MUNICLPAL BOARD, HAPUR versus RAGHUVENDRA KRLPAL AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 23 September 1965 | [1966] 1 S.C.R. 950 | 1965 INSC 190
Key facts
- Decided
- 23 September 1965
- Bench
- P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*, K.N. WANCHOO*, M. HIDAYATULLAH, J.C. SHAH, S.M. SIKRI
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 583/1962
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1966] 1 S.C.R. 950
- Neutral citation
- 1965 INSC 190
Text of the judgment
MUNICll'AL BOARD, HAPUR
A
v.
RAGHUVENDRA KRll'AL AND OTHERS
September 23, 1965
JI
[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO,
M. HIDAYATULLAH, J.C. SHAH ANDS. M. SIKRI, JJ.)
U.P. Municipalities Act (2 of 1916). ss. 131 to 135-Sections 131 to
134 whether mandatory-Section 135(3) whether ultra vires-Whether
suffers from excessive delegation or discrimination-Whether bad as con·
Je"ing judicial functions on State Government.
The appellant Board passed a special resolution on September 28, 1956,
imposwg water-tax in Hapur and a notification by the Uttar Pradesh Government was published in the Uttar Pradesh Gazelle under s. 135(2) of
the U.P. Municipalities Act (2 of 1916) notifying the resolution. Fifteen
house-owners of llapur "·ho received notices from the appellant lloard
for the payment of the tax petitioned to the High Court under Art. 220
of the Constilution and asked for a writ or order preventing the appellant Board from realising the tax. 'lne main objections were (a) that
the resolution of the appellant Board framing the proposal was not published in a local paper of Hapur published in Hindi and ( b) that the rules
framed for the imposition of the tax did not accompany the resolution
which was affixed on the notice board at the office of the appellant Board
in purported compliance with the requirement> for publication. The
imposition was also challenged on the ground that Arts. 14 and 19 of the
Constitution were violated. A single judge of the High Court held that
the tax was illegal inasmuch as the mandatory requirements of the Municipalities Act were not complied with by the appellant Board while imposing the tax and thats. 135(3) of the Act (which cures all defects in the
imposition of the tax by making the notification of Gover1)ment conclusive evidence of 1hc legality of the imposition) was iiltra vire.-r Art. 14
of the Constitution because it created a bar against proof and left no
remedy to the lax payers thereby making a discrimination hetwecn them
and other litigants. He further held that the sub-section by making
Government the sole judge of compliance with the Act conferred judicial
power on Government contrary to the intendment of the Constitution.
The appellant Board appealed under the Letters Patent. The Di\isional
Bench upheld the order of the single judge. The case was however certified as fit for appeal under Art. 133 and the Board appealed to thio
Court.
The contentions raised in appeal were : (i) s.135 (3) shut> out all
enquiry into the procedure by which a tax had been imposed and therefore suffered from exce-;sive delegation of legislative function: (ii) The
tAX had not been validly imposed as there had been non--0bservance of
rnandatorv provisions; (iii) s. 135(3) was discriminatory; and (iv) the
aulHlection was also bad because it conferred judicial functions on the
State Government.
HELD : Per Gajendragadkar, C.J .. Hidayatullah, Shah
and
Sikri.
JJ.-(i) The rule of conclusive evidence in s.135(3) does not 'hut out
all enquiry by court_s. There are certain matters which cann~ b~ estab~
lished by a notification under s.135(3). For example no nollficatton can
issue unless there is a special resolution under s. 134. The special resolu-
c
D
E
F
G
II
MUNI. BOARD V. RAGHUVENDRA
951
A tion i.o a sine qua non for the notification. Again the notification cannot
authorise the imposition of a tax not included in s. 128 of the Municipali·
ties Act. Neither the Municipal Board nor the State Government can
exercise snch power. What the section does is to put beyond question the
procedure by which the tax is imposed, that is to say the various steps
'
B
c
'
·'
taken to impose it. A tax, not authorised, can never be within the protection afforded to the procedure for imposing taxes. Such a tax may
be challenged, not with reference to the manner of imposition but as an
illegal impost. [958 A-DJ
(ii) There can be no doubt that some of the provisions of ss. 131 to
134 of the Act are mandatory. But all of them are not of the same
character. In the present case, as in Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. and in
Berar Swadeshi Vanaspati, the provisions not observed were of a directory
character and therefore the imposition had the protection of s. 135(3).
[958 HJ
Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Board, Rampur. [1965] l
S.C.R. 970 and Berar Swades/Ji Vanaspati v. Municipal Committee, Committee Sheogaon & Anr. [1962] 1 S.C.R. 596, relied on.
(iii) Mandatory provisions must be fully complied with, and directory
provisions should be substantially complied with. In either case 1he
agency for seeing to this compliance is the State Government. It is hardly
ro be expected that the State Government would not do its duty or that
D it would allow breaches of the provisions to go unrectified.
In cases of minor departure from the letter of the law especially in
matters not fundamental, it is for the Government to see whether there
bas been substantial or reasonable compliance. Once GC>Vernment COO·
dones the departure, the decision of the Government is rightly made final
by making the notification conclusive evidence of the compliance with
the requirements of the Act. [959 H-960 DJ
(iv) The power to tax belongs to the State Legislature but is exercised
by the local authority under the control of the State Government. It is
impossible for the State Legislature to impose taxes in local areas because
local conditions and needs must vary. The power must be delegated. The
taxes ho\vever are predetermined and a procedure for consulting the wishes
of the people is de\ised. But the matter is not left entirely in the hands
of the Municipal Boards. As the State Legislature cannot supervise the
due observance of its laws by the municipal Boards power is given to the
State Government to check their actions. The proceedings for the itn~
position of the tax must come to a conclusion at some stage after \vhich
it can be said that the tax has been imposed. That stage is reached, not
when the special resolution of the Municipal Board is passed but when
the notification by Government is issued. After the notification all en...
quiry must cease. This is not a case of excessive delegation unless one
starts with the notion that the State Government may collude with the
G Municipal Board to disregard deliberately the provisions for the imposi·
tion of the tax. There is no warrant for such a supposition. The pro-v1s1on making the notification conclusive evidence of the proper imposition of the tax is conceived in the best interest of compliance of the
provisions by the Board and not to facilitate their breach. [960 F"961 E]
Excessive delegation is most often found when the legislature does not
perform all the essential legislative functions and leaves them to some
other agency. The Legislature here performs all essential functions in the
H imposition of the tax. The selection of the tax for imposition in a muni...
cipal area is by the legislative will expressed in s. 128. Neither the Muni...
eipa1 Board, nor the Government can go outside the list of taxes therein
includedl. The procedure for the imposition of the tax is also laid down
952
SUPRE.ME
COURT
REPORTS
(1966] I S.C.R.
by the Legislature for the Municipal Board lo follow and the State Govern·
mcnt is there to ensure due ob9Crvance of that procedure. In view of all
this :here was no excessive delegation or conferral or legislatlve functions
on the appellant Board or the State Government. [961 F-962 CJ
(v). There a:e numerous statutes including the Evidence Act, in which
a fact is taken to be conclu.'>ively proved from the c."tisrenl.'.e of some other
fact. The law is full of fictions and irrehuttable presumptions which also
mvol~e proof of facts. 'fhe t~LX payers in the t\.1unicipality arc alto\ved
'? object to the proposal for the tax and the rules and to have their objecUons considered. They cannot be allowed to keep on agitating. Section
U5('J. which only concludes objections against the procedure followed
1n the 1mpos1uon of the tax cannot be said to be discriminatory and ,;oJa~
;ive of Ari. 14. [962 D-H]
l vi) The ( ujecrion that the impugned sub-section involves the exercise
of judi~ial functions not open to the legislature is wholly erroneous. The
sub-section only shuts out further enquiry and makes the notification final.
[962 HJ
/'er Wanchoo. J. (dissentin~) (i) Sec'ion 135(3) bars enquiry by
courts into all p~occdural provhions relating to imposition of taxes and
lhereforc it ba·s enquiry into any motter covered bys. 131 10 •· f35(1)
of the Act. It cannot be read down as barring enquiry only into some
procedural provisions i.e. from s. 131 to s. 133 and not into the other
procedural prov;sions i.e. s. 134 ands. 135(1). [968 Dl
A
B
c
D
Section 135(3) is not a rule of evidence; it is a substantive pro\ision
wh;ch lay\ d0\\'11 in effect that once a notific-..ition under s. 135 (2) L'i
illucd it will be conclusively presumed that the tax is in accordance with
all the procedural provisions with respect to the impoeition thereof.
[969 El
lslzar Ahmad Khan v. Urriorr of India. [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 235, r~
!erred to.
The effect of s. 135(3) is that the procedural provisions are given
the go by in the ma:tcr of irnoosition of tax and as soon as a notifica"ion
under s. 135(2) is shown to the court, the court is helpless in the matter
oven though none of the provisions of s. 131 to s. 135(1) may have been
complied with. [969 I!]
(ii) In the field of local taxation relating to municipal boards and
district boards and similar other bodies there aro reasons for delegating
fixation of rote to such bodies subject to proper safeguards. This is
aactly what has been done under the Act subject to the safeguards con,.
ta.ined in s~. 13 l to s. 135 ( 1). If those safeguards are folknvcd the delegation would he proper de~eg:Hion and could not be challenged as ultra
vires on the grolmd of excessive dclega'ion. But if the legislature after
laying down with great care saf~uards .as to the impositi?n of tax including its rate makeo; a blanket prov1s1on likes. 135(3), which at one stroke
does away with all tho.e safeguards-and this is whats. 135(3) has done
in the present case-the position that results is that there i.') delegation
of even the essential function of fixing the rate to the subordinarc au 1hority without any safeguard. Such a delegation would he excessive delegation and would be ultra vires. (972 D-Fl
(iii) Section 135(31 inasmuch as it makes the delegation con•ained
ill ss. 128 to I 35 (2) e'cessive must be severed from the rest of 1he
eectioru \\:hich are othen~:ise a proper delegation of legislative au 1hority
and should be struck down on the ground of ex.,.,ssivc delegation. [973 BJ
E
F
G
•.
H
MUNI. BOARD V. RAGHUVENDRA (Hidayatullah, J.)
953'
A
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 583 of
1962 .
Appeal by special leave from the judgi;nent and o!'1er, dat?'1,
November 23, 1959, of the Allahabad High Court m Special
Appeal No. 524 of 1958.
B
S. V. Gupte, Solicitor-General, Guru Dayal Srivastava and
T. Satyanarayana, for the appellant.
•
B. R. L. Iyengar and A. G. Ratnaparkhi,
Nos. 1, 2, 4, 8 & 12 to 14.
c
for
respondent$
C. B. Agarwal and 0. P. Rana, for Intervener No. 1.
A. V. Rangam, for Intervener No. 2.
G. C. Kasliwal, Advocate-General, for the State of Rajasthan·
and R. N. Sachthey, for Intervener No. 3.
D
I. N. Shroff, for Intervener No. 4.
The Judgment of GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., HIDAYATULLAH,
SHAH AND SIKRI, JJ was delivered by HIDAYATULLAH, J. WANCHOO·
J. delivered a dissenting Opinion.
E
-·
-
Hidayatollah J. The Municipal Board, Hapur (shortly the
appellant Board) passed a Special Resolution (No. 296) on
September 28, 1956 imposing water tax in Hapur from April l,
~957 and a notification by the Government of Uttar Pradesh was.
published in the Uttar Pradesh Gazette under s. 135(2) of the
U. P. Municipalities Act (Act 2 of 1916) dated December 11,
JI' 1956 notifying the resolution. Fifteen house owners of Hapur
who received notices from the appellant Board for the payment
of the tax assessed in respect of their houses, petitioned to the·
Htgh Court at Allahabad under Art. 226 of the Constitution and'
asked for a writ or order preventing the appellant Board from
realising the tax. Their contention was that the ta"{ was illegal as
G it was imposed in contravention of the provisions of the Municipalities Act. The main grounds of objection were (a) that the
resolution of the appellant Board framing the proposal was not
published in a local paper of Hapur printed in Hindi, and (b) that
the rules framed for the imposition of the tax did not accompany
the resolution which was affixed on the notice board at the office
H of the appellant Board in purported compliance with the requirements for publication. The imposition was also challenged on
the ground that Arts. 14 and 19 of the Constitution were violated ..
954
SUPREMB
COURT
REPORTS
[1966] I S.C.R.
The petition was heard by Mr. Juslice James who decided all A
the points against the appellant Board. He held that the tax
was illegal inasmuch as the mandatory requirements of the
Municipalities Act were not complied with by the appellant Board
while imposing the tax, and that s. 135(3) of the Act (which
cures all defects in the imposition of tax by making the notification
of Government conclusive evidence of the legality of the imposi- B
lion) was ultra vires Art. 14 of the Constitution because it created
a bar against proof and left no remedy to the tax payers thereby
making a discrimination between them and other litigants.
He
further held that the sub-section, by making Government the sole
judge of compliance with the Act conferred judicial power on
Government contrary to the intendment of the Constitution. The C
appellant Board was accordingly ordered not to collect the tax
from the petitioners. The appellant Board appealed under the
Letters Patent. The Divisional Bench hearing the special appeal
agreed with Mr. Justice James. The present appeal has been
filed by special leave of this Court. Since it will be necessary to
consider whether the appellant Board complied with the require- D
ments of the. Municipalities Act or not and, if not, to what extent,
it is necessary to analyse the provisions in the Municipalities Act
for the imposition of a tax and then to follow that up with a narration of the steps taken by the appellant Board.
E
Section 128 of the Municipalities Act confers on the Municipalities in Uttar Pradesh the power to levy taxes and enumerates
the kinds of taxes. One such tax mentioned in cl. ( x) of sub-s.
( 1) of the section reads : "a water tax on the annual value of
the building or land or both". This was the tax which the
Municipality had attempted to impose in Hapur. There can be F
no question that the appellant Board had the competence to impose
this tax and so the first question is whether it went about the
business in the wrong way and, if it did, what is the effect.
Section 129 specifies certain restrictions on the imposition of
water tax. We need not refer to them because no objection wa.s
raised that the restrictions there prescribed had not been observed. G
Sections 131 to 135 lay down the procedure for the imposition
of the tax. Section 131 provides that when a Board desires to
impose a tax it shall, by special resolution, frame a proposal
specifying the tax, the person or class of persons to be made
liable and the description of the property or other taxable things H
or circumstances in respect of which they arc to be made liable,
the amount or rate leviablc from such person or class of persons
and any other matter which the State Government may require
MUNI. BOARD v. RAGHUVENDRA
(Hidayatullah, !.)
A
955
by rules to be specified. The same section requires the Board to
prepare a draft of the rules which it desires the State Government
to make and the Board is required to publish the proposal, the
draft rules so framed, and a notice in the prescribed form, in the
manner laid down by s. 94. That section says that every resolution passed by a Board at a meeting, shall, as soon thereafter as
B
may be, be published in a local paper published in Hindi and
where there is no such local paper, in such manner as the State
Government may, by general or special order, direct. After the
notice etc. are published, s. 132 enables any inhabitant of the
Municipality to submit to the Board an objection in writing to
c all or any of the proposals framed by it and the Board is required
to consider the objection so submitted and to pass order thereon
by special resolution. If the Board decides to modify its proposals or any of them it must publish the modified proposals and
(if necessary) the revised draft rules with a fresh notice, for
objections. Any new objection so received has to be dealt with
n in the same way. After the Board has finally settled the proposals,
it has to submit the proposals, the objections (if any) and the
orders made in connection therewith, to the prescribed authority.
The prescribed authority under s. 2 ( 17) (ii) means an officer or a
body corporate appointed by the Stat~ Government in this behalf
by notification in the official Gazette, and, if no such officer or
be
E body corporate is appointed, the Commissioner. It may
stated that the proposal we are considering was accepted by the
Commissioner. Then follows s. 133 and it gives power to the
State Government or the prescribed authority to reject, sanction
or modify any proposal. When the proposals are sought to be
modified they have to be referred back to the Board f.;-r further
F consideration. When the proposals are sanctioned by the State
Government or the prescribed authority s. 134 of the Act requires
that the State Government, after taldng into consideration the
draft rules submitted by the Board, shall proceed to make such
rules, under its powers under s. 296 of the Act, in respect of
G the tax, as the Government may consider necessary. After the
rules have been made, the order of sanction and a copy of the
rules are sent to the Board and thereupon the Board by special
resolution directs the imposition of the tax with effect from a
date which it specifies in the resolution. This is stated in s. 13~
which may be reproduced here fully :
H
"135. Imposition of tax,( 1) A copy of the resolution passed under Section 134 shall be submitted to the State Government,
956
SCPREME
COURT
REPORTS
[1966) I S.C.R.
if the tax has been sanctioned by the State Government,
A
and to the Prescribed Authority, in any other case.
(2) Upon receipt of the copy of the resolution the
State Government, or Prescribed Authority, as the ca e
may be, shall notify in the official Gazette, the impo<ition of the tax from the appointed date, and the imposition of a tax shall in all cases be subject to the condirion
that it has been so notified.
( 3) A notification of the imposition of a tax under
sub-section (2) shall be conclusive proof that the tax
has been imposed in accordance with the provisions of
this Act."
B:
c
The appellant Board passed a special resolution in terms of
s. 131 ( 1) of the Act. The publication of the resolution was made
by affixing a copy of the resolution on the notice board as provided
by a notification dated July 5, 1916 and by beat of drum in the
town of Hapur. The resolution was, however, not publi,hed in D
a local paper published in Hindi as required by s. 94 (3 \ of the
Act. It is admitted that two Hindi weeklies entitled "Jnnmat"
and "Bharatvarsh" and one Hindi daily entitled "Vyanar" were
published at that time at Hapur. The anpellant Board did not
pblish the notice etc. in these journals because, in its onin;on,
non~ of these papers was a suitable JocaJ paper havin~ wid~ E
circulation in the town at the time. Notification of the S•h July,
1916 provides that, where, in a Munici~ality, there is no !<>cal
paper, a copy of every resolution passed hv a Board at a mee•ing
'hall. within ten days from the date of the meeting, be pa<ted up
and for thirty days be kepi pasted uo on a notice board to be F
c~hibited for public information at the building in which the meetings of the Board are ordinarily held.
Two objections against the tax found favour with the High
Court. The first objection arose from the non-observance of
,-. 94 ( 3) which, as already noticed, requires that the publication
of the proposal etc. should be in a local newspaper published in
Hindi. The High Court held that there was no need to take
recourse to the notification of the 5th of July 1916, because the
first part of s. 94(3) could be complied with. The next objection
against the tax w'1s that even if the special Resolution under s. 131
was prn.,erly published. the rules which ought to a~comnany
the Resolution were not exhibited. The appellant Board claimed
:h3t the court was precluded from making an enquiry by reason
<'f s. 135 (3) which made the notification conclusive evid 'n'e that
G
H
,
MUNI. BOARD v. RAGHUVENDRA
(Hidayatul/ah, !.)
957
the tax was imposed in accordance with the provisions of the ·
Municipalities Act. The respondents met this by challenging the
legality of the sub-section. They pleaded that it was discriminatory inasmuch as it did not allow one set of litigants to prove
their allegations as against the general body of litigants and
further that there was a conferral of judicial functions on the
B legislature which was contrary to the separation of powers u~der
the Constitution. The High Court accepted these contentions
also.
There can be no doubt that the language of s. 135 (3 \ is a5
wide as it is peremptory. Read literally it can lead to the con·C clusion that even an illegal tax cannot be questioned. Prima facie,
it appears that even if a Municipal Board goes outside the categories of taxes mentioned in s. 128 and if the Government is
persuaded to notify the imposition, all will be well. This cannot
be the intent and hence not the meaning. We must, therefore,
see if the words are susceptible of another construction obvitating
:D such a patently absurd result.
E
F
,G
\ff
There is at the very start the fundamental fact that the powe~
to tax in a State can only be exercised by the State Legislature,
the extent of the power being fixed by the Constitution. The taxes
which the State Legislatures are allowed to raise are enumerated
in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The State Legislature can impose all these taxes itself but it is usual to authorise
the levy of some of them by local authorities for their own purpose. Taxes so raised by a local authority are not imposed by
it as a legislature but as a delegate of the legislature. What is
done is binding by the authority of the legislature and the tax
is valid only if it is one of the taxes the delegate can raise and
the delegate imposes it in accordance with the conditions laid
down by the fogislature.
It is thus that we find an elaborate procedure prescribed by
all the Municipal Acts. In the U.P. Municipalities Act also,
as we have seen, a Board must first pass a special Resolution
framing a proposal and the draft rules, invite objections, consider
them, and then get them approved by Government. After this
approval there must be a final special resolution imposing the
tax from a particular date and the Government then notifies the
imposition of the tax. It is the duty of Government to see that
the various steps laid down for the imposition of the tax are
followed. Before it notifies the resolution Government satisfies
itself about the requirements. The notification is made conclusive proof that the tax is imposed in accordance with the provi-
956
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
[1966] I S.C.R.
· sions of the Act. The question arises : Is this rule of conclusive A
evidence such as to shut out all enquiry by couns ? We have no
hesitation in answering the question in the negative. There are
cenain matters which, of course, cannot be established conclusively by a notification under s. 135(3). For example, no notification can issue unless there is a special resolution. The special
resolution is the sine qua 11011 for the notification. The State B
Government cannot impose a tax all by itself by notifying the
imposition of the tax, without a resolution by the Board. Again,
the notification cannot authorise the imposition of a tax not
included in s. 128 of the Municipalities Act. Neither a Municipal
Board nor a State Government can exercise such a power. A tax
can only be said to be imposed in accordance with the provisions C
of the Municipalities Act, if it is contemplated by the Act. ·mere
is a difference between the tax and the imposition of the tax. The
fonner is the levy itself and the latter the m~thod bv which the
levy is imposed and collected. What the sub-section does is to
put beyond question the procedure by which the tax is imposed, D
that is to say, the various steps taken to impose it. A talC not
authorised can never be within the protection afforded to the
procedure for imposing taxes. Such a tax may be cballenged,
not with reference to the manner of the imposition but as an
illegal impost.
It would thus appear that at the very start the selection of
The
the tax must be with reference to the delegated powers.
Municipal Board of the State Government cannot select a tax
which the legislature has not mentioned in s. 128 of the Municipalities Act. As the State Government cannot itself impose the
tax it must have before it, the special resolution of the Board
before notifying the imposition. Between the special resolution
selecting a tax for imposition and the special resolution imf>O'ing it
sundry procedure is gone through and section 135 (3) says that
the notification by Government is conclusive proof that the procedure was correctly followed.
E
It is argued that ss. 131 to 134 use mandatory language and
it is the intention of the Legislature to secure obedience to its
wishes and therefore it is for the couns to say whether those provisions were followed by the Municipal Board and the State
Government. There can be no doubt that some of the provision>
are mandatory. But all provisions are not of the same character.
In Raza B1111/a11d Sugar Co. Ltd. v. The Municipal Board. Rampur(') ss. 131 to 134 were considered in the light of the tests
G
----
·--(!) [19651 I. S. C. R. 970.
F
H
MUNI. BOARD v. RAGHUVENDRA
A
•
B
C
D
...,
I
E
F
G
J
H
~.> '
(Hidayatullah, /.)
959,
usually applied to determine whether a provision of law is mandatory or directory. It was there pointed out that all the sections ino
spite of the language used in them were not mandatory.
The
majority opinion considered that the first part of s. 131 ( 3)
requiring publication of proposals was mandatory and the second
part which required that publication should be in the manner
required by s. 94(3) was only directory. In one of the minority
opinions no such distinction was made but s. 94(3) was held to
be directory. In the other minority opinion distinction was made
between provisions for the protection of tax payers which were
stated to be mandatory and provisions for promoting despatch,
publicity and efficiency were stated to be directory requiring substantial but not literal compliance. In that case the notice imposing water tax in Rampur was published in Hindi but in a newspaper published in Urdu. The majority treating the latter part
of s. 131 ( 3) as directory held that there was substantial compliance. The minority treating s. 131 ( 3) to be mandatory upheld
the tax treating s. 94 ( 3) as directory. One of the minority views.
relied upon s. 135 (3) as shutting out enquiry .
In Berar Swadeshi Vanaspati v. Municipal Committee Sheogaon & Anr. ( 1 ) the Municipality passed a resolution under
s. 67 (1) of the C. P. & Berar Municipalities Act, 1922. Subsections (1) to (7) incorporated provisions similar toss. 131-135
of the U. P. Municipalities Act. An attempt to question the tax
on the ground that the procedure prescribed by s. 67 was not
followed was repelled. It was observed :
" ...... This notification itherefore ;clearly is one
which directs imposition of octroi and falls within subs. (7) of s. 67 and having been notified in the Gazette
it is conclusive evidence of the tax having been imposed
in accordance with the provisions of the Act and it cannot be challenged on the ground that all the necessary
steps had not been taken."
The defect in the imposition of the tax here being of the same
character as in the two cases of this Court above cited, the imposition would have the protection of s. 135(3) and the tax must
be deemed to be imposed according to the procedure laid down
in the Act.
As observed already, some of the provisions controlling the
imposition of a tax must be fully complied with because they are
vital and therefore mandatory, and the others may be complied
(I) [1962] I S.C.R. 596.
960
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
[1966) l S.C.R.
with substantially but not literally, because they arc directory. Jn A
either case the agency for seeing to this compliance is the State
Government. It is hardly to be expected that the State Government would not do its duty or that it would allow breaches
-0f the provision to go unrectificd. One can hardly imagine that
an omission to comply with the fundamental provisions would
ever be condoned. The law reports show that even before the 8
addition of the provision making the notification conclusive
evidence of the proper imposition of the tax, complaints brougbt
before the courts concerned provisions dealing with publicity or
requiring ministerial fulfilment. Even in the two earlier case'
which reached this Court and also the present case, the complain1
c
is of a breach of one of the provisions which can only he regarded
as directory. In cases of minor departures from the letter of the
law especially in matters not fundamental, it is for the Government to see whether there has been substantial or reasonable compliance. Once Government condones the departure, the decision
of Government is rightly made final by making the notification D
conclusive evidence of the compliance with the requirements of
the Act. It is not necessary to investigate whether a complete lack
of observance of the provisions would be afforded the same pr<.>tcction.
It is most unlikely that this would ever happen and
before we pronounce our opinion we should like to see such a
case.
E
It was, however. contended that there has been excessive
delegation, inasmuch as the State Government has been given th~
power to condone breaches of the Act and thus to set at naught the
Act itself. This is not a right reading of the relevant provisions.
We have already pointed out that the power to tax i' conferred F
on the State Legislature but is exercised by the focal authoritv
under the control of the State Government. The taxes with which
we are concerned are local taxes for local needs and for which
local inquiries have to be made. They are rightly left to the
representatives of the local population which would bear the tax.
Such taxes must vary from town to town, from one Board to G
another. and from one commodity to another. It is im,.,ossible
for the Legislature to pass statutes for the imposition of such ta'te-;
in local areas. The power must be delegated. Regard bcin!! had
to the democratic set-up of the municipalities which need the
proceeds of these taxes for their own administration. it 1s proner
to leave to these municipalities the power to imnose and collect H
these taxes. The taxes are, however, predetermined and a procedure for consulting the wishes of the people is devised. 13ut the
;.'.i
·~·
~
"
-
,,
\
•
MUNI. BOAl\D v. llAGHUVENDllA
-
(Hidayatullah, I.)
961
matter is not left entirely in the hands of the MuriiCipal Boards.
As the State Legislature cannot superv~ the due observance of
its laws by the Municipal Boards, power is given to the State
Government to Clieck their actions. The imposition of the tax
is left to the Municipal Boards but the duty to see tliat the provisions for publicity, and obtaining the view~ of the persons to be
B taxed are fully complied with, ii laid upon the State Government.
The proceedings for the imposition of the tax, however, must
come to a conclusion at some stage after which it caiJ. be said
that the tax has been imposed. That stage is reached, not when
the special resolution of the Municipiil. Board is passed, but when
the notification by Government is issued. Now it is impossible
c to leave the matter open so that complaints about the imposition
of the tax or the breach of this rule or that may continue to be
raised. The door to objections must at some stage be shut and
the Legislature considers that, if the State Government approves
of the special resolution, all enquiry must cease. This is not a case
D ohncessive delegation unless one starts with the notion that the
State Government may collude with tho Municipal Board to disregard deliberately the provisions for the imposition of the tax.
There is no warrant for suck a supposition. The provision making
tho notification conclusive evidence of tho proper imposition of
tax is conceived in the best interest of compliance of the proviE sions by the Boards and not to facilitate their breach. It cannot,
therefore, be said that there is excessive delegation.
A
•
The matter may be looked at from another point of view.
Excessive delegation is most often found when the Legislature docs
not perform all the essential legislative functions and leaves them
l'<' to some other agency. The Legislature here performs all essential
functions in the imposition of the tax. The selection of tax for
imposition in a Municipal area is by the legislative will expressed
in s. 128. Neither the Municipal Board, nor the Govenunent
can go outside the List of taxes therein included. The procedure
for the imposition of the tax is also laid down by the Legislature
G for the Municipal Board to follow and the State Government is
there to ensure due observance of that procedure.
We have
already shown above that it would be impossible for the Legislature to legislate for the numerous Municipal Boards and local
authorities with a view to raising taxes for them. The provisions,
such as they are, are the best means of achieving consultation of
II the local population and close scrutiny of the actions of their
representatives in imposing the tax. The notification which issues
is given finality by the voiee of the Legislature. It would, thereLBSup.CI/65-18
962
SUPREME
COURT il!POiTS
[1966] 1 S.C.R.
-
fore, appear that in the selection of the tax and its imposition the A
Legislature plays a decisive part and also lays down the method
by which the tax is to be imposed. The Legislature does not make
local enquiries, hear objections and decide them-functions which
:ire most inappropriate for the Legislature to perform. 111is task:
is delegated to the appellant Board which is the representative
body of the local population on whom the tax is levied. In other B
words, all the essential functions of Legislation are perfom1ed by
the State Legislature and only the minor functions necessary for
the imposition of the taX and the enquiries which must be made
to ascertain local opinion are left to the Municipal Boards. An
additional check is available as Government can veto the actions
of a Board if it docs not carry out the mandate of the Legislature. C
In our judgment, there was no excessive delegation or a conferral
of Legislative functions on the appellant Board or th~ State
Government.
It remains to consider two other arguments in the case. The
first is the question of discrimination which is said to arise from D
the proviso which makes the notification conclusive in respect of
the procedure by which the tax is imposed. There are numerous
statutes, including the Evidence Act, in which a fact is taken to
be conclusively proved from the existence of some other fact.
TI1e law is full of fictions and irrcbuttable presumptions which
al.so involve proof of facts. It has never been suggested before E
that when the Legislature says that enquiry into the truth or otherwise of a fact shall stop at a given stage and the fact taken to be
conclusively proved, a question of discrimination arises. The
tax payers in the Municipality are allowed under the Municipalities
Act to object to the proposal for the tax and the rules and to have f
their objections considered. They cannot. of course, be allowed
to keep on agitating and a stage must come when it may be said
that the provisions of the 'Act have been duly observed. Th.it
~tage is reached after Government has scrutinized the proposal,
the rules, the objections and the orders and ha.s approved of the
proposal, a special resolution is passed by the Municipal Board G
and a notification is issued. It cannot be said that sub·s. ( 3) of
s. 135 which leads to the conclusion that the imposi!ion of the
tax is according to the Municipalities Act is discriminatory
because it only concludes objections agaimt the rrocedure
followed in the imposition of the tax.
The next objection that the impugned sub·scction involves the 11
exercise of judicial functions not open to the Legislature, is wholly
erroneous. The sub-section only shuts out further enquiry and
"
'T
4.'
MUNI. BOARD v. RAGHUVEND!lA
•
'
}
•
(Wanchoo, I.)
963
A makes the notification final. There is no exercise of a judicial
function. In our country there is no rigid separation of powers
and the legislature often frames a rule such as is incorporated in
!he third sub-section of s. 135. The Evidence Act is full of such
provisions. In the United States of America where the separation
of pewers is extremely rigid in some of the constitutions of the
B States it may be open to objection that the Legislature in shutting
out enquiry into the truth of a fact encroaches up0n the judicial
power of the State. Such disability has never been found to exist
in our country although legislation of this type is only too frequent
The objection is, therefore without substance.
In the result we are 'of opinion that the judgment of the High
c Court
under appeal must be set aside. We accordingly set it
aside and order the dismissal of the petition under Arts. 226 and
227 of the Constitution from which the present appeal has arisen,
In the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to
costs.
D
Wanchoo J. I regret I am unable to agree.
This appeal by special leave from the judgment of the
Allahabad High Court raises thc:,"1'Uestion of vires of s. 135(3)
of the U.P. Municipalities Act, NO'. 2 of 1916, (hereinafter
referred to as the Act). The facts in the case are not in dispute
E and may be briefly stated. The appellant, namely, the Municipal Board Hapur, decided to impose water tax from April 1,
1957. In consequence, steps were taken under ss. 131 to 135
of the Act to effebt!Jate that purpose. However, proposals and
draft rules were never published as required by s. 131 ( 3) of
the Act. All that was done was that a notice in the form set
F forth in Sch. III was pasted on the notice-board and there was
some beat of drum with respect to the notice. Even so, the
draft rules were not appended to the notice which was put up
on the notice-board and in effect there was more or less no
compliance with the provisions relating ito ,the publication of
proposals and draft rules. Eventually a notification was issued
G under s. 135 (2) of the Act by the relevant authority about the
imposition of the tax from April 1, 1957. Thereafter collection
of tax began. The respondents who are residents of Hapur
received notices for payment of tax. Thereupon they filed a
writ petition in the High Court, and their main grievance wa~
H that the provisions of s. 131 relating to publication of proposals
and draft rules were not complied with and thus they were de·
prived of an opportunity to file objections as provided under
s. 132 of the Act. They contended that the publication as pro-
964
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
[1966) I S.C.R.
vided in s. 131 of the Act was mandatory and as a mandatory
provision of the Act was not complied with, the imposition of the
tax was invalid.
A
•
The petition was heard by a learned Single Judge who found,
as already indicated that the provisions of s. 131 (3) relating to
publication had not been complied with, consequently, the residents of Hapur had no "'opportunity of making objections to the
proposals and draft rules. Reliance however was placed on
behalf of the appellant ()n s. 135(3) of the Act, which is in these
terms:"A notification of the imposition of a tax under subsection (2) shall be conclusive proof that the tax ha.,
been imposed in accordance with the provi,ions of thi'
Act."
JI.
C
In reply to this, the respondents contended that s. 135 ( 3) was
ultra vires, and this contention was accepted by the learned Single
Judge. He therefore allowed the petihon and directed the appel- D
!ant not to collect water tax from the respondents until ~uch
time as the tax was imposed 1n strict compliance with the provisions of the Act
Then there was an appeal by the appellant to a Division
Bench. There also reliance was placed on s. 135 ( 3) of the Act.
The Division Bench upheld the order of the learned Single Judge,
though its approach to s. 135(3) was different. It held that
s. 135 (3) was not a provision for validating anything done with·
out complying with the provisions of the Act and it could not
protect the invalidity of a tax if it was invalid on account of
its being imposed without following the legal procedure. Then
there was an application by the appellant for a certificate to appeal
to this Court, which was refused by the High Court. The appellant thereupon got special leave and that is how the matter has
come up before this Court.
The main contention on behalf of the appellant before this
court is that s. 135(3) which Jays down that the notification
under s. 135(2) would be conclusive procf that the tax had been
imposed in accordance with the provisions of the Act bars any
enquiry into the various procedural steps taken for the imposition
of the tax, and the court where such a question is raised must
hold that the tax has been imposed in accordance with the
provisions of the Act. Once the court comes to that conclusion
it would mean that it must assume that the necessary procedural
steps for imposing tax had all been properly complied with and
F
G
,.
H
MUNI. BOARD v. RAGHUVENDRA
•
\
(Wanchoo, !.)
965
A therefore there could not be any invalidity of the tax on the
ground that all steps necessary for the valid imposition of the
tax had not been taken. It is further submitted that s. 135 ( 3)
bars enquiry as to the procedural steps necessary for imposing
the tax which are contained in ss. 131 to 133 of the Act, and it
is urged that what a court can enquire is whether the special
B resolution as required by s. 134 ha8 been passed by the municipality or not.
On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents contends that ifs. 135(3) is to be given the meaning for which the
appellant contends it will be ultra vires because then there will
C be an abdication of its essential legislative functions by the
legislatures with respect to imposition of tax and therefore
s. 135(3) would be bad on the ground of excessive delegation.
It is further urged on behalf of the respondents that s. 135 ( 3)
read literally not only bars enquiry into procedural steps necessary
for the imposition of the tax, which, according to learned counD sel, are contained in ss. 131 to 135(1) but also bars enquiry
as to whether the tax is in accordance with ss. 128 to 130, which
arc substantive provisions with respect to taxes which can be
imposed by municipal boards. Learned counsel for the respondents thus urges that s. 135 (3) would give blanket power fo1
the imposition of any tax whether it is contained in s. 128 01
E not and wonld also permit violating the restrictions contained
in ss. 129 and 130; and if that be so, it would be a case of
complete abdication of its essential functions by the legislature
with respect to imposition of tax and a gross case of excessive
delegation. The question that falls for consideration therefore
is about the scope of s. 135 (3) and whether on a true interF pretation of that provision it can be said to amount to a case
of excessive delegation and therefore liable to be struck down
on that count.
Before I come to s. 135(3) I may indicate the scheme of
municipal taxation contained in ss. 128 to 135 of the Act.
Section 128 mentions the taxes which a board may impose subG ject to any general rules or special orders of the State Govern.
ment in this behalf. Section 129 lays down certain restrictions
on the imposition of water-tax and s. 130 lays down certain
restrictions on the imposition of certain other taxes. Section
130-A specifies the powers of the State Government to require
a board to impose taxes. Then comes section 131 to 135 which
H
are obviously procedural provisions with respect to imposition
of any tax mentioned in s. 128. That these are procedural provisions is clear from s. 13 6 of the Act which lays down that the
966
SUPJlEMB
COURT
JlEPORTS
[1966] l S.CR.
procedure for abolishing a tax or for altering a tax in respect of
certain matters shall, so far as may be, be the procedure prescribed by ss. 131 to 135 for the imposition of a tax. The
essentials of the procedure contained in ss. 131 to 135 may be
briefly summarised thus. When a board desires to impose a tax
it has to pass a special resolution framing proposal~ specifying
the tax, the persons or class of persons on whom the tax will
be imposed, the amount or rate Ieviab!e and any other matter
referred to in s. 153 which the State Government requires by
rules to be specified. The board has also to prepare a draft of
the rules which it desires the State Government to make in that
behalf. After the proposals and draft rules have been prepared.
the board is required to publish them along with a notice in the
form set forth in Sch. III : (sec s. 131). On the publication
of the notice along with the proposal~ and draft rules any inhabitant of the municipality has the right to submit objections in
writing and the board has to take such objections into consideration and pass orders thereon by special resolution. If the board
decides to modify its proposals, it shall publish the modified proposals and (if necessary) revised draft rules in the same manner
as the original proposals and draft rules were published. If any
objections are received to the modified proposals they arc again
dealt with by the board which has to pass orders thereon by
special resolution. When the board has finally settled its proposals, it has to submit them along with the objections (if any)
to the proper authority, s. (132). The proper authority may
either refuse to sanction the proposals or return them to the board
for further consideration or sanction them without modifications
or with such modification not involving an increase of rhe amount
to be imposed, as it deems fit; (section 133). Whell' the proposals have been sanctioned by the proper authority, the State
Government after taking into consideration the draft rules submitted by the board has to make such rules in respect of the tax
as for the time being it considers necessary. When the rules
have been made, the order of sanction and a copy of the rules
has to be sent to the board and thereupon the board has by
special resolution to direct the imposition of the tax with effect
from a date to be specified in the resolution : (s. 134). Thereafter a copy of the resolution pas.sed under s. 134 is submitted
to the proper authority. Upon receipt of the copy of the resolution the proper authority has to notify in the official gazette the
imposition of the tax from the appointed day and the imposition
of a tax shall in all cases be subject to the condition that it has
been so notified.
A
•
c
D
E
G
H
MUNI. BOARD v. RAGHUVENDRA
A
•
B
c
D
•'> '
(Wanchoo, !.)
967
It will be seen from the above procedural provisions that
the legislature has taken great care to see that the tax is imposed
after the inhabitants of a municipality have had a chance to make
representations in that behalf and after the tax has been approved
at all stages including the disposal of objections by means . of
special resolutions, which require a special quorum for the meeting
in which they are passed. Further the legislature has taken care
to provide that the disposal of objections by , a board even by
special resolution is not sufficient and it has required that the
objections shall be sent to the proper authority, presumably for
its consideration before it sanctions the tax. These provisions
to my mind indicate the safeguards the legislature intended in
a case of this kind where the legislature itself has not indicated
the rate of tax but has merely indicated the heads of taxation and
the fixation of rate of tax and all incidental matters have been
delegated to the board subject to the supervision of the State
Government. It is after all this elaborate procedure has been
gone through that a tax can be validly imposed by the delegate,
namely the board.
This brings us to s. 135 ( 3) which has already been set out.
The first question that arises is the interpretatioR of this provision.
As I have already indicated two different submissions have been
made in this connection on behalf of the parties. The appellant
E submits that this section only bars enquiry by the court into the
procedural provisions contained in s. 131 to s. 133. On the
other hand, the respondents contend that this provision bars
enquiry into all matters contained in s. 128 to s. 135(1). If
the words of this provision were to be literally interpreted they
lay down that the notification under s. 135(3) shall be conclusive
¥ proof that the tax has been imposed in accordance with the
provisions of the Act. The last words are very wide and it is
contended on behalf of the respondents that they would include
all the provisions of the Act and once a notification is issued
under s. 135(2) the court is barred from inquiring whether the
tax is against any of the provisions of the Act. I feel however
G that even though the words may be capable of such a wide interpretation, as is being put upon them on behalf of the respondents,
it would not be right to read them as if they provide that a
notification under s. 135(2) bars enquiry even. into the question
whether the tax is one which could be imposed by the board at
all under s. 128. It would to my mind be proper to read the
H
section in a restricted sense and to hold that when it speaks of
tax being imposed "in accordance with the provisions of this
Act" it refers only to the procedural provisions relating to the
968
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
[1966] I S.C.R.
imposition of tax_ by the board. The legislature by these words
co~d not have mtended that the board could impose any t;u
which was even not within the legislative competence of the
State legislature and enquiry into that aspect would also be
barred. Therefore I must reject the extreme argument on behalf
of the respondents that these words mean that the court is barred
from enquiring even whether the tax imposed is such as can be
properly imposed by a board under s. 128 of the Act. I must
read down ~ese w?rds only to mean that they bar an enquiry
as to comphance with the procedural provisions of the Act with
respect to the imposition of a tax.
This brings me to the next question namely whether the bar
created by this provision is only with respect to s. 131 to s. 133
as urged on behalf of the appellant or goes further. I have
already indicated that the procedural provisions for the imposition of a tax by the board are contained in ss. 131 to 135 (1).
It is after these procedural provisions are complied with that a
notification under s. 135(2) is issued. I can understand
s. 135 (3) being restricted in its application to procedural provisions only with respect to the imposition of a tax; but I cannot
understand how that provision can be read down further so that
it bars enquiry only into some procedural provisions i.e. from
s. 131 to s. 13 3, and not into the other procedural provisions
i.e. s. 134 and s. 135 (I). I can see no way of reading
s. 135(3) in the manner suggested on behalf of the appellant.
I must therefore hold that s. 135 ( 3) bars enquiry by courts into
all procedural provisions relating to imposition of taxes and
therefore it bars enquiry into any matter covered by s. 131 to
s. 135 (1) of the Act.
This brings me to another question namely, what is the nature
of the provision contained ins. 135(3) of the Act. Is it merely
a rule of evidence as urged on behalf of the appellant or i~ ir
more than that and is a substantive provision in itself ? This
Court had occasion to consider the question whether a rule of
irrebuttable presumption was a rule of evidence or a substantive
provision in lshar Ahmad Khan v. Union of India(') and observed that "the proper approach to adopt would be to consider
whether fact A from the proof of which a presumption is required
to be drawn about the existence of fact B is inherently relevant
in the matter of proving fact B and has inherently any probative
or persuasive value in that behalf or not. If fact A is inherently
relevant in proving the existence of fact B and to any r:itional
(I) (1962) Supp. 3 S.C.R. l3S.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
1·-
-
MUNI. BOARD v. RAGHUVENDRA
•
•
_, j.
\
(Wanchoo, I.)
969
A mind it would bear a probative or persuasive value in the matter
of proving the existence of fact B, then a rule prescribing either
a rebuttable presumption or an irrebuttable presumption in that
behalf would be a rule of evidence. On the other hand, if fact
A is inherently not relevant in proving the existence of fact B
or has no probative value in that behalf and yet a rule _is made
B prescribing for a rebuttable or an irrebuttable presumption in
that connection, that rule would be a rule of substantive law and
not a rule of evidence." It is on this principle that I must consider whether s. 135 ( 3) is merely a rule of evidence or a substantive provision. To my mind it cannot be said from the mere
fact that a notification has been published under s. 135(2) that
C that fact is inherently relevant in showing that all the procedural
provisions have been complied with; nor can it be said that that
fact has inherent probative or persuasive value. There is in my
opinion no inherent connection between the publication of a
notification under s. 135(2) and the compliance with all the
procedural provisions (namely, s. 131 to s. 135(1) ) of the Act.
D It will all depend on whether the proper authority has been
vigilant or not in seeing that all the provisions contained from
s. 131 to s. 135 ( 1) have been complied with. I would therefore
hold that s. 135 ( 3) is not a rule of evidence; it is a substantive
provision which lays down in effect that once a notification under
E s. 135 (2) is issued it will be conclusively presumed that the tax
is in accordance with all the procedural provisions with respect
to the imposition thereof. In other words, the effect of the substantive provision contained in s. 135(3) really comes to this.
namely, that all the provisions from s. 131 to s. 135(1) are wiped
out and the notification issued under s. 135 (2) becomes the sole
F basis of the imposition of tax. It has been said that there is
no reason to suppose that the proper authority will not see that
the provisions of s. 131 to s. 135(1) are complied with and that
there is no reason to presume that the provision of s. 135(3)
will be abused. So far as the first aspect is concerned it is
obvious in this very case that the proper authority has not seen
G that the provisions of s. 131 to s. 133 have been complied with.
As to the second I do not say that the proper authority will
abuse the provisions of s. 135(3); but that does not in my
opinion make any difference to the devastating effect of that provision on compliance with the procedural provisions contained in
s. 131 to s. 135 ( 1) of the Act in the matter of imposition of tax.
H The effect of s. 135 (3) which in my opinion is a substantive
provision is that the procedural provisions are given a complete
go-by in the matter of imposition of tax and as soon as a notifi-
970
SUPRE:vlf.
COURT
REPORTS
[1966] l S.C.R.
cation under s. 135 (2) is shown to the court, the court is helples.,
in the matter, even though none of the provisions of s. 131 to
s. 135 (1) may have been complied with. This in my opinion
is the effect of s. 135 ( 3), as it stands and there is no question
of presuming that the proper authority would abuse that provision. Irrespective of the abuse or otherwise of that provision.
the effect thereof in my opinion is to wipe out all the procedural
safeguards provided in s. 131 to s. 135 (1) of the Act relating
to imposition of tax and to make the tax a completely valid
imposition so long as there is a notification under s. 135(2).
On this interpretation of s. 135(3) a serious question arises
whether it is a provision which can be said to be intra vires. As
I have already indicated, this is a case of delegation of power
to impose tax in so far as its rate and incidence is concerned.
Generally speaking. I am of opinion that it is the duty of a legislature when imposing a tax· to specify the rate at which the tax
is imposed, for the rate of tax, again speaking generally, is one
of the essentials of the taxing power given to the legislature. But
I cannot fail to recognise that there may be situations where the
legislature may delegate to a subordinate authority the power
to fix the rate under proper safeguards. It is not necessary to
specify all the situations where this can be done. But there can
be no doubt that in the matter of local taxation like taxation by
municipal boards, district boards and bodies of that character
there is pre-eminently a case for delegating the fixation of the
rate of tax to the local body, be it a municipal board or a district
board or some other board of that kind. The reason for this
is that problems of different municipalities or districts may be
different and one municipality may require one kind of tax at
a particular rate at a particular time while another municipality
may need another kind of tax at another rate at some other time.
Therefore, the legislature can in the case of taxation by local
bodies delegate even the authority to fix the rate to the local body
provided it has taken care to specify the safeguards in the fom1
of procedural provisions or such other forms as it considers
necessary in the matter of fixing the rate. So far as I know
practically all Municipal Acts provide safeguards of the nature
contained in ss. 131 to 135 ( l) of the Act or some other prov;sions which are equally effective in the matter of controlling the
fixation of rate of tax by a delegate of the legislature. In such
a case where delep.ation of fixing the rate has been made by the
legislature to a subordinate body with proper safeguards, it cannot be said that the legislature bas abdicated its essential functions In the matter of taxing legislation by delegating the rate
A
8
c
D
E
F
G
H
MUNI. BOARD
"J
'
v. RAGHUVENDRA (Wanchoo, !.)
971
A of taxation to be determined under proper safeguards by the
delegate. Nor can such delegation be struck down as a case of
excessive delegation which means that the legislature has abdicated its essential legislative functions in the matter of the legislation concerned. But there is ample authority for the view that
where the legislature has abdicated its essential legislative funcB tions and has made a delegation which may be called excessive
such excessive delegation may be struck down. I may in this.
connection refer to two decisions of this. Court, namely, In re The
Delhi Laws Act, 1912( 1 ) and Rajnarain Singh v. The Chairman,
Patna Administration (j:ommillee ( 2 ). It has been held in these
cases that an essential legislative function cannot be delegated
C by the legislature. Exactly what constitutes essential function
cannot be enunciated in general terms. But the essential legislative function consists in the determination of the legislative
policy and its formulation as a binding rule of conduct. It cannot be said that an unlimited right of delegation is inherent in the
legislative power itself. This is not warranted by the provisions
D of the Constitution and the legitimacy of delegation depends
entirely upon its being used as an ancillary measure which the
legislature considers to be necessary for the purpose of exercising
its legislative powers effectively and completely. The legislature
must retain in its own hands the essential legislative functions
E which consist in declaring the legislative policy and laying down
the standard which is to be enacted into a rule of law and what
can be delegated is the task of subordinate legislation which by
its very nature is ancillary to the statute which delegates the
power to make it. Provided the legislative policy is enunciated
with sufficient clearness or a standard is laid down, the courts
F should not interfere with the discretion that undoubtedly rests.
with the legislature itself in determining the extent of delegation
necessary in a particular case.
In these two cases the question arose whether certain laws
could be applied to certain areas with such modification as the
executive authority deemed fit to make. It was held that where the
G executive authority was permitted, at its discretion, to apply without modification (save incidental changes such as name and
place), the whole of any law already in existence in any part
of India, that would be good. Further the executive authority
could even be authorised to select future laws in a similar way
and to apply them to certain areas. But where the authorisation
H was to repeal laws already in force in the area and either
substitute other laws with or without modification, this was held
(I) (1951] S.C.R. 747.
(l) (1955] I S.C.R. 290.
972
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
[1966] l S.C.R.
to be excessive delegation and ultra vires. Further where the
modifica.tion in a law to be applied did not affect any essential
change m the law and alter its policy it could be modified to
that e~tent and applied by the. executive authority under delegated
authonty. But where a modification affects a radical change in
the policy of the law to be applied such an authority could not
be delegated and would be ultra vires.
A
B
It is on the basis of these principles that I have to see whether
s. 135 ( 3) can be upheld. There is no doubt that the legislature
delegated its power of imposing taxes, including the power to
fix the rate, to the municipal board by s. 128 with respect to
taxes specified therein. I have already said that generally speak· C
ing the fixation of rate of tax is one of the essential legislative
functions but there may be situations where it may not be considered to be an essential legislative function and may be dele·
gated by the legislature to subordinate authorities with proper
safeguards. I have also said that in the field of local taxation
relating to municipal boards and district boards and similar other D
bodies there are reasons for delegating fixation of the rate to
such bodies subject to proper safeguards. This is exactly what
has been done under the Act subject to the safeguards contained
in ss. 131 to 135 ( 1 ) . If those safeguards are followed, the de!·
gation in my opinion would be a proper delegation and could
not be challenged as ultra vires on the ground of excessive delc- E
gation. But if the legislature after laying down with great care
safeguards as to the imposition of tax including its rate makes
a blanket provision like s. 135 ( 3), which at one stroke does away
with all those safeguards--and this is what in my opinion
s. 135 ( 3) has done in the present case-the position that results F
after such provision is that there is delegation of even the essen·
tial function of fixing the rate to the subordinate authority with
out any safeguard. Such a delegation would in my opinion be
excessive delegation and would be ultra vires.
The question then is whether in the present case I should
save the delegation contained in s. 128 read with the safeguards
provided in s. 131 to s. 135 (I) for the imposition of variou.•
taxes mentioned therein or upholds. 135(3) which in one sweep
does away with all the safeguards. Tn my opinion s. 135(3) is
severable and the legislature would have provided for various
safeguards contained in s. 131 to s. 135 (I) when it delegated the
power to impose a tax including the fixation of rate to municipal
boards. It would therefore in my opinion be right to hold that
sections 128 to 135(2) indicate proper delegation of the authority
G
•
11
MUNI. BOARD v. RAGHUVENDllA
•
•
(Wanchoo, /.)
97~
A of the legislature to impose taxes specified in s. 128 and that it
is sub-s. ( 3) of s. 135 which should be struck down because it
is the only provision which makes the delegation excessive. I
would therefore hold that s. 135 ( 3) inasmuch as it makes the
delegation contained in ss. 128 to 135(2) excessive must be
severed from the rest of the sections which are otherwise a proper
B exercise of delegation of legislative authority and should be struck
down on the ground of excessive delegation.
c
I would therefore dismiss the appeal with costs and uphold
the order of the High Court holding that the tax imposed by the
appellant had not been validly imposed, though on a different
ground.
ORDER BY COURT
D
. I
'
In accordance with the opinion of the majority the appeal is
allowed. No order as to costs.
·
Report an error or ask for masking: grievance@lawgrids.org