On November 16, 1964, a writ petition was filed on behalf of
Aboobacker by the appellant in the High Court, and the contention
raised therein was that Aboobacker was an Indian citizen and therefore the order passed against him under the Foreigner's Act was
illegal. It was prayed that the order should be quashed and
Aboobacker released.
·
The petition was opposed on behalf of the State and on the
facts which we have set out above and which are not in dispute now,
the contention of the State was that Aboobacker ceased to be a
citizen of India when the Constitution came into force by virtue of
Art. 7 thereof and in consequence the order directing him to leave
India under the Foreigner's Act was legal and proper.
The main contention raised before the High Court on behalf of
Aboobacker was that Art. 7 had no application in this case because
migration contemplated in that Article must be with the intention
to leave India permanently and settle finally in Pakistan and that as
Aboobacker was a minor at the time he left India he could not be
imputed with any such intention, and in any case he had no such
intention because he had simply gone to Karachi in search of livelihood as he was poor. On the other hand, it was contended on
behalf of the State that no such intention was necessary and that
migration under Art. 7 of the Constitution simply meant the physical act of going from India to Pakistan and if any person did so
whether he was a minor or a major he would be covered by Art. 7
of the Constitution. Reliance was placed in the High Court on
behalf of A boo backer on a decision of this Court in Smt. Shanno
De1·i v. Mango/ Sain.(') The High Court seems to have held that
even if any such intention was necessary there was sufficient
indication to prove that Aboobacker had such intention. The
High Court did not accept the extreme argument on behalf of
Aboobacker that a minor could never have any such intention.
It therefore held that Aboobacker had migrated to Pakistan
within the meaning of Art. 7 and was thus a foreigner within the
meaning of that word in the Foreigner's Act and the State Government was justified in ordering him not to remain in India, and as
he was unwilling to comply with that order his arrest for the purpose
of deporting him to Pakistan was justified. In consequence, the
"(ijll961] I S.C.R. 576: A 1.R. 1961 S.C. 58.
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petition was dismissed. Thereafter on an application for a certificate, the High Court granted the certificate to appeal to this
Court on the ground that a question as to the interpretation of
Art. 7 of the Constitution was involved in the case.
The main question that falls for consideration therefore is the
meaning of the word "migrated" used in Art. 7 of the Constitution·
Article 7 runs thus:
"Notwithstanding anything in articles 5 and 6, a person
who has after the first day of March 1947, migrated from
the territory of India to the territory now included in
Pakistan shall not be deemed to be a citizen oflndia:
Provided ........................ "
The word "migrated" is capable both of a narrower meaning
as well as of a wider meaning. In its narrower connotation it means .
going from one place to another with the intention of resi4ing
permanently in the latter place; in its wider connotation it simply
means going from one place to another whether or not with
any intention of permanent residence in the latter place. In Webster's dictionary (Second Edition, 1937), the word "migrate" means
"to go from one place to another; especially to move from one
country, region or place of abode or sojourn to another, with a
view to residence; to move." Corpus Juris Secundum published
in 1948 gives the same meaning except that it adds one more meaning namely, "to change one's place of residence". It will be seen
that if the narrower meaning is given an intention to settle in the
place to which a person moves on migration is necessary. On the
other hand if the wider meaning is given all that is necessary is that
there should be movement from one place to another whether or
not there is any intention of settlement in the place to which one
moves. The question that is posed for our consideration is which
of the two meanings was intended by the Constitution-makers
when they used the word "migrated" in Art. 7. The matter has
been referred to a larger Bench because when dealing with the same
word "migrated" in Art. 6, this Court took the view in Smt. Shanno
Devi's case(!) that the word "migrated" had been used in that
Article in the narrower sense. The contention on behalf of Aboobacker is that the same narrower meaning should be given to this
word in Art. 7.
In order to decide the question whether the narrower or the
wider meaning of the word "migrated" was intended by the Constitution-makers, we have to look at the scheme of Part II of the
Constitution which deals with citizenship. The first Article in that
Part is Art. 5 and it lays down the normal rule of citizenship. Under
that Article every person who has his domicile in the territory of
India at the commencement of the Constitution and satisfies one of
(I) [1961] l S.C.R. 576 : A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 58.
710
SUPREME
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REPORTS
(1966] 3 S.C.R.
the three conditions laid down therein is a citizen of India. But the
Constitution also deals with the abnormal situation that prevailed
in the country about the time of its partition between India and
Pakistan and Articles 6 and 7 deal with that abnormal situation.
It is well-known that there was large movement of population from
what is now the territory of Pakistan to the territory of India and
vice l'ersa from about March 1947 and this continued late into
1948. Articles 6 deals with this movement of population from the
territory now included in Pakistan to the territory of India while
Article 7 deals with the movement from the territory of India to
what is now the territory of Pakistan. Both these Articles begin
with a non obstante "Clause. Article 6 begins with the words "notwithstanding anything in Article 5" and Article i begins with the
words "notwithstanding anything in articles 5 and 6". The presence of the non vbstante clause in both these Articles clearly
indicates that they were meant to deal with the abnormal situation
to which we have already referred and prescribe conditions as to
who shall be deemed to be citizens of India on the date of the
commencement of the Constitution (Art. 6) and who shall not be so
deemed (Art. 7). It is also remarkable that both these Articles are
silent on the question of domicile and the presence of the non
obstante clause in the beginning of these Articles clearly shows in
our opinion that the concept of domicile was not to be brought
into them when deciding who shall be deemed citizens of India
(Art. 6) or who shall not be deemed to he citizens of India (Art. 7).
These two Articles make special provision for dealing with the
abnormal situation created by large movement of population from
one side to the other and vice versa and lay down special criteria
of their own, in one case for deciding who shall be deemed to be
· citizens of India (Art. 6) and in the other case who shall not be
deemed to be such citizens (Art. 7). It seems to us therefore that
the Constitution-makers did not intend that the concept of domicile
should be brought into Articles 6 and 7 notwithstanding that such
concept was present in Art. 5, which provides for the normal case
of citizenship of India. Jn this situation it seems to us clear
that when Art. 6 a; well as Art. 7 use the word "migrated", the
intention must have been to gi' e the wider meaning to that word,
namely, going from one territory to the other.
We may in this connection refer to the following observations
of Mahajan, C.J. in Central Bank of India v. Ram Narain(') to
show that the idea of domicile or permanent change of residence
could not be a part of the meaning of the word "migrated" as used
in Arts. 6 and 7 :"It has to he remembered that in October or November
1947 men's minds were in a state of flux. The partition
of India and the events that followed in its wake in both
·- ··--·(!) [19551 I S.C.R. 697 : A.LR. 1955 S.C. 36.
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Pakistan and India were unprecedented and it is difficult
to cite any historical precedent for the situation that arose.
Minds of people affected by this partition and who were
living in those parts, were completely unhinged and unbalanced and there was hardly any occasion to form
intentions requisite for acquiring domicile in one place or
another. People vacillated and altered their programmes
from day to day as events happened. They went backward
and forward; families were sent from one place to another
for the sake of safety.
"Most of those displaced from West Pakistan had
no permanent homes in India where they could go and take
up abode. They overnight became refugees, living in camps
in Pakistan or in India. No one, as a matter of fact, at the
moment thought that when he was leaving Pakistan for
India or vice versa that he was doing so for ever or that
he was for ever abandoning the place of his ancestors."
If this was the situation (and we have no doubt that it was so
even from March 1947) at the time when the abnormal movement
of population from one side to the other took place, there can be no
doubt that when the Constitution-makers used the word "migrated"
in Arts. 6 and 7 they could never have intended to give what we have
called the narrower meaning to the word "migrated", for there
could be no deliberate intention to change one's residence permanently when this large movement of population from one side to
the other and vice versa took place. That is also the reason why
both these Articles begin with a non obstante clause and thus in
our opinion exclude the concept of domicile for the purposes of
these Articles. If that was so and if the concept of domicile is
excluded from these two Articles and we have no doubt that it is
so excluded by the use of the non obstante clause in both these
Articles, the word "migrated" used therein must be given the wider
meaning. If we give the narrower meaning to it we shall be introducing the concept of domicile in these two "Articles which was
obviously not intended by the Constitution-makers and in any case
was definitely negatived by the use of the non obstante clause at the
beginning of both these Articles.
It is said that curious consequences would follow if the intention
of residing permanently in one territory or another when the migration took place is not inherent in these two Articles. These curious
consequences are said to be illustrated by the case of two persons,
one of whom was born in what is now India and has all along lived
there and another person who though born in what is now India
went to live in areas now in Pakistan and then moved back to areas
in what is now India. The first named person would have to satisfy
the requirement of domicile at the commencement of the Constitution under Art. 5 before he can be a citizen of India while the other
712
SUPllEMI!
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[1966) 3 S.C.R.
would not have to satisfy this condition if he falls within Art. 6.
That is undoubtedly so. But we do not see anything strange in it.
In the hypothetical example the first person would have no difficulty
in establishing his domicile in India for the very assumption that he
was born in India and lived in India all along would prove his
domicile. In the case of the other man the necessity of domicile
is certainly obviated on our interpretation of Art. 6 but that is
because Art. 6 was dealing with an abnormal situation and therefore
did away with the concept of domicile by the use of the non
obstante clause therein. That is one reason why we think that the
Constitutio.n-makers intended to give what we have called the wider
meaning to the word "migrated" in Articles 6 and 7.
Then we may refer to Art. 8. That Article also begins with
the non obstante clause "notwithstanding anything in article 5".
That Article confers Indian citizenship on a person who on the face
of it had no domicile in India, if certain conditions mentioned therein are fulfilled. It is clear therefore that when Art. 8 as well as
Articles 6 and 7 use the non obstante clause, the intention clearly
is to exclude the concept of domicile from these three Articles.
Article 6 would deem a person to be a citizen of India if the conditions thereof were satisfied while Article 7 would make a person
not a citizen of India if conditions thereof were satisfied and finally
Art. 8 would deem a person to be a citizen oflndia if the conditions
thereof were satisfied -all of course at the commencement of the
Constitution. We may add that Art. 7 begins with a non obsra11rc
clause which excludes both Articles 5 and 6. Therefore, a person
to whom Art. 7 applies cannot claim citizenship either under Art. 5
or under Art. 6. He can either fall under the main part of Art. 7
(in which case he will not be deemed to be a citizen of India) or take
advantage of the proviso to Art. 7, if he can, to show that he has
become a citizen of India thereunder.
There is another consideration which leads us to the same
conclusion. Article 6 which provide; for deeming a person to be a
citizen of India lays down in cl. (b) (i) that such person should have
migrated to India before the 19th day of July 1948 and should be
ordinarily resident in the territory of India since the date of his
migration. Now this provision will apply to all cases of migration
before the 19th day of July 1948 and even before the 15th day of
August 1947 when India and Pakistan came into existence. Take
a case of a person who migrated from what is now the
territory of Pakistan to what is now the territory of India
in 1946. At that time there could he no question of his
changing his domicile for both territories were parts of the same
country. Therefore when Art. 6 speaks of migration it can only
mean going from one part of the country to another and there
would be no question of any intention to change the domicile by such
migration. Similarly Art. 7 speaks of migration from the territory
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of India to the territory of Pakistan after March 1, 1947. Take the
case where a person migrated after March 1, 1947 but before August
15, 1947, when India and Pakistan came into existence. At that
time there could be no question of any intention of changing
the domicile for the two countries were still one and it was only in
June 1947 that the final decision to divide India as it was before
August 15, 1947 was taken. Even so, the exact boundary between
the two countries which were to come into existence was not settled
till the Radcliffe award just about August 15, 1947. In such a
situation it would in our opinion be odd to introduce the concept
of domicle either in Art. 6 or Art. 7. All these considerations therefore lead us to the conclusion that when the Constitution-makers
used the word "migrated" in Art. 6 and Art. 7 they used it in the
wider sense to which we have referred earlier and not in the narrower
sense and this meaning is in our opinion in accord with the circumstances which prevailed at the time which resulted in large movement
of population from one side to the other.
Even so we are of opinion that there is one qualification which
be attached to the word "migrated" as used in these two
must
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Articles, even though that word has the wider meaning of going
from one place to another in the context of these Articles. That
qualification is that the movement should have been voluntary and
should not have been for a specific purpose and for a short and
limited period. A case where a person went on what may be
called a visit from the territory of India to the territory·of Pakistan
.E for a short and limited period with a specific purpose would not be
covered by the word "migrated" as used in art. 7. Similarly a
case where a person was forced to go from the territory of India to
the territory of Pakistan as, for example, where he might have been
kidnapped or abducted would not be covered by the word "migrated" as used in Art. 7. Barring such cases the word "migrated" as
F used in Articles 6 and 7 has the wiaer meaning, namely, movement
from one territory to another territory whether or not with the
intention of permanent residence in the latter place. We may in
this connection refer to State of Bihar v. Kumar Amar Singh( I),
In that case a lady went to Karachi in July 1948 leaving her husband
.in India. Her case was that she had gone there for medical treatIt was held that she had
G ment, but this was found to be false.
migrated from India to Pakistan after March l, 1947 and even if Art.
5 could be said to be applicable on the assumption that her domicile
was that of her husband, the case was covered by Art. 7 which
applied notwithstanding anything in Art. 5. Thus this case shows
that if migration was voluntary and not with a specific purpose and
for a short and limited period, Art. 7 would apply irrespective of
H the fact whether the migration was with the intention of residing
permanently in the place {o which the person migrated.
(1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1259: A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 282.
714
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This brings us to Smt. Shanno Devi's case('). We are of opinion
that the narrower meaning given in that case to the word "migrated"
as used in Art. 6 is with respect not correct, and that the word
"migrated" used in Arts. 6 and 7 has the wider meaning namely,
roming or going from one place to another, whether or not with
the intention of residence in the latter place, subject to the qualification which we have already indicated.
We may incidentally refer to Art. 9 also though it docs not
directly arise insofar as the question before us is concerned. That
Article provides that no person shall be a citizen of India by virtue
of Article 5, or be deemed to be a citizen of India by virtue of
Article 6 or Article 8 if he has voluntarily acquired the citizenship
of any foreign State. That Article came up for consideration rn
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Peer Mohd. & Another(') and it was held
that it did not apply to a case of acquisition of foreign citizenship
after the Constitution came into force but only applied to such
<:ases where foreign citizenship was acquired before the Constitution
commenced. By oversight however in Abdul Sattar Haji Ibrahim
Patel v. State of Gujarat(') it has been stated that cases in which
migration had taken place after January 26, 1950 fall to be considered under Art. 9 of the Constitution. Article 9 does not use
the word "migration" and deals only with voluntary acquisition of
citizenship of a foreign State before the Constitution came into force
as already decided in Peer Mohd.'s case(2). We have thought it fit
to refer to Art. 9 to correct the slip which has occurred in Abdul
Sattar' s case(').
Cases of voluntary acquisition of foreign
citizenship after the commencement of the Constitution have to be
dealt with by the Government of India under the Citizenship Act,
1955.
Coming now to the facts of the present case it is obvious that
Aboobacker went voluntarily to the territory of Pakistan some time
after March I, 1947. It is equally obvious that he did not go for
any specific purpose and for a short and limited perio l His case
therefore clearly falls within the meaning which we have given to the
word "migrated" in Art. 7 and therefore by virtue of thllt Article
he will be deemed not to be a citizen of India on the date of the
commencement of the Constitution. Thereafter he has not acquired
the citizenship of India and he should therefore be held to be a
foreigner; and if that is so, it is not disputed that the order passed by
the State Government is legal and the view taken by the High Court
thereof is correct.
In the view we have taken of the meaning of the word "migrated" in Art. 7, it is unnecessary to consider the other point raised on
behalf of Aboobackcr, namely, that a minor can never have the
(I) (196111 S.C.R. 576: A.1.R. 1961 S.C. 58.
..
[1966] 3 S.C.R.
(2) 11963) Supp. I S.C.R. 429.
(3) A.l.R. 1965 S.C. 810.
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intention implicit in the narrower meaning of the word "migrated".
The appeal therefore fails and is hereby dismissed.
Hidayatullah, J. I agree that Aboobacker, on whose behalf this
appeal has been filed cannot be said to have acquired the citizenship
of India under the Constitution, bnt as I construe the word 'migrate'
in Arts. 6 and 7 of the Constitution differently I wish to record my
reasons separately. The ·facts have been stated already and I
need not repeat them at length. Aboobacker left India in 1948
when he was 12 years old and went to Karachi. He came to India
in 1954 on a Pakistani passport obtained on March 10, 1954 and
returned to Pakistan in November 1954. He came once again on
the same passport in June 1956 and went back to Pakistan. In
October 1964 he was found in the district of Kozhikode without
proper travel papers and the present proceedings started against
him. He does not claim to have returned to India under a permit for
resettlement of permanent return issued by or under the authority
of any law, which primafacie, he ought to have done under Arts.
6 and 7 if he wished to assert his Indian citizenship. As he admittedly 'migrated' after March 1, 1947, Art. 7 would apply to him
but his claim is that he did not 'migrate' because he had no intention
at the time, being a minor of acquiring a new domicile. He relies
on a decision of this Court reported in Smt. Shanno Devi v.
Manga/ Sain(') (to which I was a party) in support of his contention that the word 'migrate' means going to another country with
a view of acquiring a new domicile there. That ruling is questioned in this appeal. It was decided in Shanno Devi's case(') that the
word 'migrate' means going from one place to another with the
intention of permanently residing in the latter place.
As doubt has been expressed I wish to give my reasons for
adhering to the view then expressed. The word 'migrate' has many
shades of meaning. At one end of the spectrum it means to go
from one place to another and at the other to leave one's country
to settle in another. The word also connotes movement from one
place of abode to another place of abode.
My learned brother Wanchoo has held that the word 'migrate'
means no more than to go from one place to another and that the
element of an intention to acquire a domicile is not necessary.
He has, however, given fostances of some cases in which going
from one place to another would not be sufficient because either the
going was involuntary or there was no intention to stay in the new
place but to return. These instances, which I also adopt, show that
migration is not bare physical movement from India to the territory
now included in Pakistan but is such movement accompanied by
an intention of some sort. What that intention should be is the
matter in dispute.
(l) (1961] 1 S.C.R. 576: A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 58.
716
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1966] 3 S.C.R.
Articles 5* to 10 deal with who shall be regarded as a citizen
of India and who shall not. By the fifth article• every citizen,
who at the conunencement of the Constitution had his domicile
in the territory of India and (a) who was born in the territory
of India or (b) either of whose parents was born in the territory of
India; or (c) who had been ordinarily resident in the territory of
India for not less than five years immediately preceding such
commencement, is a citizen of India. If we were to apply this
test we would have to enquire whether A boo backer, who admittedly
was born in India, had his domicile in the territory on January
26, 1950. But this article does not apply to him because he admittedly left India for Karachi which is now in Pakistan, after
the !st day of March, 1947. His case therefore, falls within
Art. 7. It is, however, claimed that as he was a minor in I948
he could not have any intention to change his domicile and as
he went to Karachi in search of livelihood, his domicile continued
to be Indian. As Aboobacker was aged 12 at the time he went
to Karachi, can we say that his going to a place now in the territory
of Pakistan amounts in the circumstances to what the word
'migrate' connotes and attracts the provisions applicable to
persons migrating after March I, 1947 ?
Before I attempt to answer this question I shall say a few
words about Arts. 6 and 7 because that will show how f view the
word 'migrate' used in them. Article 6f begins with the words
"Notwithstanding anything in article 5" and lays down that a person
who has migrated to the territory of India from the territory now
included in Pakistan shall be deemed to be a citizen of India at
the commencement of the Constitution if he or either of his
parents or any of his grand-parents was born in India as defined
in the Government of India Act, 1935 (as originally enacted)
and (a) in case such person had so migrated before the nineteenth
day of July, 1948 he had been ordinarily resident in the territory
A
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•5. Citizenship at the commencement of the Constitution.
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At the commeno:mcnt of th~ Constitution every person who has his domicile in the territory of India and- (a) who was born in the territory of India; or
(b) either of whose parents was born in the territory of India; or
(c) who has been ordinarily resident in the territory of India for not lcs..'>
than fiv~ years immediately preceding such commencement
sha11 be a citizen of India.
t"6. Rights of citizenship of ocrlain pcr5ons who have migrated to India from
Pakistan.
Notwithstanding anything in article 5, a person who has migrated to the
territory of India from the territory now included in Pakistan shaJI be
deemed to be a citizen of India at the commencement of this Constitution if(1) be or either of bis parents or any of bis grand parents was born in India ..
defined in tho Government of India Act, 193 5 (as ori&inally enacted); and
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v. KERALA (Hidayatu/lah, J.)
717
of India since the date of his migration, or (b) in case snch
person had so migrated on or after the nineteenth day of July,
1948, he had been registered as citizen of India. The non obstante
clause has the effect or segregating article 6 from Art. 5.
Viewing Aboobacker's case in the light of Art. 6 I find that
he has not applied for registration nor has he proved that he returned
to India before the nineteenth day of July, 1948. In fact he came
back much after that date. Since Art. 6 deals with rights of
citizenship of persons who migrated to India from Pakistan both
the conditions in Art. 6 are not satisfied by Aboobacker.
I shall now examine his claim under the proviso to Art. 7.
Article 7* also begins with the words "Notwithstanding anything in articles 5 and 6", and deals with a person who has, after
the !st day of March 1947, migrated from the territory of India
to the territory now included
in Pakistan. Aboobacker
migrated from the territory of India to the territory now
included in Pakistan after the !st day of March, 1947 and the'
article, therefore, applies to him. He can only claim the benefit
of the proviso provided he returned to India under a permit for
resettlement or permanent return issued to him, as provided. A
person who returned to India as provided in the proviso was deemed
to be treated as if he returned to India after the 19th day of July,
1948 and had to register himself. As Aboobacker went to Karachi
after the !st day of March, 1947 he could only return to India inthe
manner provided in the proviso, that is to say, under a permit for
resettlement and he had to get himself registered on his return. Again,
Aboobacker must fail on this claim as he did not get himself
registered after his return to India.
(b) (i) in the case where such person has so migrated bl!fore the ninet~enth
day of July, 1948, he has been ordinarily resident in the territory of India
since the date of his migration, or
(ii) in the case where such person has so migrated on or after the nine ..
tt~cnth day of July, 1948, he has been registered as a citizen of India by an
officer appointed in that lNchalf by the Government of the Dominion of
India on an application made by him thereof to such officer before the
commenc.:ment of this Constitution in the form and manner prescribed by
that Government :
Provided that no person shall be so registered unless he has been resident in the territory of India for at least six months immediately prec~ding
the date of his application.''
•"7 Rights of citizenship of certain migrants to Pakistan.
Notwithstanding anything in articles 5 and 6, a person who has after the
first day of March, 1947, migrated from the territory of India to the territory now included in Pakistan shall not be deem,~d to be a citizen of India:
Provided that nothing in this article shall apply to a person who
after l'aving so migrated to the territory now included in Pakistan, has
returned to the territory of India under a permit for resettlement or permanent return issued by or under th<: authority of any law and every such
person shall for the purposes of clause (b) of article 6 be deemed to have
migrated to their territory of India after the nineteenth day of July, 1948".
MllSup. CI/66-14
718
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
[I 96<i] 3 S.CR.
It will appear from this that three dates are important. The
first is the 26th of January, 1950 on which day a person who had his
domicile in the territory of India and satisfied one only of the three
conditions in Art. 5 was deemed to be a citizen of India without
anything more. The application of the other two articles depends
on two dates. The first date is the 19th day of July, 1948 when a
permit system was introduced. Persons who had not migrated to the
territory of Pakistan but were in what is now Pakistan could return
and claim citizenship under Art. 6. If they did so before the 19th
day of July, 1948 and ordinarily resided in the territory of India
from that time till January 26, 1950 they were to be citizens oflndia
without anything more. If they migrated to India after the 19th
day of July, 1948 they had to apply and get registered as citizens
of India after residing for six months continuously in the territory
of India.
The other date is the I st of March, 1947 which is crucial for
persons who migrated after that date into the territory now in
Pakistan. Such persons are not deemed to be citizens of India
irrespective of whether they had, before their migration, domicile in
the territory of India ,,nd whether they satisfied anyone of the three
conditions in Art. 5. Since Aboobacker does not satisfy the conditions of Art. 5, 6 or the proviso to Art. 7 he cannot claim to
be a citizen oflndia. He, however, contends that the word 'migrate'
in Arts. 6 and 7 means migration with the intention of acquiring a
domicile in Pakistan. I shall now examine this contention.
The word 'migrate' in this context cannot obviously mean mere
going from one place to another. A lawyer in Amritsar who conducted a case in Lahore on the 2nd of March, 1947 could not be
said to have migrated from India to the territory now in Pakistan.
His intention was not to change his place of abode. In the same
way when persons fled the dangerous area because death and rapine
were at their heels, they could not be said to have migrated to the
territory now in Pakistan unless they were changing their abode.
The decisive consideration is whether in so migrating a person
changed his abode, that is to say, he left the territory of India to go
and acquire an abode in the territory which is now in Pakistan.
Just as domicile is a question of fact and intention, migration is also a
question of fact and intention. The immediate requirement of
intention in migration as used in the Constitution is that the
person intended to change his abode from one part of India to
another. If the part to which he went came to be incorporated in
the territory of Pakistan he had to return in the manner prescribed
in the proviso to Art. 7 or he would not be deemed to be a citizen of
India.
Aboobacker left India in circumstances to which Art. 7 must
dearly apply. That he was a minor makes no difference. The
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KULATHIL MAMMU v. KERALA (Shah, J,)
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Constitution does not make a distinction between an adult and a
minor. The intention of changing his abode from India to the
territory now in Pakistan (whether he had it at the time or not)
must be attributed to him because he returned to India several times
and went back again under a Pakistani passport which clearly showed
that he was intending to change his abode from India to Pakistan.
His subsequent action shows the intention and an election to change
the abode which the word 'migrate' in Art. 7 of the Constitution
obviously indicate. This was the view taken by Das Gupta J, in
Shanno Devi's case and I think that the decision was correct.
I would dismiss the appeal for the reasons I have set down
above.
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Shah, J, The principal question raised in this appeal relates to
the true meaning of the expression "migrated from the territory
of India" in Art. 7 of the Constitution, conflict of opinion in this
Court.
Part II of the Constitution deals with citizenship. By Art.
11 Parliament is given the power to make provision with respect to the
acquisition and termination of citizenship, and by Art. 10 every
person who is or is deemed to be a citizen of India under the
provisions of Arts. 5 to 9 shall, subject to the provisions of any
law that may be made by Parliament, continue to be a 'citizen of
India. Articles 5, 6, 7 and 9 were intended to deal with citizenship
at the commencement of the Constitution. Article 8 deals with
acquisition of citizenship by registration of a person ordinarily
residing in any country outside India, if he is either before or after
the commencement of the Constitution been registered as a citizen .
By Art. 5 of the Constitution every person who had his
domicile in the territory of India [as defined in Art. 1(3)] and who
was either born in territory of India, or either of whose parents
was born in the territory of India, or who had been ordinarily
resident in the territory of India for not less than five years im·
mediately preceding such commencement was to be a citizen of
India. This is the basic rule conferring citizenship at the commencement of the Constitution upon every person who had his
domicile in the territory of India and who satisfied one or more
of the three conditions in Art. 5. But Art. 5 was not exhaustive
of the conditions in which citizenship of India could be claimed
at the commencement of the Constitution : persons who did not
satisfy the requirements of Art. 5 could still be citizens. By Act.
6 a person who has migrated to the territory of India from the terri·
tory now included in Pakistan would be deemed to be a citizen
of India at the commencement of the Constitution if he satisfied
two conditions that (a) he or either of his parents or any of his
grand-parents was born in India as defined in the Governement
of India Act, 1935; and that (b) he had either migrated before
720
SUPREME
COURT
RBPOlt.TS
[1966] 3 S.C.R.
July 19, 1948, and had ordinarily been resident in the territory
of India since the date of his migration or where he had migrated
after July 19, 1948, he had been registered as a citizen of India
by an officer appointed in that behalf. A person who could
not claim to be a citizen of India under Art. 5 could still be deemed
to be a citizen of India if the conditions mentioned in cl. (a) and
either of the conditions in cl. (b) of Art. 6 were satisfied. Article
7 engrafts an exception both upon Arts. 5 and 6. A person who
would have been a citizen of India because he satisfied the conditions of Art. 5 or who would be deemed to be a citizen of India
because he satisfied the requirements of Art. 6, would still not
be deemed to be a citizen of India, if he had after the first day
of March, 1947, migrated from the territory of India to the
territory included in Pakistan, unless he had after having migrated to Pakistan returned to the territory of India under a permit
for resettlement or permanent return.
Article 6 therefore confers citizenship upon a person in the
conditions mentioned therein who would otherwise not be entitled
to that status, under Art. 5, where as Art. 7 disables a person from
claiming the status, notwithstanding that he otherwise complies
with the requirements of Art. 5 or of Art. 6, if he has after the specified date migrated from the territory of India to the territory of
Pakistan. Article 6 deals with migration into India which confers
citizenship and Art. 7 deals with migration from India which disables a person from claiming citizenship of India at the commencement of the Constitution. The expression "migrated" cannot have
different meanings in the two Articles.
The word "migrate" is used in more senses than one : it in
some contexts means movement from one region or country to
another implying intention to settle in a new land pennanently;
it in other contexts means movement from one place to another
without an intention to settle pennanently in that of the other place.
In ascertaining the meaning ofthe expression "migrate" in Arts.
6 and 7 the Court would have regard to the scope and object of the
Constitutional pro' isions examined in the light of the events which
were witnessed both before and after the birth of the dominions
of India and Pakistan, resulting in a violent upheaval in which largescale exodus of population took place from across the boundaries
which divided the dominions.
As pointed out by Mahajan, J.,
in Central Bank of India v. Ram Narain ( 1) :
"Minds of people affected by this partition and who
were living in those parts were completely unhinged and unbalanced and there was hardly any occasion to form intentions requisite for acquiring domicile in one place or another.
People vacillated and altered their programmes from day to
(I) 11955! 1 S.C.R. 697, 705.
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721
day as events happened. They went backward and forward;
families were sent from one place to another for the sake of
safety. Most of those displaced from West Pakistan had
no permanent homes in India where they could go and take
up abode. They overnight became refugees, living in
camps in Pakistan or in India. No one, as a matter of
fact, at the moment thought that when he was leaving PakisB
tan for India or vice versa that he was doing so for ever
or that he was for ever abandoning the place of his ancestors.
Later policies of the Pakistan Government that prevented
people from going back to their homes cannot be taken into
consideration in determining the intention of the people
who migrated at the relevant moment."
c
Another matter which must also be kept in mind is that Arts. 6
and 7 deal with the status at the commencement of the Constitution.
Therefore migration into the territory of India which conferred the
status of citizenship under Art. 6, and migration from India which
disabled a person from claiming citizenship under Art. 7 must be
complete before the date of the commencement of the Constitution.
B H therefore intention to settle permanently in the country in which
a person has moved is a necessary component of migration, snch
intention must have been formed before the commencemnt of the
Constitution, and many persons who were compelled to move
from their hearths and homes on account of a sense of insecurity
resulting from riots and civil commotion still hoping that they would
be going back to the abodes of their ancestors when the situation
returned to normal, may not be deemed to have migrated at all.
This, in my judgment, would introduce an element of uncertainty in
the determination of citizenship and involve great hardship to the
migrants.
Two cases in which this Court was called upon to consider the
F meaning of "migrate" may be referred to. In Smt. Shanno
Devi v. Mangat Sain(!) it was held by this Court that the expression
"migrated to the territory of India" in Art. 6 of the Constitution
means "come to the territory of India with the intention of residing
there permanently". The dispute in that case arose in an election
case. Mangal Sain who was born in 1927 of Indian parents in the
G territory which since August 15, 1947 had become part of Pakistan,
moved in 1944 to Jullunder, and thereafter lived in the territory which
is part of India, except for a short period when he went to Burma.
It was contended in an election dispute that Mangal Sain was not a
citizen of India and therefore could not stand for election. That
contention was rejected by this Court on the finding that the respondent Mangal Sain who had earlier moved from a place in
H Pakistan to Jullunder had definitely made up his mind to make
India his permanent home and therefore he satisfied the first
(1) [1961] l S.C.R. 576.
722
SUPREME
COURT
Rl!POll.TS
[1966] 3 S.C.R.
requirement of Art. 6 after migration to the territory of India from A
the territory now included in Pakistan and it heing established that
MangaI Sain was born in India as defined in the Go\'ernment of
India Act, 1935, he satisfied the requirement of cl. (a) of Art. 6.
The Court in that ca~e regarded movement from one territory to
another, with intention to reside permanently in the new territory
as a necessary ingredient. But in an earlier judgment of this Court B
in The Srarc of Bihar \'.Kumar Amar Singh & Others( I), the question whether one Kumar Rani Sayecda Khatoon was, because of
migration from the territory of India after March I, 1947, not to
be deemed a citizen of India. Kumar Rani who was born in the
territory of India and had married Captain Maharaj Kumar Gopal
Saran Narayan Singh of Gaya in 1920 left for Karachi in July
c
1948 and returned to India in December 1948 on a temporary
permit. She again left for Pakistan in April 1949 on the expiry
of the permit. Her claim that she went to Pakistan temporarily
for medical treatment was not accepted. After her property in
India was taken over by the Custodian of Evacuee Property, she
obtained a permit for permanent return and came to India in 1950.
This permit was later cancelled, and she was directed to leave India. I>
In a petition filed before the High Court of Patna it was declared
that Kumar Rani was a citizen of India and the order directing her
to leave India was set aside. This Court reversed the order of
the High Court holding that since Kumar Rani had migrated
from the territory of India to the territory of Pakistan, she had disqualified herself from claiming citizenship of India. The facts E
proved in Kumar Amar Singh's case(') disclose that there was no
evidence tending to show that Kumar Rani had entertained at any
time before the commencement of the Constitution an intention
permanently to reside in Pakistan. Her husband was in India,
her property was in India and she had gone to Pakistan for about
eight months in the year 1948 and thereafter in April 1949. The
Court in that case apparently did not accept the view that to attract F
Art. 7, migration from the territory of India must be with an intention permanently to reside in the territory now included in
Pakistan.
As already observed migration which has a bearing on the
acquisition of citizenship must be complete before the commencement of the Constitution. And if intention to take up permanent
residence in one or the other Dominion, coupled with movement
could alone justify, a claim for citizenship into which the migrant
has moved, a large number of persons who migrated from the
territory of Pakistan to India would find themselves without
citizenship of India in the territory whereof on account of the
compulsion of political events they had moved and had since then
lived.
-(I)-(t955]
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--t S.C.R. 1259.
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(Shah, ],)
723
In my view "migrated from the territory of India" within the
meaning of Art. 7 means moving from one place to another but not
necessarily with the intention of permanently residing in the country
in which the person has moved. I agree, however, that the movement should be voluntary and not purely temporary, such as
movement for purposes of a business transaction or a professional
or a social visit. I agree that the appeal shall stand dismissed.
Appeal dismissed_
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