DR. RAM MANOHAR LOHIA versus STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 7 September 1965 | [1966] 1 S.C.R. 709 | 1965 INSC 175
Key facts
- Decided
- 7 September 1965
- Bench
- A.K. SARKAR*, M. HIDAYATULLAH*, RAGHUBAR DAYAL*, J.R. MUDHOLKAR, R.S. BACHAWAT
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 79/1965
- Disposal
- Case Allowed
- Citation
- [1966] 1 S.C.R. 709
- Neutral citation
- 1965 INSC 175
Text of the judgment
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DR. RAM MANOHAR LOHIA
v.
STAIE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS
September 7, l 965
[A. K. SARKAR, M. HIDAYATULLAH, RAGHUBAR DAYAL,
J. R. MUDHOLKAR AND R. S. BACHAWAT, JJ.]
Defence of India Rules, 1962, r. 30(1) (b)-"Public order" and "law
and order", difference between-Scope of rule.
Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 359(1)-President's Order suspending
rights under A"ts. 21 and 22-Right to move Supreme Court under Art.
on.
c 32-Efject
Rule 30( 1) (b) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, provided that a
Stat~ Government might, if it was satisfied with respect to a person that
with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial, inter
alia to "public safety and maintenance of public order" it is necessary
to do so~ order him to be detained. A Distric~ Magistrate to whom the
power of the Government qf the State of Bihar had been delegated under
s. 40(2) of the Defence of India Act, 1962, ordered the deten:ion of the
D petitioner under 'the rule.
The order stated that the District Magistrate was satisfied, that with a
view to prevent the petitioner from acting in any manner prejudicial to
the "public safety and the maintenance of law and order," it was necessary to detain him. Prior to the making of the order the District Magistrate had, however, recorded a note stating that having read lhe report
of the Police Superintendent that the peti·tioner's being at large was
E prejudicial to "public safety and maintenance of public ordt!r'', he \vas
satisfied that the petitioner should be detained under the rule. ~fhe petitioner moved this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution for a writ of
habeas corpus directing his release from detention, contending that : (i)
though an order of detention to prevent acts prejudicial to public order
may be justifiable an order to prevent acts prejudicial to law and order
would not be justified by the rule; (ii) the order mentioned a notifiootion
which did not contain the necessary delegation; (iii) the District MagisF trate acted beyond his jurisdiction by considering the danger not only
in his district but in the entire State; and (iv) all the conditions mentioned
in the rule must be cumulatively applied hefore the order of detention
could be made. The respondent-State raised a preliminary obJection,
that the President of India had made an Order under Art. 359(1) that the
right of a person to move any court for the enforcement of the rights
confe"ed by Arto. 21 and 22 shall remain suspended for the period during
which the proclamation of emergency under Art. 352 was in force, if
G such person had been deprived of any such rights under the Defence of
India Act or any rule made thereunder, and that therefore, this Court was
prevented from entertaining the petition.
HELD: (Per Full Court) : (i) The petition was maintainable.
Per Sarkar, J. : The order of the President does not form a bar to all
appJications for release from detention under the Act or the Ruies. Where
person was detained in violation of the mandatory provisions of the
u aDefence
of India Act his right to move the Court was not suspended.
Since the petitioner contended that the order of detention was not justitied bv the Act or Rules and was therefore against the provisions of the
Act, th-, petitioner was entitled to be heard. [716 G; 717 A-Bl
710
IUPUIO COURT REPORTS
[1966] I i.C.&
Per Hidayatullah and Bachawat, JJ. : The net result of the President'•
Order is to stop all claims to enforce rights ansing from Jaws olher than tho
Dolence of India Act and the Rules, and the provisions of Arl. 22 at
variance with the Defence of India Act and the Rules are of no avail. But
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the deprivauon must be a1 good fallh under the Defence of India Act or any
rule or order made thereunder. The President's Order docs not say that
even if a person is proi..cedc<l aga1n~t in b. each ot the l.)cfcnce of India
Act or the Rules or ma/a fide he cannot move the Court to comploin that
tho Act and the Rules under colour of which some action was taken, do
not warrant it. It follows, therefore, that this Court acting under Ari. 32
on a petition for th~ issue of a writ of habeas corpus must no~ allow
breaches of lhe Deience of India Act or the Rules to go unquestivned, aa
Art. 359 and the President's Order were not intended to condone an illegitimate enforcement o[ the D::fence of India Act. [731 B, E, F; 733 B-C)
Per Raghubar Dayal, J, : This Court can investigate whether the District
Magistrate exercised the power under r. 30 hones1Jy and bona fide, or not,
that is, whether he ordered detention on being satisfied as required by r. 30.
(748 HJ
Per Mudholkar, J. : Before an entry into the portals of this Court
could be dented to a detenu, he must be shown an order under r. 30(1)
of the Defence of India Rules made by a competent authority stating that
it was satisfied that the de:enu was likely 10 indulge in activi1ies which
would be prejudicial to one or more of the matters referred to in the rule.
If th-o detenu con'ends that the order, though it purports to be under
r. 30( I), was not competently made, this Court has the duty to enquire
into the matter. Upon an examination of the order, if the Court finds that
it was not competently made or was ambiguous, it must exercise its powen
under Art. 32, entertain the petition thereunder and make an appropriate
order. [755 H; 756 A-Bl
Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab, [1964) 4 S.C.R. 797 followed.
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(ii) Per Sarkar, Hidayatullah, Mudholkar and Bachawat JJ. : The petitioner should be set at liberty.
Per Sarkar J. : The order detaining the petitioner would not be in
terms of the rule unless it could be said that the expression "law and order"
means the same thing as "public order''. What was meant by maintenance
of public order was the prevention of disorder of a grave nature, a disorder
which the authorities thought was necessary to prevent in view of the
emergent situation created by external aggression; whereas, the expr~ion
"maintenance of law and order" may mean prevention of disorder of
comparatively lesser gravity and of local significance only. [718 B, D, BJ
Courts arc only entitled to look at the face of the order, bccau~ the
aatisfi.ction which justifies the order under the rule is the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. If on its face an order of detention i!
in terms of the rule. ordinarily, a court is hound to stay ils hands and
uphold the order. When an order is on the face of it not in terms of the
rule, a cour' cannot enter into an investigation whether the order of dcten·
tion was in fac! in terms of lhe rule. So the Sta'.e canno! be heard to say
of prove that an order was in fact made 10 prevcn~ ac's prcjud:cial to public
order though the ord~r docs not say so. It io; not a case where the order
is onlv evidence of the de 1eniion having ht!en made under th'! rule. The
order 'is conclu9ive as to the state of !he mind of the per.;on who made it
and no evid~nce is admissible to prove that state of mind. Extraneou.'
evidence such a~ the no'e made by the District Magistrate was not admis.sihle to orove that the rule ha~ been complied with. [718 G-H; 718 B-D;
720 G: 722 B-C)
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R. M. LOHIA v. STATE (Sarkar, l.)
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This is not taking too technical a view, but is a matter of substance.
H a man can be deprived of his liberty under a rule by the simple process
of the making of an order, he can only be so depri>ed if the order is in
terms of the rule. If for the purpose of justifying the detention such compliance by itself is enough, a non-compliance must have a contrary effect
A mere reference in the detention order to the rule is not sufficient to show
that by "law and order" what was meant was public order". [719 F-G;
720 A-CJ
The order no doubt mentions another ground of detention, namely, the
prevention of acts prejudicial to public safety, and in so far as it did so,
it was clearly within the rule. But the order has notwithstanding this, to
be held illegal, though it mentioned a ground on which a legal order of
detention could have been based, because, it could not be said in what
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manner and to what extent the valid and invalid grounds operated on the
mind of the authority concerned and contributed to the creation of his
subjective satisfaction. [722 E; G-H]
Shibban Lal Saksena v. State of U.P. [1954] S.C.R. 418, followed.
Per Hidayatullah and Bachawat, JJ. : The satisfaction of the detaining
authority cannot be subjected to objective tests and courts are not to exer-
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cise appellat» powers over such authorities and an order proper on its
face, passed by a competent authority in good faith, would be a complete
answer to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. But when from the order
itself circumstances appear which raise a doubt whether the officer concerned had not misconceiv:d his own powers, there is need ,to pause and
enquire. The enquiry then is, not with a \iew to investigate the suffi-
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ciency of the materials but into the officer's notions of his power.
If
the order passed by him showed that he thought his powers were more
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extensive than they actually were, the order might fail to be a good order.
No doubt, what matters is the substance; but the form discloses the approach
of the detaining authority to the serious question and the error in the form
raises the enquiry about the substance. When the liberty of the citizen
i.s put within the reach of authority and the scrutiny by courts is barred,
the action must comply not only with the substantive requirements of
law but also with those forms which alone can indicate that the substance
h"" been complied with. [739 H; 740 B-C, E; 741 C; Fl
The District Magistrate acted to "maintain law and order" and hi3
order could not be read differently even if there was an affidavit the other
way. If he thought in terms of "public order" he should have said so in
his order, or explained bow the error arose. A mere reference to his
earlier note was not sufficient and the two expressions cannot be reconciled by raising an air of similitude between them.
The contravention of
law always affect• order but before it can be said to affect public order, it
must affect the community or the public at large. One has to imagine
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three concentric circles, the largest representing "law and order~', the next
representing ..public order" and the smallest representing 0 security of
State". An act may affect "law and order" but not "public order," just
as an act may affect "public order" but not "security of the State". Therefore, by using the expression "maintenance of law and order" the District
Ma~strate was widening his own field of action and was addinv. a clause
to the Defence of India Rules. [740 E-F, H; 746 B-E; 747 D, E]
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The order on its face shows two reasons, but it was not certain that the
District Magistrate was influenced by one consideration and not both,
because, it was not open to the Court to enquire into the material on which
the Di~trict Magistrate acted. or to examine the reasons to see whether
hi• action fell within the other topic, namely, public safety. [746 F-G]
712
SUPllEMB OOllllT llEPORTS
[1966] l s.c I<.
J'er Mudholkar J.: The use of the expression "maiolenance of law
and order" in the in1pugncd order makes Jt ambiguous on iLs Lice and
therefore the order mus. uc held lo b..: bad. No doubt the order also
refers lo pul>J1c safety. llu-l then the qucs:ions arjs·~: What is it that
weighed wuh I.be Dis[rict Magbtralc, U1c apprehension r~garding public
safety or an apprehension regarding mainten~nce of la\v and order?
Was the apprehension entertained by the Dislrict lviagistratc that tho
petitioner, if left at large, v.·as likely to do something which will in1pcril
the mainJenance of public order generally, or was it that he apprehended
that the petitioner's activities may cause di~lurbanccs in a particular Joc;.dilv?
His order, which was the only matcri<1l which could be considered, g:lve
no indication on th09C que::iLions. ·J"ltc cxpr·.::,~ion .. J<.iw <tnd order" docs
not find any place in the rule and is not synonymous wilh "putlic order".
"Law and order" is a comprehensive expression in which wool<l be included
DO! merely public order but mat1ers such as public peace, ira11'1uilliLy,
orderliness in a locality or a local area and pcrhap• olher mailers. [756 H;
757 A, C, D, FJ
Pu Ragbubar Dayal J. (dissenting): The District Magistrale made the
impugned order on his being satisfied that it was necessary to do so \vith
a view to prevent the petitioner from acting in a manner prejudici:il to
public safety and maintenance of public order. The in1pugncd order was
therefore valid and consequently, the petitioner could not move t!1is Court
for the enforcement of his rights under Arts. 21 and :!2 in vie"'· of the
President's Order under A!I . .J59( I). L755 B-CJ
The detaining au:hori-:y is free tu c fahlish tha~ any defect in the
detention order is of forn1 only and 1101 of ~ubs'.ancc, i! being sat!..,fi..!J of
the necessity lo detain the person for a purpose mentioned in r. 30, though
the purpose has been inaccurately s~ate<l in the detention order. ·111e
existence of salisfaction does not depend on \\'har is stared in 1hc order
and can be e;lablishcd by the District Magis:rate by his aftidaviJ. His
omi98ion to refer to "maintenance of public order" docs not mc;in that
be was not so satisfied, especially when his no1e refers to lhc pc!itioner
being at large lo he prejudicial to public safc~y and 1hc 1naintcnance of
public order. The pe?itio:.e;·'s affidavit and rejoinder sho\v lhJt 1hc J)istrict Magislrate was SJ.tisfied of the necc')sity of detaining the pc1ili-Jncr to
prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to rhe public order,
because of the setting of events that happened on that date. "Maintenance of law and order" may be an expression of wider import than "publlo
order", but in the context 1n \\hi1.:h i: \~:1'> use:! i'1 the detention order and
in view of its use gener<?llV, it should he cono;1rued to mean mainten:1nce of
law and order in regard 10 maintenance of public tranquillity. (749 C-D;
750 C-D; 751 C, F-Gl
Sodhi S/wmshu Singh v. State <>I Pepsu, A.LR. I 954 S.C. 276, referred
to.
Even if tho exprcs'iion "maintenance of law and order" in the impugned
order be not construed as referring to ''maintenance of puhlic ('trder.. the
impugned order cannot be said to be invcilid in view of its being made
with a double objective, that is, with the ohje:t of preventing the petitioner
from acting prejudicially to the public safety and the maintenance of law
and order. His satisfaction with respect to anv of the purposes mentioned
in r. 30( I) which would justify his ordering the detention of a person i•
sufficient for the validity of the order. There i.o; no room for ..:on51dering
that he miJ~ht not have passed the order merely with one object in view.
the object being to prevent him from acting prejudicially to public <afety.
It is not a case where his satisfaction \Vas based on two grounds one of
which is irrelevant or non-existent. There docs not appear to he any
re."l.SOn why rhe Dio;;trict \f:1r,istra1c 1,i,1ouid not h;ive paso;;cd the order of
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R. M. LOIDA v. STATE
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(Sarkar, J.)
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dctenlion against the petitioner on the satisfaction that it was necessary to
prevent him from actrng prejudicially to public safety. [752 H; 753 B-D;
754 A-Bl
(iii) Per Sarkar, Hidayatullah, Raghubar Dayal and Bachawat, JJ. :
The delegation was valid.
Per Sarkar J. : In spite of the mistake in the order as to the Notification
delegating the power, evidence could be given to show that the delegation
had in fact been made, because, the mistake did not vitiate the order. To
admit such evidence would not be going behind the face of the order,
becaUBe, what is necessary to appear on the face of the order is the satisfaction of the Authority of the necessity for detention for any of the
reasons mentioned in r. 30(1)(b), and not his authority to make the
order. [721 D, F-G]
Per Hidayatullah, Raghubar Dayal and Bachawat JJ. : There was only
a clerical error in mentioning the wrong notification and being a venial
fault did not vitiate the order of detention. Also, s. 40 ( 2) does not
require the imposition of any conditions but only permits it. [737 F; 738 A;
741 G; 748 DJ
(iv) Per Hidayatullah, Raghubar Dayal and Baohawat, JJ.: There was
nothing \Vrong in the District Magistrate taking a broad view of the peti~
tioner's activities so as to weigh the possible harm if he was not detained.
Such a viewing of tbe activities. of a ~rson before passing the order
against him does not necessarily spell out extra-territoriality. but is really
designed to assess properly the potentiality of danger which is the main
obj<!ct of •he rule to prevent. [737 G-H; 748 DJ
(v) Per Hidayatullah, Raghubar Dayal, Mudholkar and Bachawat, JJ. :
It is not necessary that the appropriate authority should entertain an apprehension that the person to be detained is likely to participate in every one
of the activities referred to in the rule. [739 F; 748 D; 756 Fl
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION :
Writ Petition No. 79 of 1965.
Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
The petitioner appeared in person.
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A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and S. P. Varma, for the respondents.
Sarkar J., Hidayatullah J. (on behalf of himself and Bachawat
J.) and Mudholkar J. delivered separate concurring Judgments.
Raghubar Dayal J. delivered a dissenting Opinion.
Sarkar, J. Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, a member of the Lok
G Sabha, has moved the Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution
for a writ of habeas corpus directing his release from detention
under an order passed by the District Magistrate of Patna. The
order was purported to have been made under r. 30<1) (b) of the
Defence of India Rules, 1962.
Dr. Lohia, who argued his case in person, based his claim to
H be released on a number of grounds. I do not propose to deal
with all these grounds for I have come to the conclusion that he
is entitled to be released on one of them and to the discussion of
714
SUPllBIO COU1T llBPOR.TS
[1966] 1 S.C.R.
that ground alone I will confine my judgment. With regard to his
other grounds I will content myself only with the observation that
as at present advised, I have not been impressed by them.
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The order of detention runs thus : "Whereas I, J. N. Sahu,
District Magistrate, Patna, am satisfied ........ that with a view
to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the II
public safety and the maintenance of law and order, it is necessary
to make an order that he be detained. Now, therefore, in exercise
of the powers conferred by clause <b) of sub-rule ( 1) of rule 30
of the Defence of India Rules, 1962 read with Notification No.
!80/CW ............ I hereby direct that .......... Dr. Ram
Manohar Lohia be arrested ........ and detained in the Central c
Jail Hazaribagh, until further orders." Now the point made by
D1. Lohia is that this order is not in terms of the rule under which
it purports to have been made and, therefore, furnishes no legal
justification for detention. The reason why it is said that the
order is not in tenns of the rule is that the rule does not justify the
detention of a person to prevent him from acting in a manner pre- D
judicial to the maintenance of law and order while the order
directs detention for such purpose. It is admitted that the rule
provides for an order of detention being made to prevent acts
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, but it is said that
public order and law and order are not the same thing. and,
therefore, though an order of detention to prevent acts prejudicial
to public order might be justifiable, a similar order to prevent
acts prejudicial to law and order would not be justified by the
rule. It seems to me that this contention is well founded.
Before proceeding to state my reasons for this view, I have to F
dispose of an argument in bar advanced by the respondent State.
That argument is that the petitioner has, in view of a certain order
of the President to which I will presently refer, no right to move
the Court under Art. 32 for his release. It is said that we cannot, therefore, hear Dr. Lohia's application at all. To appreciate
this contention, certain facts have to be stated and I proceed to G
do so at once.
Article 352 of t.he Constitution gives the President of India
a power to declare by Proclamation that a grave emer1?ency exist.I;
whereby the security of India is threatened inter a/ia by external
aggression. On October 26, 1962, the President issued a Procla11
mation under this article that such an emergency existed. Thi~
presumably was done in view of China's attack on the north eastern
frontiers of India in September 1962. On the same day as the
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Proclamation was made, the President passed the Defence of India
Ordinance and rules were then made thereunder on November 5,
1962. The Ordinance was later, on December 12, 1962, replaced
by the Defence of India Act, 1962 which however continued in
force the rules made under the Ordinance. On November 3, 1962,
the President made an order under Art. 359 ( 1) which he was
entitled to do, declaring "that the right of any person to move any
court for the enforcement of the rights conferred by article 21
and article 22 of the Constitution shall remain suspended for the
period during which the Proclamation ........ is in force, if such
person has been deprived of any such rights under the Defence of
India Ordinance, 1962 or any rule or order made thereunder."
There is no doubt that the reference in this Order to the "Defence
of India Ordinance, 1962" must, after that Ordinance was replaced
by the Act, as earlier stated, be understood as a reference to the
Act : see Mohan Chowdhury v. The Chief Commissioner,
Tripura ( 1 ). I should now state that the Proclamation is still
in force.
It is not in dispute that the present petition has been made for
the enforcement of Dr. Lohia's right to personal liberty under Arts.
21 and 22. These articles in substance-and it should suffice for
the present purpose to say no more-give people a certain personal
E liberty. It is said by the respondent State that the President's
Order under Art. 359 (1) altogether prevents us from entertaining
Dr. Lohia's petition and, therefore, it should be thrown out at
once. This would no doubt, subject to certain exceptions to which
a reference is not necessary for the purposes of the present judgment, be correct if the Order of November 3, 1962 took away
F all rights to personal liberty under Arts. 21 and 22. But this,
the Order does not do. It deprives a person of his right to move
a court for the enforcement of a right to such personal liberty only
when he has been deprived of it by the Defence of India Act-it
is not necessary to refer to the Ordinance any more as it has been
replaced by the Act--or any rule or order made thereunder. If
G he has not been so deprived, the Order does not take away his
right to move a court. Thus if a person is detained under the
Preventive Detention Act, 1950, his right to move the Court for
enforcement of his rights under Arts. 21 and 22 remains intact.
That is not a case in which his right to do so can be said to have
been taken away by the President's Order. This Court has in
H fact heard applications under Art. 32 challenging a detention under
(1) [1964] 3 S.C.R. 442.
716
SUPlll!MB COUllT REPORTS
(1966) I S.C.ll.
that Act : see Rameshwar Shaw v. District Magistrate of Burdwan('). If any person says, as Dr. Lohia does, that he has been
deprived of his personal liberty by an order not made under the
Act or the Rule~. there is nothing in the President's Order under
Art. 359( I) to deprive him of his right to move the Court under
Art. 32. The Court must examine his contention and decide
whether he has b:cn detained under the Act or the Rules and can
only throw out his petition when it finds that he was so detained,
but not before then. If it finds that he was not so detained, it
must proceed to hear his petition on its merits. The right under
Ari. 32 is one of the fundamental rights that the Constitution has
guaranteed to all persons and it cannot be taken away except by
the methods as provided in the Constitution, one of which is by
an order made ur.der Art. 359. The contention that an order
under that article has not taken away the constitutional right to
personal liberty must be examined.
Mr. Verma said that Smith v. East F.l/oe Rural District Counri/(2) supported the contention of the respondent State. I do not
think so. That case turned on an entirely difforent statute. That
statute provided n method of challenging a certain order by which
property was comnulsorily purchased and stated that it could not
be questioned in any other way at all. It was there held that an
action to set aside the order even on the ground of havin!! been
made ma/a fide, did not lie as under the provision no acfion was
maintainable for the r1urrose. That case is of no assistance in
deciding the question in what c;rcumstance a right to move the
court has been taken away by the entirely different provisions that
we have to consider. Herc only a right to move a court in certain
circumstances has been taken away and the question is, has the
court been moved on the present occasion in one of those circumstances ? The President's Order does not bar an enquiry into that
question. Apart from the fact that the reasoning on which the
English case is ba~ed, has no aonlication here, we have clear
observations in judgments of this Court which show that the Order
of the President does not form a bar to all applications for release
from detention under the Act or the Rules. I will refer only to
one of them. Tn Makhan Singh v. The State of Punjab(') it was
said, "If in challenging the validity of his detention order, rhe
detenu is pleading any right outside the rights specified in the
Order, his right to move any court in that behalf is not ~us.oended"
and by way of illustration of this proposition. a case where a
(I) [1964) 4 S.C.R. 921.
(2) [1956) L.R. A.C. 7'6.
(3) (1964) 4 S.CR. 797.
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person was detained in violation of the mandatory vrovisions of
the Defence of India Act was mentioned. That is the present case
as the petitioner contends that the order of detention is not justified
by the Act or Rules and hence is against its provisions. The
petitioner is entitled to be heard and the present contention of the
respondent State must be held to be ill founded and must fail.
I now proceed to consider the merits of Dr. Lohia's contention
that the Order detaining him had not been made under the Defence
of India Rules. I here pause to observe that if it was not so made,
there is no other justification for his detention; none is indeed
advanced. He would then be entitled to his release.
I have already stated that the Proclamation of Emergency was
made as the security of India was threatened by external aggression. That Proclamation of emergency was the justification for
the Act. The Act in fact recited the Proclamation in its preamble. Section 3 of the Act gave the Central Government power to
make rules providing for the detention of persons without trial
for various reasons there mentioned. Rule 30( 1) Cb) under which
the order of detention of Dr. Lohia was made was framed under
s. 3 and is in these terms : "The Central Government or the State
Government, if it is satisfied with respect to any particular person
that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner
prejudicial to the defence of India and civil defence, the public
safety, the maintenance of public order, India's relations with
foreign powers, the maintenance of peaceful conditions in any part
of India, the efficient conduct of military operations or tl>.e maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the community, it is necessary to do so, may make an order-(a) ....... .
(b) directing that he be detained." As I have said earlier, the
order was made by the District Magistrate, Patna, to whom the
power of the Government of the State of Bihar in this regard had
been duly delegated under s. 40(2) of the Act.
Under this rule a Government can make an order of detention
against a person if it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so to
prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial, among other
things, to public safety and the maintenance of public order.
The detention order in this case is based on the ground that it
was necessary to make it to prevent Dr. Lohia from acting in any
manner prejudicial to public safety and the maintenance of law
and order. I will, in discussing the contention of Dr. Lohia,
proceed on the basis as if the order directing detention was only
for preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the
718
SUPllEME C:OUR.T REPOllTS
(1966) 1 S.C.R.
maintenance of law and order. I will consider what effect the A
inclusion in the order of detention of a reference to the necessity
for maintaining public safety has, later. The question is whether
an order could be made legally under the rule for preventing
disturbance of law and order. The rule does not say so. The
order, therefore, would not be in terms of the rule unless it could
be said that the expression "law and order" means the same thing B
as "public order" which occurs in the rule. Could that then
be said ? I find no reason to think so. Many of the things
mentioned in the rule may in a general sense be referable to the
necessity for maintaining law and order. But the rule advisedly
does not use that expression.
c
It is commonplace that words in a statutory provision take
their meaning from the context in which they are used. The
context in the present case is the emergent situation created by
external aggression. It would, therefore, be legitimate to hold
that by maintenance of public order what was meant was prevention of disorder of a grave nature, a disorder which the D
authorities thought was necessary to prevent in view of the
emergent situation. It is conceivable that the expression "maintenance of Jaw and order" occurring in the detention order may
not have been used in the sense of prevention of disorder of a
grave nature. The expression may mean prevention of disorder
of comparatively lesser gravity and of local significance only. To E
take an illustration, if people indulging in the Hindu religious
festivity of Holi become rowdy, prevention of that disturbance
may be called the maintenance of law and order. Such maintenance of law and order wa~ obviously not in the contemplation
of the Rules.
•
F
What the Magistrate making the order exactly had in mind.
by the use of the words law and order, we do not know. Indeed,
we are not entitled to know that for it is well-settled that courts
cannot enquire into the grounds on which the Government
thought that it was satisfied that it was neces.~ary to make an
order of detention. Courts are only entitled to look at the face G
of the order. This was stressed on us by learned counsel for
the respondent State and the authorities fully justify that view.
If. therefore, on its face an order of detention is in terms of the
rule, a court is bound to stay its hands and uphold the order. I
am leaving here out of consideration a contention that an order
good on the face of it is bad for reasons dehors it, for example, 11
because it had been made ma/a fide. Subject to this and other
similar exceptions--to which I have earlier referred and as to
·•
•
R. M. LOHIA v. STATE
(Sarkar, J.)
which it is unnecessary to say anything in the present context
and also because the matter has already been examined by this
Court in a number of cases-a court cannot go behind the face
of the order of detention to determine its validity.
A
'
The satisfaction of the Government which justifies the order
under the rule is a subjective satisfaction. A court cannot
enquire whether grounds existed which would have created that
satisfaction on which alone the order could have been made in
the mind of a reasonable person. If that is so,-and that indeed
is what the respondent State contends,-it seems to me that when
an order is on the face of it not in terms of the rule, a court
c cannot equally enter into an investigation whether the order of
detention was in fact, that is to say, irrespective of what is stated
in it, in terms of the rule. In other words, in such a case the
State cannot be heard to say or prove that the order was in fact
made, for example, to prevent acts prejudicial to public order
which would bring it within the rule though the order does not
D say so. To allow that to be done would be to uphold a detention without a proper order. The rule does not envisage such a
situation. The statements in the affidavit used in the present case
by the respondent State are, therefore, of no avail for establishing that the order of detention is in terms of the rule. The detention was not under the affidavit but under the order. It is of
E some significance to point out that the affidavit sworn by the
District Magistrate who made the order of detention does not say
that by the use of the expression law and order he meant public
order.
B
•
It was said that this was too technical a view of the matter;
there was no charm in words used. I am not persuaded by this
argument. The question is of substance. If a man can be
deprived of his liberty under a rule by the simple process of the
making of a certain order, he can only be so deprived if the
order is in terms of the rule. Strict compliance with the letter
of the rule is the essence of the matter. We are dealing with a
G statute which drastically interferes with the personal liberty of
people, we are dealing with an order behind the face of which a
court is prevented from going. I am not complaining of that.
Circumstances may make it necessary. But it would be legitimate to require in such cases strict observancei of the rules. If
there is any doubt whether the rules have been strictly observed,
H
that doubt must be resolved in favour of the detenu. It is certainly more than doubtful whether law and order means the same
as public order. I am not impressed by the argument that the
F
720
SUPREMB
COUllT RBPORTS
(1966] I S.C.ll.
reference in the detention order to r. 30 (I )(b) shows that by
law and order what was meant was public order. That is a most
mischievous way of approaching the question. If that were
right, a reference to the rule in the order might equally justify all
other errors in it. Indeed it might with almost equal justifica·
tion then be said that a reference to the rule and an order of
detention would be enough. That being so, the only course open
to us is to hold that the rules have not been strictly observed.
If for the purpose of justifying the detention such compliance by
itself is enough, a non-compliance must have a contrary effect.
A
B
Carltona Ltd. v. Commissioners of Works(') is an interesting
case to which reference may be made in this connection. It turned C
on a statutory Regulation empowering a specified authority to
take possession of land for the purposes mentioned in it in
various terms but which renns did not include the expres.sion
"national interest". Under this Regulation possession of cenain
premises of the C'arltona Company was t:iken after serving a
D
notice on it that that was being done "in the national interest".
It was contended by the Carltona Comcany that it had been
illegally deprived of the possession of its premises because the
notice showed that that possession was not heing taken in terms
of the Regularion. This contention failed as it was held that •he
giving of the notice wa< nnt a pre-rcqui~ik to the exercise of the E
powers under the Regulation and that the notice was '10 more
than a notification that the authorities were exercising the powen.
It was said that the notice was useful only as evidence of the
state of the mind of the writer and, that being so, other evidence
was admissible to establish the fact that the possession of the
premises was being taken for the reasons mentioned in the Regu- F
lation. Our case is entirely different. It is not a case of a
notice. Under r. 30(1 )(b) a person can he detained only by
an order and there is no doubt that the order of detention has to
be in writing. It is not a case where the order is only evidence
of the detention having been made under the rule. It is the
only warrant for the detention. The order funher is conclusive G
as to the state of the mind of the person who made it; no evidence
is admissible to prove that state of mind. It seems to me that
if the Car/tona case was concerned with an order which alone
resulted in the dispossession. the decision in that case might well
have been otherwise. I would here remind. to prevent any
possible misconception, that I am not considering a case where H
(!) (!943( 2 All E.R. ~60.
•
•
•
R. M. LOIDA v. STATE (Sarkar, J.)
the order is challenged on the ground of mala fides
similar grounds to which I have earlier referred.
A
721
or other
Before leaving this aspect of the case, it is necessary to refer
to two other things. The first is a mistake appearing in the
order of detention on which some argument was based by Dr.
B Lohia for quashing the order. It will be remembered that the
order mentioned a certain Notification No. 180/CW. The Notification intended to be mentioned however was one No. 1115/CW
and the Notification No. 180/CW had been mentioned by
mistake. It was under Notification No. 1115/CW that the power
of the State Government to make an order of detention was
c delegated to the District Magistrate under the provisions of
s. 40(2) of the Act to which I have earlier referred. The reference to the notification was to indicate the delegation of power.
The Notification actually mentioned in the order did not, however,
contain the necessary delegation. The result was that the order
did not show on its face that the District Magistrate who had
D made it had the necessary authority to do so. This mistake
however did not vitiate the order at all. Nothing in the rules
requires that an order of detention should state that the authority
making it has the power to do so. It may be that an order made
by an authority to whom the Government's power has not been
delegated, is a nullity and the order can be challenged on that
E ground. This may be one of the cases where an order good on
its face may nonetheless be illegal. When the power of the person
making the order is challenged, the only fact to be proved is
that tbe power to make the oraer had been duly delegated to
him. That can be proved by the necessary evidence, that IS,
by the production of the order of delegation. That would be a
F case somewhat like the Carltona case. In spite of the mistake
in the order as to the Notification delegating the power, evidence
can be given to show that the delegation had in tact been made.
To admit such evidence would not be going behind the face of
the order because what is necessary to appear on the face of the
order is the satisfaction of tbe authority of the necessity for the
6 detention for any of the reasons mentioned in r. 30( 1) (b) and not
the authority of the maker of the order.
,
H
'
The second thing to which I wish to refer is that it appeared
from the affidavit sworn by the District Magistrate that prior
to the making of the order, he had recorded a note which ra1i
in these words : "Perused the report of the Senior S. P. Patna for
detention of Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, M.P. under rule 30(1)(b)
of the Defence of India Rules, on the ground that his being at
L8Sup. C. 1./65-3
722
SUPllEMB COU1T UPORTS
(1966) I S.C.R.
large is prejudicial to the public safety and maintenance of public
order. From the report of the Sr. S. P., Patna, I am satisfied
that Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, M.P. aforesaid be detained under
rule 30(1)Cb) of the Defence of India Rules. Accordingly, I
order that Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia be detained ........ " I
am unable to see that this note is of any assistance to the respondent State in this case. It is not the order of detention. The
respondent State does not say that it is. I have earlier stated
that extraneous evidence is not admissible to prove that the rule
has been complied with though the order of detention does not
show that. Indeed, this note does not even say that the District
Magistrate was satisfied that it was necessary to make an order
of detention to prevent Dr. Lohia from acting in a manner prt>
judicial to the maintenance of public order. It only says that the
Superintendent of Police reported that he was so satisfied. The
satisfaction of the Superintendent of Police would provide no
warrant for the detention or the order; with it we have nothing
to do.
A
I
8
c
D
For these reasons, in my view, the detention order if it had
been based only on the ground of prevention of acts prejudicial
to the maintenance of law and order, it would not haTe been
in terms of r. 30( I )(b) and would not have justified the detention. As I have earlier pointed out, however, it also mention< E
as another ground for detention, the prevention of acts prejudicial
to public safety. In so far as it does so, it is clearly within the
rule. Without more, we have to accept an order inade on that
ground as a perfectly legal order. The result then is that the
detention order mentions two grounds one of which is in terms of
the rule while the other is not. What then is the effect of that ? ••
Does it cure the illegality in the order that I have earlier noticed 7
This question is clearly ~ettled by authorities. Jn Shifiban Lal
Saksena v. The State of Uttar Pradl'sh(') it was held that such
an order would be a bad order. the reason being that it could
not be said in what manner and to what extent the valid and
invalid grounds operated on the mind of the authority concerned G
and contributed to the creation of his subjective satisfaction which
formed the basis of the order. Th~ order has. therefore. to be
held illegal though it mentioned a ground on which a legal order
of detention could have been baSl'd. I should also point out that
the District Magistrate has not said in his affidavit that he would H
have been satisfied of the necessity of the detention order only
-------··-(I) [1954) S.C.R. 418.
•
'
R. M. LOHIA v. STATE
A
B
C:
(Hidayatu//ah, J.)
723
for the reason that it was necessary to detain Dr. Lohia to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to public safety.
In the result, in my view, the detentfon order is not under the
Rules. The detention of Dr. Lohia under that order is not
legal and cannot be justified. He is entitled to be set at liberty
and I would order accordingly.
Hidayatullah, J. Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, M.P., has filed this
petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution asking for a writ of
habeas corpus for release from detention ordered by the District
Magistrate, Patna, under Rule 30(1 )(b) of the Defence of India
Rules, 1962. He was arrested at Patna on the night between 9th
and 10th August, 1965. As it will be necessary to refer to the
terms of the order served on him it is reproduced here :
"ORDER
No. 3912C.
E
F
G
H
•
Dated, Patna, the 9th August 1965
Whereas I, J. N. Sahu, District Magistrate, Patna,
am satisfied with respect to the person known as Dr. Ram
Manohar Lohia, Circuit House, Patna, that with a view
to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial
to the public safety and the maintenance of law and
order, it is necessary to make an order that he be
detained.
Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred
by clause (b) of sub-clause (i) of rule 30 of the Defence
of India Rules, 1962, read with Notification No. 180/
CW, dated the 20th March, 1964, of the Government of
Bihar, Political (Special) Department, I hereby direct
that the said Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia be arrested by the
police wherever found and detained in the Central Jail,
Hazaribagh, until further orders.
Sd/- J. N. Sahu,
9-8-1965
District Magistrate, Patna.
Sd/- Ram Manohar Lohia.
10th August-1.40."
Dr. Lohia was lodged in the Hazaribagh Central Jail 'lit 3-30 p.m.
on August IO, 1965. He sent a letter in Hindi together with an
affidavit sworn in the jail to the Chief Justice, which was received
on August 13, 1965, in the Registry of this Court. Although the
petition was somewhat irregular, this Court issued a rule and as
724
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1~66] I S.C'.R.
no objection has been taken on the ground of form we say nothing
more about it.
A
In his affidavit Dr. Lohia stated that he was arrested at midnight on August 9, 1965 and was told that it was on charges of
arson but later was served with the order of detention and that in
this way his arrest for a substantive offence was turned into pre- B
ventive detention~ He further stated that the order of detention
showed that he was to be detained in Bankipur Jail but the n?me
of .the Jail was ~cored out and "Central Jail, Hazaribagh" was
aubstituted which led him to conclude that typed orders of detention were kept ready and that the District Magistrate did not
exercise his mind in each individual case. He contended that his C
detention under Rule 30 (1) (b) was illegal because, according to
him, that rule dealt with prejudicial activities in relation to the
defence of India and civil defence and not with maintenance of
law and ·order of a purely local character. He alleged that the
arrest. was mala fide and malicious; that it was made to prevent
him from participating in the House of the People which was to D
go intp Session from August 16 and particularly to keep him away
from. the. debate on the Kutch Issue. He further alleged that he
had 00;ly addressed a very large gathering in l?atna and had disclosed certain things about thf! Bihar Government which incensed
that Government and caused th~m to retaliate in this manner and
·E
that detention was made to prevent further disclosures by him.
In answer to Dr. Lohia's affidavit two affidavits were filed on
behalf of the respondents. One affidavit, filed by the District
Magistrate, Patna, denied .that there was any malice or ma/a {ides
in the arrest of Dr. Lohia. The District Magistrate stated that
he had received a report from the Senior Superintendent of Police, F
Patna, in regard to the conduct and activities of Dr. Lohia and
after considering the report he had ordered Dr. Lohia's detention
to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the public
llllfety and maintenance of public order. He stated further that
he was fully satisfied that ths forces of disorder "which were sought
to be let loose if not properly controlled would envelop the whole G
of the· State of Bihar and possibly might spread in other parts of
the country which would necessarily affect the problem of external
defence. as well in more ways thah one". He said that the report
of' ~e Senior Superintendent o~ Police, Patna, contained facts
which he considered sufficient fdr taking the said action but he
could not disclose the contents of that report in the public interest. H
He sought to c;:orrect, what he called, a slip in the order passed by
hilil, by stating that notification No. l 1155C, dated 11th August
I
....
R. M. LORIA v. STATE (Hidayatullah, J.)
725
1964, was meant instead of the notification mentioned there. He
stated further that as the disturbance was on a very large scale
it was thought expedient to keep ready typed copies of detention
orders and to make necessary alterations in them to suit individual
cases, at the time of the actual issuance of the orders, and that it
was because of this that the words "Central Jail Hazaribagh" were
B substituted for "Bankipur Jail". He denied that he had not considered the -necessity of detention in each individual case. He
repudiated the charge that the arrest was made at the instance of
Government and affirmed that the action was taken on his own
responsibility and in the discharge of his duty as District Magistrate
and not in consultation with the Central or the State Governments.
C He denied that the arrest and detention were the result of anger
on the part of any or a desire to prevent Dr. Lohia from circulating
any damaging information about Government. The District Magistrate produced an order which, he said, was recorded before the
order of detention. As we shall refer to that order later it is
reproduced here :
A
D
E
F
"9.8.65.
Perused the report of the Senior S.P., Patna, for
detention of Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, M.P., under rule
30(1) (b) of the Defence of India Rules, on the ground
that his being at large is prejudicial to the public safety
and maintenance of public order. From the report of
the Sr. S.P., Patna, I am satisfied that Dr. Ram Manohar
Lohia, M.P., aforesaid be detained under rule 30(l)(b)
of the Defence of India Rules. Accordingly, I order that
Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia be detained under rule
30(l)(b) of the Defence of India Rules read with Notification No. 180/CW dated 20.3.64 in the Hazaribagh
Central Jail until further orders.
Send four copies of the warrant of arrest to the Sr.
S.P., Patna, for immediate compliance. He should return
two copies of it after service on the detenu.
G
Sd/- J. N. Sahu,
District Magistrate, Patna".
H
•
The second affidavit was sworn by Rajpati Singh, Police Inspector attached to the Kotwali Police Station, Patna. He stated in his
affidavit that the order was served on Dr. Lohia at 1-40 A.M. on
August 10, 1965 and not at midnight. He denied that Dr. Lohia
was arrested earlier or that at the time of his arrest, he was informed
726
SUP.UMJI COUIT REPORTS
(1966) l S.C.R.
tliat the arrest was for an offence or offences of arson. He
admitted, however, that he had told him that cases of arson and
loot had taken place. He affinned that there was no charge of
arson aga~t Dr. Lohia.
Dr. Lohia filed a rejoinder affidavit and in that affidavit he
stated that the internal evidence furnished by the order taken with
the counter affidavits disclosed that his arrest and detention were
patently illegal. He pointed out that while Rule 30(1 )(b) provided that detention could be made for the maintenance of public
order, the order stated that Dr. Lohia was arrested for maintenance
of law and order. He characterised the counter affidavits as full
of lies and narrated other facts intending to show that there was a
conspiracy to seal his mouth so that disclosures against the Bihar
Government might not be made. This represents the material on
which the p_rescnt petition is based or opposed.
The petition was argued by Dr. Lohia in person though he was
receiving assistance in constructing his arguments. His contentions
are that he is not being detained under the Defence of India Rules
but arbitrarily; that even if he is being detained under the said
Rules the law has been flagrantly violated; that the order passed
against him is ma/a fide; and that the District Magistrate did not
exercise the delegated power but went outside it in various ways
rendering detention illegal.
A
B
c
D
J
E
On behalf of the State a preliminary objection is raised that
the application itself is incompetent and that by the operation of
Art. 359 read with the President's Order issued under that Article
on November 3, 1962, Dr. Lohia's right to move the Supreme
Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution is taken away during the
period of emergency proclaimed under Art. 352 as long as the
President's Order continues. On merits it is contended on behalf
of the State of Bihar that the petition, if not barred, docs not make
out a case against the legality of the detention; that this Court
cannot consider the question of good faith and that the only
enquiry open to this Court is whether there is or is not an order
under Rule 30(1 )(b) of the D~fence of India Rules 1962. If this G
Court finds that there is such an order the enquiry is closed because
the petition must then be considered as incompetent. The State
Government admits that the words of Rule 30( I )(b) and s. 3 of
the Defence of India Act were not used in the order of detention
H
but contends that maintenance of public order and maintenance
of law and order do not indicate different things and that the area
covered by maintenance of law and order is the same if not smaller
than the area covered by the expression maintenance of public
-
-
R. M. LOHIA v. STATE (Hidayatullah, J.)
727
A order. We shall go into the last contention more elaborately after
dealing with the preliminary objection.
Questions about the right of persons detained under the
Defence of India Rules to move the Court have come up frequently
before this Court and many of the arguments which are raised here
B have already been considered in a series of cases. For example,
it has been ruled in Mohan Choudhury v. Chief Commissioner,
Tripura(') that the right of any person detained under the Defence
of India Rules to move any court for the enforcement of his rights
conferred by Arts. 21 and 22 of the Constitution remains suspended
in view of the President's Order of November 3, 1962. It has
c also been ruled that such a person cannot raise the question that
the Defence of India Act or the Rules are not valid because, if
allowed to do so, that would mean that the petitioner's right to
move the court is intact. Other questions arising from detentions
under the Defence of India Rules were further considered in
Makhan Singh v. The State of Punjab ( 2 ). It is there pointed out
D that, although the right of the detenu to move the Court is taken
away that can only be in cases in which the proper detaining
authority passes a valid order of detention and the order is made
bona fide for the purpose which it professes. It would, therefore,
appear from the latter case that there is an area of enquiry open
before a court will declare that the detenu has lost his right to
E move the court. That area at least embraces an enquiry into
whether there is action by a competent authority and in accordance
with Defence of India Act and the Rules thereunder. Such an
enquiry may not entitle the court to go into the merits of the case
once it is established that proper action has been taken, for the ·
satisfaction is subjective, but till that appears the court is bound
F to enquire into the legality of the detention. It was contended
that Makhan Singh's(') case arose under Art. 226 and that what
is stated there applies only to petitions under that article. This is
a misapprehension. The ruling made no difference between the
Art. 32 and Art. 226 in the matter of the bar created by Art. 359
and the President's Order. What is stated there applies to petitions
for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights whether by way of
Art. 32 or Art. 226.
G
H
Mr. Verma appearing for the State of Bihar, however, contends
that the area of the enquiry cannot embrace anything more than
finding out whether there is an order of detention or not and the
moment such an order, good on its face, is produced all enquiry
into good faith, sufficiency of the reasons or the legality or illegality
(I) (1964] 3 S.C.R. 442.
(2) [1964] 4 S.C.R. 797.
728
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
(1966] I S.C.R.
of the action comes to an end, for to go into such matters is tantamount to allowing the petitioner to move the court which the
President's Order does not permit. He contends that the courts'
power to issue a writ of habeas corp11s in such cases is taken
away as completely as if cl. (2) of Art. 32 made no mention of the
writ of habeas corp11s. According to him, an order under Rule
iO(I )(b) proper on its face, must put an end to enquiry of any
kind. In view of this objection it is necessary to state the exact
result of the President's Order for this has not been laid down
in any earlier decision of this Court.
The President declared a state of grave emergency by issuing
a Proclamation under Art. 352 on October 26, 1962. This
Proclamation of Emergency gave rise to certain extraordinary
powers which are to be found in Part XVIII of the Constitution,
entitled Emergency Provisions. Article 358 suspended the provisions of Art. 19 during the Emergency and Art. 359 permitted
the suspension of the enforcement of the rights conferred by
Part III. That article reads :
A
B
C
D
"359. Suspension of the enforcement of the rights
conferred by Part III during emergencies:
(I ) Where a Proclamation of Emergency is
in operation, the President may by order
declare that the right to move any court
for the enforcement of such of the rights
conferred by Part III as may be mentioned in the order and all proceedings
pending in any court for the enforcement of the rights so mentioned shall
remain suspended for the period during
which the Proclamation is in force or for
such shorter period as may be specified in
the order.
(2) An order made as aforesaid may extend
to the whole or any part of the territory
of India.
(3} Every order made under clause (I) shall,
as soon as may be after it is made, be laid
before each House of Parliament."
The President issued an order on November 3, 1962.
The Order reads :
E
....
G
II
R. M. LOHIA v. STATE
A
B
c
(Hidayatullah, J.)
729
"ORDER
New Delhi, the 3rd November, 1962.
G.S.R. 1454.-In exercise of the powers conferred
by clause ( 1) of article 359 of the Constitution, the
President hereby declares that the right of any person to
move any court for the enforcement of the rights conferred by article 21 and article 22 of the Constitution
shall remain suspended for the period during which the
Proclamation of Emergency issued under clause ( 1) of
article 352 thereof on the 26th October, 1962, is in
force, if such person has been deprived of any such rights
under the Defence of India Ordinance, 1962 ( 4 of
1962) or any rule or order made thereunder.
No. F. 4/62-Poll(Spl.)
V. VISWANATHAN, Secy."
As a result of the above Order the right of any person to move
any court for the rights conferred by Arts. 21 and 22 of the
Constitution remains suspended, if such person is deprived of any
such rights under the Defence of India Ordinance 1962 (now the
Defence of India Act, 1962) or any rule or order made thereunder. No doubt, as the article under which the President's
E Order was passed and also that Order say, the right to move
the court is taken away but that is in respect of a right conferred
on any person by Arts. 21 and 22 and provided such
person is deprived of the right under the Defence of India Ordinance (now the Act) or any rule or order made thereunder. Two
things stand forth. The first is that only the enforcement in a
F court of law of rights conferred by Arts. 21 and 22 is suspended
and the second is that the deprivation must be under the Defence
of India Ordinance (now the Act) or any rule or order made
thereunder. The word "thereunder" shows that the authority of
the Defence of India Act must be made out in each case whether
the deprivation is by rule or order.
G
It, therefore, becomes necessary to inquire what are the rights
which are so affected ? This can only be found out by looking
into the content of the Arts. 21 and 22. Article 21 lays down
that no person is to be deprived of his life or personal liberty
except according to procedure established by Jaw. This article
thinks in terms of the ordinary laws which govern our society when
B there is no declaration of emergency and which are enacted subject
to the provisions of the Constitution including the Chapter on
Fundamental Rights but other than those made under the powers
D
730
SUPRJ!MB COURT llBPORTS
(1966) I S.C.IL
conferred by the Emergency Provisions in Part XVIII. When the A
President suspended the operation of Art. 21 he took away from
any person dealt with under the terms of his Order, the right to
plead in a court of law that he was being deprived of his life and
personal liberty otherwise than according to the procedure established by the laws of the country. In other words, he could not
invoke the procedure established by ordinary law. But the President B
did not make lawless actions lawful. He only took away the fundamental right in Art. 21 in respect of a person proceeded against
under the Defence of India Act or any rule or order made thereunder. Thus a person so proceeded could not claim to be tried under
the ordinary law or bring an action under the ordinary law. But to
be able to say that the right to move the court for the enforce- c
ment of rights under Art. 21 is suspended, it is necessary to establish that such person has been deprived of any such right under
the Defence of India Act or any rule or order made thereunder,
that is to say, under the authority of the Act. The action of the
authorities empowered by the Defence of India Act is not completely shielded from the scrutiny of courts. The scrutiny with D
reference to procedure established by laws other than the Defence
of India Act is, of course, shut out but an enquiry whether the
action is justified under the Defence of India Act itself is not
shut out. Thus the State Government or the District Magistrate
cannot add a clause of their own to the Defence of India Act or
E
even the Rules and take action under that clause. Just as action
is limited in its extent, by the power conferred, so also the power
to move the court is curtailed only when there is strict compliance
with the Defence of India Act and the Rules. The Court will not
enquire whether any other law is not followed or breached but the
Court will enquire whether the Defence of India Act or the Rules ~·
have been obeyed or not. That part of the enquiry and consequently the right of a person to move the court to have that enquiry
made, is not affected.
The President's Order next refers to Art. 22. That Article
creates protection against illegal arrest and detention. Clause (I)
confers some rights on the person arrested. Clause (2) lays down G
the procedure which must be followed after an arrest is made.
By cl. ( 3) the first two clauses do not apply to an alien enemy or
to a person arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive detention. Clauses (4), (5), (6) and (7) provide for the
procedure for dealing with persons arrested or detained under any
H
law providing for preventive detention, and lay down the minimum
or compulsory requirements. The provisions of Art. 22 would
have applied to arrest and detentions under the Defence of India
R. M. LORIA v. STATE (Hidayatul/ah, J.)
A
'
,
731
Act also if the President's Order had not taken away from such a
person the right to move any court to enforce the protection of
Art. 22.
The net result of the President's Order is to stop all claims to
enforce rights arising from laws other than the Defence of India
B Act and the Rules and the provisions of Art. 22 at variance with
the Defence of India Act and the Rules are of no avail. But the
President's Order does not say that even if a person is proceeded
against in breach of the Defence of India Act or the Rules he
cannot move the court to complain that the Act and the Rules,
under colour of which some action is taken, do not warrant it.
c It was thus that this Court questioned detention orders by Additional District Magistrates who were not authorised to make them
or detentions of persons who were already in detention after conviction or otherwise for such a long period that detention orders
served could have had no relation to the requirements of the
Defence of India Act or the Rules. Some of these cases arose
D under Art. 226 of the Constitution but in considering the bar of
Art. 359 read with the President's Order, there is no difference
between a petition under that article and a petition under Art. 32.
It follows, therefore, that this Court acting under Art. 32 on a
petition for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus, may not allow
claims based on other laws or on the protection of Art. 22, but
E it may not and, indeed, must not, allow breaches of the Defence
of India Act or the Rules to go unquestioned. The President's
Order neither says so nor is there any such intendment.
There is, however, another aspect which needs to be mentioned
here. That is the question of want of good faith on the part of
those who take action and whether such a plea can be raised.
F
This topic was dealt with in Makhan Singh's case('). At page
828 the following observation is to be found : "Take also a case where the detenu moves the court
for a writ of Habeas Corpus on the ground that his detention has been ordered ma/a fide. It is hardly necessary
G
to emphasise that the exercise of a power ma/a fide is
wholly outside the scope of the Act conferring the power
and can always be successfully challenged. It is true
that a mere allegation that the detention is mala fide
would not be enough; the detenu will have to prove the
mala fides. But if the mala fides are alleged, the detenu
H
cannot be precluded from substantiating his plea on the
ground of the bar created by Art. 359 ( 1) and the Presi(I) [1964] 4 S.C.R. 797.
732
SUPllEMB COURT
REPORTS
(1966] I S.C.R.
dential Order. That is another kind of pica which is outside the purview of Art. 359( I)."
Mr. Verma, however, contends on the authority of Smith v.
East Elloe Rural District Cormical & Others( 1 ) that the validity
of the orders under the Defence of India Rules I 962 cannot be
challenged on the ground of bad faith when the action is otherwise proper. That case dealt with the Acquisition of Land
(Authorization Procedure) Act 1946 (9 & 10 Geo 6 Ch. 49).
Paragraph 15(1) of Part IV of Schedule to that Act provided:
"If any perso11 aggrieved by a compulsory purchase
order desires to question the validity thereof. ... on the
ground that the authorization of a compulsory purchase
thereby granted is not empowered to be granted under
this A~t. ..... he may, within six weeks from the date
on which notice of the confirmation or making of the
order ...... is first published ...... make an application
to the High Court ........ ".
The appellant more than six weeks after the notice had been published brought an action, claiming inter a/ia that the order was
made and confirmed wrongfully and in bad faith on the part of
the clerk. Paragraph 16 of that Act provided :
"Subject to the provisions of the last foregoing paragraph, a compulsory purchase order ...... shall not
...... be questioned in any legal proceeding what-
A
B
I>
•
;
E
soever . ..... ".
The House of Lords (by majority) held that the jurisdiction of
the court was ousted in such wis-e that even questions of bad faith
could not be raised. Viscount Simonds regretted that it should be
so, but giving effect to the language of paragraph 16, held that
even an allegation of bad faith was within the bar of Paragraph 16.
Lord Morton of Henryton, Lord Reid and Lord Somervill of
Harrow were of opinion that Paragraph 15 gave no such opportunity. Lord Radcliffe dissented.
The cited case can have no relevana: here because the statute
provided for ouster of courts' jurisdiction in very different circumstances. Although this Court has already stated that allegations
of bad faith can be considered, it may be added that where statutory powers arc conferred to take drastic action against the lifo
and liberty of a citizen, those who exercise it may not depart from
the purpose. Vast powers in the public interest are granted but
under strict conditions. If a person, under colour of exercising
(!) [1956! A.C. 736.
F
..
G
II
R. M. LOHIA v. STATE (Hidayatullah, J.)
A
B
c
D
,
E
G
J
ll
7 33
the statutory power, acts from some improper or ulterior motive,
he acts in bad faith. The action of the authority is capable of
being viewed in two ways. Where power is misused but there is
good faith the act is only ultra vires but where the misuse of
power is in bad faith there is added to the ultra vires character of
the act, another vitiating circumstance. Courts have always acted
to restrain a misuse of statutory power and the more readily when
improper motives underlie it. The misuse may arise from a breach
of the law conferring the power or from an abuse of the power
in bad faith. In either case the courts can be moved for we do
not think that Art. 359 or the President's Order were intended to
condone an illegitimate enforcement of the Defence of India Act.
We now proceed to examine the contentions of Dr. Lohia by
which he claims to be entitled to have the order of the District
Magistrate set aside. It is convenient to begin with the allegation
of want of good faith. Dr. Lohia alleges that there was a conspiracy
between the Central Government, the State of Bihar, the Senior
Superintendent of Police and the District Magistrate, Patna, to
stifle his disclosures against the Bihar Government, the Chief
Minister and others. He also alleges that he was arrested for a
substantive offence under the Indian Penal Code but the
arrest has been converted into preventive detention to avoid proof
in a court of law. He says that he was about to leave Patna and
if the train was not late he would have gone away and he hints
that his detention was made to prevent him from taking
part in the Session of Parliament. The District Magistrate and the
Inspector of Police deny these allegations. The District Magistrate
has given the background of events in which he made the order on
his responsibility. On reading the affidavits on both sides, we are
statisfied that the contentions of Dr. Lohia are ill-founded and
that the order of detention was made by the. District Magistrate in
good faith.
There is no dispute that the District Magistrate was duly authorized to act under Rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules, 1962.
Dr. Lobia, however, says that the order is in flagrant disregard of
the requirements of the Defence of India Act, 1962 and the Rules.
For this purpose he bases his argument on three circumstances :
(i) that the District Magistrate acted outside his jurisdiction as created by Notification No. 11155-C
dated 11-8-1964 published in the Bihar Gazette
Extra dated August 11, 1964;
(ii) that the District Magistrate's order is defective
because be purports to derive power from notifica-
734
SUPUMB
CO~T
llEPOllTS
(1966) 1 S.C.R.
tion No. I 80 of March 20, 1964 which had been
rescinded; and
(iii) the District Magistrate purports to act to maintain law and order when he can only act to maintain
public order under the Defence of India Act and the
Rules thereunder.
A
}I
We shall now consider these grounds of objection. Before we do
so we may read the provisions of the Defence of India Act and the
Rules to which reference may be necessary.
The first part of the Defence of India Act we wish to read is
the long title and the preamble. They arc :
c
"An Act to provide for special measures to ensure
the public safety and interest, the defence of India and
civil defence and for the trial of certain offences and for
matters connected therewith.
D
WHEREAS the President bas declared by Proclamation under clause (I ) of article 352 of the Constitution
that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of
India is threatened by external aggression;
AND WHEREAS it is necessary to provide for
special measures to ensure the public safety and interest,
the defence of India and civil defence and for the trial
of certain. offences and for matters connected therewith;
•
E
"
We may next read section 3 which confers power to make rules :
F
"3. Power to make rules.
(I ) The Central Government may, by notification
in the Official Gazette, make such rules as appear to it
necessary or expedient for securing the defence of India
and civil defence, the public safety, the maintenance of
public order or the efficient conduct of military operations, or for maintaining supplies and services essential to
the life of the communitj."
Then by way of illustration and without prejudice to the generality
of the powers conferred hy sub-s. ( 1), certain specific things are
mentioned for which provision may be made by rules. Clause 15
provide1;
;
G
'
II
R. M. LORIA v. STATE (Hidayatullah, J.)
-
A
B
c
D
735
"(15) Notwithstanding anything in any other law
for the time being in force,(i) the apprehension and detention in custody of
any person whom the authority empowered by the rules
to apprehend or detain (the authority empowered to
detain not being lower in rank than that of a District
Magistrate) suspects, on grounds appearing to that
authority to be reasonable, of being of hostile origin or of
having acted, acting, being about to act or being likely to
act in a manner prejudicial to the defence of India and
civil defence, the security of the State, the public safety
or interest, the maintenance of public order, India's relations with foreign States, the maintenance of peaceful
conditions in any part or area of India or the efficient
conduct of military operations, or with respect to whom
that authority is satisfied that his apprehension and detention are necessary for the purpose of preventing him from
acting in any such prejudicial manner,
(ii) the prohibition of such person from entering or
residing or remaining in any area,
E
(iii),' the compelling of such person to reside and
remain in any area, or to do or abstain from doing anything, and
(iv) the review of orders of detention passed in
pursuance of any rule made under sub-clause ( 1) ;"
F
We need not trouble ourselves with the other clauses. Section 44
next provides :
"44. Ordinary avocations of life to be interfered with
as little as possible.
•
G
Any authority or person acting in pursuance of thi~
Act shall interfere with the ordinary avocations of life
and the enjoyment of property as little as may be consonant with the purpose of ensuring the public safety and
interest and the defence of India and civil defence."
H
By virtue of the powers conferred by s. 3 of the Defence of
India Ordinance, 1962 (now the Act), the Defence of India Rules
1962 were framed. Part IV of these Rules is headed "Restriction
of Movements and Activities of Persons" and it consists of Rules
25-30, 30-A, 30-B and 31-34. These rules provide for various
SUPREME
736
COURT REPORTS
(1966) I S.C.R.
subjects such as "Entering enemy territory" (Rule 25), "Entering
India" (Rule 26), "Information to be supplied by persons entering
India" (Ruic 27) or "Leaving India" (Rule 28), "Regulation of
Movement of Persons within India" (Rule 29), "Powers of photographing etc. of suspected person" (Rule 31 ), "Control and
winding up of certain organisations" (Rule 32), provisions for
"Persons captured as prisoners" (Rule 33) and "Change of name
by citizens of India" (Rule 34). We are really not concerned with
these rules but the headings are mc.ntioned to consider the argument of Dr. Labia on No. (I) above. Rule 30 with which we
are primarily concerned consists of eight sub-rules_ We are concerned only with sub-rule (I). That rule reads :
A
B
c
"30. Restriction of movements of suspected persons,
restriction orders and detention orders.( I ) The Central Government or the State Government, if ii is satisfied with respect to any particular
person that with a view lo preventing him from acting in
any manner prejudicial to the defence of India and civil
dcfenc~. the public safety, the maintenance of public
order, India's relations with foreign powers, the maintenance of peaceful conditions in any part of India, the
efficient conduct of military operations or the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the
community, it is necessary so to do, may make an
order-
D
(a)
(b) directing that he be detained;
F
"
Under s. 40 ( 2) of the Defence of India Act, the State Government may by order direct that the powers conferred by the Rules
may be exercised by any officer or authority in such circumstances
and under such conditions as may be specified in the direction. A
special limitation was indicated in s. 3 (15) of the Act, where
authority is given for making rules in connection with the apprehension and detention in custody of persons, that the delegation should
not be made to an officer below the rank of a District Magistrate.
By virtue of these various powers the State Government issued
a notification on March 20, 1964 authorising all District Magistrates to exercise the powers of Government under Rule 30( 1) (b).
G
'
H
•
•
R. M. LORIA v. STATE (Hidayatullah, 1.)
A
B
c
737
That notification was later rescinded by another notification issued
on June 5, 1964. A fresh notification (No. 11155-C) was issued
on August 11, 1964. This was necessary because of a mistake
in the first notification. The new notification reads :
"No. 11155-C.-In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section ( 40) the Defence of
India Act, 1962 (Act 51 of 1962), the Governor ot
Bihar is pleased to direct that the powers exercisable by
the State Government under clause (b) of sub-rule ( 1)
of rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, shall
be exercised by all District Magistrates within their respective jurisdictions.
By order of the Governor of Bihar
M. K. Mukharji
Secretary to Government".
D
Dr. Lohia contends that the District Magistrate in his affidavit
"says that he apprehended danger not only in his district but in
the whole of Bihar State and even outside and hence he bas not
acted within his jurisdiction. His argument attempts to make out,
what we may call, an exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction on
t: the part of the District Magistrate. He contends also that the
notifications are bad because although the Defence of India Act
contemplates the imposition of conditions, none were imposed and
no circumstances for the exercise of power were specified. In our
judgment, none of these arguments can be accepted.
F
•
Section 40(2) of the Act does not require the imposition of
any conditions but only permits it. This is apparent from the
words "if any" in the sub-section. The only condition that the
Sta_!~ Government thought necessary to impose is that the District
Magistrates must act within their respective juris~ictions. It cannot be said that this condition was not complied with. Dr. Lobia
G was in the Patna District at the time. There was nothing wrong if
the District Magistrate took a broad view of bis activities so as
to weigh the possible harm if he was not detained. Such a viewing of the activities of .a person before passing the order against
him does not necessarily spell out extraterritoriality in the sense
suggested but is really designed to assess properly the potentiality
H of danger which is the main object of the rule to prevent. We
find nothing wrong with the order on the score of jurisdiction and
argument No. (i) stated above must fail. Argument No. (ii) is
LSSup. C. & J./65-4
738
IVPRDB CX>UaT UPOll.TS
(1966) I S.C.IL
oot of any substance. There was a clerical error in mentioning
the notification and the error did not vitiate the order of detention.
A
This brings us to the last contention of Dr. Lohia and that is
the most serious of all. He points out that the District Magistrate
purports to detain him with a view to preventing him from acting
in any manner prejudicial to the public safety and the maintenance
of law and order and argues that the District Magistrate had misunderstood his own powers which were to prevent acts prejudicial
to public order and, therefore, the detention is illegal. On the other
side, Mr. Verma contends that the Act and the Rules speak of public order which is a concept much wider in content than the conoept of Jaw and order and includes the latter, and whatever is done
in furtherance of law and order must necessarily be in furtherance
of public order. Much debate took place on the meaning of the
two expressions. Alternatively, the State of Bihar contends that
the order passed by the District Magistrate prior to the issue of the
actual order of detention made use of the phrase "maintenance of
public order" and the affidavit which the District Magistrate swore
in support of the return also uses that phrase and, therefore, tho
District Magistrate was aware of what his powers were and did
exercise them correctly and in accordance with the Defence of
India Act and the Rules. We shall now consider the rival conten-
tions.
8
c
o
E
The Defence of India Act and the Rules speak of the conditions
under which preventive detention under the Act can be ordered.
In its Jong title and the preamble the Defence of India Act speaks
of the necessity to provide for special measures to ensure public
safety and interest, the defence of India and civil defence. Tho F
expressions public safety and interest between them indicate the
range of action for maintaining security, peace and tranquillity of
India whereas the expressions defence of India and civil defence
connote defence of India and its people against aggression from
outside and action of persons within the country. These generic
terms were used because the Act seeks to provide for a congeries G
of action of which preventive detention is just a small part. In
conferring power to make rules, s. 3 of the Defence of India Act
enlarges upon the terms of the preamble by specification of details.
It speaks of defence of India and civil defence and public safety
without change but it expands the idea of public interest into H
"maintenance of public order, the efficient conduct of military
operations and maintaining of supplies and services essential to tho
life of the community". Then it mentions by way of illustratioa in
R. M. LOHIA v. STATE (Hidayatu/lah, /.)
7 3!>
A cL ( 15) of the same section the power of apprehension and detention in custody of any person whom the authority empowered by
the rules to apprehend or detain (the authority empowered to detain
not being lower in rank than that of a District Magistrate), suspects, on grounds appearing to that authority to be reasonable : B
(a) of being of hostile origin; or
(b) of having acted, acting or being about to act or being
likely to act in a manner prejudicial to-(i) the defence of India and civil defence;
c
(ii) the security of the State;
(iii) the public safety or interest;
(iv) the maintenance of public order;
(v) India's relations with foreign states;
D
(vi) the maintenance of peaceful conditions in any
part or area of India; or
(vii) the efficient conduct of military operations.
It will thus appear that security of the state, public safety or interest,
maintenance of public order and the maintenance of peaceful conditions in any part or area of India may be viewed separately even
though strictly one clause may have an effect or bearing on another.
Then follows rule 30, which repeats the above conditions and permits detention of any person with a view to preventing him from
acting in any of the above ways. The argument of Dr. Lohia that
F the conditions are to be cumulatively applied is clearly untenable.
It is not necessary to analyse rule 30 which we quoted earlier and
which follows the scheme of section 3 ( 15 ) . The question is whether by taking power to prevent Dr. Lohia from acting to the prejudice of "law and order" as against "public order" the District
Magistrate went outside his powers.
E
-·
G
B
The subject of preventive detention has been discussed almost
threadbare and one can hardly venture in any direction without
coming face to face with rulings of courts. These cases are now
legion. It may be taken as settled that the satisfaction of the detaining authority cannot be subjected to objective tests, that the
courts are not to exercise appellate powers over such authorities
and that an order proper on its face, passed by a competent authority in good faith is a complete answer to a petition such as this.
740
SUPREMB COUil? llEPORTS
[1966) l S.C.L
The rulings in our country adopt this approach as do the English A
Courts. In England one reason given for the adoption of this
approach was that the power was entrusted to the Home Secretary
and to the Home Se1:retary alone. In India courts are ordinarily
satisfied on the production of a proper order of detention made in
good faith by an authority duly authorised and have not enquired
further even though the power is exercised by thousands of officers B
subordinate to the Central and State Governments as their delegates. When from the order itself circumstances appear which
raise a doubt whether the officer concerned had not misconceived
his own powers, there is need to pause and enquire. This is more
so when the exercise of power is at the lowest level permissible
under the Defence of India Act. The enquiry then is not with a C
view to investigate the sufficiency of the materials but into the
officer's notions of his power, for it cannot be conceived for a
moment that even if the court did not concern itself about tho
sufficiency or otherwise of the materials on which action is taken,
it would, on proof from the order itself that the officer did not rea0
lise the extent of his own powers, not question the action. The
order of detention is the authority for detention. That is all which
the detenu or the court can see. It discloses how the District
Magistrate viewed the activity of the detenu and what the District
Magistrate intended to prevent happening. If the order passed by
him shows that he thought that his powers were more extensive E
than they actually were, the order might fail to be a good order.
The District Magistrate here acte{I to maintain law and order
and not public order. There are only two pos.~ibilities: (i) that
there was a slip in preparing the order, or (ii) that maintenance
of law and order was in the mind of the District Magistrate and
he thought it meant the same thing as maintenance of public order. F
As to the first it may be stated at once that the District Magistrate
did not specify it as such in his affidavit. He filed an earlier order
by him in which he had used the words "public order" and which
we have quoted earlier. That order did not refer to his own state
of the mind but to the report of the Senior Superintendent of
Police. In his affidavit he mentioned "public order" again but did G
not say that the words "law and order" in his order detaining
Dr. Lohia were a slip. He corrected the error about the notification but naively let pass the other, and more material error, without any remark. Before us every effort possible was made to reconcile "public order" with "law and order" as, indeed, by a pr<>- H
cess of paraphrasing, it is possible to raise an air of similitude between them. Such similitude is possible to raise even between phrases as dissimilar as "for preventing breach of the peace", "in the
R. M. LOIUA v. STATE (Hidayatullah, J.)
741
interest of the QUblic", "for protecting the interests of a class of
persons'', "for administrative reasons" and "for maintaining Jaw
and order". We cannot go by similitude. If public order connotes
something different from law and order even though there may be
some common territory between them then obviously the District
Magistrate might have traversed ground not within "public order".
B It would then not do to say that the action is referrable to one
power rather than the other, just as easily as one reconciles diverse
phrases by a gloss. When the liberty of the citizen is put within the
reach of authority and the scrutiny from courts is barred, the
action must comply not only with the substantive requirements of
the Jaw but also with those forms which alone can indicate that
c the substance has been complied with. It is, therefore, necessary
to examine critically, the order which mentioned "law and order"
with a view to ascertaining whether the District Magistrate did not
act outside his powers.
A
Before we do so we find it necessary to deal with an argument
of Mr. Shastri who followed Mr. Verma. He contends that there
is no magic in using the formula of the Act and Rules for the
language of the Act and the Rules can be quoted mechanically.
We regret such an attitude. The President in his Order takes away
the fundamental rights under Arts. 21 and 22 from a person provided he has been detained under the Defence of India Act or the
E rules made thereunder. The Order is strict against the citizen but
it is also strict against the authority. . There can be no toleration
of a pretence of using the Defence of India Act. The President's
Order itself creates protection against things such as arbitrariness,
misunderstood powers, mistake of identity by making his order
apply only to cases where the detention is under the Act or the
F rules thereunder. No doubt, what matters is the substance but the
form discloses the approach of the detaining authority to the serious question and the error in the form raises the enquiry about the
substance. It is not every error in the order which will start such
an enquiry. We have paid no attention to the error in the reference
G to the notification because that may well be a slip, and power and
jurisdiction is referrable to the notification under which they would
have validity. The other is not such a veneal fault. It opens the
door to enquiry what did the District Magistrate conceive to be
his powers?
D
;
H
In proceeding to discuss this question we may consider a
decision of the Court of Appeal in England in Carltona Ltd. v.
Commissioners of Works and Others( 1 ). Curiously enough it was
I. [1943] 2 All. E.R. 560.
742
IUPUlO COUlT IEPOR.TS
(1966] 1 s.ca.
brought to our notice by Dr. Lohia and not by the other side. That A
case arose under Regulation 51(1) of the Defence (General)
Regulations in England during the last World War. The Regulation read:
"A competent authority, if it appears to that authority to be necessary or expedient so to do in the interes!3
of the public safety, the defence of the realm or the
efficient prosecution of the war, or for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community,
may take possession of any land, and may give such
directions as appear to the competent authority to be
necessary or expedient in connection with the taking of
possession of that land."
B
C
There was an order against Carltona Ltd. by the Colnmissioncr of
Works requisitioning the factory. The order read :
"I have to inform you that the department have come
to the conclusion that it is essential, in the national interest, to take possession of the above premises occup~
by you."
It was objected on behalf of the Company that the mind was not
directed to any one of the various heads mentioned in the Regulation which were put in the alternative. Lord Greene, M.R. speaking on behalf of Lord Goddard (then Lord Justice) and Lord du
Parcq (then Lord Justice) observed :
"It was said that it was the duty of the person acting
in the capacity of 'a competent authority' to examine the
facts of the case and consider under which, if any, of
those various heads the matter came, and it is said that
the assistant secretary did nothing of the kind. It is to
be observed that those heads arc not mutually exclusive
heads at all. They overlap at every point and maDJ
matters will fall under two or more of them, or under
all four. I read the evidence as meaning that the assistant secretary, seeing quite clearly that the case with
which he was dealing and the need that he wished to
satisfy was one which came under the regulation, did not
aolemnly sit down and ask himself whether it was for the
efficient prosecution of the war that this storage was
required for maintaining supplies and services essential
to the life of the community. He took the view that it
was required either for all those purposes, or, at any
D
E
F
G
H
IL M. LOHIA v. STATE (Hidayatullah, J.)
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
•
H
•
H3
rate, for some of them, and I must confess it seems to me
that it would have been a waste of time on the facts of
this case for anyone seriously to sit down and ask himself under which particular head the case fell. He regarded it, as I interpret his evidence, as falling under all tho
heads, and that may very well be having regard to the
facts that these heads overlap in the way that I have
mentioned. It seems to me, therefore, that there is no
substance in that point, and his evidence makes it quite
clear that he did bring his mind to bear on the question
whether it appeared to him to be necessary or expedient
to requisition this property for the purposes named, or
some of them."
The case is distinguishable on more than one ground. To
begin with, it dealt with an entirely different situation and different provision of law. No order in writing specifying satisfaction
on any or all of the grounds was required. Detention under Regulation 18-B required an order just as detention under the Defence
of India Act. The distinction between action under Regulation 51
and that under Regulation 18-B was noticed by the Court of
Appeal in Point of Ayr Collieries Ltd. v. Lloyd-George('). It is
manifest that when property was requisitioned it would have been
a futile exercise to determine whether the act promoted the efficient
prosecution of the war, or the maintaining of supplies and services. But when a person is apprehended and detained it may
be necessary to set out with some accuracy what he did or was
likely to do within the provisions of Rule 30, to merit the detention. The use of one phrase meaning a different thing in place of
that required by the Act would not do, unless tho phrase imported
means the same thing as the phrase in the Act. Here the phraJe
used is niaintenance of Jaw and order and we must see how that
phrase fits into the Rule which speaks of maintenance of "public
order". The words "public order" were considered on some
previous occasions in this Court and the observations made then>
are used to prove that maintenance of public order is tho same
thing as maintenance of law and order. We shall refer to some
of these observations before we discuss the two phrases in the
context of the Defence of India Rules.
Reliance is first placed upon a decision of tho Federal Court in
Lakhi Narayan Das v. Province of Bihar( 2 ) where the Court
dealing with item 1 of Provincial List, 7th Schedule in the Government of India Act, 1935 which readI. (1943] 2 All. B.R. 546 at 548.
2. (1949] P.C.R. 693 at 104.
744
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1966] l S.C.R.
"Public order (but not including the use of His
Majesty's naval, military or air forces in aid of the civil
power)"
observed that "Public Order" with which that item began was "a
most comprehensive term''. Referenc~ is also made to Ramesh
Thapar v. State of Madras(') where this Court dealing with the
same subject matter also observed :
" .... 'Public order' is an expression of wide connotation and signifies that state of tranquillity which
prevails among the members of a political society as a
result of internal regulations enforced by the Government which they have established ...... it must be
taken that 'public safety' is used as a part of the wider
concept of public order ...... "
and referring to Entry 3 in List HI (Concurrent List) of the 7th
Schedule of the Constitution which includes the "security of a
State" and "maintenance of public order" as distinct topics of
legislation, observed" ...... The Constitution thus requires a line to be
drawn in the field of public order or tranquillity, marking off, may be, roughly, the boundary between those
serious and aggravat~d forms of public disorder which
are calculated to endanger the security of the State and
the relatively minor breaches of the peace of a purely
local significance, treating for this purpose differences
in degree a~ if they were differences in kind."
Fazl Ali J. took a different view which he had expressed more
fully in Brijbhushan and Another v. the State of Delhi(') but he
also observed that "public safety" had, as a result of a long course
of legislative practice, acquired a well r.~cognised meaning and
was taken to denote safety or security of the State and that the
expression "public order" was wide enough to cover small disturbances of the peace which do not jeopardise the security of the
State and paraphrased the words "public order" as public tranquillity."
A
'
B
C
D
E
F
G
Both the aspects of the matter were again before this Court in
The Superintendent Central Prison, Fatehgarh v. Ram Manohar
Lohia( 1 ) when dealing with the word',ng of clause (2) of Art 19
as amended by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, it
2. [1950J S.C.R. 605.
I. [1950] S.C.R. SP3 al 598.
3. [1960] 2 S.C.R. 821.
•
H
•
R. M. LOHL\ v. STATE (Hidayatu/lah,
J.)
745,
fell to be decided what "public order" meant. Subba Rao J. speaking for the Court referred to all earlier rulings and quoting from.
them came to the conclusion that "public order" was equated with.
public peace and safety and said :
" ...... Presumably in an attempt to get over the
effect of these two decisions, the expression "public
B
order" was inserted in Art. 19 ( 2) of the Constitution by
the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, with a
view to bring in offences involving breach of purely local
significance within the scope of Art. 19 ........ ".
A
C
-
D
Summing up the position as he gathered from the earlier cases, the
learned Judge observed :
" ...... "Public order" is synonymous with public
safety and tranquillity: it is the absence of disorder involving breaches of local significance in contradistinction to national upheavals, such as revolution, civil strife,
war, affecting the security of the State; ...... ".
These observations determine the meaning of the words.
"public order" in contradistinction to expressions such as "public
safety", "security of the State". They were made in different contexts. The first three cases dealt with the meaning in the legislalative Lists as to which, it is settled, we must give as large a meanE ing as possible. In the last case the meaning of "public order"
was given in relation to the necessity for amending the Constitution as a result of the pronouncements of this Court. The context in which the words were used was different, the occasion was
different and the object in sight was different.
We have here a case of detention under Rule 30 of the Defence
of India Rules which permits apprehension and detention of a
person likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of
public order. It follows that if such a person is not detained public
disorder is the apprehended result. Disorder is no doubt prevented by the maintenance of law and order also but disorder is a
G broad spectrum which includes at one end small disturbances and
at the other the most serious and cataclysmic happenings. Does
the expression "public order" take in every kind of disorder or cnly
some ? The answer to this serves to distinguish "public
order" from "law and order" because the latter undoubtedly takes
in all of them. Public order if disturbed, must lead to public
H disorder. Every breach of the peace does not lead to public disorder. When two drunkards quarrel and fight there is disorder
but not public disorder. They can be dealt with under the powers
1<'
•
7'6
IUPUJO CX>Vl.T UPOllTS
(1966) l S.c.&.
to maintain law and order but cannot be detained on the ground
that they were disturbing public order. Suppose that the two
fighters were of rival communities and one of them tried to raise
communal passions. The problem is still one of law and order
but it raises the apprehension of public disorder. Other examples
can be imagined. The contravention of Jaw always affects order
but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the
community or the public at large. A mere disturbance of law
and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for
action under the Defence of India Act but disturbances which
subvert the public order are. A District Magistrate is entitled
to take action under Rule 30(1 )(b) to prevent subversion of
public order but not in aid of maintenance of law and order under
ordinary circumstances.
It will thus appear that just as "public order" in the rulings of
this Court (earlier cited) was said to comprehend disorders of !cm
gravity than those affecting "security of State", "law and order"
also comprehends disorders of less gravity than those affecting
"public order". One has to imagine three concentric circles. Law
and order represents the largest circle within which is the next
circle representing public order and the smallest circle represenb
security of State. It is then easy to :;ee that an act may affect law
and order but not public order just as an act may affect public
order but not security of the State. By using the expression "maintenance of law and order" the District Magistrate was widening his
own field of action and was adding a clause to the Defence of
India Rules.
A
B
("
-
D
•:
We do not know the material on which the District Magistrate
acted. If we could examine the reasons we may be able to say F
whether the action can still be said to fall within the other topic
public safety_ That enquiry is not open to us. If we looked into
the matter from that angle we would be acting outside our powen.
The order on its face shows two reasons. There is nothing tD
show that one purpose was considered to be more essential than
the other. We are not, therefore, certain that the District Mag»- G
trate was influenced by one consideration and not both. The order
of detention is a warrant which authorises action. Affidavits hardly improve the order as it is. If there is allegation of bad faith
they can be seen to determine the question of good faith. If mistaken identity is alleged we can satisfy ourselves about the identitJ.
II
But if action is taken to maintain law and order insTead of maintaining public order, there is room to think that the powers were
misconceived and if there is such a fundamental error then the
•
\
R. M. LOHIA Y. STATB (Dayal, I.)
747
A action remains vulnerable. It will not be possible to say that
although maintenance of law and order were specified, what was
considered was the problem of maintenance of public order. The
error is an error of a fundamental character and unlike quoting a
wrong notification. It is thus apparent why on.e error in the order
of detention is admitted but not the other, and why with elaborate
B arguments it is attempted to establish that "public order" involves
elements more numerous than "law and order" where, in fact, the
truth is the other way.
It may be mentioned that Dr. Lohia claimed that the satisfaction of the President under Art. 359 is open to scrutiny of the
C court. We have not allowed him to argue this point which is now
concluded by rulings of this Court.
In our judgment the order of the District Magistrate exceeded
his powers. He proposed to act to maintain law and- order and the
order cannot now be read differently even if there is an affidavit
D the other way. We have pondered deeply over this case. The
action of the District Magistrate was entirely his own. He was,
no doubt, facing a law and order problem but he could deal with
such a problem through the ordinary law of the land and not by
means of the Defence of India Act and the Rules. His powers
were limited to' taking action to maintain public order. He could
E not run the law and order problems in his District by taking
recourse to the provisions for detention under the Defence of India
Act. If he thought in terms of "public order" he should have
said so in the order or explained how the error arose. He does
neither. If the needs of public order demand action a proper order
should be passed. The detention must, therefore, be declared to
F be outside the Defence of India Act, 1962 and the Rules made
thereunder. Dr. Lohia is entitled to be released from custody and
we order accordingly.
Raghubar Dayal, J. In this writ petition Dr. Lohia challenges
G the validity of the order made by the District Magistrate, Patna,
dated August 9, 1965, under cl. (b) of sub·r. (1) of r. 30 of the
Defence of India Rules, 1962, hereinafter called the Rules. This
order is as follows :
•
H
"Whereas I, J. N. Sahu, District Magistrate, Patna,
am satisfied with respect to the person known as Dr. Ram
Manohar Lohia, Circuit House, Patna that with a view
to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial
to the public safety and the maintenance of law and
148
SUPllEMB COlJlT llBPOllTS
(1966] 1 S.C.R.
order, it is necessary to make an order that he be detained.
Now, therefore, in the exercise of the powers conferred by clause (b) of sub-rule ( l) of rule 30 of tho
Defence of India Rules, 1962 read with Notification
No. 180/CW dated the 20th March I 964 of the Govt.
of Bihar, Political (Special) D;:partment, I hereby
direct that the said Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia be arrested by the police wherever found and detained in the
Central Jail Hazaribagh, until further orders."
If this order is valid, Dr. Lohia cannot move this Court for
the enforcement of h;s rights conferred by arts. 21 and 22 of the
Constitution, in view of the Order of the Pre;ident dated November 3, I 962, in the exercise of powers conferred on him by cl. (I)
of art. 359 of the Constitution.
B
C
Dr. Lohia has challenged the validity of this order on several
grounds. I agree with the views expressed by Hidayatullah J., D
about all the contentions except one. That contention is that the
appropriate authority is not empowered to order detention with a
view to prevent a person from acting in any way prejudicial to the
maintenance of law and order. It is urged that though the District
Magistrate could order the detention of the petitioner with a view
to prevent him from acting in any way prejudical to the public E
safety and the maintenance of public order, he could not order
detention with a view to prevent the petitioner from acting prejudicially to the public safety and maintenance of law and order, as
the latter object, being not synonymous with the object of preventing him from acting prejudicial to public order, is outside the purview of the provisions of r. 30( I) of the rules and that, therefore,
the entire order is bad. I do not agree with this contention.
Under r. 30(1)(b), the District Magistrate could have made
the order of detention with respect to Dr. Lohia if he was satisfied
that he be detained with a view to prevent him from acting in any
manner prejudicial to public safety or maintenance of public order. G
Such satisfaction is subjective and not objective. The Court cannot investigate about the adequacy of the reasons which led to his
satisfaction. The Court can, however, investigate whether he
exercised the power under r. 30 honestly and bona fide or not i.e.,
whether he ordered detention on being satisfied as required by
r. 30. What is crucial for the validity of the detention order is such H
satisfaction and not the form in which the detention order is framed.
A detenu can question the validity of the detention order-valid
•
•
ll., M. LOHJA r. STATE (Dayal, /.)
'
-
749
A
on its face--on various grounds including that of mala {ides. The
onus will be on him to prove mala (ides. He can .-question the
validity of the detention order on the same ground when, on its
face, it appears to be invalid. In such a case the onus will be on
the detaining authority to establish that it was made bona fide.
B
An order is made mala fide when it is not made for the purpose
laid down in the Act or the rules and is made for an extraneous purpose. The contention of the petitioner to the effect that the detention order cannot be made on the satisfaction of the detaining
authority that it is necessary to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order, in effect,
amounts to the contention that it is made mala fide.
c
The detaining authority is free to establish that any defect in
the detention order is of form only and not of substance, it being
satisfied of the necessity to detain the person for a purpose mentioned in r. 30 though the purpose has been inaccurately stated in
D the detention order. The existence of the satisfaction required
by r. 30 does not depend on what is said in the detention order,
and can be established by the District Magistrate by his affidavit.
We have therefore to examine whether the District Magistrate was
really satisfied about the necessity to detain Dr. LOhia with a view
to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to public safety
E and maintenance of public order.
•
,
The impugned order was passed under r. 30( I )(b) of the
rules. The District Magistrate decided to detain the appellant
with two objects, firstly, to prevent him from acting in any way
prejudicial to public safety and, secondly, to prevent him from
F acting in any way prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order.
The District Magistrate has--even in the absence of any such
contention as under discussion and which was raised after the filing
of the District Magistrate's affidavit-said that having regard to,
inter alia, the circumstances which were developing in Patna on
August 9, 1965, he was fully satisfied, in view of the report made
G by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Patna, in regard to Dr.
Lohia's conduct and activities, that it was necessary to direct that
he be detained in order to prevent him from acting further in any
manner prejudicial to the p~•blic safety and maintenance of public
order. There is no reason to disbelieve his statement. His original
order, set out below, bears out this statement of his in his later
H affidavit :
"Perused the report of the Senior S. P. Patna for
detention of Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, M.P. under rule
75U
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1966] l S.C.R.
30(l)(b) of the Defence of India Rules, on the ground
that his being at large is prejudicial to the public safety
and maintenance of public order. From the report of
the Sr. S. P., Patna, I am satisfied that Dr. Ram Manohar
Lohia, M.P., aforesaid, be detained under rule 30 ( l)
(b) of the Defence of India Rules. Accordingly, I order
that Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia be detained under rule 30
( 1 )(b) of the Defence of India Rules read with Notification No. 180/CW dated 20-3-64 in the ilazaribagh
Central Jail until further orders."
A
,
B
-
'The District Magistrate's omission to repeat in the second sentence
111here he speaks of his satisfaction that Dr. Lohia be detained with C
a view to preventing him from acting prejudicially to the public
safety and maintenance of public order, does not mean that he
was not so satisfied when the earlier sentence makes reference to
the report of the Senior Superintendent of Polico for detaining
Dr. Lohia on the ground of his being at large to be prejudicial to
public safety and maintenance of public order.
0
The District Magistrate referred, in para 3 of his affidavit, to
his satisfaction that the forces of disorder which were sought to be
let loose, if not properly controlled, would envelop the whole State
of Bihar and possibly might spread in other parts of the country
which would necessarily affect the probrem of external defence as II
well in more ways than one. The possibilities of such force1 of
disorder spreading to other parts of the country satisfied him with
the necessity of taking immediate action to neutralize those forces.
It appears from his statements in paras 6 and 7 of the same affi.
davit that actual disturbances took place at Patna that day and
that he had to operate from the Control Room. In para 9 Ii. F
atates that the action taken against Dr. Lohia was purely for the
purpose of maintenance of public peace in the circlllilltances
stated by him earlier.
In his rejoinder affidavit Dr. Lohia states with reference to the
alleged forces of disorder referred to by the District Magiatrate
that even if he was promoting what the executive would call
'forces of disorder', he was doing so not with a view to impair the
defences of the country but further to strengthen them, that the
various allegations made against him were extraneous to the
scope and purpose of the legislative provisions of the proclamations of emergency which had no rational relationship to the
circumstances which were developing in Patna on August 9,
1965.
G
•
H
•
B.. M. LOIDA v. STATE (Dayal, /.)
A
•
•
B
751
Even in his original affidavit Dr. Lohia stated in para
that:
6
"It is also revealing to note that after the evenis of
the 9th August for which responsibility should have
been sought to be fixed either through trial or enquiry,
on me or Government or anybody else, I addressed a
crowd of nearly a lakh for over an hour after seven in
the evening."
The setting of the events that appear to have happe11ed at Pa~
on August 9, 1965 further bear out the statement of the Distnct
C Magistrate that he was satisfied of the necessity to detain Dr.
Lohia in order to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial
to public order.
Further, the exr-ression 'maintenance of law and order' is not
used in cl. ( 1) of r. 30. The corresponding expression used
therein is 'maintenance of public order'. The two expressions are
D not much different. The expression 'public order' has been construed by this Court in a few cases, the latest of them being The
Superintendent, Central Prison, Fatehgarh v. Ram Manohar
Lohia( 1 ) wherein it was said at p. 839 :
•
•
•
•
" 'Public order' is synonymous with public safety
and tranquillity: it is the absence of disorder involving
breaches of local significance in contradistinction to
national upheavals, such as revolution, civil strife, war,
affecting the security of the State."
The expression 'maintenance of law and order' would cover
F 'maintenance of public safety and tranquillity'. If may be, as
urged for the petitioner, an expression of wider import than
public order but, in the context in which it is used in the detention order and in view of its use generally, it should be construed
to mean maintenance of law and order in regard to the maintenance of public tranquillity. It is not usually used merely with
G reference to enforcement of law by the agency of the State pros&
curing offenders against any of the numerous laws enacted for the
purposes of a well-regulated society. Simple and ostensibly
minor incidents at times lead to widespread disturbance8 allecting
public safety and tranquillity.
H
Reference may be made to the case reported as Sodhi Shamlher Singh v. State of Pepsu( 1 ). In that case certain persons wen:
J. [1960] 2 C.S.R.821.
2. A.I.It .1954 S.e. 275.
752
SUPREME
COURT
llEPORTS
(1966] l S.C.IL
detained under an order under s. 3 (1) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, on grounds which, in substance, were that one of
them had published certain pamphlets whose circulation, in the
opinion of the Government, tended to encourage the Sikhs to
resort to acts of lawlessness and plunge the Hindus into a feeling
of utter frustration and discouragement and consequently to make
them take the law into their hands for the redress of their grievances. Section 3 (I) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950,
reads:
A
•
B
f
"The Central Government or the State Government may( a) if satisfied with respect to any person that with
a view to preventing him from acting in any
manner prejudicial to-( i) the defence of India, the relations of India
with foreign powers, or the security of
India, or
(ii) the security of the State or the maintenance
of public order, or
(iii) ....
C
D
(b) .... , make an order directing that such person
be detained."
This Court used the expression 'maintenance of law and order' in
place of 'maintenance of public order' used ins. 3(l)(a)(ii) at
three places in paras 4 and 5 of the judgment. I do not refer to
these to show that the Court has construed the expression 'maintenance of public order' as 'maintenance of law and order' but
to reinforce my view that the expression 'maintenance of law and
F
order' is generally used for 'maintenance of public safety and
tranquillity' which is covered by the expression 'public order'.
When this Court used this expression in place of 'maintenance of
public order' I cannot conclude, as urged by the petitioner, that
the District Magistrate's using the expression 'maintenance of law
and order' in place of 'maintenance of public order' is any indi- G
cation of the fact that he had not applied his mind to the requirements of the provisions of r. 30( 1) or had not actually come to
the conclusion that it was necessary to detain Dr. Lohia with a
view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order.
If the expression 'maintenance of Jaw and order' in the impugned order be not construed as referring to 'maintenance of
public order' the impugned order cannot be said to be invalid in
•
•
II
•
R. M. LOHIA v. STATE (Dayal, /.)
753
view of it being made with a double objective, i.e., with the object
of preventing Dr. Lohia from acting prejudicially to the public safety and from acting prejudicially to the maintenance of law
and order. If the District Magistrate was satisfied, as the impugned order and the affidavit of the District Magistrate show
that he was satisfied that it was necessary to detain Dr. Lohia
B with a view to preventing him from acting prejudicially to public
safety, that itself would have justified his passing the impugned
order. His satisfaction with respect to any of the purposes mentioned in r. 30 ( 1) which would justify his ordering the detention
of a person is sufficient for the validity of the order. There is no
c room for considering that he might not have passed the impugned
order merely with one object in view, the object being to
prevent Dr. Lohia from acting prejudicially to public safety. The
entire circumstances in which the order has been made and which
I have referred to earli.er, point to that.
A
\
The question before us is not really at par with the question
that arose in Ramesh Thappar v. State of Madras('). In that
case the provisions impugned were those of a statute whose language authorised the passing of orders which could be constitutional in certain circumstances and unconstitutional in others. In
such a context, it was said that where a law purports to authorize
the imposition of restrictions on a fundamental right in language
E wide enough to cover restrictions both within and without the
limits of constitutionally permissible legislative action affecting
such right, it is not possible to uphold it even so far as it may be
applied within the constitutional limits, as it is not severable; so
long as the possibility of its being applied for purpoes not sanctioned by the Constitution cannot be ruled out, it must be held
F to be wholly unconstitutional and void. It was so held as, otherwise, the orders passed for purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution would have been in accordance with the law held valid.
The validity of the orders passed under a valid law-the Defence
of India Act and the rules have to be assumed to be valid-deG pends on their being made by the appropriate authority in accordance with the law empowering it to pass the orders.
D
•
H
The question before us is also not at par with the question
which often arises in construing the validity of detention orders
passed under the Preventive Detention Act for the reason that
some of the grounds for the satisfaction of the appropriate authority were irrelevant or non-existent. The presence of such grounds
raised the question whether the remaining good grounds would
t. [1950! S.C.R. 594.
L8Sup. C. & 1./65-S
754
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
[1966] I S.C.R.
have led the authority to the requisite subjective satisfaction for
ordering detention. In the present case, however, the question is
different. The question is whether the District Magistrate would
have made the order of detention on his satisfaction merely to the
effect that it was necessary to detain Dr. Lohia with a view to
prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to public safety.
It is not that his satisfaction is based on two grounds, one of
which is irrelevant or non-existent.
Even in such cases, this Court has held in Dwarka Da.J
State of J & K('):
I
B
v.
"The principle underlying all these decisions is this.
Where power is vested in a statutory authority to deprive the liberty of a subject on its subjective satisfaction with reference to specified matters, if that satisfaction is stated to be based on a number of grounds
or for a variety of reasons, all taken together, and if
some out of them are found to be non-existent or irrelevant, the very exercis~ of that power is bad. That is
so because the matter being one for subjective satisfaction, it must be properly based on all the reasons
on which it purports to be baszd. If some out" of
them are found to be non-existent or irrelevant, the
Coi:rt cannot predicate what the subjective satisfaction
of the said authority would have been on the exclusion of those grounds or reasons. To uphold the
validity of such an order in spite of the invalidity of
some of the reasons or grounds would be to substitute
the objective standards of the Court for the subjective
satisfaction of the statutory authority. In applying
these principles, however, the Court must be satisfied
that the vague or irrelevant grounds are such as, if
excluded, might reasonably have affected the subjective satisfaction of the appropriate authority. It is not
merely because some ground or reason of a comparatively unessential nature is defective that such an order
based on subjective satisfaction can be held to be invalid."
As stated earlier, there does not appear to be any reason why
the District Magistrate would not have passed the order of detention against Dr. Lohia on his satisfaction that it was necessary to
prevent him from acting prejudicially to public safety. On such
t. A.l.R. 19S7 S.C. 164, 168.
A
c
D
G
•
II
R. M. LOffiA v. STATE (Mudho/kar, l.)
755
A satisfaction, it was incumbent on him to pass the order and he
must have passed it.
I am therefore of opinion that the District Magistrate made
the impugned detention order on his being satisfied that it was
necessary to do so with a view to prevent Dr. Lohia from acting
B in a manner prejudicial to public safety and maintenance of
public order and that the impugned order is valid. Consequently,
Dr. Lohia cannot move this Court for the enforcement of llis
rights under arts. 21 and 22 of the Constitution in view cf the
President's Order under art. 359 ( 1) of the Constitution. I would
dismiss this petition.
Mudholkar, J. I agree that the petition of Dr. Ram Manohar
Lohia under Art. 32 of the Constitution be granted and would
briefly indicate my reasons for granting it.
•
•
At the outset I shall consider an objection of Mr. S. P. Vanna
on behalf of the State as to the tenability of the petition. The objecD tion is two-fold. In the first place, according to him, in view of
the Proclamation made by the President under Art. 359 this Court
has no jurisdiction to entertain it. In the second place his contention is that the order of detention made against the petitioner
being one under the Defence of India Rules, he cannot challenge
E the validity of his detention thereunder in any court. In support of
these contentions Mr. Varma relies on the decision of this Court
in Mohan Choudhury v. Chief Commissioner, Trip11ra (' ). In that
case this Court has, while holding that the right of a person whose
detention has been ordered under the Defence of India Rules to
move any court for the enforcement of his rights under Art. 21
F of the Constitution is suspended during the continuance of the
cmeregency declared by the President by a Proclamation under
Art. 352, held that the powers conferred on this Court by Art. 32
of the Constitution are not suspended. It is true that where a
person has been detained under the Defence of India Rules he
cannot move this Court under Art. 32 for the enforcement of
his
right under Art. 21 and so there will be no occasion for this
G
Court to exercise its powers under that article in such a case. But
what would be the position in a case where an order for detention
purporting to be made under the Defence of India Rules was itself
one which was beyond the scope of the Rules ? For, before an
entry into the portals of this Court can be denied to detenu he
H must be shown an order under r. 30(1) of the Defence of India
Rules made by a competent authority stating that it is satisfied
1. [1964] 3 S.C.R. 442.
7S6
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
(1966] I S.C.R.
that the detenu is likely to indulge in activities which will be prejudicial to one or more of the matters referred to in the rule. If
the detenu contends that the order, though it purports to be under
r. 30( I) of the Rules, was not competently made, this Court has
the detenu contends that the order. though it purports to be under
order if the Court finds that it was not competently made or was
ambiguous it must exercise its powers under Art. 32 of the Constitution, entertain his petition thereunder and make an appropriate
order.
A
,
B
In this case the District Magistrate, Patna purported to make
an order under r. 30 ( I ) of the Defence of India Rules. The State
has placed on record copies of two orders : one is said to have been
c
recorded by the District Magistrate on his file and another which
was served on Dr. Lohia. We are not concerned with the former
because the operative order must be the one served on the detenu.
The District Magistrate may well keep the former in the drawer
of bis table or alter it as often as he likes. It cannot, therefore, be
regarded as anything more than a draft order. The order which n
ftnally emerged from him and was served on the detenu would
thus be the only one which matters. The grounds for detention
given in the latter order arc that Dr. Lohia's being at large is prejudicial to public safety and maintenance of law and order. Under
r. 30( I) an order of detention of a person can be made "with a
view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to E
the defence ·of India and civil defence, public safety, the maintenance of public order, India's relations with foreign powers, the
maintenance of peaceful conditions in any part of India, the
efficient conduct of military operations or the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the community". I find
it difficult to accept Dr. Lohia's argument that the appropriate F
authority must entertain an apprehension that the person to be detained is likely to participate in every one of the activities referred
to in the rule. To accept it would be, apart from making a departure from the rules of grammar, (for doing which no valid grounds
exist), making not only the rule in question but also s. 3 of the Defence of India Act where similar language is used almost ineffective. G
What has, however, to be considered is his other argument. The
question posed by the argument is whether an authority competent
to make an order under the aforesaid provision can make such an
order on the ground that the authority feels it necessary to prevent
a person from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance
of law and order. The expression "law and order" does not find fl
any place in the rule and is not synonymous with "public order".
It seems to me that "law and order" is a comprehensive expression
•
R. M. LOIDA v. STATE (Mudholkar, J.)
A
'
B
c
D
E
F
G
757
in which would be included not merely public order, but matters
i;uch as public peace, tranquillity, orderliness in a locality or a
local area and perhaps some other matters. "Public order" is
something distinct from order or orderliness in a local area. Under
r. 30( 1) no power is conferred upon that authority to detain a
person on the ground that it is necessary so to do in order to prevent that person from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of order in a local area. What is it that the District Magistrate, Patna had in mind when he ordered the detention of the
petitioner ? Was the apprehension entertained by the District
Magistrate that Dr. Lohia, if left at large, was likely to do something which will imperil the maintenance of public order generally
or was it that he apprehended that Dr. Lohia's activities may cause
disturbances in a particular locality? There is thus an ambiguity
on the face of the order and, therefore, the order must be held to
be bad. No doubt, the order also refers to the apprehension felt
by the District Magistrate about Dr. Lohia's acting in a manner
prejudicial to public safety. But then the question arises, what is
it that weighed with the District Magistrate, the apprehension regarding public safety or an apprehension regarding the maintenance
of law and order ? Again, would the District Magistrate have
made the order solely on the ground that he felt apprehension regarding the maintenance of public safety because of the activities
in which he thought Dr. Lohia might indulge ? It could well be
that upon the material before him the District Magistrate would
have refrained from making an order under r. 30 solely upon the
first ground. Or on the other hand he would have made the order
solely upon that ground. His order, however, which is the only
material on the basis of which we can properly consider the matter
gives no indication that the District Magistrate would have been
prepared to make it only upon the ground relating to public safety.
In the circumstances I agree with my brethren Sarkar and Hidaya~
tullah that the order of detention cannot be sustained. I have not
referred to any decisions because they have already been dealt with
fully in the judgments of my learned brethren. In the result,
therefore, I allow the petition and direct that Dr. Lohia be set at
liberty.
ORDER
H
In view of the majority opinion, we allow the Petition and order
that the petitioner be set at liberty.
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